Transcription
Okay, so back in May 2024, I made three predictions. And I made these predictions when nobody believed me. When people were laughing at me, when my own students were looking at me like I had lost my mind.
My first prediction was that Donald Trump would win the 2024 election. My second um prediction was that Donald Trump, once he became president, would start a war with Iran. And my third prediction, the one that shocked everyone the most, was that the United States would lose that war. And in losing that war, the world would never be the same again. Okay?
So now it's 2026. Trump won, the war started, and now people are starting to realize that maybe, just maybe, the third prediction is also coming true. So today, I do not want to talk about the past. I do not want to say, "I told you so." That is not interesting. What is interesting, what I think you really need to understand, is what comes next.
Because here is the thing, I did not make those predictions by guessing. I did not flip a coin. I did not read tea leaves. I made those predictions because I understand how history works. I understand the patterns. I understand the game theory. And those same patterns, those same structural forces, are telling me very clearly what is going to happen next.
So today, I want to share with you my next predictions. And I want to explain to you exactly why I believe they will come true. Not as prophecy, not as entertainment, but as serious structural analysis based on history and game theory. Okay? So, let's begin.
But first, before I give you the predictions, I need to explain to you why the first three predictions were right. Because if you don't understand why they were right, you won't understand why the next predictions will also be right. Okay, so think about this. Why did I know Trump would go to war with Iran? The simple answer is this: America had no choice.
Now, most people hear that and they say, "Wait, what do you mean America had no choice?" America is the most powerful country in the world. America has more weapons than anyone. America can do whatever it wants. And that is exactly the wrong way to think about it. Let me give you an analogy. Think about a drug addict. Okay, a drug addict has one goal, and that goal is to get the next fix. Not because they want to, not because they are choosing to, but because if they don't, if they stop, their whole system collapses. Their body shuts down. They cannot function.
America is addicted to something, and that something is called the petro dollar. Here is how it works. Since 1973, all oil in the world has been traded in US dollars. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, everyone. You want to buy oil, you need dollars. This means the entire world must hold dollars. This means the entire world must buy American debt, American treasury bonds. And this is what finances the American empire. This is how America pays for its military, its government, its lifestyle. The whole thing is one giant Ponzi scheme held together by oil traded in dollars.
Now, in February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Okay? Why does this matter? Because when Russia invaded Ukraine, something happened that had never happened before. Russia, Iran, and China, three of the most powerful countries in the world, started moving closer together. They started trading in currencies that were not the dollar. They started building a Eurasian trade system that did not need American ships, did not need American banks, did not need American permission. And this is the existential threat to America. Not because Russia, Iran, and China are going to attack America, but because if the world stops needing dollars, the entire American financial system collapses overnight. The Ponzi scheme ends, and America can no longer afford its empire.
So America had to act. It had to break this alliance. And the weakest link, the most vulnerable member of this alliance, was Iran. Iran was already sanctioned. Iran was already isolated. And Iran controlled the Strait of Hormuz, which is the most important choke point in global energy. If America could take out Iran, it could cut China off from Middle Eastern energy. It could reestablish petro dollar dominance. It could survive. That is why the war happened. Not because Trump is crazy, not because Netanyahu pushed him. Those are just details. The structural reason, the real reason, is that the American Empire had no choice. The drug addict needed its fix. Okay, does that make sense? Good. Let's keep going.
Now, why did I know America would lose? Okay, so let me explain something about how wars actually work. Because most people think about war the wrong way. They think war is about who has the biggest guns, who has the most planes, who has the most money. And that is completely wrong. Let me give you another analogy. Okay, think about a school fight. In this school, there is a big bully. The bully is the biggest kid in school. He's got muscles. He's got a group of friends. He's got a reputation for being dangerous.
Now, one day a new kid arrives at school. Smaller kid, doesn't look very impressive. And the bully decides he's going to put this new kid in his place. Now, who wins this fight? Most people say the bully wins because the bully is bigger, stronger, more experienced. But here is what most people miss. The bully has something to lose. The bully has a reputation. If the bully fights the new kid and it doesn't go perfectly, if the new kid lands a punch, if the fight goes longer than expected, if the bully gets tired, the bully looks weak, his reputation suffers, and his whole power in the school is based on that reputation.
The new kid has nothing to lose. For the new kid, every punch he lands is a victory. Every day he survives is a victory. The longer the fight goes on, the worse it looks for the bully, and the better it looks for the new kid. This is exactly the dynamic between America and Iran.
America went into this war expecting Iran to fold immediately. They expected shock and awe, massive bombing, decapitation of the leadership. And then Iran calls uncle, unconditional surrender, done in two weeks, maybe three. That is what they planned for. That is the only plan they had. And that plan failed on day one because Iran did not fold. Iran did not call uncle. Iran shot back. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz. Iran attacked American bases across the Gulf. Iran fired missiles at Israel. Iran launched drones, cheap drones, $50,000 drones that flew over American bases and destroyed helicopters worth tens of millions of dollars.
And here's the math that changes everything. Okay. The Americans are using interceptor missiles to shoot down Iranian drones and missiles. These interceptors cost anywhere from $3 million to $10 million each. The Iranian drones they are trying to shoot down cost $50,000 each. Do you understand what I'm saying? America is spending 60 times more money to defend itself than Iran is spending to attack. And Iran can produce drones faster than America can produce interceptors. This is not a fight America can win by spending more money. The more money America spends, the faster it loses.
And this is Iran's strategy. This has always been Iran's strategy. They are not trying to defeat America in a single battle. They are trying to bleed America slowly. Every dollar America spends that Iran does not have to spend, that is an Iranian victory. Every week this war continues without America achieving regime change, that is an Iranian victory. Time is on Iran's side. Time is destroying America.
Okay. So now I want to get to the real point of today's lecture. Because now that you understand why predictions one, two, and three were correct, I want to tell you what comes next. I have three new predictions. Let me walk you through each one very carefully.
My first new prediction is this: America will send ground troops into Iran. And this will be the biggest strategic mistake in American history since Vietnam. Now, let me explain the logic here. Because some of you might say, "Wait, I thought the point was that the air campaign is failing. If the air campaign is failing, why would they escalate to ground troops? Wouldn't that make things worse?" Yes, it will make things worse. That is exactly why they will do it.
Here is what you have to understand about the American decision-making process right now. America went in with one plan: Bomb Iran, force a surrender. The plan failed. Now what? If you are a rational actor, if you can step back and say, "Okay, this is not working. Let's try something different," then you might negotiate. You might find an exit. You might cut your losses. But America cannot do that. And why? Because of something called hubris. Because the American leadership cannot admit that the plan failed. Cannot admit that Iran has not surrendered. Cannot say publicly, "We made a mistake. This war is not going well. Let's find a different path." So instead, what they do is they double down. They escalate. They say, "Okay, the bombing is not working, so let's do more bombing." And when that doesn't work, they say, "Okay, let's send in ground troops."
The scenario that follows a direct American ground invasion of Iran would be fundamentally different from the wars the United States fought in Iraq or Afghanistan. Iran is not a small, isolated battlefield surrounded by weak institutions and fractured command structures. It is a vast civilization state with nearly 90 million people, a deeply rooted national identity, and geography specifically suited for defensive warfare. Unlike the open deserts of Iraq in 2003, Iran is dominated by mountain ranges, hardened tunnels, underground military infrastructure, and terrain designed by nature itself to exhaust invading armies. For more than two decades, Iranian military planners have anticipated the possibility of a western invasion. Their doctrine has never depended on defeating the United States in a conventional head-to-head confrontation. Instead, it has focused on attrition, asymmetry, endurance, and the ability to impose unbearable costs over time.
The moment American ground troops enter Iranian territory, the battlefield would likely expand far beyond Iran itself. Iran's strategy has always been regional, not merely national. Iran's network of allied militias and partner organizations across the Middle East gives it the ability to transform one war into multiple simultaneous crises. Forces aligned with Iran in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria could activate in parallel, creating pressure points against American interests and allied governments throughout the region. Supply lines, oil infrastructure, shipping routes, and military installations in places such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia could suddenly become vulnerable from several directions at once. Instead of fighting one centralized front, the United States could find itself drawn into a sprawling regional conflict where every base, convoy, and maritime corridor becomes contested territory. This is the strategic danger many analysts believe Washington underestimates.
In modern warfare, victory is not simply determined by battlefield superiority. It is determined by sustainability. Iran's objective would not necessarily be to destroy the United States militarily. Rather, its objective would be to make the war so expensive, so politically divisive, and so psychologically draining that the United States eventually loses the will to continue. History has shown that even the strongest empires struggle when they enter conflicts that consume vast resources without producing clear victories. Vietnam demonstrated this. Afghanistan demonstrated it again. Iran's military doctrine appears built around extending that same principle to an even larger scale.
The economic consequences of such a conflict could become severe very quickly. The Persian Gulf remains one of the most critical energy corridors on Earth. Any disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would immediately affect global oil prices. Energy costs would rise, transportation expenses would increase, and inflationary pressures could spread across international markets. Fertilizer production, food distribution chains, manufacturing, and global shipping networks would all feel the impact. In the United States, ordinary citizens could begin experiencing the effects not only through headlines, but through rising grocery prices, higher fuel costs, declining investment markets, and economic instability at home. Wars become politically dangerous when citizens begin to associate them directly with declining living standards.
This is where the conflict could evolve from a foreign policy crisis into a domestic political crisis inside America itself. The United States is already deeply polarized politically, economically, and culturally. Confidence in institutions has weakened over many years. Congress struggles to achieve consensus on even basic fiscal matters. Public trust in media, government agencies, and political leadership continues to decline across ideological lines. In such an environment, a prolonged and costly war could deepen internal fractures dramatically. Support for military operations often declines when casualties increase without visible strategic success. If economic hardship intensifies simultaneously, opposition movements inside the country could grow rapidly. The result would not necessarily be civil war in the traditional sense, but rather a severe internal struggle over America's future direction. One side might argue that retreat would signal weakness and accelerate global decline. Another side would argue that continuing the conflict would destroy the nation economically and morally. Such paralysis could slow decision-making at the exact moment decisive leadership is required. Historically, empires often begin weakening internally long before they are defeated externally. Political exhaustion, financial overextension, and social fragmentation frequently precede geopolitical decline.
Beyond the immediate conflict, some geopolitical theorists argue that a larger transformation of global power may already be underway. Since the end of World War II, the international system has largely revolved around American military dominance, financial influence, and control over global institutions. The US dollar became the reserve currency of the world. American naval power secured global trade routes. Western financial institutions shaped international economic rules. This structure became known as the Pax Americana, an era in which American power underpinned the global order. However, critics of the current system argue that this order is showing signs of fatigue. Endless military interventions, rising national debt, political instability, and declining public trust have led many observers to question whether the United States can continue sustaining the same level of global dominance indefinitely.
Some theorists claim that powerful financial networks and geopolitical elites are less attached to any single nation than they are to preserving a stable imperial structure capable of enforcing the broader global system. In this interpretation, empires are not permanent. They are replaceable instruments. Within that framework, some analysts speculate that new regional powers could begin assuming larger strategic roles as American influence declines. Israel is often discussed in this context because of its military innovation, intelligence capabilities, technological sophistication, and high level of national mobilization during times of conflict. Supporters of this theory argue that Israel demonstrates characteristics historically associated with resilient powers: unity under pressure, willingness to absorb costs, rapid adaptation, uh, and strong institutional cohesion. Critics, however, strongly dispute the idea that any single regional state could realistically replace the United States as the central organizing force of the international system. The modern global order is far too economically interconnected and technologically complex for simple historical analogies to fully apply.
At the same time, China's position in the emerging global landscape continues to expand. While the United States has remained heavily engaged in military and geopolitical confrontations, China has focused on trade networks, industrial expansion, energy partnerships, infrastructure investment, and long-term strategic planning. Beijing's approach often reflects the ancient strategic principle described by Sun Tzu: allow rivals to exhaust themselves while quietly strengthening one's own position. Many observers believe China's greatest advantage lies not in direct confrontation but in patience, economic leverage, and the ability to capitalize on instability created by others.
If such a conflict were ever to unfold on the scale described, its phases might appear gradual rather than sudden. Initial military operations could be presented as successful. Governments and media institutions might emphasize tactical victories and operational progress. Yet over time, the cumulative costs, casualties, financial strain, regional instability, energy shocks, and political division could alter public perception. Eventually, pressure for deescalation could grow stronger than the desire for military persistence. Any eventual withdrawal would likely be framed diplomatically as a negotiated settlement or strategic repositioning rather than a defeat. Nevertheless, perceptions matter in geopolitics, and the global interpretation of the outcome could influence international alignments for decades afterward.
In the aftermath of such a transformation, the Middle East itself could enter a completely new strategic era. Regional powers such as Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Gulf monarchies would all attempt to reposition themselves within a changing balance of power. Some states might align more closely with emerging Eurasian blocks. Others might seek security guarantees through new partnerships. The era of uncontested American dominance in the region could gradually give way to a more fragmented, multi-polar environment where influence is shared, contested, and constantly renegotiated.
Ultimately, the larger argument being made by proponents of this theory is not merely about one war. It is about the historical life cycle of empires. Throughout history, dominant powers have often expanded beyond sustainable limits, accumulated internal contradictions, and eventually entered periods of decline. The Roman Empire, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and many others all experienced moments when military overstretch combined with internal pressures to accelerate transformation. The claim is that the modern world may now be approaching another such turning point.
Whether these predictions prove accurate remains uncertain. History rarely unfolds exactly as theorists expect. Wars are unpredictable. Alliances shift, technologies evolve, and societies adapt in ways few anticipate. Yet the broader concern underlying these arguments continues to resonate globally: that the international order established after World War II may be entering a period of profound transition. If that is true, then the most important question is not simply who wins or loses a particular conflict, but what kind of world emerges afterward and which nations, institutions, and societies are prepared to navigate it successfully.