Transcription
in. We've got Professor Robert Pipe on the show. Initially, when I asked him to come on the show, I thought I'm going to ask him, "Professor Pape, the war seems like it's over. Are we now moving towards the uh fourth uh track of his um presentation?" And I thought like this is it. Is this Iran consolidating power now? And they're going to start moving towards the fourth center of power.
But since then, we've had two major revelations today. First of all, the US bombs Iran at least three times. We had the uh attack by Iran on a vessel in the straight of Hermoose yesterday. And in addition to that, we've got this contradictory agreement between Lebanon, United States of America, and Israel, which completely directly conflicts with the first article of the MOU.
So, Professor Robert Pip, thank you so much for joining us. How are you?
>> I'm doing great. Um, it's great to be on again and I can certainly appreciate all the listeners feeling the whiplash. Uh, because what's been happening is everybody has been uh calling peace. Everybody's saying this is over. It's all over. We're just winding this down. And after modeling this for 20 years, um, no, we're in the middle of the escalation trap. So, I didn't fall for this. Um, I've been explaining on all these interviews, uh, and now you're seeing the reality of what I'm talking about, which is this was never over. Uh, everybody wants it to be over, but wanting it to be over and getting it over are two very different things. And what you're watching just right now in front of our eyes is exactly the power struggle. One of the power struggles I would point out that I wrote about on Monday in my escalation trap Substack. This is not a who could have wondered what would have happened here. This is a part of the modeling that we're in the middle of the trap and we're in a power struggle that's escalating over Hormuz. And it's a power struggle. And you listen to President Trump today, he kind of you look at the the look on his face. I mean, it's it's got the sad this hang dog look. It's like they got what? They got fight left in them. Well, yeah, that's right. So, the bombing didn't knock the fight out of them. The blockade didn't knock the fight out of them. Um, and what you see is that um theou has been not an end to the war. It has been another catalyst of power politics of the first order and that's what you're really seeing play itself out. I'm glad to go through all of those details and the point you make about the uh for the Iran becoming the fourth center of world power and you were going to talk to me about it. These two are tightly linked at the hip. These are not separate ideas precisely because the balance of power is shifting to Iran. You're seeing uh President Trump and JD Vance just before I get on saying violence will be met with violence. So you this isn't just one-sided. This is the trap of the escalation trap I've been talking about for four months.
And so just on that because you mentioned the words power is shifting and so is it the shift in power or the attempt to shift in power that causes the trap to continue to be effectuated and what I mean by that is I know you've seen it as the power change another way from the other side people see it as the power shifting more towards the US and what I mean by that is you basically had anou that many believe that it was very much in Iran's interest it was major capitulation by the United States of America. And so the power shift seems to be happening where Israel refuses to leave, Israel continues its escalation. Israel, that's one element. And then the second element is JD, sorry, Marco Rubio going to the Gulf States, but just three of them specifically and making that statement, attacking Iran, attacking the resistance. And then you the third element you had of it was today which was this agreement between Lebanon, Israel and um the United States of America with Marco Rubio once again which goes against article one because it says Israel can stay there. It says is the resistance in Lebanon needs to be um basically demilitarized. So it's and and now I see it as like them the power slowly shifting towards the US. But if you can elaborate on that.
So, so you have done a really nice job of talking about all of the specific events and summarizing them quite well that have happened over the recent period of time. What I do that's different is I give you a framework. And once you have the framework, you'll see you can remember all those events a lot easier because your listeners are going, "Well, that's great. He summarized it because I kind of forgot about that one and that one and that one." And that's what happens here. uh and and that's what you did is an excellent job. My role is different. I'm not just recounting specifics because I've got a longer memory than other people. It's a framework that's at issue. Now, here is the framework that's driving things and then I'll explain an alternative which one might have had which which is goes in a different way. The big framework here to keep in mind is the balance of power among the United States which started this as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf. Number two, uh, Israel, which was the rising power under America's umbrella in the Persian Gulf or in the Middle East. And then number three which was Iran which before the war was a declining power. What happened after 116 days of war and yes even with theou we really have been at war for 116 days. Okay what happened is that balance of power has radically shifted. America is still very strong, but it's not the preeminent America that it was 116 days ago because the fact of the matter is it it cannot beat Iran. Um certainly not without a lot more expenditure. Another way to put it is it can't beat Iran on the cheap the way it's been beating many states for 35 years since the 1991 Gulf War. That's changed. So America's power is clearly down. That also means Israel's power is clearly coming down. And that's what you see. Then who's going up? Iran is going up. So it is hormuz it's the fees. But all of those details are about the changing abrupt changing balance of power among those three actors in literally um just three and a half months. It's really quite stunning to see the rapidity of this power shift that we have seen.
Now, in order for the war then to come to an end, for real, to actually come to an end, all three actors have to agree on the new balance of power. All three actors have to agree on the new balance of power. That's what happened after, say, World War I, the Versailles treaty. They're agreeing on the new balance of power. What happened? Let me just jump to another one. The end of the Cold War. The parties at the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union is agreeing to the new balance of power. It's not fighting back. It's not having a missile crisis. It's accepting the new balance of power. Now, in this particular case, it's actually the case that the balance of power is not quite done moving yet because what you see is Iran is not just happy surviving. Iran wants to extend this to regional primacy over time, not in a day, but build more power, more power, more power. Now, that is what Lebanon is about. Lebanon is not just about uh keeping uh Hezbollah alive to fight another day. What they're demanding in Lebanon is Israel evacuate southern Lebanon. Just to be clear, that is power beyond what they even have right now. And they're leveraging the United States to get that. And so, and you just saw a tiny little peace deal here. This is probably too little to satisfy Iran's power. You see what I mean? Because they want Israel out of Lebanon and they have a power reason to want to do that. But then if you look at what's happening with um the unfrozen assets, all of a sudden you see Donald Trump saying, "I'm going to tell you what is going to happen with those unfrozen assets. They're going to my farmers here." Well, that's not the deal. That's not in theouou. And theou says it's Iran who decides who gets that money. And so if Iran gives in on that, they got their they're going to still get six billion of something, okay? They'll still be able to sell that grain on the open market, but they lose power. And that's what they want. They want they don't want to give America an inkling of a chance to get back into that pro that preeminent position it was in before. That's why they're fighting on that issue. So I can go through and then Hormuz is obvious, right? Because that is the cornerstone of that hold on the 20% of the world's oil. So what you are seeing is signing the piece of paper is not the same as a piece. It's a piece of paper and what the piece of paper it does reflect a different balance of power which is Iran is is is a rising power, America declining and Israel declining. But America and Israel, they've got to accept that. And that means they've got to execute theou strictly exactly as written, not squeak out of it the way Trump and Rubio are trying to do. That's the problem that we have here, which is it's a balance of power problem here. And all of those issues. Once you understand the right framework, you can really see why the deal this is coming unglued and exactly where it's going to come unglued.
So just a question on that because based on your framework and the reason I asked this question is for example I had Robert Barnes who is basically Trump's lawyer and probably the biggest advance advocate as well as close friends with him >> and he presented this as Rubio trying to derail Vance's deal you know theou and this kind of dynamic to appease the Israeli lobby. Now I'm assuming your position might be slightly different in terms of when you look at the move that happened today in Lebanon. It was essentially a direct in conflict with theou article one which Iran says is the most important thing to them and as you said they were demonstrating a huge power move by including that in there and this deal that has happened which basically infringes on that is essentially Israel doesn't have to leave Lebanon until the resistance demilitarizes. Israel can keep in the area. There'll be two areas where Israel doesn't even have but the Lebanese army and the US are going to go in and remove his bullah. So why have they made such a move which is going to be very difficult to achieve especially the bit where the US army and the Lebanese are going to come in. So what's the reason what's the what's the reason for that?
The underlying reason and then I'll get to the specifics that you've you've asked but let me just give again the big framework answer so people can follow these details okay is that the United States doesn't want to own the L it doesn't want to own the L so for the last week you've had a number of people on and and of course I have been on saying that theou represents a strategic defeat and it's because it's true it's a strategic big defeat. Okay, everybody understands that. Well, that is a problem for President Trump to own and for the Trump administration to own. Now, a week ago, you got to be fair here at this, if we roll back to about eight days ago, nine days ago on the Wednesday when President Trump said, "You got to understand, folks, the world's economy is going off the cliff and so we're going to have to eat this thisou." Well, people were saying, "Well, he's going to own the L." I said, "Well, he's owning it for a moment. Let's see how long he owns the L." You see, because it's not good enough to simply say it for a day and then take it back day after day after day after day, which is exactly what he did. So, what he's doing and what um uh you are seeing is the administration is trying to squeak out of the loss, the L on their back, the giant L. Okay? And they're trying to uh not just put lipstick on a peg. They're literally trying to change the deal right in front of our eyes. And they're doing it in three ways. There are three ways. Okay.
Number one, they're violating article one. And you just laid out exactly why. And just so listeners know in article one it says expressly that um there is a uh a territorial the United States will ensure the territorial integrity of Lebanon meaning complete evacuation none of these uh you know sort of salami slice deals like you're seeing Rubio trying to do. So you're exactly right that violates that but it also infringes on the power of uh Iran going forward. The second big thing that's happening and this is in article five and this is what the navy is doing under Trump is they are fing out or encouraging out in the third uh there there's the southern route out of the gulf and that is in violation of article five. Okay. Article 5 says quite clearly that there is going to be an arrangement here with um Iran and Oman and Iran and Oman are going to decide who leaves the uh passes through Hormuz period. Not the US Navy, not guaranteed by the US Navy. No secret plan by Trump here. And they are requiring Iran is requiring registration and that's with the International Maritime Organization. And so they they're they're not just saying this at a very high level. They're implementing this idea. Well, what happened that that um tanker that was assaulted went through the wrong place. And so that Singapore, they're violating the the um the terms of article 5 directly. You see, but it's power. Article 5 just isn't a piece of paper. It represents the future of Iran's economic wealth. Controlling 20% of the world's oil. That's a lot of wealth. That's why we don't want Iran to have it. This isn't about, you know, the, you know, international waterways. That is there as a secondary issue. We don't want Iran to have that much wealth because that equates to missiles, drones, nuclear weapons. So the third issue is article 11. Well, what's happening there is that's the issue on the unfreezing of the assets. So, if people will go and look at that article, they will see right in the middle of the article, it doesn't just say unfreeze assets, it says. And the uh uh actor that will determine where those assets go is Iran. No mention of the United States whatsoever. And that's important because again if if uh the United States takes that back uh it's not just a technical violation who cares from Iran's perspective this is going at its power it's reasserting American hegemony over Iran which remember 53 years ago we toppled the government we just killed their leader so this is there this is not just about a piece of paper and the on the farmers or something that's this not that trivial now that is from a power frame framework. Do you see how a And so, yes, you're right. There's probably games going on. Rubio wants to be president. Vance wants to be president. That is all well and good or true, but the bottom line is who's driving this train is Iran. And they're sell and they're telling you they're driving the train and you want to stop it, you're going to have to fight for it. And President Trump's got that crystal clear. That's the key thing that and so yes, you're right about the details here. But notice my framework doesn't turn on uh Net and Yahoo. It doesn't turn on the battle between JD V. It's all interesting. I'm focus on power politics, balance of power frameworks. And my goodness, for four months, it's been calling it almost every week. Almost every week. And it it you know, um it it's a structural argument. It just explains what the incentives are and that's why you're seeing this thing uh in it's calling it a breakdown of the ceasefire. It was not really there.
>> Fair enough. So in terms of like what's again happening in terms of uh Trump, one of the things he said was oil reserves were at a low. This is what many of the financial economic experts are had on. I believe the reserves are like $330 million. So taking that into consideration, you're talking about this power dynamic. Obviously, this impacts uh America's power ability, ability to sorry, exude power, but also limits how far they can go. And so how do you take that into consideration when you base this when you when you basically say we're in the middle of it, does that not accelerate?
>> What that does is it offers Trump an opportunity to project that he's still in control. But all the oil experts and I just spent time with another one yesterday. They all the detailed oil experts here. There's very very clear what's going on which is we have suddenly um released the what's called the floating storage that was the um several hundred million barrels of oil that's been just sitting in the Persian Gulf. Some of that has been coming out and the oil traders are betting all of it's going to come out over the next 30 days. Well, what that's going to do is have a temporary glut of oil on the market. But it's a temporary glut of oil. And they all know that. And it's temporary because what's going to happen is the tankers are not going back in at the same rate they're coming out. The the what's in what's happening at the uh tanker level is you're getting more than double the number out as you are going back in. And if you were if you were owning a ship and if you were a crew, does that surprise you? Okay. Are you really willing to take that risk for being locked up another four months or death? Yeah, here that that's quite a fair bet. So this um yeah, so price oil has come down. It makes perfect sense why that's happening because you get a glut. But it's temporary. It's not going to stay there. Now then you say, well uh why won't people sort of uh shorter bet on it or or so forth and so on. Well, the other dirty secret that's going on here from the traders that I'm getting secondhand from their bosses at the highest levels here is uh they don't want to get fired is the bottom line. See what's not being said here and I'm going to say it very directly. So that's my what I do on the substack and that's what people appreciate here is imagine you're a day trader and you try to price the oil the way it should be in supply and demand and President Trump jawbones it down uh5 $10 a barrel u here just within a few seconds a few minutes what happens you lost a bunch of money for your company and what does your company have a budget you're allowed to lose lose so much money and then you're out because they're not there to be a charity and carry you. You've got to pull your weight. So, what's been happening with the day tra with the traders is they're not on their own. They're part of big companies. Those companies have rules. You lose, you're out and they won't take the risk. So, they literally say Trump sets the price and that's the way it's going to be until the balloon pops. That's going to be the problem. So the the this is why everybody's asking why is this everything all out of sync. What's going on? Uh the traders just can't lose their job because then they lose their mortgage. Their kids don't go to college. It's just that simple. This isn't as complicated as people want to make it out once we just peel down to the reality here of what's actually occurring.
>> So you you know you mentioned power dynamic and if you look at the straight moves, it's open but it's kind of not open. And what I mean by that is from the research I've done and again some of the experts I spoke to, it seems like almost all the oil that's going out is Iranian oil. There's actually not been any American linked oil that's gone out. And so is this again Iran showing their power dynamic to make sure that actually we're going to open the strip, but only we're going to benefit.
>> Uh yes. And they're going to benefit either through only their oil coming out or you pay to get your oil out. It's a protection racket. So nice nice oil you got there. A nice ship you got there. Shame if something were to happen to that ship, Singapore.
>> Okay. And it's now burning. And notice they didn't even sink it. They wanted to be there and burn. Okay. You couldn't ask for a bigger protection racket, you know, idea. Maybe they didn't game it that far out. That's that's going pretty far. Yeah. But the point is you could really see that this fits their model pretty well because it's not they do want money. So I do want to emphasize here. I'm not saying Iran is a religious fanatics. I'm not saying they don't care about money, but they care about power more. Because this is why people want to be president after they're billionaires. Okay? Donald Trump a billionaire. Why does he want to be president? Power. Because you get power, you often get actually more money when you have power. So these two are not add-ons. And and this really I if I could just expand on this a little bit because I wrote a big substack to explain the p balance of power model versus what I call the business model of this of this piece. See, a lot of people think that what's going on here is a straightforward business deal. We want Hormuz open. what's it going to cost? We're just going to pay for it and all we got to do is have the right strike price. And that's JD Vance. You could see this all the way through. He's just saying, "Okay, if we got to give them six billion here, 12 billion there, sell the oil, we've got to give them the uh waivers, we've got to, you know, we'll give them the big carrot at the end." For him, this is just a straightforward business deal. And the Iran does want the money. And don't get me wrong, that equates to missiles and other things. So, it's not so much that they don't want the money. It's that the business model says violence gets in the way. This is the old godfather line. Bis violence is bad for business. That's exactly right. Violence. So, as a business deal, this is why all the business people I talked to and I just had 25 of them at a seminar yesterday. Uh my I did a live Substack with them in Chicago and they're and they're just all most of them are business people. They're they're tra they're in the actual business world. You see what I mean? For them, it's just a business deal. And they don't understand why there's any violence at all and why this couldn't have been settled on March 3rd. You just pay the price. Okay? And and so this is what everybody is thinking in the back of their mind. But this is not major power politics. This is not international politics. This is talking about it like it's a business deal doesn't is it's not doesn't make it a business deal because power equates to future security. With business deals, you've got courts to protect you. You if somebody violates your contract, you sue them. Okay. Um with international politics, this is about power. How do you get somebody to not welch on the deal? Power is what determines that. That's why power trumps wealth in international politics.
>> So talking about this like power dynamic today we had it where uh the US did bomb three locations in the straight of Hermus siq island and Iran kind of didn't really respond. Uh also the uh you know this agreement between Lebanon and Israel they didn't respond to that as well. Does that do you I know it's a very specific and you don't really but in terms of from the power perspective does that kind of
>> Well well I think you should check your news um the news it's it's being Ron is saying they've responded CNN I just watched just before we got on they brought on two people and they say well we don't have all the details yet but what do you think and they're basically tacking to sure Iran hit some bases so just check the news I mean look I I'm I'm not the journalist so I don't really know, but I'm just telling you I do try to keep up with this and so you let me know and if the news is wrong, if I'm wrong, I'm just telling you that literally before I g came on, um Google is saying that that that's happened. Iran is saying that's what happened and CNN just had a panel on that happened. So, it may not have happened. I can't tell you for sure because I'm not physically in the Gulf. I'm not seeing the bases. And I'm not trying to challenge you, but I'm just pointing out that that we're in a a power struggle here. And even if for some reason Iran didn't So that would be Iran hit yesterday, the United States uh responds here. Uh and and to say, well, it's been uh 30 minutes. Iran hasn't responded yet. We're good, man. We're sailing right through theou. Iran's about to cave on the nuclear issue. I can feel the nuclear dust under my fingernails. No, this is too much. You see, we are in a um uh one of the most precarious ceasefires uh and calling it even a ceasefire. This is a non ceasefire ceasefire. I mean, you you've got to go a few weeks in a row without people attacking each other to before you can actually say that you've really got a um um an actual, you know, calming down of the peace. And I think it's going to be very hard to get there for you know two three weeks in a row. And the reason is because the power dynamics I'm saying and people number one have to agree on who what is the new structure of power is Iran the rising um state in the region and and Israel is truly the declining state and America has learned it can't defend any of the Gulf countries because that's what I think is going on. I think that's what and that's a big problem for the United States. That means its allies in Asia. A lot of big question marks there. So if you um um but if you and then on top of that, you've got to see that um there's these, as you just pointed out, actors that want to use everything for their own future advantage. And maybe Rubio does want to scuttle the deal, help Israel scuttle the deal, in which case um that would uh make the argument I'm making even more uh extreme.
>> Yeah. Yeah. And I've got some more question for you. And just in terms of the response, I guess I need to be a bit more acro. Iran does claim they responded, but the response is so minimal. Many of us believe it to be something which was more symbolic, not a real response, if that makes sense. So they said they struck you know targets close to the straight of her moose but we never saw no visuals of it. We never saw
>> So what you have is the situation where then the the real question here is going to be is that Thor is that southern passageway going to bypass Iranian arrangements. So I'm not saying Iran is escalating for escalation's sake. I'm putting it in a balance of power dynamic. So if the United States cowtows to Iran and encourages those vessels to sign up with the arrangements that Iran is already uh requiring, they're not requiring the fees right now. They're requiring the arrangements. They want to set up a pattern so everybody knows through the International Maritime Organization how to sign up for these uh uh for the fees down the road. So they're establishing their bureaucracy, so to speak. uh here and if the United States allows that to happen even if it goes through by the way they accept the southern passage it doesn't it's not just it's it's really the control more than geography uh then they Iran will probably pull back uh from um uh from this at least for a while then we'll have to see what happens with uh the unfrozen assets then we'll have to see what happens with Lebanon so we really can identify and that's what I did the red lines on Monday we really can identify the very specific red lines here because Iran's it the the it's it's really quite specific. And then Trump signed Iran's and by doing that he essentially allows Iran to say all they're doing is enforcing the four corners of theou. But theou gives Iran enormous power. It's a road mapap to Iran becoming the fourth center of world power. It's a roadmap and after 60 days there's nothing keeping Iran around. They might extend it, they might not. Um, but there's nothing causing Iran or binding Iran to make any concessions on its nuclear program. You're going to have to pay one hefty price, not just in money, but in power if you're going to get that nuclear program out of Iran.
And so I presume what's happened over the last 24 hours adds to your argument about this power dynamic because if you look at yesterday Oman was like I don't think we're going to charge at all. They talked about allowing an alternate route and then today you and then yesterday you had the Singaporean ship being hit and Oman came out today and said actually we're going to be following we're going to be doing it with Iran. There is
>> Exactly. I used the Oman point on Monday in my in my substack. So, I didn't this isn't just kind of after the fact. I said if uh the United States goes and tries to undercut Article 5 by pressuring or trying to move Oman away, and maybe there's some reporting that's what Rubio did. I don't know if that is a fact. Uh then that would be seen as a a violation worthy of shutting down the straight. So, I'm I'm not just saying it's a legal violation and we're going to settle in court. There's no court. So, and that's exactly what I was uh explaining from a power framework, from a business deal framework, the answer is just simply how much more unfrozen assets do you got to pay Iran to allow um uh the Southern Passage where they don't pay Iran a toll. So, if you're in the business model of what I'm telling you, I I I see from JD Vance and others, and by the way, the media, then you just pay Iran more money. And in fact, business people would say that all the time. What do I got to pay you? Okay. So, you want uh you want me to um uh allow you not, you know, to get out of article 5. What's it going to cost for you to amend article 5? And Iran is telling you there's no price. There's no price. Now, maybe they'll change their mind, in which case um we'll see. It's um whether it adds to their power or not. But what I'm explaining is that once you have the framework right, this gives you a lot more predictive power going forward. You can predict the red lines. You can see who's got the incentives. How the incentives change over time. Right now it's the incentives are on Iran to pressure to shut down the straight after day 60. It's the incentives are more on the United States to start bombing. Uh and everybody's, oh gosh, no. Trump would never do this again. They're just thinking about this without thinking about the balance of power. And I'm not telling you the balance of power always means that you will have nothing but war after war after war. It's about agreeing on what that balance of power is. So wars do come to an end. They they you know they do. The escalation trap actually ends. Okay. But but they don't just end because everybody says, "Oh, it's too painful. I want to watch my get ready for soccer and get ready for uh NFL preseason. I've had enough of this war. That just does is not how war ends.
>> So, Professor P, now in terms of this power dynamic, obviously the Israeli factor, you did say that all three countries need to agree to this. Israel's been whatever theou and that's why I never thought the MOU was going to succeed because of the Israeli factor. Israel's been very stringent in saying we're not going to leave Lebanon, we're going to continue to keep within the security zone and if we see anything as a threat either within or without the with the outside the zone we will neutralize that th threat and so that is completely a different position to theou and to Iran and so how do they play into this kind of power dynamic uh when you're basically working out this entire situation
>> Yeah, so Israel is is not just a rational actor here. It's important to understand that after October 7, their society has been traumatized. So that's why you have 80% of Israelis in opinion polls saying they don't mind if mass numbers of Palestinians die. So this is not just rational. This is there's a lot of emotion going on inside of uh uh inside of uh of Israel. Now, if it was just straightforward a rational actor, then you could see that, well, wait a second here. Uh, we've got the oil inventory drawd down that's still being drawn down. The world is still heading to the cliff of the economic crisis. That has not changed yet, even though people have decided to ignore it, but you know, they ignored it before and it will it could easily come back. And so um what Israel could decide if it was a straightforward rational actor is help the United States get through the oil inventory draw down window meaning uh cooperate with the United States get out of Lebanon between now and say next spring. Just get out and help the United States get through this period and during that six eightmonth period build up your oil inventories like crazy. That would make a lot more. That's what a realist would tell Israel to do. The problem is Israel is facing a situation where they're traumatized after October 7. And if they pull out uh from Lebanon, those drones that Hezbollah has over the next six months of the next year can go from hundreds to thousands of drones. And those thousands of drones can be focused not just on Israel troops on the other side of the border. They can be focused on Hifa. They can attack the ports and they can do to uh Israel, Israel seaborn commerce what um Iranian drones and Houthy drones have done to commerce in the Red Sea and the Gulf. I did a big paper on this. So this is a long extended milit net assessment of the future of what Hezbollah can do with drones. Not five years from now. This isn't 21. This isn't science fiction. This is literally using the drones, the Shahedes, the first view, the ones that they have now just a little bit more. Increase the number a little bit more and target them just a little differently to do what Iran does in Hormuz and what the Houthis have done in the Red Sea and Israel 55% of Israel's GDP hinges on trade seaborn trade so you shut that down you start having a few drone swarms hit Hifa and even if Israel shoots 75% of them down that's going to cause quite a problem here over the next uh year or so Israel isn't just got emotional problems. I'm trying to say there's a real issue here for Israel. And so this is going to be a very difficult thing for Israel to accept one because um the emotions are just so high. You see this in the opinion polls. I mean there is no give in these opinion polls. Uh and if anything, if Netanyahu falls, you might get a more extreme leader. And then on top of that because the elections are coming up in October and then on top of that there's the next war against Hezbollah which isn't just this war and that is means a much more challenging problem here uh because Israel is going to discover it's like an island with only a handful of ports.
So in terms of what you just mentioned, is that the only thing? And what I mean by that is when you look at Israel, it is heavily relying on the United States of America. And I always saw this as a time issue for Israel. And this is why they'll never succeed. And this is why I didn't think they'd be in agreement. Because if you look at it from the Israeli perspective, just from a purely geopolitical perspective, you have a scenario where the country you rely on, the United States of America, the vast majority of Americans now have become anti-Israel. The overwhelming majority are becoming youth are becoming anti-Israel. And so, if you look at it, you've got Trump now. Could you get Trump to go back in again? Probably not. Um, could you get the next president to go? It's probably going to be a Democrat. It's going to be unlikely because most Democrats are anti-Israel. And then you just got a time issue. You may never get this opportunity again. And so when I take that aspect into consideration, I think there's and and I do believe that Israel wants to go into his I do think they want to try sorry on wants to go into Lebanon and possibly expand. And so when you take but that element into consideration, I just don't see how they could ever basically retreat or leave or even leave Gaza or anywhere else because this is the or even Iran. This is their last chance saloon. That's the way.
Well, if they were a pure realist, you would leave for 6 months and go back. So, it is not like once you leave, you would never go back. Um, but that just is is is unlikely given the emotional state of Israeli society, which then their leaders reflect that. So, that's what I'm pointing out.
>> No, but wouldn't you need So, I'm trying to say they would only be able to go back if they had Trump on their side. Would Trump if
>> Oh, going back into Lebanon. No, this would be um this is going to be a different story. It's going to be uh you would end up having um um a much much more uh extensive war here for going back in. That is for sure. But Israel is pretty strong strong enough to go back in and say go up to Lebanon, maybe even go all the way up to Beirut here in Lebanon and ethnically cleanse that whole half of the country on its own. This is that they are not they are uh they are depending on the United States against Iran. They're depending on the United States u uh in order to be preeminent so the Gulf states don't start siding with Iran against Israel. They depend on the United States to keep the uh money flowing, the cash going to Jordan and to Egypt because you take those away. Now you're creating a a much more multifront problem here for Israel. That would be they don't have enough force to uh uh so what I'm trying to point out though is that in the period we're talking about going back in in 6 months. Um I just don't think it's right. They just can't literally do it. That they need the um the intelligence you hear. No, they would be they will be painful. they but the idea that they are not going to be able to literally do the uh cleansing of of a good hunk of southern Lebanon on their own, this just underrates um Israeli military power. Uh it's true there would be a lot of damage done uh here and it's true that uh Israeli um uh civilians uh will pay a price, but it's not true that that they don't have that u that much power. That's my assessment here. And so I think that it's underrated. So if I if on a strict realist basis, you would say Israel just get out now for six months and then play the game of going back in once the oil inventories are back. I just don't think it's likely to happen because they are too emotionally unwound as a result. They're traumatized and you see it in the opinion polls. I think it would be extremely hard for any leader um to win uh here in October if they really do withdraw in this realist time frame uh I'm explaining and I think that's just going to be a a giant problem because I don't see any sign that Iran is budging on that they're in the driver's seat and if anything I think what they'll do is they will put more pressure on uh Trump u to cut off aid, including intelligence, to Israel. I just think it's going to be a really difficult thing to truly get those leaders to evacuate the um uh the southern part of Israel. This would be a uh uh an emotional kurfuffle. I think that I'm just not sure I can see this society going through right now.
>> Not only that is he's getting a huge amount of pressure from even people within the government. You got left wing like Yari Laid, Napali Bennett, who was his rival, Ben Gavilla, he's actually probably the most moderate. I know it sounds crazy, but compared to all the people left or right in terms of their view about how far to go in Lebanon and look, I'm in agreement with you. I think when it comes to the air, the Israelis can bomb it. I think on the ground they struggle, but I guess I meant the greater Middle East. So, I mean, cuz they they only view Lebanon, this is a cont Israeli security service. for example, I treat a pari and he said that for example he was told that um they Lebanon is only there to basically neutralize that threat his bullah so that later they can go for Iran and I'm saying they could never do that without the US but
>> Well well once you widen it out so I was literally only focusing narrowly on the Lebanese thing because many of the listeners and talk has been that but if we widen out as you suggest well once we widen out then you see that Israel is only 7.4 4 million Jews surrounded by 4 to 500 Muslims depending on if you count Pakistan in the mix. So, so this is without America's preeminence in the Middle East writ large. the idea that Iran that Israel could become a rising power through the Middle East have the Abraham Accords uh the uh many of the Muslim and Arab countries are going to then normalize relations with Israel that really hinges on American preeminence throughout the Middle East which is why the Abraham Accords are just coming unglued. Um, so this that because America has been knocked down a peg and that affects then the Abraham Accords and that is why Rubio is trying to hold it together here and that's my view of what the mission one is. He's probably got multiple missions by going to the Gulf, but he's trying to hold it together because he both wants the Gulf States to uh sort of kind of pay a little bit of lip service to uh the idea of a $300 billion thing, but at the same time, he doesn't want them bandwagoning with Iran. And this is going to be a very big problem because what's the best way to um not have your country bombed? It's appease Iran. So that's just the the reality of the situation. And then so in the bigger picture, America is no longer that preeminent m you know great power in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East. And what that's doing is taking that security umbrella away for Israel to be the rising power. So I don't think Israel can continue to be the rising power uh here. So if we widen it out that big, I think we're in full agreement. I was I was really focusing narrowly on on southern Lebanon because I really feel badly for all those refugees that have been hurt and I don't want to sell them down the primrose path that they're suddenly going to be protected because we do that all the time. We did that with the coast of ours, you know, we told the coast of ours we're going to bombic in March 99. It's all good. And then what do you got? 800,000 cleansed out of the country and the Clinton administration sitting there going, well, I'm sorry. Okay. So, I really feel badly when we sell these uh uh populations that we just did this with the Iranian population. We told them it's all going to be okay. You can go ahead and and with uh you know opposing your government and and tens of thousands get killed and we stand by the side and say, "Well, we're we're sorry or something." But I just feel badly about it. So, that's where that's coming from in southern Lebanon. It really is very very uh very hard to
Watch what happens to those civilians. And we saw what Israel did in Gaza.
>> Yeah, I totally agree with you in terms of southern Lebanon. My heart does go out to those people. You mentioned about the uh, America being a decline in power and this protection. The Gulf States, um, if you look at it, they always saw the U.S. as a protection. They had their bases, they had the U.S. bases. Obviously, those have been largely destroyed. But what we've seen is a major shift. We've seen many of these Gulf states making deals, as per what you just said, with Iran.
Uh, reports came out that Qatar actually had made a deal very early on, a secret deal. I actually did the exclusive, and then it was confirmed later, and the same with Saudi Arabia. And so, what I guess, and there is this claim that many of my, like for example, I had CIA Larry Johnson on, and his insider knowledge was saying that there's this pan-Islamic alliance that's being created with Saudi Arabia, um, what was again, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and uh, whatever the sixth country was, but they were basically creating this kind of unity. And we then had confirmation that in Riyadh there's going to be a meeting in a few weeks with Iran—sorry, the other country was Iran—with Iran in terms of creating this unity, which they're calling, the Israelis are calling it, the anti-Abraham Accords. And so, what's your, again, putting this onto your model, this kind of adds to this rising and kind of shift in power against Iran, is essentially not completely replacing the U.S. because they're saying it's more of a security umbrella.
>> What you're seeing is an Iranian sphere of influence. So, the way realists like me talk about this, the Abraham Accords weren't just being nice to Israel; they were Israel's sphere of influence. And what you saw here is the Iran war has broken the Abraham Accords. And who's developing a sphere of influence? It is Iran. And they're doing it in multiple ways. And this is fully predictable.
Sum, and I hate, I'm sorry to keep telling you this, but these are the substacks in March and early April explaining what's going to come. Okay? So, this isn't just reacting to the details. And it's because this is what you would expect. They would move to a sphere of influence. So, why is the IRGC talking about a, uh, resistance security belt from Lebanon through the, uh, Red Sea, uh, to the Gulf? It's because they want to control any possible pipelines that could exit, uh, the oil in the different ways. That's what that's about.
And how do you even tighten that even more? You have those Gulf states now basically cowtowing to your new order. See, the United States hasn't fully bowed to the new balance of power. Israel hasn't bowed to the new balance of power. The Gulf States are bowing to the new balance of power. And they're the ones who really have the most immediate problem because America has shown through three and a half months of war, they can't protect Dubai. They cannot protect Riyadh.
If you're in Doha, who do you go to for protection? You're not going to the Americans. You're not going to Israel. The UAE tried to go and build something of a, you know, this remember this idea of the Iron Dome. They were going to work with the Israelis. Not it didn't work out, did it? So, what's happening here is the balance of power is shifting.
And that meeting you are describing here, it will be all put on with diplomatic niceties. There'll probably be no power talk like I'm doing. I'm talking, you know, very much brute, you know, brass tack terms, but this will all be done with smiles. It's called the velvet glove over the mailed fists. You see, that's the velvet glove over the realist. And realists understand. Henry Kissinger understood. Bismarck understood. You want to use power, but you don't want to use it unnecessarily. You want to get what as much as you can with them giving you things, and that's what the Gulf States are doing, and it's, uh, because America can't protect them.
It used to be, and the real thing this war is about is the inverse of the '91 Gulf War. So, in 1991, the United States, at the end, after the Cold War, within months after the Cold War, Saddam Hussein took Kuwait with 300,000 ground troops, and he was about to be the oil hegemon in the Middle East with 22% of the world's oil if he also had taken Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia. And what we did is we kicked him out in 39 days of an air war and four days of a ground war days. We kicked out those 300,000 troops.
And how many died on our side, the U.S. side? 147 combat troops. Think about that. That was a stunning victory. That was the American unipolar moment that came to be. And for decades, America's reputation has rested on that: that nobody can really beat us. We could beat ourselves, but nobody could really beat us. Well, Iran has changed that. So, the n 2026 Iran war is going to be the inverse of the 1991 war. And that's what you're seeing play itself out.
And by the way, the '91 war didn't just influence politics in the Middle East; it influenced politics all around the world. Because why did those European states cut their military and defense budgets? It's because America could beat anybody just on a dime. They didn't. Nobody really needs to spend any money because America can beat you with two hand, with a hand tied behind its back. That's over. That's over. That's over.
>> And just one other element, which is the economic aspect, because part of being a powerhouse in the future, you know, going down your fourth tract, if that ends up happening, and Iran becoming the fourth biggest power, where one element is power and the other one is the economy of it. And so again, if you look at Iran now, they're already talking about this security umbrella. You're talking, and apparently it's going to be an economic umbrella. You're talking, they're all, there's conversations about Iran and Pakistan with China funding this oil corridor. This Caspian Sea between the North and South through Russ with Russia. There's the East-West corridor, the Belton Road, and various other things. And so Iran is almost in the center of all of this. And so when you take that into consideration, where does that play into the whole? >>
>> Well, well, so in the, in early April, I published a big piece in The New York Times on Iran rising as the fourth center of world power. I'd say it would take about a year or two. It's a very controversial piece at the time. Now people are saying that's what's, what's happening. I mean, it was only been a couple months.
Um, but to answer your question, what I said at the bottom end of the piece is the very plausible future here is going to be that U.S. is power center number one, China number two, Russia number three, and Iran number four. Russia controls 11% of the world's oil. Chi, uh, Iran will be 20% of the world's oil. And, uh, China needs a lot of oil and also has a lot of technology, has a lot of AI. So, there's a natural set of relationships, I believe, are going to form as you have just described, which is going to involve, uh, the Gulf States, Iran, uh, I believe you'll be seeing Russia will end up being part of this, and I think China is going to end up being part of this.
And who's going to be the odd man out? America. And where did all the seeds of that get planted? It's when the Iranian foreign minister, remember in April, when, um, after the J.D. Vance meeting with the Iranian foreign minister, Iran went back to Pakistan. They weren't wanting to meet with the Americans. It was about the Pakistanis for a new security architecture. And that was the beginning of what I'm describing here. And where did they go right after meeting with Pakistan? Russia. And where did the foreign minister go right after meeting with Russia? China. This was before.
So, just to kind of remember that period of time, this was not just, you know, idol chithat. I believe what they were doing is defining and working out with their great power allies, uh, what a new security architecture would look like in the Middle East without the United States. And it's because this is what was already clear in balance of power terms. And I think that what you're seeing is they're going down that road.
Uh, America doesn't like it because, look, we used to run so much of the Middle East. You know, that's how we could basically cause Israel to become a rising power. You see what I mean? America, great powers don't like it when they don't run things anymore. This is a very big, uh, a very big, um, uh, and this is why I think you see two sides of Donald Trump. One day he's saying, "Oh, yeah, I can't let the world, you know, can't become Herbert Hoover." The next day it's like, "Oh my goodness gracious. Am I really gonna become Lyndon Johnson?" You see? So, he's going back and forth between Herbert Hoover. Think of the choice. Do you want to be Herbert Hoover or Lyndon Johnson?
>> Exactly. Exactly. And funny enough, Robert Barnes was telling me, they keep telling him that don't become Herbert Hoover. So, yeah, that's totally. >>
>> Well, and then he said, "So, you want me to be now Lyndon Johnson?" So, this is why he's going back and forth. And, and I do hope that he, uh, does not go back and re-escalate, but the problem here is it's not just up to, uh, Donald Trump. A lot of people think as long as Trump doesn't re-escalate, the world's economy is going to be just peachy keen. Well, notice who's been doing the escalation in the last since theou's been signed. It's been Iran, and they've been basically sending brushback pitches. Uh, in Trump's terms, these are Trumpian, uh, love taps.
And what they're doing, and you're right, they're not going over the top. They didn't bomb Tel Aviv or, you know, missile attack on Tel Aviv. But what they are doing is they are sending the clear message like a, like an American pitcher on the pitcher mound that has a brushback pitch to get the batter off the plate. That's what's going on here. And, uh, and if they need to, they're showing they're not deterred. They're not deterred. They're not shaken in their boots when, uh, when America says, when Donald Trump posted today, uh, that this was a violation. Yeah, I don't see anything, any Iranian leaders, shaking in their boots as a result of that. >>
>> No doubt. Professor P, always appreciate you coming. I had many more questions, but we need to let you go. Appreciate you coming on. >>
>> Okay. Well, thank you for, as always, the great engagement here, and, uh, just can't thank you enough for, uh, uh, this opportunity. Thank you so much. And I know people can find you, and you've got two substacks you told us last time. One is "The Escalation Trap," which kind of blurs all of this out. I'm presuming you got something. What's the last thing you wrote, or have you got something more? >>
>> The last thing I wrote was, uh, "Theou Getting the Framework Right." Is it balance of power framework or as a business deal? And what are the red lines of each? How would you know one from the other? And this week, as shown, has been in favor by far of, um, um, of that.
And then what I wrote on the "Professor Paper." So, there in the last couple weeks, I've been looking at the future of Israel. And so I have a piece that I just published a couple days ago on "Professor Paper" because it's going to be more global, not just the narrow of "The Escalation Trap." And I said, uh, Israel in 2020 20, if present trends continue, which they may not, Israel in 2035 is going to be an isolated nuclear Sparta. That's what I said. It'll still be there. It's still going to be a tough cookie. The idea it's going to go defunct is probably wrong, uh, here, but a better way to think about it is an isolated nuclear Sparta. That's what's really coming.
So, what I'm doing on the substacks is, the one is because there are so many people who really, really, really want the details of what's happening in the war, "The Escalation Trap" model in detail. And then other people are saying, "Well, what's going to happen in Taiwan, and what's going to happen in Russia, what's going to happen here and there as a result of the Iran war?" Well, that's a different set of things. You see what I mean? And you don't, some do both, by the way. Uh, others don't. And I think that's just, I'm just experimenting. >>
>> No, I'm looking forward to reading the one about Israel and theou. I've not read either one of them yet. And I'm looking forward to, cuz I'm about the details, but actually to see the result of what's going to happen or what your thought is about Israel, cuz, yeah, is Israel going to end up similar to what? >>
>> And read the paper, the one the week before, about the coming, the next war with Hezbollah that I call "Closing Israel," where I really lay out in detail a military assessment of what, uh, Hezbollah can do from the Becca Valley with, uh, drones in about a year. And this is going to be, and this is the real, these are the things that are coming. See, people are coming to me to help get a better sense of what's coming, not just like what happened today. >>
>> No doubt. No doubt. I'm looking forward to reading this, and I do recommend everyone following your sub, both. >>
>> But thank you so much for joining us. Appreciate you. >>
>> Look forward to talking again. Thank you. >>
>> Definitely. Thank you so much. That was Professor P. Do check him out. I really enjoyed that conversation, cuz you get into, it's a totally different dynamic. It's about like power politics and how things are working and what's happening. I think it's a very interesting conversation, to say the least. Make sure you like this video. Make sure you subscribe to the channels, and, uh, let me know in the comments what your thoughts were about what Professor Prep had to say.
That being said, next we've got Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Aguiler coming on. So, I'm going to put the link in. Oh, I've put the link in. I've pinned it. So, I'll see you on there. It'll be like a minute or two. But in terms of this stream, uh, much love to each and every single one of you. Really appreciate you all. And I'll see you on the next stream. So, I appreciate you guys joining in. I appreciate you guys.