Transcription
What does it mean for us to live in a world no longer dominated by the West? With the reemergence of China as a rising and peer power to the US, how are the rest of us in Asia adapting today?
Today I speak to Chandra Naya, founder of the Global Institute for Tomorrow, an independent think tank based in Hong Kong focused on trying to understand the pressing issues that face countries in the global south. In our conversation, he puts out quite provocatively what it means for us Asians to live in a post-Western world. I hope this conversation challenges you as much as it did for me.
Chandran, you spent the past 15 years kind of telling off the Western media about how they've misread China. Interestingly, you're not Chinese. You're a Southeast Asian. You're a proud Malaysian. I wanted to get your view on what do you think the West gets wrong about China fundamentally?
Well, I think there's two aspects to this question. One is what it gets wrong and what it doesn't want to understand. You know, they are two sides of the same coin. I think I've been often asked this question and I say it's the refusal to understand, right? It's a denial because by understanding, there is a great fear that the sort of, um, narrative that the West has projected around the rest of the world about its political economy will essentially seem rather flimsy, almost dismantled. So that's the fear. And then the bigger fear is that the rest of the world, which has been subservient to the Western political economic narratives, etc., will say, "Hey, there's something better." Right? So I'm not here to say that the Chinese system is better or the Western system is, uh, outdated. It is simply that it doesn't work for everyone, and other countries should have the choice. But the two things that I, or three things that I would say that the, the, uh, gets wrong.
The first is that, um, it doesn't fully understand the civilizational roots of, of China, and therefore how that system translates into a governance model because it's fixated on the view that if it's not like us, because there's an inherent sense of superiority, you know, that has been embedded in the Western mindset and in the mindset of many Asian elites, that that must be the best model, right? So the sense that if it's not like us, something's wrong with it, right? This, so, so not understanding the civilizational nature of the state and how culture is embedded in the governance system, etc.
Second, assuming having built the narrative that this is not like us, it's repressive, it's authoritarian. All of those words which have, you know, essentially helped many people, uh, to think, uh, not helped, forced on many people to think that there's some oppressive state there that can't be good. It's run by evil people. So it's really this issue of not understanding that the Chinese government system, built on a civilizational, uh, understanding of the nation-state, is essentially one with lots of checks and balances. But what it refuses to understand, but also, if I give the benefit of the doubt, misunderstands, is a system with lots of checks and balances.
The third is not understanding how, uh, um, uh, decentralized the system actually, the governance system, is. Everyone thinks there's a bunch of old guys in Beijing who dictate to everyone what to do. Uh, it's much more complex than that. And so the point I'm trying to make here is that it's decentralized, and it worked, as we have seen over the last 30, 40 years. And in previous eras, there were periods where, you know, every model acknowledged, uh, for a whole host of reasons, China essentially went off track, became poor, the 150 years of humiliation, all of those things. No country is perfect, and China has its own, uh, problems in its history. But overall, and looking at the last 40 years, the miracle of China, which I don't think anyone can, you know, um, with the right, uh, honest, with any honesty, um, deny, has been based on meritocracy.
Only the best people get to the places. And I'm not talking about the top level government. I'm talking right through the system, from villages to townships to municipalities and provinces. Only the best get to be. So without, um, without making too many unfair comparisons with what we've seen in other countries, particularly in Europe and the United States, the quality of the leadership, um, that these in China is far superior throughout the layers to many in, in the so-called sort of more democratic, neoliberal economies of the world. So those are the three things that I think people just don't understand. They think it's a repressive society. It's, it's not, but it has its own conditions around which it seeks to govern, rooted in a civilizational understanding of the rule of the state. The second, there's lots of checks and balances throughout the system. The structure is such if you don't perform, you're out, including at the top, believe it or not. And then thirdly, it's based on merit. It's, it's based on, so there is this, there's order, and then there's meritocracy.
I want to get you to kind of talk a little bit more about the idea of the civilizational aspect.
It's interesting to see China as a civilizational state. I think this is something that Professor Wongu talks about often. And one of the things that you see in the way it's being operationalized, it often looks back at its own history and reflects. So if you look at the way political leaders like Xi Jinping speak about China in public, there's always references to history, and there's always a constant obsession with history. So there's one facet of that civilizational aspect. From your point of view, as someone who's in a space of sustainability on rethinking economics, where do you see this operationalization, or civilizational, civilizational thinking, one would say, in the way they approach policy today?
Yeah, thank you. Firstly, yeah, let me say I'm, I'm not a distinguished professor of Chinese civilization, as some of your previous guests may have been. So, my thoughts, and I hope they are, uh, valid, come from a lived experience of being in China. So, I've been going to China for well over 30 years. The first time I went to China, uh, China was very poor. Uh, I always remember going to Tiananmen Square and staying at the Beijing Hotel, and at that time, there's hardly any heating in the hotel. Today, it's a nice upgraded hotel, and everyone was dressed in, you know, the old clothes. So I, I come from that understanding. And then, I think, coming to your point about my area of particular interest, in my first maybe 20 years, 25 years of my professional life, was in this whole area of sustainability, sustainability, etc. And I got involved in many, uh, much, a lot of work in China during the early days of its development, um, through essentially looking at many environmental issues, etc., working with multinationals and, uh, bilateral agencies like the ADB, World Bank, etc. And what I could see then was China was extremely polluted. What I could see was this notion about the learned person being willing to really understand and seek knowledge through facts. I mean, that's the whole Chinese thing, right? Find solutions through facts. Uh, not, uh, not simply ideology and, um, and, um, and beliefs that you, you know, uh, that something must happen. It's knowledge and facts.
So, in terms of your question about what I could see then was, firstly, extremely knowledgeable people, but in a system where they did not have the capacity yet, but rooted in an education system that drew on the civilizational point of view of the community, the communitarian aspects of it. And I've spoken about this as the bedrock of the Chinese system. It's not perfect, there are people who abuse that system, and all, like in any part of the world, but the commitment through the day with different levels of government, which I've spoken about, right? The competence, all of that, and the meritocracy was rooted in what I thought was a civilizational knowledge of where the nation needs to go after a period of darkness, if you want to call it. But it went back to that, rather than saying, "We will reinvent ourselves to be something else." Right? And that's rooted in the belief that the core civilizational values are as relevant today as they were before. Right? The frugality, the communitarian, the collective, all of those things which detractors then use to say, "Oh, authoritarian, communist, socialist," which don't mean anything within the context of the Chinese civilizational understanding, right? That the collective is more important than the individual. That the, the rights of the individual are subservient to the interests of the collective, and that you work always towards a communitarian value, and you're judged in your contribution by what you've done for society, rather than what you've done for yourself. You know, that old Chinese tradition that the merchant is actually less respected than the teacher. In fact, the merchant is a lower class than even the farmer and the teacher. And I think that's really important.
And in the last few years, as all over the world, as countries have modernized, and modernization in the last 50 years has essentially been how to be more Western, right? Both in terms of economic models, the physical manifestation of what is modernity, and in also in what you think. You know, your, is your political theory Western enough? If not, you're not modern, right? Uh, so if you've got political theories that, uh, hark back to something that is non-Western, whether it's African, uh, Islamic culture, you, you can't be modern. So the whole generation of elites in Asia, who then started to repeat these, these Western ideas. And I think in China, in the last few years, as you probably know, especially under the current leadership, well led by the current leadership of President Xi, was to reinforce, now having taken care of the, the basic needs issue, which was, you know, uh, the, the biggest challenge, having taken, taken care of that, not fully, but, you know, as you know, China eradicated extreme poverty about two years ago, that was the leadership's most important thing. Now, the emphasis on making sure that the cultural roots are not diluted, they don't fade away, as they do in most countries as we have supposedly modernized, which often is Westernization. And I'm not saying Western culture is bad, I'm saying that if you lose your own culture, uh, at the expense of adopting something else, you lose a lot, and you perhaps, uh, will never be able to be those other people, right? So you have to blend it together, learn from the best of both worlds. So China's emphasis now is a lot on culture. Uh, you'll see it even in the way people are dressing and all of those things, but it's philosophically in the mind, the education institutes, etc. So that's how I see the cultural roots and how the political system is emphasizing culture, not as a chauvinistic element, but looking at it from the point of view of what it is that we have that have stood the test of time for thousands of years, that we should retain and build on to cope with also the, I don't want to say the modern age, but the era we're in.
Yeah. It reminds me of this quote that I think Lee Kuan Yew made, you know, a rally. I think he was talking about how Asians should not be Westernized. And he was very obsessed with this idea that if you try to do that, you'll only always be seen as inferior because you're never the, the true thing. So the right thing to do is to, to a certain extent, search inside yourself and figure out, like, what is the cultural identity that you truly stand for.
I can, I just, you know, I think it's an important point that, uh, that I, I, that clip of Lee Kuan Yew saying that, I've seen it many years, but for some reason, it popped up again on my dreadful feed, uh, a few weeks ago, and I shared it with a few people and I said, you know, I think Lee Kuan Yew will be disappointed. And here again, I'm very respectful to the Singaporean audience. But, you know, the reason for having these kinds of conversations is to sometimes also speak about some inconvenient things. And, and I think Singapore has essentially become, it is, it is, and I'm no expert on, you know, how that transition or what's happening, but it has, from the point of view of someone like me, who's Malaysian, lived around the world, being in Hong Kong, etc., adopted more Western norms than most places, right? So, you know, I wrote a book called "Dismantling Global White Privilege."
And, uh, in that book, I basically said that the capture of the mind is the most, uh, insidious part of the post-colonial era. So you don't have to now, you know, capture the institutions of the state. You don't have to have boots on the ground, but you can capture the minds of the elites. And that is the most insidious war that's going on at the moment. That's part of the media war. Capture the minds of people. And a lot of people don't understand how insidious that is. That is why most people, hopefully only until lately, um, you know, watch BBC and CNN, said, "This must be true." But never ever understand or were willing to even consider the notion these are propaganda machines of the empire, the US, etc., right? But if it's CGTN or something, "Oh my God, Chinese propaganda," right? So, um, the point I was trying to make here is that in my book, I did say that in places, richer places in Asia,
The capture of the mind has been so strong, people don't even understand. And I mentioned Singapore and Hong Kong.
Interesting.
As places where elites are actually wannabe whites.
Okay. So that's quite cutting.
Yeah.
And I never got invited to Singapore to do my book launch, but I won't go into the details of all the institutions that declined me an invitation to speak here. And one of the most prominent Singaporeans tried to get me an invite. I won't name his name. Tried to get me an invite, and no one, no one accepted.
Mainly because just in one paragraph, I said this is a problem.
But this is a problem in other countries too. But I just named.
Yeah. And in Africa, in particular, African academics, uh, and writers in the post-colonial era have been very forthright about this issue, right? Capturing the essence of this black people seeking proximity to the ex-colonial masters' power, right? And that's how power, Western powers, and what I call white privilege persists in the world. People seek legitimacy, non-Westerners, through association with Western institutions, you know.
So that's, that's also a very important thing that since you raised it, I just wanted to bring it up for a discussion because I think Lee Kuan Yew was profound in his understanding of what that actually means. I would love to kind of bring him back and say, "Hey, what do you think?"
Man, I've spoken to many folks, uh, operating in Singapore and have experience in the region. So, I, I, I don't know to what extent.
No, I mean, you know, you live here. Your, your point is, is valid. I, I'm reflecting on the Singapore context, um, because it's a much wider global, uh, issue. The capture is, is global. And in my book on dismantling global white privilege, um, I dissect essentially nine, 10 elements of globalization.
Yeah.
Which are essentially rooted in extending white privilege.
Yeah.
And white privilege continues to be extended because they have co-opted elites in our system.
Right. And it was inevitable after 400 years of colonization, you know, people want to, you know, skin whiteness, the largest beauty product in India, in Southeast Asia. Why people want to look
White.
Yeah.
And I, I can go into details which I will not mention on in this podcast about the extent to which people want to be white.
Yeah.
Right. So that, that is a phenomenon around the world, you know. Uh, I mean, just look at the way people dress, right? Particularly women's fashion. Uh, the Cheongsam, I don't think anyone wears really wears in Singapore anymore. Everyone's wearing Western clothes, right? Uh, and I'm not suggesting we should go back to something, but why not even, why can't somebody turn up to work at DBS with a sarong?
Just saying, right?
Yeah.
You see what I'm saying, right?
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, but we are totally, um, captured. That that is the way you present yourself. And if you turn up looking like something else, my God, you know, that person is not us. And so I think this is much more insidious than we all think.
Okay.
And among young people, the fads, the fashion, whatever, it's the onslaught of how people want to be, nobody wants to look African in Asia.
You know, nobody wants to look, uh, like something else than what Western stylists say they should look like.
So I have a chapter about fashion in the book.
And the little black dress, that's a product. It's not culture, right?
Yeah. But product manifests.
It manifests, but it's not, it's just a car.
Yeah.
Uh, but for the longest of times, like Chinese cars were seen as superior.
Of course, but that, but, but it was clear that the product became superior. So the consumer buys the superior product. But culture is more subtle. And we can talk about this more, but I'll just say, and then we can move on. Yeah.
Um, you know, it's like, um, all the, the hysteria around bringing what I consider a third-rate star called Taylor Swift. You know, I play music, right? And I, you know, that stuff to Singapore.
Yeah. And not nationalistic or chauvinistic from a cultural point of view. Just be open, more open to the world and say, you know, why am I listening to this crap when there's so much other stuff in the world? And why do we give, spend all our money on this, these brands rather than so much else? And I could go on and on about stuff. But, uh, my, my point of coming to your, you know, to respond to your question is to get, hopefully, the audience that you, you know, you, uh, you attract to just think about this and,
Read a lot more about it. And without wanting to promote my book, go and read the book because it's the only book out there that actually dissects this, this dilemma.
That's the, uh, that's interesting. I, I do hope nobody else wants to write about it. Certainly not white people. On that note, I thought it would be interesting to kind of use the China case study as an example of what it means to kind of, I think, independently go your own way, as one will put it. Because I think one of the biggest shifts that you've seen was, you know, with the reemergence of China as a, a technological, economic powerhouse, is that now you could say that there is actually a, a third way, or even a new, as a country, or even in an Asian country, no matter how small you are, I can say that actually Asians are also capable of producing great technology, great cultural products. So if we were to look at, say, China today, of, you know, all the things that they've done, be it lifting people out of poverty, the infrastructure build-out, their innovation technology, what are some of the lessons or key lessons that small states, middle states in our region can learn from them that we could apply?
Yeah, you know, can I, uh, pick up on just something you said, right? You said, "And now we believe Asians can also, uh, create all this technology." So, think of the roots of that statement, the subconscious. And I'm not trying to pick on you, but you know, think about the roots. The roots of that is essentially, we never thought we could do anything. Now, who put that in our minds? The education system. We're all Western educated. I was Western educated, and I had to decolonize my mind. It was a radical process. But I had the opportunity of a lived experience of then living. First, I was in the UK for about six, seven years, and I realized, my God, uh, this place is so archaic and part of the old world, and I had no sense that I needed to belong here. Yet, every Asian's dream at that time was to live in the UK or go, and if you got a work permit, which I did as a young person, I've made it, including my parents, and or go to the United States. And I realized this is not my place. I don't belong here. Second, then I went to Africa. So had a different lived experience there to open up my mind. And then I came back to Asia and I had the grand opportunity of working out of Hong Kong for about 25, 30 years and going to China and having the experience, the learning experience of seeing what I think most people would consider the greatest transformation in human history. Right? So, but we, we always thought that we can't, right? Where did that come from? That came from our Western education, that we are inferior, you'll have to follow us. So, I, even in literature, you know, what the hell was I doing learning Shakespeare, uh, in monsoon Malaysia, you know, learning about meadows and, and, and mosquitoes and rain, etc. So, it's colonization of the mind. So, the idea that we are inferior is not ours. It comes from that.
So, I'm just saying that now we can. But all, and it's not just saying that, "Oh, no, we are equal." As it's humanity, there's one humanity. But the idea of progress came from who controlled the world. If you control the world and resources and enrich yourself, then you essentially enabled yourself to advance technologically, and if you had stability. So, coming to your question about China, China basically went through a very dark period. We all know that the history, it was subject to its own failings, uh, and the influence of external influence, the Opium Wars, and all of that. But, you know, it was also, take responsibility, own failings, and that period essentially required a transition, which was reaffirming the nation-state, the civilization state, reaffirming a governance system suited to this. And that system then became, was led by the, the Chinese Communist Party. But the key, and this comes back to the notion of the civilization, was stability. Create stable conditions. And to create stable conditions, and Singapore is much smaller, but Lee Kuan Yew did the same. Create stability. We are not going to tolerate a lot of unnecessary noise. Yeah. Because we have to come from a very low base, and we have to move up. And that's what Lee Kuan Yew did, and he set an example. And as you know, the Chinese even came to a small state like Singapore to say, "So, how did you do that, Mr. Lee?" And that's how it started. So, once China established its stability over 30 years, people understood what was going on. Then it could do the other things, which is, at peril, and I talk about this in my book. Key things for that economic rise and technological advancement was essentially massive investment in infrastructure. A very clear focus on reforms that enhanced economic productivity. Classic neo, you know, neoclassical economics. They borrowed that. Then strategic investments in technology, right? And through educa, and in education. But very importantly, I believe in the communitarian. So, not allowing all of these elements of progress to result in a society in which that the divide was so big. This is not to say there isn't the divide in China still, but to not allow private enterprise to capture the entire economy. So the communitarian, and I think very importantly, don't get, uh, excited by your rise and get involved in foreign incursions. And I've done quite a few podcasts about people say to me, "Why isn't China involved in that?" But the, the Chinese view is not to get involved in that. So, I think those are the reasons why, you know, China, good. So for middle states, I think it's difficult to say what is it you can, uh, copy from China. But I was asked in a podcast, I think about a month and a half ago, by a Singaporean journalist, but of Indian from India, uh, and about what can India learn from China. And that podcast went viral, actually. A lot of comments from Indians from around the world. But I said, I don't think, I think there's a lot India can learn from China, but I don't think it's able to because of its political system, and its civilizational roots are different. And that sort of unified civilizational state and the political system allows China to do. And most people in China understand, they're no one's like, "Oh, wow, this is the best government we have." There's no country with that. But people understand the trade-offs, right? So they say, "Hey, this is good enough. We're all sort of growing up here, and we're getting better." So, I think, you know, I said India can't, there's many lessons to take, but can it implement? No. And mainly because of the main one is the political system. Then I said, I talked about culture too. So for middle states, it's kind of difficult. But I would say two things that I've been asked. Let's take my country, Malaysia. And I think the main thing Malaysia could learn from is essentially having a rule of law that is essentially, um, based on no form of discrimination in terms of who has power, etc. It's not a feudal system. And again, I, I want to qualify what I'm saying by not saying, by saying that I'm not suggesting China is perfect, but it's very clear. The law is very clear, and you can't get away with certain things. We're just sacrosanct to essentially the communitarian system, right? But the most important thing I think we can take away, and most countries are beginning to understand, um, is the system of governance needs to be, the institutions have to be very strong. I wrote about this in my second book, "The Sustainable State," that if we are to navigate the challenges of the 21st century, which are rooted in managing the existential threats of a crowded planet, right? It's not simply an environmental discussion. Then we're going to have to have institutions that are essentially do not bend to the powers of the private enterprise market. Institutions are strong. Singapore has that. Singapore's government, I mean, there are people who can criticize various aspects of it. But if you're in, if you live in Singapore, you're a very lucky person because you are protected from so many of what we call, most of the world suffers from, which is the rights to a decent life. And there are different elements of that. But more or less, Singaporeans are probably some of the luckiest people in the world. Some Singaporeans complain, "We work too hard. The government taxes too much. There's too many fines." But my God, you're a lucky lot in that sense, right? You haven't been to Bangladesh. You haven't lived in India. So, middle states, I think, learn from China, should learn, should learn from China. The emphasis on strong institutions of the state. The strong institutions should be competent. Only the best work there, and it's based on meritocracy. And there's no other rule. And if you can do that, then you're able to do a lot with the resources you have to essentially manage what I call the unprecedented times we live in. You know, I'm not saying forget the wars, but the wars are actually a symptom of a much larger problem, which is essentially what I said in a podcast, uh, recently. It's all geopolitics is all about who controls resources. Who controls the resources of free passage through the Hormuz Straits? All of those is who's going to control now, like the straits, you know. So, it's resources. And then there's the resources of, uh, essentially minerals, all of that. And if you have those institutions, then you have a solid basis to endure what's coming. What's coming? So, I, I look at Malaysia, and my advice always to my, to try to is strong institutions. The Chinese system works, institutions are super strong. Is it infiltrated by bad actors? Of course, but the system is also taking out the bad actors as much as it can. Uh, and many of our systems are not. So, if you get the strong institutions, um, competent people, meritocracy, Singapore is a great example. Of course, it's smaller, but, you know, and in a week, Japan is very different, but it's the same strong institutions. Do not, not reliant on these on the political system. Only the strong institution in, in Japan, and I talk about this in my book on sustainable state, is even the village. So, the institution is not just the government. It's the institutions of our society, which start with the institutions that put in the laws and regulations, but those institutions then have to be supported by the institutions of our community. So, I just want to talk about the Japanese system for a little, not system, but just, but Japan is orderly because not because there's policemen around the corner and institutions just finding everybody, because that society has essentially cascaded a value system right through where no person in any village in Japan would throw trash in a river. It would be seen as so anti-Japanese. I think the Koreans have the same elements of this, and I dare I say, you know, several of the, the European nations where there is now actually an erosion, but I've said Germany and those places, you know. So, I think that's what middle states need to do. And I was talking to people about the Middle East, and much of the tensions in the Middle East arise from the fact that so many, I mean, apart from the geopolitical tension, that the societies are not organized. So you've got to get organized. And you can only get organized through the institutions, fairness, and then you have to deal with what the constraints we have. We, we have to live with. Each country has different constraints.
Yeah. Speaking of institutions, you look at China today is building up a lot of institutions and be, and perhaps deepening integration across Asia. Right. One thing's off the one, but one belt, one road initiative, one thing's off, uh, SCO organizations like these, and even BRICS, if you think about China's role in building up institutions today, how is it perhaps seeking to shape the international order differently from say, the Americans did when they were, you know, at the height of their powers?
Yes. Yeah. So, you know, in my earlier response to you, I talked about institutions and that was institutions at the, at the state level, right? The, the nation-state. I think your current question is then how do powerful states, uh, um, and you gave the example of China, lead the creation of international institutions and international initiatives? The Belt and Road is not an institution as such. It's more an initiative of the Chinese government. And then the SCO and all of those initiatives to provide an alternative to the, the what has been, you know, for 60, 70 years, a Western-led dominated global system. So when the West talks about the global order, what they mean is our order. And, and, uh, you know, the Chinese, the Indians were not party to signing up to all of that. The Chinese perhaps more because they were part of the setting up of the UN. So, so I think, you know, to your point, what does that mean? I think what China is trying to do, and I think they can't do any of this without the tacit support of others. So whilst China is seen as the forefront, uh, because they are so big and have attained a, a status through trade, etc., and economic power, a seat at the table, um, they are listening to the voices of around the world to create these institutions and play a leading, a leading role in them, uh, mainly to sort of also for their own interests, uh, neutralize the power of the Western, Western nations, who, in my view, and I think most neutral observers would say, have abused that power, particularly with regards to tariffs, sanctions, willy-nilly against, you know, "We don't like you, we will sanction." Who abused that? Uh, the, the use of sanctions by the Americans, drawing upon the exorbitant privilege of the dollar, is an abuse of what was the grand bargain of creating the reserve currency. Total abuse. And finally, the Europeans have also woken up to it. So, if you're, if you're China, or you're India, and if India was in China's position, they would do the same. They would stand up to this and say, "No more." And, [snorts] I think China is doing it in a way which is not strident. You know, you don't see the Chinese leaders yelling at the UN, abusing people, and saying, you know, "It's our time, and we're not going to do it this way," and all of that, or criticizing the United States in that way. So that's a cultural difference. So I think China is helping and leading the world while it's listening to the, the, the, what others have to say. I talk in my book about China is now, you know, feeling the stones as it crosses the river, right? Just checking, because they're very scared, or my, cautious, I should say, about overstepping because they've seen what's happened. [snorts] So I would say that one of the three things that you'll see always being said by the Chinese is that they are not, they want the UN system to work. They're not looking to trash it. They're not looking to dismantle it. Their funding to the UN has increased considerably, from 1% to I think 20% now, etc. And I've been asked quite a few times in recent interviews, etc., if the US is looking to exert its power by holding back its funding to the UN, what can we do? And I said, you know, stop thinking that the United States is the only benevolent power or will remain benevolent. Yes, it's a lot of money, but it's loose change in the larger scheme of things of rich nations. So, it's time other nations step up. And there are many rich nations to step up. And I think China has stepped up. I think it could do more. It might do more, but other rich nations around the world should step up. So I think this Chinese, uh, uh, uh, approach to creating institutions that, uh, complement, uh, should not be simplified into, they're trying to dismantle the whole system. I mean, they're extremely committed to the UN system, and that is good for the world. And they, as you know, the, the Chinese have put forward various different initiatives, the Global Governance Initiative, etc. There's a ton of work that the Chinese have done to do that. Most people are not aware of that. And these are not to undermine the United, the UN, but to enhance the UN, and not to antagonize the Western powers either. It's to bring them in, because we need the Western powers to be part of this architecture of change.
Yeah. I don't think it seems to me that I don't think it's an attempt at dismantling. I think it would be more of like it trying to influence international norms in a way that is perhaps much more favorable to its own national interest.
Sure. I mean, you can't, I mean,
All nations of power, you said, but you know, none of us, not none, but most of us thought it was acceptable.
When the Western powers did all of this. In fact, it was the,
It was the playbook. We all said, if the Western powers, it's all right because they're good guys.
Right. That's the capture of the mind again.
No. No, I agree with you. I said, I don't, I don't think whatever they're doing is bad. I think it's, it's good. They're generating a lot of public good.
And, but I have said to the Chinese, but they have to be careful because they could fall into the same trap, right? They can fall into the same trap. So, every, uh, big power, uh, will try and influence it. But I think we need to be careful, particularly when we think that China or any other non-Western nations when they do this, uh, we have to be more careful than if the West did it. And part of the reason the Western nations are so paranoid, and I've said this quite a few times, is you talked about the lack of understanding of the world, lack of understanding of Chinese, but actually many of them don't understand the world as a large, partly because of their dominance. Even the average European, uh, might be liberal, but in their mind, I'm superior.
But, but I'm not someone who's going to exhibit my superiority in a way over you. That would be jarring, that you would think I'm being, uh, a supremacist. I look down on you. But in the, in the deep, in the consciousness, can't help it. We were in charge of the world. Then there is within the political class an inability to accept, because the ramifications will be throughout society in the West, that the others have risen. And that inability to accept that if they have power, what will it be like? And the most important point I want to make in this is, if your history is essentially steeped in the dominance of people and civilizations for 400 years, and there's no running away from it. That doesn't mean other countries didn't commit crimes, etc. But the most persistent dominance of the entire world for the last 300, 400 years has been Western imperialism. Right? Genocides, extermination of populations from Australia to, to New Zealand, to Canada, to the United States. All of these are new nations created through the expansion of Europeans. And if your experience is only that, imbued in that is also the sense of superiority, then you're really worried now because you think the others will do to you what you did to them. And that is the biggest fear. Thus, is irrational thing that the Chinese are going to take over the world and dominate this and dominate that. Coming back to your point, they really don't understand. Even at its peak, and again, I want to be sure that people don't think I'm being an apologist for China. China has got many things it's got to do better, get right. But China was not an expansionist state. Nor were the Indians. It was only the Europeans. And I had a very well-known European historian say, "We were the outliers in terms of violence against the rest of the world in every corner of the world." And so, in that is that fear that, "Oh, you guys might do the same." And you have to understand that the animosity towards the Chinese is at the moment being manifested. But it could be against others too, because for the first time in 400 years, the West has had to confront a non-Caucasian civilization. And this is hard and painful. And elites in our part of the world also bought into that. How can anyone be better than the West? After all, many of our elites are essentially products of Western institutions and political theory and, and been beneficiaries of that system. So if you work for Goldman Sachs or something in Singapore, you're going to defend that system. As much as we know that system was essentially embedded in a privilege of that society and, and an era of creation of financial, uh, institutions that gave privileges to those institutions. So, so I think this is, uh, this is the most important thing that we fundamentally got to understand. At the same time, remind our Chinese friends not to forget. But my view is, is an exaggeration of the fear by the West for the reasons I just described.
Yeah, I, I don't think I was trying to like say that they were doing anything nefarious. I think what I was trying to get at was more of in the way they implement statecraft. Yeah. Uh, in in terms of shaping international norms, how do you see them deferring from the West? For example, if you look at infrastructure, right? Like I think they're spending a lot more, investing a lot more in infrastructure connectivity. So in, in that sense, when you have better economic integration with China, then naturally with that comes hopefully better geopolitical or diplomatic relations, as an example. So, so for me, the interesting aspect of the way they are in the, be it shaping international norms or in institutions, it's kind of they're very keen on, you know, investing in a lot of these, uh, um, say, infrastructure, as opposed to maybe in the West, where in the West, there wasn't that much of an emphasis on that.
Yeah. Well, you know, invest in Africa, and I lived there for a while, and you just, you know, there are instances where, you know, one can be critical of China's investments, uh, in there, but it's not the Chinese government. And that's the other problem, right? When, when China is in the world doing business, the Chinese companies do something awful, say, in Zimbabwe, and immediately the news is, "China is bad," and it must be the president, and those guys are terrible. Able, right? Whereas a Rio Tinto or or Exxon do something bad in South Africa or Southern Africa or Asia, we say, "Exxon," and "Rio Tinto," we don't say the company, right? So this is again, the sort of a racism and all kinds of things. I mean, we should not, we should not, uh, underestimate, uh, the core racism in all of this, too, right? Which is in the Western media. Uh, so, but, so the Chinese need to be very careful, and should anybody else as they go into this country, these countries. But, you know, um, you can speak to almost every African leader, and there's, there's been annually a summit in Beijing where almost every African nation, uh, uh, leader attends. And they attend because they might have their concerns about Chinese overreach, and everybody should be in Southeast Asia too, and we should talk. But what they see very differently about this, to your point, is they see a nation that wants to, once has their self-interest, but understands that if we want to do trade with you, and we need your, we want to do trade because we have need for some of your resources, or we want to be in your marketplace, etc., we can't impose it. So the best way is to help you develop too, because if we want our products to be sold in Kenya, that we need more Kenyans to essentially be more economically mobile, etc., etc. And the Chinese view is that development is the key, not geopolitics in terms of sanctions and, "You're not like us." You know, there's this issue that so much of the aid from the West was tied to "Be like us," or we will not, uh, you know, tied aid, it was called, right? All the sort of, uh, misconstrued and, and, uh, flawed, sort of, you know, human rights issues, etc., whilst the West was, you know, essentially transgressing on almost all human rights issues around the world, willy-nilly, depending on who you like or not. The Chinese were, "No, we're not interested in that, because these, these countries are different. But we will help build the ports, help build the railways, help build the power plants, help build the schools and clinics, and we'll try and get our part of, you know, the upside. But you also get the, you also get the upside." And that, I think, comes from, you have to look at the, the sort of China's involvement in the post-colonial sort of, uh, unraveling, because when I was in Africa too, when the, when the southern, the wars in Southern Africa were raging, Mozambique, Namibia, anti-apart, the apartheid, the fall of the, the fight against apartheid, Zimbabwe, etc. Guess which countries were most present supporting the anti-re, the, the revolutionary struggles? And this is not 500, 200 years ago, huh? This is 30, 40 years ago. China, Cuba, Russia. The most prominent. And that's why even when Nelson Mandela died, the people who got front row seats with the CNN people who didn't know history, didn't understand who said, "How is the Cuban minister sitting next to, you know, I think it was Obama?" Well, because Cuba was heavily involved. China was heavily involved in the revolutionary struggle, so was Russia, or so-called enemies of the West. So, I think that's also kind of important to understand where China's role in the world and how it sees itself. And I think it sees itself as an engine for development, rather than preaching to countries about, "You know, you must have these rules at the monetary." Because if those countries develop, then it has its own self-interest, taking into account access to markets, investments, and, uh, and its geopolitical sort of relationships are strengthened.
You mentioned Southeast Asia. I wanted to ask you, China's role in the development, or perhaps its relationship with Southeast Asia. So, more if I could be more specific, you framed the way Southeast Asia would work with China as an opportunity with No, sorry, let me, let me get that right. I want to get that right. Sorry. So you, you kind of framed China's rise, it represents a bounded cost and unbounded opportunities. And for Southeast Asia, we can capitalize on that. Practically speaking,
How would that look like? What would that look like to kind of have that deeper and stronger economic relation with China?
Yeah, I think you know when I mentioned that I I was in many instances talking about the unbounded sort of opportunities but bonded cost uh that um there are in China. So many opportunities firstly for Chinese businesses to grow etc but also many constraints within this the system. Those are being loosened as reforms but the Chinese government is very clear and I was speaking to someone else if you're a large Chinese company and that's the difference is everything is about it but there are restraints.
So then when you we come to talking about opportunities for Southeast Asian countries etc my view has sort of shifted in the last few years especially in the last two three years and I think this is something we in Southeast Asia really have to think about because the two-way traffic is going to be less because what does China what does Southeast Asia have that China needs? It's typically resources and that's a low game play in mi right? You just don't want to sell durian from Malaysia and you don't want to just be selling rare well China's got it rare and metals. You don't want to just be selling uh fish products. You don't want to just growing food for China. You have to have more than them. And I think that's a wakeup call for many in Southeast Asia because China in the space of 5 years uh but the roots have been set longer has just raised ahead.
Yeah. Right. You you know what I mean? It's got his own problems with that too. and you know about the involution and all of that the the the race to the bottom and the Chinese government is taking very strict uh rules but that's point again its ability to respond. It's not going to let the free market or private actors essentially curtail it and that's the difference right? And it has very strong institutions, very capable people looking into the details of this.
So [snorts] for Southeast Asia I think you know We we have been caught by surprise how fast China has moved because for a while if you go back 25 years ago even in Malaysia we thought we were better than China and probably in Singapore a lot of people thought we are far ahead. Let me give you Hong Kong. I've been in Hong Kong for over 25 years. There still a lot of people think Hong Kong is superior to China. But when I first came to Hong Kong, Shenzhen was a ship was a small uh fishing village. Today, Shenzhen is the the tech center, uh the infrastructure is huge.
So, what has Hong Kong got for China? Actually, the only thing Hong Kong really has is this notion of the super connector and all of that. It's basically financial flows because of the one country, two systems, the different financial infrastructure. So that investors from Singapore will feel more comfortable channeling their money through the institutions of Hong Kong and putting it in China. And China likes that because it doesn't want the international finance market to essentially be centered in in China which has always been its theory that the financial centers should be enclaves outside don't get the contamination of the financialization of the Chinese system.
So I think for Southeast Asia we really have to think what do we have to offer apart from [snorts] raw materials you know and do we have anything technologically to offer? I don't think so. We don't. Right? Can we manufacture cheaper? No, we can't. So even if you take Singapore I think the greatest export at least forgive and forgive me if I'm wrong was the earlier was was the soft power of Singapore in terms of its management capabilities. China learned a lot from that, right? How to organize that that experiment in is it Shujo and all that. And so Singapore earned respect for that.
So I I I fear my my that uh we should not get in Southeast Asia get trapped in a raw materials export model to China. Because China is so big. They will suck it all up. You know Malaysians may not have durian to eat.
I I spoke to experts in this field. They have advised China. They have uh do they have done business in China and I've also spoken to people who are on the outside of it who are in Southeast Asia and one of the challenges was that and an economist put it to me in a in a very clear way. He said that what as China climbed up the ladder of industrialization because it could leverage its huge market sometimes it has crowded out or pushed off its neighbors in other parts of Southeast Asia. So, so the challenge and and to a certain extent even in Singapore small things like you know the FnB industry in Singapore. You feel crowded out because um as part of like what you shared earlier in China many of them especially the tech companies they see the way to escape evolution is to go overseas.
Yes. So you bring the full might of what you've developed. And we can't compete. That that I think is the central tension and I I wonder you know, is there a way for us to fine-tune our value proposition or should it be just that we accept that as it is and then kind of take the the wisdom of tong which is you bite your time you learn from them and then maybe you you're willing to kind of be that um be part of the one of the smaller fish within the ecosystem and then uh try to grow your own capability over time.
Yeah. Yeah. I think we have to do something different because you know the purpose what you've outlined to me is essentially in a way maintaining the status quo of the free market, right? And so I think we need to do something different.
Yeah. What would. And I have talked to the Chinese about this. So my my my point to you is I just take Malaysia again you know because our markets we bought into the free market ideology etc. And because we have weak institutions, there's a lot of leakage. So everything can be exported if you see what I mean, including river sand. And I just bringing that up so people understand river sand is actually extremely precious commodity. And Singaporeans will also know that seabed sand is extremely important and Singapore itself has come under criticism. And I think there was a little international court uh uh case between Malaysia and Singapore about seabed sand and reclamations all of those things. But riverbed sand most people don't think is anything but a lot of riverbed sand from Malaysia is being exported from the states of Pahang etc.
Now you think riverbed sand who cares. Coming back to this point that because China is so big. So what's Malaysia's problem? Coming back to my earlier question, weak institutions, right? Weak institutions are susceptible to being undermined by active economic actors. You can call it corruption maybe a crude word or the inability to regulate. So my point with this is we start and using the river sand example. The Malaysian government should be very tough and said no river sand will be exported and the Chinese would say [ __ ] again same as China has said they will restrict the export of rare rare earths. You know that right? They started. And they did it both strategically but they also did it to protect themselves because for those who are not aware mining is one of the most uh dangerous environmentally damaging activities in the entire mining sector and there were so many of this that the Chinese thought we need to regulate the state went in. So when the state was weak many private actors in provinces essentially saw it as cheap money making they didn't see the value the state imposed an order.
So I coming back to your point I think we in this part of the world should say we can't this I don't want to use the word tsunami it's inappropriate but this uh force of China is not good or bad but it has effects on us. They are just going by what uh you know international trade allows come in. We have private actors in our countries who are willing to sell everything of ours because the rules allow it. Intervene.
Yeah. And that's why I think the states should intervene. So whether it's FNB. The Singapore state can intervene and said no and if not but do it in a way it's not a geopolitical thing but go to the Chinese and say sorry but you know we need to protect this. And I've said to the Chinese, last point I want to make on this, you know, Chinese um fisheries in off the coast of East Africa have been doing what they do, going out and catching fish in one of the most abundant sort of ocean uh ocean fisheries in the world. This is depleting stock. Um but they're not criminals but they should be stopped through the governments of the East African countries coming together and doing a deal with the China setting quotas monitoring etc etc and making it very clear but if you don't have the institutions and this is the problem for the poorest states of Africa right they don't have the institutions they don't have the technology to monitor this and all of that so you have to go back to the power like China and say hey we can do this and my advice vice to the Chinese government of fisheries is you can't do this. This is really bad for your your reputation and it's unfair.
Yeah. If you want full access to the transcripts of every episode, just head over to ykeith.com and you'll get full and free access to each transcript. Now, back to the show. How do we rethink the way Southeast Asian fine-tune it value proposition to the world? Not just to the Western world, but to the world at large. How should we do that?
Can I flip that around? Yeah, sure. And say first thing is um what is our value proposition to ourselves? Because I've mentioned already we live in an era of existential threats. Most people don't understand how extensive and insidious the existential threats are.
Yeah. So if I just look at say Malay KL you know a recent report says KL would be one of the hottest cities in the world. I never thought this could happen because I thought hot was Dubai and Riyad and places like that. This is our tropical city because we have essentially not managed well. Right? You're doing a better job, but it'll get hotter. The weather will get more extreme in terms of wind speeds. And again, you're doing better. And you may not be aware, but the Singapore government is looking at even what type of trees to plant which can withstand the windshare and all of these things. So I I don't think we should be looking at the world from the point of view of what is our value proposition others. That's the old world. We want to sell something to everybody else and that's the only way we can survive. No, I think we should look at what is the value proposition ourselves.
And how do we manage within constraints? These constraints are coming. You have to be in denial not to understand. So people need to read a lot more. But so let me go back to my Malaysian context, right? Uh the value proposition for Malaysia is actually what do we want the country to look like in 30 years? And if you can start mapping that out 30 years given what we know is happening around the world and not get fixated just simply by a war but actually the more insidious things happening in terms of the natural systems which are being turn which are being put off balance by the economic model the so-called all value proposition of the past a value proposition that is essentially is destructive. So the value proposition is what do we need? So if I Look at Malaysia. I would say actually one of the biggest threats and to Singapore too is food security. I'm just giving you an example food security and food security. Chinese China is spending a lot but they started 15 years ago looking food security because they had the experience of hunger right? You know I I wrote an article about two years ago saying that the founder of Huawei in the 1970s was scrambling picking weeds and berries in his province to feed his family. So the Chinese experience is not you know hundreds of tour it's now It's in the live experience of many of the leaders. Food security is number one priority.
Yeah. If people are fed, it's going to be okay. Right. So when you look at what the world's going to look like, then you have to prioritize what is economic value proposition really about.
Yeah. Right. And then you get back to basics. Then we leverage everything we have, the technology, the knowhow, etc. But we can't think about our society simply from the point of view of the neoliberal economic idea of spurring consumption of everything and anything essentially that translating into jobs and salaries and then people society should be okay. I think we have to think about it very differently. So I think the value proposition uh that we have to think about is firstly for ourselves for a small nation like Singapore therefore where does it sit within the ASEAN ecosystem what are the more fundamental relationship it has to have what role does it play in that and how can it help okay how can it help the Indonesians etc to essentially navigate what I've already talked about would be the biggest threats of our time.
That's the value proposition. And I can go further you know than say if you start looking at that then you will see that actually most of our surface waters are polluted. And people might say oh he's talking environmental stuff. No, I'm talking economics. If our surface waters continue to be polluted and this is not Singapore right? I mean your surface waters are minuscule compared to you know the rivers and all that then we are fundamentally threatening the the true economic right opportunities that should be un uh capitalized over the next 50 years given the world we we live in. So that's how to think and then create economic activity around that. So I could give you an example, you know, take Jakarta, you know, I would say 8 90% uh to be fair to my Indonesian friends, but uh I okay, let's say 70% of all waste, human waste is not treated.
Now you might say, well, that's an environmental issue. No, it's fundamentally an economic issue because if the rivers are polluted, you can't grow the rice, right? You can't have your cost of drinking water goes up. We can't continue to live in the world where everyone's drinking out of a plastic bottle manufactured by industry, you know. So that's how you create that economic value. I mean, I would estimate that just restoring the integrity of the natural systems will create hundreds of millions of jobs.
Yeah. And then the question is what is your monetary policies essentially to create those things right? And for a small state like Singapore it'll be very different from Indonesia.
Yeah. And you probably play a key role in being the finan a financial center right? And maybe partly a technological education center etc. But your role is in Southeast Asia rather than what the I mean who cares what the what the rest of the world thinks about Singapore. But its plan it survival depends on the ecosystem because it's connected.
Yeah. And that's really what I I think uh the world should look like and what we in Southeast Asia should look like. We will have to feed. Today's population of Southeast Asia is about 700 billion. We will add no 750. Yeah. We'll add about another 250 million people. The next 30 40 years. Will be a billion. A billion people living in one of the most ecologically sensitive hotspots in the world which needs to be protected not because you know we need to just save rhinos and tigers but because they are symptoms of a much more uh important thing which is the disruptive natural systems and when those natural systems start to be destroyed they essentially come crashing back on us. Those the symptoms, right? The haze is one system. The haze is not about fires or palm oil. It's a destructive economic model. So, we have to rethink all of those things.
Yeah. To create the the proposition, what is our value proposition to the world?
Yeah. And to ourselves.
That's an interesting reframe. On that note, I have one final question for you for the final minute.
Yeah. Given all that you know about the world, if you had one piece of advice you have to give to a fresh, brighteyed young university student who has just graduated entering into the working world, what would it be?
Don't do AI. But most seriously uh and attest to that is um start looking at what is your purpose? And this is not a spiritual question. And it's actually a fundamental question that anyone with a graduate degree privilege etc should say what do I actually want to do rather than how much do I need to earn. I'm not saying money is not important but if you can at an early stage of your life start what do I want to do and let me answer that question if you can give me another minute. Say you are um you just done a PhD in chemistry at N US. There's several jobs that are open now. I come from a chemical engineering biochemistry background. There's several things you can do. You can go and work for a chemical company and do research and development on more agrochemicals which pollute the world which is the current model. Or you can do research and development that essentially looks at reducing by 60% the chemical potency and toxicity of agrochemicals. Right? You can do two things. You might have to work for different companies. You can work go and work for a defense contractor and fuel the military-industrial complex, right? Or you can go and start your own company or work for a company which is looking at building which is it is chemistry uh the world's uh waterless toilets. Why? Because with 10 billion people in the world, uh there is no chance of us all having a flush toilet. There's not enough water. The infrastructure is too expensive and um the cost uh the the infrastructure cannot be built because of the crowded nature of our cities now, right? So you could then therefore go and say hey there's a great opportunity to do this far-reaching technology to look at not just the technology but the entire system of the waterless toilets and I am going to use my chemistry my intelligence and my sense of uh purpose to go and do that. Well, I I would say, you know, it's a good question. Um, please don't get bogged down in AI. It'll make it more stupid. Uh, you lose your cognitive intelligence. So, try and preserve your your cognitive intelligence. But try and say, what do I want to do? And don't follow the feds. The feds are the killer to do something different. And I just gave you the example. If you're an economist, what do you want to do? If you're studying finance, why are you studying finance to get go and work for a VC or do you want to go and do something else? And I think that's where the future lies and a happier life too because you know lots of young people are mentally unhealthy because of the stressful environments in which many of them find themselves working in today chasing reward systems that are framed through what I call ruthless meaningless KPIs. That's what I would say you should do. And we need a new paradigm for young people to go and do stuff.
With that, Chandran, thank you so much for that thought-provoking conversation.
Thank you so much for having me. I hope it was slightly useful.
That was very useful.
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