Battle Of Perceptions In Operation Sindoor

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Hello and welcome to Strategic Front Lines, the YouTube channel of laws. And today we are going to discuss a very sensitive issue and rather, I would say, a very important issue related to any conflict. And, uh, as you all are aware, there are over 113 conflicts going around in the world. So if you actually plot it on the map, it would look like that World War 3 is already on. Only thing is that we are not able to perceive it in the manner as a holistic phenomena which is going on across the world.

But, uh, that having said, in our country also, we saw a brief cameo of of Op Sindhur, during which we had an intense narrative war which played out between both India and Pakistan, and I dare say aided and abetted by China. So all these three actors were involved in some kind of a narrative war which is continuing even post the, uh, operation seizing of the operations. I won't call it as ceasefire because technically India has not declared ceasefire. We have just declared a secession of military activities on land, sea and air.

Uh, today to discuss this with, uh, with us, we have Ashish Singh, MD and the editor-in-chief of World Plus 91. A very warm welcome to you, Ashish, to the show.

Thank you. Thank you, General Singh, for inviting me. It's, it's a pleasure to, uh, be with you on this, uh, uh, broadcast and talking about one of my, uh, you know, favorite topics, uh, the perception management, the information warfare, the SCOs, and the strategy communication. Look forward to your questions and introductions.

Yeah. Yeah. Thanks. And I, I would like to briefly, uh, introduce, uh, to the audience, although he doesn't require any introduction, but suffice it to say that he has been in this journalistic field for quite some time, and he has live covered the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas war, and he's now currently closely watching the Iran-Israel conflict which is going on. As also during Sindhur, he was, he was, uh, in a very, very important role to ensure that India does get the right kind of approach to whatever was coming across on us from the across the border, both from the western as well as the northern.

So before we go ahead and, uh, start probing the mind of Ashish, I would like to briefly just, uh, put across to our audience what all actually happened during this of Sindhur and then we will widen up the entire discussion to include all the other conflicts. So I'll, uh, do this by starting with the presentation which I have.

So this is basically, I'm calling it as, you know, mastering the black magic geopolitical tool of conflict management. This is what is going to be the future. And if you are not mastering this black magic, I'm reminded of Chanakya who used to say that one of the means by which you can actually subdue your enemy is through magic. Now, people used to think, you know, that he's just written that thing out of his hat. But let me tell you, this is what is black magic. What is happening around you is the black magic. Somebody called it as gray zone. What is gray zone is tending towards the black.

So with this brief note, let me share with you a feedback which I got on a podcast from one of our podcasts which I have done with Jaishankar and others. And it is a listener from United States of America who says, "I currently live in the US and I have observed a deeply worrying trend. Anti-India sentiment is spreading rapidly across TikTok, especially among Gen Z users. Pakistan is capturing the minds for next 20 years. Instagram reels and the other social media are not famous in US. Here are just few examples of the toxic narrative gaining traction against Indians: India is an aggressor in South Asia. Why Indians don't sh? India is a dirty, unsafe country. India lost the war to Pakistan. Hindus are weak and uncivilized. Dirty Hindus," etc., etc.

Now, you can imagine, we have banned TikTok. So we could not even respond to these narratives. The other social media platforms are not very popular in the US. So therefore, we should have had some handle in the United States to actually counter these, uh, narratives which were taking place. I'm not saying that we should react to every, uh, small little thing. But this was across the board US, it's viral. These were viral narratives which were going on. So he suggested certain things. The, the, the, the beef of it is that, you know, sometimes the banning becomes counterproductive. So maybe we could have found an alternate way to get into TikTok and start building a narrative through our friends. And he says that in the youth is very much capable of actually countering these narratives. Unfortunately, there was no guiding factor in the United States which could have done this kind of a thing or the other western countries. So I would, uh, from my side, recommend that wherever is the platform, we must have the presence to counter such, uh, issues.

Then we, uh, come to a brief overview of what is India's overall media picture. 900 private TV channels, 550 FM radio stations, 1 lakh 18,000 print publications, rapidly growing digital ecosystem with 86 million internet users and 491 million social media users. This is a 2-year-old figure. If you add it to the current figures, I think we would be touching a a billion mark as far as internet users are concerned. But I'm not very sure about it. It is projected to grow, uh, driven by digital media and OTT platforms, of which Ashish is a very, very important, uh, driver as of now. He's actually focusing in these two areas. It's likely to grow by 43.03 billion by financial year '28. Not very far, just about, uh, three years down the line. We are, and maybe it might get hastened up.

Data crunching and exploitation by the Chinese intelligence agencies are taking place where they're removing the outliers and catching the the, uh, essence of Indian media and trying to build counternarratives from the Chinese side. And I'll show you the virality of the narratives which were being built from the other side. So if you look at, uh, the scan of the Pak narrative, I think most of you have seen it. I won't like to repeat, uh, this thing, but I would like you to focus on the central portion, you know, which says that "Hello India, are you ready?" You know, where they have got Xi Jinping, Yunus, and Shehbaz Sharif, all three put together. So they were picking up almost everything and anything which they could use to build a narrative. If you look had the false flag operations, they were consistently employing Indian journalists to throw out a propaganda, intelligence, failure of inner army. I mean, Satpal, Mallay, Karan Taper, Radha Kumari, the work, Siddharth, so many guys have been actually talking about it. And how are they talking? They are talking basically based on, uh, reach out by the others, by the by our adversaries. And, uh, unfortunately, we have not found unity in this kind of a narrative game.

Look at the targeting of religion. You know, they targeted actually that there is Sikhs have stopped cooperating in Amritsar. Now, this kind of a narrative was going on for a for quite some time before the Indian, Indian fact-checking organizations and the media houses. Unfortunately, it was left to the media houses to counter these, uh, narratives. I think there should be a much more rigorous method of countering these negative, putting it across as a fake, fake news, uh, you know, fact check. But, uh, anyway, propaganda was the other issue which was, uh, being played out in a very, very intense manner. Uh, if you look at the fake news scan, you'll find most of it later on was actually stamped as fake, but it did the damage during that period. Suppose it was an active war and it was a face-to-face war. It was not the aerial to aerial, uh, combat which was going on. It would have had an impact on our on our troops, and even now, probably some impact would have taken place on frontline troops.

So, uh, coming down to social media, now look at the, you know, virality. They have compared the operations of Pakistan and Operation Sindhur. They are naming operations of Pakistan as unprovoked and India as provoked. That means trying to trying to actually say that we are the aggressors, and they are, and somehow they got picked up in the international environment. My own experience has been that wherever with whomsoever think tanks I interacted, I'm talking of the foreign think tanks, based on our interactions in the past few days, I found that everybody was towing these lines and not the other way around. Okay. Chinese narrative. They were actually feeding to Pakistanis what exactly they have to do. And look at this. The, the, one of the tweets has gone to almost 59 million. 59 million. That's a huge number. And, you know, when the when the program ends, it is 989 views. Suddenly by the morning, it becomes 8.5 million views, and, and another by the evening, it becomes 53 million views or 48.3 million, thereabouts. What is all this? I think there is a now need for a structure, a need for good narrative builders, and a good narr, and a good method of dissemination across the entire globe. Otherwise, we'll be losing out in the, uh, narrative war.

Uh, these are some of the, you know, things which they took out from our, uh, you know, from their war. We took out our own counterpropaganda, call calling out straight fact check, def fake, etc. But I think we came a little late in this. Besides countering the narrative, we should have also projected our narratives of positivity. We, we started a little late.

So, uh, with that, I will end my, uh, presentation here and, uh, get my guest today. So, uh, Ashish, with that brief overview which I gave, I tried to hurry it up. Uh, what I want you to, um, basically focus on in your opening remarks is that, do you think that we could have done slightly better in, uh, in Ops Sindhur as far as strategic communication is concerned, right from top down to even tactical communications, as far as our, uh, narrative building is concerned? So, and thereafter, we'll expand the discussion. So over to you.

Thank you, sir. Uh, uh, yes, uh, certainly, uh, we, we, as a, uh, you know, as, as, uh, country, as, as, uh, structure, could have certainly done, uh, a lot better. But at the same time, it is somewhere in between. We did better than, you know, say post-surgical strike or the Balakot strike. So there is a lot of improvement as far as that particular area is concerned. Now, having said that, it's important to see, uh, uh, you know, every IW blue, every, you know, perception management, every psychological SCOs, all those strategic communication aspects primarily come from the trait of a country, you know. Uh, it, it may be as easy for a China to do that, as easy for an, uh, Pakistani army or a DGPR to do it, as compared to say, a very, uh, you know, uh, vibrant democracy like India, which has lot of, you know, structures and layers, which is obviously our strength as well. At the same time, in these domains, it becomes more complex and layered as far as the entire national approach is concerned. So we have done, uh, much better, uh, as far as the domestic part is concerned, but the sync is the problem, you know, the sync among the, uh, structures, the, the, the parties, the government, the, uh, verticals of the government. So it was kind of left to, uh, you know, certain verticals to take care. That's not going to be practically possible to, you know, counter at that level.

But the best part is, you know, this is one of my domains which I've been focusing a lot for last almost, uh, five, six years. It was good to see the beginning. The beginning has been, uh, pretty good. And as we say, uh, you know, it's difficult to have that journey from zero to one, but once you start, it's easy to go, uh, one to 10. So we are in that direction. We have started it. There are many areas that need to be worked upon, as specifically the sync and the, uh, coordination at both at the top government level and, you know, going down till the verticals and the, uh, specific domains. That is one area we need to work on. At the same time, I must mention, uh, you know, these things are never built overnight. It's not practically possible. Yeah, when you see specifically when I visited the, you know, Israel-Hamas conflict in October, a couple of years ago, it was, it was pretty evident that Israelis were doing this thing only because they could, they could counter the Hamas narrative only because they had the decent preparation. Without that, it's not going to be, uh, practically possible for any country or any vertical to have that particular approach. And that's the reason why preparation is very important as far as, uh, the entire approach of IW and SCOs are concerned. Without that, it's not practically possible. We have started, and even when we have started, I think it's going to take few years before we reach reach that stage if we expedite it quickly. These things. So that is the approach we need to work on. But as I said, it is heartening to see, good to see, at least we have begun in various aspects, and that is the reason why we were much better, not slightly much better, at least in the, uh, initiation part, in maintaining part, a bit of preemptive things were also done. Some of our government verticals, as we, as we, we call in in our, you know, colloquial language, the sarkari systems, they were also, some of them surprised with their activity. Yes, there were, there was a lot of room as far as the fact check is concerned, but for a change, you saw PIB fact check was pretty active, right? When whenever system, uh, doing much, much better, so it means we have begun well, it has started well. Yes, it needs to be ramped up, it needs to be institutionalized, it needs to be synced, it needs to be coordinated. Yeah.

So, uh, actually, what you are trying to say is, this particular issue, this is the slide which I showed, that our counternarrative really kicked in. What you were exactly trying to say, and in this, we also had the public sector or the government sector, as you are calling it, also kicking in quite, quite, I would say, effectively. Only thing which I felt was that possibly we, we improvised as the things went by. I think there is a need for, like you said, institutionalizing it, making structures which are pre-planned and anticipating as to what kind of narratives will be now coming from the adversary and having prepared counternarratives, as also our own positive narratives going out simultaneously. Like what we did in the conduct of the operation, I think the conduct of the narrative operation should have also been done simultaneously. Okay, this is happening, this is what going, what is going to be the narrative. The problem in this is that, you know, there are chances of losing out the secrecy part of it, you know, the surprise part of it. So for that, we have to work out somehow that, you know, the narrative arm or the information arm of the the country now as such has to be very well thought about and created in a manner that it is in sync with the operations which we are which we are likely to undertake.

So having said that, there was one area which I felt, this is my personal view, and I may be wrong in this. I'll remove this. I may be wrong in this, and that is the, the fact that, you know, I found that, and you yourself also, I think somewhere hinted when you, when you made the opening remarks, that while the internal narratives were very well, uh, taken care of, there was something about the international narrative or international, uh, arena where we found ourselves slightly, uh, behind. And it was much later that we started with the initiative of sending delegations out, etc. So do you think, uh, that this is the right perception of mine, or it is just my limited view? And if it is true, then how should we actually go about it in the future? Because narratives have the danger of leaking out the plan. That is also one of the, uh, one of the, uh, factors. Yeah.

What you, so, sir, if you, uh, uh, you know, see, uh, there, there are two theories that I have developed. Okay. Uh, one is the Triple M theory, and the, the second one is called the, uh, the, uh, third pitch. Okay. Okay. The third pitch is the issue here as far as India's approach on the, uh, narrative building abroad is concerned. Now, what is that third pitch? I'm talking about. Now, how much ever you try, be it Indian media, or Indian military, or Indian politicians, Indian institutions, corporates, whatever any institution of any nature, you know, government, private, remember, they all are trying to play on a pitch that does not belong to them. That pitch belongs to some Elon Musk. That pitch belongs to some Mark Zuckerberg. That pitch belongs to some, uh, you know, Altman, or so on and so forth, you know. It belongs to, uh, some other party which is largely and primarily dominated by the western, uh, dominance, right from Facebook to Twitter to, uh, you know, lot of lot of such verticals, from WhatsApp and everyone. So, that is where the issue is, and that's where I feel we got to be a little practical and realistic as well. That's where the larger, uh, picture counts.

Do you feel the West is going to easily accept India's rise, India's capability building? Certainly not. We all know that, you know, it has not been so, you know, nicely accepted and digested as far as our journey from fifth economy to the fourth economy is, four, fourth largest economy is concerned, and we are now on the way to becoming the third largest economy. So, it's not going to be easily digested. So, it's, it's like this, like America wants us to be, you know, good powerful when it comes to China, right? Basically to fight their own war. But when it comes to dealing with Pakistan, they suddenly become all these balancer and, you know, uh, uh, try and, uh, sort things out, all those aspects. So, it's a very calculative approach. So, are western, uh, social media and digital media companies, the pitch I'm talking about, the third party pitch, are they going to let us do our narrative? Certainly not. I'll give an example, and that's where I want to bring the listeners' aspect towards my Russia-Ukraine war, and most of the people may not be aware of it, but I'll tell you, this is going to be revealing and shocking. Do you know that during Russia-Ukraine war coverage, from YouTube to almost all major western-dominated social and digital media platforms, they banned the monetization of Russia-Ukraine war coverage? So, basically, you can, but will not monetize. It will not let you earn. So, in Indian discouraging it, right? So, in fact, I was expecting that. So, it, it discouraged, right? Because they knew Ukraine is not going to get that advantage, and Russia's, you know, being a bigger country, bigger army, bigger military, is not something that should go in the psyche and the minds of across the world, people across the world. So, what they did is, they indirectly discouraged. Obviously, you know, social media, digital media, there's no monetization part. It, it's, it's a, you know, thumbs down or a discouragement as far as the content creators are concerned of any platform. I was expecting that stage to reach in during Operation Sindhur as well, right? Luckily, it didn't stretch for that long. So, that is the third pitch I'm talking about. You are ultimately, you know, whatever, how much ever you want to work hard, sweat out in the net practice. But if the pitch curator is not in your favor, you know, that pitch curator might do that, you know, pitch wet, dry, that grass size, and all those things can suddenly, that's just one twist can change the entire, you know, your preparation, your game plan, your team composition, a lot of it. So, that's where I believe we need to, we need to be a little realistic and practical. The solution of it is, we have our own BBCs and the CNNs and the RTs and the France 24, coupled with our own capability, capabilities of social and digital media. Once we have these two combinations, I'm sure we'll be least dependent on the, uh, on the, uh, these western social media and the western media. Let's leave that fascination of BBC and CNN and Washington Post and the New York Times. We all know they, they're horribly, horribly biased, and they still look at us as most of them as the snake charmers and the, you know, the rounds third world country. So, let's not depend on them. Let's not, uh, let them measure us. It's okay. But yes, we need to have our own stuff. We need to have our own platform. That's the, uh, solution. So, that is one.

Second, uh, the aspect you mentioned about, uh, the, uh, the narration part as far the western media is concerned. You know, Jeff Bezos, Amazon owns one of the biggest, uh, media houses. Who, who's Bloomberg? A businessman. Who's Rupert Murdoch? A businessman. Most of the media houses across the world, if they are not government-funded, they are primarily the media pattern is either a politician or a business tycoon. Now, if you have F-16 being downed by an, you know, vintage MiG, do you feel the American media is going to like it? Certainly not, right? Balakot time. So they're not going to like it. They're not going to support us. And if you see, uh, uh, the, uh, in the recent Ops Sindhur, a lot of competition was from the made-in-India weapons, right? Are they going to encourage it? Certainly not. They're not going to digest it nice and well. So we should not expect, and that's where I feel, let's be realistic and let's be practical. Do not, uh, let them give us marks. Having said that, we build our own capacities. We build our own, as I said, the CNNs and the BBCs and the RTs of the world. The other aspect, I must realize that we, as a country, as, uh, uh, you know, as system, as government, as politicians, as the corporates, institutions, we have not learned the trick of the trade as far as the communication is concerned. If you see China, I'll just give a quick example. The Chinese ambassador in India, you know, every person has a Twitter handle. There is a Twitter handle of Chinese ambassador. There's a Twitter handle of Chinese spokesperson, embassy spokesperson, then there's a Twitter handle of the Chinese ambassador and the embassy and everyone. Do we have that? Even when it comes to Indian ambassador or Indian embassy abroad? No. No. Even if an ambassador has it, it's it's in a pure personal capacity. So the Twitter and such games are banned in China, right? They their diplomats are not practiced or tuned to it. They're not practicing that back home. But when they come outside, they know how to utilize this narrative medium, how to utilize social and digital media, and they are utilizing it very well. Whereas we, being world's largest democracy, we are not practicing it. So there, there is a need to, you know, pump up and pull up our socks, get that advantage as far as the initiation part is concerned.

Before we go further, I just want to take 30 seconds, sir, to, you know, to our viewers, explain this entire concept of which, which you also mentioned, the reaction part and the catch-up part. Information space is like a void. If you don't fill it, someone else will fill it. Somebody, somebody else will fill it. So, uh, uh, the, the reaction is going to be horribly problematic. It's always best to have the preventive filling of that space. If, if you fail, trust me, it's going to be very difficult. First, you have to remove someone else's or counter someone else's narrative, and then fill it with your narrative. It's a much more complex task. It's best to have that space filled in advance. And we, as a country, as a system, as government, as institutions, as corporates, we need to up our game as far as that particular aspect is concerned.

So, so two quick, uh, you know, questions to you. You have, you know, highlighted the various issues related to being up on the game, filling the space, etc. Now, filling the space cannot be a one-off event, right? The filling the space has to be a continuous process because information warfare has got or operations have got nothing to do with, you know, whether a conflict is going on or whether a conflict is not going on. There would be challenges between relationships as far as international relations are concerned. So we need to be constantly upgrading our, you know, nuanced information operations. So therefore, I feel that is one area where it has to be a continuous process so that when the time comes, you just simply upgrade, just simply push it up a notch higher to ensure that you are actually taking the lead. That is, that is one issue. The second part which I wanted your answer on this is, of course, a comment which I gave you. The, the, the second question which I want is, you know, we also banned certain apps etc. and certain incoming communications coming from various inputs. But, you know, that these bans can be overcome through VPN and things like that. Do you think it is better to ban or it is better to actually, you know, combat it? So between the two, I mean, combat it through through the information space only and not through the physical space. You know, the Israelis tried to actually physically damage the, uh, propaganda sources of the, uh, of the Hamas, but they couldn't succeed in the past, whether it was 2006 or 2008 or subsequently in 2011 and so on and so forth. So, what's your views on the banning part of it? You know, should we go ahead with or should we should we contest it?

So, uh, it must be compartmentalized. Okay. Uh, we can have, and we, my personal opinion is, we should have both. Planning part had largely to do with the, uh, economic aspect as well, right? Like when you have a TikTok or similar such companies, they're making billions of dollars. So that's why it was called like a surgical strike, the economic strike as far as, uh, uh, you know, banning those apps are concerned. Obviously, it comes with the security reasons, you know, like a lot of these apps are utilized by the, uh, terrorists for the chatting thing without SIM cards and, you know, on on a gaming app, one can do these things. So that is that is one. Banning is is is a good idea. It also sends a message. It has its economic, uh, uh, aspect. So that that is that is fine and that must be done, no doubt about it. And, uh, as far as the countering part is concerned, that's where I say, let's compartmentalize. You know, we can ban while simultaneously build the capacity to, let's be combed, let's, you know, we, we will ban you, we'll not let you enter us because it has, you know, various reasons, A, B, C, economy, message, national security, a lot of things. But we can also, it's simply like, you know, surgical strike, like we not only have our guarded system, but we can also enter your territory and kind of destroy and damage at the time and will of our choosing. That part is missing. The capacity building, being combed, and, you know, how do we explore and enter, uh, is the part missing as far as, you know, the military destroying is concerned. I've seen lot of, you know, younger officers. In fact, a lot of these interactions have taken place at CLAWS under your leadership, and it's, it's heartening to see a lot of young officers, you know, have these capabilities, have developed as compared to say, what the set of officers I was interacting with, say, 8 years ago or 10 years ago, who, you know, after becoming IW officer or PRO officer or, you know, similar media and communication domain, they used to download Twitter for the first time after appointment. Now, a lot of them are coming well prepared. Obviously, it has, it has more to do with the generation. The younger generation is becoming more, uh, you know, better in the social media apps, but there are good officers and there's lot of awareness and exposure as far as those parts are concerned. It's just a matter of, you know, time. Let's keep our focused approach as far as building this capacity is concerned. And as you rightly mentioned, which I was, you know, describing in my earlier, earlier answer as well, those narratives have to be, those capacities, you know, a lot of times I was asked this question, do we need this? Do we need to do that? I'm like, look, let's build it. When do you want to use it? How much you want to use it? If you want to use it or not, is something that you can decide later on, on a case-to-case basis. The intensity of it, the direction of it, the quantity of it. Let's leave it to the situation. But you got to build it. Once built, you know, it's like, you know, having simple those tanks and those missiles. Do we need to buy you? You keep it yourself prepared, right? You, you use it when you want to use it. Whether you will use a BrahMos or a loitering munition is something that will decide on that particular evening or a day prior, depending on the situation. So that capacity building part is something that we need to have a continued focus. And the reason I'm mentioning continued focus because it's nice to see, uh, uh, in in the current regime, there's lot of awareness, there's lot of push, there is lot of focus on in those areas. If we have, say, couple of years more continued intensity and approach, we'll be there. We'll be there to tackle the DGPRs and, you know, a lot of these, uh, third pitch that I, uh, mentioned.

The other aspect I must mention, sir, is, uh, uh, is the, the Triple M theory that I mentioned earlier, you know, earlier. Yeah, you, yes, this is something I wanted to introduce to your viewers as well. Uh, the Triple M theory is, the realization has taken place in the political parties, but the institution needs to have a, you know, much emboldened approach and much more active approach in that particular front. Like, uh, uh, you are say military, M1, IM media, M2, and there is masses, M3. So military is obviously an example here. It could be utilized by anyone, a corporate, or a government, or a political party. They already doing it. A lot of are already doing it. I, I, I, I, I, sorry to interrupt you. In fact, I feel that the politicians, political parties are way ahead in this game, and possibly we need to replicate these people to actually fight our narratives. Yeah. Yeah. Like it, dislike it, agree, disagree. If there is a, there is a successful model of such thing exists in our complex democracy and communication country like India, there is no shame in simply copying or maybe just learning tricks and the trades from them. It is successful, and there should not be any shame in it. It's okay if you don't like it, some political party, a political B political, doesn't matter, unless and until it serves our country, it serves our military, serves our institutions, let's go for it. Let there be that clarity.

So that continuing the Triple M theory part for our for your viewers. I'm sure you, you have heard about it from me a couple of times. But I'm really very passionate about this Triple M theory. So from M1, earlier military needed M2, the media, to reach M3, masses. Now, with the advent of social and digital media, the M1 can directly reach M3 and be least dependent on media. You know, media itself is going through so much churning, at least in India, that it has now become from a journalism to the Gen Z's use the journalism, you know. So from journalism to journalism, that has happened because you got to, you know, quickly take out so many copies, you know, digital, whatever fire. So it's, you know, churning speed that also becoming one of the factors. So, yeah, that Triple M realization, Triple M theory realization is something that must take place. Once you realize the potential of it, then there is no looking back.

Okay. Uh, Ashish, I think we are flooded with questions in our, uh, in our, uh, chat box, and we have limited time. So what we will do is that I'll ask you the last question, and thereafter start taking questions from the from the audience because they are just filling up the boxes, and I need to honor them because they've all taken their time out and are listening to our, uh, podcast. So the question which finally I want you to basically briefly cover is that if you were to pick one good and one bad examples of narration or perception management from Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Hamas, and of Sindhur, what will be those examples? And if you don't want to say something about Ops Sindhur, I, I leave it to you because because I wouldn't like anything to, but but it's always good to know where we stand and then subsequently improve upon it, you know, it's not a question of admitting anything or something so. So we can start with Russia, Russia-Ukraine, and then go on to that was your first bastion, then you went to Hamas, and then thereafter you came here. Yeah. Yes. Yes. So, uh, okay. I'll try and give a little more than just one, one. Let's start with the recent one of Sindhur. You know, uh, we were the first initiator. We, we, we, we struck first as far as the announcement part is concerned, and that's where we, you know, the first. Yeah. Yeah. So we, Yeah. Yeah. And as, as they say in in other domain, it it's applicable in IW and perception management and SCOs as well, that, you know, well begun is half done. Now, compare that with, so this is, this was good. Okay. Uh, then, uh, the, uh, Sindhur projection was fabulous. No, it's like just touched everyone, almost everyone across religion, across, uh, gender. The, the selection of, uh, uh, you know, Colonel Kureshi and Wing Commander Domika was fabulous. You know, it did the right job at the right time. So that was fabulous. Uh, then elevating at the right time, you know, although it could have come slightly earlier, as far as the communication part is concerned, from when when the batting was handed over to MOD plus MEA to pure MOD, just the three services. You see the day, the, the weekend when we had, you know, all our, uh, uh, DGMOs, DGAO, and the DGNO doing the press conference, back-to-back two press conferences, we had a fabulous, you know, hard-hitting narration because, you know, when men in uniform and women in uniform talk, almost everywhere, it's a universal phenomena. Almost every, uh, country loves and respects and follows their armed forces. That was the, uh, best part. The, uh, international narration, you know, as far as our Indian military is concerned. Modi generally does not indulge much. Whether they are allowed or not, it's not, it's not their charter also. So the international, I think, I think it needs the MEA's. Yes. So, that's what I mentioned. I don't think they're allowed or the charter to do that. But MEA failed there a bit, and I'm, I'm very disappointed with that. Probably that's where the catch-up part took place where, yeah, Dr. Jaishankar went there and to Europe and, you know, he started doing that. But that, that, that's, that's pretty weak on our friends, specifically when, remember, we have our press attaches, when we have our embassies, that's their job. That's for years, they are supposed diplomacy is supposed to be one of the fighting elements of any warfare.

Ash, I want to just substantiate your point by a comment which I got from one of our, you know, I can say he's our adversary, and I can make out the guy where where does he come from. This is where, you know, the first point, General, we had no leverage and moral authority in the first day or two to challenge India's narrative. Exactly what you're trying to say. This was based on a remark which I on a podcast which I did with Gunner Short, and he responded to me on my Twitter handle as part of the notification bit, and he laid out all the three elements, and he actually laid out his, I mean, the plan of Pakistan, and exactly this is what they followed. So, so your point about, you know, the first two days, I think we, we really had them well. It was a very, very good, uh, I would say, preparedness. But subsequently, yeah. Now, compare, sorry, sir, sorry, completely sorry. Yeah, yeah, go ahead. Now, compare that with the last such similar episode we had, Balakot strike, right? Yeah. Strike, 5:36 AM, 26th February 2019. DG ISPR made that worst tweet, right? Probably by the time our pilots would have come back to their respective air bases and, you know, they would not even have changed from their, uh, gear. They dominated narration from beginning till end, despite we making so much effort. So that initiation part was good. Uh, we were much better, uh, as compared to them. We did not leave it purely to the 10:30 AM, uh, you know, government time press conference to take place. We were good to react. Our messaging was very good. Our internal preparation was, uh, very good.

Now, uh, since you mentioned about these two examples, Russia-Ukraine and Israel, I'll give a on-ground experience. Now, when, when, whenever war begins, unlike our, you know, clashes, Russia-Ukraine is a war. Ours is not a war. Ours is an operation or a conflict or a clash, you can say. But war, whenever war begins, Ukraine had this, you know, advantage time. So they were preparing their YouTube warriors, and I'm specifying the word warrior, okay? Like if you, if you tell me, General Ashish TV, I'll be like, sir, okay. And if you tell me, Ashish, you are a warrior, you know, your country is warrior, you are, you know, you have to pay your role. So that person is, you know, the moment you attach that warrior, this thing. So they had a YouTube army. They prepared it. They had Telegram, they had everything that is needed. Now, if we, if we ask all our viewers, everyone consumed Russia-Ukraine war, everyone consumed Israel-Hamas war, and Israel-Iran war that is happening. But no one will be able to name without Googling, two Russian newspaper or channel's name, two Ukrainian newspaper or channel's name, two Israeli newspaper or channel's name, two Palestinian newspaper or channel's name, two Iranian newspaper or channel's name. Is because we are consuming war through social and digital media. We are not consuming it through the conventional TV and the newspaper that is that is we are currently still practicing. Ukrainians understood that. So Russians were, you know, horribly down. And that's where the, you know, one bad example, since you asked me to mention, Russians were horribly bad. They were in that conventional mode, you know, that rugged mode, and that, you know, we are what we are, you know, be it our military equipment or the information warfare. So, that. And Ukrainians were good, smart, quick. They realized if it takes Telegram to reach masses, let's use Telegram. They realized if it takes WhatsApp or YouTube to reach masses, let's do that. The other other side had a fantastic contest, Israel versus Hamas. Now, Hamas was also very well, you know, generally most of these terror organizations, they they tend to have that trait of, you know, better communication because that's that's part of their, you know, action, reaction, and operation. But Israelis were good. Whenever they had, you know, some some thing tilting against them, for example, I don't remember the exact date, I was there in Tel Aviv at that time, um, you know, driving towards the frontline areas. Whenever that, I remember that there's a big hospital, a missile attack on the hospital, that became the, you know, harakiri point as far as the entire western media is concerned, you know, the Israelis are targeting an entire hospital. But Israelis were good, quick, because they had the capability. In a matter of, you know, hours, they managed to prove that, you know, these missiles were fired by Hamas themselves. Now, if you delay that by 24 hours or 48 hours, leave that information space empty, not filling it, you would have had the narration against you. And once it goes against you, it becomes extremely difficult. But it was, it was fabulous to see Israelis managed to pull that quickly narration out of that, uh, you know, the tense and the intense situation. That was like one of the best examples I saw, you know, they, in a matter of hours, it was going against them, tilting against them, and they, they turned it upside down. So that, that, these are the examples we can learn. But I must tell your viewers, look, what was done by Russia, what was done by Ukraine, what was done by ISA, what was done by Hamas, and what is being done by Iran, we cannot simply copy-paste anyone's IW or perception management or that. Of course, that of course is is it is purely based on your country, your society, your democracy, your government, your military, you know, those those traits largely define for that particular country. It has to be case to case different. What was practiced by Ukraine was a very good IW mechanism. Can the same thing be applied here in India? No, it's not practical. We'll have to devise our own. We have started doing it. That's the best part. We are reaching from zero to one. And I'm sure the way it is being started, it's been started nicely. The awareness of it is happening. I'm sure it will not take much for us to reach from 1 to 10. Yeah.

Uh, thanks, Ash. I think we had had a very intense discussion today. Uh, and we will take on some questions because, uh, the audience has been asking, is there going to be a question-answer session today? So obviously, yes. The whole idea is to get your perspective also. I'm a journalist, we're in prime time mode, it's my time to ask questions, right? Yeah. I know that, but, but, you know, uh, I will say that you, you'll have to give way to the public. So it's a thing. Okay.

This is a question from GK. "India is a huge market for making money through social media content, and any foreign account banned in India will affect the reach and revenue." So he's basically looking at your double-sided approach which you had mentioned that there should be a ban as well as context compartmentalization. Yeah. Yeah. So basically, so your response to it.

Oh, it certainly is. Uh, but remember, uh, uh, I mean, just hitting these these social media digital media companies back won't serve. That's why I say we got to do the second part as well, right? Uh, why can't we have our own, uh, you know, X? Why can't we have our own, uh, you know, Twitter type this thing? Why can't we have our own? It's okay if it's not as good as, you know, theirs. It's okay. Big deal. Our not all our cars are as good as, you know, when when.

Tatas or the Mari started building cars. Were they comparable to Germans? They were not. It's okay. We we embrace them. We we utilize them. And I I believe the government needs to take initiative here. Uh you know, one of the most followed leaders uh uh on on the social media app is uh uh is is apps is Prime Minister Modi. uh if he just opens an account somewhere trust me half of the population is going to uh come there uh uh and he's he's someone who understands having seen him from both not only just the PM days from Gujarat days uh he's someone who has a very very good understanding of the social media and the digital media rather earlier it was called the alternative media which is now becoming uh the the primary media so uh it's just a matter of deciding to decide for example you look at coup we have half of our you know government and the ministers and the ministries present on coup maybe something that they are waiting for uh at the right you know we are there if and when we need to pivot we'll be able to pivot so those capacities need to be uh uh built within our country and that that's important so uh JBJP he's a keen listener of our programs he's asking which TV channels would you suggest people bat to follow on Iran Israel war our Indian TV news channels enh have have becoming tamasha drama not trustworthy can't rely on them for truth I mean this is a question which will be very difficult for a media person to answer because this would be taking sides yeah I know you guessed it right yeah I'm I'm going to launch world plus 91 there is a reason for plus one So just wait for a month or two and uh it'll be there for the global coverage.

Having said that uh you know uh it's okay look media is a reflection of society right uh we as country we as society being practical and realistic we as country we society like that bit of spiceness spicy thing that you know drama that tamasha and it's not just media see it's visible you can't compare Bollywood with Hollywood there is that music that drama that tamasha that spice as far as our cinema is concerned so media is a reflection ction of society. uh let's not you know alienate them they come from society the journalists come from so society right uh so if our society is such which you know likes to chan thing it is going to give rise to that I always say to people if you want to understand a country understand a country's society culture for you don't have to do anything for just 24 to 48 hours consume that country's media through different ways TV newspaper website you just consume and you you'll get a fabulous idea and an almost accurate idea of what that country is, how is that society because as I say media is a reflection of society.

So uh there's another very I I think it's a more of a comment true Karan Taper is a viruent antiational character. The guy reeks of negativity. Tapper is an example of what a journalist should not be. I think we'll leave it at that. No comments on this. We are not here to comment on anybody's character. What we are saying is that whatever they do, it should be done in the interest of national security. That's about all. Uh in case of high probability future events, is there a draft narrative available? Is there a system of rolling out these draft narrative as soon as citations are available to make them final? Look Akash this is a question which only can be answered by government agencies and government agencies would not like to answer these questions because of the fact of security surprise and so many other issues are concerned. We will leave it at that. Uh the answer lies in the fact what Ash said that we have come a long way from Balagot and uh I think uh whatever shortcomings have been absorbed in ops ops Hindu will be taken care of and we'll be moving ahead. Uh if you want to add anything else to to this Ashish you are welcome to do that. I mean uh you know there there cannot be fixed you know plans and mechanism. It has to be what what can be constant is your capacity your practice and your capacity that is the only constant. Every nar every war every conflict every situation will demand a slightly differently devised uh you know perception management or IW or SCOPS capacity. It has to be you know it's like a it's like a match. That's why I keep giving I named that you know theory uh as the third pitch theory. you are going to play on someone else's pitch. So every match is a new match. If you feel the Balac air strike and it's I believe applicable in every domain like I mean the way air force acted in Sundur is very different from the way they did in Balakot air strike. The way army did in operation Sindur is very different from the surgical strike. In the same way what was done by us uh uh during Sindur cannot just be simply replicated. It has to be a completely new new opportunity new new situation new things will have to come up. So uh this is a more of a command Indian should focus on social media content rather than focusing on yoga and I somewhere he has taken cue from what you just said.

We'll go to the next question aliyah m uh while it's true we can't deny the reach of a CNN or BBC. How can our platforms compete with that immediately? uh how do we deal with the narrative threat in the meantime? It's basically she's asking for a short-term uh response of media. You would like to comment on this? Yes. Look, CNN and BBC themselves never you know they were not like uh born or built in a day. So there's nothing immediate whenever you talk in terms of a CNN or BBC. They they they were built in a matter of decades. Uh as far as that is concerned. But uh talking about our approach for the immediate this thing yes we can have that approach uh the digital and social media uh gives you that opportunity. uh we can have lot of you know immediate plans immediate uh uh narrative uh capacities it can be done if if you can't have your own BBC and CNN it's okay learn to utilize the the other count's uh media houses and convey messages to be it Pakistan or China or Turkey or any anyone for that matter uh for example if you're doing that in say in the political domain prime minister uh is going to a country which is uh you know an adversary of Turkey uh why can't we use that country's media uh and convey message to uh Turkey? It is something similar like a you know military or a political turf game. In the same same structure media can be utilized. Use social and digital media the other countries media convey a loud and clear message uh uh if and when we want. Uh there's one thing I must mention sir in 30 seconds you know we are currently engrossed with Shindur and Pakistan because of you know postgam incident. I am telling you uh the way Beijing must be watching uh us is something that we must focus on from now on. Pakistan by and large you know uh we will take care you know it's okay if they win a bit we lose a bit it's fine we don't need to worry about a country we have beaten uh you know in several wars and conflicts uh but Beijing is what we should prepare for China is what we should prepare for they must be they must have watched our moves our understandings our uh capacity buildings our narrative plans and that's where we need to surprise them and it's going to be a complex and not so level playing field because their information and communication system is closed. Ours is open. They have managed to get that global communication scenario nice and good. Ours is still picking up. So that's what I believe we should be focusing on. Pakistan will default be taken care when you prepare for Beijing. Islamawad will default be taken care of. Yeah. the if you if you look at the bigger threat I think the smaller threat gets automatically taken care of and here I would like uh audienc's uh you know reference to what I said in the beginning that the media resources of India which amounts to a huge huge proliferation across the country with vernacular and also the main main language channels broadcasting almost 247 especially the news channel the largest are the news channels and Actually the Chinese media is or Chinese apparatus the MSS etc are doing a huge data crunching trying to analyze the sentiment of the Indian media and then devising plans as to how to counter that. So that is the area of concern for us and we should actually focus on that. So with that I think the rest of the questions are by and large a repeat of what we have uh generally taken cognizance of in the question box. So because of lack of time now I would not like to go into all the questions except uh show you some uh appreciation uh things that you know people were very happy with the with the podcast which was taking place. uh and uh for example just to show you excellent podcast by SD 1 one 9 the names are also in code uh there is there are a few comments adversely commenting upon the the circar which you mentioned uh so I will not post them not because they are going to be I mean some kind of a counterproductive it's just Look that is a perception which is there in the environment but Ashish did try to tell you that this time we did in fact react quite quickly especially the PIB so we should grant uh to them dur Dashan has also started taking uh out some programs they in fact approached me to get army officers also to come on board for such program we have done two three series but unfortunately the public also has to view them unless the public sees them, how can we actually have the impact of these programs. So with that, thank you very much Ashis for having joined us and spared your time for this wonderful podcast. I hope the audience has benefited from his expertise which is global and not only uh uh national and also the fact that based on your quest for the right information, true information, fact-based information, watch out for world plus 91 which is basically India and beyond. What he's basically aiming at is that there'll be an Indian focus of course but with a world view. So I think you will get a good uh flavor of news which comes out with analysis and other related methods of dissemination of information. With that thank you very much and Jahend to you and to our audience. Thank you sir for [Music] them.