Transcription
A data point I saw recently is that the single best day to buy the market is at an all-time high. That is the most curve-fit ridiculous data I've ever heard in my life. That is only applicable in hindsight in a bull market.
That is crap. Totally think so. Oh yeah, we've researched this because people have said that.
So what's up, guys? Today I've got a great episode with Tom Snof. He is the founder of Tasty Trade and the CEO of Tasty Live. He also happens to be an entrepreneur with nearly $2 billion in exit, including selling Think or Swim, the great brokerage account, for $750 million back during the global financial crisis.
This conversation will blow your mind. Tom brings a fresh perspective to understand why many of the data points that you've been told are wrong, why he built such great products, how he thinks about trading 100 positions per day, why he makes 18,000 trades a year, and what exactly is going on in the trader's mindset throughout the day given so much information, so many different moves in financial assets.
He also thinks that he could literally just tell you all the answers to various economic outcomes or political outcomes, and you still couldn't trade it correctly. This conversation will make you laugh, and it also will inform you.
Here's my conversation with Tom Snof.
All right, guys. I've got Tom here. Tom, I thought a great place to start the conversation is you built the same company twice and you sold it for $1.8 billion, give or take—combined. You built these interfaces that have been the gateway to trading for millions of people over the years. You built Think or Swim, then Tasty Trade. Help me understand what was the insight that you had as to why a new interface would lead to such value creation, right?
I mean, it's just incredible that you were able to do this two different times and sell these companies for so much money.
Well, the easy answer is why not us? You know, why not us? I'm a weird entrepreneur. I don't really care. Like, I'm never trying to solve a problem. I don't believe that a good entrepreneur should ever try to solve a problem. I believe you should just kind of do, you know, stay in your lane—whatever your strength is, wherever your know-how is strongest. Stay in that kind of lane and just do it better than everybody else.
I think we were lucky we were able to pull it off twice.
When you talk about staying in your lane, you are a trader. You started your career in the pits. And I think you told me that you do between 13,000 to 18,000 trades per year. Yep, is that right?
What are you trading? 18,000 times per year is a lot of trading. That's, like, what? Over 100 trades per day?
It's probably, it averages probably 75 plus, you know, I don't know exactly, um, but most days, like between 75 and 100 trades.
Is this like you put a position on and five minutes later you're selling the same position, or do you just have a massive portfolio?
So, I have a lot of...so I'm very short. My perspective is basically 45 days, so I'm not like a typical passive investor. I do have a stock portfolio with some stocks, like I hold for a long time, but for the most part, I have about, I would say on average about 100 different positions in everything. We're talking commodities—all listed products—so commodities, stocks, and mostly option strategies.
All those positions need adjustments. You need to put on new ones; you need to take off old ones. My time frame on average is 30 to 45 days, like the whole duration of the trade. So things can be adjusted every single day.
And what does it take to make it into the long-term portfolio versus the short-term portfolio?
So, you see a company, you see a commodity, a loss. Okay, explain a paper loss. You know, you buy a stock, it goes down, it's a long-term hold. You know, in the option world, you don't have to deal with that, but in the stock world, that's my life.
Okay, um, and then when you're looking at something, walk us through. Let's say that you're looking at equities. Sure.
And you know that your proclivity is for 30 to 45 days. What are you looking for to say, "Hey, I'm going to put this position on," and then do you go into the trade knowing what are the milestones or kind of things we're going to look for that's going to tell you to sell?
I go into the trade. I'm a very simple trader. I don't care about fundamental analysis, cyclical analysis, anything. I don't care about anything macro or anything like that. I'm strictly based everything off implied volatility, and I base everything off expected move.
Now, that doesn't mean I'm not directional because I am. So part of my portfolio is non-directional—Delta neutrals, we say in the option world—and part of my portfolio is very directional.
But I set my kind of mental targets at where expected move is.
And let's just walk through. You wake up. Do you immediately run to the computer like, "Let me check these hundred positions that I have?"
Okay, so how do you manage these 100 positions, and what does the day look like for you?
Oh, well, I'm always on, you know? Like I'm always involved in the market. But my day—so I have a weird schedule. I usually get up at 4, and I live in Chicago. I'm an email junkie too, so I answer about an hour of emails from 4:00 to 5:00 because my brain works best really early in the morning. Late in the day, everything starts to get fuzzy; I start to melt down. But 4 in the morning, man, I'm good.
So 4 in the morning, I'm answering emails, I'm going to look at the market, but I usually don't trade that early. The only thing open, by the way, at that early in the morning is the futures markets, and I would say about 20% of my positions are futures and futures options.
So I may adjust futures options around 5 in the morning, but for the most part, I'm not going to put on new trades—I'm just going to adjust existing trades. Like, let's say crude oil moves $2 overnight, I'm going to adjust my crude oil position, flatten it out, and then answer emails some more.
And then after the market opens in the morning, that's when we start to get, you know, it opens 8:30 Chicago time. So that's when we start to get more aggressive.
Now, what is your target? Do you have, like, "I want to make 1% a day?" Do you have a 1% a week? Is it just no target at all, and you're just like, "Hey, I'm just looking at the assets?"
My target—and this is what I say to anybody—because first of all, it's hard for me to put into, you know, like I don't want to. The easiest way to explain for about active trading targets is to talk about it as a multiple of risk-free rates.
Because nobody should be actively trading if you're targeting to make 7% if risk-free rates are, let's just say, 5%. Nah, you need some multiple of risk-free rates to make it all worthwhile.
So the way I like to explain targets has nothing to do with daily, weekly, monthly, or anything like that, but at the end of the year, you know, you need to set up a target based on whatever your risk profile is at a minimum of three times risk-free rates and a maximum is usually, you know, who knows? It could be anything you want—but for most people, it's somewhere between, let's say, 22% and 32%. Like somewhere in there, that's your target.
Doesn't mean you get there by any stretch; it just means if you're going to put in all this work, all these resources, you know, all the time it takes to manage all this stuff—and a lot of it is fun too—you have to have some in your head—some multiple of risk-free rates.
So sure, 20%, 30% in that range, I think that's fair.
Is it just like a big video game?
Yeah.
And how do you know you're winning? Is it just literally the return, or is there some other measurement?
It's literally the return. But you know you're winning if you do a lot of other things right. Like I can't put a—like I don't know if I would have built these companies if I hadn't traded my whole life and was totally okay with, you know, when we built Think or Swim, we just rolled the dice with all the money we had, you know, literally for 20 years just rolled the dice, and when we built Tasty, we almost did the same thing.
There is, you know, you have to have a certain tolerance for risk that you develop through all trading. Trading makes you think faster; it makes your brain process decisions way faster. I mean you trade, you know, and so you do everything faster, and the most successful entrepreneurs make fast decisions—period.
And as you're trading, you have 100 different positions. I think a lot of people would say, "Hey, concentration builds wealth; diversification would protect it." But you're still trying to make money; you're still trying to build wealth.
And so does the diversification actually hurt you in that pursuit?
It may; I don't know. Like in bull markets, when you have a concentration of seven or 12 stocks that basically, you know, controlled this market as far as returns go, it definitely hurts. You know because you're not going to be in those stocks, and if anything, you're probably going to be short them.
I think in a flat market to a down market, or just kind of a normal, more normal market, I should say, it probably helps. You know, non-correlated positions are great when something ugly happens. When the hits the fan, non-correlated positions save your ass.
When everything's going up and everything's very concentrated, you know? I mean, you would have rather been in five tech stocks over the last five years.
Yeah, I think I saw a statistic that over the last five years, the tech sector of the S&P 500 was up like 25.9%, or something compounded—which means that you actually outperformed the majority of the venture funds during that same five-year time period, and you had the public liquidity.
And so is that something where you're almost barbell? Like you have all 100 public positions, but then you had a massive concentrated bet in the private market, building Think or Swim and then Tasty?
Yeah, I mean, listen, that—that's, it's interesting how that works, and I, you know, I always say that the reason we were able to do it is because that's just the way our minds work. You know, like there's just, that's—we're comfortable with that risk.
I mean, it's hard to say—it's hard to rationalize it any other way. I don't think it's that risky, right? Like you are by all measures an expert in trading because you've been doing it for so long.
Well, what's risky is that in the industry, you know, you're talking about a business that runs at 50%—let's call it 50% net margins, which is pretty good. There should be 100 firms, but there's not; so it's not that easy. Why? Because building the technology and building the right—attracting customers to a space that's this narrow and attracting customers to a space that has kind of, you know, not necessarily a great reputation—because big passive firms that annuitized that annuitized money management don't want it to be.
It's a challenge. There should be more firms, and there’s not.
How do you look at the difference between Think or Swim or Tasty versus, let's say, a Robinhood or a Public? You know, some of these firms that I think are kind of mobile-first, design-heavy, payment for order flow stuff, etc. Like, are they all competitive with each other, or are they kind of different parts of the market?
No, they're pretty competitive. I mean we, we view every customer—whether you're a Robinhood customer, Public customer, you know, Schwab customer, Fidelity customer—we view them all the same. They all should be our customers; that's how we look at it.
But, you know, that's, that's like, I don't know, I mean those companies have done a great job, you know, with—I've always been impressed with Robinhood.
And there's a couple of companies out there that are, you know, to me, have always been impressive. But, you know, we've always also been impressive in our own right.
You sold Think or Swim for $750 million, give or take, and you sold Tasty for $1.1 billion. The second time, you just had more knowledge and experience; you got a bigger number? Or were there things that you did differently the second time that kind of drove a better outcome?
Well, Think or Swim was—we sold Think or Swim in 2009, and that was, you know, during the big meltdown. So it was a billion-dollar company before that; we were public, and then it sold off a little bit, you know, in kind of all the financial stocks in 2008, 2009—it sold off.
But we were very particular about not taking cash, so they tried. Because cash is accretive to comp, you know, if a big company is buying you out they want to give you cash because then it makes the deal accretive. We wanted stock.
So if you want to hear a fun story, I would love it.
Okay, so fun story—the TD Ameritrade was started by the Ricketts. Joe Ricketts started it, I think, for $25,000 in like the late '70s, early '80s.
Joe's an incredible entrepreneur. I don't know if you know him, but whatever. He's still alive today and I think he's a rancher in Montana or something like that.
But anyway, so Joe started it and built it up, but then in 2009, TD Ameritrade wanted to buy Think or Swim, but the Ricketts also wanted to buy the Cubs. And the Ricketts needed cash to buy the Cubs.
So what never has actually been discussed, we did kind of a three-way trade. I don't know if you remember when Joe Ricketts gave the money to buy the Cubs to his son, Tom Ricketts, who runs, but that’s a close family.
So they needed about $800 million to buy the Cubs. They had about, let's say they had plenty of money—billions—but they only had a certain amount of cash. So to raise the cash, and we wanted stock, so we got the stock from the Ricketts, the Ricketts got the cash from TD Ameritrade. We did a three-way trade.
No way!
Yeah, so you actually didn't get stock from TD?
We did, we did, but that's how it worked out on paper; it was a three-way trade.
That's pretty cool.
It was really cool.
Did they bring that idea to you guys, or did you somehow know that they wanted to buy the Cubs?
Well, it was pretty public that they wanted to buy the Cubs, and the CEO of TD Ameritrade worked the whole deal, Fred Tomac, who's now the CEO of the CBOE. So it's a small world, and Fred's a great guy, and we've stayed friends, you know, all the way throughout the years.
If you had to give yourself a grade on taking the TD Ameritrade stock—A+, F-—where?
Well, we took the stock at at, um, 11 or 12 bucks. I don't remember the exact price, but it was around, let's say $12.
Okay.
And you know, we were able to—it never traded lower, so that was a good trade.
And what do you think you ended up selling it? Probably between 18 and 30?
Okay, so you really sold for way more than $750 million once you actually got out of the position.
Yeah, but don't tell anybody.
Yeah, I won't; nobody listens to this. Don't worry.
Okay, and then what did you learn from the first acquisition that you then went and implemented in the second one? Was there another three-way trade?
No, but what I learned is that when we built—we started building Think or Swim in 1999, and we were just a bunch of floor traders. We didn't really know anything about building technology—not at that level.
So we learned a lot about building technology, but when we sold it, we realized there was a missing piece—or at least I thought there was a missing piece—and the missing piece was the content piece.
Like we built this cool technology, and we did some content, but we didn't—we never took the content to the next level.
And things like CNBC and Bloomberg and, you know, Wall Street Journal—all the content—financial media drove me crazy because it was just— it just wasn't interesting to me. It wasn't, you know, it wasn't engaging. And so I thought there was room for a digital financial network.
So we had this crazy idea about building a content-based, you know, digital network, and it turned out to be the largest digital financial network in the world. And we started it in 2011, um, as Tasty Trade.
And the first investor was TD Ameritrade.
So you got the people who bought your company to be your first investor in your new thing.
Our only investor.
And they did that because they were just like, "You're amazing," or was there some sort of competitive dynamic where they're like, "We can't let this guy squeeze out of our..."
No, they did it because for the right reason. I said, "Listen, you guys are amazing entrepreneurs, and we knew you weren't going to stay here, and we would be foolish not to roll the dice with you one more time." And they did.
And they actually tried to buy Tasty again a couple years later, you know, five years later.
But do you remember Theo Epstein when he was when he—?
Okay, so Theo Epstein once—I heard him give a talk, and he said, you know, "10 years is like my number." That's what he—that's when he left, like Boston to go to the—
To the Cubs.
Cubs, yeah.
And we held Think or Swim. We built it in '99, 2000. We sold it in 2009, and we built Tasty in 2011. We sold it in 2021—10 years.
And in both times, that entire 10-year period, there was no, like, real activity. Like, nobody really came after us in either company.
Like in—we built Tasty, not one person talked to us for 10 years.
But 10 years into it, five companies tried to buy us. Ten years into Think or Swim, three or four companies tried to buy us at the same time.
Like somehow, like word gets out. I don't know how it happens.
Do you think it's that you crossed over some sort of financial milestone? Do you think that it's like bankers can't keep their mouths shut?
Yeah, they just go to some conference and everyone talks about it, or something. They're like, "Holy cow, who are these guys?"
And, yeah, so, you know, the reason we did the deal with IG Group, um, with their London-based public company, is I wanted to go global, and I couldn't do it.
It's just too hard. You know, it's really hard where I am in my life; it was too hard for me to start getting licensed in all these different countries and everything.
So I really wanted an opportunity to take Tasty global, so we chose IG Group as a partner, and, you know, they've been a good partner. We'll see what happens.
So in 2009, you sold at the bottom of the market. In 2021, it sounds like you sold at the top of the market, or close to it. And was that intentional in terms of understanding where the market...
No, it wasn't intentional, just that that was the 10-year period that was up.
But you know what's funny is in 2021, if you remember, that was the SPAC Mania.
Yep.
And we had all these SPAC offers for like double, like, you know, "We'll give you two billion. We'll give you 1.8B," like crazy numbers.
And we're traders, and we were looking at each other like, "Okay, we're not worth that."
Like why would somebody give us like $1.85 billion, do you know, in a SPAC deal for Tasty, when we think we're worth like 1.1, 1.2, one million, somewhere in that range? And like it didn't make any sense to us.
And we're always like, "If something is too good to be true, you can't."
It's—the markets are too efficient; they can't—something has to be broken.
So we didn't take that. We took the lowest number that made the most sense to us because we thought that meant that we were probably—you know, at least that made—that deal seemed like it was sustainable and it was.
What was the concern that you were going to take all stock in the SPAC and then it would trade down? And so your 1.8 would become like 500 million?
Um, part of it. I mean, we would have got a couple hundred million out of it, and we would have had to turn that couple hundred million, you know, we had two concerns. One is that we're really good at what we do, but what we're not really good at is we're not like a traditional marketing firm.
So a couple hundred million dollars extra wouldn't mean that much to us if we had to spend it on marketing because it's not our strength.
Like, like global marketing—when I mean global, I mean, you know, all US and some big, huge national campaign. I'm not sure we would have converted on that, so that was one of our concerns.
The other concern was, "Hey, you know what these SPAC deals look? They look stupid." Like it didn't make any sense to us.
And if I could have shorted every one of them, we would have.
Do you short in your portfolio?
Oh my God, yes.
Okay.
So why didn't you short the SPACs?
It's really hard to. They—when the new issue comes out, you virtually can't sell it for a certain number of days, and then they're hard to borrow, and there's, you know, there are issues with...it's very hard to sell.
You know, there's no options right away. It's almost impossible—it was almost impossible to short SPACs.
Shorting in general—there's some very good short sellers who have, over the last couple of years, maybe even months, kind of thrown their hands up in the air and said, "Hey, I'm not shorting anymore."
We obviously have the GameStops of the world and things like that. But these are people who really weren't on the wrong side of those specific kind of, you know, mania-type trades.
Are they just getting old and they don't know what they're doing anymore, or is shorting now much less desirable than maybe it was previously?
Well, I mean, the market's, you know, shorting is tough when the market just doesn't do anything but go up. Every time it sells off, it goes higher.
I think that, you know, my history in markets is—I've spent almost 20 years as a market maker, which means you're just the counterparty.
You know, when you're standing there making markets, you just do the opposite anyone else wants to. You're almost like a bookie in that sense. Okay, what do you want to do? And I'll buy the bid; I'll sell the offer; I don't care what you want to do.
So you're the counterparty, so for me I've always been, "Something goes up, I sell it; something goes down, I buy it." It's not that I'm not a short seller—like I only sell short. I'm a short seller because if something goes up, I sell it.
Now, how do you kind of balance that with a data point I saw recently is that the single best day to buy the market is at an all-time high because one, three, and five years out, the outperformance of buying on the all-time high price versus any other day of the month or any other day of the year is hundreds of basis points.
And so is it just like the longer the time period?
It's just that—it is the most curve-fit ridiculous data I've ever heard in my life. That is only applicable in hindsight in a bull market.
If you were to say the absolute—
So we—so Tasty is a think tank, just so you know, and you could not have come up with a more—that is crap. Totally. Oh yeah, we've researched this because people have said that.
So we have a think tank, which is just a bunch of PhDs—physicists, mathematicians—we’re way smarter than I am. And so we studied that exact fact using a lot of data.
We basically—we have our own database, but we use—essentially we go back to 2005. Most of our data goes back 20—we go back to 1990 with some stuff, but we studied that since 2005.
And I'm not talking about one, two, and five years out, or one, three, and five years out, but there is absolutely zero—'cause I've always heard, you know, you should buy, you know, buy breakouts, all this stuff—there is zero truth to that. The markets are completely random. There’s no statistical significance whatsoever that you should buy tops.
Now, why does momentum investing work so well?
Who says it does well? You look at returns? I'm not saying that it’s better than other investment strategies, but it does seem to work in the sense that people who buy on momentum tend to make money more times than they would necessarily sell, lose money on.
Again, there's a difference between a bull market phenomenon and, you know, random, you know, efficient markets. Do we have efficient markets?
I think we do.
Do you?
No, I think that the market is—we're just in a perpetual bull market forever because I believe in positive drift.
So I believe in—so positive drift is just that over time, everything gets better. Like I believe positive for everybody. Like if you said to me, "Hey, here’s where I am in my life right now," My argument's, "Well, 10 years from now, you are going to be doing better than you're doing today." And 20 years from now, you’re gonna be better.
I think that everybody that commits themselves to something—there's—we have positive drift in our lives, and we should, and we have positive drift in the markets over time. The markets are going to go higher. But I don't think that we—I don't think that's an easy perspective to have.
And I don't think that—that I don't think that with respect to markets that actually helps people.
See my thought has always been, and we should call out that you have a very kind of trading-centric perspective.
Of course.
That's fair. I, as I told you, started out trading and very quickly realized, “Hey, maybe I should just buy and hold.” And whether I'm losing or winning on paper, like just hold is a little bit better.
But my thought process has always been if you are younger—which I think is important caveat—so call it, you know, sub-50 years old or so.
Okay. You have a 10- to 20-year, you know, kind of timeline based on a whole bunch of different factors.
It is very hard to make an argument that markets will not be higher over a 10- to 20-year time period. Sounds similar—drift.
But in the last, I don't know, five years maybe, maybe eight years, it seems like the central bank has perfected the playbook where if we get near a market downturn, they're just going to stimulate the hell out of the market and economy to the point where you could ask yourselves, like, have they outlawed a bear market?
Do you think that we'll ever see another three- to five-year kind of sideways to down market?
Yes. Do you think so?
Yes.
I don't know. So, the one thing that's changed to me is, first of all, the movie—the script really doesn't change, but what's changed is the speed at which things change.
Okay, so, I don't know if we're ever going to see another five- to ten-year bore; I don't think like the '70s is going to happen again.
And I'm not so sure that we're going to see another, you know, 2008, 2009, which was what? 500 days or something like that because the speed at which things move now is just so crazy fast.
So we call it like the rate of change or the gamma with respect to the markets has completely changed. So you might be right in that sense—we have like weekend bear markets now, right?
Like in crypto, I always laugh; like everyone goes home on Friday; they're euphoric, and somehow on Saturday everyone's like, "Oh my God, it's over," and then by Monday, again, the markets are up—everyone’s happy.
Yeah, I mean there’s an entire generation that’s never seen—you know, that’s really never seen a prolonged pullback.
Yeah. I mean, look, I remember in 2021 there was this particular person that was, you know, “Beware of the bear market! Beware of the bear market!” doing the whole thing—Goldman Sachs.
No, this is like a venture capitalist. And I remember I wrote a piece; I said, “You know, the difference here is one, I think that the markets are now heavily manipulated— not in a nefarious or malicious way, but just they have a stimulus playbook and they're going to stimulate.”
Like literally, the word stimulate means they're going to push the stuff back up.
But two, and maybe most importantly, is there's an entire generation of people—I'm going to call them the crypto generation—but it could be GameStop or, you know, whatever asset—say, um, the volatility that they experience, let's say in holding Bitcoin, where there are, you know, 30% upswings, 80% drops, and happen multiple times.
And in those 30% upswings, there are five, six, seven, eight 50% drops, or 30% drops along the way. They're just used to a level of volatility that you wouldn't normally see in the traditional stock market.
Yeah. And so they kind of have like the diamond hands. Maybe the better thing is like they’re like the diamond hands generation, right?
It's just like the volatility and speed and all—they're used to this. And so my argument was if a bear market comes, you think that like, "Oh, the younger generation is going to get punished because they committed all these, you know, sins of the timeless investing principles," or whatever.
And my point was like, "No, dude, these people are crazy. They're just going to get on the internet and be like, ‘Hold!’"
Right.
And they're not going to sell, and they're going to come out the other side and be like, "Look how smart I am!"
And so if you actually look over the last two or three years, yeah, that's—I mean sure, some people sold, but actually most of them just held for two years.
Not even two years; maybe it was a year of just kind of down.
Yeah.
And now we're hitting new all-time highs, you know, seems like every week or whatever.
And so in a weird way, you're almost training people to behave in a way that also helps to mitigate bear markets.
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Yeah, the crypto world has not helped the active trading world; there's no question about that.
It's not.
So the beauty about crypto is that it's, like you said, super high volatility, and it's essentially a tech stock with super high volatility.
It's a tech play with super high volatility, which we love. The bad thing about crypto is that it's dead money.
So what does that mean? Meaning that most people buy crypto, and that's it. It's just like, “That's the play.”
You go out, “Oh, buy, just like Buy and Hold.”
You buy and hold.
Yeah.
It's just—and you can't borrow against it, and you can't sell anything against it, so you can't reduce your basis like that.
You can't sell calls against it; you can't sell puts to get long it; you can't borrow against it—it's absolute dead money.
So in The Brokerage world, we offer crypto and digital assets as much as we can with the, you know, with the SEC overreach, but we do as much as we can do. But the money goes in—it never comes out.
Like that money never gets turned; it never gets played; it never—it's never in play, which I think is definitely Bitcoin.
Maybe some of the other cryptos, that is part of the pitch: "Hey, buy, hold, you know, forever, give it to your kids, and it'll be worth more money."
Whether that ends up being true or not, what I do find interesting is now that these assets—you know, we have the Bitcoin ETFs; we have Ether ETFs.
Do you think that all of the options, all of the borrowing, like the financialization of these assets is coming? And so 10 years from now people will be able to have access to all those tools and therefore that might change the dead money?
There's no question that all the derivatives are coming, but sometimes it's the first-to-market play.
And I don't really think that the cash market in digital assets is going to change dramatically because that particular marketplace and the players in that marketplace are very different than traditional derivatives traders and everything else.
So I don't see that dynamic changing. But the bad thing about it is you have this entire generation of young people that loved getting involved in digital assets, loved crypto, loved all the stories, loved all the technology, but they're not learning anything.
They're just stuck in this, again, in this dead money—this dead pool of money that doesn't mean anything.
Because even if it goes higher, who cares? They're not learning anything. They're not learning anything about finance or anything about strategy or anything about the rest of like all market structure, which to me is so important.
Like just being long Bitcoin? Great, so what? It goes higher, who cares? So you made a little money, now what? You didn't learn a damn thing.
And that's my biggest issue with crypto.
And, listen, we're huge advocates of the space. We're the lead investor in ZeroHash, which is one of the largest digital asset settlement companies in the US.
We help to finance a company where I'm on the board there. I mean, we've been fighting for crypto assets on our platform from day one.
You know, I love the space; I love the technology. There's so much—I think the whole world's going to be tokenized.
Do you really?
Yeah. You think like the US stock market as well?
Not exactly, but I think US investors will be able to trade in a lot of other places that we currently can't trade because we have to deal with currency conversion quotes, clearing, all that kind of crap.
And I think that will be tokenized.
Yeah?
What about hours of operation?
Well, you know, one of the things I think people like about cryptos is it trades 24/7, 365.
It's a lie that the stock market only trades in the kind of the narrow hours of operations. There’s now overnight trading.
At times there have been studies that show overnight trading actually performs better than, you know, kind of regular hour trading sometimes—it’s not true.
Do you think we just eventually move to 24/7 trading in US stocks?
I think, well, we already have 24/5 in futures, so the futures markets have been 24/5 for years now.
And crypto's been 24/7. So the problem with stocks is that the liquidity doesn't necessarily dry up that much in the stocks, but it dries up in, like, the options and places like that.
Because there's no place to lay everything off, and the high-frequency firms—it is really hard for us to find high-frequency firms that want to make markets over, you know, overnight.
Why? Because they don't want to because they don't make any money because there's not enough liquidity.
And so the problem is that we're stuck with exchanges, and exchanges—you know, remember what a crypto exchange is? It's not really an exchange; it's, you know, it's a high-frequency market-making firm.
The problem with, you know, the New York Stock Exchange and all the different option exchanges and all the different, you know, NASDAQ is they stink. Their technology stinks; they stink.
Nobody makes markets for them. You know, if you take the high-frequency traders out of the equation, there's nothing there.
Like these whole markets are run by, you know, high-frequency props firms that essentially are the most important and dominant factor of creating market-place efficiency.
When we look at, let's say Tasty, what are the assets people are trading that would surprise us? Like what are the most popular assets that are being traded on the platform?
Well, I mean, I don't think it would be any different than the most liquid assets. Like if you're talking about equities, um, probably the two most, outside of ETFs—I mean, obviously the SPX because of the zero days and the big product that it is—and the SPYs and Qs and things like that.
If you're talking about equities, um, Tesla and Nvidia are the two biggest that trade from a customer perspective. I mean, occasionally you'll find, you know, something that's hot all of a sudden, um, or something that has earnings, you know, that a lot of people might play it for earnings or stuff like that.
But if you're talking about just like—you're probably talking about 20 or so stocks that dominate about what feels like 75-plus percent of the duras business, and it starts with Tesla, Nvidia, and it works its way down.
You mentioned zero-day options. I believe that's now more than 50% of all options trading in the United States is zero-day. What has been the impact of the introduction of those assets?
I mean, the more the merrier; you know, the more the better. I mean, I don't know—we shouldn't take full credit for this, but they were our idea, really.
And we introduced those to the CBOE in 2006, and we introduced dailies and weeklies, and they didn't have them, and they started them in the SPX, and so we actually put the whole proposal in front of the CBOE back then, and they adopted it.
Wow!
What do you think about people who say that the stock market is just a casino now and people are just gambling?
Yeah, it's ridiculous.
I think so because the difference is that gambling has an embedded negative edge, and the stock market doesn't.
So the challenge here is that in the stock market right now, you can trade, you know, let's say the using the SPY ETF as an example. You trade, um, 200 shares of SPY—it's $100,000, right?
A little over $110,000—$116,000, 200 shares of SPY. And the market's a penny wide.
So basically, for $2, you can buy or sell $116,000 worth of notional in the S&P 500.
How is that gambling? In gambling, you did $116,000 notional at Caesar's Palace—give them $2,000 or $10,000, you know, or more, $11,600, whatever you want to say—but give them that—that’s the juice, the vig that they're going to take off the top.
That's gambling when you can't possibly win because you can't make that back. It's mathematically impossible to make back that negative edge because after you lose a couple of times, you've got to essentially win twice as many times.
In the stock market, everything is—all the mechanics—everything is relatively close to a zero-sum game.
And as you see many of these assets and investors, you know, kind of learning about this stuff, how much of your trading is just you sit in front of a screen?
You can look at a chart. You know, Steve Cohen is famous for this.
He can just look at the chart and start trading. He doesn't even need to know what it necessarily is, versus are you reading mainstream media? Are you consuming other content?
Like how are you deciding what to do?
Well, I love—I don't really consume other content at all, but we have all our own content.
So I love to fade our own hosts. Like I—I love to fade our own hosts, our own guys on our own network because if any of them have a macro idea, I'll take—I’ll do the actual opposite.
I think that's the best thing.
Why?
But just because I know they're probably going to be wrong.
Um, but we—is that just because everyone is usually wrong when talking about macro?
Everyone's usually wrong about everything they want. If they think—if people are really sure that they know something?
Like if you said to me, "Tom, I—I really love the Dolphins." You know, I would have said, "Fine, I'll take Tennessee."
You know, I'm—that’s just the way my mind works.
Um, but I don't look at charts.
So, but I do follow a lot of stocks and a lot of commodities, and so, um, you know, I have my own opinions about price extremes both ways.
To something, it gets too cheap; something, it gets too expensive. I have my own ideas.
Is that just gut intuition?
Yeah, and it's just dialed in over, you know, 40-plus years of just looking at these charts and understanding prices.
Well, just looking at the prices of these assets and understanding, hey, Nvidia's been trading in a certain range, and is that towards the bottom of the range right now?
And so it's a buy versus, you know—tomorrow, and I’ll tell you a funny story—when we built Think or Swim—because you used Think or Swim when we built Think or Swim—you said you were in college, right?
So we came off the trading floor; we had never used a chart ever. So we built Think or Swim, and we didn’t build charts at all.
And we launched the platform without charts, and people were like, "What the f is wrong with you guys? How do you launch a brokerage platform without charts? Everybody uses charts!"
We were like, "They do?"
Because I had never seen anybody use charts for—I spent 20 years in the business and never saw a person use charts, so we were like, "Really? So let’s get some charts."
So the guy you were watching when you said to me, "This is your network," his name is Tim Knight.
He built a company called Profit Charts. I met Tim in 1999, and he was one of the first entrepreneurs in Palo Alto.
And he built this platform called Profit Charts, and I called him up. I didn't know him; I called him up and said, "Hey, can we—you built yours in Java, we're a Java platform—can we embed yours, your charts in our platform because we needed some time to build a charting platform?"
He goes, "Sure, I’ll lease it to you."
So he leased it to us, and that’s how we became friends 25 years ago.
But we had no idea; we built the whole platform without charts.
Are there charts in Tasty now?
There are. Reluctantly, because we want people to use numbers. Like, charts don't mean anything.
There is—and I'm going to get a lot of sh*t for this, I'm sure from your listeners—but there is no proof that you can look at a chart and something that happened historically has anything to do with what's going to happen in the future.
So what are you looking at then?
When I look at price?
Yeah.
Oh, it's just, you know, just I'm just thinking, "Hey, this thing was 100 two days ago, and now it's 80; maybe it's cheap."
So let's use that example. How do you know it's not going to 70 or 60 or 50?
You don't.
Okay, so you just buy and close your eyes?
Well, we don't really buy anything. We’ll sell an out-of-the-money put.
So, you know, I'm an option trader more than I'm a stock buyer.
So, um, but I—I don't—don't get me wrong, I do buy stocks, but I would sell the put.
And so you're basically saying, "Hey, with that gut feel and the instrument that you're using, you've got a higher probability of winning than not."
Sure.
Okay, exactly.
What's the best trade that you've ever made?
He’s like, "My company TD Ameritrade at $12."
No, it might be—
No, no, no, that’s—not company-wise, yeah.
The best trade ever, um, well I have a best story about a trade.
Okay, okay, you're probably too—how old are you? 36?
You're too young.
Um, remember Desert Storm?
Yeah.
Okay, I know what it is.
Yeah, right, right.
So there was a kid that used to clerk in the OEX pit, which was the S&P 100 at the time.
And he always wanted to be a cameraman, and he got a job—you know, clerking in on the floor of the exchanges was kind of like a low-paying job, you're hoping to get a job as a trader.
Well, this kid didn't want to be a trader; he wanted to be a cameraman.
He got a job to go to the front lines in Iraq with CNN for—this was like the first televised war.
Okay?
And this kid was like standing behind us for like two or three years.
And we get a call from the, literally from the front lines in Iraq that he goes, "We're going to war tonight."
Okay, and the whole pit, you know, within two seconds knew, but everybody else had known it too.
We just didn't watch the news, yeah, we didn’t know.
The whole world already knew this.
And so, but we thought we were like, so everybody in the pit, four or 500 guys, are all fighting over each other trying to buy every put they can get their hands on, you know, thinking the market’s going to crash tomorrow morning.
And some broker that was standing next to me, 'cause when you're a trader, you can't be a broker; you have to be one or the other, some broker standing next to me sold me like a 50 lot of calls that were in the money because he couldn't get rid of them, and he said, "You’ve got to take these for me because I owe the customer fill."
So I took the 50 lot of calls.
I buy as many puts I can get my hands on, you know, thinking the market’s going to crash.
I took this 50 lot of calls—I’m buying like as many puts as I can get my hands on, and some broker that was standing next to me, 'cause when you're a trader, you can't be a broker; you have to be one or the other.
Some broker standing next to me sold me like a 50 lot of calls that were in the money because he couldn't get rid of them, and he said, "You got to take these for me because I owe the customer fill."
So I took the 50 lot of calls.
I’m buying as many puts I can get my hands on.
I took this 50 lot of calls.
So we were in the pit, remember?
And we're all got giant short that night thinking the market's going to crash.
The next day we opened lock limit up.
The next day after all, everything was televised the night before, we opened lock limit up.
That 50 lot of calls paid for everything else.
No, no, it paid for like the whole year.
And—and it was insane because I didn't want that trade; I would have given it to you for like a $10,000 loss, but I couldn't find anybody to take it from me.
And that whole trade was like probably the best single trade I've ever made.
Why do you think that it went up when everyone thought it was going to go down?
Because nobody ever knows anything.
It's the beauty of markets.
The greatest thing about what we do is that absolutely—I don't care how long you've been doing this. If I've been doing this for some 40 years and somebody has never looked at the market before and you said, "What's XYZ going to do tomorrow?" I have no better chance than that person does of knowing what it's going to do.
You don't think so?
No.
You couldn't tell me, let's say, somebody doesn't even know what Nvidia is— which I actually met somebody recently who told me "What's Nvidia?" and I had a, like remember that we're all just in a big echo chamber.
Um, but you don't think that you've got a little bit more knowledge than they do?
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Oh, I have more knowledge about like things about the market, but I don't think I can tell you any better than they can what it’s going to do up or down tomorrow.
Yeah, I really don't. I mean, if you were right, that's pretty important detail for people to know.
But—but God knows I'm going to try you know every freaking day.
Like that's what I do; I'm gonna try.
Now you tell me your best trade—what’s your worst?
Um, Money-wise?
Yeah, like, you know, just you mean in one day?
My best and worst trades in one day are probably, you know, seven figures.
Okay.
But like what was like the worst?
Oh, just being short S&Ps and it just ripping and just ripping, yeah.
I had one day in, I think, 2014 or 2013— I think it’s 2014 because I kind of remember every trade, where I was just short S&Ps and bonds thinking they're, you know, they're inversely correlated, right?
S&Ps and bonds—S&Ps go up, bonds go down, you know, same thing.
So—and they both moved together. Bonds I think were up two and a half points, and S&Ps were up like a hundred.
And I was short them both big.
Yeah, that was a bad day.
And what do you do? Like you're like, "Okay, that, that sucked." You just like go home and cry, or like do you go home and just drink?
Go to sleep, forget about it.
You get really mad.
You get really mad, but it's all part of the, you know, I—really the only thing that kills you in this business is size.
The average portfolio size for a trade—you have 100 positions, so what is it like 1% each or half a percent?
Yeah, it depends, but 1% would be for undefined risk, it'd be a little higher than 1% for defined risk, it'd be less than like a half a percent.
So undefined risk, you know, for me, would be between like one and three, one and 2%.
Do you have anyone that like checks your trades, or are you doing this all yourself?
No, I do it myself.
Okay, so like right now, if I ask you, you probably couldn't name all 100 positions that you have.
Like you’d have to like go look, or could you?
I'm not going to ask you to do it, but like could you name all 100? You think?
No, I couldn't, but I could, I could, I mean, if I just look at my portfolio, you know, very quickly, sure.
Of course not. I look at my positions like multiple times a day.
I was going to say, one time, I looked at my phone, and there's screen time, which people pay attention to, but there's also something about, I think it's like wakes or notifications or something.
It can tell you basically how many times did your phone light up, even if you don't pick it up.
I don't know that.
Mine was like 750!
Oh no!
And I just like went, and I was like I immediately had to start shutting off notifications.
I was like, "Oh my God, this is like not good!"
'Cause you just take like how many minutes in a day, right? Divided by...
Oh, um—
And so, how many times do you think you check?
Check my phone per day, like your positions? A phone or a computer?
I don't want to act like a complete psychopath, but, uh, sociopath, but 100?
No, but a lot! Maybe like every ten minutes?
Every...yeah, okay.
Are you okay?
Like, like, I mean, I'm kind of like that with Twitter.
Like I, you know, I check a lot, so sometimes I should stop.
I abandoned Twitter strictly for—I only—the only social media rabbit hole I go down is TikTok.
Oh wow, okay.
That's like, I know, it’s bad. TikTok is really bad.
What kind of content?
Like trading content?
Like whatever crazy video or whatever?
No, anything but trading.
I don't want to be down a trading rabbit hole, but TikTok—whoever thought of that was evil.
Yeah, yeah.
Yeah, maybe more ways than one.
No, listen, it's genius.
It's genius. I wish I invested in it because it's absolutely genius, but it's evil.
Yeah.
Um, this is going to be a really weird question.
Sure.
I know two brothers from Chicago trade options.
You see them on TV sometimes?
The Winklevoss twins?
Yeah, of course.
They got nice hair; you got nice hair.
What's up with guys in Chicago that trade options and have nice hair?
You know, the funny thing is that John and I actually started—I mean, we're all friends.
Yeah, of course you know.
We go back; we started like the same time in like—you elbowing each other in the pit?
No, no, he was an equity trader.
Okay, but we've been friends for 40 years, I guess.
You know, I mean, not close friends; like we don't call, but I—I mean, I had—you go to conferences; you're like, "You have nice hair; I have nice hair. Both from Chicago?"
Well, we have dinner when we run into each other.
Like, you know, last time I saw him, I think he had kind of moved to Puerto Rico, so I was kind of like—we had dinner in Puerto Rico. I was there for doing a conference.
I do a lot of traveling; I speak all over the world. So I saw him there; we had dinner together. You know, these guys, you know, we're friends.
Well, what about the hair? Like same shampoo too?
Yeah, probably, probably.
I never asked him, you know?
Scary, we don't talk hair.
Yeah, that's fine.
You're busy; you got to check your phone 100 times.
But by the way, your life is not that much different than mine; it's just that you're checking like moving numbers.
I'm checking like moving words on Twitter, so there you go.
Pretty much the same thing.
Some people would say actually things like Twitter now are moving markets. Do you worry about that?
Um, do I worry about it?
No, absolutely.
I like things that move markets; I am a true efficient market theorist.
I don't—I want like I want everybody to trade. I want politicians to trade; I want everybody in Congress; I want everybody to trade.
Do whatever the hell you want to do, 'cause I don't think anybody has any edge.
I want everybody to trade.
You don't think Nancy Pelosi has an edge?
No, I do not. Not even for a second. What if, like, she gets some information?
I—good trade on it?
I hope they—I hope, you know, it's so crazy that people think that that anybody, especially politicians, think that people have any edge.
I—I think Nancy Pelosi will never vote against anything that's going to hurt traders.
That's all I care about.
The re—we have so many horrible politicians that don't understand how free markets work.
Do you think you’re making an argument that Nancy Pelosi is a free market trader?
Of course.
I mean, you're kind of not wrong, but—
Yeah, go ahead, please.
Here’s my issue.
I'm scared that we're going to end up with the Gary Genslers of the world in mass.
I'm scared that we're going to have a lot of politicians that vote for stupid things, things like transaction taxes and that vote, you know, look! You've seen what's happening in crypto.
You know, just all these all these restrictions, all these fences, all these limitations. And what I think, as soon as people trade, all that's off the table.
None of that stuff happens, and so we need politicians that actually understand how markets work.
I also believe that the reason that the US is so powerful and has such dynamic growth compared to everywhere else in the world is because we have created a system with the largest pool of liquidity where investors—you can invest in something, private equity, venture, whatever you want—and there's a pool of liquidation that allows you to get out.
And which attracts money, which nobody else in the world has, which is why no money flows anywhere else, and all the money flows here.
And if we blow that because of some idiot politicians that don't understand how markets work, that's why I don't care if Nancy Pelosi makes an extra, you know, $100,000 or a million.
I could keep, I don't give—$100 million, allegedly $100 million.
I don't care what they make; I don't care.
Is there a number that if they made you'd be like, "Alright, that's egregious?"
Like what if politicians were making a billion dollars a year trading on insider information?
They are!
You're—you are so stupid that if there was even a chance—if two of them tried to do the same thing, here I’ll tell you this, if you—this would be the bet I would make with you.
I don't care if you tell every politician—like if you could tell them who is going to win the election, who's going to win this year's presidential election or any single election or vote on anything that comes off for a vote, and you tell them if you tell the Fed governors what's going to happen if you lower, you know, um, lower by 50 basis points or 25 or 75, whatever it is—they—nobody would know what to do.
And they would all do—50% of people do one thing and 50% of people do that thing—nobody knows what to do!
Even if they had the information!
I got one more story for on this.
I was at a conference once, and Bernanke was talking.
And, um, so Bernanke is doing this talking, and it was sponsored by Citadel.
Okay, I think they paid him like $5 million for one year, and he gave one speech. Comes out, he tells us a couple stories, and then they say anybody in the audience can ask Bernanke a question, but like anonymously.
Um, anonymously or you can just—they give us tablets, okay? And on the tablet, there was some kind of software that you could—you could ask questions, and the moderator would read it off to—
PRI.
So they picked my question, which was essentially, you know, if you could hear—would you buy bonds? You know, just trying to get an idea of like what he thought interest rates were going to do.
This is like 10 years ago, and his response was, to this day, was like—was he said, "Well, I have no idea what bonds are going to do; that's why I leave it to my Merrill Lynch adviser."
And I'm thinking, "Okay, if Bernanke can't answer the question, who in the world can?"
Like if he’s the one making the decision and he's the chairman of the Fed, and he's leaving it to a Merrill Lynch adviser that he's been friends with since he was in high school or college, it's such a ridiculous thing that anybody else thinks that they know what's going to happen to the market.
And I do think that a good recent example of this is the 50 basis point rate cut in September.
At, you know, people—25 to 50, they do the jumbo cut, and everything trades down, and I had a friend who texts me, he goes, "I don't get it. Like, you know, they cut the rates; why did it go down?"
And I said to him, I said, "Look, you know, who knows, but, uh, he kind of talked it down in the press conference, so maybe that's what it is."
And nobody ever knows!
Even—well, even in hindsight, you don't know exactly.
That's my whole point. So tell everybody everything; don’t let them do whatever they want to do!
They’ll have no idea, and they’ll all do opposite stuff.
Do you think we should just get rid of insider trading laws?
Not material nonpublic information for, you know, because I think like if you know the sales numbers of a company before the earnings report, right?
Or you're—you know, you're the CEO, there should—there needs in general—some of the insider stuff is ridiculous, but if you're talking about if you’re a true insider and you have access to material nonpublic information, like you're doing a deal or something like that, you shouldn't be able to trade that.
Mhm!
Yeah, like if you know that an acquisition is coming, can't.
Yeah, yeah.
Okay, um, what are you most excited about in finance going forward?
I think all the different things we're going to get into. Like I sense that we're on the verge—for me, digital assets was a new frontier that I think opened the door just to crack.
And it is going to—somebody’s going to push their way through.
So this means we're going to get into event-based, you know, political markets are going to—there'll be exchange markets on politics.
I think you'll see sports sooner than later, and I think you'll see tokenization, you know, to complement.
I think you'll also see a much broader—I think you'll see a lot more digital assets come back into play.
Interesting.
Which I think all of that's good by the way—probably.
Yeah, I mean it makes sense.
Um, are you worried about anything?
Um, I’m not worried about anything except somebody that gets in the way of—what bothers me the most is when people try to take things backwards.
So—so anything that slows up the technology, anything that puts like regulatory rings around things bothers me.
But I think in order for our dollar and in order for our economy to stay super strong compared to the rest of the world, we have to, you know, remain kind of the center of liquidity.
And I don't like when people mess with that.
Like messing with Mother Nature.
I don't like it.
Yeah! Well, it's you manipulating the market to a degree.
Yeah, or it's not trusting the market, really.
It's not about manipulation as much as it's just about not trusting it.
It works!
I agree with that! Definitely agree with that.
Um, where can we send people to find you on the internet?
Um, every morning, I'm on Tasty.com for three hours in the afternoon, and then if you pretty much Google Tom Snof, you'll find maybe more stuff than you want to know.
Um, my email is just Tom@TastyLive too. I'm an email junkie.
If somebody watches Tasty Live, what should they expect? Are you funny? Are you serious? Are you giving out like hot stock tips?
Definitely not giving out hot stock tips.
You're going to hear a lot of stuff about maybe my favorite restaurant—our personal lives, you know, we're about 50/50.
Um, about personal crap—like we just, you know, have fun with each other.
Fun stuff?
Yeah, it's a little bit like a locker room, and the kind of the stuff you can't do on normal, um, financial networks.
And then 50% hardcore research.
Like I said, we're a think tank, so we do 60 hours of research a day to—which we boil down into probably four or five 15-minute segments every single day; it's hardcore.
Mhm.
All right. I'm going to watch tomorrow morning. You're going to be on?
Yeah.
All right. When I watch, we're going to see if it's funny, serious, hot stock tips, whatever you got.
Oh, they'll make fun of me for the first 25 minutes, and then we’ll—that’ll be the funny part.
All right, well thank you so much for doing this; I really appreciate it. We'll definitely do it again.
Love it!
That was great!
Thanks!
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The second thing is that you're going to learn something. It's worth the price of admission just for the lessons themselves.
And then the third thing is it will make you think more deeply about your life and how you try to live it.
So go pick up "How to Live an Extraordinary Life" today. It's a quick read; it's very impactful; it's very concise, and it would mean the world to me for the support.
Go check it out today on Amazon, Barnes & Noble, or wherever you buy your books. Hard cover, audiobook—it all works.
Thank you so much for the support, and I'd love to hear what you think about the new book!