Transcription
Now, the US-China's relationship seems to have stabilized slightly under President Trump and President Xi. Both presidents seem to want to make the relationship work for specific outcomes. Do you see this relationship holding for the next three years? And what issues can derail this fragile stability?
Well, for the immediate future, maybe even three years, I think the desire not to incur a huge economic cost, whether it's rare earths, whether it's pharmaceuticals, whether it's uh electronics, uh will ensure that we don't, both sides do not wish to um join issue and make a conflict.
But in terms of the underlying issues between the two countries, I don't think that they have been addressed at all. Nor are they easy to address, and they remain there and they are very difficult to solve because the fundamental thing is the US is a status quo power. China is growing, developing, and China says, "Well, I'm happy to live in this world. I I accept this framework." But the US says, "Maybe today. But what happens when, in fact, your GDP exceeds mine by 20, 30%? Can I still be sure that that will be your position?" And so the US wants to keep the Chinese, wants to keep the Chinese, if not down, at least some distance below them. And that's a fundamental contradiction because to the Chinese, their right to develop is a red line. They have to be entitled to grow and to fulfill their full potential. So how do you reconcile that?
And even if this administration doesn't want to join issue, the Congress, the US political security establishment, they see this as an existential issue. So I think the tensions will remain there. Um, what can trigger? You could have an incident. If you have an EP-3 type incident, like happened with the uh Bush second Bush administration in 1992, not not 1992, uh in >> 2001 >> 2001. Will it be so easy to solve as last time? It could easily happen over the South China Sea or somewhere else. You could have an issue where tensions grow. You don't go to war, but you you actually have a friction. You actually have a have a matter which comes to a head. For example, when the balloon floated over the US a couple of years ago, and uh suddenly you you have an incident which maybe neither side intended. You could also have a misassessment of the other side. I think that I'm rising and you are on the decline. You think that I have a superior, or he thinks that the other party has an inferior system, and I will outdo you, and I can keep you down. And so, "history is on my side. Let's give history a shove." And I think that's going to be a problem because uh neither is China is not a pushover. America is, for all its difficulties, is not going to disappear. And as Henry Kissinger often said, "A war between the US and China cannot be won and must not be fought." But that's not something which is top of mind, I think, uh, right now in the decision-makers.
>> Right. And so you know, there have been recently some stepped-up military exercises AC around Taiwan due to to the arm sales from the US to Taiwan. Where do you see cross-straits relations going?
>> Well, we we think that if there's trouble cross-straits, that's trouble not just for the U uh Taiwan and Chi and China or the US and China, but for the whole region and for the world. And so we believe that it's important that there's peace in the Taiwan Strait. That we have had a One China policy which we've upheld for a very long time. We are against Taiwan independence. We are against unilateral changes to the status quo. The trouble is, in the real world, the status quo is never a static, frozen thing. It's dynamic. It shifts. Countries adjust their position, other countries react, then the other side reacts to the reactions, and you can have adjustments as the world changes, or you can have a spiral which can go in the wrong direction. And I think over the last few years, u the shift has been towards tenser, more troubled relationships in the Taiwan Strait, and there have been actions on all sides, although all sides say that we are maintaining the status quo. So that's very troubling. uh I hope that it will be a we will be able to gradually calm things down, and there's some hope of that because between the US and China, I think if the US wants to avoid a breach with China for now, well, they will also be careful not to use, not to cause, not to allow Taiwan to upset that, and they have considerable influence in this matter. And I think with this administration, uh, there are many things which people have views of of what it is doing, but on Taiwan, I don't think they have been doing wrong things recently.
>> Thank you. I think I better ask a question of Venezuela, otherwise the crowd will think I'm out of it.
>> Which country?
>> Venezuela. [Laughter]
>> How does Singapore see the situation in Venezuela, and how do you think what has happened impacts on the changing world order, particularly in our region?
>> Well, we are very gravely concerned by the US military intervention in Venezuela. MFA put out a press statement um stating our views, and we are against military intervention in other countries because this is contrary to international law, is contrary to the UN Charter. We have always stated our position unequivocally on these matters, who whichever the situation, whether it's Ukraine a couple of years ago, whether it's Granada um 1983, I think, which was an invasion by the US, and we have v voted accordingly at the UN. >> And I think in this case, it's quite clear it's a contravention of uh international law. Now, Venezuela is a complicated country. It's got uh very difficult internal situation. It's legitimacy of the government is questioned. It's causing difficulties to its neighbors because of drugs, because of uh refugees. It's destabilizing the environ neighborhood, including, I'm quite I can believe, causing some difficulty to the United States. But that does not justify a military intervention in into by one country into another unilaterally and without uh any proper authorization. Um, the immediate consequences, maybe it works, it's a spectacular military success. The longer-term consequences on the international system, I think that is something which we have to worry about. From the point of view of a small country, if that is the way the world works, we have a problem. To some extent, that has always been the way the world works. Um, the US has done this many times over uh in different parts of the world. I mentioned some of them just now, and other powers do it too. But you look at the situation, you look at the impact of it, and you ask yourself, is this a plus or a minus? And I don't think this is a plus. Yes.
Now, thank you. Uh, I would like to go to Myanmar now, because Myanmar is holding its general elections in a phased ballot, and this should be completed by the end of January. How should ASEAN respond, and should we recognize the elections?
>> Well, ASEAN's stand on Myanmar is based on what we call a a five-point consensus, which means that you must have a cessation of violence, you must have an inclusive dialogue, and we must have humanitarian aid and so on. And on the elections, particularly, ASEAN had a summit, I think in October in KL, and the leaders said reiterated that if you're going to have an election, before you start the process, you must stop the hostilities, and you must have an inclusive dialogue, and there must be participation. Otherwise, you will not be able to have a transparent, credible uh pro-election with an outcome which will command the respect and acceptance and legitimacy with the people. Now, um, the elections are carrying on. ASEAN has not decided to send observers to the uh to to see this election because some of the countries have grave doubts whether these preconditions will be met. And if they're not met, well, you can carry out an election, but I think the problem will remain. uh this is not something which we have not seen before. It's h Myanmar was in this situation for more than 20 years since 1990, when there was uh when the riots and the military took over. And over time, gradually the leaders, the military leaders in Myanmar came to the conclusion that there was no future for the country if it had to be ruled by repression under a military ha, that you had to have a government with legitimacy, with some popular support, and to be able to take the country forward. And so in 20 2011, uh they transitioned, uh they brought in Ananssuki and NLD, and then they had elections five years later, and then in 2020, they had elections again. But unfortunately, the parties, the military side and the uh NLD, the civilian side, couldn't make it work, and so we are back in a military rule. It's a very delicate situation because to to to govern the country, which is 130-something nationalities, you need not just a civilian government with legitimacy, but you need to have some role for the military because without the military, you can't make your government work. So how do you how do you make that come together and hold it sustainable? And last time it worked for a decade, then it came unstuck. Uh, now they are in this situation. I think it'll take them quite some time before the military leaders come to the same conclusion. And we hope that they will be able to find their way forward and work out a solution which will be which will lead to a government which will work. As for the elections, I I we do not pass judgment on other countries' elections. The question is, do I or do I not do business with a government of that country? And we do business with governments of countries where the leaders have won elections with 99% of the vote. [Snorts and laughter] So so all all countries where there are no elections, that's just the way the system works. But in the case of Myanmar, there is a specific humanitarian problem. It's a member of ASEAN. It's a problem we are collectively seized with.
>> So we will conduct business, but we do not at this point make any statement about the nature of the election or endorse it.
>> Well, we have doubts, but I think it's best that Myanmar solve that part of the problem itself. Right now, Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, but is not participating at the political level. It's different from what happened the on the previous occasion when they continued to participate at the political level. Uh, this time we took a different stand. I think there are advantages and disadvantages, but I think for now, Assean has continued with the stand. It may change at some point.
>> Yes. Thank you. So let me now go to the Thai-Cambodia conflict. This border conflict has been broken by the ASEAN chair. But in the first round, the United States played a big role. In the second round, China played a great role. Do you see this as a future trend of conflict settlement in ASEAN? And what does it say about ASEAN centrality?
>> I think ASEAN has influence over its members, but it does not have absolute influence over its members. Assan is not a super-national body with executive powers. It doesn't direct its members. It cannot override its members. It works by ASEAN consensus. It's a famous principle. We pride ourselves on it. It's the reason we're able to get along together. We are 11 countries. Uh, we have different policies, different priorities, different histories, different security concerns. It is not possible for us to be one country or even one federation. So when there are issues concerning an individual country or between them, you have influence, you have um interests involved, you would like the matter to be resolved, and we can help. But we don't have the greatest power. Who has the greatest power? Well, who are their biggest trading? Who are our biggest trading partners amongst ASEAN? Our intra-ASEAN trade is only about 20% of our international trade. Our biggest trading partners are with the developed economies, America foremost amongst them, and in our region with China. And that is where influence can come. And apart from the economy, there's also many other ways in which the major powers can exercise influence on ASEAN members. So it's not surprising that the major powers have uh are able to nudge, encourage, uh advise, even coers other countries to do something which they would like to do to some extent. Doesn't mean you can solve the problem, because the Thai-Cambodian problem goes back to maps drawn more than a hundred years ago, and temples involves temples which go back 700, 800 years. So these are not issues which will go away, but it's a reality that foreign uh external powers have influence over ASEAN countries, and ASEAN has to work together despite that, and in many areas we're still able to do so. It is a valuable organization for all of us.
>> Yes. Yeah. I still worry about the centrality of ASEAN, but maybe as >>
>> Well, I I think centrality is a has become a term of art. What it means is that we convene the meeting, people come, and it is quite useful that we can convene the meeting because they come and meet each other and discuss it with us. Doesn't mean that we are centrally directing matters, even amongst ourselves, much less in the rest of the world. [Laughter]
>> Yes.
>> You must not mistake a word for a reality. [Laughter]
>> Yes. Right. Thank you. Yeah. Now, let me just go to ASEAN. I know the audience is impatient, but I still have a few questions, you know, and I see one or two sitting at the edge of their seats waiting to ask. The reaching consensus in a regional grouping is getting more and more difficult, and this is so in ASEAN. It is also true in the European Union. Should ASEAN go for ASEAN minus X as a formula in decision-making on economic initiatives, but consensus on security initiatives?
>> There's an argument to be made for that. Singapore used to push for that u quite consistently over quite a number of years, especially when I was I remember when I was involved in economic policy, that means about 20, 30 years ago. Right now, it did not catch on with the other countries. It hasn't uh been implemented. I think there's merit to consider it. You have to be very careful how you craft it and what the supermajority needs to be. But if you have more members in ASEAN, there's more reason to think about these uh arrangements. Otherwise, if you have to have consensus, and consensus means everybody has to agree, then there's not consensus, it's unanimity. And taking to the taken to the limit. Uh uh, you see how that works in the WTO, which is supposed to be by consensus, but as a result, is very difficult to get anywhere. But if we don't do something, ASEAN is not going to >>
>> But you must decide on ASEAN minus X first of all by consensus. [Laughter]
>> Otherwise, you can't start.
>> Yes. Right. [Laughter] Indeed. Now, um, the uh, I'm looking at the time. Um, I'd like to ask you two more questions. Reflecting on your time in office, what were the black swans you had to deal with in the 20 years you were prime minister? And what lessons did you draw from your dealings with these crises that you would like to share with the people of Singapore?
>> I I think there were two very big things which happened to us when I was PM which we didn't plan, expect. One was a global financial crisis, and the other one was COVID. In both cases, it came quite suddenly. The impact on us was very great, and we had to prepare the population for the impact psychologically, as well as do things which were within our power to secure ourselves and secure our people's livelihoods and lives. Fortunately, with resources and with support from the people and with unity, we were able to do that and to come out in both cases um much less scarred than we feared. In the case of the GFC, we came through and recovered so quickly that the economy um zoomed forward. We ran out of we ran short of infrastructure, and that became a political problem. In the case of COVID, we came through safely, uh, far fewer casualties than we than could have been, and perhaps um having not quite realized what an enormous catastrophe we have avoided. But the lesson I draw from this is, first, you must have the support of the people and the trust of the people. Secondly, you must be tell speak to them clearly and directly to explain to them what is going to happen and what we can do about it. And thirdly, you must have a good team in government to come up with the plans, the actions, the schemes to to implement what you need. Whether it's a scheme to top up salaries so that employers will keep their people on the payroll while going through the crisis. Whether it's enforcing a lockdown so that uh we keep ourselves safe until vaccines come. Whether it is rolling out vaccines nationwide, persuading everybody to get jabbed because they trust you, and you say it's safe, and you've been on TV jabbed yourself, and doing it in a way where there's no no stampede, no riot, no panic, and you come through and orderly, and you know in Singapore, you're okay. I think if you can manage crisis with that kind of attitude, and then once it's over, start thinking how can it be the next time, and how can I be better prepared, then nothing is absolutely safe, but we'll be safer.
>> But the world was a better place, uh, you know, the external environment was slightly better than now, which is quite >>
>> Yes. So now you're in a situation too. It's not like the GFC or COVID, which you expect to be um finite duration. Don't know how long, but one day this too shall pass. But now you are in a situation where the old norms have permanently gone. You are not going to go back to a WTO scheme. You are not really going to go back to a a situation where we we talk about interdependence and uh co-ross co-rossperity without worrying, "What if tomorrow you're not my friend? And how do I secure myself against you?" We are in a situation where there is less trust between countries, where there's greater friction, greater rivalry, greater unpredictability, and less rules and norms which will help a small country make its way forward. And our challenge is to make Singaporeans understand that it is possible for us to prosper in such a world. But you have to work harder, and you have to be much more alive to what's happening around you. And this is going to be a for a long time. But uh, we we are better prepared for this than many other countries because we are not the only ones in this sport. And I think that's a big challenge, and it's a challenge for the new PM and the new new team. And I'm no longer the PM, but I'm doing my best to help them.
>> Did you have fun as prime minister? [Laughter]
>> I don't think uh it's quite the right mindset with which to approach the job, but it's a challenge, and is one which uh you look forward to. There is a problem, uh, and we can do something about it. Let's move. I think that's a good feeling.
>> Thank you. Now I'm going to invite questions from the floor. Can we have the first question? I can't see in this big room, and there are some blockages. Can someone help me? Ah, yes, please.
>> Good morning, SM. Thank you very much for your thoughts and uh and your >>
>> Oh, please identify yourself and >>
>> Yeah, my name is Sharon Sia. I'm from the ISIS usak Institute. >> Um, as you know, the international legal order has really served us very well, and in fact, Singapore has benefited from this order. But you mentioned as well that there's it's now at risk, and it is at risk um by certain unilateral actions. Some alarming developments have happened since January 3rd, and there are now threats going around targeting different territories. I'd like to know what defenses do we have as small states, not just Singapore. I think right now there are only two major powers in the world, maybe three if you include Russia. The rest of us are at risk. So what defenses do we have to mitigate these risks, to preserve our sovereignty and our way of life? And the second one is that you said the US-China relationship is important for Southeast Asia. Our institute has done a survey called the State of Southeast Asia every year, um, in which we realize that people actually don't want to choose, and we've always said that ASEAN does not want to choose. You also mentioned that China has made the right statements, and indeed, following January 3rd, China has made the strongest statement in support of the international rules-based order. Does this mean that we have now reached the point, in order to preserve our own sovereignty, that we now must choose a side? Those are my questions. Thank you very much.
>> What what can we do to keep ourselves safe? First, make sure that the country's economy is successful, because if you're broke and poor, poor or broke, uh, you can't do anything about it. Secondly, look to our defenses. We've been spending about 3% of our GDP every year on defense for a very long time, previously even higher, and built up a credible SCF, Singapore Armed Forces. And we continue to do that, not to threaten anybody, but just to keep ourselves safe. Thirdly, work together with our regional neighbors, cooperating amongst ourselves to the extent that we can, and also using it as a platform to partner other uh economies and other centers of prosperity in the world. Whether it's India, whether it's China, whether it's EU, ASEAN, EU, ASEAN, India, these are all ties which we can cultivate in order, even if I don't have a full WTO system, I have got a network of countries which want to trade with one another and continue to want to do business under some set of rules which will prevent us from falling back to the law of the jungle. Angle, and it's not only within ASEAN we can do that, using APEC or using the uh RC, and actively encourage this to happen. And we participate very actively when it comes to climate change conferences, when it comes even now to WTO discussions or at the UN, at through the forum of small states, FOSS, where we are an active um um organizer, promoter to work together, because small states have agency. I don't determine the outcome, but I have influence over my fate. Now, uh, on the question of people not wanting to choose sides, I think in any country, unless you are on the verge of a unless your dander is up and there's some fight and you've decided, "Let's charge and go and clobber the other fellow." Most of the time, when you ask people who are living at in peace and quiet, "Do you want a fight? Do you want to get involved in somebody else's fight?" I think most people will say no, we don't want to do that. It's a completely rational and understandable sentiment. And speaking as a government of as a government of the country, if there's a fight between two other countries, we have to ask ourselves, "What's in it for us?" Is there a principle at stake? If so, we have to stand up for the principle. We don't we we just we don't have a we don't um support military intervention in a certain country, but that doesn't mean I'm the enemy of the country which I disapprove of, whose action I disapprove of. I still do business with them. I mean, we issued very strong statements in the case of uh when Russia invaded Ukraine, we had sanctions against Russia, certain targeted sanctions, but it doesn't mean we are uh hostile to Russia. I mean, we still have we still have relations, we still do business with them. Similarly with the US, similarly with other powers. Now, on US and China, everybody says they don't want you to they're not asking you to choose sides. Everybody would like you on their side without choosing. And sometimes they make it quite clear that this is their wish, and you have to find a way to do business with both of them and not to be closed off from one side or the other. Some, if you read the reports, is open reports, nothing nothing from intelligence sources, uh, you will see that when the US concludes uh trade deals with certain other partners, I mean, in the reports recently were Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, but even from the first Trump administration in the US, Canada, Mexico trade agreement, there are provisions to Hey, if you enter into an agreement with a country which uh doesn't subscribe to US principles or which is a problem to the US, well, this deal is off. It's called a poison pill. So, uh, there is pressure to um enlist countries onto their side. I think we have to do do our best to resist that. And the more we have links with all parties, I think the more we are in a position to say, "Well, I have some options. I don't have to be pushed in completely into following one side and not the other." Frank, frankly speaking, countries in the region in Asia Pacific, including America's allies and America's friends, all have very big accounts with China. It's so for Japan. It's so for Korea. It's so for Australia. Um, the Korean president has just been in Beijing and um trying to reset their relationship, which used to be very good about a decade ago when Korea decided to host um the THAAD system, and then it turned sour, but the they still want to do business with China. Australia wants to do business with China. They sell many many things there. So does Japan, even though there are tensions between them. So this is a situation which many countries in the world will be in, and I do not think that the outcome will be that we are going to have a completely lopsided world in which one party will be alone and all the country other countries will be on one side. It is not credible.
>> I think Mr. Yes. My name is Ken Ming, a former member of parliament from Malaysia. Um, Senior Minister, I was wondering whether you would include the change in government in Malaysia in 2018 as a black swan event. Uh, were you, you know, anticipating that to happen? Uh, and also what adjustments uh do you think the Singapore government under your leadership did uh during uh the tumultuous times from 2018 to 2022 when there were a number of prime ministers? And lastly, do you think those changes uh that you uh introduced or you led would allow Singapore to adjust uh quite well uh to uh possibility of a past Malaysian government under a past prime minister, the Islamic Party of Malaysia. Thank you.
>> You're leading me into very complicated areas. [Laughter] Uh, when you have an election, you never know until the ballot boxes are open what the outcome is. Uh, we didn't expect what happened in 2018, but um uh the result uh produced a new prime minister whom we knew from many years of working with him before, and we kept relations uh on track and worked with him. Some cooperation projects were reconsidered, some continued, some didn't. Um, some new projects which we had hoped to work on, they may not have taken off yet. But well, external policy always depends on domestic politics. If your domestic politics doesn't support it or doesn't give you the bandwidth to make major external decisions, well, that's just the way it is, and we have to wait until the politics enables things to restart. And meanwhile, we just keep things on an even keel. And I think in the last, well, now eight years, nearly from 2018, seven and a half years since 2018, we have kept relations with Malaysia on an even keel. First me, and then uh Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. We've started a few new things, for example, the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone, still in progress. We have continued and we are almost completing some out ongoing projects, for example, the RTS link, which we hope will be done by end of this year, or if not soon, not thereafter. And there are new areas which we are still talking about which may be difficult to solve, but which we hope we will be able to tackle uh without letting them derail the relationship. Uh, as for who forms the government in Malaysia, I think whoever forms a government in Malaysia, we have to work with them, just as whoever forms a government in Singapore, you have to work with us. But the reality is also that we are very different systems. Singapore is multi-racial, and we go on the basis of equal opportunity and meritocracy. And in Malaysia, you are you are different. Yours is a race-based political system and uh based on a Bumiputera policy. It's the fundamental difference between our two countries, and I think therefore the relationship is complex, but we have found ways to coexist and to cooperate despite that, and I'm quite confident we will keep on doing that.
>> Uh, I think there's a question here.
>> Yeah, thank you, Prof. I'm William. I'm a senior fellow here and the editor at Fulcrum. Um, SM speaking to CNN in 2020, you said that the world had greatly benefited from US leadership for decades. This was said in the throes of COVID. You noted, however, that if America is in a different mode, we will go and look for other configurations, and things will eventually work out, but it will be at a loss. Now, looking at the recent US actions, I don't need to go there. It seems that um the the gamekeeper of the rules-based order has turned poacher. Now, does it appear to you that many states now will be, in your own words, looking at different configurations, and many of these configurations will involve China? What would you think about that?
>> Well, I think all states will be asking themselves if this will be the new reality. And it is not contested that the US will is no longer willing or perhaps able to play the role which it did until maybe not until this year, but maybe until maybe 15 years ago. Then how can the world get along, and what is the best way we can cooperate with one another in trade? I have sketched some of the ways we try to hold the network together. You can have regional groupings, you can have cooperation between regional groupings. You theoretically you could have the world minus one, but when the one is this big, that's not easy to do. And yet, when it comes to other issues, such as climate change, and the US says, "No, I do not believe in climate change," then the question is, do we also decide not to believe in climate change? Do we decide that, well, even if the US doesn't believe in it, let's the rest of us uh get together to minimize the damage which climate change can do to our economies? Or will it result in countries saying, "Well, if the US is going to do that, then why am I uh hurting myself in order to try and save the earth?" So that's something which is outstanding for the world, and I hope that we will be able not to end up in a situation where it's every country for itself, because I think that's the worst possible outcome for everybody. So some a degree of cohesion and cooperation. The rules may not be as uh well complied with or respected. The participation may not be as universal, but it is possible for countries to work together because we are all on this one little globe. And that's the best way to secure the future for our children. Thank you.
>> Uh, are there any other questions? Am I not seeing uh, sorry. Yes, the cameras are in the way. Yes, please.
>> Good morning, Senior Minister. My name is Patrick. I'm a student at St. Joseph's Institution. My question is with regards to with regards to the United States, specifically the increased role that personal and financial interests of Mr. Trump himself and of the individuals that he surrounds himself with have in shaping the foreign policy of the United States. So to cite some uh examples that made the news a while back, I think the most prominent one was the uh $400 million plane that he was gifted. Of course, various other examples include some of his cryptocurrency ventures which several Middle Eastern states have invested money into. With that, my question is, should this avenue of shaping foreign policy, be it either through assuaging Mr. Trump's personal interests or by targeting members of his administration or people he surrounds himself with, such as Jared Kushner, be considered and developed as an instrument of foreign policy by smaller states such as Singapore or in ASEAN?
>> I think as a small country, we just accept the way other countries run themselves. [Laughter] We have certain rules in Singapore, certain ways of doing things. uh certain expectations of uh people in politics. You must be honest. You must not lie. You must not take bribes. You must not let down the public trust in you. And if you do, there has to be consequences. Uh, we don't I mean, doesn't mean we don't have from time to time lapses in Singapore, but that's what we try to do. Other countries run their societies in different ways. It often works for them. I think it's very presumptuous for this tiny little island to go and pronounce on who's right and who's wrong and what we should do about it. So we just take the world as it is, and we leave other countries to work out their own affairs, because we wouldn't like them to work out our affairs on our behalf too.
>> Thank you. There's I think it's Zo, is it?
>> Thank you.
>> Yeah. Thank you for uh SM. I would like to ask you a question about the challenges of intergenerational leadership change. I think uh we we look back in the last 20, 30 years, we quite clear in terms of the the leadership regeneration from EMLKY Liquanu and then to Goh Chok to you. We all can know, we know roughly what to expect, what to predict. But looking forward, how do you see that? Because we we look around, we even not sure now what kind of leadership change that will happen in Malaysia, in Indonesia, who are the people who going to come in and take over leadership role. So if you look at ASEAN, and you look at ASEAN also in the context of ASEAN-China relations, how do you see the challenges of this regeneration and intergenerational challenges of leadership change? Thank you.
>> Leadership change is never straightforward. Um, how do you decide who is the next person? You can't anoint him. You can't predict him. It you have to see who the talent is, how, and there's some way in which somebody emerges and is accepted. It happens differently in different countries. In Singapore, we have tried to make it a more systematic process by putting a lot of effort into trying to get good people into government, into politics, so that there are choices. You don't know who quite is going to emerge and and and naturally become the leader. But if you have no good people in politics, you have no good choices for the next generation. And it's a process which takes a long time, and which, despite our best efforts, is not guaranteed to work. But that's the best option we have, and it's something which has worked for us so far. Fourth prime minister now, and we hope it will continue to work. But if you ask me, "Who next, and who next next?" I think that's uh my crystal ball is too cloudy to answer that question. In other countries, even more so. But that's the way the world is. If you are in the US, you don't know who the candidates will be in the next election, much less who will win. In some countries, uh, you have such a quick change that you don't know beforehand, and you can't remember afterwards. And it doesn't always work well for them. But we we hope to maintain it stable, predictable, and also keeping up with the times, so that you have a leader who is in sync with the generation, uh, on top on on top of his job, and in touch with what's happening in the world, and he feels that, "I am of this generation, and I'm going to take it forward and hand it over in good shape to the next one." And that's the way we think we should do it.
>> Now, uh, I'm really, I have one last question here, and this will be the last. Can you make your question brief, and uh, we'll wrap up after that.
>> Thank you, Prof. Um, good morning, Senior Minister. My name is Julia Lao. I work for IC's. Um, now that you mentioned about elected leaders, we live in an age where there are unelected tech titans and they're trillion-dollar companies, and they potentially can wield political influence, uh, in terms of social media and other things to impact societies across the globe. How can governments implement, and you can limit this to Singapore, if you wish. Uh, how can governments implement guardrails and frameworks to ensure proper accountability and oversight when these people are not elected? Thank you.
>> Well, the first thing to do is to keep money out of politics, because if your politics depends on money, then the people with more money will have more influence on your politics. That's how it is. And in Singapore, we have tried very hard to keep politics. So, when you uh run for election, there's a spending limit, three, I think, $3.50, 50 cents per voter, and you you're that's all you're allowed to spend. Uh, we don't allow political advertisements. We you you nowadays with social media, we can't stop you boosting posts, but you have to track and declare that, and it's all within this budget. And therefore, politics is contestable, and the people who are elected are not beholding beholden to their sponsors, and therefore the government is able to respond to their true masters, which is the electorate who voted for them, and pass and implement policies which will reflect the interests of the population and the country. And if those policies affect wealthy wealthy entrepreneurs or wealthy businesses, well, so be it. But the politics holds, and the policies will stand. If you are dependent on money from the companies, and that's a different situation, then you will find your MPs melting on you, or your congressman melting on you, and the next thing is you will find a reason why your old arguments were no good, and your new arguments are more persuasive, and then, well, things which previously were anathema have now become doctrine. And I think that that would be very dangerous for Singapore.
>> Well, you know, we've come to the end of the session. We've gone beyond the time. I've eaten into your coffee time, so please forgive me. We I'd like to ask you to join me in thanking Senior Minister for a very wide-ranging and comprehensive uh answers to questions. [Applause] Thank you.