Transcription
Tensions reignite along the Thai Cambodian border. The two countries trading accusations of breaching a ceasefire agreement. The fresh conflict triggering mass evacuations on both sides. For more on this and other events shaping geopolitics in the region, we're joined by Philip Lor in the studio. He's a professor of geopolitics at the ASC Business School and a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China. Thank you for joining us in the studio.
Professor Lok, Thailand, Cambodia. When an early freeze on kinetic war was reached in July, there was urgency because, and it's happening again, mass evacuations and deaths. It's easy to look back and say root causes were not addressed. I mean, this situation has been dragging on for decades now, and it's, it's very sad that, you know, there's so many big wars and troubles going on in this world that these two neighboring countries that have been sort of collaborating on and off, including through ASEAN, are now picking up this fight again. So I hope, I hope it gets settled soon, and I hope, you know, both, both sides become reasonable again.
And I mean, there's a much bigger conflict going on in Ukraine, following the attack by Russia, three and a half years ago, and, and, and I see nowhere to, to an end for the time being. And, and this is something that Europe feels very concerned about, and, and that Europeans particularly feel a bit sidelined by the talks that the US has been trying to engage with Vladimir Putin's Russia. Um, so I think, you know, for the future of, of Europe and for the future of the world, this is probably a much more serious situation. Not that I want, you know, the, the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia to, to drag on, but I think, you know, both should stop, basically.
>> All right. Uh, it is difficult to say any one war is worse than the other beyond looking at, I suppose, death tolls. However, one can draw some parallels.
>> So in the case of, uh, Thailand, Cambodia, as you mentioned, this has gone on for a very long time because there are very basic issues to do with how each country sees itself. So if we look at Ukraine, one of the many reasons that is so hard to solve is because it goes beyond just Ukraine, both for Europe, for Russia, and possibly for Washington, for other parties who could be involved, such as China. Yeah, I think the Ukrainians, uh, basically parted from, uh, Russia a long time ago, and parted from, uh, Russia particularly, uh, a few years after the Soviet Union collapsed, and, and, uh, Vladimir Putin has been trying to restore some kind of Russian empire, and the Ukrainians obviously don't, don't want to be part of, of, of his empire. And so the problem now is how to agree on, on the settlements. Now, it's quite obvious that Ukraine will not be exactly the way it was, uh, four years ago. U, but if, I mean, the, the European mood is rather, uh, gloomy at the moment because if we accept, uh, the territory to be, uh, reduced, if we make too many concessions to the Russians, uh, that means, uh, what is next? Uh, the Baltic states, Poland, uh, uh, you know, Finland, some neighboring countries.
>> The hope was that it makes concessions, but in return, Russia gets a very, very stern warning that thus far and no further, and you're not seeing that from anyone who can exert that pressure either militarily or economically.
>> Um, well, I mean, the United States has been claiming to, uh, pursue deals. Uh, I mean, the national security strategy was listing all the, all the, all the victories that, uh, President Trump is claiming to be, uh, responsible for. Um, but the problem is he's been talking to Russia through his special envoy without including, uh, the Ukrainians nor the Europeans. And, and the, the economic sanctions you were referring to, uh, have been, um, somewhat, uh, um, uh, not, not sufficient enough to stop the Ukrainian conflict because, because Russia has been helped by China, which has been, you know, buying a lot of oil and gas and supplying consumer goods to Russia. So that's also why this, this war is dragging on. This is also why the Europeans are trying to, to get China to help, uh, on this matter without much success, I have to say.
>> Ultimately, it comes down to whether or not you are able to exert that pressure and not really from trying to persuade someone to, quote, from your point of view, that doing the right thing. In terms of exerting pressure, that national security strategy you mentioned, do you see Washington taking the position it needs to take to put the right kind of pressure that you see to get these things done very quickly?
>> So the, you know, the, the national security strategy, which is a document coming out every, every four years, usually, is, is a typical MAGA, you know, Make America Great Again document. It's blaming the Europeans for a lot of things, including not being European enough. Can you imagine Singapore being told it's not Singaporean enough? Um, and, and secondly, it's not really criticizing Russia nor China. These two countries, if you remember eight years ago, when President Trump came to, to the White House for the first time, were the prime targets of its, of its previous national security strategy. So, it's a little strange that you have this, this White House trying to, to strike deals with, with countries just like business deals, because that's what President Trump does mainly, with both Moscow and Beijing, without, without involving, uh, all the parties around the table. So it's not clear. I mean, it's not pure diplomacy as we, we have normally. And he's really interested in, in, you know, in helping, uh, business deals, American deals, rather than helping the, the Ukrainians, who have been suffering so much for the past four years.
>> All right. But if there's any one party that can have some degree of strategic and economic autonomy from either the United States or China, this is relative, it would be the European Union. And you've talked about this year being a year of very hard choices for the European Union. Arguably, it's been a year of hard choices for everyone involved who has to negotiate with both China and the United States. A year of hard choices. Next year, will those choices get any easier?
>> Right. It's, it's extremely, it's a, it's a very complicated moment for the Europeans because on one hand, you have the United States, uh, asking, uh, Europe to be more, uh, responsible, that's what it says in the NSS, to be more, uh, uh, strategically, uh, autonomous, but at the same time, it wants the Europeans to buy, uh, American, uh, uh, weapons as opposed to building their own. How can you be, uh, strategically autonomous if you don't have your own, uh, um, arms industry? So that's, that's one dilemma. The second dilemma, we, we, we discussed, which is the, the, the Ukraine situation, which is very close to, to the Europeans's hearts and minds and concerns in terms of national sovereignty and security. Thirdly, you, you, you ask about China. So, China is a long-term threat to the European economy, um, because it has so much capabilities, industrial capabilities, and not just industrial, but also services and also technology, as we all know. Um, the, uh, the trade surplus that China has with Europe has been climbing up to 35% for the past five years. Um, there is nothing that the Chinese, uh, almost nothing the Chinese cannot do, versus what the Europeans can do, which means the European, the companies are struggling in the China market, while China wants to sell more electric vehicles and so on. So this is the sort of the ultimate concern for Europeans, and eventually this will lead to more, to a more restricted European market for, for Chinese goods, and that's what President Macron was trying to say to the, uh, to the Chinese leaders last week.
>> President Xi Jinping last week, in a visit in which he was trying to ask for what, a greater balance in trade, which was for him insufferable, the current imbalance. Thanks so much for joining us this evening in the studio. Philip Lov, professor of geopolitics at the ASC Business School and senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China. Thank you.