Transcription
We have to continue fighting in Lebanon. We have to fight in Gaza. We have to finish the job. We cannot have a reality where, uh, our citizens are endangered or our enemies are building themselves again. And we are sitting on the side and looking at them, you know, gaining capabilities once again.
Welcome everyone to this briefing, brought to you by the Israel Defense and Security Forum, IDSF. The US and Iran have reached an agreement. What does that mean for Israel? What does that mean for Iran and for the US? So much to discuss. It's a great pleasure, as always, to be joined by the founder of IDSF, Brigadier General Amir Aviv. General, thank you for joining me today.
My pleasure, Mash.
So, General, everyone wants to know, what do you think about this agreement? What is going to happen in the coming days? What can you share with us?
Well, first, I think, you know, in Israel, everybody is really, really frustrated, really worried. Nobody really knows exactly where this is going. I try to explain what I think about, you know, what will happen and what is going on. Um, but overall, you know, we would like to see a continuation of the blockade. We would like to see further kinetic attacks on Iran. We believe that if we push them more and more, you know, at the end of the day, this regime will collapse. But at the moment, this is not what you are seeing. We are seeing a memorandum of understanding. It's not a, you know, an agreement, a final agreement. It's an intermediary agreement, a memorandum of understanding that says that in the next 60 days, the Strait of Hormuz will be opened completely for trade and the blockade will be relieved. And during these 60 days, there will be discussions about the end state, which is dismantling Iran from being a, you know, a nuclear potential country, how to get out of the enrichment, and so on.
Um, the question is, why? Why? Why doesn't Trump continue the blockade? Why does he need these 60 days? There can be many explanations. One explanation, of course, is really the situation of the global market, the energy market, which is in a pretty devastating situation. Talking about the prices of oil and energy that has gone up in some countries more than 50%, especially in Europe. But also, there is a crisis in the East. There are more than a thousand ships stuck in, um, the Gulf, the Arabian Persian Gulf. And, uh, in the 60 days, you can basically empty the Gulf completely, get out all these, uh, ships, at least for a while, stabilize the energy market globally, and then you can go back and deal with them in a situation which is much more comfortable. So this is, I would say, my explanation.
Look, I, I followed very, very carefully many of President Trump's interviews. Um, I think he doesn't want to be Obama. He doesn't want to be Biden. He understands perfectly well what JCPOA is. He knows, um, how bad these previous deals were. He says again and again, "I will not let Iran be nuclear." Uh, but obviously, he has also other considerations. Um, when I look at it from an Israeli point of view, I think that one very important lesson for Israel, and it's a lesson we have learned long ago, Israel must be able to defend itself by itself. We cannot be dependent on anybody. We have to be able to defend ourselves, get the job done. Um, and also, we must keep our, you know, ability to control our, our future and destiny.
Um, we have to continue fighting in Lebanon. We have to fight in Gaza. We have to finish the job. We cannot have a reality where, uh, our citizens are endangered or our enemies are building themselves again, and we are sitting on the side and looking at them, you know, gaining capabilities once again. This is not an option. And this is a, you know, a big challenge for Prime Minister Netanyahu to make it, you know, crystal clear. We are not going back to what was before the 7th of October. We have to be proactive. We have to defend ourselves. And if we have to deal with Iran, we will also deal with Iran and reach the goals of war. I still believe that we can do that together with the US. And even if we have, um, some disagreements, and there are interests the US has that we don't have, the way the president looks at it globally is not the way Israel looks at it. Um, we look at it from a very pinpointed, you know, point of view, looking at us, looking at the region, not looking globally.
Um, at the moment, as we speak, there is still a blockade on Iran. The blockade is still in place. It hasn't been released yet. The IDF is still attacking in Lebanon. Uh, the Israeli Minister of Defense stated clearly, Israel is not going to withdraw from South Lebanon. We're going to stay in our positions, um, and defend our towns in the north and our soldiers. We're going to continue operating in our areas of control, and any danger we'll see from, we will attack.
Uh, what will happen on his side? We don't know. What worries me, and this is something that I think might happen in the coming months or two, is that the reality we are seeing now, I would say from a psychological point of view, looking at Hamas and Hezbollah, this might embolden them, especially Hamas, that was pretty much contained in its small area of control in Gaza. We might see Hamas now much more proactive and emboldened because of the reality we see at the moment in Iran. Um, and, uh, same goes with Hezbollah. They might continue to be, you know, proactive and attack us. And we have to, any attack will have to deal and continue degrading them as we did until now.
For us, it's very important not to connect Lebanon and Gaza with what's going on in Iran. This is crucial. We'll have to see also enabling Iran to trade now for two months. And I don't know what kind of foreign money they're going to get and how much. It's not clear. But if they get money, they will obviously use it for terror. And this is not good news. Until now, we saw how effective, you know, the blockade was and how much it put Hezbollah in a very, very bad situation. Um, you know, Hezbollah was created to defend, defend Iran, and what we see is exactly the opposite. Now Iran is defending Hezbollah because of its weakness, because of the situation of Hezbollah.
So, obviously, I think what is mostly frustrating is that we reached a point that we really weakened our enemies dramatically. You know, we, we can see, uh, in the horizon like an opportunity to win decisively against the Shia axis, and now we are being stopped. Now they are getting an opportunity to recover, and this is not good news at all. Uh, this is something very, very, uh, disappointing from an Israeli, uh, point of view, and I would say even a regional point of view, because that this will impact also other countries in the Middle East, the Gulf States, and other countries that will see Iran regrouping and, uh, getting stronger again.
Um, when we hear the stories from Iran, and it's very important to understand the way they see it, they see it as an American surrender. They see it as a, a win for, for Iran. They feel that the, the Americans are giving up, and they're getting everything they want. This is the way they're explaining things. They're staying crystal clear. "We're not going to give up our nuclear ambitions." "We are not going to enable free trade." "We will demand the toll and, you know, ships paying us." Um, so Iranians, you know, they feel they're winning here in these negotiations. And it's amazing because, you know, they're really weak. Their economy is destroyed, their currency is worth nothing, and all their military industries are destroyed. We have no navy. And yet, even with this amazing military achievements, we're, we're at a point where, in their eyes, you know, it's America surrendering, it's not them. And, uh, on top of that, some of the remarks the president made against Israel, against Netanyahu, this is also not serving us or, uh, the mission, because this, you know, gives a feeling that there is a daylight between Israel and the US, and the Iranians are trying to take advantage of this reality and really distance between Israel and the US. I, I don't think there is much of a daylight, but the, the rhetoric of the president is not helping here at all.
Um, and I'm asking myself, you know, whether, you know, things will change in the coming weeks, because Iranians are not going to give up. They're not going to give the uranium. They're not going to agree to anything the US wants, and, and they're not going to enable the president to reach the goals the way he wants to reach them without serious pressure on them economically, blockade, militarily. Um, I think the US, at the end of the day, will have to renew the blockade and will have to renew kinetic attacks. And if the president is serious, if he really means that Iran cannot be nuclear, eventually he will have to do something about it, and, uh, an attack.
General, let me ask you a question. Is it possible for Israel to defeat, if Iran emerges intact after this war? I don't mean defeat in terms of, kind of, tactically what's happening in southern Lebanon, but to really end the threat in Lebanon. Can that even happen if the regime survives?
Look, the regime equips, funds, trains, and gives the technology to Hezbollah. So if the regime is able to do all of that, then, you know, Hezbollah will rebuild itself, and it will be much, much harder both for Israel and for the Lebanese government to, to deal with them. One of the most crucial issues in dismantling Hezbollah is the inability of Iran to sustain them, to, to help them, to fund them, to train them, equip them, and so on. Um, so obviously, there, there is a deep connection between what you do in Iran and how effective you are against Hezbollah, and the ability to dismantle Hezbollah in the long term, which is also, by the way, dependent on how much the US is going to help to build and reform, by the way, the Lebanese army, and of course, the freedom of operation to the IDF to continue and degrade, uh, systematically the way we have been doing in the last, you know, year.
And you mentioned that you see from all of this the tremendous need for Israel to be able to defend itself by itself and not be dependent on the US. Is that moment coming? Meaning, would Israel be ready and willing to strike Iran post a US deal if it feels that there is a threat and not kind of get the permission or the partnership of the US? Are, are we there yet, or that's, there's still too much to go in terms of Israel's defense establishment and kind of the ethos in Israel of being willing to do that?
I think that both the defense establishment and the government understand that we have an historical, almost biblical, you know, opportunity to to bring down this regime. We're not going to give up on this. I, I, I firmly believe that we can do it together and with coordination with the US and CENTCOM. Um, but Israel has prepared, uh, decisive plans to deal with the Iranian regime. We completely control their airspace. We can attack them fiercely again and again. Um, but of course, we are basically, um, in a partnership. We are doing things in coordination with the US. And as long as the overall objectives remain the same, and we understand that Iran cannot be nuclear and cannot produce massive amounts of ballistic missiles and cannot continue equipping, you know, and, and, and helping these proxies, um, then Israel, you know, will have to agree that things might take more time, but the goals will be reached at the end of the day. But if we see the US changing the strategy and not willing, uh, to do the job, I believe that at least under Prime Minister Netanyahu, he won't hesitate to say to the president, "This is our country. This is our security. This is our lives, and we'll do what we need to do to defend ourselves." Um, I saw this decision-making throughout the war again and again. Um, well, I hope we won't reach this point, but we might, you know, um, we, we have to do what we have to do at the end of the day.
You know, we're seeing in the media this back and forth between Trump and Netanyahu, and it, it's almost like it creates, could create a scenario of plausible deniability where Trump basically says, "We're out. Israel's on their own," and almost gives Israel an opportunity to, to finish the job. So, could there be a silver lining in this where Israel would not be kind of held back to, to really fully engage with Iran? Is that a possibility, or that's too, too optimistic?
Look, from the very beginning, the position of the administration was, "You are a capable partner. You have your own, you know, interests, and you, you do what you need to do to, to defend yourself." I think that at least this administration appreciates countries who are strong and know can defend themselves and not are not dependent on the US, you know, uh, sending troops to defend them. Um, this is the kind of alliance the US wants. It wants an alliance with strong partners. Strong partners, you know, have a say and have a responsibility to defend themselves. Um, I think that, um, we're not there yet. I think that the, the goals we have in Iran are shared both by the US and Israel. Maybe the tactics differ, maybe the time frame is different. Um, but I'm not sure. I'm not, I don't think we're in a place where we can say, "Okay, that's it. The US, you know, has given up the goals of war, and we have to now do everything by ourselves." Um, at least what I heard, uh, from, you know, the Prime Minister's office were, well, coordinated. They talk, you know, almost on a daily basis. Um, and sometimes there is a bit of a game, you know, or what they say in public and what they tweet is not necessarily what's going on, uh, behind the scenes. Behind, behind the scenes, we're are much more coordinated than what people might think.
So, in terms of US military assets in the Middle East, they're all here, I assume, still. Uh, is that an indicator about the strength of this, of this alleged deal? Because, uh, you know, until we see all the boats, you know, leaving the Middle East, there's still a very strong US presence, and and things could escalate again.
Not only is there a very strong, uh, presence, there are still reinforcements coming in. But the US, at least for now, is not in a retreat. It's in full force in the Middle East. Still, by the way, as I said, enforcing the blockade. And, uh, we'll see, I think, develop in the, in the coming days, and whether this is really something very pinpointed, tactical, in order to really ease, you know, the market, the energy market, and move all the ships outside of the Gulf. And the big question, or the big issue, is what will happen in the coming months or two, where, where this is pointed. It will be the big challenge. And, uh, you know, I said it when Obama started his presidency. I said it when Biden was president, and and also and now with Trump as president. He needs to decide how he wants to be remembered in history. Is he going to be a Churchill or a Chamberlain? That's it. I, I have the feeling, my gut feeling, he wants to be a Churchill, not a Chamberlain. But, uh, we'll see, we'll see in the coming, uh, future where this is going.
And as you speak, uh, to the Israeli public, what are you finding the reaction of of citizens in Israel and, uh, and also the leadership across Israel? Is there, kind of, this uniform understanding that Israel needs to continue this war with Iran, or are there large segments within Israel who, who want, who want to end the war?
I think that we are united in our frustration. Everybody is frustrated. You know, I think that in Israel, I would say the vast majority of the society wants to win decisively this war. Uh, and are very disappointed that, you know, we're not attacking and not doing what we need to do to finish the job. Um, some accuse Trump, some accuse Netanyahu for not being strong enough against Trump. There is a lot of politics, you know, at the end of the day, elections are coming, and a lot of the comments of different politicians are from, you know, the political stance and not necessarily to the point. But overall, people are disappointed, at least for now, disappointed and frustrated and worried, you know, where this is going. We, we don't want to see Iran rebuilding its forces or building against the proxy, building again the proxies against us after everything we went through, and the, the plans in which we really degraded all these forces, we don't want to see them now rebuilt.
So, General, in terms of of the hopes of a regime change in Iran, I, is there any possibility that that's maybe the next level of strategy? Meaning, military strikes didn't bring down the regime. Economic, uh, warfare did not bring down the regime. Is it possible that there's, there's a new strategy on the horizon? Meaning, rather than say this is the end of the war, maybe there's a new opportunity.
Look, to break down the regime, you need to sustain the pressure. And, uh, you know, at the time, President Trump talked a lot about the maximum pressure campaign. A maximum pressure is a combination of, you know, economic pressure, sanctions, the blockade, which was very, very, very effective, and kinetic attacks when when needed in a pointed way. At the moment, so far, we had 40 days of very, very meaningful kinetic attacks, and then we had two months of blockade, which was very, very effective. And now it's not clear. I mean, if, if there is no blockade and no attacks, obviously this is not really promoting, um, a change of regime, unless suddenly we'll see, you know, again the people rising and the fighting again, which might happen at a certain point. Um, but this is something internal that might happen. If you want to bring down the regime, and we have to bring down this regime, you have to combine between economic pressure and the military pressure on this, uh, regime.
Thank you. And we have so many questions coming in from our wonderful viewers. If you're watching this briefing, uh, remember you can send in your questions so that we can address that which is relevant to you. General, a lot of people want to understand the kind of the larger framing of the implications of a deal between the US and Iran in terms of the US and China, uh, Russia's involvement. Can you try to speculate about what this means for these broader alliances?
Well, looking really, you know, at the big picture, um, I think that, you know, US goals, and I've said that from the very beginning, are are bigger than Israel. Israel, you know, looks at the issue of Iran from a military point of view. We don't want them to be nuclear. We don't want to be shot by ballistic missiles. We are worried about terror. When the US looks at Iran, it looks at the balance of power and alliances, and, and what the US would like to see is Iran shifting to the US, like, like Venezuela. US wants to control Iranian oil. US wants to have leverage over China. US doesn't want Chinese and Russian dominance in the Middle East. And Iran is a key country that you want to really have a, you know, a serious relationship with to make sure that the Chinese and the Russians are not, you know, powerful in, in the Middle East. Now, China has is controlling a lot of the rare materials, uh, for AI industry and electrical cars and so on, and really restricting the trade with the West. And this is putting the West in a big problem because, at the end of the day, everybody's dealing with AI and electrical cars and chips and so on. The way the US can create leverage against China is controlling the energy. It's controlling the oil. That's for the US, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, the issue of Iranian oil, and so on. It's a big deal. Um, and I wouldn't think that the US would be motivated to give up this leverage, and especially taking in account that the war was so, so effective and with so few casualties. You know, we're talking about the big war against Iran, 13 soldiers were killed. This is not Vietnam. It's not, you know, Russia, Ukraine. It's not that the US is paying prices it cannot, cannot sustain. And, and the opportunity is huge. And I think that everything I'm saying to President Trump is crystal clear. He knows all of that. Not saying anything he doesn't know. So when we look at his need to have this 60 days to open the Strait and his, you know, the, um, the energy market reality, I think that this is the way we need to look at it. Something that is very tactical. It serves the US, it serves the West, it serves the East. It also serves Iran, which is desperate, you know, for some money and trade because of the blockade. Um, so we have maybe a very, very short period of time of some kind of win-win on all sides. But the big, big challenge and the big question is what happens next. And what I expect to see next is again a blockade. I expect to see again attacks, especially if at the end of this 60 days, Iran hasn't agreed, not only talking about that, but actually doing it, giving the uranium. So they, there will be a moment when they will be tested whether they are really, really willing to give up their aspirations or not. And if not, then they will have to pay, pay the price. We'll have to, to deal with them. I, I think in the long term, we can definitely bring down this regime and, and reach out, reach the goals of war. But it's a long game. We have to be patient.
It's amazing to hear your optimism, and I think our viewers very much appreciate that perspective. Brigadier General Amir Avivi, thank you so much for your leadership. Thank you for sharing all of that with us and for fighting for Israel. Thank you to all of our viewers and supporters for tuning into this briefing. We will be back with you tomorrow, 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time, 5:00 p.m. here in Israel. Until then, stay safe, stay strong, take care, everyone.