Transcription
Welcome to Trinity Radio. I'm Braxton Hunter, and today we're going to be taking a look at a clip by an atheist that I haven't been familiar with until now, called Allegedly Ian. We're going to actually see a couple of clips from him on comments he made regarding God's nature and the nature of God with respect to time and human freedom and the beginning of the universe. So, let's just go ahead and jump in right now to a conversation he had with Jordan Peterson recently. So, here's that.
"If you believe in an all-knowing God, then free will is impossible."
"You know, a thousand years of deep thinking philosophers would disagree with you."
"But and a thousand years of or at least like the last 50 years of philosophers would disagree with you. These analytic philosophers, people like Graham Oppy make arguments about the incompatibility of omniscience and free will. That if God created this world, if he chose this world instead of that world, then he makes it causally inevitable, every single action that you were going to make. If he made a world where we were just electrons in love, then none of this would have happened. But by making us in this world, knowing exactly what's going to happen in the future, it makes all of those events inevitable, which means that they're all causally determined, which means that we have no free will if you believe in an all-good God or an all-knowing God that made everything."
"Well, have it your way."
"Okay, cool. So then theodicy fails."
"Well, it fails for you. That doesn't mean you've disproved it. I mean, your argument."
"Yes. You tried to make a case for a causally deterministic universe. I don't think there's any evidence for that at all."
"Do you think that God could have created a different universe than the one that he created?"
"I have no idea."
"Okay. So then there's going to be a double bind, right? So either he couldn't have done it, in which case he lacks a power, or he could have done it, in which case we don't have free will because he chose this world instead of that world, making the events of this world instead of that world inevitable with his infallible knowledge."
"I don't understand where you're headed."
"Which just means that the free will defense fails. Like all this, like, and under your view, if you want to have it fail, no problem. I don't know why it's relevant to the issue with."
"Do you acknowledge that under your view free will doesn't exist?"
"No."
"Oh, then do you want to respond to the argument?"
"You'll have to phrase it more clearly so that someone like me can understand it."
"Yeah, I got you. So, so God already knows in advance everything that's going to happen, which means that by making this world instead of that world, everything is inevitable. Which means that God's act of causing this world instead of that world."
"Doesn't mean determined."
"It's causally inevitable if God chooses this world instead of that world. Causally determined."
"Causally inevitable means determined."
"No, it doesn't."
"Absolutely. Yes, it does."
"Well, have it your way."
"Well, it kind of depends on what you mean by inevitable. So, let's jump into this. He mentions Graham Oppy. I actually have a copy of Arguing About Gods and have read it thoroughly and quoted from it multiple times. I think that's principally where Graham Oppy talks about the. I can't help but say that even though I think a lot of viewers might think I have every reason not to feel this way, I really kind of enjoy listening to Ian talk. I don't know what it is about the way he talks and the way he says things. Oh, so do you want to respond to the argument? It's just kind of funny to me. I don't know. It's entertaining. But anyway, let's jump into this. So when we're talking about God's knowledge, um, what he's trying to say and what Oppy is saying, at least in part of his criticisms, is like, like Ian just said, it's inevitable once. So let's talk about how we might view this. When he asked about could God have created other ways, he's kind of responding to what within theology we would talk about as a view called Molinism. At least that captures kind of what we're talking about because he's using possible world semantics. And when that's brought to this particular subject, it's most at home among Molinists and Molinism. So what's that all about? Many of you already know this, so I'll try to be brief. But on Molinism, imagine that you met a little old lady after church and you asked her the question. Almost any old lady in America after church on Sunday, you ask her, you have a conversation with her and you say, "Hey, do you think God knows everything that's going to happen and everything that has happened?" She'll say yes. You say, "Well, do you think he knows what would have happened if we hadn't been having this conversation right now? You know, do you think he knows who you'd be talking to and what you'd be talking about? And if I went and got in the car, how I would turn the wheel and what would be on the radio and how I would think about that? Does he know all of that?" I almost guarantee you that almost every little old lady you speak to will say, "Well, yeah, he would know all of that. God knows everything." Well, what you've just said is God not only knows what has happened and what will happen and what is happening, but he knows what would have happened under other circumstances if we had freely chosen otherwise. And that is to affirm something that in theology is referred to as middle knowledge. And so basically, this is the building blocks of Molinism. Now, to extrapolate that out, maybe you just discovered that you're a Molinist. Well, as we extrapolate that out, um, when in philosophy we use possible world semantics, what one is talking about is God, let's say God is aware of all these possible worlds. Now, that doesn't mean real worlds out there in the way that like in Marvel's multiverse, there are all these real universes and you might be, maybe you could go to them if you have some way to go to them through magic or a machine or something. No, no, that's not what we're talking about. Possible worlds are worlds that we can imagine or that God would be aware of that don't have any incoherencies in them, no contradictions. So, a possible world isn't a world that really exists, but it's one that that could have existed. We can imagine. So maybe a world where everything is exactly the same as it is in this world, the actual world, except nobody has a left arm. Okay, maybe that's a possible world. Maybe there's nothing contradictory about that as far as I can tell. Or everything is the same except that I have a freckle on a different part of my face than I do now, or something like that, you know, or music was never a thing. You know, these are worlds that don't involve necessarily any contradiction. They're possible in that way. An impossible world would be something like a world where there are square circles. Okay, that's not a possible world because that's an incoherent idea. So God's aware of all the possible worlds. He could create that way. He could create any of the possible worlds. But Molinists will say, well, perhaps God chooses because we think we have free will. Like, is the point of this discussion? We think we have free will. So it looks like God chose to take a subset of those possible worlds, worlds that are we might call feasible worlds, worlds where man has free will. And then God may shake out the free will there, give put the free will agents in these worlds, and he knows what they would do in all these real circumstances. And there may not be a world where everything, all things being equal, goes exactly the way God would have wanted it to go. So he chooses among those worlds of free creatures, the world that perhaps most adequately fits his ultimate desires. And so he actualizes that world. He actualizes it. He brings it into being. Now, he only chose among worlds where people had free will, real libertarian free will, where most of the time, at least, they could have done other than whatever they ended up doing. So man has free will, and he chooses one of those worlds where his goals are ultimately met. But man has free will. Now, once God actualizes that world, once he brings it to be, it will be the case that everything will be as he knows it will be. And so, what some people want to look at that and say is, okay, well, if God actualized that world, he knew what everyone would freely do in that world. And he can't be wrong. So, he knows in the future that I'm going to start this stream at, start recording this at roughly three o'clock on New Year's Eve. Well, that means that that is set in some sense. Since God knows it and God can't be wrong, I must not be free to choose otherwise because if I chose otherwise, then I would make God wrong. Okay? And so he says, this is why he says it's inevitable. He makes it inevitable with his knowledge. Well, I'm sorry. He doesn't make it inevitable with his knowledge as Ian definitely said in that clip, because knowledge isn't causative. Knowledge doesn't make anything happen. And so what you need to understand here is the difference between, yes, it is the case that if God knows that I will do this stream, then it will be the case. God will not be wrong. It definitely will be the case that I will do this stream. But that doesn't mean that it must be the case that I do this stream. Or, said differently, God knows that I will make that choice, but it doesn't mean that I couldn't have chosen otherwise. You say, well, of course it does. It's set. Well, here's the difference. God knows what I will freely do because that's what I freely will do. God knows what my free action will be. It's not that God knowing it makes it happen. It's that he knows what I will freely do. Okay? Now, that is a big difference, and it is the difference that people like Plantinga and Craig and others will use to push back on this suggestion from Oppy and others is to say, "No, no, it's not that it must be this way. It's just that it will be this way." So, think about a particular instance like Peter denying Christ three times and Jesus predicting or prophesying that. Well, we might want to say, well, hold on. After Jesus said that's what's going to happen, it had to be the case. Peter was not free to do otherwise. Well, sure he was. Peter would do that, as Jesus said, and God will not be wrong about that. But Peter was free to have done otherwise. It's just that if Peter had chosen differently, then God would have known differently from eternity, and Jesus would have prophesied differently. You see? So, thinking about this in reverse is kind of helpful.
Now, another way to think about this, and this is an analogy, and no analogy is perfect. We know that. So, this is not meant to capture every aspect of this, but just think about this. So, imagine that I wanted to impress you with my favorite rock band, U2. I think U2 is the greatest rock band. I really want to convince you. So, let's say I've got three DVDs of concert footage from the same tour where U2 is doing, say, the Vertigo tour from roughly 2005. And I'm going to show you. I've got three different concert DVDs. In one of those, they don't really perform that well. They're off-tune. He doesn't sing right. The crowd's not really into it. The stadium's not really full. Um, actually, it would have been an arena show on that tour. But anyway, I'm not going to show you that one because I want to impress you with U2, and this isn't as impressive as the others. The second DVD that I have, they do pretty good, but there's nothing special about it. And in the third DVD, it, I mean, the night just goes off. I mean, it's amazing. The music is incredible. Everything's spot-on. There are these incredible transcendental moments. The crowd is on fire. It's just amazing. Okay. Well, I get to choose of these three worlds, we might say, these three DVDs, which one I want to actualize on the screen for you. So, I choose the best one, the one that meets my goals the best, and I actualize it on the screen for you. And then you watch it, and you become an amazing U2 fan after that, obviously. But you, my knowing, my knowing every detail of what's going to happen in the DVD that I actualize on the screen for you. My knowing when they were going to sing this song and when that audience member was going to leap into the air and when Bono was going to go out into the audience. My knowing all of those things in detail doesn't cause any of it to happen. It's just my knowledge of what's going to happen ahead of time. But the individuals, the audience members, the bandmates, all of those people are free in the moment. My knowing it doesn't make them not free. They're, I know it because they freely chose to do that, right? And I've seen it before. Now, the imperfection here is I'm a finite being, and all of this is on DVDs, and they're not worlds that one could actualize. But really, when you think about it, if God has foreknowledge, if he knows what's going to happen, then we have the relevant details here. He knows what we are going to freely do. And yes, it will be the case that we will do the thing that he knows. Just like the bandmates on the screen and the audience members will do the things that I know because I had prior knowledge of it. God knows what we will do. But that's not, that doesn't mean that's what we must do. It's just that he knows what we freely will do. Okay? Now, that is a big difference, and it is the difference that people like Plantinga and Craig and others will use to push back on this suggestion from Oppy and others is to say, "No, no, it's not that it must be this way. It's just that it will be this way." So, think about a particular instance like Peter denying Christ three times and Jesus predicting or prophesying that. Well, we might want to say, well, hold on. After Jesus said that's what's going to happen, it had to be the case. Peter was not free to do otherwise. Well, sure he was. Peter would do that, as Jesus said, and God will not be wrong about that. But Peter was free to have done otherwise. It's just that if Peter had chosen differently, then God would have known differently from eternity, and Jesus would have prophesied differently. You see? So, thinking about this in reverse is kind of helpful.
Now, another way to think about this, and this is an analogy, and no analogy is perfect. We know that. So, this is not meant to capture every aspect of this, but just think about this. So, imagine that I wanted to impress you with my favorite rock band, U2. I think U2 is the greatest rock band. I really want to convince you. So, let's say I've got three DVDs of concert footage from the same tour where U2 is doing, say, the Vertigo tour from roughly 2005. And I'm going to show you. I've got three different concert DVDs. In one of those, they don't really perform that well. They're off-tune. He doesn't sing right. The crowd's not really into it. The stadium's not really full. Um, actually, it would have been an arena show on that tour. But anyway, I'm not going to show you that one because I want to impress you with U2, and this isn't as impressive as the others. The second DVD that I have, they do pretty good, but there's nothing special about it. And in the third DVD, it, I mean, the night just goes off. I mean, it's amazing. The music is incredible. Everything's spot-on. There are these incredible transcendental moments. The crowd is on fire. It's just amazing. Okay. Well, I get to choose of these three worlds, we might say, these three DVDs, which one I want to actualize on the screen for you. So, I choose the best one, the one that meets my goals the best, and I actualize it on the screen for you. And then you watch it, and you become an amazing U2 fan after that, obviously. But you, my knowing, my knowing every detail of what's going to happen in the DVD that I actualize on the screen for you. My knowing when they were going to sing this song and when that audience member was going to leap into the air and when Bono was going to go out into the audience. My knowing all of those things in detail doesn't cause any of it to happen. It's just my knowledge of what's going to happen ahead of time. But the individuals, the audience members, the bandmates, all of those people are free in the moment. My knowing it doesn't make them not free. They're, I know it because they freely chose to do that, right? And I've seen it before. Now, the imperfection here is I'm a finite being, and all of this is on DVDs, and they're not worlds that one could actualize. But really, when you think about it, if God has foreknowledge, if he knows what's going to happen, then we have the relevant details here. He knows what we are going to freely do. And yes, it will be the case that we will do the thing that he knows. Just like the bandmates on the screen and the audience members will do the things that I know because I had prior knowledge of it. God knows what we will do. But that's not, that doesn't mean that's what we must do. It's just that he knows what we freely will do. Okay? Now, that is a big difference, and it is the difference that people like Plantinga and Craig and others will use to push back on this suggestion from Oppy and others is to say, "No, no, it's not that it must be this way. It's just that it will be this way." So, think about a particular instance like Peter denying Christ three times and Jesus predicting or prophesying that. Well, we might want to say, well, hold on. After Jesus said that's what's going to happen, it had to be the case. Peter was not free to do otherwise. Well, sure he was. Peter would do that, as Jesus said, and God will not be wrong about that. But Peter was free to have done otherwise. It's just that if Peter had chosen differently, then God would have known differently from eternity, and Jesus would have prophesied differently. You see? So, thinking about this in reverse is kind of helpful.
Now, that's really important because I think what that does is that alleviates the problem of inevitability in the way that Ian clearly means it and perhaps Graham Oppy means it. But there's another thing that we need to say about this. We don't have to say it, but Ian actually opens the door for us to make the whole Christian narrative all that much more plausible because this brings us to Graham Oppy's comments and Arguing About Gods that has to do with the Molinist perspective as it relates to how there can be free will in heaven. See, some people will say, "Well, there can't be free will in heaven, even if you think you have free will here now." Because clearly, when God gives man free will, they mess everything up. And Christians believe there will be no sin in heaven. Well, actually, I don't know how all that's going to happen. I do believe that, but I'm not sure how God's going to accomplish that. But I do believe we'll have free will in heaven. And I don't believe there will be any sin. And actually, it may well be the case that, well, I'll just read what Oppy has to say about it in Arguing About Gods, the copy that I have, starting on page 318. He says, "One option here might be to follow the Molinist version of the free will defense developed in Plantinga in 1974 and discussed above. Suppose that there are true counterfactuals of freedom and that the truth of these counterfactuals of freedom is not something that can just be known by a perfect being. For all we know, it is logically possible that when a perfect being comes to create contingent things, it has open to it the option of making a universe in which free creatures freely go wrong, that is conjoined to a heaven in which free creatures always freely go right. But it does not have open to it the option of making a universe in which free creatures always freely go right."
Now, let's talk about what that means for just a minute. What that means is he's saying, look, here's one option for how it might be that if God gives people free will, that we might still get a heaven that has that has free will but no sin. And it could happen like this. Maybe God is aware of all of the feasible worlds where he gives man free will. Now, he doesn't have to create one of those. He could just determine everything the way Calvinists seem to think he does, and he could have had whatever way he wanted. But if he wanted to give man free will, then he limits those options to what people do in worlds where they have free will. Right? So of those options, it could be that the only way you get a world of free creatures in heaven where there is no sin is that you, in that same world, there is a world this side of heaven where people end up sinning. And that's just the way it is. And that would go a long way, actually, to resolving the problem of evil. But it would also show you how you would get a world where you have sin here and man has free will, but then in heaven they have free will and yet no sin. It's because God was aware of that possible world. And so he actualized that possible feasible world, and that's how he got it. So far from actually causing a problem for free will in the nature of God, we actually were able to talk about Graham Oppy and see how even with what is sometimes called the problem of heaven, there's really not necessarily a problem that doesn't have a defeater to it.
But let's move on to another thing that Ian has to say in a different clip where he is presenting to a kind of belligerent caller who's calling into the show about why he knows that there is no God. That's right. Ian is not just taking the agnostic position. He's actually taking the position that God is not real. So let's go ahead and skip over to that.
"I can give an argument for the proposition that God isn't real. Like, I can give an argument for why God isn't real."
"How do you know God isn't real? How do you know?"
"The fact that creation is an action, actions require change, and change requires time means that there can't be a God because necessarily creation requires time. What that means is that the universe itself cannot be created because time is a part of the universe."
"Time is a figment of your imagination."
"That's false."
"Yeah, that is false. Time is not a figment of your imagination. But what he has said here is, look, time is a part of the physical universe. So time, you know, for God to create the universe, you would need time, but time is a part of the physical universe. And to my mind, this is one of the simplest things to answer because all it requires is that you have God existing changelessly, sans the physical universe, no space, no matter, no time. But from the moment God goes to act to create, time begins. It's just as simple as that. And so this happens simultaneously with God's action to create. Then God enters time. Time begins to exist with the creation of the universe. I mean, to my mind, that is so simple. And the way that William Lane Craig has in the past expressed this is to say, imagine, just as an analogy again, analogies aren't perfect, but just analogy. You have a man who is sitting, and he, and you have a stopwatch. The man is sitting, and the moment that he moves to stand, you start the stopwatch. So time, so to speak, has begun with the start of the stopwatch at the first moment of action. And that's all that's being said about the creation of the universe. When God goes to act to create the universe, that's when time begins. Now, someone might go further and say, "Well, yeah, but wait a minute. God, how does God? God's thinking right prior to the beginning, he thinks, 'Now I'm going to create?'" Well, God, if God is omniscient, then he doesn't have to think through thoughts to arrive at a conclusion. God knows everything, um, simply in that way. Because think about it, when you are thinking through your thoughts to arrive at a conclusion, that's because you actually aren't omniscient. You have to think through things you already know to arrive at something you don't know or a moment that you didn't know you were going to choose. So this is, this is actually a process of learning within your own head. But if God knows everything and is omniscient, he doesn't have to think those things. So he really can exist changelessly until, until in a timeless state, sans the creation of the world. But at the creation of the world, that's when time begins, and God creates simultaneously. I'll let Craig say a, uh, one final thing about this before we move on.
"Now, what I do think is correct about what you said is that if God exists timelessly and he brings the universe into existence, time comes into being. And because God is causally related to the universe, God now stands in a relationship in which he did not stand before, and therefore there has happened a change, and that brings God into time. So I would say that the moment at which God creates the universe is the moment at which the universe comes into being. And when you think about it, what could be more obvious than that? Of course, the moment at which the universe comes into being is the moment at which God creates it. So my view is that God exists timelessly without the universe. He existing alone is timeless. And that with the creation of the universe, God enters into time in virtue of his real relationship with a temporal effect. And it seems to me that that is a, a coherent and plausible account of God's relationship to time."
Right? And so I think that resolves that. But also in this clip, or in this longer video where Ian's discussing this with someone, he also says he doesn't believe in the beginning of the universe, that there's no reason to believe that the universe has a beginning. Well, there's a couple of ways we could go about discussing this. First of all, you could discuss the fact that if you believe that time is a real thing, as Ian does, and as Ian argues for in the video, then you can't have, on my theory of time, a theory of time, you can't have a past infinite series of temporal moments stretching back infinitely into the past. There would have to be a beginning. And the reasons for this have been discussed all over this channel multiple times, but very briefly, you result in logical absurdities. So, for example, a couple of things to think about. If the past is infinite, if we have a literally infinite series, an actually infinite series of past moments, not just a whole lot, but there is no beginning. Well, then this creates two problems. One is, how would you ever arrive at this moment that we're experiencing right now as you're watching this video? Because you would have to cross an actual infinite number of temporal moments to arrive at this one. And if it's an actually infinite number of temporal moments, no matter how much time in the past you crossed, you still would not have arrived at today because you'd still have an infinite amount more to go because it's actually infinite. And so a way of wrapping your mind around this is to think about the infinite library where every other book is red and every other book is black, and there's an infinite number of red and black books. You say, "Well, I want to empty out half of that library to save some space." So I take out all the black books so that all that are left are red books. So you've taken out half the books. Now, how many books are in the library? Still an infinite amount. You've come no closer to infinite to removing the books from the infinite library or to creating more space because there's an actually infinite number. So no matter how much time was crossed to arrive at today, you'd still have more to go. And so since we are experiencing today on the timeline, well, then the past is not infinite. Another thing is, if there is no beginning at all, then how would you ever even get started? As J.P. Moreland, the philosopher, puts it, it'd be like trying to jump out of a hole that doesn't have a bottom to it. And don't try to be clever and say, "Well, maybe you could ninja off the walls." That's not what we're doing here. If there's no bottom, you can't even jump off of anything to get out of the hole. If there's no beginning, then you can't start anywhere to start crossing the infinite timeline to arrive at today. And you also can't arrive at today through successive addition. This is kind of the same thing put differently of counting one day after another after another, or I guess without celestial days, temporal moment one after the other after another. You can never stack up to infinite. You'd always just have a really big number. So I think this fails on an A theory of time.
Well, there's also something called the B theory of time. And on the B theory of time, what's going on is the past and the future and the present are equally real. So on the A theory of time, that is most intuitive to most people, the past did exist. 1968 did exist, but it doesn't exist now. Now, 2025, 2026, by the time you're watching this, is what exists. And from your perspective, 2025, the moment I'm inhabiting now, as long as well as 1968 isn't real anymore. It was real, but it's not real anymore while you're watching this. And the future will be real, but it's not real yet. But on the B theory of time, all of these times are equally real. You get into trouble trying to describe this because we're so used to tenses. We talk about the future and the past tenselessly. You can't talk about them tenselessly as easily. So you talk about, you know, 1968 is real. Well, is it? It is real, but it's not happening simultaneously with the present in the sense that we're talking, we're used to thinking of on an A theory of time. But bottom line is, what you want to get to is 1968 is real, and the future is real. 2168 is real. And if you had a time machine, maybe you could go to those places, but they're, but, but so they're all real, is what we want to say. You're just experiencing this part of a block that we might call the time block. You can imagine this block hanging in space, and it has edges to it. Now, if they're all real, then they all might have been here, just, you know, as a brute fact forever. You know, it's again, we're using temporal language here. But in this way, maybe you don't have to explain, you don't have to worry about an infinite past. There may actually be a limited past. There's, we just wouldn't refer to it as the first moment of the universe. We refer it to it as the, the earlier edge or that edge of the universe. And maybe this block, you can imagine as hanging in space, and someone is looking down on it. And from their perspective, the past and the future and the present is all right there, all at once, so to speak. Okay? It's all there, and it's just been there. And yeah, you're experiencing this moment, but it's all just been there always, in some sense of always. Even though again, temporal tenses get confusing here. And so that's on a B theory, maybe you don't have this problem because you don't have what's called temporal becoming. Each moment doesn't have this time moving forward and things coming into being in that way, temporally. And so for reasons that might not be clear to you, on a B theory of time, many people, including many of the Christian philosophers that push something like the argument we've been, the Kalam cosmological argument, we, we to talk about that the universe beginning to exist is evidence for God. You know, the Kalam cosmological argument says everything that begins to exist must have a cause. The universe began to exist, so the universe must have a cause. They think that this sort of resolves, sort of gets around that first premise of this argument because it could be the case that the block universe just exists that way, and you don't have to account for the beginning of the universe because causation is a little different anyway, because the whole thing exists there on the block. Well, Andrew Lok has, as well as others, have tried to defend the Kalam cosmological argument in light of the B theory of time. And what they would still point out is, okay, maybe this whole time block is just there, and so it didn't really, we don't really have this temporal becoming. It's all real, all at the same time, though not at the same time in a sense. But what we could say about that is within the universe that we experience, it still is the case that even if it's all equally real, we still see causal connections between events that occur. If I take my keyboard and I were to throw this keyboard at the window, and actually the window wouldn't break, the keyboard probably would. But when the keyboard broke, there was a causal chain that led to that, even if every moment of that was equally real. So there was still a causal chain there. So that means that when we go back to the earliest edge of the block universe, and we have this, this first moment, that still needs an explanation because everywhere else in the universe, we see this causation happening. So what's the explanation for the causation there? Now, some people think that there's some circularity in reasoning that way. And Andrew Lok offers an augmented version of this argument in which it mixes in a little bit of the contingency argument. However you think this block universe exists, it still needs an explanation for its existence. So what explains the existence of this block? Even if you don't want to go with this temporal becoming answer. And so I think there's still good reasons to think that this idea that the universe didn't come to exist fails, whether that is a past infinite universe or a time block on the B theory that doesn't necessarily have a past infinite existence. In either case, I think it fails. And so what I think we have here is a really interesting video. I've enjoyed listening to Ian, and I'll check him out in the future, and if I see anything I want to comment on, I'll do that then. But I think we just have maybe some simple explanations that are in the literature that resolve a lot of this. And with that, I'll see you next time on Trinity Radio.