Transcription
But if you talk to the American congressman, they have no clue because, frankly, and I'll name names, the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal gives them a distorted perspective on China.
Some of us are concerned that the Chinese leader seems to be postponing his retirement indefinitely. Uh, would you mind just commenting on that fact, please?
And the American ambassador is telling me, no, it wasn't Xi Jinping. It was the United States' failure to accept that offer. So that is, that is a fact, but that fact never gets reported. And I would say that if you talk to the average American, they genuinely believe that the Chinese Communist Party has locked up 1.4 billion people in a jail, that the Chinese people are being oppressed by this repressive Chinese Communist Party.
Quoting Lee Kuan Yew, uh, he actually said that, uh, in this world, we shall never bet against the United States. Uh, but it seems to many of the Chinese readers, uh, Chinese observers, people are thinking that China has bet against the US where it has came out with lots of narrative saying that the East is rising, but the West is like falling or declining.
Um, is the narrative of East, a rising East and a declining West, necessarily true? Uh, from your perspective? Fore speech. Fore speech. Fore speech. Fore.
Thank you, Professor Mbani. I'm going to jump straight into it. No doubt we are living in consequential times, as you so skillfully laid out just then. In a very short amount of time, I've also heard you talk in even bigger game than that, Professor. A few weeks ago, you said in public remarks that, quote, "The next 10 years will possibly be the most exciting 10 years since human history began in the field of geopolitics." Just the last century in human history, we saw the Second World War, the fall of the Soviet Union, to name just a couple. Why do you think the next 10 years will be so pivotal? And how do you see that next decade playing out when it comes to the US-China relationship?
Well, I mean, the reason why I think the next 10 years will be so pivotal is because, number one, the contest between the US and China is already baked in. The forces that are driving it are structurally already created. And at the same time, the size and scale of the powers today, of the United States and China, far exceed those of any other great powers of the past. I mean, the Soviet Union never came anywhere close to overtaking the United States in the size of its economy. And if you go back to World War II, the strength of Great Britain or Germany in those days cannot compare with the strength that the United States and China have in terms of the size and scale, uh, of their economies. And therefore, we have never seen two powers of the size of the United States and China in human history going to battle directly with each other. And that's why the next 10 years will be incredibly exciting, and that's why I'm trying my best to stay alive for the next 10 years.
Happy birthday as well. I believe this is your 75th year. Yeah.
Um, you alluded to it at the end of your remarks. Um, how will the choice that American voters make in November affect those next 10 years? To what extent will that make a difference, the decision that voters make in the polls?
Well, I think the decision on the choice of a president is always consequential. Always. And certainly, uh, uh, history will flow differently depending on how whether or not, uh, Trump is selected or Kamala Harris is, uh, selected. But the one key point I need to emphasize is, regardless of who's selected, the contest will continue. But how the contest is managed and be played out will be different. The contest, uh, will continue. And, you know, you could have a discussion as to who will be better for China. You know, in some ways, probably Kamala Harris may be better for China because she'd be more predictable, and I don't think she'll be as dangerous on Taiwan as Trump could be. Uh, as you know, Trump's former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, actually gave a speech saying that the US should recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Now, that's a declaration of war, clearly. And it's amazing that he said so. So, if he comes back, he could be very dangerous. But on the other hand, Trump, as you know, could alienate so many countries in the world that people will be rushing to China for comfort. So, you know, it's a, it's hard to say who will be better or worse for China. What we can say for sure is the next decade will be consequential, to say the least.
A few days ago, um, you were speaking at an event hosted by the Hong Kong Chinese. You've seen, you've seen the follow my speeches. I, um, my research professor. Um, and a few days ago, you've been in Hong Kong for over a week, I believe. You spoke at the Hong Kong Chinese Importers and Exporters Association. Um, today, to our audience, you spoke about strengths and weaknesses of, of China and the US. And in this speech, you spoke about three structural forces that are driving the turbulence in the US-China relationship. The first being what you describe as the ironclad rule: the, the number one power will always want to stop the number two power dethroning it. Uh, the third being the ideological battle. Um, the second is, as you yourself admitted in the speech, somewhat politically incorrect. The second structural force you mentioned, and please forgive me, I am quoting directly, is, quote, "The fear of the yellow peril." You said it. I did. Which you said, uh, has deep historical roots, is very real, and affects how US policy is formulated. Can you expand a little bit on that? Are you saying that US policy is formulated based partly on ethnocentricity at best, or xenophobia at worst? What were the nature of your comments?
Yeah, you're, you're right. This is actually a very politically incorrect subject that will get both you and me into trouble, especially people in an American campus discussing the fear of the yellow peril. But I, I do believe that if you, if you're a sort of objective social scientist, you have to acknowledge that the yellow peril exists. It's been buried there in the Western imagination since the Mongols almost conquered, uh, Europe about 800 years ago. And it's, as you know, it's surfaced in Western literature in Fu Manchu and other characterizations. I can tell you something, something you should all go and do some research on. I lived in New York in the 1980s as ambassador to the UN at that time. The yellow peril wasn't Japan, wasn't China. It was Japan. And I remember reading a novel about the Japanese. It was stunned me. He described the Japanese people as this cruel, evil yellow people who were trying to undermine the white race. I mean, that's, that's actually, I read the novel. But if anybody has any doubts that the, the yellow peril exists in the American imagination, please remember that the United States Congress passed a piece of legislation called the Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese Racial Exclusion Act in the 1890s. Now, if that's not a fear of the yellow peril, I don't know what is, you know. And I emphasize that dimension because I'm trying very hard to persuade the United States and China to behave rationally towards each other. But if you are driven by an emotional fear which is deep and dark, then frankly, you may do things that are crazy. And that's why I want to surface this emotional dimension. I want it to be understood, dissected, and analyzed so we can say, are you seriously being influenced by your emotion or your reason in this contest against China?
You mentioned the Chinese Exclusion Act, which obviously was in, in the late 19th century. Obviously, a lot of societal progress has happened in the US and around the world since then. The Chinese Exclusion Act was 30 years before universal suffrage in the US, before women were given the right to vote. And a part of America's ongoing social progress is it may be about to elect its first South Asian president. How would that change this interpretation of and this force that you think you're postulating is at play in US foreign policy conversations?
Yeah. Well, you're, you're right. I mean, the United States is an amazing society. I think before Kamala Harris, the fact that Barack Obama was elected, uh, was a tremendous, uh, source of inspiration to people all around the world. I remember I felt very excited and inspired when the United States elected a first black, uh, African-American, uh, president, Barack Obama. So, the United States has the capacity, uh, to do that. But at the same time, as you know, there, there are many reasons why Donald Trump was elected in 2016, but one reason is that there wasn't a backlash, but there was a white lash. And, you know, there was this feeling among the white population that we've had enough of minorities running the United States. It's time to go back to a strong white person. So, there, there are always in any society conflicting strains, and one of the clear strains is the fear of the white population of losing its power within the, uh, United States. And, and that also results in, uh, antipathy, uh, towards people of other races. And I think this is something. Now, what I'm saying, by the way, is factual. Please go and check and research this. Attacks on people who look Chinese on the streets has increased. There's data to show that. That reflects what I call yellow peril. Um, indeed, the Stop Asian Hate campaign a couple of years ago was as a result of this increase.
Um, moving on, I'm sure that the audience may come back to this point in, uh, in the Q&A part. Moving on, the US-China bilateral relationship is often depicted as a game of winners and losers, the victor and the defeated, with some commentators sometimes coming across more as sports pundits picking the runners and the riders, you know, the, the winners in the big game. Is it a zero-sum game, or is there still a path to a win-win situation in this relationship?
Well, I firmly believe that there's a path towards a win-win solution, which is why I conclude my, um, book, "Has China Won?", in the concluding chapter with what I call the five non-contradictions between the United States and China. And frankly, you don't have to be a rocket scientist to realize that the United States can grow and thrive and succeed, and China can rise and grow and thrive and succeed without necessarily having to bring each other down, you know. And the, the one of the problems here, which is of course a very large issue, geopolitics is still driven by concepts and metaphors that come from 19th-century battlefields where it was all a zero-sum game, especially within the powers in Europe. But we are no longer in the 19th century. We're in the 21st century. And in the 21st century, if you're a reasonably educated human being, you have to realize that the priority number one for the human race is to save planet Earth. Because if planet Earth goes, that goes to the human race. We don't have planet B to go to. So if we were rational, intelligent human beings, we should all be coming together, including the US and China, to first save planet Earth. But what's amazing is that we actually may end up in a situation where the United States may reelect a man, Donald Trump, who actually doesn't even believe in climate change, which is shocking, right? So the fact that the world's most educated society can elect a complete ignoramus on, on the greatest threat facing humanity is a sign that the world is in trouble.
You've spoken, uh, quite a bit, uh, over this last week that you've been in Hong Kong on a number of different subjects. So, I want to, as we're speaking at the Foreign Correspondents Club, ask you a couple of questions that relate to the media. Um, in your writings and public remarks, uh, you have often made the claim that what you call the Anglo-Saxon media has a distorted perspective of reality. You are speaking in the right room to air those grievances today. What is the nature of your criticism of Western media, particularly in its coverage of China?
Well, I think the, it's, I would be fair to say that the Anglo-Saxon media provides a distorted, uh, perspective, uh, of China. And I would say that if you talk to the average American, they genuinely believe that the Chinese Communist Party has locked up 1.4 billion people in a jail. That they, the Chinese people are being oppressed by this repressive Chinese Communist Party. And most Americans are not aware that in the year 2019, before COVID came, 139 million Chinese traveled freely out of China and 139 million Chinese returned back to the gulags of China. There's something wrong with this Chinese people. They voluntarily return to gulags, you know. So, you know, the impression that Chinese society is the gulag is, is created by the Anglo-Saxon media, which only gives negative coverage of what's happening, uh, in China and doesn't describe all the positive developments. And, you know, the Chinese people have experienced greater improvements in their standard of living in the past 30, 40 years than they have in the past 3 to 4,000 years. So the sense of pride that the Chinese feel in what they have accomplished is absolutely amazing. But if you talk to the American congressmen, they have no clue because, frankly, and I'll name names, the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal gives them a distorted perspective on China.
I'll move on to my second question and look forward to questions from the floor, uh, shortly, uh, to follow up on that point. Um, the other question I have that pertains to misinformation in general, um, on issues such as the South China Sea, you've said in the past that the Western narrative and the Asian narrative now can't even agree on the same facts. Yesterday's small flare-up with the, the Chinese naval vessel colliding with a Philippine ship is an example of exactly what you were talking about. This also speaks to a wider trend in public life of not being able to agree on facts, right? The rise of advocacy media, social media echo chambers, disinformation campaigns, and some politicians' willingness to exploit these media ecosystems with what Kellyanne Conway notably termed as "alternative facts." Um, we seem to live in an age where people feel entitled to not only their own opinions but also their own facts. You have been in public life for, for five decades. How have you seen the rise of the partisan press and social media change diplomacy and the nature of diplomacy over the decades?
Well, I mean, definitely in the age of social media, you're definitely getting much more untruths circulating more widely, and it's going to be a big problem for all of us. The search for truth is going to become harder and harder. That's a reality. But, you know, I, there, there are two dimensions of the problem. One is social media, which is unregulated, which is the problem. But I would say, in, in quite often, even the regular, in my view, the Anglo-Saxon media can give a misleading, uh, story. And I give you one example. That's a story that now everybody in the Anglo-Saxon media believes is that, uh, Xi Jinping offered to Barack Obama to demilitarize the South China Sea. Since you refer to the South China Sea, and after Xi Jinping made the offer, Xi Jinping violated his promise and militarized the South China Sea. Every Anglo-Saxon media says that. None of them report what I said in my book, "Has China Won?". I had lunch with a former American ambassador to China, Stapleton Roy. I have his permission to cite him and know him. Stapleton Roy said that when Xi Jinping made that offer to Barack Obama, Barack Obama should have shaken his hand and said, "Let's do it. Let's demilitarize the South China Sea." But instead, there was no acceptance of that offer, and the United States stepped up its naval patrols in the South China Sea, rejecting Xi Jinping's offer. So who, who violated that promise? Was it Xi Jinping? Was it the United States? And the American ambassador is telling me, no, it wasn't Xi Jinping. It was the United States' failure to accept that offer. So that is, that is a fact, but that fact never gets reported.
You talked about some of the structural issues in, in your comments a few days ago. One of them, um, we discovered, the other being, um, the ironclad law that number one will want to try to stop number two, and the third was ideological. Um, this, um, do you believe yourself in the intrinsic value of democracy?
Yes. Uh, I think, frankly, there will be a long run evolution towards, you know, uh, different kinds of ways of managing one's societies, and I think at the end of the day, uh, most countries will pick, in one way or another, uh, democratic systems because as you educate your population, the population wants to have a greater say in running the government, and therefore, they'll move towards democracy. But what you will not get is not necessarily a convergence to the Western liberal democracies because Western liberal democracies today are in serious trouble. This is something that's also not widely accepted. Yeah, I'm glad that, um, uh, Martin Wolf of the Financial Times has come out with the book called "The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism." Look at his book, even the first chapter, and he'll point out to serious structural flaws that have developed in democracy. So when the West goes through its worship of democracy, it is actually doing democracy a lot of damage because democracy is a very difficult political system to manage. And this, and the warnings of why it's difficult to manage was given to us two over 2,000 years ago by Plato. He warned us about populists. We didn't listen to his advice. And Donald Trump came back, uh, to misquote Winston Churchill, democracy being the worst form of government, apart, apart from all the other ones.
That's right, Professor. Uh, I'm going to ask one final question before I open it, um, up to the floor. Today's talk hasn't been about you, but you have recently published your memoir, which you were kind enough to sign some copies of, uh, before the talk, "Living the Asian Century: An Undiplomatic Memoir." The writing of which no doubt entailed a lot of looking back and personal reflection. In retrospect, looking back at your career thus far, what do you think is the most important lesson that you have learned in your 50 years of public life that relates to what we've been speaking about today?
Well, I mean, the, the big lesson I learned about geopolitics is that it's a very cold, calculating, dangerous business. And in much of the discussions on geopolitics, tends to be very naive, and the belief that countries are doing X or Y because they believe in certain principles or values. Principles and values, I discovered after two years in the UN Security Council, are irrelevant. Countries are driven by cold, hard interests, and that's the primary thing. And if we, if we drop our illusions about geopolitics, then you'll realize you will manage geopolitics in a much better way. And I can say in my book, what I try to do is pay tribute to the three founding fathers of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, Rajaratnam, because they were amazingly brilliant, you know. I speak as someone who has shaken hands with many world leaders. I mean, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Henry Kissinger, Brzezinski. I know, I know the quality of mind of these leaders, but the quality of mind of the founding generation of Singapore leaders was amazing. And I only realized that now on reflection. So, one of the goals of my book is to make Singaporeans aware that you have no idea how lucky you were to have these leaders.
We have about 10 minutes. Professor Mbani has a hard stop at 1:30 for another engagement. Uh, a microphone will be, uh, going around. If you have a question, please raise your hand. Do identify, uh, yourself before asking your question, and please keep your question to one question. The gentleman over there.
Hi. Uh, thank you, Prof Mbani. Uh, very fortunate one. I'm a Singaporean working for, uh, not the Western, not, not the few big names that you mentioned. Uh, uh, quoting Lee Kuan Yew, he, uh, I, I still remember in 2013, when I was still serving Singapore media, uh, uh, he actually said that, uh, uh, in this world, we shall never bet against the United States because that's where the innovations, technologies are coming from. And, uh, you have the great, like what you said, the greatest group of entrepreneurs who can come out with the most brilliant stuff. Uh, but it seems to many of the Chinese readers, uh, Chinese observers, people are thinking that China has bet against the US where it has came out with lots of narrative saying that the East is rising, but the West is like falling or declining.
Um, is the narrative of East, a rising East and a declining West, necessarily true, uh, from your perspective? And, uh, what can this world do to avoid the kind of, this economy of scale where the best company, who, the best country which supposed to do manufacturing very well, that's China, and the American, who innovates very well. But now it seems that the world is going back to each other, where China is driving lots of money to do innovation, and the US is trying to pour a lot of dollars into manufacturing. So, uh, is there a path going forward that these two can continue or come back to look at their synergies that's potentially huge and beneficial? Thank you.
Okay, very, very quickly. We don't have much time. Thank you for keeping it quick with him. Appreciate it. Uh, I think there are two big points in your question. One is about, in a sense, the, the strength of the West, and two, whether or not there can be synergies within the US and China. Now, I want to emphasize that the West will remain the single strongest civilization on planet Earth for several more decades. I mean, the West is not going to die and collapse in any, in any sort of way. But the difference is that, you know, remember, a hundred years ago, in 1924, a hundred thousand Englishmen could effortlessly rule over 300 million ancestors of mine in India, which is remarkable. A hundred thousand Englishmen running 300 million Indians. Now, can you imagine that happening today? Impossible, right? Which is why I said in my recent Financial Times piece, it's time for the UK to give up its Security Council seat and give it to India, which is now a much more powerful country than the UK, which is a sensible thing to do, which I guarantee you the British will not do. Uh, uh, but that, that's an example of the power shifts that have to occur. The relative power of the West is going to decline significantly, and the best way to man, for the West to manage that decline is to intelligently share it, share its positions in global governance institutions with the rest of the world.
Now, the question of synergies is easier to answer. I do believe there are tremendous synergies, uh, that can, uh, exist between the United States and China, and that's the conclusion of my book, "Has China Won?". It's time for the US and China to come together, first, first of all, to save planet Earth, right, because of climate change, and then also work together to improve the conditions of the rest of humanity, because if they work together, they can achieve a lot more. And it, frankly, it doesn't matter whether the United States has the largest economy or the second largest economy. If the American people are thriving and doing well, that's the most important thing. Okay.
Uh, the gentleman just there. I'll come over here in a moment. Uh, thank you very much, Prof Mbani. I'm Brian. I'm an assistant professor at HKU. Uh, when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo took office, he told, uh, the State Department officials to have swagger when they talk to the outside world. In the past few years, maybe not so recently, but certainly the past couple of years have seen a more trenchant approach and stance adopted by Chinese diplomats in reaction to domestic pressures, but also the audience from within the wall, so to speak. So my question is, at times when formal diplomacy seems to be struggling, what role do you see citizens, academics, and ordinary folks like ourselves, journalists and writers? What can we do to mend frayed relations? Is there agency on our part, or must we nevertheless accept that despite our best efforts, the state prevails and we must humbly accept the fate of being the subjects of a bipolar world with governments calling the shots and not ourselves? Thank you.
Uh, thank you, Brian. Great question. I wish I could give you good news that the people of the world matter. Uh, unfortunately, uh, the one trend I've seen, there was a time, you know, maybe post-Cold War, when you had the impression, especially after Francis Fukuyama's essay, that civil society, NGOs, and all could make a difference. But there has been a tremendous power shift away from civil society towards governments. And, and certainly at a time of great contestation, uh, I can tell you that even in the United States, is, by the way, the most free, most democratic society on planet Earth. You can say anything you want in the United States. Okay? Even in that society, people who want to say something rational or reasonable on China get punished. So they censor, self-censor their remarks on China. So if you can have self-censorship on a big scale in the United States of America when it comes to dealing with China or other issues, including Gaza and others, then it's a different world. And therefore, the role of governments become, is going to become more important. And therefore, it's much more important to persuade governments of what is the right thing to do.
We have time for one more question. Two if we're quick. Uh, back there next to the wall.
Thank you. Uh, some of us are concerned that the Chinese leader seems to be postponing his retirement indefinitely. Uh, would you mind just commenting on that fact, please?
Well, I mean, if you look at the history of East Asia, the countries that have successfully transformed themselves from what I call third-world economy to first-world economy have always had leaders who stayed in office for quite long. South Korea, Park Chung-hee. If you look at territory like Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo, and certainly if you look at Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew. So that there's a certain phase in the development of societies where having continuity of strong leadership makes a, a big difference. And by the way, in the British parliamentary system, uh, you can stay on as a leader for 30 years if you win the elections and so on and so forth. So at the end of the day, length in office is not what matters. It's what you do with that length, uh, in office. Whether or not you transform your society and leave behind something that is positive. I'll give you another example. Uh, and this obviously, you can see is a much more controversial example. One of the great mysteries to me is how Indonesia has emerged as the world's most successful Islamic democracy in the world. I mean, it's quite remarkable. They've had three peaceful transitions now: SBY, Jokowi to Prabowo. What, what happened? And, and then the remarkable, a remarkable part of the answer is because they had a dictator like Suharto for so long who actually improved the economic situation of the people at the bottom, raised their standard of living significantly, which then developed the middle class, which then developed the democracy that you see. So having leaders in office over a long time, if they do the wrong thing, if they do the right thing, can have a positive effect, uh, on the countries.
Thank you. Let's squeeze in one final question. There's the hand up. Let's do the gentleman back there.
Philip Bing, journalist. Uh, you present a very bipolar view of the world, US against China. Um, but both of those countries are, in fact, in relative decline against quite a number of other countries, notably India, and including, in fact, as you just mentioned, Indonesia. So, is your, uh, view not far too simplistic and takes no account in particular of India, which now has the largest population and certainly, uh, although far behind China at the moment in industrial capability, uh, has a ability to catch up just as China caught up in, in the years between, uh, 19, 1990 and, and 2010. So, what, how do you see India's role in this bipolar world that you otherwise present?
H, well, I'm happy to inform you, I agree with you. Given the shortage of time, you have to simplify things, but I can assure you that I guarantee you that, uh, in the next 10, 20, 30 years, we are clearly moving to a multipolar world. And in that multipolar world, India will be the third most independent pole. Right now, by the way, just so that you understand the relativities, if the United States is about 24 trillion and China is 17, 18 trillion, India is still 3.6, 3.8 trillion. So India is still be way behind. India will catch up, and certainly, uh, by 2050, India will be number two or number three, uh, in, in the world, clearly in the same league. But that will take some time. Over the next 10 years, uh, India will not be participating as much as a third pole because it's still way behind. But over time, and we are moving to a multipolar world. And I also want to emphasize that many countries in the Global South, including countries like say, Brazil or South Africa, and the BRICS countries, are going to step up and play a bigger role, uh, on the world. And, and, and if you want to understand the world that is coming, uh, I describe it in three M words, okay? It's going to be a 3M world. It'll be multi-civilizational. There'll be many successful civilizations. It'll be multipolar. There'll be many powers. And you notice, for example, like even in the Ukraine war, it's striking that 85% of the world's population has not imposed sanctions on Russia. That's a very incredible statistic that shows that this Global South is making its own decisions. And the third M is multilateral. And what we have to do actually is strengthen multilateral institutions if you're going to take care of our common global problems. So, you'll be a, I agree with you, it'll be a very complicated world coming. But in the, over the next 10 years, I would focus on US-China and then get ready for a different world.