Webinar | Brazil – Japan Relations at a Crossroads

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[music] Institution [music] [music] event. [music] [music] Welcome everyone. My name is Julia Masiel and I'd like to thank you for joining us for today's webinar on Brazil Japan relations at a crossroads: strategic scenarios across the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

This event is a partnership between the School of International Relations at FGV and Japan House São Paulo. Before introducing our speakers, just a quick confirmation following the copyright information video. Is everyone in agreement? A nod will do. Thank you.

With that, it is now my pleasure to introduce our speakers. First, we have Dr. Yuichiro Masukata, who will begin with a lecture. Dr. Masukata is associate professor in the faculty of law at CU University. He holds a PhD in international relations from Sophia University, Japan, as well as an MA in international relations and a BA in foreign studies from Sophia University. His research focuses on international relations and environmental politics, with particular interest in climate change policy and global governance.

Following his lecture, we will have commentary from Dr. Danielle Huchinto, who is teaching professor of international relations at FGV. He holds a PhD in political science and international studies from the University of Birmingham, an MA in political science and international relations from Nova University of Lisbon, and a BA in international relations from Pukahu. His research focuses on international security, especially political violence and interstate conflict.

After that, we'll have a Q&A session with questions from the audience. There's a Slido link in the YouTube chat where you can submit your questions. Before we begin, I would like to invite the president of Japan House São Paulo, Mr. Kusuhoa, to offer his opening remarks. Mr. Hoa, thank you very much for being here and for the continued collaboration with FGV. Please, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Julia. Thank you very much for your introduction. First of all, I'd like to thank you very much, Professor Masukata from CU University and Professor Danielle Huchinto here from FGV, and all FGV staff that due to their hard work made this seminar, this webinar possible.

Well, for Japan House São Paulo, it's a pleasure to be here on this event. Uh, Japan House São Paulo is an institution that has at its main objective to present Japan in Latin America. There are three Japan Houses in the world: one in São Paulo, one in London, and one in Los Angeles. Uh, and Japan House São Paulo was the first one to open its doors in 2017. So we are nine years on the road presenting Japan here in Latin America.

Physically, we are at the Paulista Avenue in São Paulo, Paulista Avenue number 52, but we are also very much uh attentive in our social media, our website, our Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, and all these social medias. And perhaps people know more about Japan House by our exhibitions, but uh we also are, it's our mission to show Japan of all aspects, not just artistic exhibitions, but also events related to gastronomy, to tourism, to technology, to sports, dance, music, and also discuss these important subjects like webinars like this one.

So for us, it's a pleasure to be here. Uh, personally, I'm very interested in listening to Professor Masukata about your opinion and to see the counterpoint of Daniel Huchinto from a Brazilian perspective. So I would like again to thank you very much for all our audience to be here, and I wish all of us a good event. Thank you very much.

>> Thank you. Professor Masakata, you may begin your lecture.

>> Okay. So let me share. Am I right? Uh, can you see this slide for everyone?

>> Yes.

>> Okay. So, let me begin. So, um, thank you very much for the kind introductions, uh, Julia, and thank you to all the FGV and to all the colleagues joining today. So, um, it is a great pleasure to have an opportunity to discuss Brazil-Japan relations with the Brazilian audience. In my setting, this relationship is introduced through its historical and human dimensions, like the Nikkei community and Japanese pop culture like manga, anime, but uh, and of course, those dimensions remain very important. However, um, today I would like to approach the topic from a somewhat different angle. As the subtitle suggests, I am interested in strategic scenarios around the Atlantic and in the Pacific regions, but I would like to do so in a way that begins with Brazil's and Japan themselves, and only then widens the conversation. So the aim, uh, of this talk is not to replace the familiar story, but to, uh, open a somewhat different one. A story about practical cooperation and, uh, the international situations might be.

So, uh, this slide presents the core message of the talk. My current, uh, discussion begins by asking how Brazil fits into the Indo-Pacific. I would like to reverse that perspective slightly for this audience. I think the more productive question is the one on the side: where can Brazil and Japan build practical cooperation starting from the South Atlantic? The map helps illustrate the analytical shift I am proposing. Uh, it is not meant as a literal, uh, geopolitical map, but rather as a conceptual one. On the left-hand side, when the relationship is framed simply as HIP plus Latin America, its receptivity tends to be limited. In much of Latin America, it can sound geographically distant, externally framed, and not always, uh, closely connected to regional priorities. So on the left, uh, on the right-hand side, when the conversation is reframed as South Atlantic, Brazil in the Pacific, receptivity becomes higher. This is because the starting point changes. So we begin not with the important map, but with Brazil's own geographically maritime space or strategic languages. So the South Atlantic is also not only a geographic space in Brazilian diplomacy. It has long had institutional and political meaning, as reflected to cast the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic. So what I found important here is that Brazil stays at the center of the story. This is not a matter of rhetoric or alone. It is always and also affects how the relationship is explained, both intellectually and politically. If the conversation begins with Brazil's own geography and interests, it becomes easier to explain in Brasília and, I would say, also easier to communicate in Tokyo. So the key line for the whole presentation is that start from Brazil's position in the, uh, South Atlantic, and then. So the next question is, does this conversation matter now? My suggestion is that Brazil-Japan relationship now have what the stride calls the practical opening. One reason is energy transition. Recent tensions, uh, along the Straits of Hormuz have reminded us that energy routes, uh, matter again in a very visible way. And another reason is, um, the resilient supply. If we think about grains, beefs, soy, and critical minerals, the issue today is not simply, um, trade volume and reliable delivery. And so the third reason is what I would call the strategic room to act. So the developments involving Venezuela, Iran, and the, uh, broader US and China relationship all increase that the value of, uh, having room for maneuver and diversify partnerships. So when the slide says that this, uh, relationship now looks useful, not only friendly, I think that is exactly the point. So the, um, the relationship is still historically friendly, but currently conditions allow us to discuss it, uh, more practically. So this is why I suggest that, um, the South Atlantic is a more effective starting point. But of course, the starting point matters only if it, uh, opens up a more, uh, compelling and practical agenda. Uh, this is the analytical starting point I would like to emphasize, and the South Atlantic is where Brazil's already speaks with confidence. I think these frames, uh, work well for several reasons. The first, it connects directly to trade, energy routes, and resources that Brazil's already traded as important. The second, it allows Brazil to speak from its own geography, rather than from imported labels like, uh, Western Hemisphere or the Southern South, you know, Third World, or like Global South, and so on. The South Atlantic is also not only a geographic space in Brazilian diplomacy. It has already, uh, had institutional and political meaning as, or as already mentioned, ZOPACAS. And the third, it makes maritime space more visible. Once we begin from the South Atlantic, the look towards the Indo-Pacific becomes easier to explain. And finally, as the stride notes, and there is also an audience effect, it sounds more grounded, more Brazilian, and less imported from outside. So, uh, I would summarize this slide very simply, and once again, slide: start from Brazil's own geography and strengths, and then build the, uh, broader, uh, strategic discussions. Right now.

So if we begin from Brazil, then the next question becomes, what does Brazil gain and why does Japan fit well in this story? On the Brazilian side, I would highlight the three gains shown on the slide. The first one is long-term investment that states. The second is technology and industrial, uh, upgrading. And the third is cooperation without pressure to, uh, choose sides in a more polarized international environment. The third point matters a great deal. Um, on the Japanese side, the slide uses the phrase "a comfortable partner." In spoken terms, I would interpret that as a partner associated with trust, rate delivery in finance, infrastructure, and standard. So with continuity and implementation, and with an agenda, uh, that is relatively easy to present through, uh, energy, industrial, and connectivity. So, and this is also supported by the official bilateral framework and the strategic and global, uh, partnership action plan for 2025 to 2030. Together with the ISFM, give their this connection, relationship more, uh, concrete agenda around, uh, sustainable mobilities and ports and airports. So the bilateral value here is not abstract, as you already know, that it is already institutionalized.

So this leads to the practical agenda of this talk. Um, uh, I focus on the three, uh, areas not because they exhaust the relationship, but because they are relatively easy to explain and easy to remember. The first is green energy and green industry. The second is reliable supply and industrial corporations. The third is port, sea routes, and ocean corporations. So what I'd like to, uh, to, uh, say about this structure is that it moves us away from the very, you know, a general diplomatic vocabulary and toward more tangible sectors, and it also gives us a simple set of memory words which appear at the bottom of the slide: energy, industrial, and connectivity. So the length of the talk is organized around those three areas.

Let me begin with green energy and green industry. The, uh, stride suggests this is probably the easier, uh, entry point because it speaks at once to growth resilience and technology. Brazil brings scarce ethanol and transition rules. Uh, on the contrary, uh, Japan brings technology, finance, and delivery. So concrete examples of the stride help, uh, make this visible. One is the Toyota hybrid flex-fuel prototype presented in São Paulo in 2020, uh, 18. And the other is ISFM in 2025, which moves sustainable fuels and mobility, uh, uh, okay. So, uh, the, what is the analytical interest here is that this is not a simple story of technology transfer. It is a story of adaptation to Brazilian conditions. That is why this area learns well. It is positive, practical, and future-oriented, and already visible. So it gives a good first illustration of what a more practical Brazil-Japan agenda, uh, might look like.

So the second, uh, area is reliable supply and industrial cooperation. Here I would especially stress the phrase "reliable delivery" on the slide. In the current, uh, context, states and firms are not thinking only about efficiency, but they are also thinking about reliability, resilience, and practicability. The slide breaks, uh, this into, uh, three parts. The first, food, energy, and security, secure delivery. Uh, this is where the grain MOU and big market opening become relevant. And, uh, second, critical inputs and diversification, that, uh, such as, uh, Jock minus cooperation is important because it shows how critical minerals move from geology into industry today. The third, standard of finance and, and implementation. The action plan gives bilateral cooperation a, uh, a framework for more resilient and reliable supply chains. So if I have to condense this slide into one oral line, it would be this: grains, beef, critical minerals, and supply chains are where resilience becomes concrete.

So the third area is port, sea routes, and, uh, ocean cooperation. I think this, uh, topic is more familiar, and I think the professor is more knowledgeable about this topic. So after that, I'd like to discuss more about this topic for the maritime or oceans, uh, cooperation. Then, this, for example, this is where the South Atlantic framing becomes especially useful for India, Brazil, and Japan's relationship. So one, with, uh, once we begin from the Brazil branch geography, maritime space becomes central. The stride raises, uh, this out very clearly: Southern Atlantic and the ports, cape routes, and Indian Ocean, East Asia, and hubs, and finally, projects and delivery. So below that, the slide also gives the three practical entry points: logistic coordination and tone. The logistic means thinking about Santos, the cape route, and shipping, uh, links. The coordination means port links, data sharing, and customs. And, in terms of the tone, I agree with the SR that this is easier to explain than the defense map. And so my leading of the thrive is that maritime connectivity should be treated not as a secondary issue, but as a part of the infrastructure of strategic cooperation between Brazil and Japan.

So up to this point, my argument has been bilateral. The next step is not to abandon, uh, sorry, not abandon the bilateral base, but to, uh, ask whether some agendas become stronger when the partnership grows beyond the two countries. So this is where India's becomes important. My reason for the introduction of India is not simply that, uh, trilateralism sounds attractive. It is that Brazil and India already have substantive relationships of their own. They are strategic partners. They are, uh, working together in BRICS, or IBAS, or BASIC, and G20, and so on. And there, the bilateral ties have grown, uh, the economic weight in recent years. So we are not starting from zero. We are building on the existing, uh, political institutional base. So that it matters, and because some projects need more scale, some sectors work better with a wider, uh, wider site networks, and some agendas gain legitimacy when another major emerging power is involved. In that sense, India should be seen not as a decorative addition, but a partner that can make some Brazil-Japan agendas more operational. So the bilateral relationship remains the starting point, but in selective areas, widening the framework may improve practical, uh, visibility.

So why India in particular? I would suggest three reasons. The first, India as scale. The Brazilian and Indian economies already interlock at a significant level, and bilateral trade has expanded strongly. The second, India adds policy experience in sectors that are central to my argument today, especially energy transitions and food systems, industrial development, and strategic technology like AI, such as today. And asserts India's widen the conversation by posting it into the narrow security-centered vocabulary. And what is especially important for the presentation is that Brazil-India cooperation already overlaps with the sectors I have been discussing. The 2025 India-Brazil joint settlement identified food and nutritional security, and energy transitions and climate change, and industrial partnership in strategic areas as priorities for the next decades. So India is not an abstract third actor. So I would frame India in a fairly modest but practical way. So not as a slogan, but as a substitute for Japan, but as a country that can widen the Brazil-Japan agenda where wider scale and coordination actually are useful.

So this slide adds one important reason why India matters in my argument. The Brazil-India trade is no longer marginal. The issue is not whether there is scale, but what kind of scale it is. Indeed, the structure is still uneven, but Brazil's mainly exported commodities to India, especially crude oil, soybean oils, and low sugar, cotton, and iron ore. Or India, by contrast, exported more manufactured and chemically intensive goods to Brazil, including petroleum products, grow chemicals, and pharmaceutical and engineering products. So the key point is that this is fast-growing South-South trade, but it still follows a commodity and manufacturers pattern. So that is precisely why India is relevant to the wider agenda on energy, food systems, and industrial resilience.

So, um, if that is the case, what would Brazil-Japan-India cooperation look like more practically? Um, I would suggest there are scenarios. The first is energy transitions, and this is perhaps the most convincing starting point because Brazil and India already have strong complementarities in areas such, uh, bio-fuel, sustainable fuel, and broader climate-related cooperation, against disasters or prevention. And while Japan's added technology, finance, implementation capacity. The second is in industrial resilience, including food systems, critical minerals, and standards and financing arrangements. And the third is maritime connectivity. The way of wider Atlantic-Indo-Pacific conversation becomes easier to sustain when it includes another major partner from the emerging powers or another country in the, uh, global South.

What makes these scenarios more persuasive is that Brazil and India are not beginning from a blank pitch. They are, they already have political coordination, growing trade, and expanding sectoral agendas. In that sense, trilateralism here is not speculative. It becomes a relationship that already exists. So the principle remains the same: widen the story only where it clearly adds value. So, uh, where does India make the agenda broader, more credible, and more operational?

Let me conclude. The final takeaway line at the top of the slide captures the whole presentation very well: Start from Brazil, build with Japan, expand with India. So for me, that is not only a good summary but also a useful analytical sequence. The second sentence on that slide makes more points in the four-form: rather than asking where Brazil fits in the distant map, I think it is more productive to ask what Brazil and Japan can build now in the pros, foods, and minerals, and ports, and then ask where India can help widen that cooperation. So if I leave you with only three words from today's talk, they would be the same three words at the bottom of the slide: energy, industry, and connectivity. Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to the discussion.

>> Thank you, Professor, for your presentation. Now, I'd like to invite Professor Daniel Huchinto for his commentary. Please, the floor is yours.

>> Uh, thank you very much, Ud. Thank you very much, Professor Masukata, for your, um, very, uh, enticing, uh, presentation. Uh, can you hear me? Well, is it working? Okay, excellent. Um, for your, for your entire presentation. I think this was an excellent blueprint of potentials for Brazil and Japan cooperation. Um, I hope, uh, truly that we have in the audience people from the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and maybe the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they have listened to your talk and they have plenty of good ideas on how to implement this increased cooperation because I think you gave us a very sort of compelling blueprint, uh, and plan as to how we can, uh, look into, um, potential cooperation, even greater cooperation between Brazil and Japan, even in areas where, I think your presentation, um, um, shows us that there's a possibility of cooperation even in areas where there's, uh, it's not so traditional, um, to have cooperation between the two countries. There is expanded cooperation between the two countries. Brazil and Japan go a long way in terms of cooperation and so on. There's a very important Japanese community in Brazil, lots of Brazilians in Japan. Um, there's lots of links, but, uh, sustained cooperation, especially in wider matters and wider political, uh, cooperation. It seems you, you're giving us a very good, uh, um, uh, path, uh, towards that.

Um, I want to follow, I want to follow your, um, your presentation and try to give some comments and then maybe offer some, some ideas. Um, I, I really like the way you framed, um, um, uh, FOIP, uh, freedom, free, and open Indo-Pacific idea in contrast or in, or in, you know, as a sort of a mirror image of ZOPACAS. And I, I think that's a, that's a very, that's a very good, uh, that's a very good framing. I find it's a different geography, but a very similar idea in many ways. So the idea behind ZOPACAS for, uh, for the, uh, South Atlantic, is a very similar idea in terms of FOIP. I think that's, that tells a story about how Brazil and Japan think similarly about, uh, the value of trade, the value of economic resilience, resiliency, the value of, um, um, um, good supply chain security, and, and, and, and that commerce and trade is a tool of development and, uh, of, um, wider, um, progress for countries. So, and, and that seas, for that matter, are important places where that, uh, development, and where that, um, um, economic success, uh, happens, and that that justifies FOIP and ZOPACAS in, in, very, very similar, uh, ways.

I, um, I was, uh, quite surprised to understand this is something that I did not, uh, really know about the, uh, lack of, uh, receptivity that FOIP had in Latin America. Um, I wouldn't expect that. Uh, but it's interesting, it's interesting to know, and maybe the bridge that you are offering of showing how similar it is in idea to ZOPACAS might be a way to try and dismantle or or weaken, uh, that, um, uh, lack of receptivity, and I, I wonder if that's, if that's a way forward. Um, um, for me, again, it makes, it makes a lot of sense, uh, understanding, um, oceans and, and shared, the shared space of oceans that connect, um, our countries to the world. I think it's the same in Brazil. It's the same, uh, uh, for, for Japan, as areas we would like to see as free, peaceful, accessible, and, um, um, ready for, for trade and ready for, um, navigation.

Um, so I, I believe, and I, I'm, I'm surprised, I believe that, uh, this idea of economic resiliency as a, as a, as a way of framing, um, FOIP, both FOIP and ZOPACAS, is, these are very, um, um, these are very connected, connected ideas and ideas that make a lot of sense, a lot of sense for me. So again, I'm, I'm, I'm quite surprised. I was surprised by your presentation, given all those things I'm saying, um, why why it would be, um, um, not so, um, resilient.

Um, of course, for Brazil, um, um, we, uh, see, we, we live in a very peaceful environment. This is a, a very common, there's a very particular feature of Brazilian foreign policy and of Brazilian policy in general. This understanding that we live in a very peaceful neighborhood, and our corner of the world, uh, is an easy corner of the world to live. Which also means that our engagement with ideas on security, uh, is also tricky at times. Just recently, we had, um, um, a commentary by, by the Brazilian president, which said that we, where we, we don't really talk, I think it was in India, saying we, we don't really talk too much about geopolitics, when by meeting between presidents, um, and that that was that was a very salient, a very salient commentary. And, and I mean, not on the sense that geopolitics are not important, but that the, the drive of the Brazilian foreign policy is, of course, trying to expand trade and trying to expand, um, um, e relationships that, uh, provide for, um, economic success and, and, and, and economic expansion, rather than talking in terms of security. This is the talk. This is a talk that I think it's much easier, um, um, um, in Japan, is much more common. It's much more of the daily conversation in Japanese politics than it is in Brazil.

Nonetheless, um, I think there's a, um, great, uh, acknowledgement here that security is important, and that talking about the security, the maritime security in, uh, um, the South Atlantic is a very important topic for Brazilians, as is the wider security of the seas, um, everywhere in the world. And, um, um, in that sense, I think that, uh, you also get very right, and I agree with you entirely, that the way, uh, um, um, framing security, um, um, cooperation between Japan and Brazil, uh, through the lenses of, uh, trade, and through the lenses of maritime security, and through the lenses of, uh, resilient supply chains, and, um, um, um, high quality, high potential logistics, uh, not only between the two countries, but, but between Asia and Latin America in general, is the kind of conversation that is more resounding in Brasília and, uh, uh, potentially in Tokyo. And, and I think that's, uh, that's, um, conversation that enables, it's a, it's a key word that enables both countries to engage, uh, with that topic without having to skirt, um, um, issues that, um, both countries may, may not want to engage, uh, directly. And in doing that, um, it's also creating great potential for delivering on development, on economic development, which is something that Brazil values greatly, but also increasing security and increasing political cooperation, which is, which seems to me, is one of the goals, one of the goals of, uh, um, the Japanese government.

Um, I think that in general, Brazil is, Brazil sees Japan as a very trustworthy partner and as, as a very sort of close, uh, u, um, partner in the sense that, um, Brazil and Japan have shared a lot of similar beliefs about how the world should work, uh, the importance of institutions, multilateralism, international, um, law, and, and all of those, all of those, um, um, ideas, big ideas about how the world works. And I think this puts both countries in a very good position to work together, um, besides all the cultural and, and, and even family and, and immigration, uh, connections that I have already mentioned. And with that, I'd like to move to the, uh, sort of second part of the commentary, which is, which is trying to focus on your idea about a bilateral, a bilateral, um, cooperation set that turns into a trilateral cooperation set with the inclusion of India. And, and again, I think that that makes, uh, that makes a lot of sense, right? So the big, obviously the big, uh, sort of the elephant in the room, or the elephant in the world, if you want, if we want, of course, in this conversation, is China. China is the greatest, uh, uh, trading partner of Brazil. Um, and, and, and, um, the conversation of, uh, Brazil, Japan, uh, cooperation is always, uh, done, whether we like it or not, under the shadow of, uh, of China. And, and, and I think that that's, that's part of how, how politics work. But I'm trying to highlight this because I think that, um, while there is, of course, political sensibilities that that will need to be addressed by policymakers, uh, uh, to, to be able to deliver on this improved, uh, and improved cooperation and to navigate this improved, the, the implementation of this improved cooperation framework. I believe that you are very right, um, to, to posit that including India in this, uh, sort of minilateral, trilateral, um, frame helps to maybe dilute concerns in Beijing, right? It might, it might make it easier, um, um, for, for, uh, both Beijing and both in Beijing and in Brazil to make it, um, um, possible.

Um, India is also seen here in Brazil as a reliable partner, is seen as a sort of broader country that has the same kind of, same position in the world, same, um, um, same general feeling about how the world should, how the world should work, um, some different concerns, some different conditions, uh, but very, very similar in this sense. And, and I think that the, um, uh, there's a, India would serve very well as a connection and as a sort of, um, u, link, um, given that there is a high, um, uh, the, the Japanese Indian relationship is at a high point, the Brazilian Indian relationship is also at a high point, and I think that's, that that poses a great, a great opportunity for that, um, for that connection, um, um, and for that interaction. Um, again, it's not only the fact that if we think maritime, time trade routes, India sits through the, especially through the Cape route. India sits more or less in the half, not halfway, but it sits somewhere in the middle, and it would be an interesting partner, um, and, and geographically speaking, is a, is a very obvious partner in this relationship, as is South Africa, which, which, uh, haven't been mentioned, but could also eventually be be part of that, of that conversation, um, and offers, um, an alternative route, offers a, an alternative but also potentially very profitable route that connects those big countries. By the way, uh, the Cape route is very interesting because it adds, uh, South Africa, and consequently most of Africa, or a lot of, of the African continent in this chain, right, in this logistical chain. So one could easily say, oh yeah, but why are you talking so much about the Cape route if we could do the Pacific route? And that's, that's of course also worth of mention that, you know, the many development of Pacific ports and increase, um, of, uh, um, land-based routes between Brazil and the Latin American Pacific countries that would enable alternative routes, maritime routes to to Asia. That's also very important, of course.

Um, but, um, I think there's added value in this way of looking, uh, at the connection between, um, Japan and Asia, East Asia in general, uh, via India into, uh, South Africa, and then Brazil. That's a, that seems to be a very, to be a very strong route and, and trade route for the future, uh, which again, u, increases the opportunity window and the, the interest that both Brazil and Japan would should have for, for, for that route and for that, for that perspective. So again, I think you, you really get that, um, you really get that right, and, and I, again, I hope that our diplomats, our trade people are watching this and thinking, ah, great idea, we should really be looking into this.

Um, I also, um, um, think that that this, again, it's not only geographical, it's not only about trade, but it's very importantly also about politics, right? As, as I mentioned, the relationship between Brazil and India, and the relationship between India and Japan is, they're both at, at highs, and, and, and I think that this, this gives a prime, uh, sort of prime opportunity for this mobilization.

Just to add two more, uh, very brief ideas, and I want to build up from the points that you made on your final slides about the trade relationship between, between Brazil and India being based on commodities and trade between commodities and manufacturers, which I also think, uh, you're, you're very right. This also, this is also the same sort of relationship, or very similar relationship that we have to China, and, uh, Brazil is a great exporter of commodities, and, and this is, this is our biggest exports are are commodities, right? But, um, I think that another window of opportunity is precisely the fact that Japan is a country that could offer something that both India and Brazil look after, which is high technology and cooperation in the, in the technology field, and in the, you know, high aggregate value industries. U, automotive industry, which is also, which is already very popular. Japanese cars are quite popular in Brazil, um, lots of factories here. Um, and, and, and, and I, I really, I really find that this is anecdotal information, but I really find that people here in Brazil, they look at Japanese cars and they have, they find Japanese cars to be really trustworthy and, and of high quality. Um, and I think that this would be something that would be, um, uh, very easily expandable, uh, not only for cars, but for for technology and, and high value added products in general. Right? Brazil is always seeking, and has been always seeking for the longest time, um, um, um, collaboration in, in technology development and, uh, in, in, um, transfer of technology. Right? So, so in that sense, I think Japan has a great opportunity to be seen by Brazil as a, um, you know, as a, uh, valuable partner that can deliver on those, on those things.

And, and just, just to finish, I want to, um, uh, mention, I think three areas that I find, being someone that studies international security, being three areas where I find there's very, very great potential for cooperation between the two countries. One is, it's obviously defense. I think both Brazil and Japan have had a long history of building its own, um, um, technologies and, and, and for defense, and not even though Japan acquires, uh, military, uh, equipment and procures military equipment from other countries, uh, it has a strong, uh, um, history and a strong, uh, um, um, potential in developing, um, um, defense equipment. I think that this is something that could be explored, and that is definitely underexplored between the two countries. Brazil is also trying, and is also on a high trajectory in the defense sector, um, big companies such as Embraer and, and, and, and growing defense industry that seeks to build native, uh, defense technology could benefit from partnership with Japanese companies, and, uh, um, companies, joint ventures between Japanese companies and Brazilian companies could be selling, uh, defense material all over the world and supplying our own needs, um, of military, of, of defense, of the defense industry, which again, it's, it's remarkable that right now, the, with the recent changes in the world, uh, both Japan and both, and Brazil have understood the requirements that they have in increasing their defense, their native defense capabilities. So I think that there's a, there's a strong opportunity there.

Um, another strong opportunity, I think, it's, and also related, is on a space, on the space area, and, um, um, we have exchanged about that before, um, but, um, I think that the space area has high potential for cooperation. Brazil has excellent launching pad areas. Uh, we have been pursuing space technology for a very, for a very long time, and, um, and I think that this is, this is somewhere technology that Japan has, and that there could be potential for cooperation. And finally, um, nuclear, nuclear technology, which is also something that Brazil is looking on increasing, and that Japan already has a good domain of. Um, Brazil has traditionally partnered with, um, Eastern Europe, sorry, Western Europe, and, and the US on that front. But I think there could be potential for also for cooperation with Japan to expand that, and because all of those things require a reliable partner, and I think that Japan could deliver on that kind of reliability, um, as well as Brazil could deliver on reliability for Japan in that partnership, and in, in producing, um, strong supply chains, especially on critical minerals, as you mentioned, but also on energy, and also on commodities that we can export. And hopefully, over time, that relationship gets less of high technology on one side and commodities on the other side, but becomes more, a more, um, diversified, diversified partnership, in, in, uh, for, um, economic enterprises in both countries. And I think I'm going to leave it here.

>> Thank you so much, Professor Huchinto, for sharing your thoughts. Uh, now we'll begin the public Q&A. Uh, we received a question that is, if Brazil seeks to identify partnerships, how does simultaneous engagement with China as a primary trade partner and investor reconcile with deepening Japan-India cooperation that explicitly counters Beijing's influence?

>> Is it, can I respond to these points?

>> Of course. Yes.

>> Okay. Okay. Uh, thank you very much for, first of all, thank you very much for the comments on the, uh, Daniel, so very valuable, uh, points. Uh, what would like to discuss these points. So, um, I was, first of all, I'd like to see that HIP and, uh, Latin American point is great. Uh, have already discussed for many times, but if the Japan tries to involve the, uh, insertion of, uh, white, uh, Latin Americans, but is, as I think Latin American side has some resistance for this point because of the, the HIP means the some strategically some inclusive of the western, uh, ideas, the shadow of the, uh, the China's challenging ideas, and also, um, on the other hand, Latin America has some strategic autonomy towards, uh, to maintain of the diversifications of these, uh, diplomacy. So that is why I think it's not a good idea to include inclusive, uh, the HIP and the Latin America. That is why I said that less receptivity. But on the other hand, the India, and the another side, Atlantic Oceans and in the Pacific Oceans connectivity is a, I think the good idea due to the respect for the, uh, strategic autonomy of the these countries, India and Latin America, principally, uh, Brazil. I think the for the Brazilians, positions the South Atlantic is more have more, uh, safety zone, and I think more, uh, have a lot of the, uh, great autonomy, uh, towards these parts. So I think it's very good connection, uh, uh, for the these countries, and also I really respect on the, uh, global South, uh, positions in the uncertain international dilemma of the international liberal order. I, I have visited a lot of time into India as well. I, I think a lot of the commentator of the Indian side has, uh, we need more, we need more, uh, maximization of the, uh, interest, that's all. So I think it's, uh, India has not have a lot of, uh, the priority to the gaining of the, uh, in, uh, or alternative, uh, of the international liberal order. So it has, these countries has maintaining the each autonomy of each scenarios. That's so that is why we would like to connectivity to respect all of the countries. So first of all, I'd like to mention this, and also Julia, please let me again more simply on the question of the audience, please, India and China, is how do you maintain? Let me, >> um, >> how does simultaneous engagement with China reconcile with deepening Japan-India cooperation that explicitly counters Beijing's?

>> Uh, yes, I really totally agree with the idea with the comments. I think it's India and Japan has sometimes have a graph ship, the the shadowing of the China, but so, so my idea is not to give the some compression towards the China to maintaining India and Japan and Brazil's corporations. Uh, so that is why I, I think it's not to, uh, not to mention about more security issues on that, which, uh, we are talking on the discussion of trilateral, uh, lateral cooperation. On the other hand, we need more economic scenario, is a very good point to connectivities, uh, or, uh, trade cooperation is more, uh, uh, relevant, uh, uh, which it does not have great pressure towards, uh, China. Uh, so we need more diversification and, and more self, uh, sorry, um, out, uh, autonomy, which the country has already have.

>> Thank you so much, Professor Masato. Another question is, how can we integrate Japan into our thinking about South relations, given its close alignment with US foreign policy and recent political trends?

>> Thank you very much. This is a great point. Uh, I would like to ask some my ideas. The Southwest, uh, cooperation is good to the, uh, more, uh, thinking towards the, uh, India, uh, Japanese diplomacy as well. That one point is to the all of us the same international political and environment issues like a climate change and food security ones. Um, the even the Japan has also had thinking on the, uh, the this part of the South, uh, South point. And, when I three two two 10 years, a 20 years ago, uh, Japan has a trilateral community, trilateral relationship in Japan, India, sorry, Japan, Brazil, and Africa, trilateral cooperation, but I think it's like a bit more uneven, even relationship. So we need more respect for the autonomy, uh, uh, uh, towards to involve in the South-South corporations. I think Japan's, uh, involvement is bit more have to modified in the uncertainly, uh, international, uh, uh, order. May I ask, I, it would be happy if I respond to these questions.

>> Thank you so much, Professor Masakata. This was very interesting. Uh, sadly, we are out of time, but I would like to thank you both, Professor Masakata and Professor Huchinto, for accepting our invitation to this webinar, and also thank the Japan House São Paulo for our continued partnership, such as this successful partnership. Thank you all so much for joining us today on this webinar, and see you on another opportunity. See you.

>> See you. Thank you very much.

>> Thank you very much for your great pleasure opportunity.