Transcription
Hello to you who are part of this broadcast and welcome to today's press briefing. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, Minister for Foreign Affairs Maria Malmö Stenegard, and Minister for Defence Paul Jonsson are participating in the press briefing. A few hours ago, the decision was made, at Denmark's request, to send a unit contribution with anti-drone capabilities to Copenhagen. Counter UAS, a military term. To be able to counter unmanned vehicles, primarily to protect the Copenhagen area against unwelcome drone visits, drone incursions for a period. We are also sending radar capability, separate Swedish radar capability, to Denmark for a period to increase the ability to detect over a broader geography. It is incredibly good that this capability exists here. All of this has its background. It is that about a week ago, the first indications came that there were drones blocking airports in Copenhagen. I was in contact with Mette Frederiksen, the Danish Prime Minister. This was during an ongoing UN meeting, moreover, and this comes immediately after Poland had confirmed drone attacks, Russian ones, and thereafter air incursions in Estonia and Romania. So we took it very seriously. I told Denmark that we have capabilities that are quite new in Sweden. They were shown as recently as this summer on Gotland, where we showcased those capabilities. And then they were with the Swedish Gripen aircraft in Poland when we had Gripen responsibility for protecting the supply chains to Ukraine of various military contributions. So all of this was in place, and I said we can, for a period, ensure that Denmark benefits from these. All of this should be seen in light of the fact that, intentionally or unintentionally, these drone attacks affected Denmark's ability to hold two EU summits that begin on Wednesday morning. An informal EU summit, a regular European Council, and also what is called the EPC, European Political Community, which includes all European countries in the neighborhood. 44 prime ministers are to land in Copenhagen within a few hours. That Denmark viewed the risk of this needing to be affected or canceled with some seriousness was quite obvious. I am very pleased that very many in the Armed Forces, in our agencies, and in the Government Offices have worked all weekend to ensure that this material is now on its way to Copenhagen. What did not require a government decision went yesterday. What required a government decision has now been shipped. Enough about this. I have also had consultations with the party leaders, partly about this, of course. It came in handy, but also a follow-up conversation to the one we had a few months ago to update the party leaders on the security situation. We had Mikael Classon present, who went through in quite detail our view of the situation on the ground, our view of these latest events in our surroundings, our view of NATO's force generation for what is called the Eastern Century, and of course also how the coalition of willing countries contributes to various things in Ukraine. We have informed broadly about all of this. I think it is important that we have as broad a consensus as possible on these serious issues. And therefore, it is important that, alongside the Foreign Affairs Committee, which is the formal body under the Riksdag where we also inform about important foreign policy events, we can also discuss Sweden's contribution in serious international situations. With this, I intend to ask both Maria Malmö Stenegard and Paul Jonsson to supplement with some important points. Maria.
Thank you, Prime Minister. I wanted to say something further about how we are acting, both with our allies in NATO and with our partners in the EU. And we are in constant contact with our colleagues, not least the Nordic and Baltic ones. And on the same day as the Russian violation occurred of Estonian airspace, I also had my Estonian colleague, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, here. And it is clear that close relations with our neighbors are absolutely necessary in this very serious security situation. During last week's opening of the UN General Assembly, I met colleagues from around the world, and I can state that the reactions to these Russian violations are sharp from many quarters, and not just from countries in our immediate vicinity. Within NATO, activity has been intense as a result of what has happened; allies have twice in recent weeks requested so-called Article 4 consultations. This shows how serious the situation is. It is also proof that NATO functions and acts, which is absolutely crucial for Europe's security and for our own. Allies stood behind both Poland and Estonia, and the Alliance also responded clearly with the new operation Eastern Century to strengthen deterrence and defense along NATO's eastern flank. Recent violations and incidents also show the link between Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and broader European security. And for this reason, we also need to continue to counter Russia. The government is working for the EU to adopt an ambitious 19th sanctions package as soon as possible to further increase pressure on Russia. In addition to military support for Ukraine, sanctions are one of our primary tools for maintaining this pressure. The next sanctions package should include, among other things, further measures to reduce Russia's energy revenues, including measures against the shadow fleet. And Sweden also wants to see a total import ban on Russian liquefied natural gas as soon as possible. The government continues with extensive support for Ukraine and is pushing for more countries to do more for Ukraine. The Nordic and Baltic countries, just as a comparison, have about 33 million inhabitants, and this year we are estimated to contribute approximately 14 billion euros in new military commitments. And this can be compared to what is believed to be the total military support from all NATO countries with 950 million inhabitants, which is 40 billion, so 14 out of 40 billion euros this year. Ukraine's primary security guarantee is a strong defense of its own, which we and other like-minded countries need to assist with sustainable and long-term financing. And here, the frozen Russian central bank assets can play a completely central role. And the government is therefore acting for the EU to use not only the yield but also the principal capital of these assets for the benefit of Ukraine, so that we can equip Ukraine both militarily and financially for many years. And with that, I hand over the word to the Minister for Defence.
Thank you for that. I want to start by, just like the Prime Minister, reminding about the seriousness of the security situation, but also the value of being able to have these trusting conversations with the party leaders in the Riksdag parties. And it is not only these recent incidents with drones that demonstrate the seriousness, but we have also seen a range of events concerning everything from sabotage of critical underwater infrastructure and cyberattacks to GPS jamming and violations of our allies' airspace. So it is against this background, naturally, that we are also analyzing these events. Sweden is undertaking, alone and together with our allies, major efforts to strengthen our defense and our resilience against these threats and risks that we can now observe. The government has, on the one hand, historical investments in defense with the goal that we will reach 3.5% of GDP by 2030. And this also enables a major investment in our defense capability. During the current term, we have gone from when we entered. When we entered, we had a defense appropriation of 75 billion. And if the Riksdag now adopts our budget, which we believe, we will be at 175 billion. That is an increase of 100 billion in level. Investments in the budget proposition recently presented enable investments in combat vessels, combat vehicles, rocket artillery, and ammunition. But it also enables major reinforcements of our air defense. Just in recent months, we have placed orders for air defense exceeding 10 billion. This includes, among other things, medium-range systems and short-range air defense, as well as electronic warfare systems used to jam drones. And there are further deliveries that will strengthen the defense force's air defense capability going forward. For example, it also involves equipping our Visby corvettes with air defense, and also what is called the Luulo class will have what is called high-altitude air defense, which can also handle ballistic missiles. But it is also important to remember that Sweden is not alone in this; we are undertaking a series of security-enhancing measures together with our allies within NATO. NATO has gradually strengthened its presence in Sweden's immediate vicinity in recent years and increased its deterrence capability. Since Sweden became a NATO ally, we have also powerfully contributed to these measures. I am naturally thinking of the mechanized battalion we have had in Latvia. I am thinking of our naval vessels being part of the Baltic Sea operations, but not least also the air surveillance mission we conducted over Poland, including the protection of the mission. And here, the Air Force, among others, gained important experience when it comes to handling this drone threat. The latest deterrence activities launched are Baltic Sea operations and Eastern Century. Baltic Sea operations were initiated as a consequence of cable incidents in the Baltic Sea and have fulfilled their purpose and shown very good results. Eastern Century is now under development, and it is also a response to the air defense violations that have occurred recently. And the activities will include, among other things, various capabilities to strengthen NATO's ability to uphold the territorial integrity of the allies, including the protection of airspace. And Sweden has announced that we are ready to contribute to Eastern Century as well. Recently, Sweden and Poland also exercised on Gotland in an exercise called Svenex, which also involved moving coastal missile systems, which is also a signal, naturally, of our commitments regarding collective defense. So, in summary, Sweden's and NATO's capabilities are being strengthened overall, specifically regarding meeting the threats and risks that allies face both in the short and long term. And this is work that will also need to continue. But I want to emphasize that the events of the past week show that political solidarity in NATO is strong, as is the will to take new measures to maintain deterrence and defense within the defense alliance.
Thank you, Poul. And lastly, my message today to the party leaders was that what has happened now in Poland, what has happened in Estonia, what has happened in Denmark could just as easily have happened in Sweden and can happen in Sweden. That is the seriousness with which we view this, and we are now doing for Poland, for Denmark, exactly what we would have done if it concerned Sweden. The capabilities we have are useful right now in Denmark, previously in Poland. We escorted Gripen aircraft from Estonia. And those capabilities also exist in Sweden. So we view this with great seriousness, great seriousness, but we are well prepared for the task.
With that, we will move on to questions in plenum. Let's start with Peter Wallberg from Het.
Thank you. The atmosphere is quite tense now, and there is talk of shooting down Russian planes and Russian drones that encroach on airspace. Has the risk of war between NATO and Russia increased in the last two weeks? And how worried is the government that misunderstandings and so on will lead to a military confrontation with Russia?
I don't think the atmosphere is that tense. Everyone understands the seriousness of such matters, so no one is running away, I think. Poland called for Article 4 consultations; that was quite natural after confirmed drone incursions on Polish territory. The same after a 12-minute air violation by Estonia. I don't think that indicates that countries are rushing to act thoughtlessly. On the contrary, everyone understands the seriousness. However, I think your second question is enormously relevant. When one takes such great risks, violating others' airspace with drones, intentionally or unintentionally, with aircraft, one also increases the risk that things happen by mistake when other aircraft are scrambled to meet them, when one does not know the motives behind it. So I think that is probably why we say that Russia's actions right now point towards increased risk-taking, not least towards the immediate vicinity and the countries that support Ukraine the most. Possibly in the belief that it will reduce our support for Ukraine. I think that so far Russia has seen the opposite, but it requires a lot of judgment from all countries in the immediate vicinity that have now been visited or could be visited.
One last question as well. Zelensky stated yesterday that there were signs that drones were taking off from Russian oil tankers in the Russian shadow fleet. How do you view those reports?
Yes, I just note them. We have no independent information about that.
Thank you.
Thank you. Then we'll take SVT over there. Yes, well, starting with two questions about these government decisions. Firstly, why did you make the government decision only today, not last week? And then I also wonder, regarding the radar equipment, why is no government decision needed for that?
Now we are getting into important details. There are different kinds of decisions. Some are agency decisions, meaning inspections for strategic products, as you are surely aware, which examine whether we have the right to transport things across borders, in this case to Denmark. They made those decisions over the weekend, and no government decision is required for that. This primarily concerns the radar capability from a large Swedish defense industrial company. The other is a purely military capability, including personnel. A government decision is required for that. And then the question... and why it was done. Yes, well, as I said, I had contact with Mette Frederiksen almost a week ago. Then they had a process. Exactly what they needed. Which countries did they want to turn to? If I am correctly informed, it was Sweden and Germany, I believe, who jointly received a request, and so quickly could I answer that question. So we had to specify exactly what it was so that we could make that specific government decision. Then I have a question regarding Jens Stoltenberg's book, which some of us have managed to read. He describes being quite worried that Finland might join NATO before Sweden. How worried were you that Sweden would not join?
He has promised me a book. I haven't actually read it. He contacted me the other week. I have seen the nice films about him that you have surely seen on SVT. No, worried, I don't know. We go back to the time when Finland, when that happened, which we initially didn't think could happen, but where we did not moralize at all about Finland. We had no problem with Finland. We had a problem with Turkey and Hungary. So we were not particularly concerned that Finland chose. The alternative would have been for Finland to say, we are actively refraining from formalizing our membership until Sweden can also be formalized. So we were not. Then, of course, it was a frustrating period when we felt we had done everything that could reasonably be required of Sweden, and it still took time. So, but I am not the worried type.
Dagens Nyheter over there. And then TV4 for...
Yes, when there were these violations in Poland, you said you were sure that Russia was behind it. Are you equally sure that Russia is behind these drone violations against Denmark and Norway?
The exact answer is no. We have clear intelligence information that Russia is behind the violations against Poland. We have also seen the products literally fall in interesting places in Poland. We do not have the same intelligence information or technical evidence regarding Denmark.
Mm. Why not?
No, but yes, sometimes you have information about things, sometimes you have intelligence, sometimes you don't. So, that's why I was very clear. We attribute, meaning we don't point fingers at other countries unless we are very sure. Then we are not naive. Of course, when strange things happen in the Baltic Sea or in the air over Nordic capitals, it is clear that everyone looks at who has an interest in creating unrest or creating uncertainty. So that's why everyone is now acting quite in concert, so to speak. But we do not attribute, we do not point out countries if we do not have clear evidence for it.
Let's take TV4 at the front here. Jess Josefsson.
Yes, I wanted to ask when you say you will send a unit to Denmark, how many soldiers or how many people are we talking about, and how extensive is what you have sent? And then I wonder, Maria Malmö Stenegard, when you say that one should be able to use not only the yield but also the principal frozen money. How much money are we talking about that could be used, or that you see as possible to use?
Mm.
I have a few more questions, but we can take them one at a time.
We are a bit cautious with technical specifications, but you can describe what you think is appropriate to tell in terms of volumes and technology. Yes, we are saying that it is a unit that has the capability to identify, detect, and also combat drones. And that is a capability that we are now allocating to Denmark, and it is also to strengthen the Danish capability here, especially considering that they have a number of major political meetings now, both with the European Council and then they also have another meeting the day after called Europc. So they have requested that type of capability. They are also familiar with the fact that it is a capability that we are strong in, both when it comes to detection and a certain electronic warfare capability that is also included. I don't know if you missed your question.
No, but it's large sums we're talking about, but there is a very intense discussion going on right now about whether one can take the whole amount, whether one can take parts, whether one can change the placement of the principal capital to get further yield if one is willing to go there. But for us, it is important to state that there is a legitimate demand from Ukraine for compensation for the damages that Russia has caused them, and that one should therefore be able to claim the entire sum, really. So we continue to push for that. The problem is that we will need to support Ukraine with quite large sums going forward. So far, we have more or less taken those funds from our own national budgets, and we can continue to do so. But it is a very skewed distribution that I fear will not be sustainable in the long term. Either we take the frozen Russian assets, which I think is morally important to do, or we have to find a new way to finance it, and I am not sure that the EU is interested in that either.
You know the background. First, it was just to freeze them, almost as a punitive operation. Then it was to use the yield from the assets, a few billion a year, one can say. And now it is about using the money in partly different ways that allow for greater returns. All of this is about a number of states that physically have, or digitally have, the money with them, but also a number of euro countries being able to agree on this. So we have pushed, and I perceive that more and more countries now share our view that it is unreasonable that we have several hundred billion dollars in Russian assets that cannot fully benefit Ukraine.
When you talk about these violations, what more information have you received about these drone incidents that have occurred in Denmark and Norway? Are they linked to these meetings, do you think? And have you received information about more details about what type of drones have been used, a bit more concretely what it could be, the reason why they are happening now, and what types of drones are we talking about?
Mm. We note what the Danish side says, and the Danish side, not least Frederiksen himself, has said that it is a very serious, perhaps the most serious violation to date of critical infrastructure in Denmark, and that it is a capable actor that obviously has a resource-strong actor and possibly also a state actor behind it. But that is the information we have, and we are in very close dialogue with Denmark regarding their needs, and they have made the assessment and evaluation that during, not least now during the European Council, I believe there are 44 heads of state and government, but if one also counts what is called the EPC that is coming to Copenhagen, they have the capability to strengthen control and capability when it comes to handling drones. But could that be the reason why it is happening to Denmark and happening now?
Yes, that's a bit harder to... I can say this: I cannot speak for Mette Frederiksen, but the purely temporal connection made the matter extra serious. If, in this security situation, large European meetings had to be canceled or jeopardized, that in itself would be a serious signal. So I understand their concern very well. But that does not mean we have any information that says there is an immediate connection.
In Norway, the Norwegian military filmed these drones. What do those films taken by the Norwegian military show?
Mm. I have not actually seen the exact images. We have had discussions, we had a Nordic-FPC meeting as recently as Friday where we compared the situation. Then, as I interpret it, there is a significantly more serious situation in Denmark than in Norway. What one also knows is that often when such events occur, we also receive a lot of reports, and that is natural because people become more vigilant. And naturally, every day there are a large number of drones operating in Swedish airspace, but they primarily operate over civilian or military protected objects, which is also a crime.
Thank you. Then we'll take Expressen and then Aftonbladet, and if we have time, we'll break for individual interviews.
Yes, I have a couple of questions. First and foremost, Denmark has issued a ban on private drones from Monday to Friday. Given our proximity to Denmark, could this also become relevant in Sweden? We have not considered anything like that at the moment, and not because of what is happening in Denmark. Then I understand that they want to avoid any risk of accidental incidents due to carelessness or young people sending up a drone in the wrong place, so to speak, or brokers sending out a drone in the wrong place. We need to be careful here. We are talking about quite different types. One is what we might think of as drones, i.e., rather flat things that fly relatively low. The other is quite potent, which changes the entire question of air defense altogether, which flies much, much higher, goes much, much faster, and can also carry weapons. So we are talking about quite different things. These latter ones are really changing the map quite a lot for air defense right now. That is also why it is so important that we have that capability now, so that one does not have to use much, much more expensive and less suitable weapons to take down drones. Then I also wonder, the Social Democrats said before they entered this meeting that they demand that Sweden take the lead in building a drone wall against Russia. How do you view that? Is that demand being made first and foremost? And how do you view the demand? Honestly, we are working on it, that's what we are doing right now. I think this initiative shows that. I think what we are offering Poland also shows that we have good capabilities that we want to be used. So I think we have proven exactly that. If they are coming up with it now, they are a bit late, because we took the initiative last week to use Swedish capabilities elsewhere as well. If, on the other hand, they mean what the frontline states mean, i.e., those who have their own border with Russia have discussed a joint initiative to build a common drone capability. That is interesting. Right now, it's the frontline states. There are also discussions about Europe as a whole having more common drone defense. And we sometimes discuss those discussions at EU meetings as well. Then there is the question of what NATO should be responsible for, what the EU should be responsible for, and what each country should do itself. So those discussions are ongoing.
Thank you. Then we'll take the last one in plenum from Aftonbladet here. Yes, Aftonbladet reported today that SKF's goods have been exported to Russia to the value of 500 million kronor since the start of the war. These are goods like ball bearings that are used in the Russian war industry, including in drones that ended up in Poland recently. What are your thoughts on this import to Russia continuing?
I am not aware of any further details about this. I just assume that all companies, both Swedish and European, follow the regulations that exist regarding restrictions and sanctions. But I cannot answer that question in more detail.
Thank you very much. Then we will break for individual interviews. The Minister for Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs will remain for about five minutes.
Thank you very much. Thank you.