Transcription
Well, it had been 5 months because Madine and Jad had not given any sign of life. No public appearances, no explanations until Alira Méney's funeral. We see him here with his hand raised a few hours ago. Well, today, the New York Times lifts the veil on this silence. Armadi had become the linchpin of a plan, an Israeli plan to install him at the head of Teran. Made up of secret meetings, foreign trips, clandestine operations, a crazy gamble, Armadijad or the providential man of the post-regime era. It all began 3 years ago, in 2023. Armadine Jjad went to Guatemala for a series of conferences at the government's invitation. First attempt at approach by the Mossad. A small team of agents was deployed. What did they say to each other precisely? Mystery. Second crucial moment. And then, we change continents. Budapest in Hungary, the closest, the closest ally of Israel in Europe. We are a year later. The plan accelerates. Armadine Nedjad becomes a priority. Thus, David Barnea, director of the Mossad, contacts a member of the Hungarian government. He orders him to organize a conference in his country with the former Iranian president as the star. Invitation accepted. Armadine Nedjad boards a plane. We see him here interacting with researchers from the University of Budapest. And that's where this affair becomes incredible. This conference was in reality only a cover, a meeting set up from scratch to allow him to hold secret discussions. The essential part, therefore, was happening elsewhere, in an office away from prying eyes, David Barnea facing Marmoua Madin and Jad. Then the proposal. Trips like this, there would have been at least two in 2 years, the last one a few months ago. And there, the New York Times floods us with details about [clears throat] his methods for escaping notice. It's particularly striking. He managed to lose his Revolutionary Guard escort and disappear for hours. He protected himself by saying he was meeting professors. Equally surprising, and this is another revelation, Israel secretly paid him money to cover his accommodation and travel expenses. In short, plane tickets, hotel rooms, or encrypted phones. So why didn't it work? Well, what the New York Times recalls is that Armadine and Jad were under house arrest in Tehran, in this district in the east of the capital. His residence was constantly guarded by a patrol, and the final stage of this plan was to free him on the first day of the war, February 28th. A strike was therefore launched. It targeted the patrol. Armadine and Jad were exfiltrated extremely quickly aboard a black Peugeot and then taken to a highly secure house. But the scenario goes off the rails. Armadine and Jad flee. They finally leave the house under circumstances that are still unclear. He was upset. He seemed disillusioned by the plan, notes the New York Times. The regime's resilience probably played a role too. Let's go all the way. Lucile, how concretely did Israel intend to put him in power once he was secured? Well, that's another aspect of this plan. It was the Kurdish militias [clears throat] who were supposed to take over, those who had been training for years for a regime change on the border with Iraq. It was planned that they would enter the west of the country, that they would take control of territories block by block, with the ultimate goal of marching towards the capital and overthrowing the mullahs. A series of entirely unprecedented special operations, but the operation never took place. What is also striking is that in all our minds, Armadinjad was rather seen as the symbol of fanaticism. Yes. A fierce defender of Israel's existence, condemned to disappear, he was credited with statements saying it should be wiped off the map. But in recent years, he had become almost a pariah. Armadinejad was almost an internal opponent. He had publicly denounced corruption in the country, referring to economic mafias. At that time, he was explicitly targeting the Pasdaran. He had also called Donald Trump a man of action in the New York Times in 2019, during the American president's first term. And this is what leads the American press to say that Israel had been betting on him for years and years. Intelligence agencies had closely observed the growing crisis between Armadine and Jad and the Iranian regime. Thank you, that was perfect Lucile. Thank you very much for the essential information, for this essential piece. How is it that he is still alive? What is the use for the regime to keep Armani and Jad if he was in fact a Mossad agent, because they can continue to monitor him in a way. If the operation failed, this operation which is worthy of a John Le Carré, if all this is spectacular, but like that the Pasdaran keep an eye on him, in a way, or perhaps he provided information in the other direction. You know, spy turnarounds, that exists too. What is very interesting in this story is that the Israelis went to find someone who was unsuspected because he was one of the hardestliners of the regime. We must remember, I was in Iran at the time when Armadin Nejjad was elected president of the republic in 2009, if I'm not mistaken. He was the former mayor of Tehran. Now, it's true, he always had this image of incorruptibility. That is to say, unlike other leaders, particularly the Revolutionary Guards, he was not involved in financial scams related to oil, that sort of thing. So he had kept that image. There is an event that changed Harjad's life and made him enter a form of opposition, which is that he was extremely hurt and vexed not to be able to run for, how to say it, for succession. There were candidates, there were already candidates for the succession of the Grand Ayatollah, and he had been excluded from all that possibility, including even returning to the presidency. So he was, as was said, he had become a bit of a gamble for the regime. In a way, for the Mossad, it was a godsend because he is very anti-Israeli, at least in his public persona, so not necessarily suspected by the regime. Now, regarding all the information that the American newspapers have just heard, it is absolutely spectacular. That doesn't mean he's not under surveillance. I believe today, and perhaps he has, in exchange, very, very important information about Israel. On the other hand, and I'll finish on this, the entire operation with the Kurds, this operation that we talked about a lot at the beginning of arming the Kurds, was an Israeli-American fantasy that didn't take into account reality, which is that the Kurds already have enormous dissensions among themselves, and to form a front that would go all the way to Tehran, it would have been necessary to, how to say it, to bury the dissensions between, roughly, 9 to 12 Kurdish groups from different countries, and that this operation was sold, it was part of what Benjamin Netanyahu had sold to Donald Trump, sold in quotes in the famous Situation Room, telling him, "Here, this is the last plan of the war, the Kurds will march on Tehran." There had been some American special forces planes and helicopters that had landed in support, but this operation never really started. And the American president who explains now that the Kurds kept the weapons for other things, etc., but what that says about a regime that is incredibly infiltrated by the Mossad, to manage to turn around a former president. It has reached the highest levels. Does that make you smile, Dominique? Why? Yes. No, it reminds me of an episode of the Israeli television series Tehran. Well, yes, exactly. And it feels like, it's the upcoming season, season 4 or season 5, I'm losing track, and I don't know if we should admire the incredible intellectual agility, imagination of the Mossad, or deplore this form of hubris which consists of believing that it could work. And I'm more in the second interpretation than the first. On paper, it's incredibly [clears throat] seductive. But now, there is a point that seems essential to me, and that is, who has an interest in revealing this information? Because clearly, there were people who spoke to the New York Times, who had this information for a long time and who decided that the time had come to communicate it. And your analysis? Frankly, I have absolutely no idea, but there is something truly between tactical subtlety and, somewhere, strategic stupidity, meaning we show extraordinary refinement for something that, in the end, could not work. To me, it really looks like a deception operation, meaning that deep down, it wasn't meant to work. I don't think that was the goal. It was perhaps just to show, to further weaken the Iranian regime internally, by saying, "Look, we've turned one of your former presidents. We don't know if it's true or not. We're letting it be known today, at a time when the regime is already very weakened, to make people distrust each other even more." I mean, there's enough to become completely paranoid because we don't know who is a Mossad agent, who is talking to the Mossad or not. I mean, it must be paranoia at the highest level in Tehran because what the operation has shown, well, the current war, is the incredible penetration of the services [clears throat] because it's not just the Mossad, there are many services in Israel, Israeli external services in Iran, and the solidity of the links between the two peoples, contrary to the fantasy that is maintained here, that is to say, between Iranians and Israelis. I'm not talking about the mullahs' regime. There is strong solidarity. They recognize each other. It's they who recognize each other, and the Jews of the region for 2000 years have known each other, have traded, exchanged together. So there is something very old between them. And that's what this affair reveals. That is to say, we think of two totally separate worlds. It's true. Look at how much we think of Iran. So it's really the Islamist regime, it's horror, and on the other side, Israeli modernity and so on. But in fact, it's not that simple. I mean, the Middle East is a bubbling cauldron, it's a region where interactions are permanent. And I find that this affair, I am convinced, but not, I mean, I don't imagine Israeli hubris, that is to say, I really don't imagine for a second that they thought the Kurds would win a war that Iraq was unable to win, because you know, I remind you of the Iran-Iraq war which lasted 4 years and caused millions of deaths and served absolutely no purpose. I don't think any Israeli thought that a ground operation with Kurds without heavy weaponry could work. So I really sense the operation, as the Americans say, of deception. Josefine. Yes, we have the feeling of really being in this war of narratives. It's not the first time in recent months that we've had information about Israeli or American penetration into the very heart of the regime. The question now is, what is the usefulness of this information? Because indeed, it can destabilize the Iranian regime internally. Nevertheless, it is a regime that holds firm, that stands against the Americans, and that for the moment, even if there are some internal dissensions, which is normal, there is no collapse. So, is this story of a nature to reinforce paranoia to such an extent that it will lead to monumental purges which will ultimately weaken the regime? If it's one more operation, it's interesting. There will probably be a new episode indeed in Tehran on this incredible scenario. But the real strategic utility, we are still wondering. But you think that after these last months, this regime, and I almost want to say these regimes, because we are talking about dissensions at the head of the regime between those who agree to negotiate, in short, I'm summarizing in a rather direct way, and on the other hand, the Revolutionary Guards who want confrontation and potentially even the return of war. To what extent can the Mossad still be present despite the war in these instances? No, it is, that's for sure. Yes. It is very well informed. But the problem is that the mullahs and the Revolutionary Guards can, the day after the New York Times article, turn to the Iranian public opinion, so to speak, and say, "You see, we were right to distrust Armadine Dejad and to put him in a closet." Go ahead, Lucas. A few months ago, the number two of the intelligence services of the Revolutionary Guards was executed, arrested then executed as a Mossad agent. And that has never been denied. Well, the Israelis never comment, never deny any information concerning their intelligence services. But Israeli infiltration in Iran is major. You know, the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei at the beginning of the war is also an extremely spectacular operation. He was one of the most protected men in Iran, and moreover, the consequences are still being felt. His own son, who was appointed in his place, is still invisible today. So it's a godsend for intelligence services during this period, because it's a period where we expect a night of long knives at one point or another in Iran. That is to say, the gamble of the Israelis since the war has bogged down is to say, we must be patient, we must wait, they will end up killing each other. Between what you described as moderates and hardliners, even within the Revolutionary Guards, who are said to be the hardestliners, there are some who are much more moderate. Within the so-called moderate political class, there are dissensions between what we see on television, Ahalibf, the negotiators, and others. There are former presidents, there are still some, who are in Iran, whom we don't hear from at all. I'm thinking of Rafsanjani, whom we don't hear from anywhere since the beginning of the war. We don't know what became of him. He was under house arrest. There is an extremely intelligent and brilliant political class. But the Israelis think that the more we probe from the inside, and perhaps by making it known, the more chances we have that the regime, perhaps in 6 months, perhaps it's also a message addressed to the Iranians, about whom we speak very little, the Iranian people, is to say, "Look at that guy who was elected president on a hard line, who was the mayor of Tehran, against whom the first major demonstrations of the Iranian population took place, it was against Armadinejad. He is someone hated by the entire young, educated, bourgeois class of Tehran, disaffected. He was detested. So it's a way of saying, "You see that guy, we ourselves managed to turn him around. So go ahead, rise up." And it is in this context that, according to Axios, Donald Trump convened a security council at the White House to discuss new operations, what am I saying, a new, much broader American offensive, that is to say, beyond the three straits and some strikes in these straits. Donald Trump, once again threatening, beware, if you do not negotiate, I will strike even harder. Shall we listen to him again? Can we talk about an escalation, of anger, of the situation? Can we wonder what it could lead to in the coming hours, or should we stop commenting on every threat from Donald Trump, since, yes, that is rather your position, I felt it. Go ahead, go ahead, Jean. No, no, but it's extraordinary. Remember the tweet affair with the 20% that all the cargo ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz should have paid, 20% for the Americans, it's delirium. And the same morning, he said, oh no, finally, I was told it was a bad idea, and people are committed to investing in the United States. I mean, here, we are really in a mess. And now he explains, when he was explaining to us just a few weeks ago that an agreement had been negotiated in 15 points that we never knew, and so on and so forth, and now he says, "We will bring them back to the negotiating table." So if they are coming back to the negotiating table, did they come or not? We understand absolutely nothing about what is happening between [clears throat] the United States and the Iranian regime and the monarchy. What we do understand, however, is that there are no longer many people protected by the famous memorandum, by the famous agreement. We still have a spectacular image of a bulk carrier in the Strait of Hormuz sinking. We no longer have the impression that there is any protection for anyone. The Americans have decided, in any case, to continue to strike the Iranian economy. That's clear, since they bombed a bridge that is strategic, that allows for the transport of oil, particularly to the north of Iran. So they continue to strike. Their idea is to bring Iran to its knees. But I see again, we see that there is a regime like that, and we know from experience, it doesn't fall from air strikes. It doesn't fall from an economy that collapses. Otherwise, Russia would have already fallen. That only worked once, and that was because there was an extremely strong internal opposition. That was in South Africa. We can repeat it again and again and again. And here, Donald Trump is deluding himself, because the more he strikes, the more the regime hardens. And since there is no armed opposition, there is no armed opposition, they are not armed. There are only Kurds, indeed, but on the border. So forget it. I mean, I mean, we can see that Donald Trump has launched a war without thinking about how he was going to get out of it. That's clear. And yet he is looking for a way out. That is to say, every statement, which obviously should not be analyzed one by one, but what is interesting is to see that each time he gives them these plans, which perhaps are not really plans, but to tell them, "Don't force me, almost don't force me to go that far." And what the Iranians retain is not "Don't force me, I don't want to get to that point," but "I don't have the means to do much more than what I am doing." So the balance of power is not on the American side. And that is what is catastrophic in this war that has been launched, is that the balance of power remains on the Iranian side. What is happening in the Strait of Hormuz, despite this memorandum of understanding that lasted what, not even a week, it's laughable, well, it was swept away with a wave of the hand by the Iranians, to whom Trump offered the greatest gift he could have dreamed of, which is to make them understand that, ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz was them, they were the ones who controlled it, they were the ones who mastered it, and unless the United States sends the entire armada, but with means that would be, well, disproportionate, substantial, that Donald Trump for the moment does not really have the means to mobilize. Iran will keep control of this strait, and that is what is terrible. Let's take the example of what Donald Trump says in his statement. Bridges and power plants, bridges, bridges, bridges, I will strike bridges, etc. How would he succeed tomorrow in what he failed to do or what he did not do in the preceding months? And knowing that even when he did it, that is to say, destroy a bridge, we see that the Iranians have already rebuilt them. We have an image of a bridge that was destroyed by American strikes, and you will see afterwards images of the bridge, the same bridge, with trains already running on it. Now, one can be wary of images, of course, but how could he succeed? I mean, same means, same effects. Yes. Well, what is interesting is that we can link the two questions we discussed tonight, the war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East. With the same conclusion, time seems to be playing in favor of the party that was perceived as the weakest. This is the case in Ukraine, we have discussed it. This is undoubtedly the case in the Middle East, because there is no electoral calendar on the immediate horizon for Iran. Now, the paradox is that Trump seems to be sinking into a form of irrational, illogical calculation in which he expresses his frustrations but reinforces, [clears throat] in the eyes of the Iranian regime, the feeling of his weakness. He is nervous because he feels that this war that continues risks him losing Congress. And the Iranians say, "In any case, we risk nothing because he will not send troops on the ground." And if he continues in the line he is indicating today, that is to say, "I will destroy the bridges," and civilian targets, well, international public opinion will say, "Be careful, these are war crimes. You are exclusively targeting civilian objectives because you cannot make progress by concentrating on military objectives." During the first part of the war, there was a form of restraint from the Americans and the Israelis on a certain level. We showed you images of the bridges. But there was a form of restraint because the Americans hoped that the Iranian civilian population would rise up, and therefore, they did not want to damage too much and prevent Iranian civil society from existing. The power plants that Donald Trump refers to are a very specific threat, it is the Amavand power plant, which is 70 km north of Tehran and has the capacity to produce as much electricity as three of our nuclear reactors. If it is hit, it is gigantic. It is one of the largest power plant complexes in the world. If it is hit, the 10 million inhabitants of Tehran will be in the dark without air conditioning. It is very hot, it is summer in Tehran at the moment, and the threat is very specific. But that would mean that they would indeed, and I agree with you, take the risk of plunging the entire Iranian civilian population into darkness. Of course, there were many deaths during these strikes. I am not minimizing, saying that they were all surgical and targeted strikes, but there was a form of restraint to avoid damaging the country's infrastructure too much. Now, the threat is, well, if we don't succeed, we will be forced to plunge the country into darkness.