Transcription
China is not rising, but actually returning to its historical position in the world.
If officials, if the government not serving the people, you'll be regarded immoral in China.
The century of humiliation. Is it just a historical lesson, or do you think it is very much of an active force when it comes to policy of China's leadership?
If you're falling behind, then you're going to be get bitted by somebody else. We need to reform the UN and the UN Security Council to reflect the modern power, uh, representation.
Can you replicate the Chinese model elsewhere?
Public square democracy, I think, needs to be upgraded now with modern society. If future historians were to, you know, look back on this century, what do you think would be the single most important question that they will ask about China's role?
The guest of today's OnChina podcast is one of the world's most respected voices on China's global engagement. Henry Wong is the founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization, China's leading independent think tank. Over the years, he has established himself as a tireless advocate for dialogue, openness, and international cooperation, helping build bridges between China and the world. A former senior government official, scholar, and a prolific author, Henry has spent decades studying the forces shaping China's transformation and its evolving role in global affairs. Through his leadership of CCG, he has brought together top policymakers, business leaders, diplomats, and academics from all continents to engage in serious conversations about the future of globalization, development, and international governance. Henry Wong, president of Center for China and Globalization. Thank you for being on the Own China podcast.
Thank you. Thank you, Vog. It's great to be here.
Let me start by, um, something that may sound obvious, um, to historians, uh, as well as to most Chinese. Uh, a lot of people argue with good reason that China is not rising, but actually returning to its historical position in the world. Um, first of all, do you agree with that characterization, and how does that shape the way the Chinese policymakers view their country's role in the 21st century?
Uh, great, uh, thank you, Vog, for this, uh, great question. Uh, I think actually, uh, you know, it's probably both. It's, uh, first of all, China is, uh, returning, uh, to its, uh, probably historical high. Uh, we remember, uh, you know, before the 18th century, uh, China was always the largest economy and one of the major, uh, powers in the world. And, uh, but it's basically, uh, in the recent, uh, you know, this 150 years, uh, uh, within the 200 years, China starting to, uh, decline, uh, for, for quite some time. There's about 100 years of humiliation that China suffered from since 1940, uh, you know, Opium War to 194, uh, to 1840 to 1949, that's about a century of, of, of, of humiliation and then decline, uh, due to the, you know, semi-feudal, semi-colonial society China has. But now, uh, I think people are getting used to China getting, you know, strong, getting rise, and then the world China rise again comes up because, uh, because of, you see, the last 48 years of China's opening and reform, China become the second largest economy in the world, and China really has be the leading economy in many, uh, fronts now, particularly in the, in the green economy, and also in the manufacturing and infrastructure. So China become a showcase how the modern country can achieve such achievement in such a short time. So there's a, there's, I think there's a both, you know, China rising and China returning at, at the same time. But also the China rising, I would also say that also benefit from the globalization, from the, you know, uh, the proposed Bretton Woods system where there's a, there's a market, there's a, you know, of international trade, there's a lot of technology, uh, uh, progress, and all those things. So China benefit, benefit from that as well. So I would say that, uh, I agree that China has been returned to its, uh, historical, uh, position and that to be recognized. But also at the same time, China benefited the modern world that also rising at the same time, and China really, uh, grasped the opportunity and, and all those right conditions, and, and also combined with the strong, uh, leadership and opening up policy that really leads to both returning to the historic high, but also, so, uh, uh, rising, uh, as the world, or we're at a modern society.
So, as you say, like since the beginning of the reform and opening up, we're talking about a few decades, China has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and thus making up probably, uh, the, the strongest or the most, uh, uh, dramatic story in the history of human development when it comes to numbers and when it comes to the time span, uh, that it took place in. Uh, but, um, beyond economics and policy, uh, in your opinion, what cultural, philosophical, or historical factors do you believe made such a transformation possible?
Yes, that's also another good question. I, I think that China, uh, achieved this, uh, miracle. You know, I, I had a dialogue with Larry Summers a few years ago, and he was basically saying that China lifted 800 million people out of poverty is something achievement greater than the industrial revolution of Great Britain, uh, in the, in the 18th century because, you know, this has been a record number of people has been reduced extreme poverty and represented 70% of the global, uh, poverty reduction, uh, at that time for, for the UN. So what I think, uh, this contributed to that is because not only because of the economic development, opening up and reform, there's a, there's a cultural element. I think there are several things probably China has done right. You know, first is that it's a, it's has a really great, uh, uh, you know, the dedicated, uh, uh, governing system, uh, that Confucian value that the, you know, government has to really, uh, stick to the people. And also this people-centered philosophy of China is really important because that's where is the core value because if, if, if the officials, if the government, if the public servant servant not serving the people, you'll be regarded immoral in China. So there's a very strong Confucian value that you have to really serve the people, and then the, the, the well-being of the common people is really fundamentally, uh, the mission of the, of the government of, of China. So that has been enshrined as a, as a governing party line, a philosophy, and also way of doing it has a long history, uh, for, for, from Chinese culture. And second, I think this way to work on that is it really mobilized the whole society. You know, China has this, uh, uh, grassroots, uh, meritocracy system. All, you know, there are the college graduates, you know, actually coming to the villages, coming to the, uh, rural areas, is that really helps the government at all levels to do that. And also thirdly, there's there's good performance, uh, measurement for all the government. You know, how many, uh, people you have lifted out of poverty, and what kind of a production or well-being you have created, those are really, uh, measured year by year, five-year plan, another five-year plan. So there was a long-term planning for that. And, and finally, I think is another factor that really from a cultural point of view is there is this steady working, hard working, uh, spirit of Chinese people because they really, uh, you know, 724, many, many rural areas, there's really working very hard. And then that kind of a hardworking spirit combined with with good, you know, uh, government, society, and, and also this philosophical Confucian value that really make things, uh, really work. And I think finally, there's also a large scale of economic benefit. You know, China has 1.4 billion people. And then when you, uh, embark on this gigantic massive movement of coordinating, the management, and also governance style, and all those things all fit in, and then the efficiency, effectiveness of, of the government to, to really carry that out. Uh, and then particularly, you know, that, uh, measured by at all levels, the 28th, there's 2,800 counties in China, you know, probably hundreds of thousands of villages, and then if they all really have a, a core, uh, consensus, they have a really a mission for the government to, to achieve. So you have see the, the private sector works in entrepreneurs, government, villagers, and, and all those, uh, factors play into this, uh, this great movement that China actually, uh, become possible to lift 800 million people in this globalization area. And also, I think China joined WTO, you know, there's a great migration work around China, uh, you know, the coastal cities, and then China become a manufacturing of the world is all contribute to this, uh, lifting poverty, uh, process, and then that many factors has has helped on that.
Well, you're not the first, uh, interlocutor of mine, uh, on the, uh, podcast, uh, that kind of raises the, the continuity, the, the philosophical continuity, based on, uh, Confucianism and, and other traditional thoughts that have been lasting for millennia, as a matter of fact.
Uh, but I'd be interested in your view on, um, where does modern China, uh, depart, uh, from its ancient philosophical traditions? They continue to inspire, uh, the statecraft, uh, and governance and society. Uh, but how does modern China differ from those, uh, old ways, uh, and means?
Yeah, absolutely. Those are really interesting, uh, uh, issues because, uh, the modern China, of course, you can see evolved from the, uh, since 1949, you know, when Chairman Mao declares the People's Republic has founded, uh, we can see that there has always, uh, tried many things, you know, in this process for the last 77 years of People's Republic of China history. But historically in China, you know, China for thousands of years, it's always a highly centralized. It's a very, uh, there's a big government effort. For example, you have to do all those irrigation projects, they're building the canals in from Beijing to Hangzhou, you know, a thousand kilometers or 2,000 kilometers. You have to do a lot of big coordination and all those things. And then also that Confucian value is basically using the family style. You have to treat your emperor, you have to treat your father, your brothers as a, as the core of the pillar of the society. And then, uh, so that kind of old governing style actually influenced China. I think China still benefit from this large geographic and large population, uh, movement and, and coordination and central government coordination capability was, was a long time ago. And also China benefit from this centuries-old of the meritocracy, uh, that they choose the officials and the mandarins, they through the exams, uh, you rise to the, to the top, that you really measured by your performance in your, in your how you well you studied the classics of Confucius, uh, Confucian culture and its doctrine. So the modern China, uh, is quite different now. Of course, we have gone through semi-colonial, semi-feudal society before the People's Republic, and then now with the, with the modern concept, China also learning from the West. China also has, you know, also benefit this Marxism and all those other state organizations that, that this kind of theory. But also I think furthermore is that China, particularly, uh, you know, since, uh, Deng Xiaoping's era, that that he has actually, uh, adopted policy of opening up and reform, and that that is a sharp contrast from, uh, the previous dynasty. That's a really a Middle Kingdom. You really isolated. It was only doing on its own. The domestic market is big enough. You don't need anybody else. But now they suddenly realize they really live in an open world now. And then they certainly realize that, uh, you know, they have to learn from, from the West. They have to learn from other international, uh, best practices. And also they have also particularly learned the market, uh, uh, you know, mechanism, the important market mechanism. As Deng Xiaoping basically said, you know, socialist doesn't mean we don't exclude market, market forces. So, I think there's a combination of modern market economy with the statecraft of governing, uh, that produced a miracle because, uh, as I said, you know, the government has always accumulated a lot of experience in centralizing, mobilization, coordination, and, and the chain of command, and is always really strong, uh, throughout the industry. And then now with the market forces, with the, uh, interconnectedness with the rest of the world, that really make China to take off. So I think that, that there's a, there's a reason of Chinese culture, uh, history, and Confucianism of governing for the people, serving the people, but also meritocracy, that you have to choose the, uh, officials from the grassroots, you have to perform, you become a village official, county official, municipality, province before you rise to the top. So that kind of system is different than the Western style, how make you, how well you make a public speaking, or how, you know, you are not really measured by by your performance of the practical experience. And China attaches great importance on that. So I think that's probably how China made today is different than it used to be, and also by China now living a modern, uh, world, a globalized world, that that all those factors, uh, come into being and generate really impressive results.
Um, you did mention before the, uh, the century of humiliation, uh, starting with the Opium, uh, wars in, uh, the 1840s and lasting until, say, uh, the inception of the People's Republic. Um, it's a very, uh, powerful historic lesson. Mhm. Um, but to which extent do you think that that particular historic lesson, the century of humiliation, continues to shape, uh, China's strategic thinking today? So is it just a historical lesson, uh, or do you think it is very much of an active force, uh, when it comes to policy, uh, of Chinese leadership?
No, I think this, this sense of humiliation and, uh, China was, uh, was defeated, was depressed, and then, and then, you see, uh, uh, uh, all those, uh, things happened at that time is really China for some of, there's, there's eight, eight Western country powers came to China, they looted the Beijing, you know, imperial gardens, and then, and then burned the imperial garden at that time, in the summer palace, close to Summer Palace. And then, of course, you, you see China also suffered the Second World War, war of Japanese occupation, invasion for, for many, many years. So those kind of, was a big surprise to China. You know, China, Chinese people are thinking, okay, we, we were in the past, we, we, we, we have enough space. We have, we just central kingdom. We cultivate our land. We have the two Jan River and the Yellow River, and then we abandon ourselves, and we, we, we conduct a peaceful exercise like the, like Marshall Zheng He in the, in the Ming Dynasty. He did the expedition seven times, uh, uh, you know, in the ocean beyond, beyond Africa, but they never stayed, they never invaded any place. So they were thinking by using the moral attractiveness, by using the, uh, the Confucian, you know, this hierarchy, uh, standard that they can really get along with all the neighbors. But then I was really shocked by by seeing this since the Opium War, 19, 1840, and then China was forced to open and then suffer this humiliation. So I think that that kind of experience, that kind of, uh, trauma has led a big scar in the, in the memory of, of the Chinese. I mean, in the history of Chinese too. So I think then they realize, okay, we, we, we, we, our old style may not working, you know, we just, you do your own things well, then you are okay. No, this, you have to really, uh, be, be forced to, to make yourself strong because there is a Chinese saying, if you're falling behind, then you're going to be get, uh, bitted by somebody else. So you have to really make yourself strong. So I think that kind of mentality has made, uh, Chinese people, and particularly the government and society in general, intellectually that you have to really build a strong modernized society. I remember when I was young, Zhou Enlai, uh, saying that, oh, we're going to have a, we're going to realize by 20, uh, uh, by 20, you know, year 2000, you know, China going to realize full modernization. That was a, uh, proposal made in the 1970s. So, so said by, by the end of the century, China could be realized for modernization. Now, uh, after that, Deng Xiaoping said, we need to really achieve well-being and, uh, you know, adequate, uh, uh, prosperity. So, so I think, you know, they always want to feel that they can, they can be really a, a strong, uh, society. And I think through the generation of efforts on that opening up and reform, China did realize, uh, this kind of status of being the second largest economy and one of the strongest, uh, country in the world. I, I, I do think that, uh, uh, this, uh, century of humiliation plays some role there. But China, of course, not going to, uh, uh, learn from, from, from other Western powers. They're going to repeat, uh, the, the, the colonial, uh, style, or they're going to start a new imperial approach, uh, to invade, occupy, or to do that. But then they realize, okay, we have to basically, uh, uh, stick to our culture, but also at the same time, uh, we need to, you know, build up strong because the old style, the old self-sufficient economy, self-sufficient, uh, society is not, uh, well enough to cope with the modern society, and then you need to really, uh, be stronger, be, uh, be, be, be more adequately built up. And then also, but then China is a peace-loving country still because of the culture. China is not a nation on on horses, not the Normans, not really never invaded any other country in the history. So I think, you know, that kind of culture, uh, plus a, a strong industrial capability will make China strong, but then, uh, not going to take all the imperial approach, uh, towards the others.
So, um, speaking about the relations with the others, when Chinese leaders speak of a community with a shared future for mankind, um, I'm wondering in your view, what would the international system actually look like, uh, if that vision, uh, were fully realized? And, um, how would that world, let's say that this idea, this vision succeeds, how would that differ from the post-1945 order, uh, that was by and large built, uh, by the United States?
Yes, I think it was really, uh, interesting. We see, uh, uh, President Xi, actually not too long ago, made a Global Governance Initiative, which, which is also now, I would think this is probably the fifth initiative China proposed. China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, China Development Initiative, Global Development, also Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative, and then the Global Governance Initiative. So, uh, what I think now, China, in my interpretation of China's, uh, Global Governance Initiative is that China wants to really, uh, seek a cooperative approach, and then seek the, uh, uh, economic development approach because that's really what China benefited from. China really, uh, experienced this kind of a achievement, and then say, okay, let's, let's focus on the economic, focus on the trade, focus on the investment, focus on the, on, on the cooperation, and then that is really the future globalization and global governance. Probably would be more centered upon. Of course, China, also, uh, has developed a very strong security initiative, which means that, uh, we should have an overall whole security architect that protects everyone. And then also, you know, China abandons those bloc economies, you know, blocks, uh, mentality, or really going to seek a military confrontation, or unipolar world, you have a big muscle, or you have a law of the jungle, then you really, uh, uh, prevail in that kind of a old fashion. So I think from the 1949 Bretton Woods system, which is a, a system established based on a situation at that time, you know, you have all those US, European, and, and many other countries have a de-western developing countries. Basically, it's a system where it favors their development. But then after, you know, 80 years later, we, we see the global landscape has hugely changed. We see the rise of the Global South, the BRICS countries represented by China, India, uh, Brazil, and many, many more. So we, we need to adjust and adapt that system. So, so I think, including the UN system, I mean, your, your Horizon magazine has has, you know, reported many those good articles, and I contributed one as well, is that we need to reform, for example, the UN and UN Security Council to reflect the modern power, uh, representation. So, so I think what China has, uh, been proposing is that, okay, we need to have a fair system. We need to really reflect the development of all countries, and we need to really benefit that. For example, China safeguards WTO. China become the second largest donor to the UN budget, uh, donated 500 million to WHO while US pulling out of that. So, so I think this kind of the economic development, uh, uh, prosperity initiative still really for the, for the global governance. But then on, on the political leadership structure, I think you still China upholds UN Charter, UN authority, and UN establishment. So that we need to reform, we need to enhance, improve, and enlarge, and then particularly the power of the, of the UN representation at the Security Council. So I think there's many things, uh, China's Global Governance Initiative, uh, uh, includes, but, but certainly focus on development, focus on economic cooperation, focus on the inter, uh, uh, uh, twin with all the economy, and then abandon the, the Cold War mentality, abandon the blocks, uh, mentality, and then confrontation should not be the way to go, but then cooperation. But then in order to do that, you really need the global, uh, authority, uh, that, that for the last 80 years, we still have the UN, and we need to really reinforce that and, and, and improve on that.
Um, I'd like to ask you the question of, uh, development, uh, before democracy, or versus democracy. China's experience over the past 40 years in particular, uh, challenges very directly one of the central assumptions of Western modern political thought, and that is that economic modernization inevitably leads to, uh, political convergence, uh, with Western liberal democracies. Uh, what lessons, in your view, uh, should the world draw, uh, from China's alternative, uh, path? Uh, or simply, is China's model, uh, exportable?
Uh, or simply is China's model, uh, exportable? Uh, we talked about Chinese uniqueness, yeah, because of the millennia, uh, of history and culture that is very much part of the China's model, and, uh, the rest of the world doesn't have that, or has something else. So the question is, can you replicate the Chinese model elsewhere?
Well, this is a very good question. I think, uh, you know, many people ask that, ask that. No, I, I do think China's experience, I, I would not really say that is a model, but maybe the experience or its path has some advantages and, and maybe can be summarized into several aspects. First, I think, you know, uh, Chinese system, which is, uh, even from its long history, thousands of years, is really, uh, you know, put emphasis on the long term. So that's really important. I think the modern, uh, society, uh, particularly in the Western economy, they were really, uh, you know, every cycle of elections, two, three, four years, is very short-term, where China has one five-year plan after another five-year plan, and has has really long-term view. So that really can carry out a longer, long-range planning and long-range mobilization and long-range implementation. I think that is really, uh, one thing that I, I think the Chinese, uh, path or Chinese model, uh, can be really, uh, uh, you know, summarized and promote, uh, to, to the rest of the world because there's long-range planning is absolutely important. Second, I think, uh, the democracy of, uh, uh, you know, Athens, you know, originated from Greece, from the public square democracy, I think needs to be upgraded now with modern society. I mean, China does have a democracy. I call it meritocracy, uh, meritocratic style of democracy, which means that, for example, every year, you know, 30 million, 40 million, uh, high school students being selected or, uh, or elected into the system by examination papers. So it's examination voting, and every year there's about, uh, you know, 300,000, uh, public servants recruited at all levels in China, and then three million college students, uh, go to the exam for that. And then so, so you can see it's very fierce competition. So once you get into a public servant, uh, position, then you have to start from, uh, uh, uh, uh, village level, county level. So there's a performance-related promotion system. So this, uh, there's a meritocratic democratic selection system is not by what you have written, by what you have, you know, uh, uh, made a good speech, or, or really how handsome you are. You has to perform, and then so, so in that case, uh, uh, they promote officials through different ranks, and then there's a layers of promotion. So, so all the governing officials are very experienced. You have to be a, a chief of local economy or this municipality before you promote to the, to the provincial level. You have to be a two-province party secretary before you promote to the central level. So there's always a 10, 20, 30 years of experience before you get promoted. So I think that kind of well-competent, uh, uh, public service system is really a good, good example of China. And thirdly, I think what China has, uh, that, that, you know, can be beneficial to other countries is this, uh, uh, also, uh, you know, market, uh, uh, economy, uh, with very, very good hybrid economy. You, you have a, you have a really, uh, 60% of private sectors, which generate 50% of national revenue, 60% of national, uh, uh, uh, government innovation, 70% of enterprises, 80% of employment. So that's that sector, and then you have another 20% SOEs. So SOEs, uh, does all the, you know, uh, strategic important jobs like, uh, national railway, which is not profitable, then you have to do it. High-speed railway has to be done by by SOE, by the 5G networks, you have to lay all the towers, set up all the stations, also SOE, and also the dirty jobs of, you know, disaster relief or earthquake relief, they all done. And then they have another 10, 15% of the private sector, no, multinational foreign enterprises. And then they actually, uh, you know, generate the 40% of China's export international trade. 40% was done by multinationals like Apple, you know, they make 80% of the Apple phone in China, everybody's using it. There's, there's no national security issue, but, uh, actually, it's cheaper, it's cheaper to buy an Apple phone than a Huawei phone, yes, in China. Yes, actually that's right. So you can see this kind of hybrid economy, that's very unusual, is only China has that. You know, you have a 60% private sector, 20% of 25% of SOEs, and another 10, 15% of international, uh, private sector, foreign enterprises. So this kind of trilateral economy structure is very stable for China. And so, so I think, you know, those things, you know, long-range planning, uh, and then meritocracy selection of the system, and then, uh, a unique trilateral structure of the economy, and then on top of that, you have a very consistent long-range government, uh, uh, uh, implementation, and, uh, you know, without this, uh, you know, overpromise and, and underdelivery, short, uh, political cycle. So I think those are probably what made China so efficient and, and fast development.
Um, I want to ask you about the Belt and Road. Um, believe it or not, about 13 years ago, uh, uh, when I set up my think tank, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, uh, we were the first partner of, um, Chinese, uh, State Council's think tank, the Development Research Council, uh, in organizing the first conference outside of China where the concept of One Belt, One Road, it was called at the time, yes, was actually promoted. Uh, so, um, I've spent years, um, discussing and, and, and working on projects related to the Belt and Road. But there is a different way in which Belt and Road is now viewed in a number of places in the world. Um, the Chinese story, which, which I understand very well, having been involved with it since the beginning, was to do with the Chinese philosophy of connectivity, reminiscent of the Silk Road. Yeah. But the critics of the Belt and Road talk about "debt traps," Mhm. uh, and, uh, in a way, this project being something like, uh, China's, uh, hegemonic aspirations being implemented in situ, uh, around the world. So, so what do you say to these, uh, critics?
Yeah. No, that's a question often being asked. I, I really think that, uh, the world has developed since the Second World War, 81 years, 82 years now, that, uh, we see there's a big, uh, post-war construction. You know, we see the Marshall Plan after the Second World War. [clears throat] There's a lot of infrastructure built at that time. But then for the recent, uh, 20, 30 years, and even longer, uh, the world is lacking, uh, infrastructure and development. I, I, I often, I mingle with ambassadors of many of them in in different developing countries, you know, many are saying, look, where are the last big plans have been launched in the world tackling the infrastructure or development? Uh, we see only China does that. And, uh, arguably, there was a, there was a big, uh, infrastructure investment plan in Eastern Europe following, uh, the end, uh, of the Cold War.
Yes. Yes. No. That's right. You know, that was, uh, since that time, uh, since the post-baby boomers and 50s, 60s, and, and then for the, for the recent 30, 40 years, there's no such a plan. And then for Western countries, there are some like USAID and, and some other countries, there's always strings attached. Uh, you know, if, if they are going to do something, and so many, many developed countries are really, uh, suffer from that and then not able to do that. So, so in that, in that kind of situation, China launched this Belt and Road Initiative in about 2013. It was really to, uh, to really, you know, make the gap, uh, for the global development, uh, deficit, you know, infra,
Fill the gap. Fill the gap, yeah. Fill the gap.
Because China has benefited so much on this, uh, infrastructure. For example, there's a famous saying in China, say, if you want to be rich, build roads first. So that is the mentality that that China consensus China has all has on now. And then, uh, you know, you, you now you go to China, everywhere is well-connected, longest highways in the world, longest super speed railway in the world, and, and what have you. So, so China wants to say, okay, we, we have benefited from this infrastructure boom and, uh, and connectivity, we want to help developing countries that. And then they launched this BRI initiative. So I think that has been launched, and there's many good successes now. For example, uh, I recently went to Indonesia, and then, uh, there's a high-speed rail built by China for from Bandung to Jakarta. Used to be four hours, now it's 40 minutes. And then you have China-Laos railway, you have China now is, you have, you know, we have where we, where we, where we in in Serbia, you know, Hungary, there's another, yeah, railway has been built now. So, so I think, I mean, all of China built over 100,000 highways in Africa, another 10,000 railways in Africa. Actually, my father, you know, in the 1970s went to Tanzania and Zambia, built this Tanzania-Zambia railway. He was one of the, uh, builders at that time. I, I. So, so I, I can see China has a lot of experience and then really can contribute to that. China felt this is China's contribution can be made to the world. I, I, I think there's a lot of people interpret this as as a geopolitical, uh, ambition of China, or maybe there's a, there's many other, uh, debt traps and things like that. But if you really look at all the statistics, uh, there's not really a, a good case or good study or good numbers of of that trap. I mean, the often cited example of this debt trap in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, you know, I talked to Sri Lanka ambassadors, and I read many reports. The Sri Lanka, you know, China debt accounted less than 10%. There's, there's a lot of debt from multilateral lending agencies, a lot of private, uh, lending agencies. So China's debt there is less than 10%. So, so it's not really a, so-called China debt trap. So, so I think now, I think Chinese initiative has actually made some good progress. We see other countries proposed US proposed Build Back Better, B3W, EU has proposed EU Global Gateway, and India proposed India-Middle East Corridor and, and, and European connection. So I think all those could be connected. I propose that World Bank, you know, AIIB, ADB, all the development banks, AFDB should work together, right? Because they have a lot of similar experience, and then they can, they have their development languages. So I do think that we need World Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and New Development Bank, all those banks work together, uh, to really coordinate all those great projects. So I think, you know, by improving US-China relations with recent years, you know, like we see Trump and President Xi had a lot of meetings going on in 2026, that probably, you know, one, there's some trust, some new things of thinking, you know, those develop helping on other countries. I just hosted the German CDU parliamentary delegation in China. Germany has a big development plan overseas, and that can work together with Chinese plan. So, so I do think, you know, uh, let's more countries walk into that, but avoid, of course, there's, there's nothing perfect, there's always a, a bad case here and there, but, but cannot be categorized as as a bad debt trap. So I, I would think, uh, you know, we have a good examples, good experience, let's have all this country work together to have a better connectivity for the world, and particularly Global South countries.
Um, misunderstandings or misconceptions. Let's there. Um, there's an argument that, uh, a lot of, uh, Western analysts, uh, uh, make analytical mistakes when looking at China because they're trying to, uh, interpret China's policies, uh, through Western, uh, historical experiences or political categories. Mhm. Do you think it's, uh, it's a fair assessment? And, uh, if that is part of the problem, then, um, what do you think are the, um, most common misconceptions, uh, by Western analysts?
Yes. When they look at China?
Well, I think there's a, there's several, uh, uh, you know, clichés, maybe you can probably talk about that. First is that this is always talk about autocracy versus democracy. Because if China is not, uh, democratic country, then you're bound to be, uh, authoritarianism, you're bound to be, uh, you know, so so brutal to your, to your citizens, and then you, you're not going to make any good progress. But it's on the contrary, you know, China, as I said, is a meritocracy. You know, this meritocracy really works well with Chinese cultural history and, and all those ways of doing that. And also this, uh, long-term, uh, uh, planning and a long-term governance style. Uh, stability is the, is really, probably if you look at the one word that that China really attaches great importance is stability. And then that's recently China and the US has reached a new consensus from strategic rivalry to strategic stability now. So, so I think this is really important. So that's one of the misconceptions I think, or if you are not as us, every three, four years, we're going to have a massive voting election, and then you, you, you are not one of us. You must be doing badly. So, but, but that's not, not true, because just because we are not doing this one, uh, four, five years short-term cycle, we have this long-term cycle, long-term, uh, uh, governance, long-term, uh, uh, uh, power that in place that we can do five-year plan for another five-year plan, and that we can really, uh, get all the correct, uh, way of doing things because, uh, uh, we have this meritocracy is capable of doing things. So that's, that's, that's, I think that's why China achieved so much progress. But number two, uh, uh, misconception of China is that, uh, uh, uh, you are not a market economy. You are state, uh, you know, uh, so SOEs, you're only run by, and then you're, you're too big government, too small society, too small economy, which is not true. You know, China actually is, I think it's a great combination of a market economy, state economy, plus, uh, the market forces. As I said, you know, there's a, there's a trilateral economy of Chinese structure like private sector, SOEs, plus, uh, multinationals made a unique combination, which is you, you won't find anywhere in the world. And then this is really great is that, uh, uh, you know, this, this state SOEs sometimes become a welfare for the, for the, for the, for the poor. Now, for the those all those, uh, government use that as a supplementary to do all those strategic important like, you know, not profitable sector, and then maybe doing all those, you know, you know, not really a big business sector. SOEs is the only because they're doing that is providing some welfare to the, to the government. So that's really another way of look at that. And, and finally, I think there's, there's some misconceptions that when China gets stronger, become the second largest, or even future the largest, China must, uh, going to be taking the same approach as US, going to set up military bases everywhere, going to be hegemonic, going to, you know, conquer or invade other countries, which is not true, because the Chinese culture, you know, thousands of years, you know, China is agricultural society. The the ancestors or farmers always cultivate along the Yangtze River, Yellow River, and then you, they have to grow three or four, five crops a year, and then they have to stay in that land, and they cannot go far away. Like Confucius said, if your parents are alive, don't travel far away. So they always stick in that land and cultivate and always produce all the goods they need. And they, they are not horse on the nation, the Mongolians, or they're going to have a big expedition. They're going to conquer many places or have this colonial, uh, uh, you know, conqueror of different places. They never had that history. So, I think that that is not in Chinese DNA. That is not in Chinese mindset. And I think they just want to, you know, stay well and then get along with your neighbors, get along with everybody with this modern technology, with this modern, uh, economy, and modern infrastructure. So, so I think this is probably a lot of misunderstanding on China. But then if you go really go to China, and then the best way to get rid of, get out of this misconception is by visiting China, by have a fast train ride in China, have a Chinese food in China, and then you will see how different. For example, one of the per misconceptions, oh, Beijing is so, you know, 10, 15 years ago, so polluted. You, you Chinese are polluted so much now. But now China's turned around, you know, really made very clean and bright society. So, so I think, you know, there's a lot of things can be solved by really have a real visit. That's why China opened the visa for, uh, for 20 some European countries and many more. And I'm sure going to open for US citizen visa regime, uh, with China. And yes, it happened during my term in office. I was, I was the, the Foreign Minister of Serbia who started this.
Yes. Uh, when I became Foreign Minister in 2007. So for close to 20 years, actually, Serbia has had an open, uh, travel regime, and I'm very pleased that now this is being replicated.
You know, I was, I, I came in this morning. I was so friendly the border, and then my, my visa took about 30 seconds. Passport. Yeah. I don't need a visa. My passport, just 30 seconds. They just come in. So, but when I go to other countries, going big lined up and all those things. So, so this you can see the great, uh, you know, scheme you established.
Let me ask you about, uh, this, uh, phrase, this, uh, term, uh, that, um, there are different ways of looking at it. Um, it's called, it's the term multipolarity. Yes. And, you know, in many parts of the world, when you say multipolarity, it comes like with a threatening sound, like, uh, that is something dangerous, that is something inherently, you know, unstable, right? But, um, I think that there are very, very few, uh, you know, scholars or thinkers who would argue that the world is not already, uh, multipolar. Yes. Yes. So, uh, what does the word multipolarity mean to you, or by extension, um, China's foreign policy, uh, thinkers? What is multipolarity?
Yeah. Yeah. That's a good question. Yeah. I remember last year when, when I was at the Munich Security Conference, uh, they kicked off the, kicked off their annual report, uh, for last year was "Multipolarity," that, you know, the report name. I was on a panel with the chairman of the Security Conference and also another European and African representative. We, we had a panel to discuss about that. I think for the first time across the Atlantic, they recognize multipolarity now. And multipolarity is a reality. And, as you said, it's just we are in the process of, uh, achieving this multipolarity, but that multilateralism is still, is still not there. So in that sense, what, what I think for, for us to, uh, as a Chinese to think about that is that we, we're going to see a more, uh, intertwined, uh, global, uh, poles now, because, uh, which means, uh, there's not just one pole, one unipolar, and now we have several poles, probably, you know, China, US, EU, India, know, uh, Global South countries, and then, then so with that pole, we need to really find a new way to coordinate, to, to discuss, to do that. And I found that also the world is now with 193 countries of UN, it's a world of, we are living a democratic world of society. For example, uh, US is probably the biggest opposition party of China, and China could be the biggest opposition party of US, too, or EU opposition party of China, China can be. So we, we, we check on each other, we, uh, we criticize each other, but also we praise each other if, if we're doing right. So I think this kind of a new multipolar world, we need a new multi-governing system.
So there is like, uh, the world is multipolar, but there is no multipolar order yet.
Yes. Absolutely. Exactly. You're absolutely right. Is that we, we are getting the multipolar. The danger is that we really have to find the solution, uh, to avoid this gap to be too long. Mhm. Because if we, we are, which we already seeing the dangers of what's going on in the Russian-Ukraine war. We have this Iranian thing going on. If, if, you know, you have this, uh, uh, Kindleberger's trap, you know, that if, if one unipolar war is really winding down, then they, they, they can go to Venezuela, they can do the things in Iran, and then the world is, there's no check and balance. Not the UN is not really effective. So, so I think we are in that kind of a, probably enter into uncharted waters, very dangerous phase now. So that's why I think it's so important, uh, those, those big poles, get together. We're not talking just G7. We need to talk about, uh, all those big powers that get together, you know. Uh, so I remember that in the Munich Security Conference report, they talk about multiple, they talk about US, China, EU, India, Japan, you know, uh, you know, quite a few, uh, players. So, so what I, what I think is important is that, uh, uh, particularly, uh, those, you know, top several largest economies like, like US, China, EU, uh.
India and we, we, we need to get together. We need to really, uh, I was, uh, I was at one time proposed G10, you know, we should have a G10, or have a G5, whatever, you know, that really needs more, more representation of the global balance and power. And then they need to meet regularly, rather than one bloc meeting against the other. And then, and then also the UN Security Council, we need to really reflect the G20, probably to that. Uh, we, we still keep the P5 as a, as a founding, as the V2. But then the other 15 of the G20 countries should be there to reflect a much larger voices and greater representation.
So, so I think we need a lot of, uh, reform on that. And then for, for that point, I think China has become a, a stabilizer, become an anchor, because the economy is still, China contributes 30% of global GDP growth. China is the largest trading nation, 140 countries. China actually, you know, become a stabilizer for many areas. So, so I think, you know, multiple war, we are, we are there now, but there's no multiple system system yet to do that.
So, um, in closing, I have a couple of more questions. Uh, one is philosophical and, um, it goes along the lines of, if future historians were to, you know, look back on this century, the 21st century. Yeah. What do you think would be the single most important question that they will ask about China's role in the world? Mhm. And, and what answer do you hope they will arrive at? Yeah.
Well, that's a really a hard question, but, but, uh, to my knowledge, I, I think, you know, if, if I'm guessing, if people are going to ask, they would probably say, what China has contributed in the 20th or 21st century for, for the, for the last, you know, 50 years or 100 years. I, I think that, uh, my answer would be that the, the, the rise of China, or the, the return to the, to the normal peak of China, is a, is a benefit to the world. Mhm. Uh, because, uh, China developed. You can see that China's thrive not by invading other countries, not by colonizing any places, not by conduct a unipolar war that, that, that really, uh, basically take advantage of other countries. China has developed because it followed the global, uh, you know, global system. China is a great support of a UN system. China joined the WTO. China supports WTO. Of course, China is not perfect. It's not everything is absolute all right. But then largely, I mean, in big part, China has really embraced this global system and, and then has really contributed to this global system.
So I think if, you know, if China is there and then China becomes a big stabilizer for the world, you can see what happened recently on this Iran thing, that the war that we had. China is, is, is that's, is actually behind there's all mediation and help. China's foreign minister Wang has phoned over 30, 40 foreign ministers just for this Iranian case, the hot crisis there. Iranian foreign minister came to Beijing two days before President Trump came. Pakistan prime minister came to Beijing right after Trump left. China is really mediating behind and and doing all those things. And also China has been stabilizing the oil prices because China has diversified its, uh, you know, energy supply now by green power also. So, China becomes an anchor for, for some extent, really to stabilize the world.
Uh, so I think in the 20th century, and also 21st century, particularly, if we're going to avoid the catastrophe, if we're going to avoid nuclear disaster, we're going to avoid AI huge disruption, I think China can play a lot of supply, you know, stabilizing and also a balancing role there. [snorts] So we need China to be on on on on on on the side to really for the world to be counted on, to be depended on, to really rely on China to be making more contributions to the global prosperity and stability.
I agree, I agree with, uh, much of what you said. And, uh, this the shell of China in the world, and this the role of, uh, um, Chinese leadership domestically, it was, it was basically under the leadership, and it is, and will be under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Mhm. Uh, Chinese Communist Party, one would argue, is maybe the only Communist Party in history that has, uh, undeniably delivered sustainable prosperity. Mhm. Uh, and technological modernization to its people, and, uh, and by extension, by engagement with the world, helping this be achieved in the world. Mhm. No other communist party has has made it in Eastern Europe, or in, or in Cuba, or in North Korea. You had communist parties that had results which was hardly comparable to that of the Chinese Communist Party. [snorts]
So what do you think makes the Chinese Communist Party different from, uh, its ideological counterparts around the world in the past, or today? Why is it, why is it that the CCP is successful and and other communist parties were not?
Yeah. Yeah. That's also a great question. I, I think, you know, there's probably several reasons for that. First of all, China is a country big enough, you know, have 1.4 billion people, and then, uh, the, the leadership there are more confident. And then they actually, I think that the, the communist party in China, different with other communist parties, is that the Chinese Communist Party embraced the market economy, embraced the globalization, where others was afraid of. If they're doing that, they will be overthrown. Whereas in China, I think particularly Deng Xiaoping said, okay, let's open up, let's, uh, let's embrace market economy, let's welcome capitalism. And then China actually developed some kind of a state capitalism, which I think is quite, quite successful. Uh, which is also helping for the country. And then we see other countries doing similar things, like, like the, the Chips Act of the US, and you see the European have many policies that emphasize the government intervention, government central role now.
So, so that, that is number one, that Chinese Communist Party has actually embraced market economy and and and market reform. I think number two is that also, uh, this, uh, Chinese Communist Party, this, uh, this meritocracy that rooted in the Chinese history, is that old officials, you have to be picked by examination papers to get into the system, either college entrance exam or public service entry exam. They were, they were all doing that. And thirdly, I, I think public is also more, uh, different than the others, is that they have to come up through the ranks, seniority, and also the performance in different parts of China at different levels. So, that that is another reason. And then finally, I think the reason is that, uh, Chinese economy is totally intertwined with the world. Uh, it's, it's not just China, you know, by by first opening up for all the multinational companies to come to China, and then China has learned and the benefit, and also adapted to the global system, and then China now can contribute that again, by for example, green technology and EV cars. So I think in that sense, the great transition, great translation between capitalist and socialist country, China public is the is the champion for that.
So, so all those factors, I think contributed the CCP's success in China with the long-term guarantee, five years plan after another five years plan, and then then, uh, not short-term strategy, but also I think they, they are opening to all the criticism and and all the, you know, digesting of all the reports, all the, uh, recommendation of the think tanks. They have learning from everywhere. Uh, so those the leaders are are no longer the in old days, the mountains high and and the kings far away. Now they have just observing and learning from everybody. And of course, watched by thousands of medias, NGOs everywhere. And then so they adapt, they they changing. So I think that's why, uh, they become survive the fittest of of this, of this unique system now.
Henry Wank, president of CCG. Thank you very much for this conversation.
Thank you. Thank you V for for a great, uh, discussion. Thank you.
Great.
Okay. Thank you so much.