Transcription
This idea that a war with Russia is inevitable, hence, we need to prepare, is now already accepted and mainstreamed to a large degree in Europe and especially in Germany. Once the last Ukrainian bled to death, well, what what do you have left? Well, next one on the chopping board probably going to be Poland, right? Uh, so often or uh, or one or some other like willing victim. I mean, the the the Baltic states also look very um, reasonable for that. But of course, you will always do it in a way that you can um, that you can pin it on Russia.
Welcome to World Affairs and Context, everybody. I'm Lyanna Petroba. Today, I'm so pleased to welcome back to the program a good friend of mine, Dr. Pascal Looda. Pascal is associate professor at Kyoto University and founder of a very popular geopolitics channel on YouTube, Neutrality Studies. If you haven't already, I highly, highly recommend following Pascal's work. I will share the links to his YouTube and his Substack in the video description below. I'm a big fan. Pascal, welcome back to the program. Thank you so much for being here.
Thank you so much for having me, Lena. It's a pleasure to be back, and I, I'm a great admirer of your work and your show as well, not just your show but also your Substack.
Well, thank you so much. Thank you, Pascal. Let's start by pointing out that Europe is now undergoing its most significant military buildup since the Cold War. Last year, the EU unveiled an unprecedented 800 billion euro militarization plan, never seen before. Now, many European governments are openly discussing the possibility of direct conflict with Russia, even though there is no publicly available intelligence data suggesting that Russia would attack NATO, that Russia is preparing to attack NATO. Um, European and American experts have spent the last four years claiming that the Russian economy is about to collapse, while at the same time claiming that Russia is preparing to attack NATO. Pascal, what lies at the core of Europe's militarization and the push to rearm at the moment?
I've been asking myself that now for a long time, and there are, there are, there are a couple of things. Um, one is, I would argue, very, very deep-seated, deep-seated Russophobia. That's definitely one. I mean, especially in Germany, uh, France too, the UK as well, but but especially in Germany, you have this relentless drive by some people to, um, to want to have Russia as an enemy. Um, and, you know, Russophobia, in that sense, is actually not a very good word. Unfortunately, we don't have, have a much better one because phobia implies that there's a fear, a fear of Russia, but it's not fear. It's actually hate. So, um, I would use Russophobia as meaning Russian hate. And I literally, I tell you, I had that experience when I went back to Switzerland in February. Uh, and of course, Switzerland's not, not Germany, but we're German-speaking too, right? I mean, and I was in Zurich, in the German-speaking part. And, you know, the German-speaking world in Europe, they, we, we of course, we read each other, and Switzerland is way too small also to just have its own like, uh, uh, uh, um, newspaper culture and so on. So, of course, we rely a lot on, on what's coming, what's coming from Germany, and, and, and so you have very similar strains also inside, um, inside Switzerland. I would say though, at a, at a, it's boiling at a much lower level. We have that much more inside, inside Germany. Um, but I had that experience. I was, was giving a talk, uh, just, just talking about why, you know, we need to strengthen neutrality. We're going to have a referendum on that in this September or October, whether we want to strengthen our neutrality, and part of that would be to stop sanctioning other countries, uh, because sanctions are themselves a means of war. And there was, it was just talking about that and about the importance of stopping sanctioning countries, and one person in the, in the room got up and said, "I'm not going to listen to this, um, pro-Russian BS. This is, this is Putinist. You are just a Putin lover," and, and, and, and he told me while he was storming out, "I hate the Russians. I hate them." He like, anger and in his face. It was incredible. You know, it was another one of these experiences. And I'm not saying that everybody's like that. The rest of the room was quite, was quite reasonable. But you have that, and that form of Russian hate is definitely one of the motivating factors. Um, because, um, to those people who want Russia as an enemy, there's, I mean, the, the developments of the last, uh, 10, 15 years are, are beautiful, right? Because they affirm their notions that Russia is actually an enemy, that Russia was just down and, and, and now recovered, and now it's going to, going to come back, and we are now legitimized in hating and militarizing and arming against Russia. Um, so, you know, it's kind of this, this, this emotional feedback loop also on, on, on a psychological level. That's one.
The other one, then, of course, is that also the, um, a lot of the media narratives play into that, and media narratives are very supportive of government line and the pro. One of the problems we have is that Europe is not an independent continent. It's not an independent political actor. I mean, we are downstream from Washington, all of us, including Switzerland. I mean, Switzerland is downstream, uh, Berlin, or downstream Germany, and Germany is downstream, uh, United States, right? And you can see that. I mean, we all remember this, right? How the German Chancellor stood next to Biden when Biden said, "We're going to, you know, your little Nord Stream thingy there, we're going to kill it," and he just stood there and took it. And the current Chancellor, even more so. And how Europe is currently shooting itself, not only in one foot but both feet with their, with their energy security, um, because they will never, ever, ever want to talk to Russia again about energy security, and they are happy to depend 100% on the United States, especially now that the Strait of Hormuz and the whole, um, not just the Strait of Hormuz, but the entire, uh, uh, um, uh, flow of energy from the Middle East is gone. And they're going to increase that, that that reliance, even if it may mean paying three, four, five times as much, even if it means de-industrializing, and that a lot of your, um, industries are just not going to be viable anymore. They do that because A, this Russophobia, B, um, the, this, this idea of this transatlantic alliance, the idea of a lot of the European elites that, you know, they're not just in charge of Germany and France, they're in charge of the West, you know, how underline with her, with her values and so on. And we, the, we, Europe, a, I mean, she always like, she, I mean, these people think of themselves as in charge of Europe, not just in Germany and France and, and so on. We're in charge of everything, but then also charge of the alliance, and we are together, right? So we sit together at the table, and even when the US presents obviously humiliates them by making them sit, do you remember last year around this time, um, they were sitting like little school children in front of Donald Trump's desk in the Oval Office on little chairs, and, and Mr. Dup, the Finnish, uh, PM, he was even there with a little notepad like taking notes. It was, it was embarrassing. And they took a picture of it and published it on the White House. And the only one who looked like, uh, uh, who looked like embarrassed was was Maloney, who obviously understood what was going on, that they were being embarrassed, that they were being put in their place, and that the boss was talking to them. The others, they, they were happy with that because to them, it's like, you know, being, being at the table with the boss is better than being at their own table where, where they are, I don't know, like, it's, it's a weird mentality. And I've, I've had good talks with people on my, um, on my channel, including a very brilliant young scholar, Neil Bonila, who has been researching these transatlantic, um, elite factories, you know, and, and also elite networks. It's not just that they are fostered and groomed and so on. It's also that that there are just a whole circle of people who thinks transatlantically much more than nationally. Um, and that is another factor that then explains why these, why this group of elites, um, wants to stick, um, come what may, to this, not just this plan, but this entire life, uh, uh, um, that that they build up the world that they build up, and with where they know that they can transition within, right? So like Mr. Merz, uh, uh, working his ranks through these like young leaders and blah, blah, blah, blah, and so on, to CEO positions, to BlackRock, then to the chancellorship of Germany, and probably going on, currently Annalena Baerbock, now being in a former foreign minister of Germany, and now being in, uh, in the UN in New York. And that's a little bit separate, but still, it's kind of, you know, how they position and place each other. How we now have a former, uh, PM of the Netherlands as the, uh, as the chief of NATO. Um, you, you name it, you know, they go back and forth. The next one who has a big, uh, big change coming up in his career ladder that will probably be a transatlantic shift is of course, Mr. Macron. Uh, he's out of a job in, uh, two years from now. And, um, it wouldn't surprise me in the least if he was next in line for NATO, or if he was next in line for one of the top jobs, uh, inside the, inside the alliance. Maybe, maybe within the EU, maybe he wants to succeed, uh, Ursula von der Leyen. But you see how they, they move also across, across countries and institutions. Maybe IMF or World Bank, one of those would be thinkable as well, right? And that's the world they live in. And within that world, keeping that world together is much more important than making sure that, uh, the German industry has what it needs in order to be competitive on the global scale. So I can, I can discern these things. And then the prop, the media propaganda works into that because the media naturally is very elite and government obedient. Even if they say like, we check on check and balances, the fourth power, blah, blah, blah, blah, BS. None, none of them is, none of them. Not, not in the US, not in, uh, not in Europe. Um, just, just to be complete here, also not in China or in Russia, or in Japan. Like, uh, the media environment, as an environment in sum total, is never opposed to what the, uh, what your national, what your national government does sporadically against individuals and then, and a few, and so on. There, they, they have pinpricks and, and whatnot, but not as a, as a total block. So they will go along and they will launder and wash the policy priorities, um, through a process of, of course, like, uh, reporting over many, many years, and framing of stuff, many, many years, even, even when it means washing a genocide in Gaza as some form of self-defense, even when it means that they will come back and in 20 years, 25, 30 years, there will be, you know, PhD students who will write dissertations about it, and there will be a reckoning, and, oh, we did this, we did that, but at that time, it's going to be over. It's going to be done. And that's what the media does. The media makes sure that the current thing, the current priorities can happen. Um, and that's what they do.
And certainly, we can see that within the EU as well, because almost on a daily basis, it's, it's the, the way that everything is framed is very deliberate, and, and it's very, um, it's, it's designed to serve the agenda of, of creating the other, and that other in Europe is, of course, Russia. Russia is the enemy. And so the way everything is presented, even, even effectively the corrupt and illegal regime in Ukraine, Zelensky's regime, is presented as a democratic government, as, as one that's supported by its people. Even though when you speak to Ukrainian people, you understand that not only does he lack support, he also, uh, he, he doesn't, uh, truly serve, he doesn't represent the Ukrainians at this moment in time, and he hasn't in in years, because the Ukrainian population is indeed tired of war, and it, it supports seeking a diplomatic solution, not fighting till the last Ukrainian. But of course, we know that that is not the agenda that Zelensky and his handlers are, are going after. And so, unfortunately, you know, uh, the media in the West is, is a completely different reality. It, it doesn't reflect, uh, the situation on the ground. And, um, you know, in, in these, in this particular instance, it seems that, of course, it's a tool, it's a, it's a political tool, right? That is designed to, uh, create consent and, uh, to mislead the the population and, and to sort of just, uh, make sure that they're still asleep and, and not really paying attention to what's really going on, while several European countries, for example, are already reintroducing or expanding conscription, and that should be a wakeup call, but, but it hasn't been. Um, German, German Chancellor, for example, uh, is now saying that he's going to do whatever it takes to make sure that Germany is war-ready by 2029. He even pledged to make the Bundeswehr, the German army, the strongest in Europe, which obviously brings back certain historic precedents, very tragic ones. And on top of that, as far as I know, German males aged 17 to 45 must now seek approval from the Bundeswehr for stays abroad that last longer than three months.
That is just a shocking, shocking change. And, and so is that fair to say that the era of Germany, um, cultivating a post-Cold War identity that is centered around peace, restraint, and economic power over, is that completely gone at this point in time?
Yes. Yes. I would just say yes. The, the, the, at least the, the idea, the ideal of the old Germany, which never, I mean, it never completely lived up to it, but it at least tried to, and in its speech acts and so on, it was, it was baked in to their understanding of themselves, that is gone. They don't even want that anymore. Uh, the, the word you used, "war-ready," it's even scarier in Germanish. It's, it's really, it, it reminds you of the speak of the 1920s and '30s of these right-wing Hitler. It just reminds you of Hitler. It does. It reminds you of the brown history of Germany. And, and it doesn't, it does so to me. It does so to other also the pacifists and, and the people who oppose this, but it doesn't to them anymore. These kind of words are now fine. Um, and that's these kind of, how the mainstreaming really worked also of then, um, transforming fear and genuine fear and, and hate against Russia into something, you know, um, militarily useful that you, that you now make it, it's possible again to, to speak in those terms. It wouldn't have been possible in the early 2000s, the late '90s, early 2000s. This wouldn't have been accepted. This kind of language would have been called out and said like, no, no, no, this reminds us of the of the worst moments of our history. We don't want that back. And that's gone. This can be used now because, you know what they did like psychologically, these people, and it's a very, very smart trick. They outsourced Hitler to Russia because Putin is now Hitler, right? So opposing, opposing Putin means, um, fighting against the second Hitler. Wonderful. And they did it again. They outsource the Nazis to Palestine. The Nazis is Hamas, right? So fighting Hamas and supporting Israel to fight Hamas means fighting against your own brown history. And that mental trick, we must not underestimate how powerful that is because it means you can now, you can now use that, that what a wonderful German professor in Macau, Mr. uh, um, Müller, Professor Müller, um, calls guilt pride. You know, the Germans are very, have a pride of of admitting that they were do, that that their country did something horrible, that the Nazis did something horrible, that their state did something horrible. And the, the Second World War is remembered in Germany as of course, a moment of great shame, of national shame. Um, especially of course, the Holocaust, which is a good thing. It's great that Germany remembers the Holocaust as something extremely bad. And there is a beautiful monument inside Berlin to reme, to remember the, uh, to commemorate, um, all of the victims of the, the Holocaust. Um, but it's by now so, it's so baked in that if you can then use this and project that on somebody else, then it becomes useful to to justify the your own remilitarization because you remilitarize not in order to be Hitler again, you do it to fight Hitler. And that's the lesson that the Germans took, and that a lot of Europe said, we have to take from, uh, from the Second World War, never again. But now the again is not, is doesn't mean Hitler, it means the other. It means the, the Hamas in Palestine. It means Russia. It means Putin in Russia. Uh, and there we go. I mean, history twisted and put on its head. But, um, it's, in my view, it's, it's, it's what's currently going on. And the, what you, uh, uh, cited about them is of course, should, should worry everybody, uh, that Germany is preparing to use its males. And, you know, the, also the, the audacity of these people to define the "we" and not just the "we" for us. I mean, not just the "we" for the Germans, but the "we" for the Ukrainians. Germany protects the Ukrainians. Who, who are the Ukrainians? Are you protecting the Ukrainians in the Donbas that have been shelled and bombed for ever since 2014, where, uh, where 14,000 people died even before 2022? Those Ukrainians? Are you protecting the three million Ukrainians who, when 2022 happened? Are you protecting the three million who actually fled to Russia? Can you please explain to me why three million people flee to the attacker? But no, no, I mean, that all of that is discarded immediately psychologically as pro-Putin propaganda. You're just not on our side. They, they cannot refute that. Hence, they just ignore it and call it, call it names. And they create the "we" of the Ukrainians. "We help the Ukrainians," right? The ones that have the same policy. And the Germans, of course. Yeah, we will protect the Ukrainians. By the way, round up these Ukrainians in Germany and send them back because they need to go and die at the front, right? They need to go and die there for, because we protect them. We're protecting them by sending them into the hail of bullets.
Of course, they don't see it like that, but they see what they're doing. And you and I, we go crazy over it because we're like, how can you be this inhumane? I mean, obviously, these young men and young women, as they are not like forcefully recruiting women yet, but young men obviously don't want to die. And you're just portraying them as being like, uh, selfish. What kind of, what kind of person are you? Um, warmongering, Hitlerite Merz, sitting there and telling young Ukrainian men who, who fled their country because they don't want to die, to send them back into their death, and then call that the defense of Ukraine or the, the standing up for the Ukrainians. No, this, the, if we explain this, you know, in 50 years from now, everybody's going to shake their heads and think, how, how was that possible? Um, but it happens every time again that these people empowered and tell you that they know what's best, and they know, um, what has to happen, and others have to go and die for them, and they would never do that if they didn't have to, but it's their duty. And in the end, they want to be, everybody wants to be Churchill, remembered as a great statesman who took the tough decisions at the right time, but had the boat sailing through the storm. Um, it's, it's absolute complete hubris, and they are also caught in that, unfortunately. And, um, even in Germany, a good part of people doesn't want to go along with it. The problem we have, it's a sociological problem, is that also in Ukraine, Mr. Zelensky got got elected in 2017 on 70% of people who opposed war with Russia. They said, we need a peace president. We need somebody who fixes that relationship. The problem is, 70% who want peace is not enough. 30% who want war suffices. Even just 20% suffices to push the others because, um, especially if those people have access to weapons and have access to to means and methods of agitation, and, and they do, um, and that's what's happening also in Europe at the moment. And good part, a large number of Europeans doesn't want the war, but if we have 15% die-hards, 20% die-hards who want the war, they will, they will do much, much more to get that, uh, than the 80% who, you know, just don't want it, but don't want it by, you know, sitting at home and drinking tea and so on. And then you have a few, a faction that actually goes out and, and, and does pro-peace demonstrations, but it's much easier to escalate than it is to resolve and de-escalate. So we have this structural imbalance, unfortunately. Um, and you, you see that right now, how several, how this idea that a war with Russia is inevitable, hence we need to prepare, is now already accepted and mainstreamed to a large degree in Europe and especially in Germany. Hey. Hey.