Transcription
In Colombia, President Gustavo Petro's discourse has begun to sound dangerously familiar. The same excuses, the same enemies, the same broken promises that years ago turned Venezuela into a laboratory of authoritarianism. Today, "Petrismo" repeats the "Chavismo" script with surgical precision, from the anti-imperialist narrative to the denial of the Venezuelan crisis. In this interview with Ronald Rodríguez, researcher and spokesperson for the Observatory of Venezuela at the Universidad del Rosario, we expose the Bolivarian mirage that today unites Caracas and Bogotá. Ronald, welcome to Venezuela in Depth. Thank you for the invitation, Génesis. Ronald, what is happening today, or how can the background of the relationship between Venezuela and Colombia be visualized? President Petro has an old relationship with "Chavismo." Let's remember that Chávez, on one of his first trips abroad when he was already in the dynamics of the 1998 presidential campaign, went precisely to Colombia. On that journey of almost two years that Chávez had to reach that 1998 campaign, one of the countries that received him was Colombia, and particularly a group in which President Gustavo, or today President Gustavo Petro, was part of, and there was a closeness. In fact, some Venezuelan colleagues who are historians speak of how the dynamics of the 1991 Constitution influenced the constitutional change to be one of the platforms, perhaps the most important, in "Chavismo's" political project in that election. Subsequently, we know that President Petro had a very fluid relationship during the first decade of this century and during the rise of "Chavismo," and in some episodes where President Petro had tensions with Venezuelan ambassadors in Colombia, those tensions were supposedly resolved by the great friendship and closeness that President Petro, well, then Congressman Petro, had with President Hugo Chávez. What is striking at this moment is that while within "Petrismo" there are different actors, starting with Gloria Flores, who are very close to "Chavismo," it is striking that "Chavismo" is beginning to adopt discourses, narratives, and symbols of "Petrismo." I am particularly referring to two that are in the article published in La Silla Vacía. One, the "war to the death" flag, and now, particularly the governor of Aragua, and now also Diosdado Cabello, which I am surprised he is already using. Before, he used it discreetly with the meeting with the governor of Aragua, he used it discreetly, but in the last military exercises they conduct, they now put it in the middle of their chest. The "war to the death" flag suggests that the Bolivarian Revolution has decided to accept or use the symbol that President Petro has positioned in Colombia, and it is a symbol that generates a great deal of conflict because it embodies a vision of politics as friend versus enemy, almost in the terms of Carl Schmitt, who was one of the great theorists of Nazism, where the enemy is seen as the other who must be destroyed, who must be annihilated. So, that discourse in Colombia has generated a lot of noise, but what is surprising is that in Venezuela, "Chavismo" now uses it when "Chavismo" has its own narrative, its own construction, even when they have tried to clean up and convert Bolívar's figure into a very particular reading. Including that flag clashes with the vision of Bolívar and the Bolivarian Revolution.
Visualizing and analyzing all this context, who is influencing whom? Venezuela influencing Colombia, or Colombia influencing Venezuela? Yes, in the last 6 months, particularly President Petro has begun to adopt more and more narratives from the Venezuelan regime. He already had them; he has had them from the beginning. The president claims that migration is reversing. That is not true. Since President Petro took office, more than a million citizens have left Venezuela within the framework of the complex humanitarian emergency that prevails in the sister country. That the crisis is a product of sanctions, when we know it is not a product of sanctions. Even we Colombians have it quite fresh because the first ones the regime blamed for the crisis were Colombians themselves, and they spoke of contraband and Colombian paramilitarism in Venezuelan territory, and that was the cause of the expulsion of Colombians from the border area, which gave rise to what we know as the entire phenomenon of human mobility originating from Venezuela in the last 10 years. So, President Petro has been acquiring, has been adding discourses and narratives from the Bolivarian Revolution. For example, in Colombia, unlike the rest of Latin America, the anti-American stance is not so strong. Colombia is a more conservative country and has maintained a very close, very strong relationship with the United States. And that anti-American discourse, which is very popular, for example, in Venezuela and the Southern Cone, is not so much so in the Colombian case. However, the president, given the situation he is in, is the first president, since Ernesto Samper, to be certified as a president whose visa to the United States has been canceled. He has adopted an anti-American discourse that, combined with the situation in Palestine and now with the situation of the United States' presence in the Caribbean, generates a dynamic, a narrative that undoubtedly resembles that of Hugo Chávez, and "Chavismo" itself compares it as such. In this relationship between Venezuela and Colombia, there is also something, or rather, between the government of Gustavo Petro and "Chavismo." There is something very particular, and that is that Diosdado Cabello, on several occasions, has attacked President Gustavo Petro. How do you interpret these differences that may exist between these two figures from the governments of Venezuela and Colombia? I believe that the president, President Petro, in the midst of his dynamics and narratives, does not understand the complexity of the Venezuelan case. And Diosdado Cabello is a figure who has not been very close to the Cubans and who distances himself from the instrumentalization that Gustavo Petro himself has made of the Bolivarian Revolution at different times. Let's remember that Diosdado Cabello, and it has become famous on social media, accused President Gustavo Petro of having sought resources in the 2018 campaign for the presidential election, an election he lost at that time, and Diosdado Cabello revealed that on his television program. Let's remember that in the Colombian case, this is serious because in the Colombian case, the use of external resources for presidential campaigns is not permitted under any circumstances. We know that "Chavismo" has done so in the past, that it had links in presidential campaigns in the region. Perhaps the most talked-about case is the Argentine one, but this is an accusation, and that's why I put it that way. Diosdado Cabello basically accused Gustavo Petro of going to seek resources, which, whether they were given or not, already implies a criminal dynamic. Diosdado Cabello, in fact, has been the only official from "Chavismo" to attack some people from the Bolivarian Revolution, pardon me, from the Colombian government. At one point, he attacked Chancellor Luis Gilberto Murillo; they had a spat at a certain point, and that distance, however, is beginning to be bridged. Something happened a couple of weeks ago, perhaps three, which is very striking, and that is that Vladimir Padrino, for the first time, recognized the presence of Colombian groups in Venezuelan territory, and that is an important change in discourse in 26 years of the Bolivarian Revolution. That is to say, while President Petro internationally defends Venezuela and the presence of the United States in the southern Caribbean, on the other hand, the regime complies with the president by recognizing for the first time in 26 years that there is a presence of the ELN in Venezuelan territory. That is to say, the discourses are beginning to align, and despite the differences, today Diosdado Cabello wears the "war to the death" flag on his uniform, so alignments that are worrying are beginning to occur. And I am not leaving out a particular issue, and that is that President Petro is currently insisting too much that Colombia buy Monómeros and that Colombia make Venezuela its gas supplier. These are two decisions that are not logically, let's say, if within state administration, they are not logical and beneficial for Colombia, but on the contrary, they could complicate the situation in Colombia. Monómeros is almost an empty shell. Sadly, the case of Monómeros has a lot of problems that are not only attributable to the Venezuelan regime but even to the opposition. But on the other hand, depending on Venezuelan gas, as we have seen in global geopolitics, Germany had a very bad time because it thought that interdependence would improve relations, and in the end, it turned into a weakness. Depending on Venezuelan gas and bringing gas to a situation where we are on the verge of rationing in Colombia, and the oil company is pressured to use Venezuelan gas and for Venezuela to be our supplier. We are talking about a business of hundreds of millions of dollars, and one says, well, there are many things at play here that are concerning regarding the relationship between Colombia and Venezuela, and particularly that alignment that the Colombian president has today with the Venezuelan president. It could also be that the Venezuelan president is gaining, pardon me, the Colombian president is seeking the golden autumn of Rafael Correa. And it must be said, the Venezuelan regime today finances the former Ecuadorian president; it has several contracts with them that give Rafael Correa the possibility of having a golden autumn. Perhaps President Petro aspires to similar treatment to that given to President Correa, and that once he leaves the presidency, the Bolivarian Revolution will become one of his most important sponsors. Ronald, two concerns. What happens then with Colombian justice and this accusation made by Diosdado Cabello against Gustavo Petro of possible illegal financing for his presidential campaigns? And second, you spoke about the case of Monómeros and mentioned that Monómeros is an empty shell. Do you consider that this company can become a focus of corruption between Colombia and Venezuela? Regarding the first question, indeed, that accusation made by Diosdado Cabello must be looked at carefully, because we are not talking about the election that led to the selection or election of the president, for the sake of redundancy, as head of state, but about the 2018 election. That drew attention at the time. I don't know if adequate investigations have been carried out by the Colombian state, but that is an issue that is there and is a cause for concern, especially given the closeness that different actors in the government have with the Bolivarian Revolution and the president's political faction. One of the questions that remains is, well, was there financing in 2018? And if there was financing in 2018, was there none in 2022, a campaign for which it is still not clear where many of the resources for that campaign came from, and will there be financing in the 2026 campaign? And on the other hand, regarding the second question, undoubtedly, the case of Monómeros is a case that must be approached with caution, with great care, because the Colombian state, in fact, when one looks at Colombia's exports to Venezuela, one of the things that has caught my attention is that it was supposed, in the words of the then ambassador, who is also one of the people behind this whole scheme, Armando Benedetti, that Colombia was going to import agricultural inputs from Venezuela. But when one looks at the imports, it is we who are exporting agricultural inputs to Venezuela. So one says, there is something here that is not very clear about what the real sources are. Monómeros is an important company for Colombian agriculture, but sadly in recent years it has been a victim of a series of dynamics where part of its suppliers was taken over by third companies, and part of its clients was taken over by third companies. That is why I speak of an empty shell, because Monómeros is no longer what it was, and the Colombian government seems to want to buy the fantasy of what Monómeros was, not the Monómeros that actually exists today. What have been the consequences for Colombia of Gustavo Petro's stance on the situation in Venezuela and his closeness to the Maduro regime? I think one of the most worrying is that if a right-wing or center-right government wins, it is very possible that relations with Venezuela will be broken. Moreover, some candidates have already expressed this. The more moderate ones speak of lowering the level of relations, that is, leaving relations to chargés d'affaires, and others, the more radical ones, speak of a total rupture and the need for the regime's departure. Even Vicky Dávila, and it must be said by name, has asked Donald Trump to intervene in Venezuela. I think that is negative in the context of bilateral relations. Colombia must be very careful because the situation in Venezuela is very unstable, and completely breaking relations with Venezuela leaves Colombian citizens who are there unprotected. And that is another point. More than 34 compatriots are detained in Venezuela, accused of terrorism, and the Colombian government speaks of separation of powers, of investigations. When we know that Venezuela is a dictatorial regime. Colombia must be very careful. I argue that Colombia should maintain relations because it is always better to be there than not to be there. But it must understand that Venezuela is not a democracy; it is a dictatorial regime, and we cannot act conventionally with a regime of these characteristics. Instead, we must prepare and have a diplomatic team that manages the relationship, understanding that it is in an authoritarian context, a violator of human rights, where it has the responsibility to protect Colombian citizens in Venezuelan territory and Venezuelans in Colombian territory, because it is also the responsibility of the state to protect citizens who have made our country their home, who are here due to the complex and prolonged humanitarian emergency, but also because they have fled a regime that has violated their human rights. In the same vein, how "Chavismo" and "Petrismo" have complemented each other or adopted behaviors from one another, and in the case of Colombians detained arbitrarily in Venezuela, do you consider that Gustavo Petro is in some way contributing to the repression experienced in Venezuela by "Chavismo"? I feel that the Colombian government has lacked the assertiveness to demand the release of our compatriots from Nicolás Maduro's regime. If the sympathy the president has for the Venezuelan president is to be of any use, it should be for that, for that sympathy to be put at the service of Colombians and not solely at the service of those "Chavistas" with whom the Colombian government has some sympathy, even if they have already lost it with the Venezuelan government. Ronald, that's all. Thank you very much for sharing these minutes with us and, of course, for your incisive analysis of the relationship that Gustavo Petro and Nicolás Maduro currently have. Indeed, Génesis, thank you for the invitation, and I believe it is a moment when we must raise our voices more about what is happening. And the last thing I want to say is a call for the persecution of Venezuelan leaders not to be normalized in Colombia. We, civil society, human rights organizations, but particularly academia, cannot accept violent actions against Venezuelan citizens who are fleeing the regime in Colombian territory.