Transcription
You have your perspective because here in Poland, here in Europe, due to the Ukrainian war, we are starting to talk that China will invade Taiwan, China will do a war, prepare and we will have another issue on the not only Hamas, not only Donbas, but also Taipei. We have new Chinese ambition, assertive China being it belt and road initiative, being at competition in space, being the Taiwan issue, uh being in a competition for semiconductors and so on and so forth. So when Xi Jinping came out with his idea of Chinese renaissance, chi, America wake up and we have a strategic competition. So I mean you know all these people who talk about why China is not listening to Deng Xiaoing, I can tell you one thing, Deng Xiaoing was one of the wisest, shudest men that China has ever produced. I guarantee you in 2024 Deng Xiaoing would say we are now an elephant. We are not a mouse. So we must therefore get ready for the new reality uh of this uh China. And at the end of the day, remember you and I can wish for a different world, but I can tell you that when you come from smaller countries, we cannot what we cannot live according to our wishes. We have to live according to the realities.
>> What you just heard was a clip from a confrontation between veteran Singaporean diplomat Kishor Mahubani and three Polish scholars recorded in February of 2024. In an increasingly multipolar world, how will the West come to understand a rising China that is fundamentally different from itself? And in the eyes of China's neighbors, what does the growth of its power truly signify? In the content that follows, you will hear a deep dialogue on these core questions. Faced with a series of sharp inquiries from the Eastern European academics, Mr. Mabubani from an Asian perspective provides a series of thought-provoking answers. He will explore the deep-seated reasons behind the shift in China's diplomatic posture from hiding its strength to striving for achievement. He will analyze the complex triangular relationship between China, Russia, and the West. And most importantly, on the Taiwan issue, he will offer a long-term prediction about its final outcome that is radically different from what is portrayed in the mainstream media. This is a dialogue filled with clashing perspectives aimed at helping us understand the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century. Let's continue.
>> We can say that one of China's biggest weaknesses is its cenocentricism uh its middle kingdom complex. And now when we look at Russia China relations, we can see that China was able to restrain itself. But when we look at Russ China's relations with others, it's not so. Um since professor Mubani is in Singapore um 24 years 14 years ago there was a famous quote by Yang Ju who said in Singapore no it was in Hanoi but it was a reply to Singaporean the foreign minister that uh China is a big country and Asan countries are small countries and this is a fact. So uh by this kind of actions uh this is this reveals cenocentricism and this is one of China's biggest uh weakness. um they so far they were able to manage that to handle that in relations with Russia but not necessar um and um and as for disruption as for Kristoff's question I believe that um the way Russia disrupts is in a way um uh it's in a way beneficial to China's interest long-term interest because Russia disrupts the western world it disrupts in Europe it tested the Europe It's sometimes the the outcomes are not necessarily the the one chi Beijing might wish to see but nevertheless um it chi Russia is challenging a common foe of of China and in this regard this disruptions are not necessarily that detrimental to to China's interests. So um so it in a way it pays for China to have this spoiler to have Russia as the spoiler because then Russia can do many things which China doesn't want to do or which is unwilling to do in public. So in this regard there is a sort of Anton between China and Russia and it's certainly not based on love but uh uh but but it's it's based on on uh on mutual understanding and very strategic object objectives objectives. So in this regard I believe that uh that um while these this disruptions are not that negative for for China.
If I can just address this question directly to um to professor Abubani because I think it's very interesting um because to be honest in the discourse in Poland and in the west um Iran and Russia are portrayed very frequently now as a kind of Chinese proxies. Are they are they Chinese? Well, I think China will be very happy if Russia and Iran were Chinese proxies, but I think the Chinese uh the ultimate you were talking of M Shimmer and geopolitical realism, the the ultimate realist uh of any country in the world are the Chinese. And by the way, this is an insight I got actually from Henry Kissinger. You know, I had two uh one-on-one conversations with him. Uh one in uh in October 2018 when I was writing my book uh on has China one. Then I saw him again and uh uh October 2022 about one year before he died and again he reiterated his views on China which you can get by the way his book which is called on China is wonderful. I would recommend every Polish citizen to read it because if they want to understand China, they should read Kissinger's book on China and he and you should understand that.
>> Yeah, you know, the Chinese always take the long view, you know, they're not interested what happens next month or next year. At the earliest, they're thinking what will the world be like 10 years from now or what will the world be like 100 years from now. And so you know that's why when lots of give you give you a contemporary example everyone says you know China has peaked the China growth story is over China is having lots of problems yes yes yes it's having lot of problems but I'll take a bet with any of you that 10 years from now China's economy will be much bigger it hasn't stopped growing right even though the Anglo-Saxon media thinks uh uh it has uh continued to grow so I can I can I can tell you that uh from the Chinese point of view, if you want to understand the Chinese mind, the most important thing to remember is that the Chinese mind is conditioned by 4,000 years of Chinese history. Now, in 4,000 years of Chinese history, what they what is genetically embedded in their civilization, uh, is the realization that Chinese people do best when there's law and order and stability. Chinese people suffer when there's chaos, what they call luan. And so, the Chinese Chinese hate chaos. So you know if if this is why at the conclusion of my book as China won if the United States can come with a with a sort of a a a geopolitical global framework that says hey okay let's agree on a common set of rules uh you can do well we can do well but let's agree on these rules and if you offer any package deal to the Chinese that that is that emphasizes stability predictability and order, they'll take it. They they they're not interested in having proxies like Russia or Iran or so on so forth. And it's important to remember that at the end of the day, the Chinese will work with everybody. And that's why, as you know, China engineered the deal within Saudi Arabia and Iran. I mean, if Iran is their proxy, why are they linking Iran with Saudi Arabia? No, no. What they want is calm stability because China is also as you know now the world's largest trading power and you know when when you when the Houthis close the you know the Red Sea channels who suffers Chinese suffer more exports going through the Red Sea channel than than United States does right so clearly the Chinese if you give them a package deal that emphas emphasizes predictability and stability, they will work with it. They will accept it. But you see the reason the reason why this is not possible yet, and this is why I say this very sadly, the United States is so focused on keeping China down that he doesn't focus on how to cooperate with China. And I think that that and by the way, I can tell you privately that Henry Kissinger agrees with me that what the United States needs is is a long-term comprehensive strategy on what you want to achieve with China. Because today what is unclear is that the United States is obviously taking all kinds of actions against China. Tariffs on Chinese trade, uh suspension of chip exports, suspension of chip technology. But what's your end goal? What do you want to achieve? Are you going to try and get the Chinese Communist Party to collapse like the Soviet Communist Party? Maybe it can be done, but it cannot be done. I can assure you it cannot be done. So in fact, paradoxically, the more the more pressure the United States puts on China and the Chinese Communist Party, the stronger China becomes. That's the paradox.
So before I give the um um voice to professor Galuk one clarification because I think it's crucial to understand Chinese politics. Um I me personally I cannot understand if Chinese is so um um focused on trade. Why they are so passive in the crisis in um um in the Middle East? Why they are not trying to um um make the trade road via Red Sea and Sue uh operational again?
>> Why there is a Chinese state in Diot? I I can tell you very simply, the Chinese are the ultimate geopolitical realists, which means they know what they can do and they know what they cannot do. And they know they cannot. They they understand the complexity of the Middle East very well. And so the best they can do, as you know, is to try and persuade the Houthies, don't shoot Chinese ships. And I think that that that they can accomplish. by trying to persuade the Houthis to stop shooting. They can't do it. And the Chinese, by the way, don't like to engage in military interventions. You know, as you know, the United States often believes that the best solution is to either impose sanctions or bomb a country. And the Chinese don't believe in that. and and the Chinese believe that you got to try and find a pragmatic solution uh for all the challenges uh that you have. So for example, as you know, China has a lot of challenges with Japan, huge challenges Japan, but at the end of the day, they always find ways and means of working with each other quietly bene behind the scenes something is worked out and they continue. So that that's what that's what China will try to do. And since, you know, since the Chinese government doesn't have to worry about elections, it doesn't have to worry about the headlines in the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal, it does what it thinks is the right thing for it over the long term and not worry about what the next headline will say.
>> Intervention.
>> Yes. Until now, we are in harmony time to arrange something of kind of disharmony between us to be more entertaining. Uh, Professor Mambulani uh please uh make a statement after my intervention what you think about what would be said. To my mind we observe right now three another major shifts on the global scale. One was already raised by Mir Lubina. It is concerning China Russian relations. I you usually describe this relation in one Chinese proverb and sentence. They are sleeping in one bed but have different dreams. So this is the explanation. No trust. However, there is a power shift there because until the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was Russia, later Soviet Union as a big brother to Shiao Juni to smaller brother in China. Now is vice versa for how long? This is a major geopolitical question. And I suppose after Ukrainian war after Mr. Putin it will be top political issue on the global scale and this is shift number one. Shift number two which complicates our debate and also has another dimension to towards the issue has China won is this geopolitical strategic change in American attitude towards China since Kissinger and Nixon opening for some five almost decades. We had the engagement. Instead of engagement, we have harsh uh not even but very harsh uh strategic competition and bipartisan in the US case. It was inaugurated during the Trump administration is continued during the Biden administration. Of course, we had San Francisco's summit ceasefire if I may so for American election but this is a structural clash uh to give it a strap if you wish. This is why uh situation and the image of China in the western world in the global uh to some extent also in the global scene has changed uh and it is proved in public opinion polls and pos this shift number three concerning China itself.
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I happened to be in China as the first Polish student out of two in the academic year 1979 1980 the first one after cultural revolution. So I do remember as you do from 1980 that everyone was bicycling. Not no one was even dreaming about the car and right now when I was in last November just few months ago completely different planet not different country. However in this different planet I would raise one issue which is teniaing heritage. Tensia in uh August 1980 had a public had a speech during the political bureau meeting which was crucial. He he was strongly attacking bureaucracy the party. He was he he was against one man rule. He was against engagement of the party into the production and markets forces and so on and so forth. Very very harsh words which were valid for 1980s. And secondly, and you mentioned that in your previous book uh when the Soviet Union collapsed, he used this constitution of 28 Chinese characters, b your b your time, conceal your capabilities and avoid the limelight. And it was a Chinese strategy for 20 years, but not anymore. What has changed during ten uh since tenia during the xiinping era new era they say first Americans Joe Biden says America is back in China party is back. This is point number one. Point number two, one man rule his back against the will of tenia. Point number three, it was seek truth from facts, pragmatism, realism as you say, uh ultimate sophisticated realists. But right now we have more and more ideology including Marxism and Marxism by definition is against market. So we have those issues on the top of the agenda. When you go right now to to the bookstore in Beijing or Shanghai, you will see more mouth than tensia. This is something which is troubling. And finally the most important thing instead of previous low profile we have new Chinese ambition assertive China being it belt and road initiative being at competition in space being the Taiwan issue being a competition for semiconductors and so on and so forth. So when Xi Jinping came out with his idea of Chinese renaissance, chi America wake up and we have a strategic competition. So this is something which is complicating this current situation surrounding China. Uh absolutely I agree however, with your statement that they are ultimate uh realists. Uh one important issue to be raised during our debate even during the cultural revolution red guards didn't go to atomic bomb thermonuclear or nukes which were exploded during the cultural revolution. So the interests of empire fundamental interests America says well let's make America again since through aping they will say let's make China big again and that's why we have a problem we have a headache because hegemonic power is clashing with the aspirant to be hegemonic power different way.
So, um, President Mahuban, if you can just respond, is this vision of make America great again and make China great again, um, that we've, um, negotiated?
Well, I can tell you that Bob Dan made lots of points other points and that on the first point um you know when you talk about Russia and China you know uh in your first point uh I think I want to go back to a point that Michelle made when he spoke about the yellow peril.
>> Yeah, you know, and and I hope that uh uh my Polish friends will pay attention to this phrase yellow pel because that's that's an emotional dimension uh in international affairs too. And and one of the things that's driving in some ways the United States uh geopolitical contest against China is the fear of the yellow peril which I document in my book. And also frankly in in I think in Russia there's an even greater fear of the yellow peril because Russians were actually invaded by the yellow peril. So
>> They have hidden it.
>> They have concealed it. They have concealed it because they have buried their their anxieties. That's quite important.
>> You're right. You're right. They've completely but it's real and I think it's important for us if you want to understand the complexity of our world today. We have to understand that there are deep wells of history in different parts of the world. We must understand the wells of history. If you want to understand what's happening today because whatever is happening today is not just because what you and I is saying today it's about what happened 100 years ago or 200 years ago. So for example in the case of China the century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949. None of us have mentioned it so far. That is the number one psychological driving force in Chinese minds. And you must understand the century of humiliation if you want to understand why China acts uh the way it does. and and why did Xiaoing have the 28 characters that Bogdan referred to you know uh take a low profile you know don't uh exhibit yourself and so on so forth because he wanted China to focus on growth and become strong and and and Bogdan asked the question why has China switched from you know taking a low profile and becoming more assertive well you know as I I want to give you one statistic In 1990, China's GMPP, and by the way, just for as an aside, let me mention the economist said in 1990, China's growth is over. 1990, the magazine at that time, China's GMP was $360 billion. China's growth economist said growth story is over. and Ding Xiaoing said take a low profile. Now last year China's G&P is now almost 18 trillion. It's gone up 50 times. Now it's easy for a mouse to take a low profile. The mouse can hide under the table and no people don't notice it. Now China's an elephant. Elephants cannot hide under the table. There's no table big enough to find a elephant. So to China obviously when it becomes 50 times bigger is not going to behave like a mouse. And by the way all the Asian neighbors of China understand that you know if you live with a mouse you behave in a certain way. If you live with an elephant you behave a different way. Because when the elephant is sleeping and it rolls over, it can kill you. So you have to deal differently and so it is unrealistic to expect that China will not become more assertive, will not throw its weight around as an elephant. But I want to emphasize that in in English there's a huge difference between two English words and actually I wrote a column in the Financial Times about this. One is assertive, the other is aggressive. China has become much more assertive. I completely agree. Bogdan, you're big. You know, you don't expect people don't treat you right. I can tell you by the way, honestly, it's a true simple story. When I was Singapore as a member of the UN Security Council, we went to visit 15 African countries in a chartered United Nations plane, right? And we arrived in the capitals. And of course we discovered as members of security council that the five permanent members were given special treatment. 10 elected members were not given special treatment. Five permanent members were always seated with the VIPs. The post government. One place we went to, I forget which country, African country, they made a mistake. They only put four uh at the head table, United States, Russia, UK, France and they put China at the side table. I tell you the Chinese ambassador went ballistic. What is this? I should be at that table. I'm China. I'm now number one. And of course, I mean, it's fair. He's no longer a mouse. Come on. So, I mean, you know, all these people who talk about why China is not listening to Deng Xiaoing, I can tell you one thing. Deng Xiaoping was one of the wisest shudest men that China has ever produced. I guarantee you in 2024 Deng Xiaoing would say we are now an elephant. We are not a mouse. So we must therefore get ready for the new reality uh of this uh China. And at the end of the day, remember you and I can wish for a different world. But I can tell you that when you come from smaller countries, we cannot what we cannot live according to our wishes. We have to live according to the realities and that's what we have to deal with.
Talking about the elephants because China is the elephant. I absolutely agree. However, if the elephant uh China has the Taiwan issue open when you are rising quite rightly so the 100 years of humiliation uh like it or not Taiwanese is part of it. It is in Chinese psyche. Uh even in elementary schools they are teached by one sentence. China is in part Taiwan is a part of China. Yes. So do you have your perspective because here in Poland, here in Europe due to the Ukrainian war, we are starting to talk that China will invade Taiwan, China will do a war prepare and we will have another issue on the not only Hamas, not only Donbas but also Taipei. This is the issue which is discussed here sharply and I would like to hear your perspective from Southeast Asia which is more sensitive closer and you observe it uh talking about the elephants we cannot escape the Taiwan issue definitely.
Yeah, I agree. I agree. In fact, as you know, Taiwan today is the last living symbol uh of the century of humiliation that China suffered from 1842 to 1949 because as you know, Taiwan was first separated from China when China lost the SinoJapanese war in 1895. So uh so for them the separation of Taiwan is a memory of the SinoJapanese war and which is why as you know at the end of World War II the allies I want to emphasize is the allies United States, Soviet Union, UK, France all agreed that Taiwan belonged to China in 1945. People forget this point of history and of course as as a result of the civil war Chanka went to Taiwan and so Taiwan was physically separated. Now clearly uh if I can assure you one thing if the Taiwanese government declares independence China will declare war. That's 100% certainty. But if the Taiwanese government is smart and doesn't declare independence, and I think they're not likely to declare independence, then China will not declare war. Because, you know, in the case of the Chinese, and this is where you have to go back to uh Kissinger's book on China, the Chinese are thinking long term. Where will I be 10 years, 20 years, 30 years from now? And where will Taiwan be 10 years, 20 years, 30 years from now? China's position in the world will keep going up and up and up. More and more countries around the world are going to trade with China and be dependent on China. Now all these countries you ask them you got to choose between China and Taiwan. They say of course I choose China. Why would I choose Taiwan? And so Taiwan will fall like a ripe fruit onto the lap of the Chinese in due course. But of course if there are if if you have very dangerous people and as you know one dangerous person is someone like the former uh secretary of state of United States Mike Pompeo gave a speech publicly. I'm not I'm not inventing this. He said he said United States should recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Now that's a declaration of war. So we need a lot of wisdom in this world to prevent wars. And you know I must give you all a very important statistic that the the amazing thing about East Asia and in fact South Asia too is that in our region there has been no major war in 44 years since the Sino Vietnamese war in 1979 right as you know but Europe has had the Balkans wars the Ukraine war and so on so forth. So I think it's time for Europeans to reflect why is it that there are no wars in East Asia but there's so many wars around Europe.
>> Yeah, I would just um just pose the question which is um is after Taiwan if the Chinese reunification would be full. I think the South um China Sea and um northern India um gives some different perspective on this because Taiwan is not the only part of the world with China's claim. But I would like to give the um uh the the floor to Miha who has his intervention.
Yes, I would like to first of all because since we are we should discuss about the book but um before I move back to the book I would like to focus on on professor Marupani words about no major wars in Southeast Asia which I generally agree but there is one exception uh and this is or Burma because there has been a civil war in Myanmar since the very beginning of this country and it's quite hidden from the from uh it's not that well known outside of the country. Now we know after 2021 because it intensified but uh but the war has never stopped. So there was there there has been a war continuing there and as you remember quite well um Burma used to be called the the Yugoslavia of Southeast Asia. So the comparison with Yugoslavia here is quite quite telling and we'll see whether we'll end up that way. But with that exception, I I agree with with the fact that Southeast Asia after the the aftermeric Americans quitted region in 1975, which you write in the book, uh that's that's a one of those selling points if in this book at least for Polish audience because this is counterintuitive that if America is no longer intervening in a region, then this region gets then this region prospers. So this is this is one of the biggest assets for for Polish readers that uh that this counterintuitive ideas would be would be there. However, I have one um question or or maybe hesitancy uh and it's about Taiwan because the question is on whose side on whose side time is there because on one hand like seeing from outside I couldn't agree more with the fact that China will be more important more influential and so on and so on. That's clear. But on the other hand, I have a feeling that China is losing the battle for the minds of of the Taiwanese that the Taiwanese are getting much more distance towards China. There is developing self identity. Some even say that a new nation is being born and and you know well the status quo for now is is beneficial for Taiwan because it exists. So the question is that it will be China who will have to change the status quo this way or another. So um so since their policy of bringing or uh or influencing Taiwan softly has failed to many extent because DPP has won third election in a row now uh in terms of presidential elections. So so how do you um professor how do you look at that with with this variable of Taiwan and Taiwanese identity Taiwanese people because this is in a way also a small nation.
Well I mean firstly on on Burma you're absolutely right. Uh there is a civil war going on in Burma. Uh but I was referring to what I call interstate wars rather than civil wars. uh because you know there are always uh civil disturbances civil in every country you know and they've been there and and that's that's a normal thing but ma there have been no interstate war within two major interstate wars since 1979 and that's that's quite remarkable in a region full of lots of divisions now on the question of who side time time is on now you're absolutely right the Taiwanese people do not want to become um uh part of uh China today. That's very very clear. You're absolutely right. But at the same time, don't forget that the if the Chinese were going to have a maximalist demand and say that Taiwan should incorporate itself and become completely like China and the ch Taiwanese people must change all their lifestyles and uh accept the Chinese Communist Party and so on. so forth. Then I think that's a problem. But the there have been lots of incredible number of signals from China that indicate that if Taiwan is prepared to indicate that it believes in one China, China is prepared to give the Taiwanese people all the autonomy they want to lead exactly the lifestyles that they have. travel around the world, choose their local government, do what they want to do, but say we are part of China. That's all. So all you need, frankly, what's amazing about the Taiwanese problem is that it is not difficult to solve. Not difficult to solve at all because the Chinese the Chinese government doesn't need to have Chinese troops in Taiwan, Chinese police in Taiwan doesn't need all that. He just wants to say okay you accept that you're part of China you can't join us now never mind but you say you're part of China and we will discuss when you can join we can wait 100 years so if that if that's the case then there can be a solution.
>> but there's a third partner we have not only two to tango Taipei and Beijing we have America United States and unsinkable aircraft carrier which is a description of Taiwan by the Americans. So it is a much more complicated issue.
>> Oh, I agree. But I want you to know that the most separatist leader of Taiwan was somebody called Chunui Bien. And you know in uh the year 2003, Chenu Bian wanted to organize a referendum of the Taiwanese people to ask them, hey, would you like to be independent or would you like to be part of China? So he wanted to prove that the Taiwanese people wanted to be independent. And you know who stopped the referendum?
>> It wasn't Beijing.
>> George W. Bush.
>> George W. Bush.
>> Of course. True. I want to tell you this. The Americans can be very pragmatic. In theory, the dem in theory, the Americans love democracy and they should have told Chuan, "We love you. Please let the people people let you please let the people of Taiwan choose democratically." And George W. Bush, I can tell you, put incredible amount of pressure on Chenri Bian. Incredible. Because at that time the United States needed China.
>> Exactly.
>> Very badly after the American invasion of Iraq. And this is what all great powers do. They never put their values first. They put their interests first. And so today it may be in the interest of United States to push for uh Taiwanese independence. I don't know. Let me to be fair Joe B. One reason why this year I can tell your audience that in the year 2024 relations between US and China be relatively speaking calm. Okay? Because at the last meeting between President Xi Chinping and Joe Biden in San Francisco, there was a very good meeting and I understand that President Joe Biden gave a very categorical uh assurance to Xiinping that he's that he supports a one China policy and as long as United States is supports a one China policy there'll be no war.
What we have just witnessed was a deep dialogue about China and its relationship with the world. In response to the sharp questions from the Polish scholars, Mr. Machbubani provided a calm Asian perspective with a greater sense of history. In this exchange, their viewpoints formed a stark contrast and compliment to each other. The Polish scholars focused more on the geopolitical challenges brought about by China's rise and the changes in its internal governance model while Mr. Makbubani placed these changes within a much grander historical framework for interpretation. In response to why China is no longer hiding its strength, Machbubani used the analogy of a mouse and an elephant to attribute it to the inevitable consequence of China's immense growth in national power. On the Taiwan issue, he stepped outside the short-term narrative of military conflict, judging from a centurylong historical dimension that as long as there is no extreme external intervention, the issue will eventually be resolved peacefully. This conversation is so brilliant because it clearly showcases two different perspectives for observing China. One is a western viewpoint based on current geopolitical anxieties and the other is an eastern viewpoint based on long-term history and civilizational evolution. It leaves us with several profound questions to reflect on. First, when a country's foreign policy shifts, should we interpret it as a sign of aggression or should we first seek to understand the objective reality of the changes in its national power? Second, to what extent does the Western world's deep-seated historical fear of the yellow peril affect its objective judgment of China today? And third, regarding the final outcome for Taiwan, do you believe it will be resolved peacefully over time as Mahubani predicts, or will it, as portrayed by Western media, inevitably lead to a military conflict? Please leave your thoughts in the comments below. We are eager to hear your thoughts in the comments below. If you found this episode valuable, please like, comment, share, and subscribe to our channel.