Transcription
I hope that you enjoyed the lunch and conversation. Now we are going to engage in the most intellectually stimulating part of the program.
Our featured speaker, Ambassador Mabubani, has dedicated over five decades of his life to public service, including Singapore's Ambassador to UN, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and President of the UN Security Council. He is the founding dean of The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. His 10th book, a memoir titled "Living the Asian Century," was published last year, and the Chinese translation has just been published. Congratulations, Kishore. [Applause].
One of the most important contributions of Kishore's academic and diplomatic career is his prediction and perception of a declining West, a rising East “東升西降”, which is the thesis of his presentation today. Kishore made this provocative assessment not a year ago, not a decade ago, but a quarter century ago. This earned him the reputation of being an undiplomatic diplomat. I should confess that Professor Daniel Bell and I largely share the same view as Kishore. This view was once very controversial and perhaps has remained so in some corners in the world, including within some circles in China. I can imagine our media friends--there's a couple of tables with media friends here--will have bylines tomorrow stating something like Kishore, Daniel and Cheng, a trio of a rising east. (東大三重奏，或者東大三劍客) I don't know which one's a better translation.
As a matter of fact, politicians in the United States, both Republicans and the Democrats, seem to have increasingly accepted such a notion. President Donald Trump's MAGA movement is founded on the premise that America is in decline and that it has lost its greatness. Similarly, in his speech at the US Naval Academy in May, Vice President JD Vance stated bluntly, "The era of uncontested US dominance is over." For Democrats, to describe the erosion of American soft power under President Donald Trump as a decline would be an understatement. Europe too, as Kishore will share with us, has been caught up in a horrible war and other unprecedented economic and social or societal challenges.
But the story of the 21st century is not a simple narrative of decline and rise. It is rather a complex rebalancing, as Kishore argues. We should be keenly aware of the following key clarification as we discuss "A Declining West, a Rising East." I just want to spend half a minute to list five or six points. Number one, this is not an ideological binary like what happened in the Cold War. Number two, there's a a correlation but not a causation between these two trends. A declining West could be the result of self harm, like how Trump has damaged Harvard University, among many other things. Number three, the East does not refer to China only. Kishore once used the term "CIA countries," namely China, India and ASEAN, to refer to the East. 30 years ago, the middle class in this region hardly existed, but now the middle class in CIA countries accounts for 40% of the global middle class. Number four, "decline" or "rise" are relative terms. The United States remains the most powerful country in military, technology, and also finance in the present day world, although all have relatively declined. And number five, while it is not easy to reverse the trends, the time frame for this rise and fall is unfixed.
Today's talk by Kishore and his fireside chat with wonderful my wonderful colleague Daniel Bell will take us on a journey through these geopolitical economic and cultural shifts. Daniel is a chair of political theory with the faculty of law at Hong Kong U, and the world's leading scholar on Confucianism and the Chinese meritocracy. He is also the only westerner to serve as a dean in public policy school back in China, at Shandong University. All three of us believe we must approach this moment in history with open minds, empathy, humility, humanity, and the willingness to search for a new balance. Today's event is on the record. Please prepare questions for our Q&A from the floor following the fireside chat. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Ambassador Kishore Mahbabuni, my favorite MA-“馬” to share with us his new insights amid today's rapid global transformation. Please, Kishore. [Applause]
You know the battery company "Eveready," you know you have seen this movie of this "Eveready" battery, the robot keeps moving on and on and on. Next time they want a new model, I say take Professor Cheng Li. He's got so much energy. I don't know where you get that energy from, Cheng. But it's amazing to watch you effortlessly cover such a large amount of ground with your remarks. So a round of applause for our wonderful host. [Applause].
I also want to join you Cheng in thanking Robert Ng and his family for their generous hospitality. We are in this wonderful environment. Thanks to Robert, so Jeanne and David, a round of applause for both of you and your family for your generous support. [Applause].
Now I must say, it's a great honour to be invited to follow two very distinguished predecessors, Ban Ki-moon and Jin Liqun, who spoke at the Fullerton lecture before me. I can assure you I know I'm not in the league of Ban Ki-moon or Jin Liqun. So whatever deficiencies I have in stature I hope to make up in terms of provocation. But I'm carrying out that provocation not for the sake of provoking you but because I do believe that we do, we actually live in an amazing time of amazing changes around the world, and as a result of that all of us I think have an obligation to try and keep up with what's happening and suggest how we adapt to it and that's the goal of my remarks today.
And the point that we have to acknowledge at the very beginning is that we are in 2025 celebrating the 80th anniversary since the end of World War II in 1945. And when future historians look at our time in the last 80 years, at the end of the day, you have to acknowledge that we have created overall a better world for humanity. A lot of us, and certainly we in East Asia, have prospered as a result of a world order that the West gifted to us in 1945. That world order has served us very well. But the reality is, that that world order is now under threat. And what I hope to do is to explain to you where the threat comes from and what we need to do about it. And I'll try to divide my remarks into three parts. In part one, I want to explain how the world has changed so dramatically. And this dramatic changes, these dramatic changes, of course mean that we have to change the world order. And then in part two, I'll explain where the resistance to this change is coming from. And then in part three, hopefully suggest why it would be wiser for those who are resisting this change to avoid doing so.
So let me begin with part one and to talk just to illustrate to you with a few statistics of how much the world has changed fundamentally, especially in terms of the shift of power as Cheng was saying in his remarks earlier, the shift of power from the West to the East. Now I give you three examples to illustrate how dramatic the shift of power has been. First I'll compare the European Union with China. In 1980, 45 years ago, the combined economy of the EU was 10 times larger than China. 10 times. Today, EU and China are about the same size. By 2050, EU will be half the size of China. I want to emphasize one point. This kind of massive structural shift in one human lifetime of 70 years, where the European Union goes from being 10 times larger to becoming half the size in 70 years, these kinds of structural shifts don't happen very often. And because they are happening now, the pressure for change becomes very real.
But let me give you two other examples. The second one, I'll compare the United Kingdom and India. And this is a good comparison to make. Just remember, a 100 years ago quite remarkably, 100 years ago, 100,000 Englishmen could effortlessly rule over 300 million Indians. I mean looking back now, it's quite stunning that that happened. I mean just imagine today the British prime minister sending 100,000 Englishmen to run India today. They'd be massacred, right? But that happened 100 years ago. I can tell you even as recently as 1990, 35 years ago, the British GDP was still four times larger than that of India. Right? But last year, India surpassed the British to have a larger economy. And by 2050, India will be four times the size of the British. Right? Look at that. In 1980, the British were four times bigger than India. By 2050, India will be four times bigger than the UK. A major fundamental shift.
And let me give you a third example because everyone knows the China story. Everyone knows the India story. I'm glad you mentioned ASEAN, Cheng, but ASEAN has also done remarkably well. As recently as 2000, Germany, which is the industrial power powerhouse of Europe, was three times bigger than ASEAN. And by last year or this year, Germany and ASEAN about the same size, and by 2050, Germany will be half the size of ASEAN. Again, in barely 50 years, Germany goes from being three times bigger to becoming half the size of ASEAN. So these you can see therefore there has been a massive shift of power in the world. So when such massive shifts of power happen, the logical thing to do, the rational thing to do, is to adapt our world order, adapt international organizations to deal with a different world. Unfortunately, that is not happening. So in part two of my remarks, I hope to speak about where the resistance is coming from--and it's a deep resistance.
Now I'm going to speak about the West broadly speaking, but you'll be surprised that I'm going to give a bit more emphasis on the European Union rather than the United States, because overall one of the remarkable things about the United States is that it has basically kept the size of its GNP in the world relatively constant. Which is, I must say, quite an amazing achievement by the United States. Around 2000 it was 25% of the world's GNP today is still around 25% of the world's GDP, so the United States has been changing, adapting, growing, in its own, as you know, unusual ways, and everyone thinks that when you talk about the world order you must talk about the threats by posed by President Donald Trump and his tariffs and so on so forth, and of course all those things are disrupting the world, but at the end of the day, it's the structural adjustments that have to be made, that are more important than the "temporary tariffs that you see" problem. You can get very distracted by the issue of Trump and tariffs but by so doing you're not paying attention to the deeper structural challenges that have to be dealt with. And here, in terms of structural changes, since power has shifted away from Europe very clearly, it's Europe's resistance to change in international organizations that has become, in some ways, the biggest problem in terms of adapting to a new world.
And just to give you, let me illustrate that point with two examples. The first is, of course, in theory the world's most powerful economic international economic organization, which is the IMF. And it's interesting that if you go to the IMF website, and my research assistants found this, and this is what the IMF website says. In the IMF's own fact sheet on how it makes decisions, it claims that "Voting power and decision making at the IMF reflect its member countries' relative economic position." Let me repeat that. This is what the IMF says. "Voting power and decision making at the IMF reflect its member countries' relative economic position." And then it goes on to say "The IMF works to ensure that its governance structure keeps pace with changes in the world economy, including the larger role that emerging market and developing countries now have." So it's very clear that the IMF honestly admits that voting structure must reflect the new economic balance of power in the world. Now I already told you that the EU and China share today of global GNP is about the same at 17%. And therefore, the IMF voting share of the EU should be 17%. And the IMF voting share of China should be 17%. Guess what the numbers are? the Europe share of IMF voting structure is 26% instead of 17% and China's share is 6% instead of 17%. So even though the IMF website says clearly, voting shares reflect a country's share of global economic power, that's not shown, and the reason why the change doesn't happen is because the European countries have done a brilliant job of fighting this, incredible resistance, creating this incredible resistance to change in very artful little ways of ensuring that the voting shares don't keep up with the new order. And so that's one example of resistance to change.
Now if the IMF is the... incidentally, I'm not the only person who says this. I came across a quote recently by a Brazilian economist Paulo Batista Jr. who's by the way a former executive director at the IMF. In a recent report, he said, "European resistance to reform is a longstanding intractable problem at the root of a large part of the IMF's increasing legitimacy problems. Europe makes at most partial or even only verbal concessions on these matters." So this European resistance to change has been noted and documented by lots of other people too.
Now the second example I was going to give, if I was going to say, if the IMF is the most powerful international economic organization, the most powerful international political organization by far is the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council is the only international body has the power to make decisions that are binding and mandatory on all member states of the UN. So in a sense that's where the real power is and for those of you who have been familiar with my writings on the UN, you know that I've also discussed the UN Security Council at great length. And in theory the UN Security Council has got 15 members: the five permanent member states (P5) of US, Russia, China, UK, France, and the 10 other elected members, but I can tell you that after Singapore spent two years in the UN Security Council, and I was a Singapore ambassador to the UN, when I left the UN Security Council I came to the conclusion that the UN Security Council has got five members and 10 observers. And the 10 observers were treated, and by the way the one of the French ambassadors was very honest about it, when Singapore tried to propose some changes in the working methods of the UN Security Council to try and improve the Security Council, the French ambassador said, "Why are these tourists trying to change the the furniture in our living room?" Which is very honest, I must say, but that reality is that it is the five permanent members who run the UN Security Council.
Now what's interesting about this composition of this five permanent members is that in theory, the five permanent members are supposed to represent the great powers of the day. And there's no doubt in 1945, the five great powers of the day were United States, the Soviet Union, China, UK, and France. But this is 2025, and you've already seen how the British economy has shrunk and how the French economy has also shrunk relative to the rest of the world, but they still remain permanent members of the UN Security Council, resisting change. And this is a story I got to know very well because the UN actually set up something called the "Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform" in 1993 I think, and we are now in 2025. 32 years have gone by, nothing has changed. So someone said, let's change the name of the working group from "Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform" to "Never-Ending UN Security Council Group for Reform." (This is a serious suggestion). But I can tell you incidentally unless you've been in the trenches and I have been actually in the trenches, fighting these issues of trying to reform international organizations. You have no idea how brilliant the Europeans are at fighting change. Brilliant. Because what they will say up front is that, "Of course we are for change. Yes, we are for change," but behind the scenes they know exactly what levers to pull, what to do to ensure that change doesn't happen. And so you have this rather crazy situation whereby you know like, UK, Europe for example, as I mentioned earlier now has 17% of the global GNP but in terms of permanent membership seats they have 40% because the UK and France make up two fifths of the five permanent members. And that's why I wrote an article in the Financial Times last year, and I'm actually genuinely surprised that the Financial Times published it. It shows you how open-minded the Financial Times is. I said that, you know, clearly I gave you the data already, how India's economy is now larger than the British. By 2050 it'll be four times bigger than the British. So the British perhaps as a nice act of atonement for the colonization of India should voluntarily give up their permanent membership seat to India. And that's actually, I'm glad you laugh, because it sounds funny, but it is actually a serious suggestion, because Britain today represents a country of the past. India represents a country of the future, and the past must give way to the future. And you know some of you must have noticed, in a recent column by Martin Wolf on the state of his own country (the UK), I'll never forget the first line of his column; The first line of his column said: "The UK has failing politics, a failed state, and a failing economy." Failing politics, a failed state, and a failing economy. So why are you clinging onto the permanent membership? Why not give way? Right? That's the rational, logical thing to do. But sadly, it is not happening.
So in the five minutes that I have left, I want to try and explain why we should work to persuade the Europeans that it's actually in Europe's interests to make way for other powers in many of these key international organizations. Because at the end of the day, the most important fact that the West should realize is that if you look at the world's population, there's 8 billion people in the world, only 12% live in the West, 88% live in the rest. And we are now, as everyone understands, we live in a small, interdependent, shrinking world, right? In fact, Kofi Annan very aptly compared it to a global village. If you are living in a small, densely interconnected global village, and you're 12% of the population, it's in your interest as a minority to ensure that the village is well run, is stable, and not chaotic. Right? So you want to have a village council that is functioning well. And what's interesting is that it is at the end of the day it is the West, and certainly Europe, that taught the world that when you want to have village councils, the best village councils are the democratic village councils, where people vote and so the village council must represent the village as a whole and not represent a minority. And this is at the end of the day the biggest paradox about our time, because domestically the Western countries preach the virtues of democracy. You know, stunningly, democracy is the best way of running a society. But when it comes to the global village, please don't speak about democracy. Don't ask for any allocation of power on the basis of our share of global population. We want to keep our privileged seats. And that's, you can see that contradiction there very clearly. And that contradiction also means that they're laying the seeds for trouble that is coming. Because if the global village council at the end of the day doesn't represent the of the majority of the population of the world, they can become irrelevant. And so I've always said, having served on the UN Security Council, that the UN Security Council is going to face a major dilemma. And the dilemma is quite simple. You can keep your composition, with the British and French as permanent members, and you lose your credibility. But if you want to keep your credibility, then you got to change your composition. That's the dilemma. And the obvious solution, is the credibility of the UN Security Council is much more important than its composition. So bring in the new powers, and certainly bring in the powers that are rising. So I hope that as a result of our discussion today we can work together and try to persuade the West that the world has changed. Let us all adapt to this change. Thank you very much.
So, thank you, Kishore, for the wonderful talk. Normally, as a commentator, I'm supposed to disagree, but frankly I don't disagree with anything you say. So let me push it in a few directions. First of all, here in Hong Kong, we strongly value the freedom of speech, but I'm going to ask for one tiny little constraint because, as you know, my home country is Canada, and we've been subject to unprovoked bullying by a large neighbor to the south. So, please don't mention the name of that political leader, otherwise I might have a panic attack. [Audience Laughter]. So, that's the one constraint, and I'm glad you didn't mention it just now. So, other than that, feel free to say anything. [Audience Laughter].
The first, I mean, if the Security Council is so difficult to reform, I mean, what about alternative international organizations? I mean, maybe that's where there's more promise. Could you, do you have any ideas about that? Is it BRICS, or which would it be? I mean, it sounds like the Security Council really is almost impossible to reform. I mean, even today, frankly, like there's nobody, no political representatives from Europe, you know, or from North America. So I mean, they're not really open to this sort of suggestion, it seems to me. So maybe we need to look outside that and think of alternative organizations. Could you give us any ideas about that?
Well, you're you're absolutely right. By the way, I'm glad you um mentioned you're from Canada. I should add I'm an honorary Canadian since I got my master's degree from Dalhousie, and I also spent 10 years serving as a non-resident high commissioner of Singapore to Canada. So I've discovered, by the way, that, I'm sure you many of you know, that Canada is one of the nicest countries in the world, and suddenly Canada discovers that being nice to your neighbor for 50, 60 years means nothing. And in some ways, I'm glad you raised that issue, because there's one point I didn't emphasize at the beginning of my remarks, which is that geopolitics is the most cruel game in the world. And we are today, in terms of geopolitical shifts of power, experiencing far more geopolitical shifts of power, and I want to give you some examples, than any other time. And it's very important, therefore, for countries--even nice countries like Canada--have got to understand being that being nice is not enough. That you got to learn to be very geopolitically shrewd and cunning and Machiavellian, if you're going to survive in this world.
And I would say, in terms of our world order, you're absolutely right. It is very difficult to adapt the established top level institutions: UN, IMF, and so on and so forth. There are other institutions that are rising in an ad hoc fashion and clearly among these organizations, some are sunrise and some are sunset. So I give you the obvious example. Until recently one of the most powerful organizations was the G7 countries, right? Was the United States and six other European members, plus the European Union. And at one time when the leaders met, all the G7 leaders look equally strong. Today when you watch meetings of G7 leaders, it's like Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. [Audience Laughter]. And you know, I'm not even exaggerating. And I mean, one of the photographs that will go down as one of the defining moments of the 21st century is the photograph you saw recently of President Donald Trump in his White House sitting at the desk and all the European leaders were sitting in the sofa like children in front of their school teacher. I mean, that photograph was so damning. And this is the same Europe that says, "We will not give up our seats. We are very powerful." They behave like school children. But that's an illustration of how power shifts have happened.
By contrast, if you look at BRICS, right? BRICS is Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. That's clearly a sunrise organization because a lot of countries are planning to join, right? It's interesting, one, no one is applying to join the G7, but in BRICS, everyone is writing. That's an example of how power is also shifting. But there are also another important organization which I think right now is having a rough time which is the G20. The G20 at the end of the day will become more significant in the decades to come, and the G20, as you know was formed as a result of a global financial crisis, and initially only the finance ministers used to meet, but after the 2008/2009 financial crisis, even George W. Bush convened a meeting of the G20 leaders to try and deal with the global financial crisis. So that's an example of how there are various forms of adaptation taking place. But these forms of adaptation are not enough. So it's important, therefore, for especially the Asian countries to work harder to say that their voice must be represented much more strongly.
Okay. Great question. Um, one question. The two huge powers that could pose an alternative to a kind of West-centric order obviously are China and India. And you know both countries very well, and you're sympathetic to both, which is kind of rare, and so, and these ties seem to be improving now. What can they do further to improve ties to form some sort of G2 again? What, any suggestions along those lines?
Well, I mean the the China-India relationship, I think you should all know, is very complicated. And right now, well actually, until about 3 or 4 months ago, relations between China and India, they were not bad--they were very bad. I mean, they were not talking to each other, right? I mean, I'm sure you all aware that after the clash that took place in Galwan in June 2020 China and India ties went in the nose dive. Fortunately, in the last few months, step by step, their ties have been improving, and I think it's likely that Prime Minister Modi is going to go to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting, I think, at the end of this month. And that's a big deal. It's a really big deal that the prime minister of India is going back to China. But I think for the China-India relationship to improve, a lot more work needs to be done by both sides. And here I must say that if I had been giving this talk here even four months ago I would have been very pessimistic about China-India relations. But we must thank one gentleman for significantly improving China India relations, and this is the gentleman he said whose name I should not mention, but I have to give credit where it's due, and President Donald Trump's decision to impose a 50% tariff on India is one of the biggest shocks that India has ever got in recent times. But more than that, you know, as you all are aware, India and Pakistan also had a military clash a month or two ago, and after the military clash President Donald Trump invited the chief of army of Pakistan for a special White House lunch, and the Indians saw this as a slap in the face for them. And so there is now even as we are speaking a tremendous amount of reevaluation going on in Delhi about where India's place in the world is, and yeah, we're now in the midst, so you're going to watch a kind of a transition that is happening. So on the China-India front hopefully things will be much better by the end of this year.
So a few more minutes left and then we open it to Q&A. One little question about Hong Kong since we have many people here from Hong Kong. I mean, as you know, the "One Country, Two Systems," pulls in opposite directions, or at least seemingly opposite directions. So my first question is, how can Hong Kong strengthen its commitment, its national identity, its commitment to China as a political identity, without weakening the two systems? Any suggestions along those lines?
Well, I think the one country, two system is actually a brilliant solution to the the question of how you integrate Hong Kong into China. And I think that the important thing is that I believe China realizes that Hong Kong is a better asset to China if it actually keeps its differences rather than dissolving the differences and becoming just like any other Chinese town or city. And in fact, the differentiation therefore becomes an asset to China. So if you can keep up your British, what they call "common law" traditions, which is what we have in Singapore also, and you keep that going and you keep up your modern business practices and everything you are, Hong Kong is therefore a bigger asset to China but it's important therefore that the leaders of Hong Kong communicate that much more strongly. Both domestically and internationally. Because I think that frankly, and my sense is, that at the end of the day, Beijing wants Hong Kong to succeed, and part of the reason why Beijing wants Hong Kong to succeed is because the United States doesn't want Hong Kong to succeed. I mean, it's a fact. I mean, it is. I told you earlier on that geopolitics is a cruel business, right? In some ways, paradoxically, incidentally because President Trump is the one of the least ideological presidents of recent times, as you know he doesn't pay much attention to issues like Hong Kong and Taiwan, but his predecessor did and so for that reason if China sees that Hong Kong is under threat, it's in China's interest to see the success of Hong Kong. One last point about people, and I used this analogy before. In the US-China contest, Hong Kong is going to become a political football, and if you are going to be caught in a geopolitical game, the Hong Kong establishment must develop geopolitical instincts and understand the game that is being played, and then understand sometimes when to dodge, you know, when the arrows are coming.
We're rapidly running out of time, so let me ask a few quick more personal questions and also with quick answers if you don't mind. I loved your memoirs, as you know. There's a few things about it that I want to ask a little bit. First of all, you mentioned that you're kind of fond of Karl Marx and also in your interview with Brian, you also mentioned that. So can you go a little bit more in detail? Which part of Marx do you like? Is it theory of alienation, of exploitation? Is it communism as a higher ideal? What part of Marx do you like?
Have you got three hours? [Audience Laughter]. Just one minute please. Well, as you know, I basically wrote my master's thesis comparing the concepts of freedom and equality in the writings of Karl Marx and John Rawls. John Rawls, by the way, is the greatest American philosopher of the 20th century. Brilliant guy. And I when I started my research, I thought my sympathies would be more with John Rawls than with Karl Marx. I ended up actually sympathizing with Karl Marx more, because Karl Marx will go down in history as probably the most brilliant thinker on social and political issues. So his whole concept of substructure and superstructure. So we all think that the way we think about our society is a result of our imagination, rationality and all that. He said, "No." What emerges in your society is a consequence of the economic distribution of power. And where that economic power is distributed then decides what kind of society you will have. And that was one of the most brilliant insights and no one else before Karl Marx came out with that. And so, and don't read, Das Kapital, but if you can read the earlier essays of Karl Marx they are absolutely brilliant, and I think even Rawles would acknowledge that about Karl Marx. We should teach Marx in Hong Kong schools. [Audience Laughter].
Maybe just one last question since we're running out of time. Who is your favorite political leader? First among the dead and second among the living.
Well, among among the dead is easier for me. It's, uh, certainly Lee Kuan Yu. And see, because I had an opportunity, one of the greatest privileges of my life is that I've shaken hands with world leaders, you know, dozens of them. And none of the ones I met actually were as politically shrewd, frankly, as politically cunning as Lee Kuan Yu was. And I tell you I was in 1999, I was in a room like this, small room, but all CEOs and and people like George H.W. Bush was there, Henry Kissinger was there, Zbigniew Brzezinski was there, Sam Huntington was there. You know, a really formidable meeting. And at that meeting there was David Frost interviewing George H.W. Bush. And David Frost asked George HW.. Bush, "You met so many world leaders, who's the one world leader who impressed you the most?" Within a split second, George HW Bush said, "Lee Kuan Yu." So you know, that shows you that, among the, he was an amazing figure, for a leader of a very small country his influence was outsized. Okay. Now, among the living, very difficult question. [Applause and Laughter].
Any questions or comments? Can you, do you mind introducing yourself briefly as well? Hi, my name is Eddie Tam. Thank you very much. Brilliant presentation. I'm very happy also that India and China's relationship seems to be improving in the recent months. And you mentioned several times about the restructuring of the Security Council. But I think, on record, if I'm not mistaken, actually, the US, Russia, UK, and France are in support of India's rise to be accepted into the Security Council as permanent member. But I think, on the record, actually China is the only one which stands in the way. Am I correct? I've just checked that there could be hints of China dropping their opposition. I hope that happens. But so, that doesn't seem to drive with your explanation that it's the UK which stands in the way and they don't want to give up the seat. Yeah, maybe they don't want to give up the seat, but they they seem to support the inclusion of India, but whereas China for now I think does not.
Well, my first response to you is whenever countries say in public that they support India, be careful, because it's often the countries that are supporting you that are the ones that are best at undermining you. And I'm, by the way, I've seen with my own eyes, okay? Countries that in public would say of course we support India's inclusion but then what you do, the way you prevent reform, is that you introduce what I call "poison pill amendments." And when you put in a poison pill amendment, you ensure that nobody can accept it, and therefore there can be no reform, and therefore India cannot get in. You know there are ways and means of your real position is not what your public position is. And so you--I'm not sure for the record exactly what China's position is. I don't think China has opposed India's admission but I don't know whether or not China has publicly supported also any countries. But I do believe that it is in China's national interests to see a different UN Security Council. And I would say, don't listen to what countries say, observe what is their national interest, and that will tell you what their real position will be. Incidentally, in my book, "The Great Convergence," you'll find that I have proposed a 7-7-7 formula: seven permanent members, seven semi-permanent members, and seven elected members. And the reason why I propose seven semi-permanent members is because for every country that wants to get in, there's a neighbor that says "Why not me?" So India wants to get in, Pakistan says "Why not me?" Japan wants to get in, South Korea says "Why not me?" Brazil wants to get in, Argentina says "Why not me?" But the most brilliant ambassador to the UN I remember was the Italian ambassador. Because in the 1990s when everybody was pushing for Japan and Germany to become permanent members, the Italian ambassador got very upset. He says, "Why are you pushing only for Japan and Germany, we, Italy, we lost World War II also." [Audience Laughter]. That's a true story. Amazing. But I tell that story to tell you that the opposition to reform is very deep, very subterranean, very cunning. So don't pay attention to public statements. Watch what's going on underground.
We had a question from Professor Brian Wong. Thank you. [Inaudible] It's an honor to see you here in Hong Kong again. I get a lot of questions from young secondary school students and university students in Hong Kong who are bright, ambitious and want to contribute towards foreign policy and want to pursue a career in foreign policy. But as it stands, I think Hong Kong youth often struggle with entering into the mainland foreign ministry system and also making a difference for their own country, which is China. What advice would you give to Hong Kong youth if they want to pursue a career oriented around international affairs? And what advice would you give to the government, in relation to cultivating future diplomats on behalf of China? Thank you.
Well, I think one lesson I learned now, I mean, since I was a career diplomat for 33 years and I've stepped down clearly. I've now been independent for 21 years and you can make a difference on the global scene by serving as a diplomat. And I enjoyed my 33 years as a diplomat. I mean that. I learned more from my two years as being ambassador on the UN Security Council than I learned the previous 30 years, because I learned how naked power is. Geo--when I tell you that geopolitics is a cruel game. I can say that with great conviction because I saw with my own eyes how cruel it is. I've seen it, and, but at the same time you can also make a difference internationally and globally through various public fora, and speaking out and so on, so forth. So there are lots of opportunities in terms of speaking out internationally. I know that you have done it, Brian. Daniel has done it, Cheng Li has done it. And I would say there are many opportunities to make a difference because at the end of the day, if you are able, and I have discovered that if you want to change anything internationally, don't appeal to ideals, don't appeal to principles, appeal to the national interests of the countries. And so, when, if you want to try and change the China-India relationship, I try to explain to my Chinese friends and to my Indian friends why it is in their respective national interests to make the changes. Not out of high principles or ideals, because at the end of the day, the real interests matter much more than all these ideals do.
If I might switch gear a little bit, just ask a question about global finance. So, you talked about the structural change that we've seen, but the global financial structure, infrastructure, is very much still denominated and anchored in the US dollar. So global trade, access to finance, very much depend on access to dollar, including in places like Hong Kong. So how do you see this dollar dominance and global financial infrastructure that's still very much anchored in a, say, US-centric system, affect the path of globalization or structural change going forward? How does that affect dependence on dollar, if I might just ask?
Well, you're absolutely right. The dollar is completely indispensable to the global financial system. The dollar will remain the global reserve currency for decades to come. And even if the Chinese economy becomes bigger than the US economy, and I think it could happen in let's say 10 to 15 years from now, the US dollar will still remain as the global reserve currency. That's a fact. But at the same time, some of the recent actions that have been taken by the US, by the West, have led to countries questioning their reliance on the US dollar. So for example, the seizure of the Russian assets of $300 billion is clearly illegal under international law. You can't do it unless the UN Security Council mandates it. Right? But that gesture has led to many countries saying, "Now we got to hedge our bets. We cannot put all our reserves in US dollars." So there's a progressive, very slow process, of moving away from the US dollar in many years. And the other danger that the US dollar faces is that, right now for example when China exports cars to Argentina, it gets paid with dollars; Argentina exports beef to China, it gets paid with US dollars. Surely you can create a new mechanism using blockchain technology and all that to bypass the US dollar. That hasn't happened yet. But the pressure to look for alternatives has grown significantly. So I mean, I don't see any substitute for the US dollar in the near future. But the reliance on the US dollar will slowly drift down.
Hi, my name's Alvina. Historically you'd see that a nation's naval power is extremely important to its country's power position in the world. So in this current shift, in the structural shift of power, how important is a nation's naval capabilities and its naval bases, and how does it play a role in terms of geopolitics? And would this actually play into US interests because its global naval power, in terms of resisting change that you've mentioned. Thank you.
Well I must say, that's a very profound question on the role of navies, right? You know I'm not a military expert, but I have, in my book, "Has China Won?", actually did say that it is now pointless for United States to send aircraft carriers close to China. Right? Remember that in Bill Clinton's time, in 1996, when there was a crisis between China and Taiwan, Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers. He didn't actually send them through Taiwan Straits, but he sent them close enough to say, I can control the Taiwan Straits with two aircraft carriers. 1996, right? 29 years have passed. Tomorrow, if there's a crisis within China and Taiwan, US cannot send two aircraft carriers. Because nowadays, with, you know, hypersonic missile technology, aircraft carriers have become sitting ducks. In fact, it doesn't make sense to build aircraft carriers. Because, you know, they were supposed to be invincible, now they're not invincible anymore. And so, and you can see therefore, actually, again, I'm not a military expert, but what's been the most effective in most of the recent battles? Drones. Small little drones. And they're amazing that the amount of damage that can be done by little. So, the nature of warfare is changing. But at the same time I also want to emphasize that even though there are wars in Ukraine, there are wars in Gaza, most countries in the world are coming to accept that wars are stupid. You know? And the good news for the world is that wars in general are sunset industry. There are some places where they break out, and I run something called the "Asian Peace Programme," by the way, at the National University of Singapore. You can Google and look at it at our website. And I assert that wars are a result of geopolitical incompetence. The Ukraine war could have been avoided if the Europeans had shown some sensitivity of what are Russia's core national interests. It doesn't mean that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is justified. But you could have prevented it by acknowledging that Russia has got legitimate security interests. And in the same way, the Gaza war could have been avoided if the West had tried harder, pushed harder for two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. And I, and I say this publicly to my Israeli friends, if I as a friend see you walking towards a cliff, do I say "Stop," or do I say "Keep walking"? I see Israel walking towards a cliff because Israel has alienated global public opinion. Very unwise, right? So, but in the end of the day, if you want to prevent wars, to go back to my earlier point, you got to be very cunning in geopolitics. Understand countries' core interests and work around them.
We had two questions very quick. Each of you speak on that table very quickly please. Thank you. Thank you Professor Mabubani. A journalist from the South Nanfang (南方) Media Group. I want to ask a question goes to the, well you are hailed as a muse of the Asian century. So how should China, India, ASEAN, and other Asian countries can coordinate to join to shape a more inclusive and sustainable Asian century, well based on especially in global governance, climate response and maybe multilateralism? Thank you. We'll take the other question as well. Yeah, thank you Ambassador Mahbubani. So my name is Li Chen from Chinese University of Hong Kong. So my question is about the idea of multipolar world. The idea of multipolar global order. So on the one hand it could be more inclusive, more diversified and more plural. But on the other hand it could be more fragmented, right, more unstable. So I would like to seek your view about this multipolar global order, how it's going to look like in the coming decades. Thank you.
Two small questions with short answers. And Mallie says I have two minutes. By the way, I should emphasize at the outset and since you very kindly called me "Ambassador" up there, I'm no longer an ambassador. I don't speak for anybody. I speak only for myself. And Singapore doesn't have the American tradition of keeping your title as "Ambassador."
First question on the Asian century. As you know, I did publish a book called "The Asian 21st Century." And the good news about the book was that the publisher's target was 20,000 downloads. Instead, there have been over 4.1 million downloads of the book in 160 countries. The reason I mention that is that that's an indicator that the world is psychologically preparing for an Asian century. And, but for that to happen, it's very important that Asia remains at peace. And it's actually quite amazing that we in Asia haven't had a major war. We've had skirmishes, but no major war, probably since 1979. It's quite amazing. And this is a stunning feature of Asia that no one has acknowledged. But it's for us, for the Asian century to happen, our priority number one is make sure there's no major war. And even though there'll be competition, there'll be rivalry, there'll be tensions, okay, we can manage that, but you got to avoid a major war. That's condition number one to ensure that the Asian century happens, because I think the economic development momentum is real and will continue.
Now on the multipolar world, I think the multipolar world is already here. It has arrived. But of course it's fluid because some of the powers are going up, some of the powers are going down. But this multipolar world, I think Cheng Li you quoted JD Vance saying about how the multipolar world has come, and it is actually good for the world that we are having a multipolar world instead of unipolar or bipolar. Because in a multipolar world there are more actors, and so there are more balancing forces at play in conflicts and rivalries. And it creates, a multipolar world creates more opportunities. So for example, the third independent pole that's going to emerge now clearly is India. Because there was a time when it thought that India might be moving closer to the US, thanks to President Donald Trump that's not going to happen. And so India is going to move back towards playing a more independent pole and that creates options for countries. And so therefore it's a very fluid dynamic changing world, but the result will be a multipolar world.
Great. One very quick 30 seconds. What is your next project?
Well, I think my next project is quite simply to continue what I said in my remarks today to try and persuade the West that it is wiser for them to create room for other new powers to emerge because that will create a better world for the West. Okay. Thank you. [Applause]