Transcription
Welcome back. Today we are joined by Sid Muhammad Marandi, a professor at Thran University and a former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, to discuss what, uh, yeah, could be a pending war. So, thank you for coming back on the program.
>> Thank you very much for inviting me, Glenn. It's always an honor being on this show.
>> Well, thank you. And, uh, well, we see that the United States keeps, uh, building up more and more military capabilities and at the same time engaging in these talks with Iran. So, you know, one can only reach two possible conclusions. That is, one, either the US is building up military power to put pressure on Iran to accept a deal favorable to the United States. Uh, alternatively, the US is preparing to attack Iran and merely using the talks as a cover. I guess all of it kind of depends on how probable there is that there is an interest in in any talk. Uh, but how are you assessing this increasingly tense situation?
The Iranians are preparing for war. There is no doubt about that. And the armed forces are, uh, preparing. Uh, from what we are hearing, they're swiftly, uh, building, uh, new capabil—excuse me—building new capabilities and, uh, creating, uh, new underground bases for, uh, a potential war. And, uh, I think ordinary Iranians are very calm about the situation. Uh, they do talk about it, but it really isn't in our hands. Uh, so the Iranians are going about, ordinary Iranians are going about their lives, as you've seen when you came to Tehran, uh, many months ago. It's the same now. So, it's business as usual.
Um, we saw on February the 11th, the anniversary of the—the 47th anniversary of the revolution. We had, uh, much bigger crowds than usual across the country in demonstrations in Tehran. Up to 4 million people participated across the country. Anywhere between 26 to 34 million people are estimated to be have been there. There are many international journalists, some people that you know of or at least, uh, know about, uh, they, uh, they were there. And, uh, I think that was a show of solidarity, a show of force by ordinary people to say that we're not intimidated, that we're not afraid, and that, and contrary to what, um, I would call the epsene class media in the west, uh, people do not support the rioters or the terrorists or, uh, the west and their aggressive posturing with the Israeli regime. So, the country is very united. The armed forces are preparing, but no one wants war.
So, the government, of course, is going to negotiate. It has been negotiating, and it has negotiated in the negotiated in the past. But the framework that the Iranians have given for negotiations is respect for Iranian sovereignty. In other words, the Iranians have told the Americans, "We will not negotiate who our friends are, who our allies are. We're not going to negotiate our military capabilities because we know if we give up our capabilities, you will attack us." And, uh, the Iranians will not give up their rights to have a peaceful nuclear program or, uh, enrichment. What they're willing to do is to have a nuclear deal. Uh, they've already had one before, the JCPOA in 2015, where they give, uh, assurances that, uh, the nuclear program, uh, is peaceful.
Now, if there is a new deal, hypothetically, it's not very likely under these circumstances, I think. But, um, if there's a new deal, it won't be like the JCPOA because the Iranians will not go back to 2015. They've made many technological advances over the decade, and, um, they've been sanctioned for this decade. So, there's absolutely no reason why Iran would relinquish what its scientists have achieved.
And, uh, therefore, I think all of—when you look at this and look at what Trump has been saying—it's very difficult to imagine that there will be a deal. It's not impossible, but it's very difficult to imagine, especially since Trump flip-flops, pairs up deals, goes against what he said earlier, and and then flips again. So, even dealing with the—even if you have a deal with the United States, that doesn't mean it's going to last more than a few days. So, ultimately, that means that the Iranians, uh, will be preparing for war. Uh, it doesn't mean that if we don't have a deal, there will necessarily be a war. But I think the Iranians are playing it safe and saying we will prepare for war. The best way to prevent it is to have a strong military, and the best way to preserve your country in case of some attack is to have a strong military.
Well, um, the—the—the scope or conditions in any piece, this is also an interesting topic because if it comes from the United States, as you said, they—they demand, well, more or less, Iran shouldn't even have a civilian nuclear program, um, you know, for energy. Also, more or less, capitulation, as you said, as to give up its, uh, conventional weapons, that is, ballistic missiles, and give up its partnership ships.
Uh, so often, you know, Iran—Iran responds by saying, you know, if you want to deal with Iran, the nuclear issue, let's do this separately, not link all these other things into it. Uh, but we also saw that Iran's foreign minister, um, he gave a speech on February 7th in Doha. And, and, you know, it could also then suggest that instead of narrowing it, one—one could widen it to have a much more comprehensive peace agreement because, again, for the US and, uh, the Israelis, they complain that Iran is, uh, you know, working against the Israeli interest. But, of course, uh, what—what more or less we can take away from the Iranian foreign minister is if, you know, if we begin to resolve some of the root causes, that is, the issue of a Palestinian state, then, you know, perhaps the tensions wouldn't have to be there to begin with. This is how traditionally security—mutual security is enhanced. You reduce mutual security threats instead of just one side forcing the other one to capitulate. Uh, do you think there's any prospect there for a wider or larger peace agreement where essentially, well, Israel makes peace in—in America as well—with the Palestinian in terms of accepting a state and, you know, something that allows this—the—the source of these tensions to be addressed?
>> I think the real problem in our region is, uh, the fact that the ideology of Zionism has ethnosuppreism along with it. It comes as a part of the package. And therefore, respect for other human beings is—is really non-existent. And right now, there's a ceasefire between the Israeli regime and Lebanon. Yet they bomb Lebanon every day. They kill kids. And the Western media, which is controlled by the Zionist, the—the Epstein class, they will justify it somehow. It's a ceasefire, and no one is supposed to shoot. But they will somehow try to either whitewash their—the regime, or they will look away, or they will try to create some sort of outlandish justification. The same is true in Gaza, even worse so, or the West Bank. Every day there are murders, children being slaughtered, women being slaughtered, but these are all being ignored. And the—and the regime is, uh, continues to do it without, uh, any shame. And, of course, Trump says that we have peace in—in this region. So, obviously, the lives of, um, Palestinian children are of zero worth to Western legacy media journalists, to Western elites, to—to, uh, to this—to the people working for the Epstein class and those who are in control. And so, under those circumstances, I don't think that, uh, a solution is anywhere near nearby. I don't think that we are close to a solution.
Ultimately, the only way that we can have peace in our region is if, uh, the Palestinian people are treated as human beings. And, uh, that is not impossible because the world has changed. The—uh—the mood towards the Israeli regime, towards Zionism, has evolved dramatically. Uh, here in Moscow, I've been in conversation with many people. Uh, I've had more conversations on this particular trip with different Russians than in any of my previous trips. And I'm quite stunned to see how hostile they are to, uh, the Netanyahu regime, but to the whole project in general.
And this is something that I've noticed in my other travels in—in China and elsewhere, places where people in the past really didn't focus on Palestine. It wasn't a priority for them. They had very little knowledge about it. But now there's a—a—a clear dis disgust and hatred for—for what—what the Israeli regime is doing to the Palestinian people. And this reminds me of apartheid South Africa. When I was young, I was an anti-aparttheite activist in Iran. And it was before the internet age. So, our activism was very different from how activists work today. But back then, no one that I knew of ever contemplated that the apartheid regime would collapse so swiftly. And I think the reason was because, uh, awareness across the world, uh, had grown, and the—and, uh, it became in general much more difficult to sustain apartheid.
So, I think what is important is that people across the world, in the United States and elsewhere—and I think the epsene files will have something to do with it too—uh, they're increasingly becoming aware of this group of people and their mentality. And, uh, that is going to weaken the foundations of the Israeli regime. And one of the important, uh, factors in all this is how young Jews have turned against the Israeli regime. We see how, uh, activists in the United States say that this—we do not accept this—Jewish activist. And, of course, they've—they've shown the world that Zionism is not Judaism. Just like ISIS and al-Qaeda are not Islam, and neo-Nazis are not Christians. They are just people who, uh, use these labels to justify their actions. But in general, I think that the tide has turned against Israeli regime.
For Iran, the solution has always been a one-state solution, and that, uh, Jews, Muslims, and Christians should be able to live alongside one another in peace. And I think that the Israeli regime has ironically pushed Palestine towards that scenario. That's the—that's the only solution left because, uh, when there—there was talk of the two-state solution, uh, the West allowed the Israelis to undermine it. They allowed them to colonize the West Bank. The Iranians were saying even back then, that 30, 40 years ago, 45 since the revolution, they were saying that the Israelis will colonize the West Bank, and the West will allow them to do it by, uh, kicking the can down the road and talking about some hypothetical two-state solution. And now, after 40ome years, we've seen that's exactly what's happened and what is ongoing. So, now that the West Bank has been colonized, uh, by the most extremists of the extreme Zionists, uh, I think the—the only solution left is a one-state solution. So, either the Israeli regime is going to have to expel and ethnically cleanse half—over half of the population of Palestine because the Palestinians constitute the majority if you include the West Bank in Gaza. Uh, and the world is not going to accept that anymore, uh, or ultimately, with a changing mood across the world, uh, the—the regime simply at some point down the road—I don't know when, I'm not say—I'm not speaking in weeks or months or even a couple of years or anything like that—but I think, uh, down the road, it—it will not be able to, um, uh, to—to continue to exist in this way and form.
So, the—yeah, the underlying sources—it doesn't seem like we're moving towards a political settlement then, which is, uh, why this, yeah, concerns now about the US intentions. Uh, there's—there's been this, uh, report that, um, Washington had contacted Irando about, uh, the possibility of carrying out some token strikes. That is, you know, "We'll just launch a few missiles at you, uh, so we can say that we, you know, we held the regime accountable, this and that, and then, you know, you can fire some missiles back, and then we'll call it a day." Um, I'm—I'm not sure if, well, you seen these reports, so I'm not sure if, you know, whether or not, well, you can verify whether or not this is correct, if you heard anything on the Iranian side. But, uh, how—how will Iran respond to this, though, u because, uh, as you and I've spoken about before, it—it could be dangerous to let the deterrent slip even further, just to make it a casual thing that every now and then one can just drop bombs on the Iranian capital.
Yes, that is, uh, something that the Americans have put to the Iranians, that we will carry out some token strike, and, uh, you can carry out some token strike, and the Iranians said no. The Iranians have responded to the Americans that, uh, even a token strike will be met with full force. And the—the reason is twofold. One is that even a token strike is an act of war. But, more importantly, I think, is the fact that the Iranians recognize that if the United States is allowed to carry out some limited strike, that only opens the door for future strikes. And so, four months down the road, some false flag operation will be carried out somewhere in Europe, somewhere in North America, somewhere in our region. Musad will kill a few, I don't know, Israelis or something like that, and then they will blame Iran, and then there will be more threats against the country and—and attacks, or they will stage more riots or hire people to, uh, bring chaos to some city in Iran, and then again, Trump will come in to save the Iranian people by murdering Iranian people. This is, uh, something that the Iranians are saying we—we cannot tolerate. So, it—it has to end now.
If the United States attacks, whether it's symbolic or whether it's a—a major assault, the Iranians are going to, uh, launch an all-out assault, and it will be, uh, directed towards US bases. Of course, it will be directed towards the US Navy, of course, but it will also be directed towards all US interests across the region, and that can mean many things that are non-military, and that means trillions of dollars of assets will be targeted. And, of course, the Iranians have already spoken about shutting the straight of Hormos, which it's—it's—it's very easy to do. It's not just about the straight itself that can be shut down. They can sink the ships that go through the straight. They have thousands of, uh, anti-ship missiles based in the Persian Gulf that can destroy everything that's in, uh, in the—in—in the Persian Gulf region. They can destroy the ports. They can destroy the oil and gas facilities. They can destroy the pipelines. And they can do the same outside the straight of Hormos and in the Indian Ocean. So, if there is war, I believe that, uh, the oil and gas trade in West Asia, across West Asia and the caucuses, will come to an end, and that will lead to a global economic crash.
So, and US assets in the region will, of course, be targeted. And, uh, those entities—those Arab tiny Arab countries that host US bases, which are, as we speak, being used to plan against Iran—they—they'll be complicit. And I don't think these Arab regimes will last more than a few hours or a few days or at most a few weeks. These tiny entities, some of them have, uh, passport holding populations of a few hundred thousand to a million, and the foreign workers outnumber the—the citizens 5, 10 to 1, and most of the foreign workers are adult males. So, if, uh, there is chaos, then I think the regimes will collapse, and that will change the, uh, map of the region permanently. So, from my understanding, it would be insanity for Trump to attack Iran, but, uh, Trump is surrounded by, uh, Israeli fursers. Uh, Congress and the Senate are controlled by Israeli fursers. The Epstein documents give us a very small view into the ugly reality of the ruling class. Uh, so even though it's insanity, but it's quite plausible that an attack will happen.
>> Well, in—I'm glad you mentioned the oil trade because in, uh, well, in Washington now, they're bit high on hubris after the successful kidnapping of the Venezuelan president. So, they—they kind of want to—you—you heard on many occasions from different people that they kind of want to ride on this success, if you'll call it that, uh, but also apply to Iran. So, many—some politicians also made the comment that, "Oh, Iran surely should watch this. This will happen to the Ayatollas next." You know, this is kind of the—the—the rhetoric coming. You know, it doesn't make much sense, but, uh, in terms of, you know, no one's going to kidnap the president of Iran, for example, so that doesn't really make any sense.
But, but this being said, um, this—one of the instruments against Venezuela, which could be used against Iran, would be the piracy. Uh, and indeed, only, uh, two days ago, we saw the Wall Street Journal and others posting this article that the United States is considering starting to seize Iranian tankers. Uh, well, essentially, it's taking its oil. So, yeah, the same policy of piracy applying it to Iran. But, uh, it—I guess part of the success in Venezuela is that they're not doing anything much about it. They're just—they're just standing down because, well, anything else would then result in a—a larger American reaction. Uh, how can this be, I guess, applied to Iran? Do you—do you see how—how do you see Iran reacting if the Americans begin to steal, uh, their tankers on—on the open sea?
Well, first, uh, I think it's—it would be good to keep in mind that if the United States and Iran are in conflict, uh, Venezuelans will have a lot of room for maneuver. And it's not clear if they will export oil under US supervision. Even though the amount of oil that it exports is limited, the Venezuelans would quite possibly stop exporting oil altogether to increase the pressure on the United States, uh, to force it to back down against, uh, the Venezuelan people. So, because, you know, we have a good relationship—there is an excellent relationship between Karakas—Karakas and Tehran. And, uh, you know, I don't think the—the story in Venezuela is over. We have to wait and see how things play out in the weeks and months ahead.
But with regards to Iran, we've already had that, uh, game before, where the Americans and their allies carried out piracy and the IC's and took Iranian tankers. And what the Iranians did was they began to take tankers that belong to Western countries, uh, with oil that were destined to western and non-western countries. So, it is the Persian Gulf region, and therefore there's no shortage of ships that are linked to the United States or its allies. And I think it would be foolish for the United States to try to stop a couple of Iranian tankers because I think the Iranians could in return stop 10 tankers for each Iranian tanker. Uh, hypothetically, of course. I don't think that will work. I think it'll only make the oil market more nervous, and it will hurt the global economy and the American economy at a time when the economy is not doing well at all. So, I—I—I don't see that as being a successful, uh, option that will do the United States any good.
And, you know, someone asked me about the fact that Iran itself needs oil for export, which is true. But because of decades of sanctions and maximum pressure, Iran's dependency on exports is less than other countries, far less than other countries in the region. So, those countries that are in the American camp and host American bases are far more vulnerable than Iran. Iran can easily outlast all of them. So, again, it would be the Americans shooting themselves in the foot if they go down the road of war or go down the war of, uh, piracy or anything like that.
And, uh, on—and another issue that I'd like to just say before I forget is that this is—this won't be a war between Iran and the United States either. It will be a regional war. Iran's allies in Iraq are very powerful. We know that Iran trained the popular mobilization force to defeat ISIS in Iraq. They will, uh, get involved in the war. And they already showed footage a couple of weeks ago of one of their underground missile bases. So, you have a country of like Iraq with over 45 million people where, uh, powerful elements in the country will stand with Iran. And we saw that Iran's allies won the elections in Iraq just weeks ago. And Yemen is preparing itself for war too. So, two very powerful and influential countries, uh, will be fighting alongside Iran. Of course, there's Hezbollah and others as well. And then who are the American allies? Bahin with a population of what? Or Qatar, population of what? 400,000? 300,000? Uh, the Emirates, a population of 1.4 million. Uh, there's—there's no way that the Americans can manage such a war.
And, uh, in addition to that, something that Americans don't talk about is that Iran's missile capabilities that we saw used against the Israeli regime to—with such—such success, those launch long range missiles were a very small part of Iran's military capability. Most of Iran's military capabilities are directed not towards Palestine or the Mediterranean, but towards the Persian Gulf: short range and medium-range missiles and drones that can easily destroy anything in the Persian Gulf and on the other side of the Persian Gulf. Why has Iran created so many underground bases with these short and middle-range missiles? Because, uh, the United States after 9/11 invaded Iraq and Afghanistan in Iran, and Iran was called the axis of evil, and Bush and Obama kept saying all options are on the table. So, Iran prepare has been preparing itself for war with the United States. Israel has never been a real threat to Iran. It can—it can kill. It can, but it cannot—it's too small and—and—and weak and dependent on the west to be a real threat. The real threat is the United States. So, Iran has been preparing for a war with the United States for a very long time, and therefore, uh, the real firepower is focused on the Indian Ocean, the straight of Hormos, and the Persian Gulf. And then if you add all that—Iran's regional allies—uh, it's not—it won't look pretty.
But, um, how—where would the war likely spread, though? Because, uh, I heard, well, for example, Saudi Arabia said that they would, uh, want to stay out of this. That is, they wouldn't want the Americans to use their airspace, for example. While countries like Bahrain has warned that, you know, the—yeah, they will not stay silent if—if, uh, if the war is taking to them. Um, perhaps not the most powerful country in the region, of course. But, uh, how do you see—where might this war actually be fought?
I think the elites in these, uh, tiny Arab dictatorships in the Persian Gulf will probably be the first to flee, and they have already taken many, many billions of dollars out of the country, and they have estates and palaces, uh, across Europe and North America. So, they won't be around, uh, to see the war. I think that you're going to see a collapse in these regimes. Uh, it—it—I think, you know, and also Hamas put out a statement saying that a war against Iran is a war against the entire Islamic world. I don't think that, you know, there's any way for me to envisage what the boundaries will be. But what I—what I can say, Glenn, is that for Iran and the resistance and the access of resistance, it will be a fight for survival. It will be an existential war. For the United States, it will be a war of choice. And so, obviously, when it's an existential war, you're going to fight very differently than for that entity that just chose to carry out this war because Netanyahu and—and the Zionists and—and the—the—the Zionist lobby, they wanted it. It's—it's a very different thing. And I don't—I think the circumstances for such a war today are very different than after 9/11.
Um, overwhelmingly, people in the United States are against war. They're tired. The economic situation is not good. And I think the Epstein files, ironically, have created a new level of distrust. And so, if there is war, people are going to point fingers very swiftly at, uh, the Israeli regime, the Zionist lobby, at a time when they're, uh, becoming increasingly unpopular, especially among the youth. So, a war against Iran, uh, where American soldiers are dying and where the price of gasoline and energy goes through the roof at a time when Epstein files are being one by one, uh, revealed to the public—at least those that haven't been redacted or hidden from the public view—I don't think that is a—a combination that, uh, will allow Trump to go on for very long. I think it would lead to a swift end to his presidency, and I don't think—and I—and I can't, of course, predict the future—but I don't think that they can continue a war for very long under such circumstances. So, Iran will pull no punches. They will hit as hard as possible to make it very painful and for the elites in Washington to be forced to back off as swiftly as possible. And as the world economy collapses, everyone will blame Trump and the Israeli regime and Zionism. It—it won't look good for them anywhere.
>> Well, uh, if we want to get a, I guess, insights into what direction the United States is taking, it's, uh, I guess a good indicator would be to look at the recent meeting between Netanyahu and Trump. Uh, I—I was wanted to know what—what your takeaway is here in terms of, uh, how that—how that meeting went. I've seen some—some belligerent rhetoric come out afterwards. But, uh, again, this—it's hard to read the language of Trump because, uh, well, it's often deceptive by intention, and it tends to swing a bit different direction, you know, on the same day. So, how do you see this meeting as having gone? I assume that, uh, a key purpose would be for Netanyahu to make sure that, uh, uh, yeah, the US was still on the path towards increasing pressure, if not attacking Iran.
Well, at least on the surface, it appears that Trump doesn't want war for now. It could be for one of two reasons. One is that he's—he knows what—what this would mean, and it would mean the end of his presidency, or, uh, and but still, either he doesn't want it, or he wants to bring in more assets into the region, a second aircraft carrier into the region, so that maybe that will tilt the balance, which it won't—with—there's no doubt it won't. There—the vulnerability of the US and its allies in the Persian Gulf region is just too great. Anyone who's been to the Persian Gulf would know that there's no way that any of these assets can be protected. But in any case, it could be that he wants to bring in more assets.
But, uh, either way, um, it's exactly as you said, Trump changes his position very easily. He flip-flops. We don't know what they have on him in the Epstein files, what files the Israelis have that the—that, uh, that the Americans don't have. We don't know anything really. And so, the assumption in Tehran is that we have to be prepared for war. If you look at the way in which Netanyahu spoke upon leaving, it seems that he was not happy. If you look at Trump's truth social statement, it seems as—as if that he was for the time being insistent that, uh, there—would not be—military strikes. But then again, we were negotiating with the United States, uh, before the 12-day war. On day one, Witoff said that the US will recognize enrichment for Iran. The Iranians saw that as a positive step. Then on—from session the second meeting—he moved the goalpost and kept moving the goalpost. And then between, uh, the fifth round and the sixth round, the United States and the Israeli regime carried out—they conspired to secretly carry out an attack on Iran. So, for Iran, negotiations or statements from Washington really mean nothing. They are just going to prepare for war and see how things play out.
But, um, you know, on another note, I think what is—is important to keep in mind is that time is not on the side of Trump either, because we—every day we move closer to midterm elections in the United States, and things are not looking well for Trump. And, uh, if Trump attacks Iran, even if he succeeds in killing a lot of people and their families and leaders and their children and their grandchildren and their neighbors, and we have a constitution, and, uh, the leadership, uh, will issue—will not be a problem. From Iran will continue to fight the war, and the armed forces have been told how to fight, uh, on their own. And the underground missile bases, which are in their hundreds, uh, and which have been pro improved dramatically over the past 8, 9 months, thanks to the experience that they've gained, uh, during the war, they will continue to fire away. And, uh, the anti-ship missiles, the submarines, the—the speedboats, the hund—thousands of, I don't know how many speed boats they have, but, uh, they will all carry out asymmetrical warfare. So, Trump will not have a short war. It will not be a one-day, two-day, three-day affair. Iran will destroy and destroy and destroy until the global economy crashes and until the United States backs off. Trump can declare some sort of token victory. But, uh, you know, at the—every day that we move forward, we're moving in closer towards the midterm elections, and, uh, a war like that would, uh, be catastrophic for not just Trump, uh, but it would be catastrophic for all those who, uh, are bound to Trump.
>> Well, I'm glad you mentioned this, um, moving the—the—the goalpost, actually. This is, uh, always been one of the reasons of my pessimism, is that what the US now demands in a peace deal—that is, for Iran to essentially disarm itself, but with missiles, drones, and also give up part allies in the regions—is that, uh, yeah, this will be a stepping stone toward a war because, uh, you know, war is—if, you know, there's a security dilemma. If a country disarms itself, that doesn't necessarily lead to peace on the country. It allows it to be steamrolled. Uh, so it doesn't really resolve some of the underlying problems.
But, uh, but on this issue of moving the goalpost, uh, what is strange to me, though, is, uh, the narrative. Uh, usually the narratives are a bit more cohesive. There's more. Yeah, it is clear what is being said. Now it seems to go in every direction. I saw that, u, you know, Trump said Iranians should cease the institutions, essentially topple the government. They want regime change. But then we see JD van saying, "Hey, we don't really need regime change. If the Iranians want to do it, so it's up to them. We just want to make sure they don't have nuclear weapons." So, uh, you know, others are pointing them to human rights, democracy; others, again, only on a nuclear program and missiles. It goes a bit in all directions here, and even the efforts to topple the government. On one hand, it's this insistence that everything is—was organic, and, uh, anyone who disagrees with this is a Ayatollah apologist. On the other hand, Bessent gives interviews saying that, "Well, we—this is economic statecraft. We put a lot of work into trying to break the Iranian economy and currency to bring people out to the streets." So, it's very hard to see. No, it's—it's not impressive, the—the nar narrative control, because usually the Americans are quite good at this. The—the narrative control is excellent. You know, the media, the government, they all march intact. They all repeat the same talking points. Um, but how do you make sense of this, uh, the—the—the lack of a common narrative?
Well, uh, you know, one thing that I've—I believe is that, uh, the West in general, they've lost their soft power capabilities. And, uh, the United States and—and Israel and Israeli regime and the British regime, they're all very similar in that respect. Uh, when you look at, for example, Russia, it doesn't matter if you're reading the Guardian or Fox News, uh, the narrative on Russia is the same. Uh, uh, one may be more subtle and more sophisticated, and the other may be more bombastic. The same is true with Iran. Those who hate Trump when it comes to bombing Iran, they—they—they—they support it. They—they—they support, uh, the narrative Iran is evil.
Uh, during the—the riots, we now know that this was a conspiracy from the—from day one. As you pointed out, the US Secretary of Treasury said, "We brought down the currency to bring people to the streets." And then what happened? Two days after we had mild protests about the currency, uh, with no arrests and no intimidation, and the government saying, "You're right, and we have to sort this out." Then we had this influx of very violent rioters and—and armed terrorists, and they on the 9th and 8th of January slaughtered police officers, murdered innocent people. Yet the collective media, from the Guardian to Fox News, Breitbart, and the Independent, the Times of London, and the BBC, and the New York Times, all of them have the same narrative that these are just peaceful protesters being gunned down. Even though Pompeo said in his tweet that Musad's on the ground, even the former head of the CIA, even though Pompeo on channel 13 of Israel said the US was supporting these riers, even though channel 14 of Israel, which is close to Netanyahu, was saying that foreign governments, meaning Israel and probably the United States, brought in the weapons to murder hundreds, as they said, of police officers and security agents. And even though we have the statement by Musad in Persian saying that we're on the ground in Iran, and of course, more recently, we have heard that they were bringing in—they brought in, uh, 6,000 Starlinks for what exactly? For who? So, obviously, they had people on the ground, and Trump was saying, "Take the buildings, take the cities, take." So, these starings were basically to coordinate these, uh, terrorist elements.
So, the footage is there, the evidence is there, the admissions are there, the boasting is there, but Western media, whether pro-Trump or anti-Trump, all have the same fake narrative. These are peaceful protesters, and the government is gunning them down. They went up to 80,000 deaths. And then when the Iranian government gave all the names of everyone who was killed, whether police officers or innocent bystanders or the—or the riers, they—there was 3,117. And then those fake numbers went down to 6,000. Well, I—they couldn't accept the Iranian numbers, so they had to say 6,000 or some other number. But the point is that all this Western media, which was saying 10, 20, 30, 50, they said there's no internet, but they—they were inflating the numbers. They were the ones who were responsible. Their own governments were responsible by admission for what happened. Yet they inflate the numbers to and blame Iran because they wanted to create an environment for war. This what was what it was all about. What they wanted to do was to create chaos in Iran. Say that the Iranian government is evil, is gunning down women and children. Uh, these class media, they—they really care about women and children, obviously. And then, uh, they would—that would give a justification for Trump to strike. And Trump was on the verge of striking Iran, according to what we're hearing, and I don't know if it's true. Netanyahu at that time, being fearful of the implications for the regime and the Iranian missiles raining down on—on the regime, he asked for Trump not to—to attack at that moment. Again, I don't know if it's true. This is the—the what we are hearing from—from western sources.
So, um, you know, it—while there is no clear narrative, but it is interesting how, uh, I mean, there's—it's—it's difficult to understand what's going on behind the scenes in the United States, but it is interesting how western media is so, uh, monolithic in—in certain ways. And it reminds me about, uh, Venezuela when, uh, before the war, you saw these—the so-called left—and they're not left, but, uh, the mainstream left in the west and the—and the so-called liberals in the west—some of them were calling for strikes and an attack on Venezuela, and some were saying, "No, no, no, the regime," as they liked it—that whenever someone says regime, you should be suspicious of that person. The—you know, when they talk about the Venezuelan regime or the Iranian regime or whatever, when as soon as a westerner talks about regimes, you—they—you have to be suspicious about that person. But anyway, uh, not everyone, but, you know, because a lot of people are just used to using the—the—the term. But in the media, you have to be suspicious. So, you know, the Venezuelan regime is evil. Maduro is evil, but we shouldn't attack. These people are just as guilty for war crimes as the Zionists and neocons who support war because they are sort of attempting to legitimize war, legitimize death and destruction. Instead of being courageous and saying, "No, Venezuela is none of your business. The president of Venezuela is none of your business. You are the criminals for, uh, murdering Venezuelans and fishermen and ordinary people in the country and carrying out aggression." Uh, instead of saying that, they say, "Yes, they are evil, but let's not do it right now." As you and I are speaking, Glenn, they—the United States has imposed a siege on Cuba, starving 10 million people. So, these, uh, these journalists in the Guardian or the Independent or the New York Times or—or these, uh, you know, none of them are screaming bloody murder and saying that, you know, this is outrageous that they're starving women and children in Cuba. No, it's all—they will—they'll focus on Iran as much as possible. They'll criticize the US government, but they'll never use the language that they use about Iran or Venezuela about their own regimes.
>> Yeah. Now, this is the—yeah, the political version of, you know, "Why do you—why do you hit yourself?" bully. That is, uh, you know, they spent these decades now choking the Venezuelan economy, and then, of course, they referred to the mismanagement of the government, why the country is poor, why we will actually help now to bring—well, that's the language—we're going to help to the Venezuelans, uh, finally now they can have prosperity. And, of course, the same with Cuba, you see this rhetoric coming up as well. They just implemented this oil embargo to suffocate the population there, which affects everything, even the hospitals. And then, of course, "Well, we—we owe it to the Cubans to help them to, you know, have a more dignified, better lives." It—it's just very strange to watch. Uh, I—maybe just credibility disappears.
I mean, only today there's an article in political which—which sees a bit of a contradiction. That is, the different western governments have been hyping the, you know, the—the threats. You know, "Everyone's coming to take us, to get us, the Chinese, the Russians, the Iranians. Everything's a threat. World War II is coming." And then in the—in Politico, they report that the polling shows that even though everyone now is afraid of World War II and and you threat is up through the roof, they still don't give their leaders the license to—to cut out of their welfare to spend on the military. So, it's usually when you inflate the—well, engage in threat inflation, what you cash in on is more money for the military, but it doesn't appear that it's working as efficiently within, uh, these countries, um, which are pled—I can't remember who was—Germany, France, UK. Yeah. The usual. Um, no. So, it is—it is, uh, quite, um, some—something's wrong because in the past, these kind of the narratives, they had very clear, predictable, uh, outcome in terms of what it would legitimize. But now there's no co cohesion in the narrative, and they're not achieving what they're supposed to.
So, uh, yes, probably good news for Iran. The fact that so many Europeans, including in your country, are implicated in the Epstein files. And again, we don't—we know very little. Most of the files are not going to be released, and the files that have been released are largely redacted. The most sensitive parts are redacted. And, uh, yet, despite that, you see that, uh, the foundations of—of, uh, uh, of western politics are—are—are shaped—are shaking in certain countries, in the UK, without a doubt, in the United States. So, when the political elites could no longer have the trust of the population, four years ago, maybe people would—would have believed them. But now people are far more skeptical and cynical about their intentions. And that's why I think that as we move forward, it's going to be more difficult for the likes of Trump and Netanyahu and the Epstein class and, uh, for—to—to deceive the public because life is becoming increasingly difficult for people across the world and and the West in particular. For—for the sake of our own discussion, and, uh, people's eyes are more—they're—they're more impoverished. Their eyes are more open. And, uh, I don't think that's a—a good indication for, uh, the elites in the west, uh, to be able to push their agenda much further.
>> Yeah. No, I think a lot of the tricks of the past don't work anymore. I remember back in 2016 when—when there was such a disgruntlement with, uh, the American, uh, politicians that they voted in Trump, the—the—the first response was, "Well, let's blame the Russians." So, Trump was an agent of, uh, of the Kremlin. I mean, it was very ludic ludicrous, and it didn't make any sense, but, you know, they went with it, and, you know, most people believed that there was something there. And then, of course, in 2020, you had the Biden laptop scandal, and then they went with, you know, "How can you explain this?" And they went with the Russia thing as well. Didn't—never made any sense. I mean—
>> And remember why they went—
>> Yeah, exactly. But one reason why they—they began to blame Russia was actually because of Wikileaks and the fact that Wikileaks had discovered a lot of corruption, uh, in the political system. And instead of, uh, uh, dealing with the evidence that Wikileaks had discovered and Julian Assange exposed to the world, they try to distract public attention away from that and blame Russia for—for the leaks instead of dealing with the leaks and the reality of the leaks. And it's apparently, uh, the young man who took that evidence, uh, he was murdered in Washington. And, uh, so they didn't want that scandal to be blamed on—on the United States or on intelligence agencies or on Zionists or on the Epstein class. So, uh, they went and tried to blame Russia. Now, back and back then, it worked to a large degree. But now, after this whole—with this Epstein affair—again, they're trying to blame Russia, but no one's buying it. That's why I think that things have changed dramatically.
>> No, I think, uh, that's—yeah, this is an interesting breaking point. I saw the same now after all these millions of documents coming out, all of them pointing very clear direction where—where this influence operation is coming from. And, uh, in—instead of, you know, dealing with it, like, "How did we allow things to get so bad?" Uh, you know, "How do we allow this kind of an influence operation driven by intelligence agencies using all this money and, uh, yeah, pedophiles to, yeah, to—to run wild?"
>> It's, uh, "Well, let's just Russia get it." And, you know, it's—it's—it's the Russians without the evidence. And, you know, on the contrary, there's so much evidence which suggests it makes no sense. But, but why? So, it's not just they're desperate, but because it's so obviously false, the last sliver of credibility is thrown away at this. So, it's just—and—and why to protect some pedophile influence network? I mean, it's just, yeah, no, the—the amount of self harm going on now is beyond belief. And, uh, you hear from them, from governments, "Well, you know, who—who are criticizing this? They're—they're trying to reduce trust in government," as if they're not doing this on their own. So, no, something, uh, might break, I think, if they continue down this path. But, uh, anyways, something wrong with the narrative ative control. So, uh, thank you very much for taking the time. I know you have a busy day ahead of you.
>> Thank you very much, Glenn. It's, as I said, it's always an honor being on your show, and, uh, thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to—