Transcription
France's political stability is crumbling. The future of the new government is uncertain, and both the prime minister and president have bowed to opposition pressure, suspending Emmanuel Macron's flagship reform project. How weakened is this president, and what does this mean for Europe? Once a driving force of the EU, France now finds itself deeply divided and in crisis mode, with soaring national debt, high unemployment, and mounting social unrest. The political class shows little appetite for compromise, while the far right, led by Marine Le Pen, continues to gain ground. We ask: France in crisis, is all of Europe at risk?
Hello and welcome to To the Point. Let me introduce my panel: Leonard Horowski, historian at the Humboldt University here in Berlin; Tibor Laarou, Berlin correspondent of the French Business Daily Les Echos; and Daniel, political scientist and member of the board of the Bertelsmann Foundation. That's a think tank. A warm welcome to, uh, all of you. And Tibor, I want to start with you. Uh, three out of four French people, or voters, want Macron to resign. Will he?
Well, up until now, he's, uh, actually excluded that scenario, saying he will stay in power until 2027. Um, it should be what we expect, what we should expect as well. But, um, the pressure keeps rising and rising. So that's, you know, we, the both far-left and far-right parties want him to resign. Uh, up until now, they don't have the majority, you know, to force that, or, and he himself doesn't want to. But, um, um, we'll see how events unfold in the next, uh, month and the next 18 months.
Now, this crisis is not new, and the pressure on, on Macron is not new. Um, when will be, when will the pressure be too much for him to just keep muddling on?
Well, I think we can think of two scenarios. One is parliament now fails to pass a budget, and he would have to call for new elections, and he would lose even more seats for his own party, and the center could really crumble. I think that could be a moment where, at least, he will be a totally lame duck until the date where presidential elections happen anyway, and that's in April 2027. The other scenario is that people go to the streets. We have seen the Yellow Vest movement. So that was protest against higher taxes on, on, on petrol for cars, fuel, and the, the extent of that protest was really very important in France, throughout the country. So maybe such a scenario comes back, that people simply want to voice and show their discontent and really maybe even paralyze the country. Strikes have a big tradition in France, protests of that kind. So that could be a second scenario. But if you ask me for probability, I would think he'll try definitely to stick around until 2027.
We come to the Yellow Vest in a bit, but first, I want to ask Leonard, uh, have the French, the French lost trust in their whole political class?
Well, the political class is perceived very negatively, as a result, I think, of a number of long-range historical traditions. Um, partly because there's always been an almost florid love for rebellion and revolution in France, ever since, uh, the revolution of 1789 and the 100 years afterwards, which saw a revolution on average every 10 years or so. Um, so already, there's a greater readiness to at least symbolically, uh, go to the streets, uh, than in other countries. But then also, it is true that there's a political class nowadays which, because it still considers itself to be the vanguard of a revolution that was 230 years ago, tends to speak of itself as if they were the oppressed and those who were fighting for liberty, when in fact, of course, a great part of that political class is recruited from within itself, uh, is very narrowly recruited, uh, within Paris and from people who have gone to the same schools, and therefore is very hard to relate to, to a lot of French people.
Does this political class, does it include the, the hard left and hard right? The mistrust that is projected at the political class?
I think the far left and the far right really use the momentum to side with those who distrust the political class. So they would spread a narrative saying, "It's us against them, and we are part of you, that's the ordinary citizen somewhere." So they are actually using this. Um, whether public opinion perceives it that way in the long run is not clear. But Marine Le Pen is a politician who did two things over the past years very successfully. First of all, she gave herself a far more moderate image, though her far-right party didn't give up particular hard positions. Um, and then also, she seems like the ordinary French, who would talk to people, who is very nice. She's very, you know, well-seen by many voters. And so I think the, the far left and the far right really try to shed a very bad light on the traditional French political elite that has governed over, over the last years.
Tibor, is this really a, um, a fight? Macron defending the center of politics against the far left and, and far right?
Well, in the first place, I think it's a fight of Macron defending his position. Um, um,
His presidentship.
His president, yeah. Absolutely. And, and, um, defending against actually his former allies themselves. I mean, that's what's striking now is that we had, up until now, some sort of a, um, a block behind Macron, surely, uh, fragile, but now this block is actually crumbling, and even, um, very close allies to Macron ask him to resign. Um, and, and that's new. And that's, I think, what it tells us about is that Macron is very, very isolated. And, and what he's trying to defend now is mostly his own position. Whether it is to defend a center policy, um, that might be the case, but we see with the pension reform that even, uh, most important projects he had now are, are given up. So the, the original idea of Macronism with reform, pro-reform, pro-business, has already disappeared in a way. Uh, so the main idea, and, and we'll see how long it, it, um, succeeds to, to unite political forces, was to fend off the national, um, and, and
That's the right-wing party of,
Marine Le Pen. Absolutely. Um, uh, and on the other side, uh, the France Insoumise on the far left. Um, and the question now is whether, uh, this, this will is, is still here.
Let's have a closer, uh, look at the man in the center of this. Emmanuel Macron, the former charismatic luminary of France, has lost his sparkle in the eyes of many in France, and crucially, he lost his grip on the country. He does not appear to be on top of things anymore. A president propelled by forces beyond his control.
The president is increasingly isolated. Initially, he enjoyed broad support for pushing through reforms to the labor market, taxes, and social contributions. At first, Macron accomplished more than any of his predecessors. But many French citizens soon felt left behind and alienated by his elitist policies. Hundreds of thousands in the Yellow Vest movement protested when he raised gasoline taxes while cutting taxes for the super rich. Nevertheless, France's economy weathered the pandemic relatively well, thanks to high debt levels. In 2022, this helped Macron win re-election, but his controversial pension reform reignited public backlash and contributed to his party's setback in the European elections. In order to secure a majority, he dissolved parliament but failed. Instead, in less than two years, he has exhausted four prime ministers. Does Macron still have the strength to lead France out of crisis?
Well, you know, does he? Well, on the one hand, you could argue he ought to have, because the political structures of the Fifth Republic, such as instituted by General De Gaulle in 1958, give him the powers of an 18th-century constitutional monarch. So, he's a very strong figure.
So, he's a king president, is he?
He is a substitute king, for all practical purposes. He lives in the palace of Madame de Pompadour, the lover of King Louis the 15th. He has a cavalry lifeguard and lives in, in a splendor that isolates him, which is ultimately the greater problem, because in practice, of course, even General De Gaulle, uh, was driven out of office after 10 years. It is no longer possible that one figure of authority can solve a country's problems. And at the same time, uh, the setup of this pseudo-kingship, uh, tends to make people slightly megalomaniac, all the more if, like Macron, they come into office very early with incredible success at an early age, and after barely a political, uh, uh, career at all. Hailed as some sort of messiah, it's bound to make you, uh, slightly unhinged.
It is interesting that you say that he's isolated in all this pomp and circumstance, but not only there, but does he also, does he have, has he lost touch with the, with the ordinary person on the street?
Well, well, it seems so. And in a way, well, he, he did in the beginning. That was very interesting. During his first term, he went to do citizens' assemblies to discuss issues. He went around the country, for instance, on climate change and what France ought to do. He really positioned that topic also through, uh, that conversation with citizens, and he did that freely. He really engaged for hours and then drew some, drew some conclusions, interacting with citizens in a way that you don't see that way in other countries necessarily by a head of state. But recently, I think he did lose touch. And his, you know, people around him who see him regularly say precisely that. And one example of this was his decision to dissolve, uh, the National Assembly after the European elections. He wasn't happy with the result of the European elections and wanted to give, uh, that vote back to the citizens and say, "Take responsibility, go and vote, and show me what parliament I can then work with." And he was, of course, expecting to strengthen his own, uh, allies in parliament, and the opposite happened. And many people after that said he really lost touch with, um, the country.
Now, with this fragmented, um, party landscape, if you will, in, in parliament, does France need constitutional reform, one that would actually sort of curtail the, the power of the president? Would that be a way forward?
Well, in theory, I suppose. But the problem is, of course, while the French voting system, for example, certainly contributes to the volatility of the, uh, whole party system, it has also meant that under the structures of the Fifth Republic, French politicians and French parties are less used to cooperation than parties and politicians in countries that have proportional representation, where you automatically have coalitions. So the problem is, what happens if you introduce structures which, on the drawing board, look much better than what you have today, and which would address voter alienation, because the feeling of having voted and not having had a result could easily be, uh, improved that way. But what happens if you introduce these structures, and then the people who are supposed to fill the structures are not used to the kind of cooperation and non-diabolization of the other side that would be required?
Macron, um, this pension reform, why is that such a hot button issue? Uh, and it has been postponed, and that will be expensive. Can France even afford that?
Well, in the first place, the costs are not huge of, of postponing. It would be 400 million euros next year and 1.8 billion the year after. Uh, it's a, it's more of a long-term problem. Um, obviously, we, we live longer, we ought to work longer, we have less people, active people.
But the French don't want to work longer. I mean, they have an incredibly early pension age, with 62, I believe.
Yeah, that's right.
And as Germans, we would say,
There's a bit more potentially more.
Yeah. No, you're right. Um, I mean, the pension systems are quite difficult to compare, though, I'd say. Um, on, on that issue, um, the problem was also the way the reform was conducted. I think there was, um, actually room for negotiation with, um, with the unions, with political parties, and, um, Macron, uh, in the end, chose a way in front of mass, you know, protest on the streets, um, in 2023, just to force, um, the reform through, this famous Article 49.3, which he can, but promised beforehand, and not to use. Um, and both the subject itself, rent, and reform, I mean, the pension and the way it had been conducted, um, I, I think bear the fruit of, of later protest. And what we're seeing now is that they're correcting everything. They're correcting, you know, postponing the reform itself, and they're also, uh, because of this trauma, promising that they won't use this article for the budget, for instance, which is a quite a dairy, uh, because in the end, we might just have no budget at all.
Daniel, looking at French debt, economists are getting actually quite scared. Uh, if it goes on like that, is there sort of the nucleus of the next Euro crisis already?
Well, the situation, third highest debt, third highest debt in, in the Eurozone. Indeed, France ran a very high deficit last year and this year, which was late discovered, so it wasn't planned, in particular last year, which tells you something about, um, the way the budget is managed. And now France already has been downgraded. Risk premium on French debt went up, so it's more, more expensive for France to borrow in the markets. And it has very high public debt levels, well above 100% to GDP. And so there is a risk, if markets lose trust in, in the French government or in the French president, that could lead to a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. If they withdraw money from French, uh, debt, then this could increase the price even further.
And what would that mean for Europe?
Well, an unstable France has always been bad news for Europe, especially since for almost half a millennium, France was such a great power that it played the role for Europe that the United States play on the world stage. So it wouldn't just mean that, uh, France itself would be more occupied with its internal problems, but it would also mean that, uh, what is arguably the main engine for European international, um, for, for Europe, for the European Union playing an international role, would be more or less, uh, inactive. Because it isn't just that the European Union was founded around France and Germany, and that of course Great Britain is now out, but also that it was always much more France which had the wider outlook, the broader strategic conceptions of things, because France had been so used to being a great power, whereas Germany, of course, after 1945, had very consciously, um, sort of downgraded its own international ambitions. And if France then either becomes too occupied with its own problems, or in fact ends up with a government by the Rassemblement National, who, uh, incarnate the, the opposition to international cooperation, that might be a great problem.
You mentioned that, and I want to look into that, uh, because the centrist, pro-EU, liberal movement that carried Macron to victory in 2017 seems to be all but dead. Instead, the anti-immigration, anti-EU forces are vying for power now and have reason to believe to be successful. That would change France and also the balance of power in Europe.
Marine Le Pen and her protégé Jordan Bardella are gearing up. Bardella, the parliamentary group leader, is blocking all proposals to reach a compromise on the budget in the National Assembly. Their goal: new elections. Polls show the right-wing populist party clearly in the lead. By softening its message and image, Le Pen has made the National Rally more socially acceptable. But many see a wolf in sheep's clothing. And what hasn't changed is that the party still sees immigration as the root of all evil. Brexit is off the table for now, but they are still pushing for less EU funding. The right-wing populist plans would fundamentally reshape France, and with it, Europe. The Franco-German engine of the EU, the Merkel-Macron axis, would stall just as it was starting up again. France is burdened with 3.3 trillion in debt and a downgraded credit rating, posing risks to the euro itself. Yet Marine Le Pen blocks reforms and maintains close ties with Putin's Russia. How close to the abyss is the Fifth Republic, and will it drag Europe down with it?
Well, would Marine Le Pen, in case she's successful, drag down the Fifth Republic, or Europe itself? Everything.
First, first of all, France, of course. Well, uh, we don't know. What we can suppose is that what happened in the last, last elections is, um, the, um, will of the people, of the majority, to stop the National Rally to come to power, was was very strong. And you could see also in the, you know, turnout rate that people really came to the vote and and wanted that scenario, uh, not to happen. Um, today, I think, in my view, there is a difference. People are are so fed up with politics and and don't, you know, trust politicians anymore that they wouldn't even bother. And and that would probably, um, you know, raise the chance for the National Rally to come into power if there is new election. And and the scenario of, you know, snap election again is definitely something that that that may happen before the 2027 presidential election.
If we're looking at the, the surge of the, the right wing, uh, theoretically, the right-wing camp could become strong enough to force Macron into a cohabitation, uh, at least. How likely is that?
Leonard, as a historian, I'm not a good one for prognosis. I just keep being reminded of the fact that when royal rule came down in 1789, it wasn't because people suddenly realized they were being oppressed. It was because, uh, the royal government had an incredibly high deficit, tried to reform the system, and in the process of trying to reform the system, pissed so many people off that that brought the revolution.
So, in history, very often repeats itself. What do you think?
Well, right now, there's a constellation of parliament where the National Rally, the far right, is the largest parliamentary group and doesn't have a participation in government. And that's what many people are dissatisfied with because their vote somewhat, it seems lost politically. So your scenario of a so-called cohabitation, which means there's a president from one party, that would be Macron, and a far-right prime minister, could eventually happen for maybe the last few months in office. Because what we see right now is, um, the far right has really moved to a much more moderate stance. Um, of course, some of the positions remain very radical, in particular on immigration, and it has a very identitarian discourse and so on. So even if the Rassemblement National may not present the prime minister, they could participate or support a right-wing government, and that slowly puts them into a place where it is more conceivable that they can be part of government. And that has happened over a long span of time. I remember presidential elections in the year 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen's father made it into the second round, and protests were wide and broadened everywhere in France. And this is now over. There's no longer the sentiment that the Rassemblement National needs to be prevented at any price.
This is quite interesting, and I would like to say, because this, we're talking about France here, not just any small, uh, uh, country. How much of a blueprint could this be? And this is sort of our final round. How much of a blueprint is this, the, the surge of the far right, the talk about cohabitation, for the rest of Europe? I mean, we have similar discussions in Germany, don't we?
Well, I think we have discussions pretty everywhere in Europe. I mean, we have in Italy already a far-right government, um, and in other countries. And in Germany, obviously, Germany is not as, um, you could say, um, advanced as other countries, but, you know, the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland is is very telling. And especially if you compare it to Rassemblement National, which was earlier, National, perhaps 40, 50 years to come to that level of power of influence. It took the, uh, AfD just 10 years to to get to the level they have now. So, I think Germans should look quite closely what's going on in, in France.
As a model for other European countries. What, what's happening in France, and then following the rise of the far right? I think symbolically, it would mean a lot, because it is, it would be the largest and most important European country, uh, until now, that had unquestionably a parliamentary democracy that was liberal and global-oriented, and also, of course, uh, a country that very much defines itself as the incarnation of all that proceeds from 1789. If a country like that were to come, not for the historically first time, but if, if in a long time, for the first time, to come under a government, under government of a party who do not accept, let's say, half of that tradition, it would be symbolically, much more powerful than having a Hungary or comparable cases.
Well, you've been looking at this, of course. Is this a blueprint? Could France, what what's shaping up in France, could this be a blueprint for other countries in Europe?
Well, the degree of radicalization and strengthening of the fringes, far right and far left, and we, we must not forget the far left, really, because there is a, is a growing voice of anti-Semitism, also pro-Russian tones, in some extent, really not very democratic. So, I think we have to watch that very closely. But we also have to draw conclusions from the fact that a president has lost touch with the citizens. So we need to look at ways of involving citizens in democratic policymaking, and there we have lessons to draw almost on all European democracies.
We have to leave it here. I'm afraid. That was To the Point for today. We hope you enjoyed our discussion as much as we did. And if you have something to say, say it right here in the comments if you're watching us on YouTube. For me and the whole To the Point team, thank you very much for watching.