Transcription
Today, we are discussing some specific points from the introductory chapter of Anatol Lieven's book, Pakistan: A Hard Country. This book explores Pakistan's complexities, its difficulties, and a peculiar kind of strength. Yes, absolutely. And a fundamental idea that Lieven presents is that Pakistan is, in a way, two-faced. Like they say, Janus-faced. Two-faced, meaning, the very things that are perhaps obstacles to the country's progress also, in a way, help in controlling things like extremism. That's a very interesting point. Could you elaborate a bit on that, like what is said in the book about the state and society? Yes. So, Lieven states that the Pakistani state, meaning the state institutions, are comparatively weak, but society? Society is very strong. You see, most people's loyalty is more to their family or community than to the state. And what is the impact of this on politics then? It has a profound impact. You see, major political parties are often dynastic, like the Bhutto family, the Sharif family. Even at the local level, politicians come to power with the support of their community. And this is why the system of patronage or sponsorship continues, where people expect direct benefits from their leader. Exactly. And Lieven also connects corruption to this loyalty, suggesting it's not just about money but can also be a result of an old value or tradition of taking care of one's own people. True. And this system of patronage, on one hand, maintains the control of the elites – feudals or tribal chiefs whose power comes not just from land but from the loyalty of their people. But on the other hand, that same system, by delivering benefits down the line, also somewhat reduces the tension between the rich and the poor. I see. And according to Lieven, this very thing becomes a major obstacle against any radical change, whether it's a socialist revolution or an Islamic revolution. Society absorbs these things in its own way. Yes, the book also quotes a politician saying, "This is a hard country. You need family or tribal connections for your protection." Exactly. So that in difficult times, no one abandons you. This point supports the idea of a strong society. But then how does the state function if it is weak? Well, Lieven introduces the concept of a negotiated state. Negotiated state? Yes, meaning the state doesn't function according to laws or rules as we generally think. Instead, it operates on the basis of power and influence, with a continuous kind of dealing or bargaining. Dealing between whom? Between different groups and the state institutions. She also gives an example of a retired general. Oh, what example? She narrates that this general had to conduct an operation against dacoits in an area. These dacoits were taking refuge on the land of a very powerful politician. Oh, so the general couldn't take direct action. He had to negotiate with that politician, saying, "Hand over some of the dacoits to us." Really? Yes. And then it was decided that some of them would be killed in an encounter, and cases would be filed against some, and everyone knew that they would probably be acquitted later through their influence. So, does this mean that the reform efforts made during the eras of Ayub Khan, Bhutto, Zia, and Musharraf were also, in a way, absorbed into this system? Exactly. Lieven says the same thing; those reforms came from the top, but the system at the bottom was so strong that it absorbed them or rendered them ineffective. So, which institution is it that operates according to its rules? Lieven says that perhaps the army is the only institution that largely adheres to its written rules. That's why it is so organized and powerful and repeatedly enters politics. And what does she say about human rights violations? Are they a result of state power? That's another interesting point. Lieven states that most violations are due to the weakness of the state, not its strength. Due to weakness? How so? Like the police abusing power in their personal capacity, or communities at the local level making their own decisions, such as honor killings, etc. The state is so weak that it cannot prevent them. Despite so many difficulties, Lieven does not consider Pakistan a failed state. No, absolutely not. She very clearly states that Pakistan is not a failed state. It has endured a lot. True, but it still persists. It has pockets of success, like the motorways, some good universities, the nuclear program, a professional army. It has a peculiar kind of resilience, a flexibility. Another contradiction she points out is regarding the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, the TTP, right? Yes, that's a very, very important point. According to Lieven, most Pakistanis, including the army, consider the war of the Afghan Taliban a legitimate resistance against America. This also includes nationalism and the India factor. But the case of the TTP is different. Exactly. When the Pakistani Taliban challenged the state, like in Swat in 2009, the army took very decisive action against them. This shows that the state will definitely deal with internal threats, but it doesn't necessarily mean it will fight the Afghan Taliban for the sake of the West. Finally, what does Lieven see as the biggest challenges for the future? Look, the biggest threat she points out is perhaps not politics or extremism, but something related to the environment. Related to the environment? Yes. Rapidly growing population and severe water scarcity. Pakistan is already among water-scarce countries, and its entire reliance is on the Indus River. Lieven calls this "a gamble on the Indus." A gamble on the Indus. And climate change can worsen this significantly. Melting glaciers might initially increase water flow, but eventually, the flow of the Indus River could become very, very low. This could become an existential threat to Pakistan. Its survival issue is perhaps a bigger long-term threat than extremism. So, indeed, it seems Pakistan is not as easy to understand as the book's title suggests, "A Hard Country." It has many layers that are not immediately apparent. Absolutely. And Lieven's point is perhaps that Pakistan's traditional social structure is so strong that external changes, whether Western models or Islamic ones, are absorbed, and it continues on its old trajectory. However, it remains to be seen how new challenges like water will affect this system. Yes, only time will tell. The discussion should continue on this. We are talking about the second chapter. This chapter looks at the historical aspects that are connected to today's Pakistan. Yes, absolutely. And there is a recurring theme in it. It's the Islamist mobilization, attempts to change governments, and then the state's own weakness or those family influences, local power structures that prevent these attempts from being fully successful. Exactly. The chapter begins with the realization that Islam is in danger. That is, the rise and then decline of Muslim power until the 17th century. Is this the historical baggage that later created a psychology of parity with India? Yes, to a large extent, and perhaps a kind of martial spirit, that we are from the lineage of conquerors. But the interesting thing is that the major centers of grandeur, like Delhi, Agra, Lucknow, were mostly in Hindu-majority areas that went to India after partition. So, in a way, there was also a cultural loss. This is also seen in the Mughal era, Akbar's Din-i-Ilahi which didn't succeed, and then Aurangzeb's greater strictness. And from the 18th century, as Muslim power weakened, reactions emerged. On one hand, there were reformers like Shah Waliullah who advocated a return to pure Islam and even spoke of armed jihad. Oh, and then Syed Ahmed Barelvi actually made an attempt in the western regions, the same regions that later became havens for groups like Al-Qaeda. They were also called Wahhabis, although technically that might not be correct. So, this was a wave of religious resistance. But on the other hand, there was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who was saying something completely different. The exact opposite. He was saying, acquire Western education, cooperate with the British so that Muslims can progress. The Aligarh College was a result of this thinking. And it was Sir Syed who also spoke of the Two-Nation Theory. In 1888, it would be difficult. Jinnah later used this as a basis. After the 1857 War of Independence, Muslims faced greater repression, didn't they? Yes. They were specifically held responsible. The administrative language changed from Persian to English. Hindus began to get more opportunities in education and the civil service. And when representative institutions were formed, the numerical weaknesses of Muslims became even more apparent. Against this backdrop, the Muslim League was formed in 1906 to protect Muslim interests. But there was another major movement, the Khilafat Movement. Yes, from 1919 to 1924. That was more religious and radical and was also with Congress. Yes. It greatly fueled pan-Islamic sentiments against British rule. However, Jinnah remained somewhat distant from that religious fervor. The idea of Pakistan came much later. It is said that after the 1937 elections, Jinnah felt that Muslims would not get power in a united India. Yes. The experience of Congress governments disappointed him. Then the Lahore Resolution came in 1940. Although some historians like Ayesha Jalal say that perhaps Jinnah was using it as a bargaining chip. Oh, for what? So that Congress would agree to a loose, decentralized India where Muslim-majority provinces would have more autonomy. But Congress did not agree. And then in 1947, partition happened, and Jinnah got that truncated Pakistan. Yes. And Jinnah probably wanted a secular state. But the slogans in the streets were, "What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no god but Allah." Then the connection between East and West Pakistan, how difficult was it geographically and culturally, which eventually broke in 1971? The Bengali language issue, economic disparity. And then the results of the 1970 elections were not accepted by the West Pakistani establishment. A military operation took place, a war, and Bangladesh was formed. Despite the difficulties in the early years of Pakistan, there was hope. But after the deaths of Jinnah and then Liaquat Ali Khan, the Muslim League disintegrated. Yes, unlike in India where Nehru and Congress provided continuity, that did not happen in Pakistan. No strong political party could take root. The Muhajir elite dominated. Disputes also arose over making Urdu the national language. After this, we see major attempts at change. Four big names come up: Ayub Khan, then Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf. Among these, Ayub and Musharraf were, in a way, secular reformers in the tradition of Sir Syed. And Bhutto was a socialist, a democrat, while Zia was an Islamist. Yes. Ayub emphasized industrial development, built infrastructure, introduced agricultural reforms, and brought Basic Democracies. But in the end, he too had to rely on the traditional elite. Bhutto nationalized industries, which proved economically disastrous. Agricultural reforms were also not very successful, and instead of strengthening the party, state coercion, like the use of the FSF, led to his eventual execution. Zia-ul-Haq attempted Islamization, but it remained largely superficial. It couldn't fundamentally change society; rather, sectarianism increased. Yes, but during his era, the Muslim League (N) was formed. Yes, that was an important political outcome. Then Musharraf came with the slogan of enlightened moderation and tolerance. The media gained considerable freedom. Local governments were given powers. But he too eventually needed the support of old politicians for political backing, and economic progress was not sustainable. Another constant issue has been the fluctuating relationship with America, and due to this, there is also a deep anti-American sentiment in the country, especially after 1989 when the Afghan jihad ended. Pakistan faced sanctions, then America's proximity to India increased. Attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, the "Islam is in danger" narrative strengthened. Yes. And the idea that America controls Pakistan. Conspiracy theories about 9/11 are also very common. Finally, the two major parties that emerged after Zia, PPP and PML-N, also seem to have failed to bring about fundamental reforms or good governance. Yes, both parties largely operate on dynastic politics and rely on local power structures, elites, and the patronage system. So, this chapter, in a way, shows a complex cycle of attempts and failures in Pakistan's history. Attempts at reform happen, but they clash with the deep structures of society and remain unsuccessful. And the question remains whether this state-society conflict, this struggle, will take a new turn in the future, or if this cycle will continue as it is. Chapter Three is Justice. Well, in this, a farmer, Tajammul Khan of the Movement for Justice, says that the Taliban's justice is better than state courts; it's faster, it's free. Whereas the courts and police, they don't do anything even after taking money. Is this a common sentiment there? Yes, absolutely. And the book also states that this is not just the opinion of one farmer. The local elites there, the maliks, even some officials, also believe this. Although they do raise religious objections to the harshness of the Taliban's methods, for example, the way punishments are given. Oh, I see. Yes. But the hatred for the state system, the idea that justice is only available to the rich or influential, is very common. So, are people just, you know, unfortunate victims of this system? The book says no, justice here is itself a kind of politics. Everyone uses it for their own benefit. Power, money, influence, relationships – all these matter a lot. Absolutely, absolutely. And there's also the legacy inherited from the British era: a complex system, very slow-paced, expensive. The majority of the public doesn't feel it belongs to them. True. So, in comparison, there are local traditions, customs, or Sharia, and people often move between these three systems – state, Sharia, custom – according to their needs. This custom, or what is called customary law, is unwritten. But it seems very strong. Yes, very strong. Its purpose is often not to punish but to mediate, establish peace, and restore collective honor. This is where the role of the jirga or panchayat comes in. Oh, I see. They make decisions. But those decisions are also based on local power dynamics and circumstances. They are not always fair, especially for weaker sections or women. And the police, what is their role in this whole scenario? According to the book, the police are also often part of this negotiated state. Meaning, a system where state institutions compromise and use their power in conjunction with local powers and traditions. For example, there's a reference to a police chief in Larkana who says that to resolve tribal disputes, one ultimately has to resort to the jirga. Oh. Besides, the police lack resources, training, and face a lot of political pressure. And torture during investigations is considered routine. And the courts, what is their condition there? You mentioned slow pace. Millions of cases are pending in Karachi courts. Isn't there that famous saying, "Justice delayed is justice denied"? Yes, indeed. Delay and corruption are very big problems. And the system largely operates in English. The majority of the public doesn't understand, and frankly, even the English of many lawyers and judges is not that good. Against this background, the Lawyers' Movement was seen as a hope. There was a slogan for judicial independence. But did it bring about any real change in the system? The book questions this. Look, in the past, every government has influenced the judiciary. This movement was also not devoid of political alliances, especially with the PML-N. Oh, I see. And many lawyers within the movement themselves held quite conservative views. The focus on actual systemic reform – disposing of cases quickly, reducing corruption – was less. So, this weakness of the judicial system, the lack of public trust, has certainly made space for other things, like custom and religion, as you mentioned. So, let's move on to Chapter Four, Religion. The relationship between Islam and politics in Pakistan. An interesting question is why Islamist parties haven't been as successful as perhaps in other Muslim countries. Yes, there are several reasons for this. One is that Pakistani Islam itself is very diverse. The majority belongs to the Barelvi school of thought, which strongly believes in Sufism and shrines. This is quite different from the strict reformist thinking of Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith. True. Parties like Jamaat-e-Islami or JUI mostly emerged from the Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith thought. They are more organized in urban areas. But in terms of popular appeal, the roots of Barelvi traditions are deeper. So, what is the role of shrines and pirs in politics? Oh, a very deep role. According to the book, this is the foundation of Islam's spread in South Asia. Pir families, meaning the custodians of shrines, are not just spiritual leaders but often large landowners, and they have significant influence in politics. Especially, you see, in the PPP, big names like Gilani, Qureshi, Fahim – they are from those families. These families also help reduce the Sunni-Shia divide. But this same power also becomes an obstacle to modern reforms or democracy. And Jamaat-e-Islami, that seems like a very organized ideological party. Yes, Jamaat-e-Islami is indeed a well-organized, cadre-based party. It is based on the thought of Maududi. Social justice, eradication of corruption, opposition to feudalism – these are all their slogans. There is also democracy within the party, which is less seen in other parties. Right. But the book states that their approach, their thinking, has largely been confined to the urban middle class. They haven't gained broad popular support, and their stance on violence and groups like the Taliban has also been somewhat ambiguous. Oh, and what about extremism or militancy? The Lal Masjid incident. Yes, the Lal Masjid incident, the mention of Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The book says this shows how even people from educated urban backgrounds can turn towards extremism. Ghazi's stance was similar to the JI's: anti-America, desire for social change, but he was more extreme. Oh, I see. And an important point the book raises is that many militants are educated in government schools or colleges. They are not just a product of madrassas. Western analysis often exaggerates the role of madrassas and ignores the deeper social and political roots of the problem. So, today we are discussing Chapter Five, "The Military," of Anatol Lieven's book, Pakistan: A Hard Country. Let's look at it. This chapter explores the difference between the image of the Pakistani military and its reality, right? Yes, absolutely. On one hand, you see neat, organized cantonments. A completely different world. And on the other hand, you have ordinary urban areas where infrastructure and governance issues are visible. Oh, I see. And Lieven says this is not just a facade. The army also provides excellent facilities to its personnel and their families, like healthcare. Yes, facilities that are often unavailable to the common Pakistani. And this difference, like the comparison given of Quetta city and its cantonment, presents the army as a separate, better institution. And perhaps that's why the concept of "an army with a state" emerges. Meaning, the army is so powerful, with so many resources, that it seems the state exists for the army. Yes, that's an important point. The reasons for this are quite deep and historical. Starting from the British era's "martial races" policy, then in comparison to politicians, the army considers itself more, you could say, competent. Morally superior, modern. The book also quotes an ISI officer saying that the interference of politicians can create divisions within the army, and this would be disastrous for the country. Right. And don't ordinary people also often consider the army better, especially when civilian governments seem to be failing? Yes, that's also true. Lieven writes that every military ruler has been popular at the beginning. But the army's real strength lies in its tremendous financial resources, far more than other institutions. Then comes the concept of the military family, that the army is like a large family. But within this family system, he also talks about patronage or legal corruption. What is that, actually? Look, by "legal corruption," Lieven means the privileges that retired officers receive: high positions, government jobs, then valuable plots in Defense Housing Authorities (DHAs), large business entities like the Fauji Foundation and Army Welfare Trust, which are also criticized, especially the profits earned from DHA plots. Absolutely. But the army says this system is necessary for the welfare and morale of its personnel; it's an incentive. Yes. And the book also praises the welfare work of the Fauji Foundation and Army Welfare Trust, like hospitals and schools. But there's also the Okarara Farms incident. Yes. That shows the other side of the picture. So, this system, as Lieven says, is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it maintains discipline and unity, preventing rebellions. On the other hand, the country's resources are reduced for democracy and other development. The army's own structure and history have also been discussed. The concept of "martial races," the dominance of Punjab. Yes, but in recent years, there have also been attempts at diversification. The recruitment of Pashtuns and other groups has increased, and the social background has also changed. Officers are now coming from the lower middle class. The focus is no longer solely on the elite. And this social change has also been linked to fears of Islamization. Yes. But Lieven's analysis is that the officer corps is largely nationalist. Their primary identity is being military, not Islamist. He says the efforts of the Zia era have been reversed. The real anger or unease is perhaps directed at American policy, especially the tilt towards India. Oh, now let's come to what is perhaps the most complicated: the ISI, Kashmir, and the army's links with militant groups. Lieven calls this a "tragic flaw." Yes, this is a very complex issue. According to Lieven, the army's obsession with India and Kashmir has become a kind of tragedy. After the Afghan jihad, the ISI tried to apply the same strategy of using Islamist groups in Kashmir and against India. But these groups then got out of control. To some extent, yes, their roots have strengthened within Pakistan, like LET or JUD, and now they themselves are a challenge to the state. The book also raises the question of ISI involvement in the Mumbai attacks. It raises the question there. Lieven doesn't draw a clear conclusion but suggests that while the high command might not be involved, some elements, some officers, could have played a role. The current strategy, according to them, seems to be to continue supporting the Afghan Taliban for strategic depth, fight the Pakistani Taliban, but keep groups like LET on the shelf, meaning don't take heavy action against them, so they don't turn against the state. It's a very delicate balance. And finally, nuclear deterrence. On one hand, Pakistan's great achievement, security guarantee. On the other hand, a constant threat. Absolutely. The threat is not just of war with India but also the concerns of Western countries. Lieven believes that under normal circumstances, the risk of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons is low, as long as the state doesn't collapse. The command and control system is described as quite robust. So, what is the real threat then? The real threat, they say, is the fears of America that it might take action based on misinformation or panic, or that Pakistan might be targeted after a WMD attack. And the most dangerous scenario, in their opinion, is that American forces might enter Pakistan on the ground, which could lead to severe rebellion within the army. So, what does all this mean? The army is undoubtedly Pakistan's most powerful and organized institution. It provides security? Yes, but its actions, its policies, have deep and complex consequences. Challenges also arise from it. And the question remains the same: what will be the role of this institution in the future, especially as internal and external pressures increase? One final point for listeners to ponder: Does this vast welfare system of the army and its growing business empire truly make it a state within a state, and is this model sustainable for Pakistan? Well, today we are discussing Chapter Seven, "Punjab," of Anatol Lieven's book, Pakistan: A Hard Country. Yes, this chapter looks at Punjab's central position in Pakistan. But it also shows how complex Punjab itself is. Right. So, first of all, the point that Punjab has a lot of weight. Approximately 56% of the population, the majority in the army – it seems like everything is controlled by Punjab. Yes, that impression exists, but the book says that's not actually the case. Meaning, Punjab is not so united or so powerful that it can impose its will on the entire country. Oh, I see. It has to compromise with other provinces, especially Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It has to accommodate them. Is there an example of this, like the NFC Award mentioned in the book? Absolutely. In the National Finance Commission Award, Punjab receives less than its share based on its population and the revenue it generates. This is a compromise. But don't these compromises sometimes hinder national development? Obviously, they do. For example, the book mentions the Kalabagh Dam or Thar Coal. These projects have been delayed because there was no consensus among the provinces, there were fears. So, this is a conflict between national interest and provincial politics. Oh, let's talk about internal divisions within Punjab. You said it's complex. Very much so. Just look at the languages. In South Punjab, Saraiki is spoken, which many people consider a separate language. Then there are families, tribes, castes, communities – Sayyeds, Rajputs, Jats, Arains, Baloch – these identities are often stronger than provincial identity. And it's also interesting that Urdu is used more in Punjab than Punjabi. In education, in offices, even in casual urban conversation. Yes, that's an important point. Great Punjabi writers like Iqbal, Faiz, Manto also did most of their work in Urdu. So, did this make it difficult to form a strong Punjabi provincial identity? It suggests so. It says that the state's educational system has not been very successful in creating a strong national or provincial identity. Identities have largely remained local. Let's move to Lahore. A historic city, also a cultural center. Absolutely. Mughal era, British era buildings, museums, universities like LUMS, literature – Lahore is Pakistan's cultural and intellectual hub. But the book also shows the contradictions there, citing the writings of Moni Mohsin. Yes, on one hand, there's the life of the elite, club culture, and on the other hand, the city's basic problems: no electricity, water scarcity, sanitation issues. And there's also mention of a kind of carelessness or complacency, despite the threat of extremism. Yes, for a long time, there was this attitude that Lahore is safe, nothing will happen here, which later proved wrong. Oh, I see. Punjab is not just Lahore. It has different regions. What are the differences among them? Yes. The book describes three main regions. First, North and Central Punjab. This is the most fertile area. Canal colonies, the Green Revolution all happened here. That is, the Lahore, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Gujrat area. Absolutely. This is also an industrial hub: Faisalabad, Sialkot, Gujrat. Proximity to Kashmir and the 1947 migration also have a significant impact here. Second region is the Pothohar Plateau: Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Chakwal, Attock. This area is mostly barren, with water scarcity. But it has been the largest recruitment center for the army. Politics of community is very prevalent here. And the third part is South Punjab: Multan, Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan. Yes. It is said that this region has a more feudal structure. Large landlord families. The influence of pirs and shrines is also very significant. Is that so? Very much so. Especially Multan, which is called the city of saints. There are shrines of Shah Rukn-e-Alam and Bahauddin Zakariya. But this region has also become a center of sectarian tensions. The example of Faisalabad is also given in the book. Manchester of the East. Yes, the hub of the textile industry. There are also large modern mills like Chenab Mills. But along with that, the contradiction is severe electricity shortage, very poor conditions in thousands of small factories, and high illiteracy. And despite having such a large business class, their influence on politics is less. Yes. According to the book, their political influence and clout are not as much as they should be. Let's return to Multan. City of saints, but also a center of sectarianism. How is that? Look, people of all kinds visit the shrines, both Shia and Sunni. They connect people on one level. But in this region, especially around Jhang and Multan, anti-Shia organizations like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have become very strong, and they later developed ties with the Taliban. Yes, absolutely. And then the state cracked down on them, imposed sanctions, and there were also allegations of extrajudicial killings. In response, these organizations also attacked the state, especially security forces. And the influence of old families like Gilani and Qureshi on the politics of that region is still present. Yes. Those established families still play a very important role in politics. One last important point: what was the impact of the 1947 partition and migration on Punjab? It had a profound impact. The migrants from East Punjab became about 25% of the population of West Punjab. They were economically very dynamic. They took over businesses here, participated in agriculture. There must have been social changes due to their arrival. Undoubtedly, they also had strong anti-India sentiments, which were due to the circumstances of the partition. The book also states that people who came from East Punjab played a role in some extremist groups. So, overall, the picture of Punjab is very mixed and complex. On one hand, a center of power, an economic engine; on the other hand, internal contradictions, divisions, challenges. Absolutely. And the book concludes with a very important point. The author believes that perhaps the biggest long-term threat facing Pakistan, and especially Punjab, is environmental degradation. Environmental degradation, meaning climate change. Yes, especially severe scarcity of water resources. This issue could increase tensions within Punjab and between Punjab and other provinces in the future to such an extent that it might become impossible for national and provincial governments to manage it. We are discussing Anatol Lieven's book, Pakistan: A Hard Country. And today we are looking at Chapter Eight, "Sindh." Yes, Sindh. And the chapter begins with Karachi. Yes, Karachi. A city that Lieven says is violent, yes. And at the same time, surprisingly resilient. He narrates an incident from 2009. Yes, the one with the gunfights. Yes. Where 34 people died in one area. But the rest of the city was running completely normally, just like they saw in 1989. Exactly. And Karachi is not a small city, is it? 18 million people, very large. Lieven has a very interesting point: this apparent anarchy in Karachi is actually a kind of fragmented order. Violence remains localized, and the city keeps running. True. And he also says that by global standards, the homicide rate is not that high. Yes, except for political and ethnic violence. He says it's lower than in American cities. Yes. Until 2010, most killings were targeted, with political linkages, right? But Karachi's real struggle, according to Lieven, is not Islamic extremism. It's not. Rather, it's internal ethnic tensions. Ethnic conflicts between Muhajirs, Sindhis, Pathans. In his opinion, the Taliban's takeover of Karachi is difficult, but if their attacks are linked to the Pathan minority, then ethnic riots could erupt, which is a major threat. And the second threat is that if the state weakens in other parts of the country, Sindh might get more entangled in its own problems. So, that was about Karachi. But another major problem for the entire Sindh is water. So, yes, water is critical. Sindh's land is fertile due to the Indus, but the use and wastage of water are so high that by 2010, the river was reaching the sea with difficulty. Yes. The 2010 floods did provide temporary relief. Yes. But in the future, either severe water scarcity or severe floods – in both cases, agriculture and ethnic balance could be disturbed. And the threat of climate change and sea-level rise could be absolutely devastating for Karachi. Absolutely. And what is the obstacle to the radical changes needed in land and water use to fix this situation? The biggest obstacle, Lieven says, is Sindh's political and social structure, which revolves around the Waderas. Landlord politicians. Yes, this Wadera culture often resists such changes. He mentions Mohenjo-daro with regret. Yes, that thousands of years old bricks were better than today's houses. And perhaps the drainage was also better. Even today, rural...
In Sindh, there are mud houses that are washed away in floods. This Wadero system is old, but the modern identity of Karachi was formed after the partition. Yes, when millions of Urdu-speaking Muhajirs came from India. And they mention that they were quite different from the Sindhis already present in terms of education and urban lifestyle. Yes. And this difference later created Muhajir-Sindhi tensions. Initially, Muhajirs considered themselves a founding element of Pakistan. But then they felt their influence was decreasing. Especially when the capital shifted from Karachi to Islamabad and Bhutto's PPP introduced Sindhi quotas. Well, and from this sense of deprivation, from this very sense of grievance, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) emerged. Altaf Hussain laid the foundation. Initially, it became popular among middle-class students. Yes, who were previously close to Jamaat-e-Islami. MQM presented Muhajirs as a separate nation. And then riots, immediately in Karachi and Hyderabad, Muhajir-Sindhi, then Muhajir-Pathan riots, and even Kalashnikovs were used in them. So MQM gained tremendous political power in Karachi. But at the same time, allegations of violence, armed doing. Yes, they always went together. In 1990, there was an army operation. MQM also broke, the MQM Haqiqi faction was formed. But then MQM re-strengthened its grip under Altaf Hussain. Yes, who is in London. Under his leadership, they refer to Mustafa Kamal. Yes. That MQM also worked on infrastructure. Roads, flyovers, parks. Yes, they worked. But this narrative of development versus violence is very complex in the case of MQM. So this duality has continued. Absolutely, and there is also the demand to make Karachi a separate province. To which Sindhi nationalists react very strongly. Obviously. So, according to Leaven, the current scene is that MQM shares power in Karachi and PPP in rural Sindh. A kind of unhappy marriage that runs on patronage and to some extent fear. Yes, absolutely. The system of patronage and a little bit of fear. Governing Karachi with these tensions is a very difficult task. And these ethnic tensions are also visible on the ground. For example, the MQM headquarters, 90s, reflects their middle-class Muhajir base. Organized urban. But with this image, there are also tensions with the Pathan community. Which is rapidly growing in Karachi. Yes. MQM accuses Pathans of land grabbing and Taliban sympathy, and the Pathan nationalist party, NP, says this is an attempt to seize our properties. Leaders say they don't want violence. But ground realities, Leaven, cite an IB official, say that both sides avoid full-scale conflict because both are fully aware of their potential losses. Understood? This was about Karachi, but in interior Sindh, it is completely different. A completely different world. The Wadero culture is dominant there. Landlordism, tribal chieftaincy, family prestige politics run on patronage. Yes, Waderos provide jobs, help, and patronage to their people. In return, they get votes. Leaven describes their life: hunting. Yes, there is mention of wild boar hunting. Yes. Land disputes and that's it, politics, education, development are rarely seen among their priorities. Larkana is also mentioned, the home of the Bhutto family. Yes, but it is lagging in development, except for the distribution of government jobs. This is the same structural issue we were talking about earlier. Finally, Leaven also mentions Sindhi intellectuals. Yes, who often talk about Punjabi or Muhajir exploitation. But they focus less on Sindh's internal problems like water or this Wadero system. Some people even talk about a separate Sindh or ethnic war. But what is Leaven's analysis? Their analysis is that so far, whether it is the Wadero class or Karachi's business leaders, they see their benefit in remaining within Pakistan. So what is the overall picture of Sindh? A place with deep ethnic and social divisions. Basic threats like water. But despite all this, there is a complex system. Of patronage, of politics. Which is somehow keeping things running. Yes, Leaven says that a revolution might be needed here, but the fear is that the same revolution might bring more destruction. This is the dilemma of Sindh's story. Today we will talk about Chapter Nine, Balochistan, from Anito Leaven's book "Pakistan: A Hard Country." Yes, and he starts this chapter with Quetta. Yes, Quetta. Leaven describes it as a garrison town on a high desert frontier. Dust, cold winds, old colonial buildings. Absolutely. And he points out that Quetta has always felt a bit different from the rest of Balochistan. Different how? For example, he mentions the census of 1901. He said that there were more European language speakers there than Baloch or Brahui speakers. Oh, that's a very strange thing. Yes. And even today, there is a significant number of Punjabi and Urdu speakers there, while the overall ethnic mix of the province is different. That's why the "Little Paris" talk probably comes up, that there's a difference between Quetta and the rest of the province. Yes, absolutely. Then, as soon as you leave Quetta, Leaven says the real tribal world begins. There is mention of the road, FC patrols, and clashes with Baloch militants. Yes. The state's presence is there, the army, the FC, but the tribes also have a very strong influence. And in this complex picture, the spillover of the Afghan War has also come. Yes, yes, since 2001, Afghan Taliban have come into Pashtun areas, which are about 40 percent of the population there. There was also the Quetta Shura. Yes. According to US intelligence, Leaven hints that there might be an understanding between Pakistani forces and the Afghan Taliban that if they don't cause problems in Balochistan, they will be allowed to stay. But this has its own risks, the threat of US drone attacks. And if the Pashtuns turn against the state tomorrow, then Baloch-Pashtun tensions could increase, especially over control of Quetta. This is indeed complicated. Then, talking about the size and resources of the province, it is the largest province, 43% of Pakistan's area, and the least populated, only 7%. Resources include Sui gas, copper and gold in Rekodik. Yes. But due to the small population, it doesn't have much influence in national politics, and the issue of control over resources is there. The NFC award has increased its share, perhaps to 9.09%. Yes. But nationalists say it's not enough, and there are also complaints about Gwadar, that outsiders are being brought in and locals are not benefiting. Leaven makes a very interesting point that Baloch nationalists compare themselves to the Red Indians of the American West. Yes, this shows their sense of deprivation that their land is being occupied. Leaven says it might be a bit exaggerated, but he also admits that the state has not treated them well. Absolutely, there is also disagreement on history. Nationalists consider the Kalat state as their historical state. And the province created by the British was formed by joining different parts that were historically separate, wasn't it? Yes. And the border with Iran has divided the Baloch population. In Iranian Balochistan too, there have been movements like Jundallah. After the creation of Pakistan, there have been several revolts. In '48-'49, then in the late '50s, then in '73-'77 during the Bhutto era when the nationalist government was dismissed, and then in 2000, on Musharraf's projects, Gwadar, new cantonments. Initially, the Marri tribe, then the Bugti tribe, Nawab Akbar Bugti himself joined, and his death in August 2006 ignited the fire. Yes, after that, the insurgency increased significantly, and now educated youth are also joining this, who are not getting jobs. This is also a factor. Then their tribalism is quite different from that of the Pashtuns. Arna, but there is also mention of honor killings. Yes, that is also there. And Nawab Bugti's famous quote that I killed the first person at the age of 12. Yes. This Sardari system and these tribal enmities, Bugti Kalpar, Bugti Marri, Rahrani Bugti, deeply affect politics. And the state uses them for divide and rule. That's what Leaven says. Cooperation also continues, giving ministries, funds. He writes that at one time, 62 out of 65 MNAs were in the government. Oh. And the army's role, for example, they settled the Chamalang mine dispute. Yes, the army's role is also important there. Now let's talk about Rekodik. Such large reserves of copper and gold. This can be very beneficial for Balochistan or become a cause of new tensions like Sui gas. Both possibilities exist. He suggests a model like the Alaska Permanent Fund for the distribution of benefits. But above all, perhaps, is the issue of water. Leaven emphasizes this a lot, very much. The water table in Quetta Valley has gone below 800 feet, he says. Tube wells have dried up the springs. Oh! That's very alarming. Yes. So, considering all these things, what has been the state's approach? Leaven says a mix of negotiation and force. There is also a quote from General Wynne in this regard. Yes, that there are shades of gray here. Today's enemy can be tomorrow's friend. So one has to negotiate. Perhaps it failed in the case of Akbar Bugti. Leaven also calls this approach chaotic but often, in the end, fairly effective. But the question remains, does this mixed policy just manage the problems, or can it provide a long-term solution? And until the fair distribution of resources happens and basic issues like water are resolved, can there be real stability there? We will have to see. So today we are talking about Chapter 10, The Pashtuns, from Anito Leaven's book "Pakistan: A Hard Country." Yes, in this chapter, the author has taken a deep look at the history, culture, and politics of the Pashtuns. Khushal Khan Khattak's verse also comes to mind, doesn't it? Pashtun means honor and pride. Something like that. Absolutely. And the author also captures this point that Pashtun identity is very complex. Their relationship with the state of Pakistan, their own internal divisions, and their social structure. We also draw a comparison, don't we, with the 18th-century Scottish Highlands. Yes, absolutely. He says that just as they were angry with the state but also benefited from it, the Pashtuns are in a similar situation. The only difference is that, according to the author, this contrast is visible in many places without alcohol. Especially concerning Punjab. Yes. On one hand, there is the accusation that Punjabi industrialists are looting the province. And on the other hand, many Pashtuns themselves go to Punjab or Islamabad for a better future. The incident of Bashir Bilour Sahib is also interesting, which is in the book. Yes, when President Ghulam Ishaq Khan asked for his help as a Pashtun. Yes. And the story of Brigadier Saad's uncle. Oh, yes. That talk of alliance with Afghans is just to scare the Punjabis. These things reveal the complexity of the Pashtuns' relationship with Pakistan. It's not a straight line. The book also talks about the rigidity of Pashtun society, especially regarding women. Yes, he gives an example of an educated woman who says that in her family, there could be several murders in the name of honor for a love marriage. Hmm, that's a very harsh statement. And the depiction of Peshawar city, dust, dirt, the contrast between rich and poor. Absolutely. On one hand, big mansions, on the other hand, poor settlements, and the sign of the angiography center with a picture of a heart creates a strange, harsh image. And the author says that this rigidity is perhaps what paves the way for movements like the Taliban. Yes, they talk about bringing a new system by using old tribal and religious elements. The role of Pashtunwali is very important in this. Honor, revenge, meaning retribution, and Melmastia, meaning hospitality. Yes. And often tribal loyalty becomes more important than state loyalty. Absolutely. But there is also another aspect, equality and individualism. Yes, this is different from the Sardari system of Balochistan. Individual prestige is more important than hereditary loyalty. Correct. But then this individualism also becomes the cause of severe internal divisions and enmities, meaning Tabaar. Being against each other. And the importance of the Hujra, that's also there, isn't it? Yes, yes. It's not just a sitting place but a center of social and political activities. The book also mentions the difference between the Hujras of tribal and plain areas, which perhaps shows the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Now let's come to the political landscape. The book starts the chapter on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA from the British era. Yes, the Durand Line, then the formation of the province of Sarhad, NWFP, and FATA's special system, Political Agent, Mulk, and FCR, and the severe lack of development and conservatism in FATA are also mentioned. Yes. And the contrast of Pashtun nationalism is also important. Such a strong cultural identity, but they couldn't form a united modern state. What reason does the author give for this? History, partition, the situation in Afghanistan. Yes. All these factors, internal divisions, poverty in Afghanistan, wars, all these are factors. And in local politics, two major parties, ANP and JUI. Yes. Awami National Party (ANP). Its roots are in the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. But according to the author, it is now dominated by the landowners of the Peshawar Valley. And due to the Taliban, they had to ally with the army, which is completely against their own history. Isn't it? Absolutely. And on the other hand, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a Deobandi school of thought. It has also become mostly a Pashtun party over time. It is also ideologically fundamentalist, but in practical politics, it has compromised. The MMA government is given as an example. Yes, the one from 2002 to 2008. They got votes on anti-American sentiments, but during their government, there were allegations of poor performance and corruption. So the book's analysis is that both parties, ANP and JUI, are losing their structure. Internal disagreements, dealing with the establishment. Yes, there is a similar impression that disappointment is growing among voters. The idea that they are all the same. So, in this situation, if traditional nationalist and Islamist parties are weakening, then what? Then the question arises, who will fill the vacuum? This situation can create space for those groups that can attract people disillusioned with traditional politics, especially the poor. That is, ANP and JUI, which were once symbols of resistance, are now facing allegations of corruption and other issues. Absolutely. So what shape will the future politics of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa take? This is a big question. So today we are talking about Chapter 11, Pakistani Taliban, from Urdu Short Stories. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman's quote comes to mind that rebellions arise from time to time among Pashtuns. Yes, absolutely, and this Sunni Islam-loving extremism in Pakistan is a very complex issue. There are many groups, each with its own agenda. And Pakistani Taliban, i.e., TTP, who became more prominent later. Sources say they united with other groups, especially in reaction to the military operations from 2008 to 2010, yes, Bajaur, Swat, Waziristan operations. Then state objectives, Sufi bazaars, the public, all became targets. And the threat did not remain confined to tribal areas but spread throughout Pakistan. Although it is also true that initially, up to 2010, this rebellion was mostly confined to Pashtun areas. Local factors, traditions, the history of resistance against any state were more important. Soviet, British. And the backbone of the Taliban is Pashtuns. So for any solution, obviously, the support of the majority of the Pashtun population will be necessary. How did this extremism increase after 2001? The basic reason seems to be the American invasion and the influence of Afghan Taliban. Absolutely. But there is a common idea that Pakistan created the Afghan Taliban. Sources, citing Mullah Zaeef, deny this. Yes. He says that it started with students from a Kandahar madrasa in the early 80s. During the Soviet war, American weapons came through Pakistan. And then in 1994, when the situation in Kandahar was very bad, they organized themselves. Pakistan's support was initially for Hikmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami. Yes. Then General Naseerullah Babar, who was in the People's Party government, considered the Taliban worthy of support. When they established some peace in Kandahar and protected trade. There might have been differences in ISI and IB policies in 1994-95. Some contradiction. But by 1996, Pakistan had fully become a supporter of the Taliban. Weapons, training, advisors, volunteers, everything. Security agencies also asked old allies like Jalaluddin Haqqani to join the Taliban. The Haqqani network's relations have been quite close with the army, at least until 2010. Yes. And Western intelligence also says that ISI had a role in the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008. But did the Taliban leadership trust Pakistan? Especially after 9/11. No, there was a lack of trust, especially after 9/11 when Pakistan sided with America. What was the real reason for Pakistan's support? Sources say it was more strategic than ideological. Musharraf's example is also given. The basic fear was the encirclement by India. In military circles, there was a firm belief. Major General Athar Abbas is also cited as saying that India could use Afghanistan to foment rebellion in Pakistan. So, a friendly government in Kabul or at least control over the border areas was considered necessary. Yes. And the limited support for Baloch rebels from Kabul or India, and the non-recognition of the Durand Line, kept this fear alive. The hope of trade routes to Central Asia has now become quite dim. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda also came into the picture. Osama bin Laden's influence and reach grew. There was ideological alignment, money, and in northern Afghanistan, they acted as shock troops for the Taliban. Then in 1998, there were attacks on American embassies and American missile attacks. Yes. Pakistan also made requests to expel Al-Qaeda but failed. Then, in March 2001, the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas made it absolutely clear how much influence Al-Qaeda had. Then came 9/11. Musharraf's cooperation with America, providing airbases, supply lines, arrests. This was under threat from America. The talk of bombing in the Stone Age might be an exaggeration, but the threat was real. The only concession was the evacuation of Pakistani officials and volunteers from Kunduz. Yes. And many Al-Qaeda leaders also fled from there. This policy was not at all popular among the public. American pressure to end support for groups in Kashmir, anti-American sentiments from the Iraq War, and then the demand for operations in tribal areas. In this context, the Lal Masjid incident in July 2007 is very important. An extremist stronghold in the heart of Islamabad. They were carrying out vigilante activities. It was a big dilemma for the government. If they didn't take action, they would be criticized, and there was fear of public reaction, especially regarding the actions of women. Finally, action was taken under Chinese pressure, and its consequences were very severe. The media and civil society condemned it. A wave of rebellion arose in Pashtun areas, terrorism increased, and most importantly, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formed in December 2007 under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. They also announced their alliance with Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Their statements about Pakistan were also contradictory. Sometimes defensive war, sometimes revolution. Yes, there was also advice from a military officer not to call them Taliban. Maulana Sami-ul-Haq's analogy of a dog in a well also falls into this context. Where are the roots of TTP? Sources say the defense of Afghan jihad, Pashtunwali, meaning hospitality, tribal freedom. Yes. They are different from the Afghan Taliban, although their ideological foundation is the same. Their focus has been more on fighting the Pakistani state. Mullah Omar also had concerns about this. What is their structure? A rather loose alliance. Commanders are autonomous. After Baitullah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud came. And funding comes from narcotics, taxes on illegal activities, crimes. What is their appeal? Not just religion. Not just religion. The implementation of Sharia is a big slogan, but it is often a mixture of Sharia, Pashtunwali, and tribal justice. People consider it better than the corrupt Pakistani system. And they enforce law effectively. For example, the case of the ceramics trader. Yes. Controlling extortion or drug trafficking, resolving business disputes. Max Weber called such groups rational bandits, who provide what the state cannot. This narrative of defensive war is also very effective, isn't it? It generates sympathy among the public and weakens support for military action. Yes, the story of the Lahore shopkeeper, if they don't fight us, why should we fight them? Its roots are also old. In the Pashtun tradition of religious resistance, Akhunds and Fakirs, the Taliban are a new form of this tradition. A more organized, more effective union of young mullahs. Social changes also occurred in FATA. Mullahs replaced the tribal chiefs. Wahhabi influence increased. The Afghan jihad of the 80s was a turning point. FATA became a safe haven. Weapons came. The border became irrelevant. Pakistani Pashtuns went for jihad. Madrasas were built with Arab money. Returning fighters became heroes. The role of religious personalities was also important. Mediation of disputes. Yes, Syed Mian, Mullah, and TTP leaders often came from ordinary backgrounds. Like the bus conductor example. This also gave them a class appeal. This is indeed a very complex picture. History, politics, religion, tribal traditions are all intertwined. Absolutely. And as Sana Haroon has said, loyalties in tribal areas have changed, external patrons have changed, but the claim of autonomy has always remained.