Ronnie C. Chan: The Past, Present, and Future of U.S.-China Relations

Good evening. Uh, my name is Katrina Armstrong, and I have the incredible privilege of being the interim president here and being able to introduce this event tonight. I'm really grateful that you're all here to hear about the past, present, and future of US-China relations.

I want to begin by thanking our distinguished guest, Ronnie Chan, for being here alongside Jeffrey Sachs and Lean Hwin, who I've gotten the pleasure of meeting over the last hour, and we're so glad you're here and have come to Columbia. I think, as you all can imagine, there are good parts of my job and some less good parts of my job, but I will say the best part of my job, of these times, is getting to listen and learn from experts across a variety of disciplines about the topics and issues that matter the most in the world today.

Columbia is such an extraordinary place, a place where we have experts from pretty much every corner of every scholarship, every way of thinking, and we can bring them together in areas of study that create these hubs of discussion, collaboration, and exchange that I think are truly second to none. Today, we're here because of the Weatherhead Institute, which is really a wonderful example of what we can do and what is the best of us, a place where we can host topics and speakers, as we're doing tonight, such as the conversation on this incredibly important, complex, and consequential topic of US-China relations.

Of course, I want to, as we head into this conversation, situated in the importance of that relationship here between Columbia and the people and institutions of China, something that I was hearing some of the history about not too long ago. I think, as we know, that this relationship has been nurtured for a long time, a relationship that believes in the sharing of information, the pursuit of research, and the growth of ideas, really dating back for more than 150 years. In fact, as I understand it, it dates back to the late 19th century, during the Qing Dynasty, when a group of prominent Chinese leaders came to study here.

In the 20th century, Columbia developed over the years into a major research university and learned the power of the exchange with China, where students came here to receive advanced training in scientific fields like chemistry and physics and became well-known, preeminent scientists. And that, of course, we learned from those students, and those students brought an exchange to us that has strengthened us over the decades and many, many years to come. Many of the leaders in China learned from some of the systems they encountered here, just as we brought those ideas to what we were building here at Columbia University. And I know that we're incredibly proud today that this dynamic exchange of people and ideas continues to propel us forward, both from the students who we welcome from China, the classes in Chinese history, language, and culture, and events like this one, where we ask ourselves the important questions about how we can continue to build that relationship, continue to learn together.

With that, I'm absolutely delighted to be able to introduce Jeffrey Sachs, the university professor and director of the Center for Sustainable Development in the Institute, who will be introducing our speakers this evening. Thank you all so very much for being here.

President Armstrong, thank you so much for hosting us here, and how lucky all of us are to be at this wonderful event. Uh, Ronnie, thank you for being here. We have a, a, a great leader of China, of the business community, the policy community, one of the world's great philanthropists who has spread, uh, through a family tradition, tremendous benefits in public health and in so many other areas. And, uh, we're here to celebrate the Weatherhead East Asia Institute's 75th Anniversary, which is, uh, absolutely, uh, phenomenal, of this great institution with, uh, Lean H, our wonderful director and a great scholar and historian of US-East Asian, uh, affairs over the last century and some of the most difficult periods of the last century, notably the Vietnam War experience.

As President Armstrong said, Columbia's tradition, uh, is so strong with China. You would hope and think that there would be no problems. We would just be here celebrating a great, long tradition. And I was just thinking about one of the greatest accomplishments of one of the greatest Chinese graduates of this university, P.C. Chang, who was a student of Thomas Dewey, uh, in, uh, of John Dewey, excuse me, in the 1920s and then went on to be the, uh, Vice Chair under Eleanor Roosevelt for the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which showed we can have global ethics and we can have a global community based on human dignity and decency, drawing on the great traditions of China, of the United States, of Europe, of world cultures. And that was the real meaning of that, and that's someone we're very proud was trained here, uh, and shows this long, great tradition of Columbia, uh, and China relations.

I have to say, that's how I feel about relations with China. I can't understand why we feel that there's any kind of crisis at all. In my view, there doesn't have to be. But we're not here to listen to me. We're here to listen to these great, uh, leaders, uh, who, in each of their distinctive ways, in scholarship, in business, uh, in, uh, government advising, in philanthropy, are helping to bridge the United States and China in the most constructive ways. Ronnie Chan, of course, is, uh, a great business leader, uh, of Hang Lung Properties Limited, the honorary chair in Hong Kong. He has been a senior advisor to the Chinese government in many capacities. I've known him, uh, in his capacity as a senior advisor to the China Development Research Foundation, which also hosts an annual gathering for the last 25 years, which brings together people from the United States and Europe to China, and it's been a great way to deepen relations and build trust and build a sound understanding that if it could be generalized, would be phenomenal for the world. And, uh, Ronnie Chan will be in conversation with our very own, uh, Lean H. Uh, and, um, I'm going to turn it over to you because we're just desperately eager to listen and to learn and to benefit from, uh, the wisdom of both of you. Thank you very much.

First, I just want to thank President Armstrong and Professor Sachs. Uh, President Armstrong for the wonderful opening remarks, and to Professor Sachs for their great introductions. I also would like to thank the Weatherhead East Asian Institute faculty members, uh, many of whom are here tonight, uh, as well as the lovely staff, who without them, this event would not have happened at all. Uh, they're amazing, uh, and to all of you for coming out, uh, on this cold evening, and most of all, to my good friend, Ronnie Chan.

So, just a little bit of background. Uh, I met Ronnie when the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, uh, decided to undertake a summer alumni tour to reconnect with our communities in Asia. Uh, and it was on this trip, uh, to Hong Kong in particular, and to the Asia Society, where we screened our artist-in-residence Tony Bui's film, *Three Seasons*. And there, Ronnie and I began this great conversation over dinner. We had, uh, one-table conversations, and we did that that night after the screening of *Three Seasons*, and then the next night at, at the office of, of Hang Lung. And this is sort of an extension of that, but we're doing it in front of our closest 200 friends here, uh, in the audience. So it's a little different, but I hope to kind of try to reproduce that intimate discussion, uh, here with you all today.

So, to begin, and kind of following up on, uh, Professor Sachs, I'm a historian. I love dealing with the past, so I'm going to start there. Uh, and of course, our, our title is, you know, the past, present, future of US-China relations. And I'm not going to start in the deep past, uh, even though I teach courses that begin pretty much in the 1760s to today. But I'm going to start with one man, Henry Kissinger. And, and Henry Kissinger is someone that Ronnie, who Ronnie knew quite well, uh, when he was alive, but I only met once, but studied very closely through the course of my research for my book on the Vietnam War. And a recent tribute to Doc, to Dr. Kissinger, upon the year anniversary, he only passed away about four days ago, one year and four days ago, the year anniversary of his death. You began your speech in Hong Kong emphasizing the importance of understanding history. Uh, for Dr. Kissinger, in his life, his career, and his legacy, so we historians are very familiar with that. We know how deeply, uh, Dr. Kissinger's respect for history, uh, basically was during his lifetime. He always took the first cut. Uh, and what I mean by that was that, uh, Dr. Kissinger, uh, wrote magisterial volumes about his time in office as National Security Advisor, as well as Secretary of State.

So my question to you, uh, one of the landmark achievements that you contributed to Dr. Kissinger was basically crediting him with the opening of a new chapter in US-China relations. And that, of course, was the beginning of Sino-American rapprochement. That from 1949 until about 1971, with Nixon's, with Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing, Beijing and Washington were enemies, and they went to blows directly over the Korean Peninsula and indirectly during the war in Vietnam. That period of friendship that Dr. Kissinger opened lasted for 40 years or so. In your estimation, it was an arbitrary date that you said with Obama's pivot to Asia. I'd like to pick up on this brief observation that you made to Dr. Kissinger, uh, and his tribute, and I want to ask you, what lessons can we take away from that peaceful era of close friendship from about 1971 to 2011? In other words, what can we learn from that era that could apply today if both sides were willing to cooperate and collaborate rather than compete and challenge? So, my past question. Thank you.

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First of all, allow me to pick up on, uh, one or two things that was said. Jeff was right that in the 1920s, a young man from China came here and and studied, and eventually, uh, had a tremendous effect in changing modern China, Mr. Hu, and he was a president of China Institute, and two of his successors are here actually, I'm, uh, Hammerz, as well as George Gay. So it's really, this is really good work that Columbia has done, uh, 100 years ago. Exactly 100 years ago, uh, because I think it was in 1927 that he took over the China Institute, which is still alive and well today. One other thing I want to acknowledge to people here, because the last time I spoke here was, uh, well, one of the times I spoke here was 1997. Three people invited me: Professor NT Wang, M. Zen, and Carol Gluck. Carol and Maddie are here today. So wonderful that we are still all together.

To answer the question more directly, uh, I have told Henry this. I said, um, the relationship between the US and China in 1971 was very much driven by, I can't say a wrong reason, but it's an inadequate reason, and that is, both countries were having a common enemy in the Soviet Union. That's one reason why the United States wanted to work with China, and that's also why China wanted to work with the United States. And I've long told Henry this, that it is too bad that you had a good beginning for whatever reason in building relationship, that the rest of us have not followed through with other efforts in order to better the relationship and deepen the relationship. So instead of dwelling on just the outward policy, uh, side of things, I would present another side of history. We call her Han, Professor Yan is too difficult to pronounce, so we call her Han. So forgive me. And that is the Chinese people and the American people historically have always been very fond of each other. America never colonized China. The Portuguese did, the British did, the Dutch did in the case of Taiwan, but the Americans never did. American was the most generous. American was the most, it's not I'm not saying this because I'm an American citizen, but that too, uh, America, uh, was the most generous and genuine in its dealings with other people in the absence of purely practical needs or wants.

I remember 30 years ago, I was in Northeast China, bitterly cold, picked up by a business person who was formerly a government official, coming to pick me up in his Buick. And I said, "Why do you have a Buick?" He said, "Oh, made in America, the best." He doesn't know better. My wife and I drove a Buick when we first got married in 1980, and it was a lemon. My point is this, that whether it is the best or not, the Chinese people, as late as 20, 30 years ago, still think that anything that is American, America is automatically the best. I'm not saying whether it's true or it is not true. My point is not that. My point is that the goodwill on a person-to-person basis and in a community-to-community basis far exceeds that of just the outward policy necessity of the day that might have caused Dr. Kissinger and, and President Richard Nixon to better the relationship. So I think that while we are entering into a phase where policy-wise we're diverging, I think that this is the time that we should never forget that there is something more than just policy. There's something more than just necessity of each country, and that is the person-to-person relationship. And my hope is that in the absence of, uh, of the, the opposite of a tailwind, in the opposite of a nice tailwind, these are the times that we need to strengthen the people-to-people, uh, response, uh, person, uh, relationship, which then requires a basic decency of you, of our common humanity, that will carry us a long way. So I, not being a policy wonk, not being an academic smart enough to speak in depth, allow me just to begin my answering your question by bringing it back to a person-to-person basis, that that is at the end of the day something that will endure.

That, uh, one of the, the things that I would love to, uh, explore more in my US-East Asian relations course is the importance of the Open Door Notes. Uh, and this is something that speaks directly to P, perhaps how, uh, sort of understanding of, of the United States or of Americans may be something that could be celebrated, uh, in terms of how the United States, uh, weren't one of the, uh, Western imperial countries that that tried to colonize China, but that instead fought off, uh, other countries, in particular Europe.

I have a question then. So in terms of, you know, if you're looking at this period that Kissinger began in 1971 as a period of, of close friendship, and that it lasted for, what it did, for about 40 years, is the presence of a common enemy, but it outlasted that, that common enemy. So now we're going a little bit more into, into the present, up until 2011. So I want to discuss then this brief, uh, observation that you made in terms of looking at the longer durée of US-China relations since 1949, uh, and to talk about this next chapter, uh, that, uh, Dr. Kissinger witnessed for a little bit, uh, for a good decade, a plus. So what happened in terms of this road to growing tensions? If you could speak a little bit now, moving from the past to the present, and one of the things that I do want to point out that, uh, Professor Carol Gluck made this great observation at this conference that we had on US-Japan relations, that was pretty much in honor of Professor Curtis, and I see them seated, that we're, we're in the middle of what you call, uh, this different chapter, this chapter of growing tensions, of, of perhaps returning to pre-1971 as enemies. You stated that, uh, in your interpretation, that you see US-China relations as cyclical. So if we are now in the middle, and it's hard to talk about the middle, uh, while we're still in it, but what would you say? What would you point to in terms of policies undertaken by both sides that led us to this new chapter, this new, uh, sort of chapter of a potential being opponents and enemies? And I'm going to ask, so that's one: What, what policies did Beijing and Washington take that got us here today? The second would be, outside of thinking of the bilateral relationship, what role did domestic politics play in both countries that led us to here, to where we are today? And the third is geopolitical factors. So outside of what was happening in terms of the United States, uh, and China. So if you could speak generally about where we find ourselves today, anecdotes would be great, because, uh, I, uh, we, he regaled me with many very interesting anecdotes, uh, about your particular role in seeing this happen too.

Well, the difficult relationship was something that I hoped we would, uh, not be smart enough, but good-hearted enough to avoid. Because after all, America has done a lot of good for the world, especially in the last 100 years. I think even enemies of, of America have to admit that America has brought a lot of good to the world. My hope was that America would be able to rise above the, the, the, the pettiness of self-interest. Perhaps I was naive. Perhaps I didn't learn from Dr. Henry Kissinger enough. Perhaps I forgot about realpolitik when I hoped that America would be better. Because you look at it, when the United States built relationship with China in 1971, that was in the height of the Cultural Revolution. That was when China was at its worst. So why is America building relationship with China when China was at its worst? Personal worship of Chairman Mao and many other crazy things that were going on at that time. Yet America built relationship with China. Now, obviously, we mentioned about the common enemy, the Soviet Union at the time. So to bring in morality in, in, in a full sense, is always problematic in diplomacy. We should all have values, that I absolutely agree. But to think that up to a certain point, that value can drive everything, it is just not true. When it comes to existential threat, for example, of some country, of any country, everything goes out of the window. Existential need, survival will become the most important. So if US-China can build relationship when China was in the height of terrible violation of human rights, what about today? Today is far better. China today is far better than what it was in 1971, '72, and yet the relationship is deteriorating. And to me, whether you like it or not, whether you put a label to it called the Thucydides Trap or whatever, that's human nature. That's all. And one thing about Dr. Henry Kissinger, when he read history, is he read it with the North Star of human nature. Human nature is a factor that does not change. Individually, you can improve, but for a society, for a country, it's very difficult. Just read history. Tell me which country, which period of time, a whole country humanly somehow got improved. There were, I can cite you a few, such as smaller countries like Britain during the 18th century, when John Wesley, Charles Wesley, George Whitefield, that affected the religion, affected it, but they didn't last.

So today, I said China is not a threat to the world. If China was a threat to the world, then 1971, '72 was a far worse threat to the world. So why are you now against China and you make friends with China back then? It is simply human nature again. That it is not, China is not a threat to the West. China may be a threat to the supremacy, the hegemony of some country. And if you are not able to call a spade a spade, then you have a little problem. And thank God we're in a university situation in America where there's still the possibility, I hope, of speaking the truth. And so America doesn't like the fact that somebody else is coming close to it. When Japan rose in the 1980s, late '80s and early '90s, the book was written, *Japan as Number One*, right? America reacted, and the Plaza Accord, just down the street, not far from here, in 1986, in a sense, changed the course of Japan's future up to today. So America is not going to allow anyone, or indeed any country in history, rising would not allow a second power to surpass it. And so I, I always believe that the world can, much of the problem can, must be solved when America, the number one country, and China, the number two country, work together. And for the last 30, 40 years, as I said at an Asia Society event about 10 years ago, when Kevin Rudd first joined us as the head of our think tank, I sat in that meeting outside the White House in the Hay-Adams Hotel, that China is very happy to place second fiddle to the United States. And the Ambassador of China to Washington D.C. was sitting in the front row. He did not dispute that statement. Of course, he cannot agree to it either, as a representative of China, but he did not dispute the statement. So that means that China was very happy to play second fiddle to the United States. But it takes the number one to have the magnanimity, the wisdom, the long view to deal with a rising power. If you do not give the rising power the room to grow, history tells us we will not have a good ending. And how can you deny 1.4 billion people wanting a better life? So I think that it is a very sad thing. From China's perspective, there's no choice. They have to improve. They were so pitifully poor in those years that they have to give their people a better livelihood. And rising means economic rise, means technological improvement. And up to a certain point, some people don't, doesn't like it anymore.

So let me, let me turn then to, to pivot to Asia. Then do you see in the seeds of that decision or that pivot, uh, the seeds to this growing tension and hostility, that this was part of the United States trying to contain China's growth, rather than an effort to work with China, given its, its growing strength in the region? So I guess that question comes back to, was it the deliberate, uh, policy undertaken by the Obama administration to contain China, to balance China, and not to integrate China? The reality is, it predates the pivot to Asia. America, since 9/11, was distracted by the Middle East for roughly 10 years. And once that is over, in 2009, roughly, the pivot to Asia came. And my question always to my friends is, they say, "America is back in Asia now." I said, "When did America leave?" The Seventh Fleet is still by far the strongest military power. The businesses are all there, so the universities are there. So they never left. But why do you now say that pivot back to Asia? It is a message to the world that perhaps has a lot more substance unspoken behind that may not mean as, as kind as you and I may think.

So, you know, uh, I can cite you chapter and verse how even militarily, the two were already having a lot of problems, like 1993, the, the ship that Chinese ship in the Indian Ocean stopped for 33 days, stuck, probably with the GPS system turned off. You wonder how come China has to build a B system because for 33 days a ship was cannot go on. And in fact, I was just, I was talking to somebody who was in the Defense Ministry at that time, who was part of the decision-making process, and he was absolutely correct that eventually they agreed upon to have the Saudi Arabian come on ship on board to to check out whatever material it was supposed to have and found nothing. So from 1993, and then I can cite you 1996, two aircraft carriers went to the Taiwan Strait. They never went in, but just two aircraft carriers, and they outgunned the entire PLA. And you wonder how come China is building up its military. And today, America, China is number one or number two in terms of global trade. So how are we going to protect that? So it is said that China always, the military doctrine is always to just protect the coastline. I am not so sure because as the number one, number two trading power in the world, somebody can stop you somewhere, such as the Strait of Malacca, such as the Red Sea, in many places, such as the Gulf of, the Strait of Hormuz, in many places, it can cause you trouble. And so if the, if China and the United States could work together, then it will minimize the need for China to expand its military as much. So, you know, it is action, reaction, and then re-reaction, and then re-reaction, and the world just, you know, just spirals down. And that's exactly what I've been watching. In 1999, you have the bombing of the, the Belgrade embassy. And I remember Senator Mark Kirk, Mark Kirk, I think it was, came to my office about four years or three years ago and said, "Oh, we used an old map." I said, "Sir, come on, everything is electronic these days, it's updated to the second, and you're telling me that somebody opened a map, a paper map, and used an old one? You've got to be kidding me, right?" And then you have 2001, you have the EP-3 spy plane. And I called Chas Freeman, who was a former senior official at the State Department, and said, "What happened there?" And he explained to me how the EP-3 all got to the border of China. And so one day, I was asked by J.P. Morgan to interview as a client. I interviewed the Vice Chair of the International Advisory Committee, which is Bob Gates. And I, I said, Bob, what happened? I said, "You know, you have all these spy planes along the coast of southern China, and then submarines under the water. What if the PLA are found on the California coast? What will America do?" And there's no answer for me, except that, "We did everything abiding by the international law." Say, "Okay, so the other guy also abides by the same rule that you abide by. Will America accept that?" And there's no answer. And so, you know, American exceptionalism from the 19th century is still alive and well. And, and, and, and so I said that one of the world's biggest problems today is America is still living in the world of 1946. In 1946, America has all the moral authority in the world. America has a superiority economically, militarily, politically, like no other country ever in human history has ever enjoyed. But the world has changed. Europe has risen. Russia is no longer the same Russia. Japan has risen. Now China has risen. India is in the process. So America still thinks that we can do anything we want. It is like, I am Mike Tyson, you are Ronnie Chan, and you are in the boxing ring. And of course, you can do anything you want, right? But that was 1946. It is, it's like LeBron James in the dunking contest with Yao Ming, not with Ronnie Chan. He dunked me, right? But it's Yao Ming. So, so, so the world has changed. America is still by far the number one, but the losing of self-confidence on the part of the United States is really a, a problem to the world, and I think it's unnecessary. Uh, but sadly, history tells us otherwise.

So you're getting a little bit of the flavor of the dinner conversations that Ronnie will just drop a name, drop a contact, drop a really interesting anecdote in which he is not only an observer but in many ways an agent of historical change, a player, if you will, in US-China relations. So they're amazing. And for those of you staying for dinner, you're going to hear more. But I have a question since you now brought up the future, which is the last part of our, uh, conversation. So the future. Yes, it's not, it's not China is not where Trump, President-elect Trump, last left China or when he assumed office in 2016. China's exports, its, uh, basically trade capacity is just in a different place than in 2016. It's much more robust now. While we cannot predict Trump and his policies over the next four years, or Trump 2.0, I want you to try and, here, I want you to tell me, will trade, will the trade war, will the new technology war dominate with regard to US-China relations under Trump? How do you see his cabinet picks, and who do you see in his cabinet picks will have maybe outsized importance in terms of influencing US-China relations? What will happen there? What is China doing? What is President Xi doing to prepare China for the next four years? And what do you see as the future? Ronnie, are we going to be okay?

My answer, of course, is I don't know. I don't know. I don't know any of those picks that Trump has made. Only by name, Secretary, uh, yeah, I know. But I know by name. But what will Xi Jinping do? I don't know. But let me say this, if the conflict is within just within the bounds of trade, I say, "Hallelujah." That would be the best scenario we can hope for. My worry is that it will go way beyond trade, just like what happened under the Biden administration. And frankly, my attitude is a very pragmatic one. I'm a business guy, okay? I'm pragmatic. Get, I said, "Get it over with. Do the 60% on day one if you can." China will no doubt be hurt, but so will the United States. Can China withstand it? Can America withstand it? Don't just look at the one side of the equation. China will be hurt, although, just a little story. I was with a group of my, uh, mentees. I took care of a group of, uh, very wealthy second-generation hardworking entrepreneurs. And one guy said to me, he's the biggest in his industry, manufacturing in China. He said, "60% tariff, I can manage that." But not every industry can. So China will suffer. Not everybody is as good as my friend. But that said, let me just tell you something else. I invited Jamie Dimon to speak at the Chairman of J.P. Morgan about five months ago, in Hong Kong. And he went, as you know, he's, you know, one of the top bankers in the world. And he said, you know, he went out, a lot of risks that as a leading banker, he has to deal with and be concerned with. And then he basically, at the end, said, in so many words, "My real concern are none of those, but two more beyond that. Number one, nuclear proliferation or hard power military. Number one. Number two, structural inflation." I know nothing about the military, so I'm not, I can't, I'm not qualified to talk about that. But structural inflation, I'm a business guy, and I just don't see how America can handle the structural inflation that will come if Trump were to do what he did, 60% tariff, and not just on China, now also on Canada, on Mexico, and the rest of the world. I believe that we're entering into a huge period of rising inflation, not just on a cyclical basis. I don't watch, I just saw before coming in here, one of the Fed governors was saying that he's now leaning towards maybe in December have one more cut, uh, if there's no, uh, nothing unto what happening. This, I don't read that. That clouds my mind in understanding the overall picture. I'm not a trader. I don't look at the screen every day and buy and sell bonds and currency and interest rate swaps and what have you. I don't. So what I am really concerned is that the structural inflation that will result will be so severe that he who, in inflation, would be tremendous. And he who has the most debt, and America has a lot of debt, would have to face the music. And so I think that, um, it is no longer like 1946, where America can deal with anybody at will. That is not the case anymore. And it is probably good that Europe rose, Japan rose, China rose, India is rising, Vietnam is rising. And America has learned to adjust to a new world with America still by far being the top leader economically, militarily, and if you are wise politically. But my worry is that America is painting herself into a corner. Last year, I was in the Middle East six times. I've been going to the Middle East for 49 years, the last 49 years, and I'm there all the time. And the former, uh, Central Bank Governor of Israel was sitting right here. But I go to Arab countries more than I go to Israel these days. And they told me last year, four minister-level persons from four different countries, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel, told me that America is no longer the primary player in this region. I felt sad to hear that. And then two weeks ago, I had three ladies and gentlemen at my office, the same room where I hosted, uh, for dinner, and that is Barroso, the former President of the European Commission, uh, the former Foreign Minister of, uh, of, um, Spain, Arancha González, who is now the Dean of the Sciences Po in Paris. And then a gentleman from the, uh, former Secretary General of the Foreign Affairs of France, who was successively the French Ambassador to Japan, UK, Germany, and China. And I, I said this, I made a statement over dinner. I said, "From what I can observe, I worry that America is also retreating from Europe." And the signs to me are quite obvious. What was their reaction? The reaction was zero. No reaction. That means nobody disputed my statement. And that is very telling. These three are truly leaders of Europe in many, many ways relating to international affairs. And so it saddened me as an American citizen to see America's position in the world being undercut by ourselves. Nobody can undercut America. Just like the US dollar, nobody can damage a US dollar except one country. And if you say it's China, you don't know what the heck you are talking about. It's only the United States that can undermine the US dollar. And over the last 30 years, America has been doing double time, it seems, to undercut the supremacy of the US dollar. And now, I, I don't understand how it can be good for America or indeed anywhere in the world. I believe something that nobody, most people don't believe the same way as I do. And that is, even China, people think that China, oh, they, the RMB will replace the US dollar. Ladies and gentlemen, if you believe so, as far as I'm concerned, you don't, you don't know anything about China. Even China doesn't mind having a US dollar being the leading currency because it keeps a more stable environment economically, internationally. So I think that it is, you know, very sad that what I observe today. Uh, even the international police, it is, you may not like the police, but it's better to have a police than not have a police, as long as the police is not overbearing. And I'm afraid that sometimes it gets a little overbearing. And so I think that, you know, um, we are entering into a period of the world that is so complicated that I have never seen before. So eight years ago, I gave a talk at the University of Chicago on eight ways to damage mankind to a group of graduate students. And sorry to say, all eight of them are being played out in front of my eyes. And that is really very sad and to me, dangerous. And that's why I tell my son, who is now 42, when she was, when he was 32, I said to him, one day I said, "Son, I don't admire your generation. My generation is the luckiest. Your generation is doomed." Maybe, maybe I said enough.

We can't end our conversation on a sad note. I do want to have one final question. We're going to bring it full circle again with Dr. Henry Kissinger. I, uh, wonder if there will be, in bringing back your point about sort of personal diplomacy and the importance of, of historical agents in, in flipping the script, opening a new chapter. Initially, one of the, uh, one of the people I identified is someone that, uh, actually was our, uh, keynote speaker for the Weatherhead East Asia Institute 75th Gala. So we were here in February, so almost, uh, close to a year. And John Kerry spoke about his work with his counterpart in China, and that was a real great example of collaboration between two competitors to make, to make change. But maybe not John Kerry, maybe the next Henry Kissinger could be Ronnie Chan, in terms of making a change in the, uh, trade. Been drinking vodka? What was that? You have been drinking vodka? We haven't begun yet. Ronnie. No, but seriously, do you see that it would take, uh, someone, and who that could be in the Trump administration? I, I would not know, uh, to open a new era so that, as you spoke in your tribute to Dr. Kissinger, future generations, we think, you know, in about 10 years, that we will actually see a new chapter, and that will be one of friends and collaborators once again?

Well, let me say this. You mentioned John Kerry. John, I don't know him that well, but to me, he seems to be a very decent man. And what he's doing in the climate area over the last decade or two has been very admirable. And in fact, many, many years, many, many moons ago, when he was still a senator or congressman, I, I even supported him. So I think John Kerry is a wonderful gentleman. But in order to have people such as I mentioned, three people in my tribute to, uh, Dr. Henry, Dr. Henry Kissinger, the other one is Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of Germany, and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, one from the US, one from Europe, one from Asia. To me, these are products of a time that unless there is the convergence of external environment, without that environment, such great brains do not arise. And over the last 40 years, I have been searching around the world for people from whom I learn, not having a superior in intellect. I figured the best way for me to learn is to find people who have a super intellect, and by a process of, uh, osmosis, maybe I will understand a few things. So that's what I've been doing for the last 40 years. And I've yet to find anyone that comes close to those three gentlemen. And as you alluded to, all three of them understand history extremely well, and all three of them read history with the North Star of human nature. They are not ideological. They understand ideology, they respect ideology, but in analyzing the situation in order to make practical decisions, those three gentlemen are a cut above.

Now, the question is, will the coming, your question is, if US-China were to get into a really troublesome, scary situation, which, by the way, I do not foresee, and I can tell you why, but anyway, that's another question unasked by the professor here, unasking it. Tell us, unless there is such a terrible situation, the, the, such great brains don't rise. Let me tell you what Helmut Schmidt said to me one day about Henry Kissinger, which I want, there are very few things I disagree with these gentlemen, but once in a while, I do disagree with them, and this is one of them. He said, "The problem with Henry now that they're all gone, I perhaps I can say it with all goodwill, the problem with Henry is that he has never seen war." Which is not true. Helmut Schmidt told me how in 1941-42, he and his fiancée at the time, Loki, I know her too, and they were looking, they were watching dead bodies on the streets of Hamburg every day. And he said that put in him a fear for war. Let's do our utmost to avoid it. Lee Kuan Yew, we all know what happened under the British, the Malaysia, and the house, Singapore separated, and, and, and having to fight the British, and then having to keep the Malaysians, the West Malaysians away. So these two gentlemen saw a lot of war. But I disagree that Henry also saw war. Just that once he was sent to Europe, he was so smart, and his accent tells her that he knows German, and he eventually was sent to the, the, the, the unit to decipher whatever intelligence. And the reason I believe that Kissinger has been involved in more wars is because, and by the way, of the three, Henry has the most influence on global affairs, bar none, for one reason, if nothing else, and that is Henry Kissinger represented the United States of America, being the leading country in the world. Its position is very different from smaller countries, let's say Singapore, as an example. You try to start a war, you don't have the right to. I, I'm, you tell me to start a war, to start a fight with anybody? No, I get the hell out of here, I'm small. But Henry Kissinger represented the United States, and by the way, it is just a fact that America is starting more wars than anybody has in history, probably. And according to a US Congressional survey, before 1990, there were for 190 years, America was involved in foreign war 1.1 times per year on average. After 1990, it was 6.1 times. And so, you know, Henry represented the biggest country and the most significant, important country, has no choice but they have to make decisions like smaller countries' leaders have to.

So will such great men arise? Let's not, I hope not, because if they do, if they rise, it means the world is going to be in such a bad shape, such as during the Cold War years. You may argue that the Cold War in some way is already with us. Let's hope that it would not develop to such an extent that great brains such as those three gentlemen will be able to rise. And so, and why do I think that the US, to answer your question, why I don't think that at the end of the day, US-China will get out of hand? As I mentioned today, both sides have enough power. The only way, let me jump to conclusion first, the only way to maintain peace is when there's a relative balance of power. Very certain. If there's no balance of power, one party will take advantage of the other. And so only balance of power will be able to maintain a certain sanity, certain peace on Earth. Some people, I know what you're thinking, some people say you are a warmonger. I'm not. I just read history according to human nature. And so, given that background, I asked two questions. The first question is easy: Can China defeat America? No way. The harder question is, can America defeat China, meaning that it accomplishes what it's trying to do in containing China's rise? The answer is most likely not. And if both sides cannot do it, then it will become a draw, a long draw-out contest, which becomes a psychological game in the short run. Okay? So in that situation, neither side can win, but both sides can lose. So the name of the game is not to lose. Whoever loses first loses big. Doesn't mean that the other guy may not also lose, but that's secondary. So if both sides cannot win, it is really how you prevent yourself from losing. And we all know the problems in China today, economic, political, structural, social, serious. And so if you have, if you force me to make a bet, like a businessman has to decide buy or no buy, sell or no sell, I say China is in a very precarious position in the short run. But if China can get over that hump in the next, say, five years, I think that the time may turn, then time may be on the side of the Chinese, because it is no longer a game of how many punches you can throw, it is how many punches you can absorb. And growing up in the, in the Vietnam War years, I knew how anti-war sentiment can easily rise in the United States. So if China can get over this.

short-term hump, which is not easy. Then I think that time may be on China's side. America has challenges also with now the new government. Maybe challenges will become even more serious domestically and internationally. And by the way, if either country lose, I believe it will not be because of international affairs, not because the other guy beat you up. It's because you beat yourself up. China can beat herself up. America can beat herself up too, meaning China can beat up China, us can beat up us. And in the long haul, I think that time may not be on the US side. So I think that the best, of course, is for us to resolve all that thing.

So let me jump to my final conclusion, and that is America, if you were to read history, America ends conflicts in only one of two ways. The other is, I win, you lose. Second World War, Cold War, Iran War, I win, you lose. And America is not a bad winner. The other way, however, exists, and that is what I call the Korean War model, where America knows that it cannot win, then it will very quickly get the heck out of there. That's Korean War, that's Vietnam War, that's Afghanistan. So it is not like we have not seen it before. Somebody reminded me today, America has not won a war since World War II. I said, like Israel has never won a war since 1967. And so, so I think that both sides should, in my opinion, clean up their own house internally instead of picking a fight outwardly. Because at the end of the day, it is your own house inwardly that will determine your future, not the international side of things, although that is very troublesome. And we all know willing to take questions from the audience for just a little bit. Uh, but I want to lay down some ground rules. So please introduce yourself first and and have a question, not just a statement.

Oh, hi, um, Mr. Chan, thank you so much for, um, the talk today. Took a lot of notes. Um, my name is Liam. I'm a first year, um, Columbia, uh, student, um, studying Master of Public Policy. I'm Chinese American. My question for you is, you said, um, you told your son that you are the luckiest generation, and we are all doomed. So what advice do you have for younger generations like ourselves on just what to do? Should we just be doomers and watch brain rot videos? What, what's the recommendation? Thank you.

Thank you for that question. I appreciate it. Let me first say why do I think that my generation is the luckiest? When I grew, I was born in 1949, December. So I'm a baby boomer. And and pretty soon, war debt were paid down, countries were rising economically, unless you happened to be in one of those communist countries. For those of us in the Free World, so to speak, we were enjoying economic rise like there's no tomorrow. You have a degree called bachelor's degree. You don't have to be from Columbia, it has, it can be from any little college, and you will get a job. Right? When we grew up, the sky was blue, the water was clean, the soil was unpolluted. Man, it was a good, it was a beautiful world. What happened? My generation muck it up, and we don't even apologize to your generation today. The debt is so piled up in most countries that there's no possibility of our paying back. So sorry, Zen. Your job, you pay it back, right? Sky is no longer blue, and the water is polluted. The soil is terrible, the air is bad. Well, all those kind of problems you guys have to take care of. Natural resources, we, we had abundance when we grew up. We exhausted a lot of it. You guys have to deal with it. Use technology, use whatever means, right? So I'm sorry, I'm apologizing. By the way, uh, your generation is entering into a very difficult period. That said, I believe the following. It's just one man's view, okay? Number one, studying is not just to get a job. Studying is to make you a better person. So whether you don't just, don't just look at the out, outside world, it is good, it's bad, right? Studying in itself is a pleasure, is a joy. So enjoy your four years, your three and a half in your case, right? That's number one. Number two, how we adjust our own psyche is critical. The sad thing is today, mental illness is almost a pandemic. And I had a Harvard Medical School professor said to me last year, he said, 80% of the students, or almost 80% of the students at his university, her university, needs some form of psychological counseling. I serve on the board of USC, University of Southern California, until five, six years ago, and it was brought to the board about the mental health of the student. The universities, you don't need Professor Armstrong, President Armstrong to tell you that is an extraordinarily complicated place. Nothing that is less than very important get brought to the board, and mental illness was one of them. This thing doesn't help. And by the way, Australia is now limiting people 16 year old or below, right, on on the on the on the time on cyberspace. China, about three years ago, limited the kids from playing video games and what have you to what, two hours or something on the weekends, not on the weekdays. In those days, everybody is condemning the China, the the Chinese. And today, people are condemning the Australians. You want to bet that 5 years from now, most of the country in the world will have exactly the same policy? Because the problem that it contributed to, it's not the only cause, but it's a big cause. It's so severe, severe. So I'm just using one. I can give you, you know, many other. I'm just using the psychological problem as one, uh, that your generation has to face. And I think that to keep a healthy internal, uh, psyche as well is important. Now, obviously, family is something that has broken up, broken down, uh, everywhere in the world, including China, but perhaps less so in Asia than in the West. These are, at the end of the day, critical to man's, so revival since time in memorial. And if we were to destroy these things or neglect these things, it cannot be good for mankind. So I think at the end of the day, you know, uh, I'm so glad that my son, my older son is happily married. They have no children, and my wife and I are just very happy that they have no children. We don't give them any pressure. Uh, because I don't want to see a grandson or granddaughter growing up in a world, world like today. My other son is not married, 40, but he brought back a wonderful girl, uh, last, last week from Los Angeles. Well, hey, family still matters. And so I see, uh, my friend Peter Jesu and Barbara, his wife, here. Hey, ladies and gentlemen, it's a beautiful scene. The sad thing is that you see less and less of it. I just hope that your generation will be smart enough to maintain family structure, uh, in order for yourself and your children to have a better life and be more resilient in dealing with a world that is beyond your control or that of mine.

And I would just add, it's not your generation. I want Ronnie to address poor Gen X because we can't seem to actually take over from Baby Boomers. Uh, but we'll have to give way to the Millennials and after us. It seems we're forever in the wings, we're forever bride-made, never the bride. I retired a few months ago because I think my son is very good. He's 41 at that time. He took over. I'm a free man. Wonderful. How come you're not congratulating me?

Another question. Hi, thank you so much for your enlightening conversation. My name is Philli, I'm from Singapore. I'm a senior year student at Columbia University. I'm studying Cognitive Science and Computer Science. What university, Columbia like? Oh, Columbia. Oh, sorry. Very good. So I think you offered a really pertinent diagnosis of what's of what the relationship between the US and China is, and I mostly agree with what you're saying. But my question really is, how do we, how do we actuate the kind of dynamic that you want to see in the US? Because, for instance, how do we, what, how do we actuate it? Because, actuate, yeah. For, okay, because you mentioned that the US right now is acting in very, in a very narrow self-interest because it's looking at its own economic needs, its own trade needs, its own political, um, internal dynamics. But what you are proposing is something of how can, it's kind of asking the US, asking the US to look at its enlightened self-interest, which is something which is very difficult to do. So my question is, how, how can the US move away from its narrow self-interest and think more in terms of enlightened self-interest? Thank you.

Thank you. I always use this phrase, and that is, I'm pessimistic, but I'm not passive. Because you are passive, you have no future. So whether I win, whether I don't win, I'm active, trying my best to do my little part. Am I doing a good job? I don't know. Will I make any difference? I don't know. I have no grandeur of what I can do. I'm, and nobody. But if I don't do, you don't do, he doesn't do, she doesn't do, the world is doomed. So I think that, you know, all of us have this responsibility. Will it make a difference? I hope that if enough of us do something good, maybe it will help. How do you change America, or how do you change any country, frankly? I have very little hope. I just think that things have to play out, and we do our best in every step of the way to hopefully restrain it a little so it doesn't go off the deep end. But will that fundamentally change? I don't think so. Again, I draw from history that it is not, it is almost impossible for a big country like America to be at the brink and not fall off. And so if it has to fall off, let it fall off. It won't be the end of the day. America will survive. America will do okay. So will other countries like China. China will do okay too. They may have serious challenges ahead, and even terrible things happen possibly, and they have had had a lot of it in the past, but they are, they will, they have to live on. So it's up to the people to live their own life. And so I think, and by the way, let's have a little bit more respect for one another, respect for people who are different from what we are. If we always say that I am better than you, I am the standard, then that is a very dangerous position to take. America is fond of saying, you know, democracy, freedom, you know, all that stuff. I like it too. You can tell by now, I'm a loudmouth. I need a little, a little room, a little freedom in order to survive in this world. So I enjoy that, I appreciate it. But that said, for us to say that we are the standard, everybody has to be like us, is frankly against history, against human nature. It won't happen. If you, if we can persuade others in a kind, nice way, overtime, influencing others, that's the best we can hope for. So I, I have no grandeur of trying to change the world. I don't want to discourage all the university students here, especially when you're smart enough to go to Columbia, that you know, you think you can take on the world. Well, I'm 74, uh, and almost 75, and so, uh, even when I was young, I have no dream of grandeur. I just try to understand the world around me and survive, uh, and hopefully, well, by the way, uh, I live a lot happier that way. I'm not, I'm not passive. No one can accuse me for being passive. I'm as active as in as ever, although I am pessimistic more than ever before.

I was going to say, we're going to end on those words of wisdom. Everyone, I'm going to allow Ronnie because he's my guest to just mingle here for a little, a little bit longer. So for those who have questions, please feel free to come up, uh, to the stage to ask them personally to Ronnie. But I feel like I should let him off the hook in terms of being here, in front of everyone to answer collectively. So please join me in a round of applause for Ronnie Chan.