Transcription
We're going to talk in this panel, um, a bit more specifically on the alliance itself and how it's faring under the current leadership in both capitals.
Um, we have a terrific panel here of people to sort of unpack the dynamics, um, in the US-South Korea security relationship. So I would like to start, um, by looking at, sort of, the overall health of the alliance. How you see it?
Um, during the first Trump administration, um, there was a bit of a rupture in the alliance, um, mostly over, um, burden-sharing issues. It seemed, um, more stable, sort of, to my surprise, given that there was a vacuum of leadership when, when, um, Trump first took office. It seems stable, but I do think that there's a lot of underlying tensions, um, in in the alliance. And I, and I wonder from your perspective, um, you know, how, how fit for purpose is the alliance right now? Um, are, are there fundamental differences, um, or are there things that we can just work through? And why don't we start with you, Sungho?
There's a lot of anxiety about the US alliance partnership overall in the world. In particular, if you think about NATO and US this year, Munich talking about wrecking war, and US-Canada, the rupture, all kinds of very, you know, serious accusations from the alliance partners about the United States being very different from previous traditional, uh, attitudes. Given all that, and plus you have this war going on in Ukraine, and Iran, etc., zooming, you know, into Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, I would say still, compared to that, under the circumstances, the answer is quite okay so far for quite many reasons.
First of all, yes, there's no war going on in this that part of the world, so it's quite stable. And the stability is still, uh, is a work of US presidents in the region with this commitment and the soldiers and, you know, militaries in Japan and South Korea, for example, and also Southeast Asia. And with regard to the Trump administration's policy towards this, in a sense, I mean, yes, there's a trade issues, there's some kind of, uh, you know, mishap and some burden-sharing issue, etc. But in it, in reality, it turned out to be was quite successful.
First, the thing was the summit between President Lee and Mr. Trump in both Washington and, and so turned out, turned up to be quite good. So these two leaders, you know, uh, had good meetings, and I think they, they had good chemistry between them. Of course, South Korea, you know, put a lot of effort to to please, uh, Mr. Trump, which worked quite well. And second, when it comes to real alliance, uh, issues, yes, there's a, maybe we'll delve into more detail later on, but overall, there's alliance modernization. But for example, burden sharing didn't become such a bigger issue because, in a way, South Korea, we already committed we are going to spend more money on our own defense, for which Mr. Trump was okay. And when it comes to troops, and said, yeah, there are some kind of expectations about troop adjustment, etc., but it's not like, oh, they're going to leave and drastically reduce the troops, this will be the end of the alliance, things like that. So, in general, I think at the moment, so far, the alliance has been very stable. And despite all this concern about North Korea, were that there's also kind of alignment between the US policy and current government policy towards North Korea, or in a way, kind of engaging rather than confronting. So that, at least the region or Korean Peninsula remains quite stable and peaceful. So overall, in in that context, to me, so far so good, I would say.
So Mark, I'd like your take on this too. Um, and and I want to push you a little bit. I mean, I, I agree with Sungho that it's stable, that there hasn't been eruptions, but there is some sense that, you know, the United States is focused much more on the Taiwan Straits and a possible contingency there, um, than they are on North Korea. Um, so where do you see, um, this, this, the alliance specifically? Are we on the same page, or are there some real challenges to navigate?
No. And, um, first, let me just say thanks for hosting this. This is a great event. The first panel was excellent. You're off and running. I'm sure the dinner was great last night, uh, as well. So, um, I just want to congratulate you in advance and the Asia Society Policy Institute and obviously all of the partners that are working with this, uh, to to make this a special event, and just honored to be here.
Second, just a quick say, just a quick note. I'm speaking only for myself, not any organization which, uh, which, which I'm affiliated with. No organization really wants to be affiliated with me, but so I'm usually surprised at that. But that's, uh, neither here nor there. I, I tend to be, um, a bit of a glass half full, like Sungho is over here, in that I was just in Canada. Um, and I was in South Korea the week before. And, you know, the the relationship with Canada is unbelievably strained, stressed, so much so that, you know, the Canadians are taking actions that will, will be hard to undo in the future, like, for example, creating their own defense industrial base and divorcing themselves from, uh, the American, uh, or at least I wouldn't say maybe divorcing, but more of a separation, uh, from the American defense industrial base as well. I mean, those are hard to reverse and, you know, really kind of permanent. And the the attitude and atmosphere is much different.
Uh, in Korea, um, you know, I would say it's being managed. The tensions are being managed. I, I think that's point one. Second point, though, is is where the, is it where we should be? And the answer is no, right? We should be doing a lot better. Um, it could be worse, but it probably should be better. That's kind of where I net net out on that. And you look at kind of the own goals and unnecessary friction, some of which were discussed on the last panel, and those are things that are frankly would have been relatively, I think, easy to avoid. Um, and moreover, things that do happen. There are always tensions in the alliance. You think back under the Biden administration, there were problems with, um, things such as the profit-sharing agreement for and the Chips Act, which caused a big rupture, uh, and then the IRA, the electric battery issue, all of that with the automakers. Those were serious issues, but they were managed and managed quickly and carefully. I, I don't think we're doing quite as good of a job as we were last, the last couple of, um, I would say, Democratic administrations there.
Uh, but again, having said that, I would agree with the general assessment. The leaders have a good relationship, number one. Number two, issues are generally confined to the trade and investment space. Number three, we haven't had huge blow-ups in the security area. And so I would say the alliance is, the alliance is once again proving itself, um, resilient. Let me just get off the stage by saying, you know, I think there are things that are clearly on the horizon that we're going to have to manage through. OPCON is one, all over the headlines today in Korea. Um, you sort of look through this list of issues that is that is that is coming at us pretty quickly, and you, you have to figure out, you know, how we're going to tactically maneuver through that to keep the alliance, you know, I would say relatively stable and balanced going forward. Let me stop there.
Great. Um, I know that being, you've focused on OPCON issues. And I wonder if you think of that as just sort of garden-variety alliance management, or whether that signifies something more. Um, and also just your general take, too. I mean, we're living in so much more of a volatile and unstable geopolitical environment, which suggests to me that the alliance needs to to reform in some fundamental ways. But I'd love to hear your take on it.
Um, well, it's, first of all, it's great to be, um, part of this distinguished panel, and it's been 17 years since I've been back to New York. So thank you, in many ways, for having me here today.
Um, about the alliance, uh, in general, I, I agree with all the panelists have said, um, uh, I think we are managing quite well, then, um, despite all the issues that are going on under the name of alliance modernization.
Um, but I do have some concerns because, well, first of all, um, uh, the Trump administration has set out a very clear, um, outward, uh, framework for the alliance, which is, uh, South Korea takes the primary responsibility of the defense of the Korean Peninsula, and the US will provide critical but more limited support. And the national security strategy also stated that American military, uh, will not and cannot not, um, do all the things alone. So the burden shifting and burden sharing is really the guiding principle of this alliance modernization. And to that regard, I think it's fundamental but manageable, as Professor Shen mentioned, because South Korea has hit its milestones in defense budget, conventional military, um, and we have taken, um, increasing responsibilities when it comes to conventional deterrence. So, it's a manageable, um, I would say, South Korea is positioned, um, in a better position than ever to take increased, uh, primary responsibility. So, that capability-wise, we are ready. But, um, in terms of strategic communication and how it is conveyed, that's the place I think I do have some concerns. Because what we really have to work on is that this primary responsibility, critical but more limited support, is not translated as a US's, um, um, little bit of retrenchment or retreat from the adversary's perspective. And this primary responsibility really has to be backstopped by US's continued commitment of extended deterrence and the defense of the Korean Peninsula. So, in that regard, in on whatever we do together, we have to work on consultation, um, communication, and better messaging.
Um, for the OPCON transfer, I think, uh, we, we probably go into this in detail later on, but the Yoon administration, I think President Yoon and Defense Minister Lee said a couple of days ago that South Korea will be, is ready already, and we can do it tomorrow. That's what they said.
Speaking in my personal capacity, and what I see is two observations. Uh, we have been postponing the OPCON transfer. So it previously was time-based. The Moon administration postponed the date to the, uh, Yoon administration, pushed to Park Geun-hye administration. And during Park Geun-hye administration, that was when we changed to the condition-based. But now, as President Yoon is talking about finishing the second stage of OPCON, um, by this year, and then, uh, the third last step by end of at least 2028. I think we are back going back to this time-based approach, which the US does not necessarily agree. Um, um, I hope we can go back to this, but I don't want to take too long. So, yeah.
No, that's helpful. And I think this is a pretty well-informed audience, but OPCON refers to operational control during wartime, and it's been an issue that has dogged the alliance, um, for decades now. Um, but we, we can go into that in more detail, um, if you'd like. But on the, um, US commitment, extended deterrence, um, I, I, there must be some degree of alarm given the flow of military assets to the Middle East since the Iran war began. Um, in terms of personnel, I believe some of whom came off the Korean Peninsula, um, also, um, the THAAD batteries, um, that were also transferred in that direction. So, do you, you know, have that sense of alarm right now that, that, that US capabilities are just being moved to another theater, and any concern that they won't actually return? Mark, do you want to start with that?
I guess what I would say is, first, you know, it's not been the best allocation of resources to get pulled back into this, um, conflict in the Middle East yet again. Right. I think, I think most foreign policy experts are, you know, have, you know, have been critical of this for good reason. I think that's, I think that's the first point.
Um, the second is just on the actual hard, you know, kind of the, the resource allocation. I think there are two things that are that that I think we need to be concerned with. I mean, there are multiple, but the two main ones are, one, the the movement of certain assets into the the Middle East, Persian Gulf area. I think most of those will return, frankly. But I think the large, longer-term issue is, I don't want to use the word degradation, but, you know, you are deferring maintenance, you are using up munitions, you are burning through, um, you know, human capital in terms of deployments. Those are things that strain and stress the joint force that are hard to essentially put back in place overnight. And I think those are the things that we need to watch and be concerned about with respect to the alliance and our posture in the, uh, Indo-Pacific. I mean, I think there's some good news on the defense front, right? You have record-setting budgets, and so money does help get, um, you know, ameliorate some of these strains and wear and tear. But again, some of these things are just going to take time and basically, uh, the hydraulics of the defense operations and maintenance cycle, as well as the defense, uh, capabilities in terms of production and industrial output. And those are again, functions of time. So I think those, the second basket isn't talked about as much. I think everybody is talking about the assets moving, less worried about that, although still a concern. More concerned about the longer-term health of the joint force and what that means for our presence in the Indo-Pacific. And let me just stop there.
Um, Sungho, welcome your take on this and specifically, and correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that when, during the Iraq War, um, some number of US troops deployed, deployed to the Middle East and never returned. Um, so is that, is there a risk? Um, I mean, there's in that that they won't will not come back, particularly because we know President Trump doesn't, isn't necessarily super enthusiastic about stationing US forces there. But welcome your take on any of the questions I posed.
So along with this, you know, deploy, I mean, those some of the, uh, THAAD or Patriot assets being redeployed to the Middle East, and that kind of signals, of course, it's not just a, obviously, a very positive, uh, sign from the Korean perspective, saying that those assets suddenly being removed from the Korean Peninsula, originally that was there. I mean, and especially once the thing about THAAD was, there was a huge controversy about THAAD, and Korea paid dearly for, you know, deploying the American missile defense system on the Korean soil because of the Chinese were crazy mad about it, and we underwent, you know, kind of unofficial sanctions for many, many years, and we took all the hit. But for what, anyway? And after all those years, then suddenly Americans taking those assets out of Korea, yeah. And there comes the kind of importance of strategic communication between the two governments or two militaries. If there was indeed some kind of consultation before the US, uh, movement, then maybe still it's okay. But the rumor has it, there was no notification or whatever. So that kind of, uh, story doesn't bode very well from the Korean perspective.
But still, what has been done is already that done. And I guess, yeah, going back to this Iraq situation, it was like already early 2000s, and there was a kind of similar controversy between Korea and the United States back then. George Bush administration, we were having this big fight in the Middle East. Not only we needed some troops from the Korean Peninsula, but Korea should, maybe we could contribute. And indeed, we ended up sending 3,000 some troops, mainly engineer brigade, not combat troops, to Iraq. There was some similar kind of, uh, discussion, debate with Trump in Iran, and, you know, Korean Navy being coming into the Strait of Hormuz, and we kind of in between. But so far, that doesn't really translate into like huge anxiety from the Korean public saying that, oh, Americans are pulling all these troops out of the Korean Peninsula and putting in somewhere. In a way, as the first panel talked about, this US kind of refocus on and emphasis on strategic, you know, stability, uh, uh, flexibility of US troops on the Korean Peninsula, in a way, implies that Korea's, you know, alliance partnership with South Korea for the United States is becoming, in a way, more important than ever, given this China rivalry and Indo-Pacific strategy. So there's a kind of, you know, both ways. On one hand, yeah, there's some concern about the Trump administration, you know, threatening, is cutting its troops from NATO, etc. But so far, that's, that's not happening in Korea, which is good news. Second, on the other hand, the US is trying to maybe change the US military role from mainly focusing on deterring North Korea to a more broader regional, you know, role. That creates a little bit of tension. But at the same time, that also means that the US still thinks Korea is important for its own military strategy. So, in that context, so far, we, I don't see that kind of big, huge public anxiety over this redeployment of THAAD and all those.
So, wonderfully optimistic.
Can I just come back on one quick point? Sorry, just a two-finger intervention. I mean, I think, first, just on the troop level, and I think, Emma, just to underscore what you were saying, there was a time the troop level was about 42,000. In the Iraq War, it was drawn down or expected to go down to 25,000. It was stopped by Secretary Gates at 285. Um, I think that's point one, just to refresh the recollection there. But I think the other thing that that's getting lost here that the Trump administration did do is to re-start to rationalize troop rotations on the peninsula in terms of three-year unaccompanied, two-year accompanied, and I mean, rather, sorry, two-year unaccompanied, three-year accompanied tours. And look, if you're able to rationalize that versus one-year assignments, thrown over individual augmentees, global service, there's there's a chance, especially when augmented with some of the rotational brigade deployments that have been started over the last decade, the efficacy of the fighting force goes up. And there's less emphasis, I think, on the end strength number. Not that it's not unimportant, in terms of, you know, symbolism and fighting strength. It's just less important because you're rationalizing the force underneath it.
The other point I would say is that I think that, you know, there's a revolution going on in defense technology right now, and, you know, AI, but also other forms of commercially available technology being brought into, uh, the defense system. It used to be, you know, we, the US would kind of make everything secretly and then sort of spread it out over time. It's, it's different now. We're, we're in a very different way in which we procure, buy, and equip the force. So I think the troop strength numbers need to be looked at in the overall context of capabilities and where we come out on this really important moment in defense technology going forward. Let me just stop there.
Right. Not as productive to sort of fetishize the number, um, as much anymore. Um, Ambassador, welcome your response on this, um, either the the flow of assets out of there and if it degrades US credibility, or any of the the topics that have been brought up by your,
As I recall, I am last year, the biggest, I mean, the hottest potato in, I think, South Korean security community was the report by Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell on defense priorities, which suggested that in order to pursue America First defense policy, US should withdraw, so, USFK level down to 10,000, which is, um, just, just living, just barely, um, the minimum amount of the forces. The main rationale was that US would would be beneficial to move these forces out of the first and second island chain against the Chinese threat.
But I think when it comes to numbers, I, I totally agree with what Ambassador just mentioned. It's not really about numbers anymore, given the technological buildup and how the alliance components, main platforms are changing. But I, I do think there is some, um, ceiling number that gives some kind of, uh, have important effect on the assurance. So, and if, if you think about 28,500, 20,000 army, 8,000 air force, um, out of the 20,000 army, about 5,000 are already rotating forces. They are Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. They have been rotating nine months since 2022. Those strategic flexibility is already working. So, um, uh, it's going there. So I think there should be some kind of number, um, that we should keep in mind. And and about going back to the THAAD batteries, I think I also think they will return because maybe I'm too optimistic. But, yeah, yesterday I rode an electric bike across Central Park for the first time ever. It's huge. It was huge. And as far as I know, the Pyeongtaek, the Camp Humphreys base is about four times the size of Central Park. So it's an important, it's not just the base, it's a logistics command sustainment hub for us in the Pacific region. So as long as Camp Humphreys remains strategic to US's defense strategy, THAAD batteries will need to be, uh, returned so that it contributes to US's homeland missile defense and also the ability to intercept the missiles.
By the way, Ambassador report talking about the extension of, you know, US forces troop deployed in deployment in Korean Peninsula from one-year term to two-year, three-year, that also has been happening because of very practical reason as well. One key changes is that South Korea used to be the least favorable place for any American soldiers to come to because it's far, far away from the American continent, and the culture they don't know, they don't speak the language, for especially for those young soldiers in their 20s. And they have to face this brutal cold winter against North Koreans up there. There will be always a kind of possibility of war, you know, things like that. And their living conditions were very, very, you know, difficult. Today, Pyeongtaek, for example, is one of the best, the not only the largest military base outside the US in the world, but it's the best facility in the world. So the all those American soldiers and their family members simply love it. And, you know, what the thing I, this is what I was told by one of the American colonels saying that, you know, what, my cousin out of the blue, they just want to come to Korea to Seoul. Suddenly they keep calling me, you know, Uncle, can I come to Seoul? Because they love to come to Seoul. I mean, even those young American, you know, college students, etc. So that's the kind of one fundamental change in a way. It it symbolizes a kind of maturing partnership between the US and Korea, even when it comes to the really the real everyday issue of those soldiers, the living conditions, and their, their happiness to be there.
Yeah. Camp Humphreys is the largest overseas US military base in the world, right? Um, or maybe it's just that South Korea is so cool now. It's like Squid Game is like contributing to the strengthening of the alliance.
Um, so on another sort of good news story here, um, I wanted to talk about, um, the remarkably close relations between South Korea and Japan in the last couple of years. I mean, talk about unexpected, right? When you have a conservative government in Tokyo with Kishida at the helm and a progressive government in Seoul that usually has been a recipe for disaster between in terms of relations. But they have met, I think, six times now, the two leaders, gone to each other's hometowns. I think that Kishida was most recently in Andong. They were drumming it out in Busan. So what do you make of this? Like, what is driving that this this apparent determination to set the, uh, relationship on better terms? And do you think it's durable? Is this lasting?
P, do you want to start?
Yeah, as you mentioned, I think, um, Korea-Japan relations is doing far better than everybody expected, which is very good. The underlying driving force, um, I think it's very structural. The the security environment, uh, President Trump's, uh, alliance policy, there are many things Korea and Japan have to do together. And on the other hand, I think there's also a kind of a, um, trickle-down effect from the trilateral relationship that was built under the Biden administration. If you do remember the Camp David, that was, uh, where the three countries laid out so many different agendas, not just the North Korean threat. That was the original beginning of the trilateral cooperation. It laid out like climate change, supply chain, all the things that are actually Korea and Japan are doing right now. So, uh, if I look at all the agendas that Korea and Japan are tackling right now, they are actually all the agendas that were listed on the Camp David in the trilateral format. So maybe there is a kind of a trickle, trickling down effect. And, um, yeah, I think it is, it will be durable. Yeah.
Well, it's also remarkable that this is happening basically without US facilitation, which has always been the case in the past. I mean, Camp David was very much brokered, um, by President Biden. Um, but I see it as just sort of both capitals recognizing that the stakes are higher now. Um, but from your vantage point, um, are there obstacles that still remain between the two countries, or is this, um, you know, the urgency of the moment, the intensity of the geopolitical tension going to carry this relationship forward?
Yeah, obviously there could be some, you know, issues, uh, in between, especially if there's any kind of history issue comes. Uh, but so far, I think in that sense, I would like to give some credit to, uh, Prime Minister Kishida. To the contrary to our original concern and worry, she didn't, you know, act in a way that she, you know, claimed she will do during her campaign, which is like visiting Yasukuni and touching all this raising the difficult territorial issue with South Korea. So without that kind of, uh, issues, I think, yeah, there is a kind of common, uh, agenda or or even understanding, mutual understanding between the two leadership. That given the geopolitical, you know, instability overall in the world, and the Iran issues creates a simply very practical common, you know, threat or challenge for two countries that we are so, both countries are so dependent upon the oil from crude oil from those part of the world. So, in fact, what has happened in this last summit between the two leaders, which by the way happened just immediately after Mr. Trump and Xi's summit in Beijing, then we had this Yoon-Kishida summit in Andong, President Yoon's hometown. And they came out, one of the key agreements was mutually, you know, working together on dealing with these oil issues, so that Japan will provide certain amount of their strategic crude oil petroleum to Korea so that Korea could reprocess because we have much better reprocessing capability. So, and then we will get the reexport those, like what was for example, those, uh, airplane, the oil, and which is in global, you know, shortage of oil supply, then we could supply those with imported Japanese crude, you know, reserve. In so that's a kind of one example of a very practical, uh, approach taken by these two governments in dealing with the global issues, not only, uh, uh, strategic issues, security issues, but underneath it, I think obviously they both understand the changing nature of US policy in Indo-Pacific under the current government and alliance management, and then trade and, you know, war, etc. So, uh, and this is not the first time, by the way. For example, according to, you know, our great friend Victor Cha, it happened before over the past years. For example, whenever there is a kind of abandonment fear by the Americans, during the Nixon administration, for example, for withdrawal of possible withdrawal, then suddenly South Korea and Japan got together and somehow got over all these difficult issues. So he called it as like alignment despite antagonism, right? But I would, uh, characterize this current, uh, kind of, there's a certain same element behind those, uh, two leaders' movements, but this time it looked to me, there's a kind of alignment without much antagonism, I guess. So that's a kind of, still quite a big difference of progress from previous. That is again, South Korean society and our countries are much more, and Japan, we are both very mature democracies, and we share the same kind of values, as well as the same level of economic development. So that creates a kind of more very natural partnership for now, at the moment.
Um, Mark, a couple of questions on this front. Um, first, I, I think you were ambassador when the ultimately ill-fated comfort women agreement was negotiated. Um, so I wonder, in looking back, if you think that that was a wise thing to get past, or, or, um, you know, was it structured the right way? And then, second, looking forward, um, away from, uh, historical issues. But, you know, are Japan and South Korea moving towards getting more formalized military agreements? I mean, they don't have an ACSA right now, right? Uh, we know GSOMIA was a long path to get there. So, is this going to translate into, you know, really productive cooperative security arrangements?
No. Good question. Um, no. And I, I don't think it was ill-fated at all, actually. And I think there's sort of this myth in DC that there was this was ill-fated. And you sort of heard this repetition of this unmed from the facts actually. And I think that was, it's kind of, I don't think very astute analysis, actually. I think, you know, the the agreement was important, uh, and it set the set the stage for GSOMIA, frankly, which is a, among other things. Maybe just to back up quickly, um, you know, we've seen other quote-unquote ill-fated attempts. End of Imam Bach, you know, there was a try for GSOMIA, right? And it was, um, I would say it was disastrous, right, in the short term. But in the end, the two sides got there, and it's now a pillar of the relationship, right? It's an important part of the relationship. Um, you then saw, obviously, Park Geun-hye took up GSOMIA, took up comfort women. But people forget that early in her term, she was very aggressive towards Tokyo, right? And it was really only after the sixth or, I forgot which number, the nuclear test, where, you know, Xi Jinping, despite Park Geun-hye going to the end-of-war ceremony in Beijing, taking a lot of flack from Washington to go there, did not get a, a call back, um, from Xi Jinping about this in a really timely manner. And only when she got that call back did she have to raise the the nuclear question. So my point there is two threads, right? The relationship tends to build over time. Moon Jae-in, you could argue, was the same way in terms of, I think, very, um, had a very strong view of Japan early, but by the end, and even in and around the campaign, I think paved the way for both, uh, Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung to to foster and ferment a better relationship between Seoul and Tokyo. So there's this, I think, pattern where you take a couple steps forward, there's some some problems, but then you build back. And I think that's, those two things going hand in hand. So I think that's why I take issue with, um, comfort women, and you could also say GSOMIA was quote-unquote ill-fated at the time. So I think that's one, that that the arc has generally been towards better relations over the past, I'd say, 15 to 20 years.
Second thing I would say is that, you know, we're in the backdrop of all of this. There's more popular support for it, right? And I think that that was interesting in in the comfort women agreement. You saw polls creeping up to 45% before the deal, um, started sliding backwards because of, uh, the domestic scandals there. And now you see young people supporting the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo, among other polling data that, uh, shows, uh, that direction. The third thing, which I mentioned already, was the geopolitical realities that have set in, right? I think both sides have started to recognize that, and that was that was a driver too. And then leadership, right? We have the the the two leaders on this this chapter have been deaf and I think in their handling of it has been mentioned there. Formal agreements. I'll just end by saying quickly, I think to me, I, I think you're much better off with, um, basically taking that with all deliberate speed, trying to do things in their own time. But I think the most important thing is just the muscle memory, right? Getting the operational, uh, forces together, having them practice, rehearse, drill, all that. Use the GSOMIA, right? Use the tools that you have, and then sort of build out from there versus going for paper agreements and then trying to backfill later. I think you're better building up to it over time. And let me just stop there.
Great. I know I totally sprung that comfort women agreement on you, but I'm really glad that we got a chance to talk about it and explore it a little more. Um, it's really helpful context. Um, in the face of, you know, at least the perception of some receding of American leadership in the region, um, I wanted to get your take on, um, the panelists' take on whether or not South Korea is really intentionally expanding its security partnerships. We see Japan doing this quite aggressively, and you can call it middle power strategic engagement, or whatever you want to do it, want to call it. But South Korea, I mean, aside from the bilateral relationship with Tokyo, are they expanding their reach? We heard a little bit about Southeast Asia, um, now, and what do you see as sort of, um, the, the partnerships that are the most ripe for developing? To what extent are South Korean arms exports driving those relationships? Um, and, um, is this an area that, that, you know, it's sort of Korea looking beyond the peninsula too?
Sungho, you want to start?
Yeah. Uh, I think that's quite, uh, what is happening in in Korean, uh, government, I mean, the policy today. But by the way, of course, it's not only the first time. Even before that, there's a kind of emerging discussion and debate about Korea's what we can do, what we should do beyond the Korean Peninsula. But still, we didn't, I mean, the Korean government didn't find very much kind of role and very concrete, you know, aspect of it. But these days, one of the thing is that, yes, for example, the defense industry is doing so these days well because of all these troubles in Europe and Middle East. I mean, they're in great demand from European countries like Poland and all that, and also Middle East as well. I was in, uh, Dubai last year, before the this war already. Back then, this Emirates, they were like very, very much interested in having Korean assets. And by the way, in UAE, we have our special, uh, ops soldiers stationed there for more than already 11 years. It was originally supposed to be only six months during the Imbar administration, by the way, over this nuclear power plant there. And, they, in return, the UAE, the monarchy, said, by the way, we want to you send some of your special ops so that you guys can train our own troops. So they, we sent them for six months terms, and then they stayed until now. That was like 11 years ago. So that's a kind of, you know, example of it's not only we try to act more proactively at the beyond the Korean Peninsula. There's a kind of increasing demand here and there all over the world. It's not only about, by the way, defense industry, but, you know, chips and semiconductors, but the shipbuilding and, you know, our manufacturing capacity as well. And of course, you can always say the K-pop and, you know, K-culture. So that's, I think has been a driving force, and there's some kind of realization in the Korean part. Yes, there's a maybe some more opportunity, as Japan did used to be the Japan in Southeast Asia and Africa and other parts of the world with ODA. And then, and his first year in office, President Yoon has been so busy. I mean, he is all over the world. He visited recently with ASEAN countries, many countries, but he visited UAE, Middle East, he visited South Africa, so many countries, you know, inviting him. So that's just a kind of things maybe really, uh, happening in South Korea as South Korea is emerging as a kind of new actor in this global, you know, politics, if you will. Especially, you know, times like that when you have Europeans, Canadians say that if we just sit here and we will be on on the table. So we have to act together among those like-minded countries with some capability, especially with value, common values. So I think in in that context, South Korea, you know, comes up as a quite attractive partner for many countries in the world at at the moment.
Um, I just blanked out, sorry. Um, I think, uh, South Korea's, um, partnerships, uh, I think we will have a better picture once our national security strategy is out. Right now, what we have is pragmatism, and it's, uh, I think we should work on based on what values, how, what's the balance between what's being pragmatic and how do we engage with these countries. And having said that, I think the most important partner that we should really build on at this time is still Japan. And going back to your question about the ACSA, acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Um, I think the administration recently said that they are not thinking about ACSA with Japan, but I hope that we, um, do go back to this issue. Because ACSA, well, to my understanding, it's actually a very logistical agreement. It's not, it's not mandatory. If one side asks, we need this, and if one side has it available, then we send, we send them, and then we reimburse them later. And that is why South Korea has ACSA with, I think, to my knowledge, 15 other countries, Japan with 10 other countries. So in order to make this, um, a means for security platform for growing uncertainties in this region, and ACSA is, I think, it's a, the very basic minimum that we we can work on.
When do we expect that national security strategy, by the way?
Well, I heard that it's going to be coming out, but some, I, I don't have the,
Imminently. Okay.
In a maybe now. I don't.
Planning a webinar right now. Okay.
Great. Um, Mark, anything on on on South Korea's diversifying security partnerships, but specifically also, I mean, obviously we've seen South Korea export a lot of arms to Europe, um, and to NATO. Um, is that, you know, mostly a commercial relationship, or do you see more strategic cooperation developing out of those deals?
It's a really good question. I mean, there's always been this, I don't, I don't think this, the the discussion around South Korea as a global power is the wrong word, but a global actor, I guess, or one with increasing influence on the global stage is necessarily a new thing. And in fact, it's something, you know, US administrations have encouraged, right, going back, you know, decades, frankly. And so,
But Ukraine definitely accelerated that, right?
I was going to come to that. But it's interesting, right? Because you look, you go back 10, 15, 20 years, you've got one, the North Korean threat, but you also look at the procurement and defense industrial base buildup in South Korea, and they're building and procuring global platforms that that give them the ability to project power overseas. You see them deploy them in things like the counter-piracy operation, right, in in and around the Horn of Africa, right? So you have this trend, right? Still, you have this interesting dichotomy, though. It's still a very ground-centric, army-heavy military, right, with strong platform capability, power projection, uh, built in. So it's this interesting dichotomy. The Ukraine piece is interesting because while you've got certain platforms that are made for power projection, largely what they're selling is the ground-centric, army-heavy capabilities, right? Howitzers, tanks, things like that. The the ground, um, components that a lot of militaries have gotten away from, right? And so they, the South Korean defense industry found themselves in this very unique position. Um, and then of course, was very skillful in terms of prioritizing platforms up their, uh, basically their lines, right? So very, very astute, I would say, business acumen as well. To your point, um, though, is this something that's new or starting? Are we going to see a more strategic relationship? I would just point out, you know, the South Koreans have been fairly active in the AP4, right, with respect to NATO. And I think that I wouldn't say that's new. They've always had a sort of a pre- not always, but for a long time, I've had a relationship or or kind of presence in and around NATO. But I think that the AP4 added a step to it. Now you've got defense industrial base cooperation in a very robust way. So I think it is trending, accelerating an existing trend in that direction.
Great. Um, let's talk a little bit about shipbuilding, because that's really emerged as an area of very concrete cooperation, probably helped the South Koreans in President Trump's eyes because it's very, you know, very, it's not an abstract thing. Um, so, uh, do you see this as an, you know, enduring pillar of the relationship? What could be done to to further these initiatives, um, to to cement, um, the relationship there? What are the the tensions that exist too in that? Um, so how do I?
Yeah. Uh, okay. Shipbuilding has been, yeah, one of the, it emerged as a quite, you know, surprising, uh, element that we didn't realize that shipbuilding will be that critical, uh, for two reasons. For one thing, somehow President Trump has this kind of about the idea about having a huge great armada on, you know, ships. So, and he, and he understands in that matter, but oh, by the way, we didn't have that capacity in the United States. So he, and then the South Korean government came up with the idea, the phrase "Make American Shipbuilding Great Again," which really, you know, translated. It was a huge success. Mr. Trump liked it so much. So that's one of the reasons why this first meeting went so well. And there's also a real strategic necessity and, uh, practical issue for the American military in general, or especially the Navy, because this is in the Pacific, US-China rivalry. If there's any contingency in the region, the Navy is the key. And of course, American has been always a naval power, but the reality today is American cannot really produce those ships anymore. And already compared to China, the Chinese has like 400 ships as opposed to the United States only 290 ships overall. Of course, in terms of quality and management, and then you cannot simply compare with the number, but undeniable trend is that Chinese are going to build maybe a thousand ships in maybe next 10 years, whereas without any help from like South Korea, the United States kind of catch up with that. So in that context, I think South Korea plays quite an important role so that, uh, that could become a very important pillar of this enduring and sustaining alliance partnership between the US and ROK.
One element I don't quite understand though is that, um, I mean, both countries face labor shortages. And, but South Korea, I mean, the demographics are just so striking. So, are labor shortages, you know, something that could ultimately sort of stymie this element of cooperation?
So far, I think South Korean shipbuilding industry has managed to keep, you know, have keep maintaining its competitiveness in the global market against, uh, visa v China. And, you know, South Korea's number two shipbuilders in the world, Japan is number three, and basically these three Asian countries make more than 95% of all shipbuilding in the world. And yes, we do have labor shortage, but we have also this, uh, imported labor coming from overseas, and they are working in the shipyards. But we, we do keep have a lots of those high-skilled experts on the shipbuilding. That has been one of South Korea's, uh, success. But at the same time, there's a great deal of, you know, uh, how, how should I calculate, using new technology to to make the whole shipbuilding process more automatic, using robots and etc. So there's new technology as well. So in that sense, South Korea keeps continuing to have this leading.
role in ship building industry. That's how the and then yes, coming back to your original question, what could be the issues of the cooperation between US and South Korea, especially when it comes to this military uh ship building? There has been US law that prohibits that can US uh warships can be only built in the United States or using only American vendors. I think there has been some change in those legislations. So that these days, Korean already companies are doing MRO, maintenance and repair uh operations in Korea. So American ships have been coming into Korean those shipyards and they will be refurbished. The American Navy loves it when we do it because we can do it in much shorter terms and much cheaper prices. So that's, I think it's a great potential for two countries. Of course, Hamha has this shipyard in the United, in the Philly shipyard. So, there's a great potential for this ship uh cooperation in shipbuilding.
>> Anything to add on shipbuilding or should we move on to subs?
>> I just would say, you know, really surprising and interesting part of the relationship. Three, three points. One, uh interesting and surprising part of the relationship, and it's, it's a good thing. Second is, it's, it's interesting to see where we'll go with this because I think the Trump administration has been uneven in how it approaches what I would call sensitive technologies and capabilities, right? You have the Chips Act. There's, there's, you know, bio, you know, the the Biosecure Act last Congress. You've, you've had things like EV batteries that could be argued as sensitive technologies. So, you know, are we trying to have this stable flow of critical technologies, you know, that are critical to the defense industrial base and the impending sort of revolution in in defense technology all the way down to the manufacturing, right? How are we approaching that holistically? I think the jury's out on that question. Interesting space to watch. And then I think the final point is just on what we can do more is one, I think just policy direction and coherency and two, in addition to some of the the statutory issues, just making sure our defense procurement systems are aligned, right? You know, we've got a history of some foreign contractors in the, in and around the Pentagon, BAE, Leonardo, British, Italian, you know, adding that international component and streamlining that, making that as cost-effective and efficient and user-friendly uh for for other compet primes to come in and subs to come in, I think is really critical as well.
>> Right. So on this sensitive technology front, um, this US consent agreement um that that South Korea can uh obtain nuclear subs is at once sort of um, you know, shrouded in mystery as to how this actually happens. Um, potentially sort of dangerous um, and at least in the signaling way to to um, other countries in the region. Um, but what is your sense of of I think that they're just standing up this working group now, right? With um Under Secretary Hooker leading an interagency delegation. Um, what's your understanding of of where we are at that, where they're going to be built, um, where the uranium is coming from, and whether or not you see this as a promising aspect of the relationship or something that that is is uh going to be beset with a lot of complications?
>> V1 well, um, um, South Korean government after the exchanges of back and forth, coming uh delegations, we released the outline of what we want to do. And the administration is calling this Changogo N project. Changogo is our South Korean's first diesel submarine, and N stands for nuclear, so uh nuclear sub project. And under this uh statement, uh the timeline is to acquire one sub by 2030. And how they want to do it is they want to build um at home um with um low-enriched uranium.
>> Speaking in um, very, very personal capacity, um, uh, if I think about the Korean Peninsula security environment right now, we do, of course, have other um, pressing priorities. So right now, I'm looking at North Korea, focusing on AI. They are sending like 10,000 female workers to Russian drone factories in December, and in March, they did an infantry exercise which entailed a three-stage process. And the first stage included a suicide drone. So, North Korea is evolving in its um, military strategy. And submarine, nuclear submarine, of course, if we have it, it will be very important. And second strike capability, all the military utility that come with it will be very important. But the problem is that it takes so long time. And um, uh, I think we are thinking about the AUKUS model. But as you all know, much better than me, but AUKUS was possible because of, well, under the Atomic Energy Act, I think it was section 91, which enables the president to deliver the sensitive technology, uh, on the restrict, called restricted data, if there is no concern for non-proliferation. And so Australia was able to do that, and then move it to the National Defense Authorization Act, through which they persuaded the Congress and made us through. So for South Korea seeking low-energy uranium, and of course, we are very committed to non-proliferation norms. And as we laid out in the Chang project, we, we have again stated firmly that we have non-proliferation um commitments. But would it be enough to convince the congressmen here? That's the problem. And and so, uh, even though I think so, it will be a long-term project, and if South Korea still wants it, my personal take is that we should start as with um, highly enriched uranium black box model because we begin by really showing the non-proliferation commitment, build a working culture together, and then maybe go into more details about building subs together. That's, speaking of this nuclear, not some nuclear power, some we call it, so that this is not going to, we are not going to develop any nuclear weapon. I mean, that's a very subtle but important point. But before that, getting into that, I think you're talking about South Korean NSS when it's coming out. But there's, I think there's a kind of quite good idea what will be the major, you know, defense uh priority for this Egyptian government, and which I think comes down to two issues. One is, as the first panel talked about, the operational control transfer. He is very much committed, and every time he emphasized, we are going to do this within my term. So that's going to happen, whether it's condition-based, time-based, doesn't matter. He has a very strong will, which is kind of reminding me of President Roh. But said, we are the number five military power in the world. Not that we are saying that, but all the global firepower, then we should have a self-defense uh capability, which can be translated into South Korea, you know, taking major responsibility for our self-defense against North Korea. So that's operational control. Second is this uh nuclear power submarine, which because it takes a huge amount of resource and money, even though we have increased our defense budget, there's so much thing you can do, there could be so many military items, and you can't focus on, but they have so far decided this nuclear-powered submarine, I think partly because it is, it, it was kind of several issues. One is that increasing geopolitical uncertainty and strategic uh, you know, problems surrounding the South Korea. He mentioned, by the way, when he was brought that up to President Trump during his Kyongu summit, oh, because of Chinese subs wandering around the Korean Peninsula, not only North Koreans, we may need this capability. On that, Mr. Trump said, okay. But I think obviously the main reason is about North Korea's nuclear capability, and it is becoming more and more of a kind of, you know, uh, reality that North Korea will not abandon or give up its nuclear capability in the near future, even though whatever, you know, denuclearization rhetoric is there. And if that becomes a more of a reality, what could be an option? Go for the full nuclear could be one option, which was discussed during the first panel. But I don't think that's is the right way that South Korea, we could, it could, you know, lead to the whole host of other issues, Japan going nuclear, and complicate many issues. So as an alternative, I think the nuclear power submarine is, what we call nuclear latency, that somehow South Korea, we are having this strategic capability to have a certain kind of level of self-deterring power against potential North Korea's nuclear capability. So in that sense, this is a very important strategic priority in a sense that, yes, number one, we want to have our own deterrence against North Korea, but at the same time, that deterrence doesn't translate into a kind of regional instability in terms of nuclear arms race, etc. So that's has been one of the key elements of this nuclear power submarine. By the way, my, sorry for my last note is, along with that, South Korean diesel submarine has sailed from Korea to Canada all the way for two months. They reached. Why? Because Canadians are having this huge new nuclear, I mean, submarine project, which amounts to be like $50 billion, building 12, their own diesel submarines, and Korean companies are bidding for it. So that's another just anecdote.
>> Maybe just three quick, really quick points. Um, one on, you know, the colleagues on the panel really outlined a number of key issues very well on the latency question. You know, that's a very interesting one in that I think Scott Schneider wrote a piece, you know, it's one thing to get latency, and then it's how do you address that gap once you get to latency between, you know, latency to I guess going green, um, on on nuclear weapons. So that that's a very dangerous and potentially destabilizing time period, but interesting stuff. Check out Scott's work on that. Second point, I would just make on on the submarine question is it would have been so interesting to see South Korea in August, right? And obviously there's reasons it didn't happen, probably principally probably couldn't have gotten the deal done. I I don't know, but all that back and forth, but it does make sense and then we'd be having a discussion holistically, right, among a greater set of partners, distributing the work and probably reducing procurement costs, right? So that that's an interesting kind of historical alternative that, you know, we'll never know the answer to, but but interesting there. And then the third thing I'd just say to to add to the comments is that, you know, nobody's really talking about the one point that CSIS has done some work on this. What will the future of undersea warfare look like, right? I mean, the technology is racing ahead to start to make it look, start to make to start to dramatically increase the ability to find submarines, potentially, right? And so if the whole point is to have a quiet submarine for a second strike or to be able to go long distances without being found, if that is being undermined by technological advances, aren't you, are you better off going smaller, autonomous, different, you know, a whole different way of fighting under sea, uh, and then maybe augmenting your surface combatants with a bunch of electronic warfare jamming it because you can see where they are? So that question is really out there. And the Koreans have a shorter procurement time than the Australians, but what will this look like in 10 to 15 years? I I think the jury is really still out on the future of undersea warfare, which contributes to these procurement decisions here and now. Let me stop there.
>> Great. Um, clearly wealth of expertise up here on the stage. I think we have time to take a couple of questions. Um, so if you can raise your hand, make sure you identify yourself. Yeah, there's one here and one here. We can go ahead and take both of them at the same time.
>> Robert Barbara from the United Nations Studies and Global Policy Program. So my questions pertains um maritime security. Um, so as the US and ROK alliance adapt to a broader Indo-Pacific role, how do you see Seoul contributing to rules-based maritime governance and regional stability in the areas like the South China Sea and particularly alongside partners such as Manila?
>> We can take the second question also. So the maritime security issues is becoming really important given this what has happening in Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and then Hormuz could be one important case. And the president, and then what could be the next? There's the Malacca Strait, for example. So, and and by the way, in Malacca Strait, there has been always this, this is a very important trade route, by the way. And there is also always piracy issues, even before this Hormuz and all those issues. So there's a kind of common interest in the region, even in the Pacific and South Asian countries, and Japan, and, you know, Taiwan, and South Korea, we have heavily dependent upon freedom of navigation and freedom of sea with this trading, export, and all this economy. So definitely South Korea, there is growing awareness about that. And also, yes, with that awareness, we, we feel like there's also growing growing demand by those, uh, region and countries for South Korea to do more of contributing in the maritime security. So we are already working with some of those ASEAN countries, for example, Korean, what, Coast Guard has been quite active in recent years, and working with Indonesian and Malaysian and all those navies, Vietnamese, by the way, and donating our old naval vessels to those countries, for example, which is kind of following the footsteps of what Japan has been always doing in the region. So definitely that's is becoming important. And in, I think in the coming years, given this what has happening in Iran and Hormuz, it will become a very, very hot, hot button issue in the region as well.
>> I think there was another one and towards, yes, right there.
>> Okay. Hello, my name is Sophia Mueller. Um, I'm a student at the University of Mannheim in Germany. And we've been talking a lot about the relationship of Korea with other countries. I wanted to ask about Korea specifically. Um, Korea has one of the most like rapidly aging demographies in the world. Yeah. Demographics in the world and with a 0.75 replacement rate compared to I guess the required sort of 2.1. To what extent, I like, will this affect the defense of um, Korea in the next 10 to 20 years? Right. I feel like it's a silent killer, right? Once the train stopped, you can't started, you can't stop it. Um, and so, yeah, to what extent is this part of the conversation and um, do other like, are other countries concerned about this?
>> Give you a couple minutes. Let's do you want to have the last word on that Mark or who?
>> In fact, I've been writing about this issue because demographic has Korea is, by the way, is yes, low sport rate after following Japan. More than there's a huge, you know, issue in the story, and it's a really big uh challenge for Korean military as well because we used to have like more than half a million soldiers now on conscription basis, but we cannot make that half a million. Today, already South Korea's army is already reduced to 400,000, and it's going to be 300,000, almost become by half, cutting by half by the year 2040 something. And still, we do have this North Korea with more than 1 million soldiers up there. So there's a lot of debate going on over what to do with all this. Yes, we will keep the conscription, but the thing is, there are many different ways of addressing those issues, using more act, uh, combining, uh, our military forces with our reserve forces, for example, or or or rationalizing and modernizing those reserve force mobility. On the other hand, at the same time, as you can easily imagine, the new technology, robot, and AI is becoming a very important uh element of those debates and discussions. For example, one, uh, way of doing, uh, addressing those issues. We have a large amount of our army soldiers deployed around this DMZ. There are maybe 100,000 at least or 200,000 because they have face to face with North Korean army. And there's a discussion going on, why don't we replace those soldiers because they're just sitting there and watching if there's any North Korean coming, you know, down to the south, and that can be done by robot or or this remote sensors. So that's the kind of this discussion and debate we are having about this, yeah, emerging new technology, how to incorporate into our and address those demographic issues.
>> Great. Thank you for batting cleanup there, Sonho. Appreciate that. Um, I think we've reached the past the noon hour, actually. So, join me in clapping for our talented panelists.