Transcription
This is the political event of the year in China. Economy, defense, technology. For 2 days in Beijing, parliamentarians and officials of the Chinese Communist Party are discussing the country's major political directions. Among the stated objectives is to double the per capita GDP within 5 years compared to 2020. We will strengthen our national economy in order to boost domestic consumption and ensure sustainable performance. The draft master plan emphasizes the need to increase household consumption and develop effective investments. Growth objectives that clash with the geopolitical situation. With the war in the Middle East, Chinese interests are being hit hard. More than half of China's hydrocarbon supplies transit through the Strait of Hormuz, the current epicenter of tensions. China urges all parties to stop military operations, avoid any further escalation, ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz, and prevent any consequences for the global economy. An official reaction that remains quite timid at this stage, especially since Chinese exports to the Gulf are also suffering from the situation in the Middle East. From Washington's perspective, at least, Beijing does not seem to be truly entering the Iranian equation. What is your message to Iran's allies, namely Russia and China, who have called for an immediate ceasefire? I have no message to send them. They are not really a determining factor. Our problem is not with them. It concerns Iran's nuclear ambitions. So, is China out of the game or waiting and seeing in the Middle East these days? Can the war against Iran be considered a diplomatic front for Beijing? Will China have to revise its partnerships and its plans? Our three guests are therefore Stéphanie Balme. Good evening, political scientist, China specialist, and director of the international research center at Sciences Po and the CNRS. In your opinion, the consequences of this war could be serious for China's energy supplies, but you add that it has reserves and the idea of using crises as new opportunities always exists in Beijing. Next to you, Emmanuel Verron. Good evening. Geographer, associate researcher at Inalco, China specialist. In your opinion, the war in the Middle East, which started on Saturday, will not weaken China in the short or medium term. This is notably what explains why the Chinese have not overreacted since Saturday to what is happening. They are waiting to see how the situation will evolve. And next to you, Anthony Dufour, good evening. You are a director, journalist, former correspondent in Asia. You returned permanently in 2019. You have made several documentaries about China. In your opinion, it is not easy to be a partner of China because we see that it offers no guarantees, particularly military ones. The Chinese regime seeks above all to preserve its own interests. And we start with the figure of the day. Bam! Yes, China will increase its defense budget by 7% this year, so in 2026. More than its expected economic growth rate. Beijing plans to spend the equivalent of 238 billion euros, which may seem significant, but remains three times less than the American budget. Stéphanie Balme, can the situation in Iran explain this 7% increase, or was it already planned by the Chinese regime? Or yes, no, it has absolutely nothing to do with it. And in fact, we knew it would be this figure as early as December. Okay. In fact, there were and then the statements made today by the Chinese Prime Minister confirmed to the letter all the predictions that we, China specialists, had made. No, no, it has absolutely nothing to do with it. And furthermore, this increase has been constant for years. And I find that there is another figure that is fascinating and that should make us think, and that is the level of research and development and the increase in investment in research as a percentage of GNP, which remains the highest of all OECD countries. How much is that? And it explains 2.8 and it very clearly explains China's technological power and its affirmation in the world today. Hmm hmm. Emmanuel Verron, how was this attack on Iran by the United States perceived by the Chinese as another affront? They are close to the Iranians, they were close to the Venezuelans, it is an additional affront after what happened with Madura. Indisputably, yes, it is an affront, it is more than a scratch, it is a rather significant pinprick in the plans deployed by China as part of the famous Silk Roads, which we have been hearing about for at least a good decade, particularly in the Middle East, particularly in Central Asia, and particularly within the framework of the strengthened partnership between Iran and China deployed since the Covid period and after 2021, a famous strengthened strategic partnership worth 400 billion dollars for about twenty years, a generation, covering technologies, covering subjects, particularly technologies that were useful in police reconnaissance and techniques for Iranian repression of its population in January and before, on energy issues, and quickly we will recall it, but 90% of what is produced and sold by Iran in terms of oil is sold to the sole Chinese client, which leads to this strengthening of Iran's dependence on China. Iran needs China more than the other way around. But in China's strategy in the Middle East, China has sought to make Iran a sort of linchpin in the Middle East in its geopolitics, in its strategy. Anthony Dufour, the deafening silence of Xi Jinping since Saturday is therefore explained by cautious waiting and is also explained because Donald Trump is expected at the end of the month in Beijing. And there is a form of politeness in the Chinese response. Every day, People's Liberation Army planes fly over Taiwan, over Taiwanese islands to constantly stir up urgency among the Taiwanese population. Since Saturday, no Chinese plane has flown over Taiwan. This is the first time in 3 years, and it is not a coincidence. So, we cannot directly link it to the Iranian crisis, but the fact that Donald Trump is coming to Beijing at the end of the month, we see that they are preparing, without reacting too firmly to what is happening in Iran, and by being very calm militarily in the Asia-Pacific region. We will see what the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs says. China supports Iran in defending its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and national dignity. Stéphanie Balm, however, can we imagine that there would be direct or indirect military intervention, that is to say, military aid from China to Iran, also in its response to the United States? That seems, well, it would be very surprising. Well, obviously, we must consider all possible scenarios, but it would be very surprising. Well, in fact, China has not reacted, and China has reacted by explaining that it was necessary to return to the rules of multilateralism and peace, to recall that they were probably the only country that could guarantee a peace proposal in the region, both on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and vis-à-vis itself, presenting itself as a peacemaker, presenting itself as a peacemaker, but always in an extremely abstract way and in terms that are very concrete. And in fact, its response is to say that we are an economic power and we are creating development. What I find quite interesting is that this pact of the Silk Road countries has never included a military dimension. In fact, it is not surprising for Iran that China does not react militarily. There is absolutely no expectation of that, and that is exactly what happened in Venezuela as well. However, I find it quite interesting that it is both Venezuela and what is happening now that raises the question of China's international positioning in the world. That is to say, what kind of power is China becoming? And furthermore, for China, what is a real problem is that Trump is positioning China as a power, projecting power through the economy and the military. So there is also a Sino-American conflict through these wars. But in any case, Iran was not expecting military intervention. However, Anthony F, are there warmongers in the current Chinese regime, more so than in Xi Jinping's? People who want to help Iran more militarily, who want to enter into more direct confrontation with the United States, or not? Well, we want to advise them not to necessarily go against Xi Jinping's will at the moment because there are purges, there was one a few weeks ago of the army, of army officials who were purged, who are not at the National People's Congress this morning. So we want to advise them to stick to the line, and again, Chinese interests are not measured by an epidermal or strategic reaction within a few days. They look far ahead, we are discussing the 15th five-year plan. It is long-distance, it is the long term that motivates them. And so obviously, the choices that will be made today are choices that must inspire Chinese power in the long term. Emmanuel Verron, the common point between Iran and China is to have a rather anti-Western line, isn't it? Absolutely. And this subject has considerably strengthened, a little before the Covid period, during the Covid period, and after. And this is notably the idea of this strengthening of the partnership since 2021 that we mentioned, but also with the help and support, in fact, almost even propelled, encouraged, framed by China, of Iran's integration into international mechanisms within BRICS, within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which are precisely non-Western international organizations where the Western club is at the door, is outside. It does not sit in the room for discussions or agreements. So there is really this strengthening, we cannot say of an axis, but in any case of this strategic relationship, which is an important issue for the balance of power in the Middle East and which reflects what you said, which indirectly reflects that in this military affair in the Middle East concerning Iran, there are on one side Israeli political and military objectives that overlap in part with American objectives, but above all a translation of the Sino-American rivalry in the Middle East over Iran. In other words, it is a way for Trump to assert military, technological, and diplomatic power and to make some cuts, even a bit more, in his relationship, in any case, in China's position in the Middle East. Yes. Just a clarification, sorry, on the nuclear issue, there have been shipments of Chinese materials to Iran. We heard that for the making of an atomic bomb, or not at all? That is important. You are absolutely right to ask for clarification on the subject of official materials, etc. Apparently not, that is not the issue. On the other hand, and it is factually proven through various channels that are quite structured and solid, there have been shipments of sodium perchlorate, which is part of the composition of ballistic missile propulsion. So China is participating, within the framework of its military relations and military cooperation with Iran, in strengthening the ballistic arsenal. Okay. Nothing to do with nuclear. Okay. So, there was the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The war has had a direct impact on the Chinese economy and those who drive it. Listen to this sailor who works in the Chinese merchant navy. "Just in the crude oil oil company, just in the crude oil, for example, now that there is a war, it has an impact on our company. Many ships go there, and it means that we have fewer ships, so..." Stéphanie, are the consequences very worrying for the Chinese economy or not? Not on oil supply, we've heard that a lot. Well, they are worrying, especially since with the succession of crises, yes. Well, the question of China's stocks will really be a problem quite quickly. But here, we are getting to the heart of the problem, there is a very strong link between China's internal balance and the international situation. And what worries Xi Jinping and those who oppose Xi Jinping is that these effects and direct consequences on the quality of life of Chinese citizens at a time which is that of the National People's Assembly. And so, in relation to the question you asked before, that is to say, I think that generally speaking, Xi Jinping's foreign policy is relatively endorsed by his Chinese Communist Party, as long as Xi Jinping manages to reach agreements with the Americans, and in fact, he is doing quite well. The Sino-American relationship is not so bad. On the other hand, the internal consequences of the degradation of China's position are what pose a problem. And here, the warmongers in China can consider that it is necessary to move to a more ideological and stronger level. And just to return to the question of oil, 13% of the oil imported by China comes from Iran, so it is a problem not to have these 13% available. 30% of Chinese gas comes from Qatar. So everything that passes through the Strait of Hormuz, no matter what, yes, is blocked. And we also heard the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who had very harsh words about the American intervention, of course, but who at the same time invited Iran not to attack its neighbors and the entire region, so that its Asian allies, or at least its Asian clients, could continue to be supplied. So, we will discuss with you three the fact that in the Middle East, China maintains economic ties with Iran, but also with the Gulf countries, the famous petromonarchies. Yes. Exactly. In recent years, China has multiplied its investments in the Gulf countries, particularly in maritime infrastructure. The port of Khalifa in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, is the most telling example. China has indeed injected more than a billion dollars into the adjacent industrial zone through logistics, maintenance, and handling companies. This maritime hub will therefore allow it to secure its supplies within the framework of these new Silk Roads. But that's not all. The subsoil of Saudi Arabia is rich in resources that particularly interest China: gold, copper, and even rare earths. Three years ago, Beijing and Riyadh therefore signed investment agreements worth 10 billion dollars, including a copper mining project and the construction of an iron plant in Saudi Arabia. And then more recently, in mid-December, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a tour of the Middle East, to the Emirates, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, with the aim of deepening its partnerships in energy, infrastructure, and also new technologies. And China hopes to soon sign a free trade agreement with all these Gulf countries. Emmanuel Verron, will this current instability in the region due to Iran, the United States, and Israel undermine China's economic interests in these Gulf countries? In the short and medium term, undoubtedly, for simple factual reasons of meetings, bilateral or multilateral organization with the various Gulf countries, various Arab-Muslim countries in the region. And then in the medium term, there is an issue that is that of American companies regaining a position with the sound of cannons, if I may say so, and the military-industrial posture in the Middle East, showing the reality of Chinese power, which is in fact not coming to the aid of its supposed ally. China has no allies, it is a partner, Iran, but which, and you rightly recalled it, has given luster to this Chinese enterprise for 10 to 20 years of multiplying partnerships, multiplying supply sources so as not to be too dependent on this supposed linchpin in case of crisis, which is currently the case in the Middle East with regard to Iran. And so Anthony Four recalled the rather discreet work of diplomats, led by Wang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, with all the countries in the region, and leading to a potential form of Chinese mediation. Why? To unblock the situation in Hormuz. 45% of petroleum products leaving the Middle East go to China. In fact, everything it imports from the Middle East, that's 45%, it's colossal. And in exchange, it's manufactured goods through these various commercial subjects that China exports to these Middle Eastern countries. You said something, China has no allies, Anthony Dufour, what does that mean? There are only partnerships, it's pragmatism according to necessities and needs. China is building roads. Well, it has one ally, North Korea. It is the only one with which there is a reciprocal defense commitment. But indeed, with the others, it commits to nothing. We see clearly that in Caracas, nothing happened. In Tehran, even less. No, China first wants to secure its interests and its supplies. So that is its compass, and it wants to do so over an extremely long period. There are no other agendas today, no other agendas from the Chinese side. All this is to preserve internal tranquility, of course, because that is the main compass for Chinese leaders. Yes, that's crucial. This market and these exchanges are all the more important because, as you said, the Chinese domestic market is not doing well. So there is indeed an undeniable asset. It is necessary to trade with them. Yes. Yes. So the idea of having depoliticized partnerships is not uninteresting in today's world, especially in the face of the United States, which is not very visible, whose policy is not very clear, and so on. So there is indeed something quite interesting that China is trying to do in the idea of building alliances that are depoliticized in geopolitical spaces that are ultra-politicized like the Near and Middle East. Because what I find, when you say it has allies, I would say especially that if we think about Iran today, Iran is in a logic of dependence on China. So there are consequences for China, but there are consequences for Iran today. And so in fact, many countries need China, and what China is building is dependence on these countries. So that's the Silk Road. The Silk Roads are also about creating economic and geo-economic dependencies. A small nuance on the Iran-China issue is in fact dependence on China by the Revolutionary Guards, who have increased their relationship with China in illicit and illicit, legal and illegal logics, the Mullahs, etc., etc., more than the country as a whole. Simply. Yes, well, in terms of consumption, I mean, for one of the few countries that still allowed the Iranian population to, well, to circumvent economic sanctions and that could help, it was China. So even from the perspective of the Iranian population, this cessation of trade with China could potentially have significant effects. Before we run out of time, let's talk about China, which looks far ahead, which looks long-term. Precisely, China's ambition is to become the world's leading power by 2049. And look at this, this is the subject of our archive, an objective it has been preparing for several decades, for generations. It is 1985, and under the reign of Deng Xiaoping, Shenzhen in southern China is the symbol of China's opening up. Since 1978, this village, dormant for centuries, has transformed into a large city. The population has multiplied by 10. Buildings are sprouting like mushrooms. The reason is that Shenzhen is one of the four economic zones that Deng Xiaoping had created. Modernization, Deng said, is China's second revolution. Communism and capitalism have become engaged. For the 800 million peasants too, change is not a word. Get rich, a government directive told them last year. In three generations, when the People's Republic of China celebrates its 100th anniversary, China will be one of the most prosperous and powerful nations in the world, Chinese leaders affirm. The objectives were already very ambitious at the time, according to Four. One of the objectives that has just been announced by the Chinese is to double the per capita GDP in 2030 compared to 2020. Can what is happening in Iran currently call this ambition into question? Well, the advantage when you make predictions so far into the future is that there is no immediate control. In the very short term, we see a form of modesty in China's economic forecasts. It is, I believe, during the People's Assembly, they announced around 5.5 to 4.5. So in any case, it is the lowest figure. Yes, the growth is the lowest figure in 35 years. And youth unemployment is considerable. 18%, it's exploding. Absolutely. So, we see that in the short term, there are difficulties, which allows the grand Chinese dream to be maintained. It is also a way of uniting the population around a project that remains solid, and the party continues to embody it. You remind us why 2049 is a date. It is the centenary of the People's Republic of China, and therefore it is a symbolic date since the creation of the People's Republic. Stéphanie Balm, the objective is still to be the world's leading power. That's it, the Chinese, 2049. Well, not in terms of American hegemony, not as the Indians would say. Not as the Indians would say. Yes. Nor as Modi would say. But I think it is perhaps an important moment of reflection for us, this National People's Assembly, because I find China very fragile, the Chinese political system very fragile. We have spoken about recent political purges of military personnel of this level, of this rank, it has never been seen. To say that it is a feverish regime that carries out purges of this magnitude is, in any case, what can be read, because the difficulty, as you can imagine, of conducting research in the black box of the Chinese political system is still interesting, but what it means is that the party wants to reaffirm itself and to tell its army again that those who hold power are the party, not the army, and not those who hold the cannons and who might consider a coup d'état. Does this mean that things are being prepared? In any case, what is certain is that one must never forget that there is a very wide spectrum of political opinion within the Chinese Communist Party, and that despite and that Xi Jinping is on the verge of starting a fourth term, and that in fact this political regime has not thought about Xi Jinping's succession, and therefore faces great fragility. Yes, I think it is important to keep that in mind. Corroborate. Yes. Yes. Economic fragility, undoubtedly. The aging of the population, which only exacerbates, if I may say so, the age pyramid towards the top, a discouragement of youth in addition to unemployment, a difficulty in self-realization, no truly desirable horizon, and then structural and conjunctural problems linked to China itself. The never-ending and insoluble real estate crisis. How many tens of percent of Chinese GDP, fundamentally, is real estate activity in China? It's colossal, it's important. And then local debt, private debt, public debt, etc. In short, a set of elements that show that the Chinese economy is not as vigorous as one would like to see in Beijing, and that in the logic of rivalry with the United States, it is increasing, particularly with this affair of the war in the Middle East, sanctions on technology, difficulties with technology, the Sino-American rivalry. But at the same time, Anthony Dufour, the conflict is ongoing in the Middle East, we don't know where it's going. Will it nevertheless be a political victory for Beijing against American adventurism, in a way? This is how it has positioned itself for several months against Trump. We are stability. It is very surprising from two points of view. I find that, first of all, the Chinese diplomatic discourse is evolving incredibly. A few months ago, you know, it was the wolf warriors, these hyper-aggressive diplomats. The positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were constantly anti-Western. And now you have a call for international order. We have gone from wolf warrior to legalist lamb. So there is a complete change in tone. And then there is perhaps also a small window of opportunity. When you are in Beijing, you see that the Americans have moved a good part of their military assets to the Middle East. Their center of interest is evolving. There is only one American carrier strike group left in the Asia-Pacific, and it is undergoing maintenance in the port of Yokosuka in Japan. So in the short term, this means that Taiwan is much more vulnerable. No, in the coming days, nothing will happen on Taiwan. But in the long term, this redeployment of assets, if it were to solidify, we will not provoke at the moment from the Chinese side. We will say it's very good. Let things continue to prosper in this direction. Very good. Well, listen, that will be the conclusion. Your image of wolf warriors to legalist lamb is magnificent. We will use it. Thank you all three for coming to debate tonight.