Transcription
You are great, Mario.
>> A pleasure to speak to you again. Um, you've been referenced a few times in my interviews. Um, whenever things escalate, um, people bring up the escalation trap and how we're falling into that trap. And there's multiple fronts in which we're escalating. We've got the straight of the back and forth, the obvious one. And we've got proxy escalations as well. I'm not sure if you've covered that on your Substack yet, but we've got an escalation on the Lebanese front, the Syrian front, the Iraqi front, and especially in the last few days, the Yemeni front with the Saudi and Emirati backed, uh, militias.
>> Oh, actually I knew about the other. So in this later this week, uh, I have plans, so, um, to do more, uh, but I knew about the first couple, but I didn't know about what's happening in Yemen, Houthi. So just go ahead and, uh.
>> That's wild. Yeah, that's, that's a—I'll give you that one. I'll also give you something my last guest was telling me about. But the Yemen concerns me the most. You
>> realize just before you tell me, and so I don't make it seem like I'm perfeitting that—that's something I've been warning about the Red Sea issue for some time here. So anyway, I'm, I'm very eager to hear. You always have the latest, Mario.
>> Yeah. So on the, on the Yemeni front, obviously for the reason you've just explained, the Red Sea is extremely important now more than ever because they need an alternative to the Strait of Hummus if conflict resumes. Um, and for that alternative to exist, they need to, they need to remove Iran's stranglehold over the Babel Mandibra. That's the Houthis. And Yemen has been, is going through wars between the Amirati and Saudi backed groups and the Houthis for many years now. And then the last few days, there's been a military buildup of the, of the Saudi and Amirati backed militias, um, amassing in recent days possibly for a renewed offensive against the Houthis. So that is a worry that I have that we could be seeing the direct conflict between Iran and the US, tempor, and, uh, and Israel temporarily or even long-term move to a proxy front, multiple fronts between the US, Israel, Iranian-backed groups and even Gulf-backed groups as they all try to expand their influence and, um, kind of adapt to this new world order. And my last guest was actually talking about how it's all connected. The, he believes the crackdown we saw in Iraq a few days ago, um, was in order to crack down on the militias there because those militias threatened to attack Syria if Syria attacks Hezbollah. And as you know, Trump said he would like to see Syria attack Hezbollah as a way to get rid of Hezbollah without Israel bombing Lebanon. So it just looks messier than ever and, and, um, extremely concerning. I think you've captured it very, very well, and I'm just been more and more impressed over the weeks, Mario. Uh, and hope you, you and your audience don't mind me saying this, but your, your strategic thinking just has, you know, improved, you know, light years from where it was just a few weeks ago or a month ago. I'm just telling you, I do this for a living. So, so I have a lot of PhD students, and man oh man, you are way up there. So, I'm just, um, so yes, the, uh, your—I didn't see your previous guest, but, uh, I'm glad to—Yes, I'm the in Iraq. I think I agree with this 100%. And of course, uh, the, uh, foreign minister of, of Iran is trying to influence this as well. So, you recall that he made a trip recently, uh, in Iraq. And so there is, um, now what is happening in the big picture is about the, not just the balance of power in a vague sense that I've been explaining is at issue now, and the different, uh, uh, groups and sides disagree on this changing and fluid balance of power where it should come out. But what you're seeing here specifically is the sphere of influence issue. So Iran—this goes back, gosh, five, six weeks ago now. I think it was at the end of May. This is when the IRGC started to, uh, put out the idea of the, uh, access resistance belt or the, the access, uh, the, uh, security resistance belt, and that was going to go from Lebanon (that is the Mediterranean) to the Red Sea (that's Yemen) and then circle all the way back to the Gulf, and that would, of course, encircle Iraq as well. So what they are, uh, what is happening is as the balance of power has shifted, uh, here, uh, we are seeing a fundamental disagreement with, uh, the United States. It wants to still be the preeminent power; that's why it's trying to undermine the JCPOA in different ways so that it keeps as much power as possible. Israel wants to undermine the JCPOA in various ways because it used to be a rising power, it's fought, and now Iran wants to stick with the four corners of the JCPOA because it wants—that was a road map to its regional power. So that's the big picture, but within that, as I've been explaining, there's a sphere of influence. As Iran rises, it doesn't just want the strategic base in Hormuz and its own country, uh, and that global wealth that goes with that. It wants more, as regional powers do. They want a perimeter, a strategic perimeter that we call a sphere of influence. Now, spheres of influence are common with major powers. China's establishing one. The United States has long had one in the Western Hemisphere. Russia is trying to reestablish and broaden its sphere of influence. And they matter for power reasons. It's not just ego, prestige, or bragging rights. Uh, a game of risk, uh, here, uh, this really matters. And in the case of Iran, their perimeter that they are identifying is the perimeter that encircles all the ways the, u, uh, new pipelines could be built to exit and bypass Hormuz. So got to keep in mind, uh, this is all been—this is heavily about Hormuz, but Hormuz has tentacles into Lebanon, into Syria, into Iraq, into Yemen. Uh, now Iran has also proxies that they have had for many decades. Hezbollah goes all the way back to the year 1982. So this is a, uh, not a situation where this was all a standing start for Iran. They have a lot of pieces to work with to build and consolidate a sphere of influence. But that's what they're doing. They're not simply, um, rubber stamping or stamping a status quo where they've had relations with these different groups going for some case years, some case many decades. That's, it's more than that. Uh, Mario, they are consolidating a sphere of influence. And then, of course, there's push back, and Marco Rubio is encouraging push back. Some of that from Rubio is probably, uh, related to Israel and, and you know, direct political issues with Israel. Some of it is just simply what you would expect by the United States not wanting to, uh, accept a consolidated sphere of influence because what does that mean? It's an, in a sphere without the United States. That is a big deal. So as American power has, has sort of already receded, we already have a strategic defeat. Now what's happening is: will it become consolidated? Will this even become more lopsided against the United States? Iran is playing hard ball, man. They're, they're going for this in a serious way. Not overreaching yet, but my goodness, they are playing hard ball. And that has been a huge, huge miscalculation by the media and so forth. So, so many people in the media thought if just Trump would stop bombing everything would be okay, or just Trump pull back everything would be okay. That's not the case. The, the, the—well, certainly not my view on the escalation trap and the modeling, because Iran is now taking the initiative with force. Why? To consolidate that JCPOA, to defend those four corners, and basically to consolidate its position as the rising regional hegemon.
>> And, um, just for the audience: the last time we had a discussion a week or so ago, you've done a great job of explaining the—so I was just talking about Yemen and as an alternative, the Bab el-Mandeb strait as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz. You were explaining how Iran, through their axis of resistance, is their way of controlling all energy choke points. So if the, if they, if they charge a fee at the Strait of Hormuz, everyone's talking about how everyone will build alternatives. Well, what Iran is thinking is a step ahead of that and actually thinking as, as, as, um, um, their alter—their response to these alternatives, the Bab el-Mandeb and Hezbollah with the Mediterranean as one of those alternatives. Any reference.
>> We're so used to thinking of our rivals as dunderheads, um, and idiots that we, we having a hard time catching up. I, I wouldn't say these are, uh, the Iranians are, are geniuses, but what they're doing is they're playing the hand that they have in the, in the way realist 101 would play. It's, it's a standard default, uh, set of positions, and they're not under—they're not making the, uh, you know, many dumb mistakes here and there. Not saying they're perfect or so forth. I'm not saying they're 10 feet tall. However, um, we are underestimating that. And that's so for a long time on, u, comments to my escalation trap and my in-person meetings on the escalation trap. I'm meeting with lots of these, uh, oil, um, uh, traders and so forth, and they're saying, "You're over, you're overworried, Professor P. We're just going to knock them out in a couple years because we're bypassing this and this. They, they'll get, they'll have that Hormuz for 18 months and after that they're done." I think they, they've been thinking about this since late March as far as I can tell. So I don't think this is a case where, uh, Iran is behind the curve. I think they're just playing out. They've probably—Look, I've been modeling this for 20 years since 2005. I'd be pretty shocked if they haven't been modeling it for a long time as well.
>> Yeah. Um, they'll have their own version of Professor P. in modeling it.
>> And they probably have even better—they're probably better at it, and, and there are things they're going to see. I'm not, I'm not trying—I'm just telling you, this is just moving down the normal. And, and what I'm doing is following the 70, 80% branches of the tree. I'm not—there's, it's not like there's some genius idea of this or that. The idea here that's strong is follow the modeling and the incentives based on a power framework, not on a prestige framework, not on a, you know, ego trip for Trump all or Trump derangement syndrome. None of that is, is, is here. And it's turned out to be—we're now starting—you realize this is the fifth month of the war, Mario. The fifth month of the war. Just think about that. This was supposed to be over in three days. Reminds me of the Russia-Ukraine war. The beginning was like, "Oh, that won't last. It will last a few days." And then a few weeks later,
>> I have another thing: escalation trap. And it's very, very similar. And just remember, JD Vance said, "Oh, we're never going to get in a long war." President Trump said, "Okay, a couple days, then it was a couple weeks, then every day it's been 'this is going to be over.'" Well, of course, nobody believes him anymore. But what you are, what you are seeing is the states, as I've been saying from the beginning, they're not choosing a long war except for Iran. Iran likes the long war. If you look at Israel, you look at the United States, man, they'd like, um, if they could get a—if they could have gotten a 12-day war, they would have taken it.
>> What do you make of, um, the clashes we saw recently in the Strait of Hormuz? So Iran is trying to assert their control of the strait by striking ships that go on the Omani side. And the Americans want to make it clear that this is not, not acceptable. So they're trying to take away that control, that influence, that escalation dominance, whatever you want to call it, from the Iranians by responding and attacking the Iranians. The next day, the Iranians did it again, and then they agreed to talk in Qatar. But the Iranians are saying, "We're not going to meet the Americans. I don't know what's happening in Qatar." Um, and then today, the New York Times broke a story that, according to New York Times, Oman is already coming up with a plan, or they've come up with a plan with Iran. Oman and Iran to charge a fee at the Strait of Hormuz and manage the Strait of Hormuz together, and they, they've already presented that plan to the Americans, which they don't like. The Americans don't like the plan, obviously. Um,
>> Yeah. So what you have done is given a nice summary here. Very nice. Um, what you are seeing play itself out, Mario, is the red line. And I was, I was describing about Article 5. So this goes back 10 days ago, uh, an escalation trap post. I'm doing these on Monday now on a regular basis called "The Escalation Trap This Week." So you will see, and it has a forecast, very specific, and then it does a checkbox: what happened.
>> That's the email, that's the email that you sent. Yeah, I get that.
>> Yes, that's right. So I'm trying to make this, you know, people, you know, want to know how are these predictions working out? Let's just make this a little bit clear. And so
>> The last one, the last—the title of the last one is "The MOU is Dying. Worse Is Still Ahead."
>> That's right. That's right. And it's got a pave test in the middle of it here, so you can check the box. How's he doing? Because that's what they, they're playing the games on your shows. I mean, I'm seeing it. So let's make it easier to, to, to stump the professor. So anyway, the, um, uh, but what you're seeing and what you're describing here is a predictable red line based on the Article 5, which states very clearly Iran is going to be in charge of the arrangements, uh, with Oman, but it's Iran first. So they're the lead partner here, and these vessels are going to come after 60 days. Well, we're getting, you know, further into the 60-day clock. Um, so what you are seeing is Iran is exerting coercive leverage to prevent the United States from establishing what's called salami slicing. So, so there's this—what, what, what, uh, JD, what, what they are doing—the Trump administration with that third route is called salami slicing. It's a concept; it goes back to Thomas Schelling. This is very famous in strategy terms. So if your listeners want to kind of get a crash course on salami slicing here—but what they're doing is they're trying to whittle away that threshold in Article 5. It's called salami slice your way out of the threshold. And so this is exactly what they're doing. It's like they got their copy of Thomas Schelling. Uh, they're just reading at the NSC. This is how you salami slice your way out of it. Well, what, uh, Iran is doing is apparently they got their own copy of "Arms and Influence," and they're doing exactly what, what, what we expect in strategic studies to stop the salami slicing, which is you force the issue. You enforce the threshold that has already been established, and that is the Article 5. So their coercion, what it's about—their goal is not to wreck the world economy, although they'll accept it. Their goal is to, uh, get those fees. Now, what are those fees? It looks like they want—it's not 100% clear what the number value is, but I'm, I think they want something like $2 million a tanker. And if that's true, then given the amount of tankers that we're going through at normal levels here, uh, that equates to about, uh, $100 million a day. And then that equates to about $36 billion a year over, uh, and above what they make on selling their own oil. And within a few years, they're going to be the richest, most powerful, most wealthy, uh, uh, country in the Persian Gulf, uh, here, and they can always increase those fees, and they're going to try to block the other exits. So this—but their goal, but what the means to the goal, the strategy is always a means-end. So their goal is the fees, getting America to accept the fees. And what they're doing is they're constraining the ships, ships going through Hormuz. They're—and you've been tracking this on your show. I, or at least on the, uh, my feed on X, I see you've done a nice job of this. And so, uh, that's exactly what they want to do. Those ships were up to 70. That's a little bit too high for this. So they're lowering it back down. And conveniently, the United States violated Article 5 of the JCPOA. So it makes it international law. They can, uh, they can use that pretext. But what they're doing is it's a straightforward coercive strategy, means-ends. Uh, here, uh, they might also apply this, by the way, to Lebanon. It doesn't have to be limited to the goal of, uh, uh, the, the fees, but right now they're very tightly focused on those fees. And they're trying to reestablish Article 5 and the threshold of what's going to happen on, uh, I think it's August 16th when the day 61 comes. So this is what this is all about, and it matters tremendously. It's not just money; it's power of the first order that's at issue here, and this is why they're willing to initiate the use of force. As I said, this was not in the one you just read yesterday, but if you go back a couple Mondays, you'll see I was saying during the 60-day period, expect Iran to be the one initiating the use of force, not the United States. Worry more about the United States initiating it either in response to Iran's initiating or after day 60. And there's a set of reasons for that.
>> Interesting. What do you expect to come out of the meeting in, in Qatar now in Doha?
>> Uh, it's, it's probably either not much or very temporary. So that is in the post you just said. So I put, um, I laid it out which is what you typically see. I think this, the idea of a ceasefire that's meaningful is, is, is effectively defunct. What you are seeing is pauses between uses of military force. So, uh, escalation or wars are not linear the way people often expect. So people, uh, the public in particular, the media, because the media needs to focus on what's literally happening this second, uh, thinks things are linear—like a terrorist attack. And I know I've spent 25 years studying terrorism, not just bombing. So what the media thinks: if there was a terrorist attack today and there wasn't tomorrow, well, the terrorists must be done, right? They must be out of opportunity. They can't do. So, it's literally, uh, if it doesn't happen day by day by day for the media and most of the public and a lot of American decision makers and government leaders, it's, it's, uh, somehow, uh, over. No, that's not how it really works. And so, I think here you basically had a weekend of, um, an extended weekend. And why was it on the weekend? I think we can look at this and say this quite clearly. Iran wanted to reestablish that threshold. Trump wanted to, um, uh, bomb back so he didn't look like a complete weakling in front of the huge amount of MAGA that's crying for him to lash back, uh, here. Um, and why, and why did the Trump attack start exactly when they did? I think it was 18 minutes after the market closed on Friday. And then why did Trump say—exact—I mean, this was—I, I almost put this in a prediction, Mario. I, I knew I'd be on with you, so I just thought I'd tell the story, but I didn't put it in writing. But I, I said to my wife, "I know what's going to happen when I wake up on Monday morning. Trump's already going to be saying there's a meeting. It's already coming." And, and it's probably not going to be true. And sure enough, he's kind of wiggling his way into a meeting if he can in order to talk the markets down, um, here. And so this is what you are seeing. You're seeing a Trump yo-yo. Related—it's, it's, um, it's not exactly captured by the idea of tacoing. I think this is, uh, not quite right. It's more of a yo-yo, but it's around the idea of the market. When is it open? And he's trying to keep the prices down because, uh, the traders are terrified that if they really go to the market price, and you, you've been covering this great on your show, uh, that they will get punished rather, and they get fired. So, it's not just they lose some money, Mario. They lose their jobs if they get lose enough money on betting against Trump's words. So, this is, um, this is, uh, what is happening in detail with the coercive strategy. I think Iran's seeing this pretty clearly. They're just, uh, following what I would say is realism 101. It's not that complicated. Uh, they don't need to bomb—hit those ships every day, but they need to hit them every so often, unless the, um, administration follows the four corners of the JCPOA. And I think that's really what they're demanding, at least over the next 60 days. And any little thing that's out of that is not going to be acceptable by Iran. The question is, will we kowtow to every single thing in the JCPOA?
>> What has surprised you most, because you've been studying this for 20 years and, and, uh, gamifying this for 20 years? What surprised you most in terms of the outcomes of this war and where we are today?
>> The biggest surprise, to be very honest, is how well the modeling has done, uh, stage by stage. You have to remember—so when you model that, when I model this, we hadn't even started bombing. For so—this starts—this model that I'm talking to you about, and my students know—the students from class who have had me in strategy for the last 20 years, I see them now quite a bit when I go around and travel, um, and they're coming up and telling me, uh, how much they remember those days because it was—I would always end my big lecture class with the bombing of Iran, a simulated bombing of Iran, on, and what to expect in the stages. And stage one was we would bomb Fordow—that is, America would bomb Fordow. You could have Israel try to bomb, uh, uh, Natanz, but Israel didn't have the payload. There's a lot of operational reasons why only the United States could bomb Fordow. And, but once we bombed Fordow, for whatever reason we did that, uh, we would disable it as an industrial centrifuge factory, but not be able to find the 60% enriched uranium. And then the—then I said, and what this would mean is we would get scared over the next year or so, and I said that this would be the trigger in about a year or two to go back to do regime change bombing, which we had rejected over and over and over again, different administrations—that we would become so paranoid and so worried about what was happening with that nuclear material that we would, that, take the huge risk of doing regime change bombing out of desperation to try to shut this thing down. But that would then lead to the power, the lashing back, the Khasoggi and all the stuff that we've talked about over the months. So that was how you went from stage one to stage two, where we are now. And now we are in the middle game, bouncing back and forth between, um, uh, stage three—more escalation to take away that power that Iran grabbed with Hormuz—uh, and or stage four, which is accept Iran as the fourth center of world power. Those were the predictions. They've been the predictions all the way through. We're in the middle game, and this middle game can go on, I think, at least until January, Mario. So to put some, not some time frame on this, uh, the, the people want it to be over because they don't want their prices to keep going up. Well, that doesn't make it happen, though. So, I'm, I'm not, um, you know, putting the finger up and saying which way is the wind blowing here. I'm just sticking to what the arguments are, and the biggest surprise has been it's been so on the money. It's been, it's been really close. So that makes me want to just keep following the logics I'm laying out. And that's really what you're seeing, Mario. Um, is I would definitely, you know, have said, um, you know, that the—and if the war were to suddenly have been over two weeks ago, that would have been different than the model, and I would have said so, uh, here. And I told you what we would—been on—I said, you know, this is what that would start to look like. But remember two weeks ago, Mario, I said we would be pulling forces out and we would withdraw the forces back to the position of December. Well, if you look at the feeds of what, what US—I was just on with another show, and they're showing me the data showing we're putting more forces in, more logistics, more tankers. We're going the other way with our forces. You see, that's consistent with what I've been saying, uh, even before it happened. So, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm what I'm seeing is really quite remarkable, um, conformity or consistency with the, like, very specific, uh, real world predictions that are coming out of the modeling of the bombing of Iran, because it really is about, ultimately, Iran's power—either Hormuz or the nuclear weapons.
>> I was speaking to Admiral Mark Montgomery yesterday—uh, sorry, earlier today. So he's the former director of the operations that US, uh, Pacific Command, and I asked him the question. I'm like, "What do you think is the, like?" He's a straight shooter, so he just says things as they are. He doesn't just go around and just answers my questions directly. So I always enjoy talking to him. And I said to him, "What do you think is the likelihood that we'll see a resumption of war, full-blown war after the midterms?" He said above 50% likelihood. Not back and forth strikes like we're seeing right now, limited strikes, but he's talking about a full-blown conflict, a continuation of the war. Um,
>> That, that's not unreasonable. That's not unreasonable. In fact, that's, that's close to what I think. I haven't put quite a percentage on the way he has, but it's really quite similar to what I think. And here's the, here's the, the set of reasons, Mario. There's two fundamental reasons to go down that road. Number one is, um, if in fact the oil inventories run down to the bottom, and if in fact then the prices of gasoline go way back up, you're going to have a lot of angry, um, Americans and a lot of angry people around the world. Now, let me just focus inside the United States. What's that anger going to do inside the United States? Um, it's going to have a double-edged sword. It's not going to just put people—make people keep getting madder and madder at, uh, Donald Trump, because it will in fact in part be Iran's initiation of force that is causing that; that will just be a reality. And so what you are going to have, and Donald Trump will definitely—uh, he's already working—can see this with Mike Johnson this morning. He's working on this already. He hasn't quite come out with it yet, but don't be surprised if that becomes a big, uh, talking point by President Trump. And so what that's going to mean, Mario, is you're going to get an awful lot of people on MAGA, which Trump needs to turn out. MAGA is what's going to determine how much—whether the House falls, the US House falls or the Senate falls to the Democrats. It's going to be a big—So if MAGA is getting more and more angry, and Trump vectors that anger, uh, here and you know, "Blame Iran, not me. We did our best. I gave JD the big shot, and it's Iran who's stabbing us in the back." That is going to create momentum here, uh, before the, uh, uh, even before the, uh, midterms. But there's a second issue underneath this more detailed calculation, which is over the weekend the IRGC's Fars news service—this is a news service that I'm sure you're very aware is connected with the, uh, Iranian Revolutionary Guards—well, they floated the idea that Iran needs now—needs now nuclear weapons. And this is in fact in line with my, uh, my, my thinking as well. And about a—I was thinking again it would be about a year or a year and a half after the starting of the assassination—you know, the regime change bombing—you would have Iran truly develop nuclear weapons. Um, and but, but look, I, I predicted the regime change bombing would happen a year or two after Fordow, and it was eight months sooner than I said. Here you could get the same thing. You could get Iranian nuclear weapons sooner than I'm suggesting, but I don't think you're seeing it happening later than I'm suggesting. And what that would be is an incredible embarrassment to President Trump. This would totally turn President Trump into—I mean domestically, if Iran were to test nuclear weapons, the Trump's power would be, would almost be over. He could lash out, do whatever he wanted, but even if he lashes out, everybody would know, he is just, uh, he, he's got nothing to offer anymore. Uh, and so this would be immediately looking to JD and, and Rubio as like the actual de facto, you know, leader here. Uh, and so what you would see is Trump would, um, uh, if he gets an inkling of this coming—and we're likely have all the surveillance—Trump's telling you we got all the eyes and ears looking for exactly this. I think this could be, uh, why we still keep those Marines. So notice we didn't pull the Marines out. Okay. We, we still have those ground forces there ready to go in a few days' notice at most, in order to go in somewhere like Esfahan or wherever, um, pickaxe mountain, wherever you got to go. And I think they're there, um, uh, in part maybe they have multiple, you know, scenarios, uh, but in case they get an inkling of a test, and that is not something I would just completely dismiss. So, so I think that this idea that this whole thing is over has just missed what this has all been about in the first place. And it's true that America doesn't have good military options. People have been saying that. I was saying that for decades. This is not like we suddenly thought we had military options. But that's not how—if, if that were so true, Mario, World War I would not have been four years. The Russia-Ukraine war would already be over by now. I mean, if it were the case that this was so easy to understand, the bottom line is wars disrupt the balance of power, often in big ways, and then they end when the major combatants agree on the new balance of power. And right now, they're not agreeing. Iran is not satisfied. They're not done growing their power yet. America is not happy. It's now more and more dissatisfied with every change. And Israel is in a full-out panic as far as I can tell. Not just being rational, but incredibly emotional, uh, here as, as I think you would expect. I, I, I'd find it if October 7 happened here in, in Chicago, I'm pretty sure you would see that kind of an emotional response by the city of Chicago. So, I, I am, I'm, I that's what I see. And I think that what you said about the 50%, uh, if those ground forces aren't going to be used, let's just pull them back. Let's pull them back.
>> You'd want to keep them as pressure during negotiations as well. So it's difficult to tell. Are they there for practical reasons of what you've explained, or are they there to keep pressure on Iran? Keep that fear within Iran as a deal is being negotiated. I, I think that this is not—Yeah, there's a little bit of strategic ambiguity going on here, Mario, but this is underweaiting—as happens with strategic ambiguity, I would say, in Taiwan—that this is not just an easy out, an excuse where it's all bluff. See, what people mean by strategic ambiguity is it's all just a bluff. It's not really going to happen. So, therefore, their presence there is not real. It doesn't really have a probability on the, uh, you know, a coefficient on the variable. I, I just think that this is not quite right. Strategic ambiguity here was not really about that, um, with Taiwan. It was, um, uh, it was a velvet glove. It's so—there's realism, and then there's with the mailed fist, and then there's the velvet glove over the mailed fist, which makes it a little bit easier to deal with. Those 5,000 Marines, uh, here I think are just different. I think they're there as a backup plan, um, for, um, Iran testing. And a good question for, uh, President Trump by a journalist would be: if you saw Iran testing, would you send in the Marines? Just directly ask him and let him say, "I can't say," or whatever. But these are the actual scenarios that we should be pressing the president on. But it's hard because, you know, the, the everybody wants—does the current news which is important, but there's core underlying scenarios here. Are there—who's going to control Hormuz with fees or not? Um, and then number two: is Iran really going to have, uh, the ability to test within a couple weeks or not? And that is what this has always been about—or the first, the latter, and now Hormuz the second.
>> And, and you've mentioned Israel as well, and we haven't talked enough about Israel. I was, uh, in a conversation with former Prime Minister Bennett, Naftali Bennett, earlier today, and his—I was going through his policy to understand how different he is to Netanyahu. Very, very little difference, especially when it comes to Iran. If anything, he's in some ways more hawkish towards Iran. Um, so even if Trump decides to walk away, you've got Israel as another wild card.
>> Yes, but it's—I think a wild card means it is, um, 50/50 which way Israel will go. I don't think that's right, Mario. It's, it's I think it's directional. And what I think is it's, um, coming from number one. Uh, so—or three places really. Of course, the, the, the hawkish side in, uh, in Israel has always wanted the expansion for decades. So, that part, number, number one. Number two, October 7 has moved the public, uh, in that direction. The left basically disappeared or virtually disappeared after October 7. And you see that in the 70 to 80% of the Israeli public, uh, in the most recent opinion polls over the last few months that all say they want to go full bore into, uh, into Lebanon. Half the public apparently is willing in Israel—is willing to do that even if that means losing American support. So this is the public's really quite traumatized here, in addition to what the leaders are, and that, of course, reinforces the leaders. But there's a third thing, Mario. So this is on again—Substack analysis, military analysis of what does the next war against Hezbollah really look like, Mario. So I did a big, uh, uh, 1,800-word analysis on the Substack on this, and I call it "Closing Israel." So apply—not just the idea we know Hezbollah hates Israel. We know it wants to hurt Israel, and we know it has drones. But right now, those first-person view drones are really just being used directly against the frontline Israeli forces in either southern Lebanon or just on the other side of the border in northern Israel. But just simply extend the logic of the—I mean the operational strategic logic of what drones are doing in Hormuz as we just spent the first 30 minutes discussing—hitting ships and also the Houthis. And you're telling me more. I got to go now spend more time after this, go learn what's going on with the Houthis. Um, but apply that to Hezbollah, and notice Israel is effectively 55% of its trade—of its GDP comes from trade, comes from seaborne trade, and that's coming in through Haifa. It's coming in through just a handful of ports. So if you look at Israel, Israel is effectively an island when it comes to trade, and Lebanon—those, the, the distance between the Beqaa Valley, which is where you would build your drones and arsenals and so forth to build drone swarms, and Haifa is 80 miles. 80 miles. And if you—and I just did a big briefing on this last week for my live—when I did, I've done in-person events. I've invited people to some in-person events. So, I'm showing them what it would—how easy it would be to target those big cargo vessels in Haifa with drones. And again, you can launch a dozen drones or 20 drones. Only one or two hit, and you've done your work. Israel's, uh, knocked down 90% of them. But what that means is Israel is going to face, uh, with, with Hezbollah in Lebanon, um, a much more severe threat, a real threat, not just a made-up threat, uh, than it does today. And I'm not telling you I justify what Israel is doing. I still think if I were Israel, I'd play the hand that they should work with the United States to get us out of the escalation trap. So, so if I were advising the people you're interviewing, um, I would, I would not tell them to go down this road. However, I would start with the reality of what I think they're seeing, rather than dismiss it as, "Oh, you're just a wacko. Let me tell you why you shouldn't do what you're—" No, that doesn't persuade decision makers. Tomorrow. I spent, uh, from 2001 to 2024, I advised every West Wing in, uh, in the White House. And it doesn't work. You walk in here because usually I have to be invited. I'm just a professor. It doesn't work to walk in and say, "Yeah, you're just a bunch of nincompoops. Thank goodness I'm here." No, this doesn't work. You've got to, ex—understand things from what they're seeing, and then say either this is unrealistic what you're seeing or it is realistic. And then from there, start to create a better course of action. If you just keep assaulting them as morally decrepit and idiots, this is not—you're not going to save any lives. No, notice assaulting Israel as morally, uh, decrepit hasn't saved what—4,000 people are now dead in southern Lebanon, right? I mean, think of that. That breaks my heart. I want to actually help those people stay alive. How do you do that? This is, I think, how you do it, Mario. You've got to, um, get more deeply into this, and then, and then tell them, "You recognize this A, B, and C. You disagree with this other thing, but this is the better direction you should go for your own security." You see, and that is a way to actually get them to move. As a final question, professor, using your model and based on the latest developments, what can we expect to see, uh, over the next few weeks and months?
>> You can expect to see, uh, Iran's going to enforce the four corners of that JCPOA, uh, and that then, I think is, uh—you're quite likely, and that means using force. So I would still say Iran is likely to, do, be the side initiating the use of force over the next few weeks. Uh, but the United States is getting more and more hair-triggered to respond and to respond in bigger ways, and this will put pressure on Saudi Arabia. So, um, as I understand it, there are thousands of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia, and they've been there for over a month, and there's also some Pakistani, uh, jets. Well, that corresponds to when Saudi Arabia decided to get a, a backbone and shut down its airspace. So that's a post I put up today, and I'm not 100% sure on this, but Reuters, others have, have, have laid this out—these Pakistani troop details. And what that tells me, Mario, is that, um, in the coming weeks, as, as Iran enforces the JCPOA with force and as the United States wants to push back, don't be surprised if Saudi Arabia and maybe some other Gulf states are saying, uh, "No, we want to work with Iran in another way, and it's not with, uh, retaliatory bombing." So those are the things I'm like keenly following this week, next week. How is this exactly going to work out with these? It's, it's not really—is Jared Kushner going to meet with an Iranian diplomat in Doha? That may happen or not, but, um, I, I don't think that's—notice that those meetings have not really been very predictive of what's happening the next few days later. You see, they're, they're not because they're just talk. The realities, as I keep saying, are what the states are actually doing and what are their actual security incentives.
>> Professor, always a pleasure to speak to you. Thank you for your time.
>> Well, thank you, Mario, and thank you for all you're doing. I, I just can't believe how, how much you have—uh, you're, you're the—you're, you, you know, CNN used to do what you do and then stopped, and now you're the new CNN. I don't know whether it's an insult or a
>> compliment. No, no, I don't mean—I mean the CNN 30 years ago,
>> the CNN that we all
>> but it became CN.
>> Thank you, Professor. I appreciate your time.
>> All right. Bye-bye.
>> Bye-bye. All right, guys. I'll be going live again with Professor Gibbs, David Gibbs, in 15 minutes. Uh, in the meantime, um, I'll probably go through some of the comments for today, um, with the interview I just had with Professor Papp, the interview I had before that with Elijah Magnier, where he broke down on how what's happening in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, the Erdogan-Trump love affair, is all related to Hezbollah and weakening Hezbollah, and he also talks about Yemen. So that was a great conversation with Elijah. Before that, I spoke to Admiral Mark Montgomery. It was a great chat as always, uh, to get his thoughts on the latest developments and, and whether the likelihood of renewed conflict, and before that with former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, former prime minister of Israel, to talk about how what would Israel look like if he takes over from Netanyahu later this year. Um, so I hope you enjoyed the conversation so far today. Professor Gibbs is in 15 minutes, and we have Brendan Wert, uh, Tom Luongo, Muhammad Faridi, and then Larry Johnson to wrap up the day. Thanks everyone.