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Kishore Mahbubani Reveals China's Strategy to Counter USA

The WWII Chronicle36:24

Transcription

On the one hand, we live in the most peaceful era in human history. On the other hand, we are also about to enter one of the most dangerous periods in human history because, you know, the prospects of a nuclear war. And a nuclear war, of course, is something that the world actually has never experienced. We've had two bombs that were dropped in Japan after World War II, and we saw how much devastation they did. But in a nuclear war, let's say the one that could happen is one between China and the United States, the United States would lose 10 to 15 cities. At least China would lose more than double the number of cities. Millions would die. In theory, such a horrible outcome, the prospect should be zero. But they're not zero. That's why I think it's very important for us to understand what leads to wars and what do we do to prevent wars from happening because peace is a bit like the oxygen in this room.

No superpower ever gives up its number one status willingly, never. It'll fight to maintain it as long as possible. So sometime in the next 10 to 15 years, China's economy will become number one, and the United States, for the first time in 130, 140 years, will become the number two economic power in the world. Now, that will be a huge shock for the United States. And so when the United States is trying, going all out to stop the rise of China, that is normal behavior. We, we, we should expect it. That's what happens for thousands of years of history. But of course, we hope that the contest will be played out peacefully and not in the form of a major war between the two sides.

I think we can prevent a war between, uh, the US and China, but it requires a process, a very complex process of them talking to each other regularly so that they understand clearly where each other's red lines are, and that unfortunately is not happening now. So on US and China, I'm actually, well, I think on Taiwan, they have receded. The danger of a nuclear war has receded. The overall relationship remains very difficult, but there might even be a skirmish, but there will be no war. I mean, major war, because there's room for flexibility in that area. There's no room for flexibility on Taiwan. Zero flexibility. Because the Chinese, as you know, you know this better than I do, for them, the century of humiliation, 1842 to 1949, is like yesterday. You know, from the seizure of Hong Kong in the first Opium War to the loss to Japan, the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, which led to Taiwan being ceded for the first time, as you know. So all these memories of the century of humiliation, most of them have gone away, except for one, which is Taiwan, and there is a total unanimity of views in China that at some point in time, there must be a reunification within Taiwan and China.

The best-case outcome is some kind of peaceful reunification, or even something where you, where you postpone the current situation and let the status quo remain, where the people of Taiwan are at peace and the people of Taiwan enjoy a wonderful life. By the way, I, I love Taiwan. I've been there many times. >> Fond of it myself. >> I've been there many times, and it's a wonderful place, and people are very happy and doing very well. So don't disrupt the status quo. But this is why when Mike Pompeo said, "Hey, we're going to try and establish official relations with Taiwan," that's where he, he didn't realize that he was crossing a Chinese red line and therefore could have triggered a very strong military response from China. And the military response would have come because the Chinese leaders cannot afford to be seen to be weak on the Taiwan issue. Their hands are actually tied.

Taking place or coming back to China, I can say confidently that there are two schools of thought. The first school of thought, I would say, is what you will find in the Anglo-Saxon media, that this is clearly Xi Jinping going back to the ideological roots of the Chinese Communist Party and saying the time has come now, China is rich enough now, we can go back to socialism, we're going to crack down on these big firms, big tech, and, uh, now focus on redistribution, redistributing the pie. And as you know, the phrase used is "common prosperity," and let's take care of people at the bottom and so on and so forth. So, and if that happens, of course, if indeed he's cracking down on industries and, uh, big tech and big money and all that, then you could see, in a sense, uh, in theory, a retreat from capitalism. People will stop investing in China, and frankly, the Chinese economy will collapse. So that's school number one, and I would say it is, I don't rule it out completely, you know, I don't say it's, uh, there's a zero prospect of that happening, but there is another school of thought that, uh, says that actually Xi Jinping appreciates what China has accomplished under the free market system. Its economy has grown faster than any other country's in the last 30 years, right? I mean, just imagine that in purchasing power parity terms, China's GDP was 10% of the United States in 1980. In 2014, it became bigger in PPP terms. In nominal market terms, the US GDP was eight times the size of China's. Now it is only 1.5 times larger. So there's been a tremendous track record. But he thinks that at this point in time, there have also been some excesses that have developed. Excesses have developed in the sense of the big firms becoming too large and monopolistic and trying to control the regulators in the same way that big tech in the United States controls the regulators in Washington D.C. So, as you know, in my book, I have a chapter on how the United States has become functionally a plutocracy, which is a government of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%. And Xi Jinping is saying, I do not want a plutocracy in China, and I'd rather that we break down the power of this large monopolistic, and that's what he's doing. And if that's what he's doing, paradoxically, he may actually unleash entrepreneurial energy by killing the, by restricting the power of the big tech. Because today, and in fact, there was an article in the Financial Times today, if I'm not mistaken, saying the big tech in the US is so successful, every time a potential competitor emerges, they gobble it up before it can become big enough to be a threat. And there's a guy who's a real expert on artificial intelligence, he's one of the biggest investors in artificial intelligence, he's written one of the definitive books on it. His name is Kai-Fu Lee, and I heard him speak at, uh, an interview with The Economist. And in the interview, he's invested in a thousand startups in China. He says all these new moves make it easier for his startups to succeed because they can no longer be eaten up >> by the giants. So paradoxically, even though in theory Xi Jinping is cracking down on big tech, actually he may be unleashing entrepreneurial energy.

Now, frankly, which school of thought is correct? Is, is, uh, Xi Jinping destroying capitalism in China, or is Xi Jinping rejuvenating capitalism in China? The two schools of thought. Uh, we'll find out within 10 years. But I, as a betting man, I place my bets on the second school of thought.

One thing we can learn from China is that you can take a country where in 1980, about the figures vary, like 80 to 90% of the people lived in poverty, 80 to 90%. And today, it's almost down to zero. China's poverty eradication program is the most impressive and most successful poverty eradication program in human history. It's a tremendous accomplishment. For me, poverty eradication is actually very important because, actually, I was born in poverty. I know what it's like. I, I was put on a special feeding program when I was six years old. I didn't have a flush toilet. I've lived through all that. So I think eradicating poverty should be the number one moral imperative in the world. And China is the leading example of how it can be done and how we should learn lessons from China in that area.

And in terms of how we adapt to China, I think it is, it is, it is a fact that whenever a new great power emerges, the world order has got to change and reorient itself. And the question is whether or not, to put it very simply, will China emerge as an angry dragon or a peaceful dragon? And we don't know the answer to that because it's what we do today that will determine whether China emerges as an angry dragon or as a peaceful dragon. I think both are possible, which is why the, my thesis is that we should try to work with China as it is rising and persuade China to accept the current Western rules-based order. That is a gift from the West to the rest of the world. And fortunately, as of now, China actually loves the rules-based order because China has succeeded in developing so well in the last 30 years because the rules-based order has facilitated China's rise. So the World Trade Organization is responsible for China emerging as the world's number one trading power today. So it is not in China's interest to disrupt the rules-based order. But all this can work out if you work out an understanding with China. But if there's no mis, if there's no understanding with China, and if there is growing tension and conflict, then it is possible that China could emerge as an angry dragon, then I think the world will be a less comfortable place.

Is because the United States has not formulated a long-term strategy on how to manage China. And, and I say this with great confidence because my source for this is America's greatest living, I guess, statesman or thinker, who is Henry Kissinger. And I mentioned in my book, I had a one-on-one lunch with him in March 2018 in New York. And at the end of the lunch, I was trying to digest what he said to me. And then I said, well, he's obviously trying to tell me the US doesn't have a strategy. So I wrote him a note and said, "Can I cite you in my book saying the US doesn't have a strategy?" He said, "Yes." Okay. So in my book, I say, and, and this is, this is why there are no clear red lines. Because I actually think, and this is what I've argued in an essay that I published in National Interest two or three months ago, saying that the United States should work out a long-term strategy. And actually, it is possible for the American people, who, by the way, the sad part about the United States is that it's the only developed country where the average incomes of the bottom 50% have stagnated for 30 years. And the United States is the only major developed country where life expectancy has come down. You know, everywhere else in the world, like Singapore, life expectancy keeps going up. So, if the United States focuses on improving the well-being of its people, and if China focuses on improving the well-being of its people, US and China can and should get along. And I try to convey that optimistic message. So I'm trying to say, actually, that if they did a brutal calculation of where their real interests lie, their real interests actually lie in cooperation and not in conflict or competition.

>> So we'll turn to our audience now. >> That the United States creates an international law today is a loophole that China will walk through tomorrow. So it is in the interest of the United States, therefore, to close all the loopholes today, prevent China from doing that. I give you a concrete example. The United States has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. China has. But if China becomes number one, they say, "Okay, the previous number one didn't ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. I will withdraw my ratification." And that's not, that's not, you don't want China to do that. So the way you prevent China from doing that is for the United States to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. But of course, politically, I just want you to know this, politically it's impossible in the US Senate and Congress to achieve that. So in many ways, the United States is acting against its own interests when it creates all these loopholes for China.

But the question is, will China demolish the rules-based order when it becomes number one? In my book, I argue that it is not likely to do so for one actually important cultural reason. For the Chinese, having order is very important because the history of China has taught the Chinese people that whenever there's disorder under the heavens, people suffer. So the best thing to have is order, stability, predictability. Which is why, by the way, the Chinese, according to a Harvard Kennedy School study, support for the Chinese Communist Party has gone up from 86% in 2003 to 93% in 2016. Why? Because the Chinese Communist Party has been delivering order, stability, predictability. So when China becomes number one, and if China becomes a much bigger global trader by then, then it is in China's interest to preserve the order and stability not just inside China, but around China also. And so I actually think we can persuade China to continue to abide by the rules-based order. But you've got to do that now, before it becomes number one, and not wait till it becomes number one to say, "Hey, why didn't you keep the rules-based order?" Because I think, and I talk about Southeast Asia, especially ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, because it's very important for the ASEAN countries to make the point that this growing contest between the US and China is not just going to disrupt lives in the United States, disrupt lives in China. I mean, and by disruption, I don't mean necessarily war. No, even without war, there'll be disruption. I mean, for example, farmers in the United States lost their incomes when, when China retaliated against American trade tariffs, farmers in America got less money, and then the US Congress had to give farmers money. So these are, these are examples of disruptions. So if the disruptions are going to be confined to the United States and China, then they can keep on doing whatever they're doing. Unfortunately, if the United States and China, when they launch a trade war, it doesn't affect these two countries. It affects the global economy. It affects the lives of people around the world. It affects lives of people in Southeast Asia too. So that's why it's important for Southeast Asians who say, "Please, why don't you just press the pause button on this geopolitical contest because frankly, we have more important issues to address." Number one, in the short term, we still haven't overcome COVID-19.

And I'll tell you why. Because no other region on planet is as diverse as Southeast Asia is. Actually, Southeast Asia is one of the most interesting human laboratories on planet Earth. Out of, uh, 650 million people in ASEAN, you have 250 million Muslims, 150 million Christians, 150 million Buddhists, you have Mahayana Buddhists, you have Hinayana Buddhists, you have Taoists, you have Confucians, you have Hindus, you have Communists. You know, it's, it's amazingly diverse as a region. And everyone predicted, including legends of various British historians, that Southeast Asia would become the Balkans of Asia, with wars starting within many countries, and there were wars between Southeast Asian countries. So what's amazing is that Southeast Asia has emerged as the second most peaceful corner of planet Earth after the European Union, where you have, we don't have zero prospect of war like the European Union, but we have zero wars, and that's amazing in such a diverse region. And, uh, that's, this is one of the most underappreciated success stories, peace stories in the world, and that is ASEAN. And Singapore is one of the smallest countries in Southeast Asia, cherishes this peace of Southeast Asia, and in fact, tries very actively behind the scenes to play a role to keep Southeast Asia in the way that it is today. I mean, the whole story of how it came about is, is quite amazing because, for example, one thing that kept peace in Southeast Asia was a close relationship that was developed between the Prime Minister of Singapore then, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, and the President of Indonesia then, President Suharto. Now, I knew, I met both these men, and you cannot imagine two people who are more different in their outlook. Because Mr. Lee Kuan Yew was a, were trained Anglo-Saxon lawyer with a sharp, rigorous, analytical Western mind. President Suharto's mind was filled with Javanese mysticism, Javanese history, spoke very little English, and would behave very, very differently from how an Anglo-Saxon gentleman would behave. So when these two men formed this friendship, it was a remarkable development. But that showed how Southeast Asia was so amazing. People who are very different have learned to get along with each other. And therefore, what Southeast Asia has done is a model for, let's say, for South Asia, a model for India and Pakistan, a model for the Middle East between Israel and Palestine. Come and see how we get along in Southeast Asia. So really, therefore, the Southeast Asian story, I would say, the United World College of Southeast Asia should try to sell the Southeast Asian story to the rest of the world.

>> Well, we, we can work together on that, I think. Can I, I was going to say to you >> is not weak by accident. It's weak by design. What do I mean, weak by design? That the great powers, and this is, this was especially, for example, true in the Cold War, when the United States and Soviet Union in the Cold War disagreed on everything except one thing. They both wanted to keep the United Nations weak. And the way they kept the United Nations weak, you see, if you want to get things done, as you know, Nick, if you want to transform an organization, you want to make it strong. When you, when you select a CEO, you will pick somebody who's dynamic, strong, driven, ambitious, out to change the world. Now, if you are dynamic, strong, ambitious, driven, out to change the world, you disqualify from becoming the UN Secretary General. Because the United States and Soviet Union both agreed after the, by the way, after the success of Dag Hammarskjöld, who was a very good UN Secretary General, that subsequently they picked weak, spineless candidates as UN Secretary General, for example, Kurt Waldheim of, of Austria. So if you pick weak and spineless candidates as Secretary General, how do you expect the organization to deliver results? So I think, therefore, the problem can be fixed very easily. From now on, they should say that if you're weak and spineless, you cannot become Secretary General of the UN.

The Chinese are very, very unhappy about this Ukraine war. If they had a choice, they would rather that Putin didn't start this invasion on Ukraine because it's in the long-term strategic interest of China to see Europe emerge as an independent political home that, uh, China can deal with as an autonomous geopolitical actor. As a result of the Ukraine war, the Europeans have become far more dependent on Americans for their protection, certainly against Russia, and they have become, in some ways, geopolitically compliant to American wishes. And if you want proof of this, just take a look at the case of Italy. Italy was the only G7 country that was brave enough to have an independent foreign policy and join the Belt and Road Initiative. Today, the Italian government is under so much pressure from Washington D.C. that it feels that it has to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative, even though it's in Italy's national interest to stay in the BRI, because if Italy loses special access to the Chinese market, it will be very bad for the Italian economy. The Italian economy has stopped growing, as we all know. It needs a new impetus for growth. And the new impetus for growth is not going to come from the US economy. It's going to come from the Chinese economy because the new middle class, the large middle class that is going to buy Italian luxury products is not going to come from the United States. It's going to come from China. So the Italians are, in a sense, sacrificing their own future by withdrawing from the BRI because of American pressure. But this is an example of how Europe has become geopolitically compliant to American wishes.

In the long run, the Ukraine conflict will be seen as a sideshow. That's not the real contest. And in some ways, the United States is doing itself a disfavor by dragging out this Ukraine conflict. And I say the United States is dragging out the Ukraine conflict because without American support for Ukraine, the war wouldn't last as long as it has. And it is not going to be the fundamental mover of world history, but it's going to be a major distraction. This war could have been avoided. And no, you all you have to do is watch the video of John Mearsheimer, which has now been watched 40 million times, over 40 million times. And you get a sense that in some ways, if the Europeans had been wiser and worked out ways and means of integrating Russia into, not the European Union, but into the European community, create a common European house, as Gorbachev said, then this war could have been avoided. What this war shows more than anything else is the geopolitical incompetence of Europe. And, yeah, it's a tragedy because if Europe had a more independent policy and found ways and means of accommodating Russian concerns without cowering to Russia, by the way, you don't have to cower to Russia, but you can give it the space and find a compromise solution on Ukraine. This war could, future historians will record that this war could have been avoided, you know. But unfortunately, uh, Europe no longer has sort of strong, powerful leaders like Margaret Thatcher, like François Mitterrand, like Helmut Kohl, like Helmut Schmidt. No longer has that. And so that's why this war is dragging on.

This is where the United States has got to realize that the world has become a much more intelligent and sophisticated place. So the kind of simple black and white distinctions that are made by American policymakers, you know, democracy versus autocracy, it just doesn't work anymore. We're moving. The 21st century is going to be very different from any other century. It's a multi-civilizational, multi-polar world where you need to understand all the shades of gray, all the nuances. And if you keep coming to this world with black and white perspectives, you'll be at a severe disadvantage. I think that's why this, I think that's also why the Asian 21st century has done so well, because what it provides is a much more nuanced view of the world than anything that is provided in the American media or Western media. So there's hunger for someone to say, "Hey, the old Western perspectives are not going to help us understand this world." Psychologically, the rest of the world is preparing for the Asian century, while the Americans are still trying to preserve the American century. And that's going to create a fundamental disconnect between America and the world.

The Americans don't pay attention to long-term threats. And I actually, again, as a friend of the United States, I'm saying, hey, this is a different world that is emerging. Instead of trying to protect American primacy, focus on improving the living conditions of the American people. In the long run, the choice for any US government, the fundamental strategic choice is, do you advance the interest of American primacy, or do you advance the interest of the American people, who, by the way, will suffer if there's climate change? So if you are interested in protecting the American people, fight climate change first. You won't fight China. But only if primacy is your number one objective, then you fight China. These, these are the strategic decisions. I feel very sad that American strategic thinkers are not bringing out these big fundamental dilemmas that America needs to address. Instead, everything is focused on short-term, on the next election, on beating up China, with no discussion of the long-term issues.

I think ASEAN is the most underrated regional organization in the whole world. It is the most underrated regional organization in the whole world because it is actually, in terms of deeds, the most successful regional organization in the whole world. You know, look at SAARC, it can't even meet. India and Pakistan cannot trade with each other. Look at the Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia and UAE had sanctions on Qatar until recently. Uh, and look at the European Union. It broke up before ASEAN did, with Brexit. And, uh, you know, the European Union today has the biggest war on its doorstep in Ukraine. So if you compare ASEAN against any other regional organization, it has done a better job at promoting peace and prosperity in its region. And, you know, let me ask you, within the years 2010 and 2020, did the $17 trillion European Union contribute more to global economic growth, or did the $3 trillion ASEAN economy contribute more to global economic growth? The answer is ASEAN. So, you know, ASEAN has done remarkable things. Now, what makes it difficult to understand ASEAN is that ASEAN is inherently a weak organization. It never has a clear long-term strategy. It always stumbles through. But guess what? It keeps stumbling through and moving forward in its own way, right? And it's actually quite amazing that, you know, how much ASEAN has progressed, especially over the last 10 years. Again, in the year 2000, Japan's economy was eight times the size of ASEAN's economy. Now it's only 1.5 times bigger. So look at that. Look at how much ASEAN has progressed. So I think ASEAN has developed its own, what I call, inner genius. And right now, for example, it's trying its best to maintain good relations with the United States and maintain good relations with China, which is the right thing to do. And again, it does it quietly, without too much fanfare, but makes sure that both sides understand clearly where they stand.

There's no doubt that the US government, I say this US government because it was either the Trump administration or the Biden administration, still wants to try and isolate China. But again, this is where there's no long-term strategic thinking. Only 12% of the population of the world lives in the West. 88% lives outside the West. And the majority of them, by the way, want to continue trading with China and want to continue dealing, uh, with China. And so, you know, take Brazil, for example. 20 years ago, it took Brazil one year to export $1 billion to China. Now, it takes Brazil 60 hours to export $1 billion to China. Look at that. And you're asking Brazil to isolate China. So I mean, the Americans don't realize that in the Cold War, they successfully contained the Soviet Union, but today they cannot contain China. It's a mission impossible. And, you know, you know, you talk about Quad and so on and so forth. Look at ASEAN, right? In the year 2000, US trade with ASEAN was $135 billion, and China's trade with ASEAN was only $40 billion. So US trade with ASEAN was more than three times China's trade with ASEAN in 2000. By 2022, US trade with ASEAN had grown significantly from $135 billion to $440 billion. But China's trade with ASEAN had grown from $40 billion to $975 billion. It's the world's largest trading relationship. It's bigger than the US-European Union trading relationship, right? It's amazing. And so this idea that you can contain China is a mission impossible. Again, it reflects a lack of strategy. So, you know, I think it's important for us, therefore, to tell Americans who visit us, please understand that the world has changed. And even if you go to Japan and South Korea, right? Again, let me ask you a simple question. Do Japan and South Korea trade more with the United States or trade more with China? You see, so you're asking Japan and South Korea. Now, of course, Japan and South Korea will go along with symbolic moves and so on and so forth, right? But a far better approach for the United States to take is to acknowledge that they cannot stop China and the best way is to try and still integrate China.

And I'm glad you used the word "rules-based order" at the beginning of your question, because I think what Americans should do is go back and read a speech that Bill Clinton gave in Yale in 2003, which I also quote in "Has China Won?". He said, "If America is going to be number one forever, then fine, America can keep on doing whatever it wants to do as number one forever." Bill Clinton added, but he said, "But if you can conceive of a world where America is no longer number one, then it's in America's interest to strengthen multilateral rules, multilateral norms, multilateral processes, multilateral institutions." So if the Americans really believe in a rules-based order, this is what they should be doing: strengthening multilateral processes. Now, again, let me ask you, which country follows multilateral rules more carefully? Is it the United States or is it China? And as a former ambassador to the UN for over 10 years, I can tell you it is China that obeys multilateral rules. It is the United States of America that is strangling the World Trade Organization by blocking appointments to the Appellate Court. China is not blocking appointments. It is the United States that refuses to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. China has ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is the United States that has withdrawn from the International Court of Justice and refuses to go back to the ICJ. So I mean, I can go on with a long list. And actually, I think it is against American national interest to do this. So as a friend of the United States, I say the United States should be the number one power embracing multilateral rules and norms, because at the end of the day, the United States as a society believes in the rule of law. So it should believe in the rule of law at home, and it should believe in the rule of law overseas.

There's a long history of countries trying to stop China's technological development, and it has never succeeded. I mean, I give you a simple example. The Soviet Union thought that they could remain much stronger than China by depriving China of access to nuclear weapon technology. Guess what? Within a couple of years, the Chinese had it. Right. So, I mean, all this, I mean, China has now producing more STEM graduates, I suspect, than the rest of the world combined in some ways. You know, the idea that you can stop China from becoming a scientific power is absurd. You know, the Americans refuse to collaborate with China in the space program. Look at what China has done. Built its space station. This is where the fundamental problem with people in the American administration is that they don't have a long-term mindset. They don't realize that the Chinese are looking to see where they're going to be, where the world is going to be 10 years, 20 years down the road. The Americans underestimate is the determination of the Chinese people. And the Americans, those who don't understand that when they carry out actions against Huawei, they're pouring salt into open Chinese wounds. And these open Chinese wounds come from the century of humiliation that China suffered from 1842 to 1949. And when you carry out actions like Huawei, they say, "There goes the West once again. They want to beat up China. They want to slap China down. But this time they cannot succeed." So, I mean, the national determination in China is absolutely amazing. And so I wish that the American leaders who make a bigger effort to studying Chinese history. And by the way, I have a free edX course for them. They can enroll in, and they will see that they've got to step into the shoes of the Chinese leaders and understand that the Chinese cannot allow China to go backwards again.

The Biden administration or the US government is using the old playbook against the Soviet Union and saying, "Oh, we can use the same playbook that succeeded with the Soviet Union against China." Then they're getting it dead wrong, because the Soviet Union, in many ways, had self-isolated. It didn't trade with the rest of the world. Its economy wasn't engaged with the rest of the world. And at the end of the day, what caused the collapse of the Soviet Union was not the access to advanced technology. It was the fact that their economy couldn't compete with the American economy. Just couldn't grow as fast and was, you know, was stagnant. Couldn't produce the consumer goods and so on and so forth, and certainly could not manufacture more than the United States of America. Now, let me ask you a simple question. Who has a larger manufacturing capability today? Is it the United States or is it China? Now let me ask you a second question. Who does more trade with the rest of the world? In the old days, United States over the Soviet Union. Today is China over the United States of America. Then let me ask you a third question. Between the United States and Soviet Union, which country was willing to sign free trade agreements in the Cold War? It was the United States, not the Soviet Union. Today, it is China and not the United States. So these are amazing differences. And if there's one country that has studied the collapse of the Soviet Union more than any other country in the world, it is China. And what's the first lesson that the Chinese took from the collapse of the Soviet Union? Never close up your economy. Always engage with the rest of the world. And it's sort of bizarre that in some ways it is the United States that's behaving more like the Soviet Union, for example, by not, by refusing to sign free trade agreements, than China does. But having said that, let me emphasize that the United States still remains a formidable economic power, a formidable political power, a formidable intellectual power in terms of soft power and so on and so forth. So it'd be a huge mistake for China to underestimate the United States of America.

Sadly, the India-China relationship today is also a deeply troubled relationship, and I, I do worry about it a lot because, as you know, Singapore and ASEAN, we are friends of India, and Singapore and ASEAN, we are also friends of China. And if you look back at the history of Southeast Asia over the past 2,000 years, the two countries that have had the biggest influence, or two civilizations rather, that have had the biggest influence on Southeast Asia are the Indian civilization and Chinese civilization. And paradoxically, even though China is geographically closer to Southeast Asia than India is, right, uh, despite that, the influence of Indic civilization is far greater on Southeast Asia. And you go to Indonesia, for example, you see scenes from the Ramayana and Mahabharata played every day in all, all over Indonesia. So clearly, Southeast Asia and ASEAN have a lot to lose if relations between China and India become bad. So I think the ASEAN countries therefore should work harder at trying to improve ties between China and India. Not to make them best friends, but just to create a new modus vivendi where they can live with each other despite the differences that they have.