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MISSION BASED JUDGES: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

Reggae Plus One1:46:40

Transcription

With us, the usual gang, uh, comprised of Mr. Rishong Goza, the Guma Lora—I don't know how he got the Lora name; we'll try and ask that much later—I have Mr. Alfred Muyaka seated right across from me, and we have Massi who is also joining us, um, online. We will try and have as many conversations as possible, as many questions, but more particularly, today's space is dedicated to understanding South Africa's, uh, experience with mission-best judges or acting judges. And to guide us into that conversation, of course, we have none other than Mr. Beckazelli Benjamin.

I do not know how to start introducing Mr. Beckazelli Benjamin, but I think top of mind to start with is that in 2023, Mr. Beckazelli was amongst the top 200 young South Africans. He's one of the leading experts on the judiciary in South Africa. He's a contributing author to the judicial financial independence in Africa and currently the lead author of the judicial chapter of South African constitutional law. Uh, Mr. Beazeli has a background in human rights litigation, research, and advocacy, and he holds an LLB from the Vitz University and is currently doing an LLM in constitutional and administrative law at the University of Cape Town. Mr. Beckazelli, we're very glad, very delighted to have you, and we look forward to this conversation that we have now. We've been revolutionary for the most part of our spaces every Wednesday, and of course, nobody can stop reggae. And I am delighted now to first of all invite Mr. Ellison Khunga to start us off.

Um, Ellison, do you want to come in now?

Um, thank you very much, um, Raymond and Benjamin. Thank you so much for joining. And I I see we've been joined by a number of interesting people, not least of whom is the president of the Uganda Law Society, Mr. Risak Simakade. Greetings to you. Salutations to you from all of us here. Um, I think this is an important conversation for us to have about mission-based judges. But Benjamin, maybe before we get into this important conversation, uh, we could ask you to tell us something about Benjamin.

We've had the profile, you, your, um, legal and research legal research and advocacy officer at Judges Matter, which is one of the leading think tanks in, um, in the in Africa on the judiciary. Um, you've written, I think, as a contributing author to one of the only books about financial independence in the judiciary. You've, uh, you've, um, been highly regarded. I think you lecture at Stanford University. You're you're like a big corner of, obviously, one of South Africa's biggest township. I think it is the the biggest township in in South Africa, and historically, townships were one of the most underdeveloped areas of of cities in in South Africa. And so understanding injustice from that perspective, of course, the apartheid legacy in South Africa also colored those motivations for pursuing justice. And so when I I finished my schooling, I went, uh, to law school at Vitz University in Johannesburg. And that's where I I I did my law degree. And for a while, law didn't make sense until I met one of our lecturers who was a human rights lawyer. And and he taught us law in a way that made sense in the world—that you're not just doing law for the sake of doing law, but really to pursue justice and and transform society for the better. And and that's how my journey started. So I I started off in in human rights law, focused on the right to housing primarily, later on on the right to, uh, education and the right to protest in particular because protest is one of those potent rights, um, that in South Africa historically has been used to achieve, uh, change, social change. And so I was really motivated to protect and advance that right. And then later on I was quite curious about the role and impact of judges because, uh, as you would know, South Africa after apartheid in '94, we de we had we adopted a new constitution which had a bill of rights and included, um, socioeconomic rights, and so judges played quite a central role in making sure that the constitution is made real, and so that's how I started to think about the role of of judges and and Since 2020, I think formally I've worked in at Judges Matter, which is a think tank that is based at the University of Cape Town, and our mission really is to ensure that we have the very best judges in our courts and holding them accountable to the high standards of our constitution. So that is broadly where I come from, and that's what drove me to do the kind of work that I currently do.

Who actually introduced me to Benjamin? We have Nabala there as well. Thank you so much, Benjamin, and I'm sure everything you said and, um, are going to be very happy. Maybe before we dig deep into this, maybe if you could also just tell us very briefly about the University of Cape Town and Judges Matter. What is Judges Matter about? Because I can tell you where we are sitting, judges really matter.

Yeah, unfortunately, judges do matter to very about particularly in in any country that aims to be a vibrant democracy that judges really matter. Judges play a central role. Yeah. Unfortunately, judges do matter to our lives, particularly in in any country that aims to be a vibrant democracy that upholds the rule of law. Judges play a central role. And in fact, in the news right now, you hear the president of the United States attacking judges. Um, and it's not by mistake. It's because judges are supposed to constrain even the most powerful, uh, politicians so for them to comply with the law. And so judges do matter in that context, but they also matter, um, for us in Africa, um, generally, not just in in Uganda or in South Africa. But, uh, Judges Matter's mission is very simple. Um, ours is to see a vibrant democracy under the rule of law, and that is underpinned by, um, an adherence to the constitution, to human rights, and to creating spaces where we can achieve social justice in our country. And so Judges Matter's mission is to ensure that we play a a role in ensuring that the very best lawyers become judges in our courts. And once they become judges, they need to uphold the highest standards of judicial excellence and ethics and also that the administration of the judiciary or the governance of the judiciary ensures, uh, excellence, independence, and integrity. So that is our core mission, and we are primarily a research-based organization. So we are based in the law faculty at the University of Cape Town, and so we are primarily researchers, academic researchers. Um, all of us are lawyers for all our sins. We became lawyers, and so we we we do research, but the research is supposed to, it's not just academic research in an ivory tower. Our mission is to ensure that the research finds application in in law, in policy and practice. And so we spend a lot of time looking at the judiciary as an institution and finding ways in which we can promote reforms that achieves our mission of a strong, independent, robust judiciary that is able to achieve the the lofty ideals of the constitution. And so we spend a lot of time looking at how judges and magistrates are appointed. So I every single year I attend dozens of judges' interviews. Um, we write up about that. We try to make it relevant to ordinary people. So we do speak a lot in public about the role of judges and how they are appointed, and also we look at how the system to hold judges accountable also functions well. So we do a lot of research on that. And then you mentioned earlier that we we were contributing authors to a book that looks at the financing of judiciaries in Africa. And in fact, we did the chapter that focused on South Africa, but the in that book there's also a chapter on Uganda, on Kenya, on Malawi, Zimbabwe, and 11 other African jurisdictions, and we were trying to understand how the financing and resources of judiciaries actually impact on their independence, but primarily on their functions and ensuring that they deliver justice to ordinary people.

Right now, we are in the middle of very many things, as very many people know, but one of the fundamental discussions we are having is about the sort of justice system that we are delivering. Our constitution provides within Article 142, subsection 2 of it that where the state of business in the courts of judicial requires, the president may, acting on the advice of the judicial service commission, uh, appoint people to act as judges, and we have coined a term mission-based judges. We are saying that the constitutional jurisprudence in Uganda allows for judges to carry out a mission for lawyers to be appointed as judges on a mission to get in and clear things like backlog, and we have a real serious backlog problem at the moment—about 45 trillion shillings, which is about, um, I don't know how much that is in dollars, um, uh, give or take a good number of dollars, uh, about 45 trillion shillings is held up in litigation in the commercial court alone. We we are looking at remand times for people on remand. Some people are on remand awaiting a criminal trial for more than 5 years, in some cases 7 years. Um, we have an average time which a land dispute takes to be resolved being 5 to 10 years. We have 12,000 appeals currently sitting at the court of appeal. We have judges on dockets of a thousand cases each. So our contention is that at the moment the men and women who serve in the Ugandan judiciary are overburdened with work. And yet and yet there is a solution. The solution is called the Uganda Law Society. It's called the members of the bar in the large numbers who can come in and help clear the backlog. And so today's conversation is really going to focus around the South African experience of using lawyers in an ad hoc capacity to come in and help the judiciary to help carry the weight and then go back into practice. And I want to just hand over this point to Rush, uh, Mr. Ranga, maybe he can take the conversation forward, but Benjamin, that really is the context within which we we we wanted to have this conversation—to to learn about what's happening in South Africa. Thank you, Mr. Maybe you can take the conversation.

But Benjamin, that brings a context within which we we wanted to have to learn from reports that, uh, uh, for the South African judiciary that Judges Matter has put up, and you see consistent shedding of backlog—27% one year, 47% in criminal cases another year, and so on and so forth, uh, and yet you know, last year, I mean, uh, maybe two two weeks ago we said here that the interventions of the Ugandan judiciary alone had shared 0.1% of the backlog. So the the numbers, Benjamin, you are probably doing in backlog, uh, are nowhere compared to any of our numbers. In fact, by comparative terms, the total case load of the Ugandan courts a year would, uh, if I converted them into people, would fill the FNB stadium four or five times, and yet we have 700 judges for all of that. So it then the conversation, uh, or the the focus of intervention became this idea of using judges to resolve backlogs or to resolve specific objectives. I wanted to hear, uh, how you're using active acting judges in in in South Africa, how, uh, they are working, and, uh, maybe we start there. What is this thing called an acting judge? What does it do? What how different is it from, you know, your conventional quote-unquote judge? We start with just a broad explanation of the South African court system.

Right. At the lowest level, we have what are called district magistrate courts. So I think it might be easier if we we start with a broad explanation of the South African court. Right. They have both civil and criminal. It's the lowest level; we have what are called district magistrate courts. Um, and those are usually courts that are based in a smaller area of of the country, and they here, uh, they have both civil and criminal jurisdiction. So for criminal jurisdiction, they would deal with, um, cases like assault, uh, robberies, uh, house breaking, and the like. And then the civil jurisdiction is up to a monetary limit of $200,000 rand, which is about $11,000, um, roughly. And then at the next level, we have regional courts which cover a much wider, uh, area, but it's still in the magistrate's court, similar to what the magistrates' courts that you might have in Uganda. And and those regional courts would have a mon civil; in civil cases, they have a monetary jurisdiction of, um, about 400,000 rand, which is give or take $22,000 US. And then at that next level, we have the high court, and in in South Africa we have a a unified high court system, and then it has a a divisions in each of the nine provinces of South Africa. So each province has a a high court division. So KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape each have a high court division. And at that high court division, you have a a different centers. I'll call them centers. So for example, if you go to the division of the high court, there is a center in Pretoria and another center in Johannesburg. And in each of those centers, there are judges stationed there. Right? So that's just broadly the system. And and, um, I'll there are all obviously other courts above those, uh, including the supreme courts of appeal which which deals with all appeals from, uh, all the high courts, um, in in the country, and then the apex court is the constitutional court which deals with appeals from the from the Supreme Court of Appeal. So the I I'll exclude the appellate courts for now. I'll focus primarily on the high courts, um, which will make our our conversation easier because the magistrate's courts, we do have magistrates there, but I'll I'll exclude them for now. The focus is on the high court divisions in each of the nine provinces, and then I I mentioned that each division has different centers. So we have about 20 high court centers across South Africa, and each of those centers they have judges stationed there, including acting judges.

Now, another thing that I need to also explain is this. I'll use acting judges. I know in Uganda it's it's quite controversial to refer to acting judges, uh, because of, um, I think it's the what Kobamba case. So I will I will you'll please forgive me for using that term, but that is the term that we usually use, and maybe in Uganda, uh, we will try to use anything's term of mission-based judges, um, and and but we are trying to refer to a similar concept. So in South Africa, we we have acting judges, and we've had the the concept of acting judges for, u, many many years, uh, it's a a tradition that we inherited from the British British, uh, legal tradition that, uh, also exist in in Uganda, but what happened in 1994 is that it was it was codified in the constitution in Section 175 of the South African constitution, and in that section allows the minister of justice, um, to appoint, uh, judges as acting judges to the different high court divisions and at the different centers, and the minister does have an appointment power, but really the power broker is the judge president of each division. So the judge president would usually be the one who will recruit acting judges, and they will recommend to the minister that these are the people that I want to appoint at a specific center for this period of time, and then the minister would would often, uh, sign off on that, uh, appointment. It's hardly ever. I I don't know, to my knowledge, any instance where the minister refused to appoint a an acting judge based on the recommendation of the the the judge president. And again, I should explain here that unlike the Ugandan constitution. So if you read Section one, uh, Article 142, subsection 2 of the Ugandan constitution, the appointment of mission-based judges or acting judges is done by the president of of Uganda in consultation with the judicial service commission. In South Africa, we don't we exclude the judicial service commission when it comes to the appointment of acting judges. So that's just plainly the the the process.

And what are acting judges meant to do? Usually, they will be appointed when there is either a casual vacancy that arose that arises in a in a specific court. So for example, judges are entitled to 3 months of long leave for 4 years of service. So if you've served for 4 years, you're entitled to 3 months off. But during those three months, cases need to go ahead, and so there needs to be someone who moves those cases ahead. And usually acting judges are appointed to deal with those cases. Sometimes judges fall ill, and and so there will be a period of time when judges are not able to do their work, and so you appoint an acting judge to to deal with that period of time when the judge has fallen ill. But there's also a period of time when judges retire, and the the period of time between the retirement and when the final appointment is made, that period of time is also filled in by an acting judge. And so those are broadly why the the the primary reasons why acting judges are appointed. But there's also circumstances where there there are special acting judges that are appointed. I I'll call them that where the for example, when there is a very high backlog in a specific court, there will be acting judges who are appointed to deal with those specific backlogs. And those kinds of projects have been in in place for for many many years. And in in different parts of the country, they have employed those, um, those those, uh, projects where you recruit special acting judges to deal with the backlog. Most recently, in the Western Cape, there was a partnership between the Western Cape High Court and the Cape Bar to try and recruit senior advocates at the Cape Bar to assist with dealing with criminal, uh, backlogs, criminal appeals, uh, every Friday. So every Friday there will be senior advocates from the Cape Bar who will come in to to adjudicate appeals, criminal appeals in order to reduce the criminal appeal backlog. So those are some of the circumstances. But in in other places like Johannesburg, which is one of the busiest, uh, high court centers in the country, they also have a a general backlog in civil cases. And so they do recruit acting judges to assist with adjudicating cases in the civil courts. And again, the recruitment usually is of very senior advocates. So the requirement, even though of it's not written, but in in many parts of the country, there is an a a a sort of implicit requirement that you must have a minimum of 12 years at the bar. You must have practiced for 12 years, and even your the nature of your practice must be must have the depth and complexity to prepare you to serve as a judge of the high court. So you can't really walk off the street and become an acting judge. So those are some of the requirements that are are put in place to do with to, uh, when it comes to the appointment of acting judges. But that is just broadly how the system works in South Africa and has been working for at least 30 years.

You talked about the case. So in Uganda, we have a scenario where people were appointed as acting judges, maybe for two years, finished serving those two years, they are then confirmed as full-time judges, and that is a dispute that was taken to to court, um, almost like probationary judges. Do you also have did you also have a system of of probation within South Africa? So we can see because in Uganda our contention has been that that probationary system is not independent, and and what we want to understand is that distinction between the acting judge and the probationary judge as you have it in South Africa. Then also, um, how how how widespread it is? Is it because is it is it very ad hoc? Is it very widespread? And then when they do come in, how they help, is it very ad hoc? Is it very widespread? How they help? So I I spoke earlier about the magistrate's court. So yes, there was a probationary system that used to apply in the magistrate's court. So for you to be appointed as a magistrate, um, magistrates were recruited primarily from, uh, practicing lawyers. So either, uh, lawyers in private practice, and in South Africa we have a split profession of attorneys and advocates. So attorneys or advocates would be recruited to be magistrates, and sometimes they would be drawn from the prosecution service. So senior prosecutors would also be appointed as magistrates. And before your appointment as a magistrate was confirmed, there was a period of probation that you needed to serve. And and though that period, depending on the court level, would either be 3 months or 6 months, and after that period your appointment would be confirmed. And that was a system that existed for many many years. But it was done away with, um, around I think 2000 or 2002, if I'm not mistaken. It was done away with because it was seen as a

A, an infringement of judicial independence and which is one of the core constitutional principles, uh, protected under under chapter 8 of the South African constitution.

And the the the argument was that if you appoint this person for a probationary period, even if the period is 3 months or even 6 months, that person you will be assessing them on their performance of their duties in court, obviously, or their temperament and their ability to do the work, but you'll also in some way, even if you deny it, but you will also be looking at the kinds of judgments that this person is is is passing. So you will be looking at at the rate of conviction or acquittal, and and those unfortunately go too deep into this sacred space where judicial officers across the board, whether a magistrate or a judge, you are supposed to be protected. You, no one should really um be interfering with your decision-making. So the the the sense that was um uh felt there was that you obviously would confirm after that probationary per period, you will confirm or you are more likely to confirm people with high conviction rates versus someone with lower conviction rates. That means it is an incentive for someone to find people guilty even though the law might not necessarily or the law and the evidence might not necessarily point towards a guilty finding. And so that probationary period um was that was one of the key motivations for why it had to be done away with.

But the second motivation, I I think it might not apply so much in Uganda, but in South Africa it was a strong motivation that the people who did the probation who confirmed the appointment of the magistrate after the probation period were senior magistrates, and unfortunately the senior magistrates in South Africa were often white and male, and so the there was mistrust that these people would be objective in assessing whether this person actually uh passes probation. There was a a strong sense that their motivation would be um or there would be prejudice in in how they assess it. So if you, for example, are a black woman who comes from a who comes from a village and you speak English in a particular accent, you might not be confirmed versus a a white person who comes from the suburbs of Cape Town who speaks the Queen's English. So there were those kinds of sentiments as well that there would be racism in that process. And so that was another reason why this probation was done away with. um, it's in some way, so it was done away as a formal process, but I must confess that even in the process of acting judges in the high courts, often it has been used as a probationary system; it's not a formal system, but when you are appointed as an acting judge, or let me rather say when you want to be a a high court judge in South Africa, the likelihood that you will be appointed without ever having served as an acting judge are very very slim. So you having served as an acting judge has sort of become a probationary period. But it's not to say that no one who has never been an acting judge has has ever uh sorry has been refused appointment. There are people who have served as or who have not served as acting judges but who've been confirmed as permanent uh appointment judges. Usually those would be very excellent advocates or excellent lawyers who would sort of hit the ground running. But it has sort of become a a requirement, even though it's an implicit requirement. It's not formally written down. It is in in my view um it has its its benefits in that you do some sort of someone gets a real understanding of how the work of a judge really is, because there are many lawyers who would be very good as legal practitioners but would be terrible as judges just because of their temperament; they just don't have the patience or the positive attitude or a manner of speaking to people that would uh commend them to judicial office, but at the same time I I do feel that sometimes having it as a formal requirement does impact on judicial independence, and so I'm I'm really skeptical about the use of probation of any kind, written or unwritten, formal or informal, in the appointment of judges. Yes. Thank you, Mr. B.

Now in Uganda, acting judges have been linked to professional judges, and it is understood that this judges work in a way to please the appointing authority so that they are confirmed on a permanent basis. But as a society, we value judicial independence and zero political influence in the making of decisions. So one would wonder, or I'd like to find out from you, how does South Africa safeguard judicial independence while minimizing the risk of political influence in the decision-making process by the acting judges? Thank you. By theitution. Thank you. Thank you very much for that question. Um, by the way, I I I believe and I do think that it was abuse of section of article 132 subsection 2 of the Ugandan constitution, and it it needed to be struck down, that that probationary system in Uganda. I I do think that it it's it was improper and it was correct that the the judge the the court struck that that issue down. But to to answer your question on the political uh influence when it comes to the appointment of of judges, this is something in fact um we at judges have been looking at for for many many years: is how do we safeguard the process of appointment to make sure that is it is rigorous, that it is fair, that it makes sure that the very best lawyers become judges in our courts. And so that's been our preoccupation for the last decade or so. uh, and and how maybe let me start by explaining how the process of appointment works in South Africa. So we have a a judicial service commission, and the judicial service commission is made up of of 23 members um and they grow up they they become about they expand to 25 when it comes to the appointment of high court judges, but broadly it's about 23 members. It is chaired by the chief justice of South Africa, and it is made up of uh about 13 lawyers and judges and 10 members of parliament. And the 10 members of parliament come from both the the majority party and minority parties, and they come from both houses of parliament in in South Africa. And the reason why it the the JC was created was because they in the past, before 1994, judges were basically appointed by the minister of justice acting alone. He could pick any advocate off the street and make them a high court judge. And and in fact during the during apartheid um at some point, especially when apartheid became particularly violent and brutal and the judiciary was complicit in that violence and brutality, including hanging of of political activists, that at that point in time the minister of justice was basically appointing advocates who were compliant or supportive of of the apartheid system and excluding anyone who had any questions about about about it. And so the power of appointment was really in the hands of the Minister of Justice, and and so there was this deep deep skepticism about this apartheid judiciary and whether it would actually be able to implement this new rights-based constitution post-apartheid. And so in 1994 um they created this judicial service commission, and it it is quite large, which is much larger than the JSC in Uganda, which I understand is made up of about nine members. Um, it's also I think the large one of the largest in the world generally, but the reason why that was is because the there was a a feeling that you can't leave the appointment of judges only to the lawyers because the lawyers would inevitably appoint people who uh who think like them and often who would be prejudiced in some ways. And so you wanted a a balance between lawyers and other people, and the other people became really the politicians. But at the same time, they didn't want to leave it only to the politicians, as we see in the United States where really depending on which which person is is president, you get judges who fall in line with that uh person's political opinions or political views. So we we also sort of didn't want that kind of politicized process. So we have a process which is fairly balanced in terms of politicians or members of parliament and lawyers and judges um sit together and they decide on the appointment of judges, and the interviews to be a judge are done in public and they are broadcast in the past and before 2015 when we came into the scene they were not uh broadcast publicly, and so we we tried to get that broadcast running, and so it is still done now. On the 1st of April, in fact, there will be interviews for judges, and they are broadcast online on on YouTube. So that process is fairly transparent, but where we did see a level of political influence of some nature was when it came to the private deliberations following the interviews. Um, at some point in time the Minister of Justice was a very senior member of the ruling party, and he s he would sort of whip the politicians into line, and and so you would find a situation where the Minister of Justice, because of the clout he holds politically, he would be able to sway uh the JSC to vote for one or other candidates, and that person would be appointed as a judge. And so that was a big problem. And so what we have been advocating for and based on on on research that we've done um we published a paper in 2021 where we we should we showed that the JSC was actually following an unfair process where one candidate would be subject to an interview lasting 115 minutes. Another candidate would be subject to an interview that lasts 34 minutes. And there was no rational reason why there was a distinction because if you look at all other qualities of this candidate, these candidates are the same, but somehow this one is treated more harshly than the other. And so what we have been advocating for is that firstly there should be written criteria to guide how these interviews are done. But secondly and more importantly is that the people who are appointed as commissioners in the JSC must be people who would be able to carry out the real mandate, the constitutional mandate of the the JSC and leave aside their political uh issues, and and that sort of happened from about 2022 where we saw a JSC that was sort of less focused on the politics of the day and more focused on getting real people and scrutinizing them as lawyers to test their suitability for appointment. So to answer your question, sorry for the long-winded answer, but to answer your question, you you can't entirely insulate the process from sort of the bigger politics of the country, but you can design the system for appointment to ensure that you eliminate as much as possible the politics of the day, and and so far I think in the last 2 to 3 years we've seen a a much more improved uh process in South Africa where there was less of that kind of naked politics and more focus on law and and experience of of of expert judges, the ones you mentioned in the western capital. Thank you so much.

I want to ask you a question: has it affected in any substantial way the quality of jurisprudence that you're getting from the bench, and in has the effect been positive or negative um so that we can learn from it? Historically, acting judges were appointed from senior lawyers. So this would be people who are experienced, who have sort of spent time in the courts, understand how courts work. They've been steeped in the law, and so they are able to and they are both prepared substantively and procedurally, and so when they come to serve as acting judges for them it was a service to the bench, it was a service in trying to uphold the rule of law and ensuring that you have a quality bench, and in fact uh one of the rumors that I've heard is that a lot of senior are trying to uphold the rule of law and ensuring that you have a quality bench, and in fact uh one of the rumors that I've heard is that a lot of senior advocates don't want to be permanent judges because it is um you earn more money in private practice than you would as a judge, even though judges for judicial office I mentioned before judicial office I mentioned earlier that some people have very bad attitudes, very bad mannerisms and ways of dealing with people, so you might be good in terms of you're not in terms of your knowledge of the law and knowledge of the procedure, but you might not be you might not have question the correct judicial temperament. And so you wouldn't be a very good candidate to be an acting judge. So you are impatient. You can't listen to counsel. You interject too many times. You don't allow council to make their submissions. And and sometimes you just um the way you phrase your questions might not be the most respectful way, and the the way that um judges ethically are bound to conduct their themselves in court. And so there are those kinds of apples, and at the same time there have been some uh acting judges who are not as skilled as one would expect for someone who has 15 years at the bar or 20 years at the bar. So we have seen some really shocking judgments coming out from from acting judges. Um, and luckily at this point it's it's few and far between, but it's still distressing that someone's uh case is dealt with in in the correct way, and you rely on the appellate process to correct those kinds of things. So I would say it's been a a a hit or miss. I can't say it has been 100% successful, but overall it it it has been a good a good uh system that we've had. And I mentioned earlier that for some it does prepare them for judicial office because some advocates assume that because you are in court every day, you can now sit on the bench and adjudicate cases. Whereas being a judge is is a complete paradigm shift from being an a council or an advocate who an advocate is partial, right? You take your client's side and you argue it to the best of your ability. As as a judge, you are obliged to listen to both sides and and and come to a a decision based on the evidence and the law. And so it requires a different kind of mindset. And often some advocates who thought, look, I'm a hotshot lawyer. It's easy to be a judge. Some said have actually said, "No, it's actually much harder than I thought." But also, one of the things that I've heard a lot recently from different advocates who acted as judges is that it actually benefits your practice as well. Having stepped as a judge, especially in a busy court like Johannesburg or Pretoria or any other court, high court in the country, you now see the kinds of pressures that judges are under. So they don't have time to be reading long-winded arguments or u court pleadings that really don't get to the heart of the issues. And so when those people who have acted as judges go back to practice, it sharpens their advocacy, it sharpens their ability to be precise, to be brief, to be on point when it comes to the kinds of uh ways in which you draft your court papers, your pleadings, and how you make arguments in court. So, it's it's been both a a a benefit for them personally, but it's also been a benefit to the public who are able to then uh get their cases heard much sooner than they otherwise would had people not served as as acting judges. If we if we were to wait until judges come back from 3 months of long leave, um it really would undermine people's confidence in the system. Not to say that we don't have backlogs, but this project seems to have addressed some of those critical backlogs.

Is that you referenced, you know, a progressive South African constitution after apartheid? Interestingly enough, the Ugandan constitution or the framers of the Ugandan constitution were in a similar progressive mindset after our problems in the 70s and the 80s. And you know you you mentioned uh uh you know, you mentioned about how judges matter, but perhaps the most important thing about uh uh judges is their number, because if you if you have so few then you can't resolve disputes quickly. Last year um our our justice system spent an extra $15 million on justice but ended up resolving 17,000 less criminal m criminal cases. So the issue I think I I I would want you perhaps to share with the listeners is from a case backlog uh point of view, from a periods of resolution point of view, how have these ad hoc judges assisted the South African struggle for justice, for access to justice, for speed in dispute resolution and so on, that that I think you've mentioned you've been very elaborate on the benefits uh to the practice practitioners and perhaps to the practice. But from a quantitative point of view, I'm interested in seeing what that did. from a quantitative point of view, I'm interested in seeing what that did.

Yeah. So, so yes, Uganda and South Africa do share um that constitutional history. Um, I think in between 1994 and 1996 um we were both in both countries we were rewriting our constitutions and and trying to to craft them in a way that would serve uh society and and maybe in the last 30 years um we we have achieved much, but I I don't think we we can sit on our laurels and think that we've achieved everything. I think there's still a lot of work to be to be done, especially in the in the in respect of access to justice. So similar to Uganda um it has and it hasn't always been a rosy picture in in South Africa. Um, we have about 250 judges who are stationed at the 20 high court centers that I spoke about earlier. We we and and and those judges um serve the entire 60 million population of South Africa, and and unfortunately because of that number there have been historically high backlogs, and those uh backlogs simply are as a result of the the we the courts are in some ways relied upon very heavily in our s in in our society, and we are seeing more and more cases that really should be resolved in in parliament, for example, political disputes that should be resolved in parliament that end up in in the courts, and and that adds a lot of pressure in our in our court system. But uh just to zoom in on on on the backlogs which we do have currently, the judiciary has a target of a 30% or less criminal backlog. And what that means firstly the the the there is no formal definition of a backlog, but we draw when we assess we as judges man assess how the the judiciary is performing, we draw on what is called the norms and standards for judicial performance, and these were passed by the chief justice in 2014, and what the norms and standards say is that a civil case has to be resolved olved uh within a space of 6 months from the time at which it is filed in court. So you you from the time at which you file the first papers there should be a all the the court papers must be exchanged and there should be a hearing and a judgment within a six-month period. And then there's a different requirement for when a judgment must be handed down. So for a a a judgment in an in a motion in a in what we call an application, the judgment must be handed down 3 months after the hearing, and that that's written in the norms and standards. So if you there was a court hearing in on let's let's say the 1st of Mar 1st of January of any year, the judgment must come out by the 30th of March, and so that is put in the norms and standards. For trials there is a leeway that is given I think it's about 3 6 month or 6 months um for you to deliver a judgment. For criminal cases, a criminal case must be resolved within 9 months. So after my numbers are wrong, but basically trial. So crystal take months of contact with six months. So we don't have a plea is entered within 6 months. So the the the the or at least a trial happens within 6 months after the plea. So we we don't have a a formal proper system that ensures proper adherence to these norms and standards, and and this is a concern for us because people are seeing the backlogs in in in cases grow. So I I mentioned earlier that there's no formal definition, but the working definition is based on the norms and standards. So if a a criminal case is taking longer than 9 months, it is considered a backlog case. And if a civil case has taken more than 6 months, it is also considered a backlog case, particularly if it is a trial um uh case, it is often considered a a backlog.

Within that time period. And so, in using those parameters, there's often a very high backlog in the different courts.

Unfortunately, the raw numbers are very difficult to find. But from the annual reports, um, that one of our colleagues mentioned earlier, the backlog, especially when it comes to criminal cases, has generally been 30% or just above, or sometimes it goes below. And so it does seem that the judiciary is meeting its targets to make sure that the criminal cases move much faster, um, than than or move according to the norms and standards, I should say. But there are many, many cases that we do know that so the 30% unfortunately doesn't tell us the exact number; so 30% could be 500 cases in one year, 30% could be 1,500 cases in another year. So we don't have those accurate numbers, but overall we know that there have been times where the backlog has been very, very high, and that is where the acting judges get appointed.

So in 2023, um, especially the Western Cape High Court and the Cape Bar, they got into a partnership where there was a huge backlog in criminal appeals. So these are people who have either been tried and convicted in the magistrate's courts and their cases are either on automatic review. So if the case was presided over by a magistrate who's less than 7 years experience, it becomes an automatic review to the high court, or sometimes there will be uh, it would be appeals that that make themselves available pro bono without payment to adjudicate as acting judges some of these criminal appeals. They were able to bring down these appeals to the point where the project was done away with. I think, um, a lot of the criminal appeals arose out of CO, and and so they were able to bring those down, but we we don't in that situation have exact numbers, but we can assume that it has worked because it's it's now no longer used as much, uh, anymore, even though there is still a specific backlog division in the Western Cape High Court. So they do still have a backlog court, but it's not it's now presided over by one permanent judge and it's no longer using those acting judges.

So in some ways we could take by that that there is some success in dealing with the backlog using acting judges. But one of the things that we've been critical of, and and I'll just close this point here, one of the things that we as judges, m, have been critical of is this over-reliance on acting judges. It's not normal. It is not acceptable in a properly functioning judiciary to have to have acting judges being sort of the go-to when it comes to adjudicating cases. We should have a full complement of judges who are able to deal with whatever case load exists in the courts. And so what we have been saying is that actually spending time on acting judges or even accepting pro bono judges distracts from the real issue of increasing the number of permanent judges that we have in South Africa. So since 2009 there has hardly been an increase in the number of judges of permanent judges in our courts.

So I mentioned that in there are about 250 judges serving the entire 60 million population of South Africa; fund the judiciary to increase the number of judges, uh, to make sure that we have an adequate supply of judges to meet the growth in the population, the growth in the economy, and the complexity of the cases that come before the courts. Um, right now we need more judges who have experience in complex criminal law that involves financial crime. We need judges who understand blockchain and and AI and and those kinds of new fields of legal expertise. And so we do need to increase the number of judges, and we shouldn't really be looking at acting judges to plug a gap that should properly be filled by a a a that is going by your norms and going by your norms and standards.

If we applied your norms and standards to backlog in Uganda, I can say without fear of contradiction that 100% of the cases in Uganda would qualify as backlog in South Africa. And any case that meets your criteria that you've set out—a verdict in a criminal trial within 9 months, civil within weeks within months—would be prima facie evidence of corruption just on the just on the face of it, and that for me is the actual crisis we are facing because when you're saying that the judiciary should be properly funded, the fact that lawyers coming in from private practice ICE are able to give you those sort of numbers and you are saying that generally you're at 30%, and when it over exceeds that the bar even comes on board with before the government can fund an ox in a pro bono manner to deliver justice. If you look at what we are having here, I know of a case where someone said 15 months into eight witnesses is is is is record speed. We have people on five years on remand, but maybe Marci will come next. But I I I like the norms and standards South Africa, and this is actually the point of article 1422 so that we can have the sort of complaints Benjamin that you're having because I can guarantee you that there is not one case, not one I know of where we would where they would qualify, except of course where on the face of it where you see that happening that would be prima facie evidence of corruption, but maybe Marci you can add a word or two.

Yeah. Yeah. Sorry, I should I should also add uh, the standards we we are pushing very hard for Benjamin that you're having because I can guarantee you the what the are pushing back against is that they say you can't understand we we are pushing very hard for there to be full compliance with them. But the what the judges are are pushing back against is that they say you can't demand that we deliver judgments within 3 months if you don't provide us with properly funded, properly resourced, and up-to-date libraries. If you don't provide us with research researchers or you don't give us the tools that enable us to write judgments within 3 months. We desire, we want to write judgments in 3 months, but you can't, you can't deny us resources and and and then expect us to perform at the optimal level. And so there's a big debate now, uh, I would call it a debate, over even though it's like much more tense than that, but there's a big debate about whether these norms and standards actually speak to a reality that exists for a judge um in a in the city or a judge in a rural area in in South Africa. So there's also those kinds of of of debates. U Benjamin.

Um, this is Mi. I just want to say um thank you very much. Um, every that conversation honestly aligns with the different conversations we've been having. Respect. Yeah. Is the idea do they find see them as people who are coming to support them or people who are coming to take work away from them? What's the what's the way that they work together? And how can we borrow that that synergies that would be maybe for it to be implemented over there? We have a very good synergy between the appointment to take work away from them. What's the what's the way that they work together and how can we borrow that that um synergy so that when we maybe push for it to be implemented over here we have a very good synergy between the appointment the appointed mission best judges and the permanent judges, and I think the other question I also have is you've been you've mentioned the appointment of mission best judges so in South Africa. How does that look? Do you have separate regulations? Do you have guidelines? How is it done so that whoever is the appointing authority has a a place to go to when they want to maybe remove somebody or manage how they're doing their work? How how is it managed in South Africa? That is really help us to have oversight.

Yeah. Thank you. Thank Thank you very much Mercy. Um, it's an excellent excellent question, and in fact this is one of the areas where constitution actually is is better than the current system that we have in South Africa. Sorry, 143 of the Uganda constitution is very clear about the qualifications that you need for appointment. The constitution um capacity to three. Article 143 of the Uganda Constitution is very clear about the qualifications that you need for appointment as a judicial officer, whether in a capacity or an acting capacity, and and that I think is is an important um guide in how this appointment power is exercised and actually would help in ensuring that you get very good people to be appointed either permanently or in an acting capacity in an ad hoc capacity, and and I think that this is something that we could borrow in South Africa and implement. So uh I I I think you you you have it good in that respect. And and part of the reasons why I think we we in South Africa should adopt a similar process is that and in response to you the second part of your question is that our um current system of appointing acting judges, even though I did say that often you would have senior advocates who are appointed as acting judges and for the most part um all of them are really good people. But where we've seen sitting where we sit as judges matter where we've observed the system is that there are weaknesses, and one of the weaknesses is that each of the nine judges presidents has their own criteria, uh, have their own criteria for the appointment of acting judges. Some judges, judge president, judges present would emphasize that you must have broad experience in in the courts. You must have the the depth and complexity of your practice must prepare you for appointment as a judge. Other uh JPs focus on the years of experience. So if you spent time then I will appoint you. But one of the things that we are really worried about is that because the system is so flexible, it does sort of become open to abuse. You can find a judge president somewhere only appointing advocates who are of a particular race or of a particular class or who come from a particular uh bar in in in in terms of the appointment of acting judges, and and I mean human beings are human beings. It's not entirely insulated from patronage where a a a a judge president would try and curry favor with their local bar by appointing certain popular members of that bar. And so we we do have that fear, and we are pushing very hard for there to be a much tighter process for the appointment of acting judges. And in fact in the last 3-4 years the minister of justice has been working on developing guidelines or criteria for the appointment of of of acting judges where I mentioned earlier that the appointment as an acting judge is sort of the first step towards your permanent appointment as a judge in the high court. And so often the judge president who selects you and we call it a tap on the shoulder. The the judge president will select you by a tap on the shoulder. Usually that sort of lays the path for your permanent appointment. But if you are a a mercy who runs their own practice, a complex uh pro bono practice, but you don't necessarily come before the face of the judge president, you might be overlooked for that opportunity. And even if you desired to be permanently appointed, you wouldn't be given that opportunity because they'll say, "Have you acted as a judge?" And so that for us is is a fear that we have and we're pushing for the minister working with the with the judges to develop clear guidelines, clear criteria that would apply across the board for how you select and appoint acting judges and how you manage them when they are appointed. You it it shouldn't be that um it it's a probationary process in the crude sense that we we spoke about earlier and even in the way that it is done in the Kabamba case where you you see it as being a threat to judicial independence. So we do feel that having guidelines would address that problem, and and and it would it would also make the process fair for everyone. Everyone would know that the reason why this person was appointed over that person is because this person was more qualified to be um appointed as an acting judge or or an ad hoc judge. So that that takes care of your second question.

Regarding your first question about the attitude of the judiciary when it comes to um acting judges, fortunately it has been overwhelmingly positive. Uh, in fact you can go anywhere in the country; any judge president would be delighted to have people make themselves available as as uh acting judges because it does take care of the work that would be facing the courts. I mentioned earlier that some cases would have backlogs, and so having people willing to come forward to do this work is welcomed. It takes a lot of the pressure uh of the the judges, and and they are able to take care of other work, and in fact in in some ways in in Johannesburg and and maybe in in in other courts usually acting judges will be allocated um I would say less complex work, and they would take care of that kind you are the more experienced you are the more effective you are charging candidate and the work or even the backlog. So the cases that would have been backlogged had it not been for the acting judges and that frees up permanent senior judges to deal with more complex work because uh the the saying in the judiciary is that the more senior you are the more experienced you are courts in South Africa are generalist courts. So we don't necessarily have a commercial division, an environment decision, a administrative law division. Usually as a judge you deal with the whole nature of the cases. Um in in one term which lasts 9 weeks, you can if you're allocated to civil work, you can deal with administrative law in one week. Two weeks later you're dealing with an environmental law case. Two weeks later you're dealing with a family law case, and and that also I I think helps in making sure that judges are are able to deal with all kinds of of work, but also it does prepare judges to be able to be skilled enough to handle uh different uh kinds of cases. So in to answer your question, Mercy, it is often welcomed. Um, judges in South Africa do welcome the the appointment of acting judges, and again I mentioned it it it does bring sort of unity and um solidarity between the bar and the bench because the bench does feel that the bar is supportive of the the judiciary and the the the bar does feel that trust them. We've ideologically aligned ourselves on on the matter of itself and capacity of ad hoc judges or mission based judges to deal with it. Uh, if I if I could borrow a word from our ULS president who is now illegally exiled, we have become doctrinally perpendicular on that matter. But I want us to deal with these bureaucratic paral. Um, for example, in South Africa, you have judge presidents, an office that's not existent in our judiciary. We have perhaps the principal judge and the chief judge. Um, you did mention that your appointment of ad hoc judges um excludes the judicial service commission um the way it's being suggested here should include the the judicial service commission. By way of advice, how would you bureaucratically approach the idea of appointing the people that should become ad hoc judges and thereafter removing them from that office? Uganda commission and that does.

Yes. So, so unfortunately the Uganda constitution article 142 subsection 2 it sort of makes it mandatory that the president has to be involved, the judicial service commission has to be involved, and and that does sort of limit the kind of flexibility that we in South Africa have when it comes to the appointment of of acting judges, and that unfortunately adds this bureaucratic layer to it. And so what I would think as advice to how you would get around it in Uganda is to try and have an open call. Well, firstly, you must have clear criteria for selection and the in what what do they I think they call them resident judges in Uganda or the senior judges would have the discretion to be implementing this process and how it should it should work is that you have you have to have written criteria. So who would be a a a good person to be appointed as a as a mission-based judge? What is the mission? Sometimes you need you would need to define it to say at one point it might be a mission to deal with a criminal backlog or it might be a mission to deal with environmental law cases where there's a backlog there or in the commercial in the commercial division of the of of of the court in Uganda. So you you will need to have that upfront, and that would assist in sort of making sure that the process is clear, is fair, it's transparent for everyone, and then secondly how you implement it I think is through an open call. So practitioners should be able to say I'm firstly raising my hand to volunteer for this process or I I'm willing to be appointed and this is these are my dates of availability. This is when I'm willing to uh give up my practice or stop practice and and serve in the courts because that is also a big big issue in South Africa where you you might find that a a well firstly the requirement in South Africa is that when you are an acting judge you are not allowed to interact with your practice at all, and so for that period you're an acting judge you're supposed to create a Chinese wall between yourself and your practice because you are now a judicial officer and your judicial independence requires only for you to be focused on your judicial work and not on your practice. So how you get around that issue is to allow people to give you the times and dates in which they are available. Often I don't think it's a good idea for someone to serve as an ad hoc judge for one week or even two weeks. I think maybe three weeks to longer is the is the best. And so people should be able to put forward the times in which they are available, and the principal judge should be able to plot in their calendar where certain people can be placed and where you'll be able to cover the period. Also the thing about the mission you have to sort of have a time period for when you this mission will be done. So if we are doing the criminal backlog in a region of Kala, we should be able to say give or take if we have a maximum of 20 ad hoc judges or mission-based judges coming on, we are likely to finish this within this period given the complexities of a trial and the nature of the evidence that needs to be heard. So you need to the the principal judge need to have a proper grasp of the kinds of cases that are sitting as backlogs in their courts, and they need to plot a a time period where we will be able to deal with that backlog. That is important for two reasons. Number one, it gives people a realistic sense of if I make a contribution, this is where my contribution will go, and it incentivizes people to actually put shoulder to the wheel and achieve the outcome of of the of the mission. So, it's good in that respect. But the second respect is that you don't want something that is unending because clearly the problem is not that you have a temporary backlog. It's a permanent backlog, and your response should be a much more permanent solution and not just a temporary solution where you appointing people for an ad hoc period. And so I I think that is another consideration how you design the system. And so if you have people who are willing to put themselves forward and they indicate the time period then you as the principal judge you will be sitting with a pool of candidates and they would have indicated the time that they are available and so you are then able to and and you have a criteria in place for how you assess those people for their suitability. Then you can design a system where you send the appointments in batches to the judicial service commission and for confirmation by the president. So the principal judge would send a list of let's say 20 uh potential acting judges who would serve for a period of 3 months or or whatever period is necessary. Let's say let's say 3 months for argument sake. Those people would serve for 3 months and those that's how long the appointments would be. So you'd send that list to the JSC. The JSC can scrutinize um that list through looking through these people's resumes or cor or or CVs and then make the recommendation to the president for appointments, and then these people can hit the ground running. But you need

To do it obviously ahead. If you're appointing people for 3 months and it's already March 2025, that means the three months will run from June to September of 2025. You can't do it today and expect that people will start working next week, because that just is unrealistic. People can't manage their affairs in that respect.

In South Africa, why it's been good to exclude the JSC and why we we actually don't want the JSC to be involved in the appointment of acting judges is that the JSC only sits twice a year. I mentioned earlier, 23 members, so you would require 23 people to sit and come to a decision, and it's not practical and in the time period that you want the decision to be made. If you're saying you're appointing people from June, then it will by June you still would not have completed the recruitment process.

But the other issue is that in South Africa the recruitment process involves an interview where it is done formally before the commissioners, the 23 commissioners and the JSC, and I don't think that that should be the process in in in Uganda. The interviews should be done ideally by the principal judge sitting in Kampala, who says these are um the candidates that have made themselves available. If I have any questions beyond what is written on their resumes, I can call them in and just quickly interview them and then recommend them to the JC, who would recommend to the president, and then appointment is made. So I think that is one way of handling it.

Um, in terms of the volumes, the numbers and also managing expectations, because like I said earlier, you do want people to let go of their practice for the period in which they are acting as judges. So you do want to give them enough time. I think it's a fantastic suggestion you've made. Although although the the the the particular um circumstances of Uganda, I think um we would we would be interested in the bar being independent and not lawyers trying to suck up to to a particular judicial officer to get the appointment, and and of course the circumstances of our judicial service commissions are different.

I would actually take everything you've said except the principal judge, who I respect very much, and I would say that and I would say that let people make the applications as you said, they come up, we have written regulations, we have the requirements that will be required, and then the judicial service commission does the advice. What what what article 1422 removes from the constitution, what the constitution removes in article 1422 is a requirement for parliamentary approval. So where you I think the JC and I think we've seen a lot of the the JC interviews in South Africa. I think at one time Malema used to switch the internet there, those famous questions between him and different judges. We don't have the the the same kind of political control of the JSC because in South Africa you are correcting the historic injustice of an 100% white judiciary and you needed some political interventions here. But I think the idea that you that you've put out that we should have ad hoc mission-based judges um coming from the bar but being appointed, I I I certainly would also I I'm I'm quite impressed that many South African lawyers do this on a pro bono basis, that you you become a judge on a pro bono basis. I think here in Uganda we would also not be encouraging anyone to sit in the judicial office on a pro bono basis for reasons I can't necessarily say, but but maybe I can hand over to Alfred and he and he he builds the point, it's actually a reason that I that that I share. Um, we we don't support pro bono judges. Um I I think one of the guarantors of judicial independence is financial security. So if you've already said someone must give up their practice for 3 months, then it is you are really really putting them at huge risk of impinging on their judicial independence if you also don't pay them. Um and so we believe that everyone who serves as a judicial officer in South Africa must be paid. It shouldn't be that you are doing pro bono judges. I mean a pro bono you're acting as a pro bono judge. I I mean it it it's different if you're doing like what was done in the Western Cape where people come in every Friday to deal with a criminal appeal backlog, that is different, then that that kind of thing can be pro bono, but if you're asking someone to serve for much longer than a day then you should pay them, you can't do pro bono. But also one of the uh things that we've seen is that the only people who can actually afford to be pro bono judges are often white male advocates who do have the the resources, the money to spend 3 months and not get a single cent coming in. But for most of the practitioners in South Africa, they can't afford that kind of expense. And so I think it's it's it's a disincentive to get the kind of diversity um that you need for a judiciary for you not to pay people. So I we are not in support of pro bono judges, even though we commend the desire of people to serve their country for free.

I have one comment from one question from the comment section which I believe is previous. One is asking why shouldn't appeals on verdicts of acting judges be handled by experienced judges. That's one of the questions, and then anyone who has questions to us can send a microphone to speak. Mr. Benjamin, I think you could you can first answer that then we could get a question from Shing Esther, then others who have questions can as well send maybe on the one of why should appeals on verdicts of acting judges be by judges. Another question, for a long time now the business of the courts in Uganda has required that at least you appoint mission-based judges. In your previous submission you briefly hinted on why it is quite hard for Uganda to appoint mission-based judges, but just on a broader view from your research, why why do you think Uganda struggled so much to effectively implement the system of mission-based judges despite having clear provisions in place since 1995? Thank you. Why why do you think so much effective system judges the procedures in place since 1985? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Um I I think I wasn't on the first question on why shouldn't appeals or verdicts on appeals be handled by experienced judges. I think I I maybe didn't explain properly. So the appeals that I spoke about earlier, those are appeals that come from the lower courts. They they come from the district courts and they they come to the high court and they are handled, the verdicts are done by magistrates and then they appeal to the high court where sometimes it it is adjudicated by an acting judge. But I should also add that a an acting judge when they are dealing with appeals from the magistrate's court they they don't sit alone. Usually appeals are dealt with, an acting judge is paired with a permanent judge to adjudicate on the appeal and those appeals are criminal appeals. So when someone is appealing a verdict, a a conviction or a a sentence, they appeal to the high court and the high court there will be an acting judge sitting with a permanent judge to adjudicate that appeal. So that is the practice that is done generally. It's not it's never just an acting judge sitting alone. But overall even in cases where an acting judge is sitting alone because in some cases they they do sit alone when it comes to civil cases where the court is the the high court is the court of first instance, the acting judge they will sit alone and they will adjudicate the case. Appeals of those cases go to a a two or a three-judge bench that is made up of permanent experienced judges. So there is a quality control system that ensures that acting judges they they their judgments are sound in law um when when they are adjudicating. So, I mean, but you you in in an ideal world, you don't want for there to be an appeal because that means a litigant is having to pay more money for them to have a correction made. And so, that that is the um I how the quality control process works. And then the question on on why Uganda has taken so long to adopt this practice. To be quite honest, I don't know. That is my answer. I don't know, but I I have a suspicion about why and and I this suspicion probably is completely off the mark, but when I read some of the the judgments from the Uganda court, it does seem that it's not a culture that exists within the legal community in Uganda. Even though ironically Uganda and South Africa do share this English common law legal heritage where in in the UK for example they do have deputy judges or recorders who are practitioners who serve as ad hoc judges in the courts in the UK and so that's where tradition in South Africa comes from and I I assumed that it's the same in Uganda but clearly I'm I'm learning that it is not. And so it might be more of a culture problem and less so of a function problem. It's just that it's it's not familiar. And and some of the arguments against it are not entirely illegitimate. They can't really be dismissed offhand where you find ad hoc judges, they might not be as independent as permanent judges because one of the guarantors of judicial independence is security of tenure. So when someone is appointed they must know that they may not be fired based on the kind of verdicts that they give or the kind of judgments that they give. And so when you have this system of acting appointments, you sort of do open you make the system vulnerable to questions of uh the the threats to or the risks to judicial independence just by not guaranteeing the security of tenure. And this is something that has sort of been thought about in South Africa in the sense that the ideal situation and which is why what I I I think Uganda should follow is that you should be appointed for a time-bound period. You should be appointed for 3 months and if you're appointed for 3 months or 6 months, it can't be that in the second month your appointment is terminated because that would be an attack on judicial independence and would infringe on this guarantor of security of tenure um or this guarantee of security of tenure rather. And so I I do think that there there is a a question to be asked about how this process is is managed. But I do think from knowing the the circumstances that exist in Uganda and the backlogs that the Ugandan courts are facing and how that is actually a serious threat to the legitimacy of the judiciary, I think Uganda should really be considering this appointment of mission-based judges or ad hoc judges or acting judges as we call them in South Africa because I mean if people don't have any faith that their case will be heard in the next 5 years. Then why not just beat up the person? Why do you need a court order to evict them from your commercial premises? Why don't you just bring a group of of bouncers and and beat someone up? It won't undermine the rule of law. It does undermine the legitimacy of the uh judiciary and it's an injustice. I mean it's a complete injustice if you have a business and you have to wait 5 years before you can get your debts to your business paid. You won't even have a business in 5 years if your whole commercial endeavor is tied up in litigation. So I do think that it is something that should be done. We're fast running out of time. I want to thank you Benjamin. I'll allow everyone to say something, but I I just want to say on the point you've just made um a serious threat to the legitimacy of justice. Backlog is a serious threat to the legitimacy of justice. And you said why should you go to court if you can just beat up the guy? Some people who can't beat you up are resorting to spiritual means. But there's there's a lot of spiritual backlog as well as a result of uh of some of these of of these challenges. And and I think the the the point really that you really put your hand on it, Benjamin. It's that we the legitimacy of justice means that disputes brought must be resolved. And I'm really going to start advocating for us to adopt the South African standard, the the the desire to say that within 9 months from a from a from a verdict from from a plea, you should have a verdict. Within 6 months from the filing of a civil case, you should have a judgment, that those those standards I can tell you would be absolutely incredible. But they um they'll definitely happen after the mission-based judges have come in, completed the mission of clearing the backlog that their lordships have and then I'm sure that their lordships will be able to to to push it on. So I think I think it's been a fascinating conversation. I don't know Russia what you think.

Um I think it's been a fascinating conversation. I want to thank Benjamin and maybe we'll just take a word from everyone, Rush then um Alfred um Merci and then Raymond and then we'll hear from Benjamin again and and wind it up. Uh thanks Edison and Benjamin and my fellow hosts. I think it's the interesting thing for me from this conversation is how much from a Ugandan perspective we underestimate the job of the backlog. Like we had said last year, government spent 15 an extra $15 million on justice and that only shifted the needle 0.1%. Now uh that the the the the conversation I'm hearing from Benjamin is that even when the South African system has exhausted all the the additional options available including ad hoc judges, they have moved the needle much further. There is still progress to be made, but they've moved the needle much further. And certainly for any of the practitioners that were listening to the conversation, if you had to choose what what what what jurisdiction to practice in, I'm sure you would you'd prefer the South African one over the Ugandan one. But perhaps for me, the other interesting thing that came out of Benjamin's conversation with with all of us here is an old saying, which I'm sure there must be an equivalent in South an equivalent in in South Africa somewhere that says that people cannot be despising the army. And you you propose that they should remove adults, you get the the the means which are available to the Ugandan justice system to provide to meet the justice demand are not sufficient. So we don't have enough. Thank you Benjamin. Enough has been said and thank you so much Benjamin for sharing with us how South Africa has used acting judges to supplement the judicial system and enable access to justice. I can't imagine having a judgment in 6 months after filing a suit. Yet after filing a 6-month I'll be having for 6 months, but if I yet after filing a 6-month I'll be having for 6 months, but if I have a judgment in 6 months of judgment I'd be very grateful. Thank you so much for sharing your experience with us and thank you for everyone who has tuned in today. Law society, Mak, I secretary, still on on call, thank you for your time joining us today. We see you next week on Wednesday on Best Judges. No one can stop reggae. Um thank you so much. I join many other people of course to also thank you for sparing your time and for being such a knowledgeable host uh and guest for us today. I don't take it lightly. Like I said, I will borrow the words of our wise but now exiled US president. We have on the matter of nation's best judges and more particularly in their role in addressing um case backlog. Ellison did mention earlier 45 trillion shillings of Uganda's money is stuck in in in the court systems and there's no other way to get it out other than to listen to the cases that are there in. So, we are waiting um very um impatiently um to have this election for JSC. We're waiting more impatiently to have mission-based judges and I hope that this succeeds. Um thank you so much also to the people that have been listening to us for close to 2 hours now. Uh we're delighted that we could make your company for for the evening. Um have yourselves a good evening. Much also to the people that have been listening to us. I can't I can't hear maybe um could be having network um I can't hear Mari. I don't know what's happened to her microphone. Uh but I think uh I I don't think there are any more requests. Um I see the president of the law society is still on. It would be good to hear him greeting his people. But um maybe at the meantime, maybe Benjamin, you could um just give us your your your your really your parting thoughts. But before you even give us your parting thoughts, really allow me to thank you so much for for really taking the time out to to explain to us why judges matter, to explain to us how your the work you're doing in South Africa, and more fundamentally to to to to really kind of expound this idea with us and to help us walk. You know they say that when one walks when you walk a journey alone you may walk quickly, but when you walk it together you will go far. And I think with you you've taken us far. You've shown us what is possible. You've shown us what is happening. You've shown us the challenges and pitfalls of what is being suggested. You've shown us the route that we can pass. And I think it's been a particularly rich discussion. There is nothing richer than sharing ideas. um to quote a a book they say somewhere that it is like when when brethren meet together it is like what Russo is um is a a part-time pastor so he says he says even the Lord laughed at the accusation he says it is like it is like oil flowing down Aaron's beard. So thank you so much Benjamin and um Shoga is a part-time pastor. So he says he says it is like it is like oil. So thank you so much Benjamin.

Yes. I'll I'll just be be brief and and I would also like to extend a really really humble and grateful word of thank you for the invitation. I I always get excited to to speak to brethren and sisters, brothers and sisters from all over the continent. I don't think that we are having enough of these kinds of conversations wherever we are sitting on the African continent. And so it's for me it's an a complete honor uh to to join you tonight and and to actually have a little bit of a taste of what's happening in in Uganda. I've really enjoyed thoroughly so to learn about what is is happening in in Uganda and read about the legal developments there. I'm really excited also to see so much energy um and for the president of the law society of Uganda be present with us throughout these two hours as I'm drawing droning on and on. Um it's it's an honor as well and I I hope that the all the members of the of the Uganda Lawyer Society and and every lawyer in Uganda does see the work that they do is valuable to us who are sitting and watching the developments there. I mean the independence of the legal the people of Uganda can enjoy um a taste of of justice. So I I thank you again Benjamin. Um I can assure you we will not stop here. Nobody can stop reggae. But um um maybe just before you go, I'm I'm seeing there's a request for a question, but I also wanted to recognize apart from the president of the law society um the honorable Mr. Justice Ezekiel Muanguzi, justice of the Supreme Court of Uganda, retired justice of the Supreme Court of Uganda, I think had served at all levels of the Ugandan Judiciary. He has also been here for 2 hours. I don't know if his lordship also wants to but I I think um the the the people who have come to listen to you Benjamin show you the level of seriousness within which this particular issue is um taken. There's a doctor Dr. Dr. Nahalana Dubet from uh from I think he's is from Zimbabwe and maybe doctor if you could just speak for just a minute before we could wind up the space to just speak for just a minute before we could wind up the space.

Hello everyone. Um, it's been a good session so far, what I've got are connectivity problems. Um, so but I just want to say as a pan-Africanist, it's heartening to see this um, intracontinental um, connection. Um, Uganda is a country, I'm a Zimbabwean. Uganda is a country I admire very very much. It's a country I hope to visit one day and it's it's good to hear of all the latest developments.

The honorable Dr. I have also seen the honorable procia Salam Musumba. I think they were both framers of the Ugandan constitution in 1995. They were both framers of the Ugandan constitution in 1995.

And um so it's I think Benjamin you've brought equality to this conversation and so many people have come to listen. But I also agree with the previous speaker that um this intra-affrican conversation is powerful and important and um in in that regard I think it's been a fantastic fantastic conversation.

Massi maybe you will as the you'll have you'll maybe mer on. Well, let's allow Massi Benjamin to to have the last word and then I will have the final final word. You can hear me very clearly. Okay. Thank you very much Benjamin. I just really want to let's allow Benjamin to have the last word and then I will have the final final word. You can hear me very clearly. Okay. Thank you very much.

Um Benjamin, I just really want to express my gratitude. um your presence on this particular space was very rewarding but also very timely. I think it summed up all our previous discussions and placed everything into perspective for anyone who has been following the spaces. I think the issue of case backlog has been made even clearer from a context of another country in Africa but also even the implementation of of this idea of mission best judges. I think my biggest takeaway is that as we've already been emphasizing um justice is not in a building. It's a service and it should be given in the most creative ways and one of them being the appointment of mission based judges. I take it from our discussion today that we only have to push to have our representative on the judicial service commission to make sure that we have this particular thing implemented. Thank you very much Benjamin. I believe we're going to be following your work and we're going to benefit more from it after listening.

I think everyone can hear the beats on the drum from corner to corner from Zimbabwe to I think Benjamin means what it means. Um is it is it Kungosa? Is it is it uh is it is it in dele who I know in dele it is who brings joy. Uh it is it is Zulu. It is Zulu. And is it is it Kumosa? Is it is it uh is it who it is? Who brings joy? It is it is Zulu. And yes, it means one who perseveres. So I I appreciate all these all these wonderful words and yeah, it's one one Africa. We are all one Africa.

Dr. D I'm hoping we would one day join our colleagues in Uganda in the pearl of Africa. We we sit and and have fun along Lake Victoria. So we look forward to that. I think Dr. Dub from Dr. Dub you are more than invited. And in Uganda, we love a namesake of yours who told us that nobody can stop Reggie. But allow me allow me everyone to just thank whoever has joined us. And as we always sign out, we are signing out right now. And from me, from my friends who have been with me here today and from everybody from everybody from coast to coast and around the world who is listening to us, good morning, good afternoon, good evening and good night. crying out. Everyone is crying out. None is crying out for justice. Everyone is crying out for peace. None is crying out for justice.