Transcription
You want to remember that the Iranians have a huge number of ballistic missiles, uh, and a huge number of drones, and they are pounding American bases and American businesses in the Middle East. What they want to do is drive us out of the Gulf States. That will have significant economic consequences for the United States.
Furthermore, you want to think about countries like Dubai and what their future is. You know, does Dubai have a future given what's happened in this war? You can see how vulnerable it is. So, what's happening on the military front has economic consequences as well.
And then there is the purely military front that we ought to say a word or two about. The fact is that the Iranians obviously have a huge arsenal of ballistic missiles, and we, uh, and the Israelis only have a limited number of defensive missiles. Defensive missiles are much more expensive to procure than offensive missiles. So, it's easier for the Iranians to stock up their inventory of offensive missiles than it is for the Israelis and the Americans to build defensive missiles.
Furthermore, you have to shoot about two defensive missiles to stand a good chance of knocking down one incoming offensive ballistic missile. This means that the Israelis and the Americans are eventually going to run out of defensive missiles. This is why the 12-day war last June was ended. The Israelis and the Americans were running low on defensive missiles, and the Israelis asked us to stop the war.
There's all sorts of evidence that the Israelis are now running low on defensive missiles once again. If they ran low on defensive missiles in the 12-day war, and this war has already gone on 18 days, and they probably started this war with less missiles than they started the June war last year with because they expended so many missiles in that June war. You can see where the Israelis are probably in trouble. We don't hear much about it because of the censorship in Israel, but I think that militarily, uh, the Iranians are gaining the upper hand in terms of their ability to drop ballistic missiles and drones on top of Israel and American military bases in the Gulf and the Gulf States themselves.
>> Yeah. Oh, absolutely. Especially as you're watching Iran's strategy here, which is very clever, right? They go in initially and they target the radar systems. They target the eyes that the US is using to see these incoming missiles. Then they start going after the refueling tankers, right? They keep taking it up and up. And even though I know Trump will get on social media and say, "Oh, well, Iran's military capabilities have been destroyed." It's like, okay, well, they just launched their what, 58th, 60th wave of retaliatory attacks in this war and they're showing no signs of stopping.
When you look at Israel and the position that they're in, I know that there is a lot of concern right now that they would turn to a nuclear weapon, that they would turn to some sort of attack on Iran that comes as they see so much destruction in Israel that they feel like they're at the very end of this and they're not m there's not much more that they can actually do. Obviously, over in Iran, the leader that they had who issued the Fatwa against nuclear weapons has just been taken out by the US and Israel. So that also puts Iran in an interesting position. And I know that a lot of times when it comes to the talk of nuclear war, right, people think surely we won't get to that point. Surely cooler heads will prevail. But where do your concerns stand about whether or not this could be the war that does go nuclear?
>> I actually don't think it will happen during the course of this war. I don't think it will be a serious possibility. I certainly hope I'm right in that regard. I think the great danger is that once the war is over with, um, the Iranians, of course, will be incentivized to acquire a nuclear weapon. All sorts of people are saying they were foolish not to follow in the footsteps of the North Koreans and get a nuclear weapon a long time ago. So after this horrible war, uh, they'll be incentivized to go down the nuclear road. And, uh, the Israelis, I think, have demonstrated now that they can't stop, uh, Iran from getting nuclear weapons with conventional forces, even with the United States. Uh, we just can't do that. Uh, so if they can't do it with conventional forces, they will be tempted to do it with a nuclear weapon. Uh, and because the Iranians will not be able to retaliate as long as they don't have an actual nuclear weapon, the Israelis will have a very powerful incentive, uh, to get that evolving nuclear weapons capability in Iran before the Iranians actually get the bomb. And the Iranians don't have a bomb, so they don't, the Israelis don't have to worry about a retaliation. And the Israelis are paranoid about Iran. There's no question about it. They think that the Iranians are the second coming of Nazi Germany. And therefore, the incentive, the Israelis have, uh, to do whatever is necessary to eliminate an Iranian bomb. Uh, the incentive is very great and it's a very worrisome situation. But thankfully, I don't think, uh, I hope I'm right here, but I don't think we have to worry about that scenario at the moment.
>> I hope you're right, too. When it comes down to really what that would mean for the world as a whole because that truly feels like the point of no return in a lot of ways. Now, going back to what you were saying about the US and it really its influence in West Asia, right? I, I think about Trump's national security strategy that was released back in November. And if you were to read that, you would think that the Middle East was a bit of an afterthought, right? That, oh, we're done with that. We're going to focus on say Venezuela and Cuba. And then now you look at what the US has done and their decision to specifically go after Iran. Is there a world in which after this war we do see a significant decrease in the US presence in the Middle East and really West Asia as a whole? Is that dreaming a bit too big there or could that be a reality?
>> I'm going to start by just reinforcing your important point. If you look at the national security strategy, it really does look like the two areas of the world that matter the most to the United States are the Western Hemisphere and East Asia. And the areas that matter the least are Europe, uh, and the Middle East or West Asia. Uh, but things certainly don't look that way these days. In fact, you know, if you think about it, what we're doing is we're drawing forces out of East Asia and sending them to the Middle East. We're taking Patriots and THADs out of Japan. This marine expeditionary force that's coming into the Middle East now is coming out of Japan. So, as I like to say, we're actually pivoting away from Europe, from East Asia, not pivoting to East Asia, which is really quite remarkable. And of course, as far as the, uh, war in Ukraine is concerned, uh, the Ukrainians are being shortchanged in the process. They're not going to get all sorts of weaponry that they otherwise would have gotten because it's going into this war against Iran. And to add to that, the Russians are in excellent shape because Trump has been forced to lift the sanctions on Russian oil. So, uh, we have this remarkable situation where the Middle East is like a giant magnet that's sucking in weaponry from all over the planet that we actually need, uh, in other places. Uh, if you believe the administration and where this all leads is hard to say. Now, one could argue that when this war finally ends, we'll say good riddance to the Middle East and we'll get back to business, uh, as it is supposed to be according to the national security strategy. The problem with that is that the Israelis and, uh, their supporters in the United States won't let us do that. Uh, we will remain firmly embedded, uh, in the Middle East, I think, for the foreseeable future.
Yeah, it's hard to see a world where the US is not in lock step with Israel, whatever that means for what it looks like for the region. But, you know, as you were saying that, I was sitting there and I was thinking about Europe. And it seems like no matter what happens, Europe gets the bad of it, right? If it's the war in Ukraine, Europe, they are the ones suffering. They are the ones, you know, cutting off Russian energy exports or at least attempting to. But then they say, "Okay, we're going to increase our reliance on the US and on the Middle East." And then here comes the war with Iran. And now Europe is watching as fuel prices are soaring because all of the sudden these Gulf states are having to cut back on production or halt it all together. I mean, what kind of a position does that put Europe in? And is there anything they can do or are they just kind of forced to continue to ride this wave wherever the US takes them to a certain extent?
I think there's no question that, uh, the damage that is being done to the international economy is going to hurt the Europeans big time. It's going to hurt them more than it's going to hurt us, and they are terribly upset about that. But I think if you look at what's happened since President Trump moved into the White House last January and you pay careful attention to the whole fiasco over Greenland and also what's happened over the past couple days regarding his request to the Europeans to send naval forces, uh, to the Persian Gulf area, I think you're beginning to see that the Europeans recognize that it's time for divorce and it's time to play hardball, uh, with the president. I was actually remarkably surprised by how hard-nosed the German response was to President Trump's request. Uh, the defense minister of Germany said to President Trump, "This is not our war." And more importantly, uh, Frederick Mayers, who is of course the chancellor of Germany, said, uh, with regard to President Trump's request that NATO is in effect a defensive alliance. Uh, it's not an interventionist an alliance. It's not an interventionist alliance. And as such, NATO has no place getting involved in this war. So the Germans have made it clear, not their war, and they're not getting involved. And I think if you look at what all the other European states have said, they've effectively said the same thing. Uh, I think they've given up on Trump. And that's another way of saying they've given up on the United States. And I don't blame them one bit. I've been saying for quite a while that the United States, I mean, that the Europeans should stop appeasing the United States for their own sake and stand up to the United States because if they don't stand up to the United States, President Trump will continue to bully them.
>> Yeah. They just keep going along with. Well, at least they were going along with it. But yeah, when you start getting that talk of NATO is a defensive alliance, it's like, okay, let's all, let's all remember that, right? Let's remember how, uh, important that is when it comes down to it. And as all of this is happening, we also have Russia and China. And I know that you mentioned, you know, Russia is in a much better position right now than the one Ukraine is in. And Russia's not too worried about the US focusing over here on the Middle East, right? They're like, "Yeah, you guys go spend your time and spend your weapons over here. We'll continue to focus on Ukraine." At the same time, China's over here, more of a US focus on the Middle East, as less of a US focus on Taiwan or South Korea or Japan or whatever that could mean for tensions in that region. So how do you see the position that Russia and China are in, especially when it comes to kind of the great power politics of the world and the fact that the US is itself making the choice to get tied up in another endless war that in this case don't directly involve Russia or China?
>> I think as your comments indicate, this war is mana from heaven for both the Russians and the Chinese. I think the Russians are probably the big winner in this war, at least so far. Uh, as we were saying before, it's helped them economically in really important ways because the sanctions have been lifted off of Russian oil. And furthermore, fewer weapons are going to go to Ukraine, which is going to make it easier for the Russians to win on the battlefield when they launch their offensives this coming spring and summer. Uh, so this, you know, this war looks very good from a Russian perspective, and you would think, uh, that the Russians would have an incentive in seeing a long war. The longer the United States is pinned down in, uh, the Middle East, the better for the Russians.
With regard to the Chinese, as we were talking about before, we're pivoting away from Europe. This has to be good news for the Chinese. Furthermore, President Trump has a deep-seated interest in making sure he doesn't get in a crisis with the Chinese at this point in time, which if anything will push him to appease the Chinese. And furthermore, just on the diplomatic level, the United States has shot itself in both feet and, uh, it's just done massive damage to itself on the diplomatic front. Countries all over the world look at us and think we're just plain nuts. And this plays to China's advantage. And of course, it plays to Russia's advantage as well. The Chinese look like responsible adults. We don't. And from a diplomatic point of view, that's going to help China all over the world. You know, you and I were talking a few minutes ago about the problems, the growing problems that the United States faces in Europe. If the Chinese are smart, they'll go out of their way, uh, to play kissy face with the Europeans, that they have good relations with the Europeans, uh, take advantage of the fact that this divorce is taking place between the United States and Europe. And with regard to the Gulf, the Chinese have a vested interest in telling the Gulf States, which are getting pounded because the United States led them into this foolish war, that China is a more responsible state and they should have closer relations with China moving forward and less close relations with the United States. So you put all this together, uh, in terms of great power politics, the United States has disadvantaged itself in significant ways visa v its two rivals, China and Russia.
>> Yeah, it's so interesting because exactly as you're describing it there, I'm going, why did they get into this war to begin with? Right. If you know that you're already in a position where you're watching China, this economic powerhouse, and you want to go up and challenge them, and then you're watching Russia become more of a military powerhouse than it's arguably ever been as it's fighting this proxy war with really all of NATO. Why would you put yourself in a position where you were at a disadvantage and where you're already you already have a finite supply of munitions and now exactly as you were saying earlier, you're sending out all of these interceptors trying to stop all of these incoming attacks from Iran, not because Iran woke up one day and decided that it was going to target US military bases, but because the US waged this war in the first place. The last thing I want to bring up, is there any going back from this for the US? Has the damage already been done? Kind of exactly like you were saying, all these countries in Europe, the Gulf States, right? Moving forward, they're going to question, do we still want to work with the US or do we want to do a little bit more work with say China or maybe even Russia moving forward? Has the myth of US supremacy and dominance been shattered to the point of no repair?
>> Well, I think the United States still remains a remarkably powerful country. Uh, the problem is it's basically a rogue elephant, and, uh, uh, you have to be careful not to get too close to the rogue elephant. Uh, there are a number of countries around the world, India is the best example, that have learned this lesson. There's no way you can avoid the United States, uh, in world politics just because we are so powerful and we're going to remain powerful. Uh, but the point is that our, uh, ability to execute a rational grand strategy is questionable at best, and countries therefore have a vested interest in keeping a good distance from the United States, and that's clearly the case with the Europeans and the Gulf States at this point in time, and as I said with countries like India as well.
I think the big question, Rachel, moving forward is how is President Trump going to get out of this mess? Um, you want to remember, you know, you were asking the question, how did we get into this? What invariably happens, uh, when states think about going to war is that if they think they can win a quick and decisive victory, they go. Uh, if they think they can avoid a protracted war, they go. If they think there's a serious chance they're going to end up in a protracted war, they don't go. They avoid it. And, uh, if you look at the German decision to invade the Soviet Union, this is June 22nd, 1941. The Germans thought that they were going to defeat, uh, the Soviet Union, the Red Army easily. They were going to defeat it handily, much the way they had defeated the French army handily the year before in May, June 1940. So the Germans went to war against the Soviet Union in 1941 thinking that this was going to be a great victory. They didn't even have winter clothing for their soldiers. Well, much like the United States in this war, the Germans did not win a quick and decisive victory. And in December of 1941, in freezing cold weather, deep inside the Soviet Union, their offensive came to a halt, and they ended up in a war of attrition, and they lost that war, thankfully. But what happens when you go into a war thinking you're going to win, and you're going to win quickly, and you don't win quickly? You end up in a war of attrition which in most cases you're not prepared for, and you're not prepared for it because you thought you were going to win a quick and decisive victory, and this is exactly what's happened here.
So to go back to the question you were raising, how do we get out of this? It's not clear. We have no war-winning strategy. We didn't prepare a plan, uh, a contingency plan that would tell us what to do and how to do it if we didn't win a quick and decisive victory. And as we've talked about here on the show, it's hard to see how we win a quick and decisive victory. So then tell me, how does President Trump get out of this? I've asked all sorts of people that question, and nobody has a really good answer other than to say he should declare victory and get out. But as you surely know, there are real limits to how much, uh, how how well you can sell that strategy. Uh, you know, just to quit and say I won, I don't think, uh, that's going to work very well. It may be the best alternative he has. But if that is the best alternative he has, it just tells you how much trouble we're in. So I think you and I are probably going to have a few more conversations about this war. I regret to say, not because I don't want to talk to you, but I hope this war ends sooner rather than later, but when you look at it, you just sort of scratch your head and say, uh, this has the potential, and I underline the word potential. It's not axiomatic. It has the potential to go on for a long time.
>> Yeah. And even just the prospect of declaring victory and getting out. Well, the US is pretty far in when it comes to its presence in the Middle East. And so even if Trump says, "Okay, I'm going to declare victory and get out of this." Iran's in a position going, "Okay, we want the entire US military presence out of our region." And that just means that we are going to see even more and more war. Exactly as you said, I don't think that there is any easy answer here. But I always appreciate you taking the time to join me to break down all of the latest here and kind of give some insight into what we're all trying to figure out as we watch these tensions play out. John Mirshimer, an author, international relations expert and professor at the University of Chicago. Thank you so much for your time and insight.
>> You're welcome, Rachel. Thank you for having me on the