Transcription
As we mentioned earlier, President Trump's trip to the Middle East this week doesn't include a stop in Israel. Can anyone read the tea leaves? Does this signal a growing divide between the two allies, or something else completely?
Veteran New York Times columnist and Middle East reporter Tom Friedman says this alliance is unsurprisingly frayed right now, given this Israeli government's approach to the war against Hamas. And he joins Michelle Martin to discuss his recent op-ed on this topic. Thanks, Cristian.
Tom Friedman, thank you so much for joining us once again.
Great to be with you, Michelle. You know, you you're a longtime Middle East watcher. I think most people know that. I mean, from your best-selling books like From Beirut to Jerusalem, your columns for the New York Times, you've been watching this region for a very long time, and you've written some very tough pieces. But I have to say this is one of the toughest that I think I've ever seen you write. And you say that Israel has a government that is no longer behaving as an ally. And you write this—this recent column was written as an open letter to President Trump. He's gone to Saudi Arabia. He's gone to Qatar. He's going to the UAE. He is bypassing Israel on this trip. And one of the things that you say is that, um, the fact that you're traveling there next week, meeting the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and that you have no plans to see Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel suggests to me that you are starting to understand a vital truth—that this Israeli government is behaving in ways that threaten hardcore U.S. interests in the region. Netanyahu is not our friend. And that you go on to say that, "I have no doubt that, generally speaking, the Israeli people continue to see themselves as steadfast allies of the American people and vice versa, but this ultra-nationalist messianic Israeli government is not America's ally." These are some very strong words. What what prompted you to to write them?
Well, Michelle, uh, first of all, this is a theme really I've been on since this government came to power, because this is the first Israeli government that has not made its priority, uh, peace with, uh, the surrounding Arab states, expanding the circle of peace with the surrounding Arab states and Israel. Its number one priority has, in foreign policy terms, been annexation of the West Bank. It's part of actually the, uh, formation, uh, document of this coalition. So, um, uh, that in itself is a threat to U.S. interests, Michelle, in this way. Basically, since Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, after the 1973 war, engineered the eviction of the Russians from the Middle East, laid the groundwork for the Camp David Peace Treaty, which was the groundwork for the Oslo peace treaty, which was the the really the groundwork for the peace process of every American administration, um, the U.S. has basically set up a regional order of pro-U.S. Arab governments and Israel that has served our interests quite well. Served the economic interests of the United States and the parties as well. And Israel's efforts, this government's attempt to basically drive Palestinians out of the West Bank, um, and out of Gaza in pursuit of a goal of annexation threatens not only to upset that whole order, um, but also to destabilize two pillars of that order, Israel's neighbors, Jordan and Egypt, because they both fear Israel wants to drive the Gaza Palestinians and the West Bank Palestinians into their countries. That is in fundamental contradiction to U.S. interests.
What What do you think is driving this?
Well, this is a, um, the most, uh, right-wing messianic government, um, Israel's ever had. Um, uh, when this government was announced, I should, uh, recall for you, um, back in late 2022, I actually wrote a column—the first column I wrote the morning after it was announced was that the Israel you knew is over. Um, because, uh, the members of this government, Michelle, um, if you're a Jewish American, you didn't go to Jewish summer camp with these people. Okay, these are ultra-messianic Jewish Proud Boy supremacists who walked out of the second temple. You don't know these people. Now, I was the New York Times correspondent in Israel, uh, back in the mid-1980s when Rabbi Kahana, um, uh, the the arch, um, right-wing, um, anti-Arab, uh, first American rabbi and then member of the Israeli Knesset used to was elected at the Knesset. And when he would actually rise to the Knesset to speak on the podium, uh, then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir used to walk out. Okay. Today his ideological heirs are not only in this cabinet, they are in two key positions—basically finance minister and minister of national security.
You say this Netanyahu government made annexation of the West Bank its priority when it came to power in late 2022, which was well before Hamas's vicious invasion on October 7th of 2023. The the question I have though is it does seem as though the Biden administration was acting as if the old Israel, as you put it, was still in play, that they could somehow reason with Netanyahu that he wasn't going to go this far. What is it that you think they didn't see that you saw?
Well, you know, President Biden, God bless him, you know, used to say about Bibi that, um, he would say to Bibi, "Bibi, um, I love you, but I disagree with you." You know, um, and I think he really underestimated how much Netanyahu himself had changed, um, and he had changed, Michelle, um, uh, ever since he was indicted, um, on three different counts of of different forms of corruption and and malfeasance. And, um, faced the prospect of going to jail. And, um, Israel has put a president in jail and has put a prime minister in jail. It puts people in jail, um, unlike some other countries I know, and, um, uh, it puts leaders in jail, and, um, this was a very real prospect for Netanyahu. Therefore, he had to be in government, and basically that created a huge vulnerability for him. The only way he could get a cabinet coalition to rule was by bringing into Israeli politics, into the very center of Israeli politics, people who had never had these positions of authority before from the national religious faction and from the far-right ultra-messianic nationalist faction. And, um, he had to bring them in, and once they were in they basically had him over a barrel because anytime he didn't follow their dictates they would threaten to topple him and expose him to the prospect of going to jail. So Netanyahu has never been a straight shooter in this from the very beginning. He wakes up every morning and thinks about his interests and he thinks about the national interest, and some days the former wins and some days the latter wins.
Now I understand that you say that you say that he's put his personal interests ahead of Israel's. But is it possible that he just thinks he's right? Is it possible that he just thinks that this really is the brutality of this campaign in Gaza, these aggressive efforts, um, in the West Bank that are just what it takes to secure Israel? Is it possible he just thinks he's correct?
It's a very good question. I opposed the Israeli invasion from the very beginning. I thought it was a mistake. I thought they should make this operation "rescue grandma," focus entirely on the hostages, um, and use the kind of very surgical tactics they used after the Munich massacre, not make it Dresden. But when Israel decided, no, no, we're going to go in, we're going to invade, I said, if you're going to do this, therefore, the only way to do this that would give you time and legitimacy and the resources you need is if you have a Palestinian partner. If you make clear that you're going into Gaza not just to wipe out Hamas and then leave a barren wasteland, not just, um, to go into, uh, Gaza to resettle it, but to to replace Hamas with a decent Palestinian Authority that might one day be a partner for peace—that is the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank led by, uh, President Mahmoud Abbas that has embraced the Oslo peace accords. Bibi did none of that. One of the people don't realize how insane this war has been. This was a war that was launched with absolutely no plan for the morning after. And the reason there was no plan for the morning after is Netanyahu knew if he ever said he would partner with the PA, the right-wingers would bring down his government. So it's fought this war now for over a year and a half with no exit strategy. So what did they do? They went in, they destroyed a lot of houses, they killed a lot of people, they they killed a lot of Hamas people. And then they went out. Then they reappeared. They went in, destroyed more houses, killed more Palestinians, killed more Hamas people, and then went out, and and then finally we had this ceasefire agreement, and then, um, that got led to the first hostage exchange. Uh, and then Bibi said, "No, we're going to resume the war. We're going to go in, and now the plan is to go in and stay in." Um, uh, and and you know, end the war once and for all. Michelle, I will tell you as a veteran of this story, the four most dangerous words in the Middle East are "once and for all." Okay. Um, remember, Michelle, Israel has been in the West Bank for 58 years. It still doesn't control the West Bank entirely. So, imagine they're going to do that in Gaza and the West Bank. You're talking about 7 million Jews trying to control over 7 million Palestinians.
The Israeli government has as much to lose as anyone. Why is there not more of a movement to counteract this this ultra-nationalist messianic movement as as you describe it?
The answer basically, Michelle, um, goes to, um, Hamas's responsibility for this. You know, one of my proudest moments in journalism was back in 2002, I interviewed the Saudi crown prince Abdullah, who, uh, in an interview with me outlined the Saudi peace plan. It later became the Arab peace initiative, calling for a two-state solution between Israel and all the Arab states, uh, based on a Palestinian state in the West Bank, uh, and Jerusalem and Gaza. Um, it was an amazing initiative. Um, uh, the interview is one of the most important things I've ever done. It was actually adopted by the Arab League in March. Um, I did the interview in February. In March in Beirut, they had an Arab League summit. You know what happened on the first night of that summit, Michelle? On the first night of that summit happened to coincide with the first night of Passover, and a Hamas suicide bomber walked into a hotel Passover seder in a hotel in Netanya and blew himself up with a suicide vest, killing I don't remember how many people but wounding scores. That was Hamas's answer to the first Arab peace initiative. So I have no absolute sympathy for these people. These are terrible people. This is a terrible organization. And for those students on campus who, on the morning after October 7th, you know, uh, put up signs of glory to the martyrs, shame on you. These are people who have d helped destroy the Palestinian future more than anybody. I have no illusions about that at all. But I'm saying to Israel, if that's who you've got out there, then you got two you got two options. You got permanent war against them, or you try try and try again to nurture an alternative. There is an alternative there. It's weak and frail. It's the Palestinian Authority. Um, it's been corrupt. It's got all kinds of problems. But I'm telling you, nurturing that alternative rather than a forever war in a tick-tock world will be much better, I believe, for the future of the Jewish people and for Palestinians.
So, last week, Reuters reported that the U.S. is no longer demanding that Saudi Arabia normalize ties with Israel as a condition to further their civil nuclear cooperation talks. And you know, as I think many people may remember, the Biden administration had made normalization a key part of a of a broader deal. Now, the fact that the Trump administration is clearly—well, seems to be walking away from that, what what does that say to you?
Well, it says they got fed up with Netanyahu, basically. You know, Netanyahu for a year tried to come up with some formulation to satisfy the Saudis. Saudi said, "We will agree, uh, to normalize relations with Israel, which would then help pave the way in Congress for a big U.S.-Saudi security treaty, including a civil nuclear program. We will agree to do that if Israel agrees to open negotiations on a clear pathway to a Palestinian state." So for a year, Netanyahu played around with all kinds of language, whatnot, that would somehow thread the needle so he could say that and not blow up his cabinet. The Saudis never bought it. The Biden administration never bought it, and Trump never bought it, and Trump basically got fed up with it. So he said, "Forget about it. We're just going to do this deal with Saudi Arabia, and and I'll get it through Congress, and, um, I'm not going to worry about you normalizing with Israel." Think of what Netanyahu sacrificed. Michelle, he basically traded the peace with Smotrich, the far-right members of his cabinet, for peace with Saudi Arabia, the biggest Muslim nation—the most important Muslim nation, not the biggest, but the most important, most influential, the home of the of the two, uh, uh, holy sites of Mecca and Medina. Um, peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia would not only opened Israel to the whole Muslim world for investment, tourism, trade and opportunity and for Muslims to be going to Israel, it also would have diffused tensions between Jews and Muslims that have been there—that are actually inorganic if you look at the broader history—but have been there since the birth of Zionism, and it would have been a huge huge change, and Netanyahu basically traded his political interests—peace with Smotrich—for peace with Saudi Arabia.
Again, you your column was written as a as a sort of an open letter to President Trump. You wrote that on the Middle East you have some good independent instincts. Does he really? Or is it more that he tends to position his foreign policy in opposition to whatever the Biden administration did? Because if that's the case then that really isn't a strategy. It's a reaction.
Um, you know, basically, uh, you know, dealing with Trump's instincts and whatnot is a perilous adventure, you know, but all what I was trying to suggest is that his willingness to negotiate directly with Hamas for the release of an American hostage and not hostage America to Bibi Netanyahu's interest—in his refusal to negotiate—I thought was a good thing. It's shaken up Israeli politics, which is in turmoil today because of that. His willingness to do a deal with the Houthis without again hostaging himself to Netanyahu. Uh, that was probably, you know, one could make a good argument for that. His willingness to negotiate with Iran rather than just giving Israel long-range bombers. Well, you know, we'll have to see. It depends what the deal looks like. But, um, he he is not, you know, Biden was in this situation—in fairness to Biden—where had he tried any of these things, Netanyahu would have gone to Republican members of Congress and they and Trump would have blocked everything Biden tried to do. So Trump is just taking advantage of the fact that he's not Biden, that the Republicans are, uh, basically a Trump cult who will do whatever he tells them to do. So he doesn't have to worry about a being outflanked on his right by Republicans or evangelicals. And this has given him much more freedom of action. How it'll all add up, let's wait and see.
Well, we see that as as you and I are speaking now, the president's still in the region. He, as we are speaking, he led it in Saudi Arabia, had this lavish, you know, welcome ceremony and is touting his ability to make deals. A lot of these are arms deals. Um, and also also it is it is asserted that there will be investment deals from the Gulf States in the United States. So, how do you how do you read that?
Well, you know, Trump is all about—he's a transactional person. Um, and, um, he thinks life is about leverage, and leverage comes from having more money than the other guy. Um, which then gives you more leverage to get more money. Um, so you know, uh, I'm I'm all for trade deals. I'm I I'm I'm disappointed that it has to be, um, all weapon systems. Um, but you know that's Trump. I mean, I I and let's see how many of these—you know, we've heard these things before. How many of them actually come through? Um, but at the end of the day, you know, presidents are not judged by how big a arm sales they make to the Middle East. They're judged by their ability to advance the peace process there. And, um, uh, when it comes to Trump, that is still TBD. What I what I was trying to say in my column is his willingness to think unconventionally, um, uh, you know, is I think can be a real asset here. But I'm not sure he has the patience, the interest or the people to actually do, um, the hard spade work of the morning after—to actually create a different reality in the region.
Before you let you go, you you ended your column by quoting an editorial in in Haaretz, and Haaretz says that, um, cites the fact that nine children were killed earlier in the week between the ages of three and 14. The Israeli military said that the target was a Hamas command and control center and that steps were taken to mitigate the risk of harming uninvolved civilians. And they go on to say, "We can continue to ignore the number of Palestinians in the strip who have been killed," more than 52,000, including around 18,000 children, "to question the credibility of the figures, to use all of the mechanisms of repression, denial, apathy, distancing, normalization, and justification. None of this will change the bitter fact Israel killed them. Our hands did this. We must not avert our eyes. We must wake up and cry out loudly, 'Stop the war.'" I just wanted to hear more about whether you think that something is changing in Israel, that the tolerance for this is diminishing.
Yeah, there's no question, Michelle, that, um, the sort of solidarity, um, uh, that was apparent in Israel for the first year of the war has fractured. You have reservists who are refusing to report for duty now, um, because there is there's a feeling that, um, all the army's doing now is going after second and tertiary targets or leaders, um, and just killing a lot of people, and, um, uh, I think as much as that hadn't got through early on, um, it has gotten through to at least part of the Israeli population—enough of it that people are—based—I I would say the majority in Israel now their view is stop the war, give us our hostages back, and if Hamas wants to run the place let them run it. Okay. And you have an Israeli cabinet basically in opposition to that that now says we're going to restart the war. We're actually going to restart it in a way where we herd all the Palestinians into about a 25% quadrant of the Gaza Strip. Um, uh, and we are going to permanently occupy the place. So the government now is completely at odds with the Israeli majority right now. And you can see that tension every day you pick up the Israeli papers. These are all people who've been too long at war. There hasn't also been a a huge outcry, uh, in the Arab Muslim world about the Jewish casualties, uh, in the first week. So, um, uh, you know, my view is these are people who have just done awful things to each other, uh, for for way too long. And, um, uh, my own philosophy in approaching this war is, um, I'm not here to keep score. Who's awful? I've been doing this for 50 years. I'm here to figure out a way out. And all my thinking is devoted to figuring out how we stop this, how we get back to two states for two people. And, um, uh, that's what's that's what's motivating me from the start and today.
Tom Friedman, thank you so much for speaking with us.
My pleasure, Michelle.