Transcription
[music] Hello and welcome to Asian Insider. I'm Ravi Valour and my guest today is Don Mlan Gil, a noted geopolitical analyst from the Philippines.
In this podcast, we discuss the so-called Donro doctrine, which is a term increasingly being used to describe Donald Trump's focus on his immediate neighborhood in America. We also discussed Trump's talk of a group of two or G2 as he calls it. Some believe that this could affect American commitments to Asia. In fact, the latest LOI Asia power index says that American power is declining in Asia and is poised to decline even more.
No nation is perhaps as concerned with these developments as the Philippines, which is frequently tussled with China over the South China Sea. And to get an understanding of how the Philippines views this talk of a dawnro doctrine and the G2, I turn to my friend Don Mlean Gil who teaches international relations at the Lassal University in the Philippines. Welcome to the Asian has a podcast. Don, >> thank you very much Ry. It's great to join you once again. Looking forward to our discussion.
>> John, let's start with talking about the Donro doctrine. Now what exactly is this and where did this term stem from?
>> Thank you very much. Now the Donro doctrine as has become more popularly known today of course has its roots uh from you know it draws from the Monroe doctrine of the 1800s. So basically fortifying US dominance within the western hemisphere which which involves North, Central and South America. Now if you look at it today though in the context of today, President Trump seeks to fortify US influence within that same region or mega region largely due to a number of important motivations. Right? As far as he is concerned, he talks about the proliferation of drugs. He talks about immigration and of course a vast oil resources and other resources there. and more importantly and more controversially to punish leaders that do not recognize US authority in the region and we've seen a number of uh critical developments uh particularly in the Caribbean visav Venezuela uh there has also been an openness in using military strikes and also just recently we've seen aircraft carriers three destroyers you know numerous support vessels in the Caribbean and you stop and think and say that This really isn't for you know uh drug control right because of the assets used you know enhancing the idea of looking at the world based on geographical zones of influence and putting you know resources to achieve this goal is going to be quite self-defeating I'd like to say in this point in time
>> now how seriously do you take this downroe doctrine and is this focus on the American neighborhood real or do you think it could just be a temporary thing.
>> Well, most likely it is going to be temporary as we've talked and we've seen, you know, President Trump enjoys the optics. He enjoys steering domestic uh sentiments. And of course, something like this is bound to improve or at least stir some sort of positivity from those nationalists within the US, seeking to of course preserve uh US dominance within what they consider as their backyard. Now, while [clears throat] Trump has talked about prioritizing the Western Hemisphere and possibly decreasing troop deployment in the Indo-Pacific, I say that this is self-defeating, especially at a time when China has not only been able to reinforce its hold over key areas of the Indo-acific, but has also increased its influence and presence in Latin America. You know, the Monroe doctrine may have had some merit to US influence building in the 1800s. However, the complexity and the overlapping nature of contemporary international political system have become too comprehensive for such a policy regardless of how powerful you are to [clears throat] work. You know, it may sound good for domestic audiences and of course for optics, but the stakes have become too high for the US to solely bank on this approach. Today the goal is to really forge a networkbased security uh partnership and which is a quite opposite to what the bonro doctrine stands for.
>> So what are the implications for the Philippines? After all you are a treaty ally of the United States.
>> That's true. And you know if we look at the Philippines case obviously the the response and the uh reaction to a second Trump administration has been mixed right. So there is no way to blanket all perspectives into one. As far as the Philippine perspective goes, the Philippines since Trump 2.0 has been trying to maximize what it can get out of the alliance and particularly in terms of defense collaboration, which has become a pillar of the Marcus Jr. administration's security and foreign policy outlook based on the comprehensive archipelagic defense concept. [clears throat] Right? So to be fair, right, the Trump administration has in fact delivered in several ways, particularly on defense, uh, which includes, you know, building on the 2024 commitment of $500 million to modernize the Philippine military, uh, continuous support to the Coast Guard, uh, and of course broadening the nature of maritime security cooperation in ways that were not done in the past. So we're talking about industrial base collaboration. uh we're talking about uh providing um unmanned system collaborations. So all these things have actually come up under the Trump 2.0 administration along with other non-military related aspects such as uh over you know $3 billion of aid uh and over $800 million on the Luzon economic corridor. However, if I may, uh, an important aspect that we have to look at is, of course, the clear separation between defense and economics under the umbrella of security. So, however, despite the expectations that the Philippines had, we do not have it easy when it comes to the trade negotiations, as you could probably say. Uh, we don't really have an alliance privilege when it comes to that. you know, tariffs were imposed on us quite similarly to our other neighbors, but in fact, they have actually done better in terms of negotiations and getting the better deal out of them uh when it came to direct negotiations with Trump. However, there are some positive trends that we have to take note of. So, recently over a billion dollars worth of agricultural goods uh have been delisted from the 19% headliner tariffs of Trump. So that that's some positive development. But if we think of it, you know, the speed of that progress has actually been quite slow. Uh despite the fact that we are a treaty ally of the United States. So in that regard, we see that there are some limitations to what we can achieve under the Trump 2.0 administration.
>> What about the other allies in the region, notably Japan and uh South Korea?
>> I think that's a very interesting point. You know, uh when President Trump met uh South Korean leadership, uh recently, you know, there was this talk about alliance modernization, right? So, both leaders want the alliance to work. uh there's some sort of convergence when it came to engaging with North Korea on the North Korean issue, but there are a lot of overarching uh loopholes as far as uh the conversation goes, right? So, one of course would still be the uncertainty of troop deployment. So, earlier on uh Trump 2.0, I know you know there was an announcement of decreasing the number of US troops in South Korea to over 4,000 right decreasing it to over 4,000 especially at a time when South Korea feels that they need more of that security guarantee especially as North Korea has been becoming more assertive right that's one another point would be the prickly issue of cost sharing so under the Biden administration the Biden administration tried to put a cap on the percentages as far as Korean cost and uh burden sharing is concerned but obviously there are concerns whether Trump would want to you know pour more salt and open up the wounds once again right so that's that's still a very persistent issue in the minds of polit uh leadership in South Korea another point is of course the practicality of the nuclearpowered submarine initiative right so Trump was very happy to announce that it would be done in in Philadelphia uh and all these things right powering uh creating and developing nuclearpowered submarines for Korea in Philadelphia. However, just recently the national security adviser of South Korea stated that this was not really a practical goal. Uh one of course one main reason is of course the fact that there's less security in in in building it there and second of course is when it comes to the technicality of the of the uh of the building uh the the infrastructure in that shipyard is quite limited right so that's another concern and third is of course in line with the first more of the insecurity issue that obviously South Korea would want to do it in South Korea right so that's another point of contestation despite the highutuding announcements, right? Uh when it comes to Japan, you know, it has been quite of a a toss and turn. Uh if you remember under the former Ishiba government, >> uh there wasn't really much of that rapport that we see today under the new prime minister. So I believe that there were some tensions between the Ishiba government and the Trump government, especially when Trump uh wanted uh key Indopacific allies to raise their uh defense spending to 5%. similar to uh the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we saw some push back from Japan when it came to that. But under the new prime minister, I think that there is more of an intent to sort of figure out how they could work things out in a way that would also uh bank on the aspect of personality similar to how former prime minister Abbe Abisan has a has been able to do that. So there is more of that um effort from Japan, but the ef the challenge still remains whether or not they could sustain that given the unpredictability of Trump. But of course the new prime minister has been trying to uh maximize whatever she can uh as far as the leaderto leader conversation goes and we saw a positive reception uh when Trump visited Japan.
>> Don, thanks for that. So, as I understand it from you, uh the Philippines is not overly concerned about this Donro doctrine, uh what are you hearing in other allies like Australia and quasi allies like uh India? You do travel to these countries, I know. What are you hearing from them?
>> Well, you know, initially for a Philippine perspective, you know, we're not complacent enough with the fact that our alliance is doing well. this would eventually have to fit in based on the broader alliance network and how they function well with the United States. So going to your question when it comes to Australia for instance when it comes to India there are concerns regarding you know the bringing up of these zones and spheres that would eventually limit you know the the maneuverability of these countries within the Indoacific and of course giving China a freer hand in that regard. Uh, of course, there have been talks based on the 2-hour long conversation between Chi and Trump regarding this. But as far as the countries are concerned, so India has already been having some friction points with uh with the US especially given the what it feels as the you know the u uh the misunderstood logic behind imposing over 50% tariffs on a key partner that the US has had you know over several decades of painstaking diplomatic uh confidence building mechanisms with to reach the the you know the level of partnership that they had, right? And similarly in Australia, which has been significantly banking on the alliance as a way to project more uh a more uh positive a more effective uh defense posture in the region. You know, that also comes as a concern especially as the US has been thinking about maintaining or pulling out or doing less at the very least. So we see these countries now trying to recalibrate how they would eventually engage in a region where the US would become less and less interested. Of course this is still an assumption right whether or not this would happen. The US is not Trump and Trump is not the US. But what could be done within a particular short time frame could eventually create bigger implications for the long term.
>> Right. Uh John, could we talk about a related subject and Trump's talk of a group of two or G2 in his communications uh with China? Uh in a way that would fit in with the Dondru doctrine, would you not say?
>> Yes, absolutely. that uh idea of a G2, you know, which which predates to the uh US Soviet Union uh entanglement during the Cold War uh is something that Trump has been mentioning quite often these days uh particularly in line with what you've mentioned as a broader scheme of things based on the Donro doctrine eventually drawing out spheres and zones and keeping the US in one area and of course China in the other area and this is quite problematic uh unfortunately based on a number of different aspects. One is the nature of 21st century contemporary international geopolitics where these sort of exclusive zones do not necessarily lead to peace or stability but eventually more exploitation and miscalculation. And this also creates an incentive for China to become less wary of engaging in assertive maneuvers that would compromise the order of the existing Indo-acific region. So when it comes to pulling out these lines right there are clear concerns among the major Indo-Pacific powers like Japan and India to an extent Australia who have been trying to present themselves as autonomous pillars and stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific and once you draw out this narrative you end up making them elements to an overarching great game and that does not really bode well for these countries especially as they have been increasing their level of activity within this region and more likely such a narrative I say that this is a narrative because I don't think that this would eventually materialize given how the way China and the US seek to negotiate it on their respective terms and we've already seen this sort of conflict of interest based on the phone call that took place between President Xi and President President Trump where President Xi has been banking on this idea and insisting of, you know, having the US, you know, frame the Taiwan narrative, the Taiwan issue in a different way than how China has been approaching it in the past, you know, such as mentioning the three China US joint communicates on the Taiwan issue, for instance. So this suggests China intends to actively reshape the narrative on Taiwan, you know, and simultaneously draw Trump into its framing. So these are of course the consequences of allowing such an idea of a G2 to unfold, which is of course something that could contribute to more instability than stability.
>> Some people believe that the G2 is just a temporary thing that uh Trump is uh put into the field uh to as suage Centin Ping and that in the long term uh the rivalry and the competition will just continue uh as it has been for these last few years. What do you say to that?
>> This goes to the question if this is a short-term or midterm idea, what is the end goal? There seems to be no end goal here, especially with the fact that you recognize that the competition would live on. If this is about economic concessions, I don't think that this would do enough. This would cut it, you know, to be able to provide the US with the kind of economic benefits that it would want from a rising superpower. Right? So in that regard, I think that this is a misguided strategy. uh especially since that there is no clear goal and there is no clear perspective as to whether China would eventually be willing to augment its behavior, manage its interests that could eventually create more insecurity in the region. There are no signs of that. but rather we see more signs of China becoming more confident, more emboldened to take up more activities that it had not done so in the past in order to pursue its uh regional ambitions. So again there is no clarity as far as the end goal is concerned and that's the problem if you have such a strategy
>> right would you say that 2025 is the year of declining American power in Asia I mean the lower the low uh Asia power index that was released on November 26th says that US power will decline even more thanks to Mr. Trump's actions.
>> Well, clearly there has been a considerable decline in US influence in the region as far as influence is concerned. Materially speaking, it may still enjoy a relative material uh advantage. However, that advantage to a certain extent depending on the sector, depending on the industry is narrowing. You know, the gap is narrowing as far as that is concerned and that creates bigger problems. And this is in relation to what I mentioned earlier. The goal today is to ensure a network-based security architecture. But the way things are being done as far as US foreign policy is concerned, you know, dilutes US the US position in the region further. So this could lead to a number of different implications. One is what you're already seeing key partners of the US taking up a bigger role, you know, as far as security provisions are concerned. The second is, of course, for the less powerful countries to eventually seek to work more with China than the United States, seeing that this could be a long-term trend that would eventually not play to their advantage. So, this would encourage more of bandwagoning for some countries, right? And third of course is the fact that you know for those countries that believe that this is a short-term approach that the US could eventually bounce back they're pretty much stuck in the middle as far as the two three years are concerned and that could eventually create more problems for their individual national security and economic calculations. So you know the mere fact of announcing and reannouncing tariffs you know cutting them off then bringing them back in again has already done a lot of damage to the global economic architecture and of course there are countries that seek to take advantage of that but that could not really lead well for you know US influence in the region clearly in the long term
>> right John you did speak about a few key countries uh trying to align even more closely what do you think that could mean do you think the new form of a quad code could arise in Asia.
>> Well, as far as miniaturals go, I mean, we have a good number of them. You know, there's the the quad between the US, Japan, Australia, and India. You have the squad with uh Australia, the Philippines, Japan, and the US. Uh you have trilaterals including the US, Japan, and Australia. Um and of course, you have uh trilaterals with the US, Japan, and the Philippines as well. So there there is no uh there is no you know there is no limit to the number of minilaterals that could be brought out of this. However as far as miniaturals that do not involve the US I think that that could eventually be a trend that has already been forming. You know you had the Japan India Australia trilateral in supply chain resilience. Um, India has actually been leading the way in engaging in these sort of trilaterals particularly in the Indian Ocean region and more recently in uh the western Pacific. But again, this would have to take a lot of political will because they do not they might not want to signal it overtly that okay, we're sort of jumping ship and creating our own multilaterals. But eventually what we would see is that these new unilaterals that may not necessarily involve the US directly would be sort of a buffer in case you know the situation continues to degrade as far as US influence and security guarantees are concerned but till then I believe that all the existing would be maximized as much as they can you know survival is definitely the main goal so you can't just simply realter the calculations create more and sort of sideline the past uh this would go hand in hand. But clearly in the minds of these uh countries like Japan, like India, like Australia, um there are ongoing calculations as to how we could serve as and prepare a buffer uh in case push comes to shove uh in the long term based on these trends. So I think that these are already ongoing
>> really an increasing number of miniaterals without the US involved. What a sobering thought. Don Mlean Gil, thank you so much for coming on Asian Insider.
>> Thank you very much, Ravi.
>> And that's a wrap for Asian Insider. I'm Ravi Valour. Don't forget to share this podcast with your friends and family. And if you'd like to read my articles, we have links in our show notes below. You can also sign And if you'd like to read my articles, we have links in our show notes below. You can also sign up for our Asian Insider newsletter. Thanks for joining us. [bell]