Transcription
Let me just tell you how I sort of think about the world, uh, at a at a macro level, uh, to try to make sense of it. And I'm not arguing that this is an approved solution, but it's just my sort of simple framework for thinking about how the world, uh, looks today.
Uh, of course, you know, up until about 2017, certainly through all of the 1990s and the first decade and a half or so of the 21st century, we lived in a unipolar world. And in that unipolar world, the United States was by definition the only great power. Uh, that world went away, in my opinion, in about 2017. And we now live in a multipolar world. And what's very important to understand about that multipolar world is that for the United States, the most important region in the world is East Asia because China is a peer competitor in the sense that China is a rising great power that threatens to even be more powerful than the United States. I'm not saying that will happen, but China is a formidable adversary for the United States. So you now have this multipolar world where, uh, East Asia is of paramount importance for the United States, and the United States still cares about two other areas of the world. One is Europe, and then the third is the Persian Gulf. Uh, so that's sort of the macro, uh, view I have, uh, at the highest level.
But then if you look at the Ukraine-Russia war and you look at the Iran war, what you see is that these two conflicts almost are guaranteed to never go away and to have to create a poisonously hostile security environment in both Europe and in the Gulf. And why am I saying that? It's very important to understand, I think, that from Russia's point of view, the situation in Ukraine is an existential threat. From Ukraine's point of view, Russia is an existential threat. I fully understand why both actors in that conflict, Ukraine and Russia, view the other as an existential threat. And Europe has piggybacked with the Ukrainians to the point where the Europeans think Russia is an existential threat, and the Russians think the Europeans and the Ukrainians together are an existential threat. And when you have two sides that both think the other side is an existential threat, how do you shut that down in any meaningful way? So I think you're going to have huge problems in Europe moving forward, mainly based on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Turning to the Gulf, as I said to you before, the Israelis view the Iranians as an existential threat. Uh, and Israel's supporters in the United States view Iran as an existential threat. And Iran views the United States, and certainly Israel, as an existential threat. But let's just focus on Israel and Iran. Those two view each other as an existential threat. How are we ever going to get a meaningful ceasefire between Israel and Iran? Especially when Iran supports Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis and has no intention of giving up that support. And the Israelis view Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as not as dangerous as Iran, but almost as dangerous as Iran and joined at the hip with Iran. So what you're going to see moving forward, even if we get some sort of agreement between the United States and Iran, is a permanent state of hostility between Israel and Iran, uh, in the, uh, Persian Gulf or in the Middle East. And then back to Europe, you're going to see endless trouble moving forward. A poisonous relationship, you and I have talked about this before, between the Russians on one side and the Ukrainians and the Europeans on the other side.
So again, just to go back to where I started, you have these three great powers in the system now, right? Who compete with each other in all sorts of different ways. And with regard to the US-China conflict, from an American point of view, China is the principal threat. East Asia is the number one area of the world. But if you look at the other two areas of the world, Europe and the Middle East, you have this very dangerous situation that doesn't seem to look like it's going to go away in both of those areas. And my final point would be to you, Glenn, you can tell all sorts of stories about how you hook the Chinese up to what's going on in the Gulf. It's very easy to do. Uh, and the Russians, of course, are already involved in Europe. They're one of the principal participants in the war in Ukraine. And the Russians, of course, are involved in the Gulf. They're helping the Iranians. Both the Russians and the Chinese are helping the Iranians. And the Chinese, obviously, because they fear an American containment strategy in East Asia, the Chinese have a vested interest in seeing the Ukraine war go on and seeing the Americans pinned down in Europe. And in a certain way, they even have a vested interest in seeing the United States remain militarily in the Persian Gulf because that means they won't be able to go to East Asia to contain China. So what I think you see with this rather simple framework that I'm putting on the table is that we live in a very dangerous world, and there's not much prospect that I can see. I hope I'm wrong, but there's not much prospect of creating, uh, a more peaceful world moving forward.
No, I'm not sure how the new, yeah, equilibrium will be established, but, uh, but, but I'm, I'm, I'm curious though, what the US goals then will be towards Europe? Because, you know, if you have the world becoming multipolar, the US can't be everywhere, has to make priorities. So the US more or less prioritizes the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, where he said its peer competitors. Well, then the US has to get out of the Middle East and Europe. Um, again, this is why the Iran war doesn't make much sense in the wider strategy. And by Europe, it seems even more important to get out of because they consume a lot of resources. But, uh, more importantly, is perhaps by having too heavy an American footprint in Europe, they're pushing the Russians closer to to China. So when Trump said, "I want to put an end to this war," you know, in 24 hours, which was never, you know, realistic, but at least he seemed to reflect that he recognized how the distribution of power was shifting. But that being said, I kind of assumed that he wanted to put an end to that war. But now we see this kind of, this new statements. I, I, I did send you a link earlier on with the Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge Colby, was, uh, you making some remarks. It didn't sound like he wanted to put an end to the war. On the contrary, he called for the Europeans to essentially step up to the plate. He sounded not to end the war, but to outsource the war to the Europeans. So, while the Europeans would like to pull the Americans into the well, deeper into the war, uh, it seems the Americans want to outsource it to the Europeans. But do you read it the same way, or, or do the US want to put an end to it, or just to make it a, if because if it's a European war, then they can continue to contain the Russians and, you know, it's the Europeans' problems. And the Russians, for, you know, they, they signal they're willing to improve bilateral ties with the Americans, even though the US is still involved in in Ukraine in terms of intelligence and sending weapons. But do you, do you see a willingness to end the war? Is it like perpetual war, forever war, which is, uh, uh, possibly a strategy just to drain the Russians and, uh, yeah, make sure that the Europeans do it on their own?
Well, you should put that, uh, uh, speech that, uh, Elbridge Colby gave in Europe, uh, up on your website so that people can access it. Uh, Glenn sent it to me. I'm talking to the audience here. Glenn sent it to me earlier today, and I read it very carefully. And of course, Elbridge Colby is a very important figure in the Pentagon, and, uh, his statement that Glenn sent me, uh, on April 15th, is I think enormously important. And my interpretation of it, Glenn, is it said nothing about solving the war or shutting down the war in Ukraine. Uh, this was all about what I would call buck-passing. Uh, shifting, um, the responsibility for security in Europe at the conventional level, uh, almost completely over to the Europeans, and shifting responsibility for supporting Ukraine in the Ukraine-Russia war almost completely over to, uh, the Europeans. Uh, and this was a case of moving almost completely away from the Biden approach to dealing with Ukraine, where we were fully involved in the process and committed, uh, to fight till the end. And I think it's very clear that what's going on here is that the United States is deeply, uh, committed in Iran and in the Iran war, and we are using up, uh, significant amounts of our weapons inventory in, uh, the Middle East in this Iran war, and that is weakening our position vis-à-vis the Chinese. If you look at the numbers of THAAD missiles and Patriot missiles and smart bombs and Tomahawks that we've expended, uh, in Iran, and by the way, Glenn, just to get off the subject that we're talking about for one second, one of the reasons that President Trump does not want to start the, uh, bombing campaign again and start the war up, uh, because it would involve Iran retaliating against Israel and the Gulf States, is that he would have to use up more of the American inventory of weapons. They don't want to use any more weapons than they have to in a future conflict in the war against Iran. Right? So, we, we have very powerful incentives not to start the war up again against Iran because we have so depleted our inventory of weapons. And this has huge consequences for East Asia, where we're supposed to be, uh, in the process of containing China, the principal threat from the United, uh, to the United States. Right? So what Elbridge Colby is saying very clearly to the Europeans is, we can't provide the weapons anymore for you to give to the Ukrainians. You Europeans have to develop the necessary weapons, and you have to do it quickly for Ukraine. We can't do it because we have other responsibilities. So this is, I think, the, uh, Colby speech, a clear statement of the Americans divorcing themselves from Europe at the military level. It's basically saying to the Europeans, you deal with the Ukraine war. They're not saying you shut down the Ukraine war. In fact, I think the document reads like, "We expect the war to go on and on." And that's hardly surprising. We failed to shut the war down. They're not going to shut the war down. In fact, they have no interest in shutting the war down. The Europeans want this war to go on forever and ever. And the end result is that Ukraine is going to have to be supplied with lots of weapons. And the question is, where are they going to get those weapons? And up to now, it's been pretty much a case where the Europeans buy the weapons from the United States and then give them to the Ukrainians. And what Colby is saying is the cupboard's bare. There are no American weapons we can give you. We're running through weapons in the Gulf at an incredibly rapid pace, and that's having huge consequences for East Asia, which is strategically the most important area of the world. So in a very important way, uh, what Colby is doing is divorcing the United States from Europe, especially at the conventional level. Uh, that's the way I read it. Do you disagree with that?
No, I think they're, yeah. No, they're handing it over or or cutting it, cutting their ties further. I think this also, uh, could be a consequence of the Iran war as well. The fact that Trump has put a lot of, well, rhetorical efforts to blame the whole thing on the Europeans. It, that could provide a, a, a reason or at least to get mobilizing support from decoupling the US a bit more from the, from, from the Europeans. Uh, but that also puts the Europeans in a, well, puts us on a much closer to war, I think, here in Europe. Because with the lack of American weapons, the situation is going more and more in Russia's favor, and the Europeans will have to escalate in a big way, which you see all these drones being made and sent, and the very openness about our participation in this war. And at the same time, the reports now of the Baltic states and or Finland allowing their territory to be used to be used to strike Russia. At some point, you know, the escalation will put more pressure on the Kremlin to respond. And there is a growing pressure. And all of this is happening at the same time that the Americans are divorcing themselves. So now the Russians would have less constraints to retaliate. I mean, why would they fear striking some German logistics center if if America's not standing behind? Is it the same as the Baltic states? The reason they be behaving this way is you had always, you know, big bad Uncle Sam standing behind you. If, if Uncle Sam's not there anymore, um, you know, and instead of toning it down, they have to escalate. Uh, I think we're looking at a recipe for war. But, uh, yeah, I mean, this, this gets to this whole point we were making before about what a plastic moment this is. Um, I mean, just listening to you talk, what about the American security umbrella, the American nuclear umbrella over Europe, uh, especially over Eastern Europe? Uh, if something happens in one of the Baltic states, uh, what are we going to do? We, meaning the Americans, uh, it's really hard to imagine the United States getting into a fight, uh, with the Russians in one of the Baltic states at this point in time. Uh, so I think the Russians are kind of, uh, flexing their muscles these days vis-à-vis the Baltic states because they understand that.
The other thing is, Glenn, I wonder what's going to happen when Ukraine finally loses this war. I mean, it's hard to say what the final arrangement is going to look like, but at some point, the shooting is going to stop. Number one, uh, and number two, the Russians are going to end up controlling a huge slice of Ukrainian territory, uh, which they've already annexed. I mean, they've annexed four oblasts and Crimea. Uh, and this is going to be seen as a devastating defeat for NATO, right? NATO lost. And President Trump will blame the Europeans. And if you think about Colby's speech, Colby's speech is putting President Trump in a position where it will be easy to blame the Europeans because the Ukrainians have lost, not lost now. We're divorcing ourselves, and at some point, the Ukrainians are going to lose. And when they lose, Trump will be able to say, "We shifted the burden almost completely onto the shoulders of the Europeans. We were doing well, or the Ukrainians were doing well, up until that happened, and then Ukraine fell apart. And of course, it's because of those pathetic Europeans who wouldn't help us, uh, in the Gulf, who wouldn't help open the Strait of Hormuz, or who wouldn't unilaterally open the Strait of Hormuz." Of course, this is all nonsense, but this is the rhetoric that he'll use, and this will just further tear at the seams of the alliance. It'll just make a bad situation worse. Uh, so I, I think what you're going to get in Europe, and I'd be curious to know what you think about this, I think you're going to get, uh, a situation where the United States is much less committed to Europe and to NATO. And at the same time, the relations between the Russians on one side and the Ukrainians and the Europeans on the other side are going to be even worse in the future than they are now.
No, I, no, I agree. I think it was also very predictable. Indeed, on, on this podcast, I interviewed the German general, General Harald Kujat. He was the head of the entire German army and he also had the highest military position within NATO. Uh, forgot what it's called. Yeah. And anyways, my, my, my point is three years ago, he was, he, he made the point that, uh, you know, he was speaking very openly about what was actually happening, unlike the rest of his countrymen. He was making the point that, yes, the US and the British sabotaged the Istanbul agreement, all of this, but he also made the point again, three years ago, that we're losing this war, as you and I always saying back in those days. Uh, and but the consequence is, at some point, the US, when it's being lost, they will, you know, have the common sense to pull away. And at this point, we, that is the Germans, will stand to face a very angry Russian, or Russia, all by ourselves. And I thought that was interesting. That was one of the reasons I wanted to talk to him as well. And, uh, I, I think that's where we are now. The, the war is being lost. The US is handing it over to the Europeans. And now we're going to face a very angry Russia. And instead of seeking to make a peace, we're making it much worse because many of the European leaders seemingly genuinely believe that Russia is an existential threat. So they don't have any political imagination for peace. So it's only escalation. And, um, but I think on the wider, I think there's also mutual divorce. Because you mentioned before the missiles being depleted, once missiles or weapons are being depleted, people lose trust in alliances. That is, you know, the South Koreans are asking, you know, why did the Americans pull out their THAAD and the Patriots? In Europe, they're saying, oh, all these missiles were supposed to get to fight the Russians being delayed or diverted. Even in the Gulf States, they're saying, oh, why are the, the air defenses, the, you know, Israel's being prioritized? So, you're seeing this side distancing themselves. And on the other side, you see the Americans who are essentially blaming some of the partners. They're, you know, they're not a force amplifier anymore. They're drained on US resources. They're not going to be able to look after their own backyard or go contain China. And, and, uh, yeah, all, all of the failings are their their faults. I mean, Europeans, they're the ones to blame in you for Ukraine, for Iran. So I, I think you see a, a mutual split. And, uh, again, I don't know what would follow though.
Just one other dimension to this, Glenn. Uh, I, I like to say that when you think about the poisonous relationship that's going to exist between Russia on one side and Europe and Ukraine on the other side, that there are six other potential flash points that are loosely associated with Ukraine. And of course, the Ukraine war could start up again. Uh, it, you know, we'll get some sort of frozen conflict, but that could start up again. But then there are the sort of other potential flash points that I focus on, or I have focused on. One is the Arctic, two is the Baltic Sea, three is Belarus, four is Kaliningrad, uh, five is Moldova, and six is the Black Sea. But, you know, if you think about it, we're talking about not the Baltic, or Kaliningrad, talking about the Baltic states themselves and potential trouble in the Baltic states. Uh, so you could add that as a seventh category. But all of this just goes to show that the potential for really big trouble in Europe moving forward, uh, is really enormous. And I would argue that you and I, like to say that there's no real Russian threat there. Uh, and that the Germans and the Europeans in general, especially the West Europeans, are hyping the threat. This is, you know, classic threat inflation. But if the Russians were to go into one of the Baltic states, uh, with military force, uh, or into Kaliningrad, there was a fight over Kaliningrad or something in the Baltic Sea, uh, this would really give the Europeans cause to think, uh, that the Russians are coming. This is the second coming, uh, of the Soviet Union, and that would just make a bad situation worse. Anyway, all of this is just to say you can tell all sorts of stories about how a conflict down the road just takes the present situation, which is very bad, and makes it even worse.
Yeah. Well, if someone would have asked me a few years ago, or only last year, if a Russian attack on Estonia is likely, or the Baltic states, I would say, you know, it's crazy talk. But there is the security dilemma. Now, I'm not so sure anymore because after all that Estonia, for example, been doing, you know, having this geographical position there as well on the Baltic coastline, I think it's quite, it's become increasingly likely, I think, that the Russians will do something in retaliation. I, it's probably going to be more something something where they can have some plausible deniability, but overall, I, I think we're moving in that direction. But, but that goes back to the whole idea, what, what is the security? Because Europeans are recognizing that things are, all these flash points you're talking about. But their, their, well, their assumption, the cause of this conflict is, well, the Russians wanting to restore empire. So, okay, we can have security, but then we have to defeat the Russians. I think it's just the wrong way, which would trigger a security dilemma. We need to, to bring it down. I think this is the problem. Um, anyways, I think we run out of time. Do you have any final thoughts before we wrap up?
>> I just make one final point. Uh, it's kind of a big point, but it's just worth throwing out on the table when we're, while we're talking about the big picture here. And just to segue away from Europe back to the Middle East, uh, if you look at the Israel-Iran conflict, uh, in recent times, I've focused on trying to think about how you could settle that conflict. Uh, and I focused mainly on Iran and Israel. But what I've come to realize over the past week or so is that that's not the right way to think about it because it's not just Iran and Israel that you have to deal with if you want to come up with a settlement. It's also Hezbollah and Hamas. I think the Houthis are much less of a problem, but Hamas and Hezbollah are inextricably, uh, linked with Iran. And of course, for Israel, Hezbollah and Hamas, especially Hamas, matter enormously. So if you're going to work out some sort of modus vivendi between Israel and Iran, you have to include Hezbollah and Hamas in the equation. And how do you do that? Uh, I, I don't know. So it, it just goes to show that these conflicts that we're talking about, you know, whether you're talking about the Russians and the Ukrainians in Europe, or whether you're talking about the Israelis and the Iranians in the Middle East, are multi-dimensional, right? It's not just those two players who matter. They have all sorts of interests and they're linked to all sorts of other flash points in ways that make it very difficult, uh, to think about how you shut down the conflict either in Europe or in the Middle East.
>> I agree. And, uh, yeah, thanks for bringing back to the original point because now the Middle East, because I think this can be, can spin out of control. Uh, you know, often people assume that the, the alliances are also written in stone, but a lot of the countries which have been hostile to Iran, be it, uh, Saudi Arabia, and maybe lesser extent Turkey, you know, if Iran would weaken, they, you know, their position would change as well. The Saudis aren't that comfortable with Israel's territorial ambitions. That Turkey is also very aware of the hostility of Israel towards Turkey. So, >> if you lose your Iranian boogeyman, and then suddenly you're next on the chopping block, perhaps. So there's a, you don't necessarily want to defeat your enemy. So I think that, yeah, instead of having this zero-sum thinking, there might be countries in the region who wants to find a new equilibrium, something that puts a check on the Iranians, but also on the Israelis. So essentially move away from this hegemonic vision where of a, you know, US global primacy or Israeli regional primacy. I think this is, uh, um, yeah, I think all the alliances can switch more. That the stability we see in the alliance systems, uh, throughout the Cold War, probably, it's a thing of the past. But, uh, again, anything can happen now. It is a plastic moment, as we were saying before. And it, it, it is hard to predict exactly where this train is headed. Uh, but you can, what's so depressing, Glenn, is that we can tell just, you know, one horror story after another. Uh, I mean, hopefully, you know, cooler heads will prevail, and we won't have any really, uh, disastrous conflicts down the road, but, uh, it's going to take a lot of luck and a lot of smart policy and a lot of diplomacy to avoid trouble moving forward.
Well, I'm not looking towards our political leadership, at least with great confidence, but maybe new people will come in. Uh, anyways, John, thank you so much for taking the time. I know we have a big day there in Chicago, so I appreciate it.
My pleasure, Glenn, as always.