La filosofia di Slavoj Žižek

One of the most common questions that I believe high school teachers are asked when one begins to study philosophy, when one begins to teach philosophy, is the following: "But professor, do philosophers still exist? Are they still alive? Haven't they gone extinct like dinosaurs?" Well, it's a legitimate question, also because when you start doing philosophy in the third year of high school, you really start from antiquity, from the Greeks, and you spend a long time on the Greeks, as if to give the idea that, deep down, philosophy is a thing of other times. In reality, no, you make them understand little by little that yes, philosophers still exist, they are still alive, they are still there, sometimes more relevant, sometimes less, sometimes more famous, sometimes less, but they still exist and indeed some of them are actually quite widely read, quite influential, quite relevant in public debate. Then everyone, of course, interprets them as they like, as they want, as they prefer, criticizes them, follows them; in short, the debate is always very open, especially when philosophers are living and address today's issues. However, here they are, philosophers exist, some make themselves heard very, very strongly, because some almost ascend to the role of, I would say, cultural rockstars.

One of them, perhaps the true rockstar of current philosophy, is the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek. A volcanic philosopher in some respects, provocative, interesting, perhaps even debatable depending on one's viewpoint, but certainly interesting, who has developed a philosophy that is partly classical, as he refers to some 19th and 20th-century thinkers, but in a very modern key because he then applies these philosophical analyses to the problems of today, and even of extreme contemporaneity. He is a philosopher, in some ways divisive because, precisely, you either love him or you hate him, so to speak, but he is certainly a stimulating, certainly interesting philosopher. Today, in a single video, we will try to present the fundamental points of his thought, at least up to today, because Žižek is still alive, alive and well, still very active, publishing books every year and sometimes even more than one a year, so he contributes a lot to public debate, but it is useful to frame him within the philosophical landscape. Let's [Music] [Applause] [Music] [Applause] [Music] begin. I know the coffee, the last one in the usual cup with the inscription "let's begin," which is the opening phrase of every video.

As represented in every video, there's Mickey Mouse, Batman, Ttoy, De André, the cushion monster, the 100,000 subscriber bot, and then another little monster that can be glimpsed behind me, and then there's also me, of course. My name is Manno Ferretti, I am a history and philosophy teacher in a scientific high school, and for 5 years on this channel, I have been daily producing video explanations of history, philosophy, and civic education that follow the high school curriculum, that follow the curriculum of many university exams, but sometimes also delve deeper, open up the discussion, and expand, as is the case today, because perhaps Žižek is also addressed in some university courses, indeed certainly, but you know when you get to extreme contemporaneity, perhaps few manage to get a clear picture of a thinker, a philosopher, of something important. Today we are talking about this Žižek, a thinker born in 1949, so not even too old, very active, especially in the last twenty years, he has churned out dozens and dozens of books, sometimes more relevant, sometimes perhaps simply a consequence of previous books. Not all books have the same weight, let's say, in the economy of a philosophical system, but a clear line of his thought is visible, it can be glimpsed; one only needs to have read the three or four right books to have framed his theoretical line, which he then applied in different sectors. Today we will try to provide the key points, the coordinates to properly understand this very relevant philosopher.

Let's first say something about his life to understand the very particular path of this thinker, because, as I mentioned in the premise, he comes from a country that has not usually given birth to great names in the history of philosophy, namely Slovenia or Yugoslavia, because he was born when Slovenia was still part of Yugoslavia. He was born in 1949 in Ljubljana, so right next to us, I mean, I live in the Northeast, in Veneto, so not exactly bordering, because Friuli Venezia Giulia borders Slovenia, but certainly not far from Italy. He was born within the state that at the time was the Republic of Yugoslavia, today he is obviously a Slovenian citizen, and yet despite coming from Eastern Europe, so to speak, despite coming from a world also very far from the sensibilities of Western Europe, at least in the 20th century, at least in the period when Žižek grew up and lived, his philosophy is strongly linked to Western philosophy. Today we will talk about it, but by exploring his thought, one can substantially see the very heavy influences. One, I would say, of German idealism, particularly Hegel's philosophy above all, but German idealism in general. He also studied other thinkers of this current. Two, of Marxism, again 19th-century German philosophy. Three, of Lacanian psychoanalysis by the French Lacan, therefore much closer to our times, 20th century, second half of the 20th century, so coordinates of Central-Western Europe, in short, 19th and 20th centuries.

Well, his path is rather traditional; he studies philosophy at the University of Ljubljana, but then, after graduating, he obtains a doctorate in Paris. He also goes to study in Paris, and it is precisely in Paris that he encounters the philosophy and thought of Lacan, not directly, but through the mediation of some of Lacan's students, and let's say he falls in love with it, is strongly influenced by it, and will pour some of those reflections into his philosophical analysis. He returns to Slovenia still relatively young, becoming a researcher at the Institute of Sociology. You have to consider that in Eastern European countries there was also a certain tradition, importance, and relevance, especially for sociological research. And he studies, he gains experience, but at a certain point, we are already in the late 70s, throughout the 80s, when the Yugoslav system begins to go into crisis, communism generally collapses, and then the 90s will also bring the wars in Yugoslavia. I might also leave a link in the description from a historical point of view on what happened in Yugoslavia, but what concerns Žižek is that precisely in these years he begins to develop a very original, very strong communicative style, very capable of hitting the mark at times, but also of leaving an impression. He has an eloquence that I would almost say is sometimes charismatic. You understand this well if you read his books, but you understand it even better if you watch his interviews or his documentaries, because I talked about it some time ago in my newsletters, I also made documentaries on cinema, for example, I might leave some links in the description, very incisive, even though he is a character who doesn't seem very suitable for, so to speak, "breaking through" the camera. He's also a bit neglected sometimes, apparently, in his physical appearance, but he knows how to capture attention, he knows how to speak very well, he knows how to strike a chord, and he also quickly learns multiple languages precisely in these 80s-90s, because he obviously trained in Yugoslavia, so he knows the Slavic languages, essentially Slovenian and the various other local languages, but then he studies in France, learns French, and then also studies for a certain period in various other universities, moving as a lecturer also in North America, so he learns English very quickly, and often in these international interviews he expresses himself in English, and then also Spanish; in short, he has a grasp of various languages, even a little Italian. This also allows him to address a widely international audience and, above all, as I was saying, this oratorical ability of his, and especially the provocation that he often brings into his speeches, makes him, as I said before, a kind of rockstar of philosophy.

Why? Because he is not the philosopher we are usually accustomed to. In the collective imagination, a philosopher is an elderly gentleman, perhaps with a long beard – and it is said he has a beard, an elderly philosopher, a philosopher who also lives a bit with his head in the clouds. This image even derives from the Greeks, even from Aristophanes, right? And then, above all, a calm, reflective thinker who proceeds with reasoning in long discursive chains, and for whom one must always be very careful because one can lose the thread of these reasonings, big, demanding, difficult words, and sometimes even on topics detached from the concrete reality of things. Well, Žižek is the exact opposite, or almost, because he might have a beard, he might have a philosophical demeanor, but in reality, he has a direct, extremely direct style, straightforward, even at the cost sometimes, at least in video interviews, of sacrificing a bit of linguistic precision, but he gets to the point very clearly, he makes himself understood even by those without a precise philosophical background, and then he very, very often uses, this is precisely the hallmark of his style, what we might call postmodern references; that is, he cites films, for example, very often, not just films, in reality, he cites elements of pop culture, but he has a certain predilection for films, for cinema. In this way, by citing film scenes, which may sometimes be prestigious, important films, but sometimes also very popular films, he manages to use these cinematic scenes as metaphors for a broader discourse he wishes to make, and thus he manages to talk about complex things from a philosophical point of view, from a, sometimes even psychoanalytic, point of view, because psychoanalysis is also very relevant, without using the technical terms of the subject, but by citing a scene, recalling that scene in the interlocutor's mind, and perhaps explaining the concept through that scene. This mechanism works, it must be said, and it has also made him world-famous.

To talk about his works, what are the most important ones? Well, perhaps the first work that gave him international recognition, which made him known, let's say, to philosophy, not just philosophy, but to culture in general, including Western pop culture, is a book from 1989, titled *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. The words "sublime" and "ideology" are terms that often recur, and we will talk about them later. From then on, it has been a profusion, because, I repeat, he has published dozens and dozens of works. If you go to any bookstore, you will find entire shelves with his works, and you can find anything on Wikipedia too. I'll mention just a few, two or three, just to tell you the most relevant ones. One from 1991 is not available in Italian; it's titled *Looking Awry*. It's somewhat a continuation of the previous one that helped cement Žižek's image. And in Italian, I would point out two works, one dated 1999, and another from 2010. The 1999 one is *The Ticklish Subject*, which in a sense completes the global vision of the system, let's call it Žižek's system. Then, *Living in the End Times* from 2010, where he addresses some very, very important themes. Then, I repeat, even these days another one is coming out; every 6 months to a year, there's a new work where he develops those ideas, perhaps addressing very pressing, very current themes, climate crises, for example, political problems. I just saw that the latest book about to be released or just released concerns Trump and Trumpism; in short, he also addresses highly topical issues always through the filter of his philosophy.

But now let's understand what this philosophy is and what Hegel, Marx, and Lacan have to do with it. So, as I was saying, three main influences that he then mixes, blends in an original way: Hegel, Marx, and Lacan. Why? We'll briefly elaborate on them later. Regarding Hegel, the aspect that fascinates him most about the system is dialectics, that is, the idea that the world is full of contradictions, full of opposing forces in conflict with each other, that the world is, or rather, that truth is never given entirely in a block, but that truth always has two faces, two contradictory faces, thesis and antithesis; essentially, this is what Hegel best intuited, and it is the very nature of reality. Reality is conflictual; reality carries within itself one thing, but also its opposite. This is partly found in Marx as well, who obviously had himself absorbed this fundamental idea from Hegel. If you think about it, class struggle in the Marxist view is precisely the Hegelian dialectic in its first two phases applied to concrete reality. Yes, Žižek takes up Marx, but here's the one important difference, which we might delve into later: he takes up Marx in what sense? In the sense of a critical analysis of the internal contradictions of the system, but also of the mechanisms of power that create these internal contradictions within the system. That is, Žižek's perspective is a Marxist perspective of critique of society, critique of power. We can also summarize it like this, but here's the thing: compared to Marx, there isn't the same economic impetus that we find in Marx; that is, if you remember Marx—and perhaps I'll leave a playlist on Hegel and a playlist on Marx in the description—Marx insists a lot that these internal contradictions of the system derive from the economy. The structure is always economic, and the superstructure that manifests those contradictions is a result of the economy. Here, in Žižek, of course, economics also has a certain weight, but Žižek, to create a system based solely on economics, does not read Marxism in a purely economic key. One must also somewhat overcome this rigid economic schema to understand that power manifests in many forms, in many ways, including economic ways, but not only economic. In this, it must be said that there is a certain influence not only from Marx himself but also from the reading of Marxism in the 20th century, particularly from the Frankfurt School, which, strongly inspired by Marx, had then reinterpreted Marx with respect to media and other systems of power. So, let's say Žižek arrives at Marx through this filter. The third important reference point, as I was saying, is Jacques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst, especially in the distinction between the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real, and in the importance he gives to the theme of desire. Even earlier in the titles, I spoke to you about desire, I also spoke to you about symbols. These are themes that strongly recur throughout Žižek's analysis, and we will see and delve into them shortly, but in general, at the end of the day, it is an analysis of society, of the contradictions of society from a Marxist perspective, but a Marxism filtered through psychoanalysis, though not so much Freud's psychoanalysis—there is some influence from Freud, of course, and other forms of psychoanalysis—because the mixing, so to speak, of Marx and Freud had already been done by the Frankfurt School, by Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer, and so on; we have already talked about it, I will also leave a link to the Frankfurt School. Instead, Žižek himself prefers Lacan, thus a more 20th-century, late 20th-century perspective on these phenomena. This is to say it very generally.

But let's look in detail. What can we say in detail? I was telling you, first of all, that society is contradictory, the world is contradictory, materialism itself is contradictory because Žižek, by his very mission, adopts a materialist perspective, but a materialism typical of every Marxist—obviously, Marxism is based on materialism—but a materialism that Žižek calls paradoxical. In what sense? In the sense that reality is purely material; there are no deities, no superhuman entities guiding the world, no providences, etc. There is matter, there is raw, naked matter, as Marx and his associates had already intuited. However, what Marx and his associates had not intuited is that this matter is never given to humans in an immediate, clear, distinct way, just as it is. Matter is not what I substantially see, but matter is filtered through symbols that deform this matter. That is, ultimately, our materialism is a materialism filtered through a form of symbolism, so it is not a true materialism, or rather, a materialism through various filters. These symbols vary in nature, but they are mostly deforming symbols. They are symbols that alter our vision of things, that do not allow us to truly understand the world, that do not allow us, to put it bluntly, to get to the core, they mean in this sense. To put it another way, to give a cinematic example, since Žižek is often fascinated by and close to cinematic terms, it's like in *The Matrix*, right? It's as if the world were a distorted image in which there is matter, because everything is matter, but the matter that reaches us is not real matter; it is matter that has passed through filters, through certain precise ways of seeing things, certain precise ways of interpreting things, okay? But by digging, because at this point one must dig, what emerges? That these—that this paradoxical materialism, that these filters, at bottom, always contain a heavy contradiction, a negative dialectic, to use terms from existentialism as well, but especially from Hegel. This is why there is also the paradoxical nature of the thing. In what sense negative dialectic? As I said before, every reality is X, but it is also non-X. Every reality is one thing and is also simultaneously the opposite of that thing. Marx had certainly understood this, had intuited it somewhat, especially when speaking of capitalism. If you recall, when studying the liberal capitalist system, Marx repeatedly states that capitalism carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction because the victory of the proletariat grows within the capitalist system. So the capitalist system, which is the system of domination by capital, by the owner, by the industrialist, by the bourgeois, etc., in reality contains contradiction because it contains its opposite, namely the proletariat, which organizes itself precisely because the capitalist exists, do you understand? It's not an opposite that is there by chance; it's an opposite that is there because it depends on its respective opposite, that is, in every reality there is X, I repeat, and X implies non-X. This is typical of idealism. Think, Fichte had already made similar arguments, obviously in an idealist key. Hegel had made similar arguments, but Žižek applies this negative dialectic precisely to the concrete reality of our days, right? A dialectic that is always present according to Žižek and cannot be overcome. Here, there is a strong difference with Hegel, because for Hegel, yes, reality is contradictory, reality is dialectical, there is always thesis and antithesis, but for Hegel, there tends to be, or rather, there always is, a synthesis afterwards, perhaps distant, perhaps yet to come, whatever you want, but there is always a synthesis, there can always be an overcoming of that conflict. Opposites exist, they enter into struggle with each other, but sooner or later this struggle, this contradiction, this clash is overcome in a dimension of synthesis that encompasses everything, that pacifies the struggle. Here, according to Žižek, however, this struggle is irresolvable; it is precisely in the nature of reality to be dialectical and therefore contradictory without possibility of solution, right? I quote from philosophy: it is not, by chance, to resolve this contradiction, which is unfeasible. It is not, by chance, to overcome the contradiction; it is to show it, to understand it, to lay it bare, even better, because this contradiction is often hidden. Power, but also we ourselves, tend not to want to see it, not to see it, to hide it, to deny it. This is contradiction. So the task of philosophy is precisely to show it, to make us aware of the contradictory nature of the real—at least this is the theoretical idea—but let's also give some examples because I realize that the discourse so far seems a bit abstract.

Where are these contradictions? Well, contradictions identified, for example, by Žižek, include the contradiction between freedom and rules. Our society, at least in Western countries, operates on a liberal framework. Essentially, our constitutions have various philosophical traditions that converge, but certainly in all Western constitutions, there is a fairly strong liberal imprint. Freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of movement, the freedom to live as one wishes within certain limits, etc., are all freedoms protected by our constitutions. Good, so freedom is a positive aspect in the sense of an affirmation of our societies, a value, we could say, of our societies, but ultimately freedom necessarily needs rules, right? It necessarily needs limits, right? Every time a philosopher says freedom must be guaranteed, they also tell us up to what point, right? Freedom only makes sense when I say how far this freedom goes and where it cannot go. For example, I have freedom of speech, I accept that, but does my freedom of speech have a limit? Of course, it has a limit. If I say that Mr. Tallitali committed a crime and this crime was not actually committed, Mr. Tallitali can sue me because I defamed him. So you see, my freedom of speech has a limit. It is thus established by law that I cannot say everything I want. I can say many things, but not everything I want, because sometimes what I say infringes on the rights of others. It infringes on the right not to be slandered by someone else, and therefore I must answer for it. Therefore, every right presupposes limits, presupposes rules, right? And it's paradoxical because right, or rather freedom and rule, freedom and limit are contradictory aspects, aren't they? Because freedom means having no limits, and limit means restricting the possibility of doing things. They are two opposites, two opposing poles that, however, need each other. This is what Žižek calls the paradox of freedom. Every act, even the freest act, presupposes discipline. In fact, paradoxically, we always think of freedom of speech. It's true that I can say many things, then I can't slander, etc. But even just the act of being able to speak presupposes that I follow the rules of grammar. If I want to speak, I want to be free to say what I want, but if I don't respect the rules of grammar, no one understands me. I can also say "la la la," but it's a useless freedom because I communicate nothing. If freedom is freedom of communication, this freedom must be channeled within rules because, simply, subject-predicate, respect for the Italian or English language or whatever I use, means staying within certain rules, doing certain things and not doing others. So you see, every freedom presupposes a rule. They are two opposite poles that are nevertheless necessary; they cannot live one without the other. There can be no synthesis here. Because how do I reconcile freedom and rules? That is, reconcile them by overcoming the conflict; the conflict remains, the conflict exists, and it is precisely in conflict that we live. Do you understand? Second example, always of this dichotomy, of this negative dialectic. Let's think, for example, of the concepts of order and chaos. And here it must be said. Žižek gives a famous example, always cinematic. Think of the Batman saga, particularly *The Dark Knight*, the films, but you can also think of the comics, as you wish. So, Batman is order, he is the one who brings order, right? He is the one who must restore legality to Gotham City. Well, the other pole is chaos. If Batman is order, who is chaos in the Batman sagas? Usually the Joker. If you have ever read anything about Batman or seen any films, you know who the Joker is. Batman is a superhero dressed as a bat, etc. The Joker, on the other hand, is a super-criminal, half-mad, or rather, completely mad, who jokes, kills; in short, a truly chaotic character, right? A character who seems to have no rules. Speaking of rules, the Joker is indeed defined as the agent of chaos. So, these two opposite poles obviously coexist, are they overcome, that is, is a synthesis possible? Well, no, because Batman would not exist without the Joker, and the Joker would not exist without Batman. The hero needs the antagonist, and the antagonist needs the hero. I would even say that the Joker is a condition of possibility for Batman, and vice versa, Batman is a condition of possibility for the Joker. If you know the story of Batman—it's been written a thousand times—but in certain versions, Batman, spoiler alert, is actually Bruce Wayne, a multimillionaire, but he becomes Batman because as a child his parents were killed after leaving the cinema in an alley. Well, in certain origins of Batman, told in various forms, it is precisely the young Joker who kills Bruce Wayne's parents and thus gives rise to Batman some years later. And in certain origin stories, the Joker first becomes a petty delinquent, then ends up being disfigured, truly becoming the Joker from the fight with Batman. So, you see, Batman creates Joker, Joker creates Batman; order creates chaos, chaos creates order. We see order and chaos as opposing poles that cannot coexist, but in reality, they always coexist. In our society, it is order and chaos together. As I said before, capitalism is also order, yes, but it carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, it carries within itself its chaos. Every order is chaos, and every chaos is order. Third example, to always make you understand this dualism, this antagonism, this dialectic: desire and prohibition, and here we enter the psychoanalytic field, right? So, desire is what often moves us in psychoanalysis, including Lacanian psychoanalysis and also in Žižek, right? But desire does not exist if there is no prohibition. Desire is wanting to overcome prohibitions, but precisely wanting to overcome prohibitions implies that there would be no desire if there were no prohibition, and prohibition is there to channel desires. If there were no desire, there would be no prohibition either, and vice versa. Žižek also gives a very popular example here, very much from daily life, I would say. Coffee without milk, right? So, if I order a coffee without milk, why do I order it? Because maybe Starbucks or I don't know what other postmodern company, what big startup makes various forms of coffee with this, with that, without sugar, with sugar, without calories, with calories, Coca-Cola Zero, without calories, etc. So, you see why there's so much emphasis on "without," right? Think of, say, cookies today—I don't have an example of my own—"without palm oil," right? It seems the name of the cookie is written like that, but "without palm oil" is written like that. Why? Because it is the negation that gives consistency to the object; that is, it is the lack that validates something that channels our desire, right? And the very absence of what is forbidden. Sugar is forbidden because it's bad for you, and palm oil is forbidden because it's bad for you. It channels our desire, right? Prohibition fuels desire instead of stifling it, and desire fuels prohibition instead of stifling it. Again, this dialectic, this paradox, this constant contradiction in society.

I also mentioned Lacan, since the last example we gave is, I would say, psychological in nature, it is appropriate to introduce the influence of his thought on Žižek. In particular, I spoke to you about the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. What are these three dimensions in Lacanian jargon and how are they interpreted by Žižek? So, the imaginary, we could say, is literally the domain of images; it is the mirror, the mirror in which we reflect and recognize ourselves, and in which we delude ourselves into being a certain thing. It is our image. To use an example that is not mine, but since we are talking about very popular things, let's use a pop example. The imaginary is, for example, the selfie we post on Instagram. We take a selfie. Clearly, this selfie is like a mirror, right? We take out our phone, use the front camera, look into it, make sure we look good, are well-positioned, in pose, etc., and then we take the shot. That belongs to the imaginary; it is our image, an image that gives us the illusion of being something. This is the imaginary. The second level is the symbolic level. The symbolic level is a level of order, an order created, however, by a network of systems, and he also calls it the big Other, which gives us an order that speaks through us. For example, language is symbolic, the set of norms is symbolic, the set of roles is symbolic. To return to our previous Instagram example, symbolic, for instance, are the likes we receive, right? Likes tell us if something is good or bad, shares tell us if it's good or bad; that is, it's a set of intangible things that nevertheless gives order to things, creates a social, political, aesthetic order, as you wish. Let's give another example to better understand what is symbolic. For example, money is symbolic because what is money? I take a €50 banknote at a concrete, material level. That banknote is not really worth €50 because it's a piece of paper. It is in the symbolic realm that it is worth €50 because there is a social pact that establishes that that banknote can be taken by the merchant, by this or that person, in exchange for certain things. So the level of money is a symbolic level because a value is given to something that normally doesn't have it, but it is the norm, it is the rule, it is the agreement that creates values. Okay? Um, for example, a school example, the grade is symbolic, the school grade is symbolic, the school average is symbolic because it is a number that acquires a value established by the system, we could say, right? It is a value that is not material; it is based on a pact. A pact, an agreement according to which there is a norm that says that grade is worth a certain amount. Marriage is something symbolic, in short. But you see, our life is regulated by a set of various levels, of symbolisms, of various symbols, of various agreements—social, economic, all types—that provide a scale, that give weight, that put our lives in order, okay? The big Other with whom we are forced to relate. So, imaginary, symbolic, the third level is the real. Now, the real is not vainly the true reality, because I told you the imaginary is the image, the symbolic is this immaterial norm that orders us. One might say, "Well, but there's also reality behind it." But in reality, the real, as Žižek understands it, is what resists symbolization; that is, our mechanism tends to give symbols to everything, to give a certain value to things, to organize things in certain ways, right? But there is something that resists. In this mechanism, there is some grain of sand that jams the mechanism. And Žižek gives a fairly famous example, which is the example from comedic cinema, the typical example of slapstick comedy, that is, when the actor in old films, like Charlie Chaplin or whoever, walks and walks, steps on a banana peel and slips, right? A classic of old-style, old-fashioned comedy, the person who trips, right? So, at that moment, that gag, a typical slapstick comedy gag, is the moment when the mechanism jams; we laugh at what we see, a thunderous laugh bursts out, not because it's actually stuffing itself, but because we see the reality behind the agreements, the pantomimes, the symbol, and all those superstructures we create upon reality, revealed. We see reality as it is. We see a fracture. We see something that escapes beyond the symbol, escapes beyond our representations, escapes beyond all the things we put on top of it. In other words, using our previous comparison, I told you the imaginary is the selfie I take, the symbolic is like the likes I get, the shares I obtain, etc. The real is when I put down my phone and a person sees me face to face and says, "But you're completely different from how I saw you on Instagram, you're something else because..." Exactly. We create superstructures, we create mechanisms, symbols, images of ourselves that are not real, but at a certain point, reality forcefully enters, exploits the holes, the faults, the cracks in this layered symbolic system, and forcefully emerges. To give an even more concrete example, if the selfie is when you look good in front of the camera, the likes, etc., reality is when you wake up in the morning without makeup, with your hair all over the place, etc. That is the reality that occasionally re-emerges, right?

So, what is the task of philosophy if this is the mechanism? If we live in a society full of contradictions that we mask behind symbols, behind various types of imaginaries, etc., we must try to adopt what Žižek calls the parallax view, that is, a view in which I manage to look at a coin. You take any coin—I don't have a coin here right now. You tend to look at a coin from one side or the other, heads or tails. No, but you should be able to look at it by holding it firmly so that you see both sides of the coin. And these sides are irreducible; they are one, the opposite, and the other; they cannot be together, yet they are together in the coin. In reality, they couldn't be together because they are opposites, antipodes, yet they form the coin together. So, if our society is contradictory, if our society repeatedly tries to mask these contradictions, the purpose of philosophy is to find a point of view, to angle the coin well so as to see both sides of the coin, to see both faces, both aspects, that is, to see the contradiction and not just see it, to reveal the contradiction, to see that there is ambivalence, that there is conflict, that the struggles are not yet resolved, we could say. That is, to show what lies beyond ideology, while knowing, however, that ideology is inevitable. And now let's see what Žižek means by this inevitability of ideology.

This leads us to discuss the last important theme to somewhat conclude the discussion on Žižek, namely the political consequences of this approach. Why? Because if society is contradictory, it means there is no simple solution. Evidently, it is the problems. It also means that we must accept that this contradictoriness implies a certain ideological approach. One might think that ideology is—or rather, we have long thought—that ideology is a kind of fable of falsehood, a lie imposed on reality to deceive us, to lull us to sleep, to keep us compliant, right? Ultimately, when Marx says that religion is the opium of the people, he means something substantially similar; of course, he doesn't directly compare religion to ideology, but it's a schema that serves to keep us compliant and should be removed, revealed, erased, so that without religion we would truly understand how the world works. So Žižek says that in reality, ideology is more complex, in the sense that it is not simply a fable we can get rid of. Ideology, as he sees it, is, I would say, a kind of fabric, an invisible, obviously immaterial fabric, that gives meaning to our experience, that makes our life habitable. We must clearly show what ideology is, understand it, unmask its tricks, because being an ideology, it is also fiction, it has a certain dimension of a mask. So we must say, "Beware, this is ideology; beware, this is a fiction; beware, this is an interpretation," etc., but in reality, we cannot do without having an ideology. "We need to rely on ghosts," he says, meaning we need to rely on an ideological gaze, even knowing that perhaps that ideology manipulates me, even knowing that that ideology is a simplification, a falsification, a mask placed over reality, but I cannot help but follow a mask, I cannot help but follow a ghost. So ideology is inevitable, I tell you. But be careful, there are many ideologies at that point; rather than passively accepting ideology, we must try to show its limits, show its characteristics, and eventually choose which ideology, right? An ideology serves a purpose, an ideology is inevitable, but this does not mean that every ideology is equally good, that every ideology should be pursued equally. It is about consciously choosing which fiction to accept. Life is largely fiction, but a fiction that we can at least partially choose. Okay?

In a world where the catastrophe has already occurred. We are worried about the climate crisis, but the climate crisis has already happened. We are worried about the dysfunctions of capitalism; they have already happened. Everything dramatic we could have imagined for the future has already occurred. The catastrophe has already taken place. We are, says Žižek, with a colorful but effective expression, "5 minutes past midnight." That is, the time has already passed; we should have thought about it earlier, in reality, if we wanted to solve the problems; we are already beyond, we have already gone too far. "5 minutes past midnight" means that the moment when we could have acted, we have already lost it. However, this does not mean we should give up; this does not mean we should passively accept reality as it is, cynically, as sometimes happens, right? Because the attitude of our times is sometimes one of cynical resignation, right? We must still transform reality, even knowing we are starting late, even knowing we are extremely late. And Žižek's proposal is one that largely harks back to Marxism, a Marxism for the 21st century, we could say. He insists on an aspect then articulated in various forms, but I would say to summarize, he focuses on this: a communism of common goods. That is, we must not return to old-style communism, meaning the communism of the single party, of the state that coincided with the party, of bureaucracy—not that. But we must return to or implement, according to a form of communism, I repeat, of common goods. What does that mean? Collective management of certain goods that concern everyone. So, a collectivism not on every aspect, but on some fundamental aspects, yes. For example, the climate aspect, right? The climate problem is a pressing problem, a current problem, a problem where we are truly perhaps a bit past midnight, but climate problems cannot be addressed by each country for itself, each society, each private company for itself; they must be studied and addressed at a social level, at a community level, at a state level at least, but perhaps even at a supranational level. And so states must make their voices heard, and states must direct, regulate, intervene on climate policies in a very, very clear way, and this is one theme. Another theme is healthcare. Also on healthcare, which is a common good—obviously, health is a common good—it cannot be privatized or semi-privatized; it must return to being a collective good, it must therefore return to forms of communism, says Žižek, using a term that is also somewhat deliberately provocative. For example, artificial intelligence: in his recent books, in recent years, this topic has become important, and Žižek has also begun to address it. That too must be approached not from the perspective of private companies, as is currently happening, because for now all research is in the hands of private companies, but by national or, even better, supranational bodies. This, obviously, should lead us towards already global bodies. Think about artificial intelligence: it is evident that individual states cannot govern this phenomenon; Italy, for example, even if it acted alone, despite being one of the main global economies, could do nothing. Because research happens elsewhere, it happens in the United States, it happens in China. So, there too, a global communism of artificial intelligence, of digital infrastructures, etc., would be needed. In short, rules would be needed that cannot be rules linked to proprietary logics, to private, privatistic logics; they must be global rules, rules of common goods, precisely. In particular, Žižek has studied in various works, in various essays, the problem, for example, of the pandemic, which has been the theme of recent years. Vaccines, for example, diagnostic tools, therapies must be managed at the WHO level, essentially, not by individual states, not by the European Union on one side, the United States on the other, etc. And so this would mean that, for example, vaccine stockpiles should also be global, that is, in the hands of the whole world, and the transfer of vaccines, the transfer also of the technology necessary to then implement medical practices, etc., should be detached from private mechanisms, but managed through solidarity funds. Substantially, this is what he proposes: that the UN should manage these things, that rich countries perhaps fund research with more money, etc., to benefit both rich and poor countries. Okay? The WHO or whoever should manage vaccines, technology, etc., through transfers from rich countries to poor countries, and according to rules established also based on per capita income, essentially, in order to transform healthcare into a non-profit field. Substantially, this is what he asks for, right? Not in the hands of multinationals, taken away from multinationals because the common good must not be linked to the logic of profit. Other goods, those that are not common goods, that are not essential goods, well, private society can exist there, free market can exist there, etc., but on things that concern everyone, concern human dignity, health, climate, there must be a global collective organization, a global collective management, possibly even. This is Žižek's dream, Žižek's proposal. The same applies. As I was saying, obviously for the climate, and there all the various laws, for example, green laws or taxes for the emission of fossil carbon, that is, the use of fossil carbon, CO2 emissions, etc., these laws should not be made by individual states, they should not be "everyone for themselves," but supranational agreements, as has also been partially attempted, but only succeeded to a certain extent, to then rebalance the imbalances that will obviously arise; that is, even taxation, Žižek says, for fuels, one must tax those who produce a lot of pollution and redistribute the money that comes from these taxes to rebalance global wealth, essentially, which, of course, then insists on how in recent years this has actually become very difficult also due to an ever-increasing polarization of global wealth. As we know, richer countries have become even richer, while poorer countries, or rather the poorer segments of the population—because this has also been observed within individual countries—have become proportionally poorer. So Žižek proposes new taxes, but not for everyone: taxes for the highest classes, for the richest classes. For example, he cites studies in certain cases, for example, that say a 2% tax on the profits of the richest would be enough to generate a certain amount of money that would allow for launching development, improvement, and even simply healthcare projects in the poorest countries, etc. Therefore, global solidarity is needed, and putting certain themes in common, putting certain themes in common in a very, very strong way. A proposal, I repeat, obviously of a Marxist stamp, but a Marxism very different from that of Marx, because it is no longer a Marxism of one class against another within a country, within the factory; it is a Marxism that touches the various great global dynamics and does so by pooling major goods. Obviously, to do all this, a change of perspective is needed, the unveiling of these contradictions, because as long as we don't see them, we won't act.

And finally, one last thing: Žižek also believes that this unveiling of contradictions, which should move us towards imagining a different world, can also come through cinema, pop culture, those more modern, contemporary aspects of pop culture, such as memes. In short, if you're of a certain age, you might not be entirely clear on what memes are. Memes are those images, comments, gags of various kinds, often used repeatedly on social networks by younger people to comment on reality, often with a cynical gaze, right? You take an image, a segment of a film, a still frame, etc., and you repeat it, repeat it, repeat it, trying to shift its meaning because in the film it meant one thing, but you use it to say something else. According to Žižek, memes, and all other dominant forms of pop culture in this latest phase of our time, function almost like a psychoanalytic session, like collective Rorschach blots; you know those blots used by psychoanalysts where they show you a strange blot and ask, "What do you see?" As if to say, through this chaos in forms, we try to understand the order within you. So, memes are cynical, absurd, sometimes even incomprehensible, but precisely for this reason, they are forms of unveiling; they are like when we trip on a banana, right? They are when order breaks, shatters. And for a moment, this break, this fracture of order, makes us see the world as it is. A cynical, contradictory, absurd world. And precisely in this absurdity, however, a turning point can also be found. This is to give a broad outline of Žižek's thought.

Then I must tell you, as I often do when there are living contemporary philosophers, that this thought has been appreciated by some, criticized by others, as always happens, in short, when a philosopher is so radical—because he is quite radical—his thought can be, I repeat, very much appreciated, but also very, very criticized. What are the criticisms most often leveled against him? Just for completeness? Well, some have called him a "talk show radical," in the sense that his ability to charm, to speak, and also to provoke with those words, clearly makes him a philosopher, at least in his public appearances, less rigorous than others, right? Very popular, even in the examples he chooses, right? Calling him a rockstar can be a compliment for some, a flaw for others. Obviously, the philosophical establishment is not accustomed to this style; it's a pyrotechnic style. Even Chomsky, who has positions not too distant, in fact, not at all distant from Žižek's from a political point of view—I'll leave a playlist on Chomsky in the description—has sometimes accused him of being too pyrotechnic, of, I would say, creating a mess in his discourse by mixing cinema, paradoxes, anecdotes, citations, in short, creating a bit of confusion from an argumentative point of view. And this is both the merit and perhaps the limit of Žižek, who is indeed volcanic; he truly is volcanic, sometimes throwing so many stimuli at you like an avalanche. Then after a while, you think about it, maybe some things yes, some things no, but while you're in the middle of it, you're overwhelmed. And then, well, Žižek sometimes writes so much that not all books, in my opinion, have the same value. He has also been accused of plagiarism in certain cases, but especially of self-plagiarism, that is, of republishing things already said in other contexts. I must say, this can be said of many authors who write a lot, who publish a book every 6 months. Well, if you publish a book every 6 months, you probably recycle ideas you've already used elsewhere because, by necessity, you can't have revolutionary ideas every 6 months, essentially. So, well, this is an accusation, but let's say it's common to a certain group of very, very prolific thinkers, let's say prolific.

Eh, ecco l'ultima però, eh, menzione di critica la devo fare anche sulle posizioni politiche, perché vi ho detto, è a favore di questo comunismo, eh, dei beni comuni. Però, ogni tanto, anche lì la politica di Zizek un po' deraglia, ma anche in contraddizione con se stesso. Per dire, lui stesso si definisce leninista, per fare un esempio, che è anche una posizione un po' provocatoria, perché Lenin, diciamo, dal punto di vista storico non gode di grandissima fama negli ultimi decenni. Ma nel 2016 dichiarò pubblicamente di votare, di voler votare Donald Trump, no? E qua uno dice: "Ma come, sei un marxista, sei di sinistra e voti il paladino della destra?". Zizek, perché votare Donald Trump, secondo lui, era il modo per far esplodere tutte le contraddizioni del sistema liberale. Vi ho detto, il mondo è contraddittorio. Queste contraddizioni noi non le accettiamo, non le vediamo, non le vogliamo accettare, mostrare. Trump le avrebbe messe davvero davanti agli occhi di tutti perché avrebbe accelerato queste contraddizioni, anche le storture del sistema liberale, avrebbe provocato magari un cambiamento. Non è avvenuto, di fatti, nel 2020, però bisogna dirlo: Zizek è tornato sui suoi passi adesso. Ho visto che sta per uscire un libro su Trump e mi sembra molto critico, ovviamente, su Trump, però per dire come, eh, a volte questo filosofo provocatorio lo sposti da un lato all'altro un po' in maniera rapida.

Ultimo tema, e qui però lo cito come spunto, poi non lo approfondisco perché servirebbe troppo tempo, è anche la posizione di Zizek relativamente alla questione del gender, cioè tutta la grande, enorme questione sull'identità di genere e sugli studi relativamente soprattutto a transfobia, eccetera. Tema che è diventato di grande attualità in certi paesi perché se n'è discusso anche in chiave politica e ci sono stati pronunciamenti delle varie corti costituzionali, in Italia molto meno. Ecco, su questo tema lui ha dato un'interpretazione di chiave psicanalitica sostanzialmente, sostenendo e facendo molto arrabbiare, direi, anche attivisti e a volte anche studiosi che si sono occupati della questione. Perché Zizek sostiene, in particolare sulla transizione, che questa transizione è uno degli esempi principali, secondo lui, tra l'altro, del conflitto simbolico che c'è all'interno della nostra società. Dicevo, i simboli sono importanti, sono il modo in cui noi inquadriamo il mondo, no? Ma c'è anche il conflitto che è importante. Allora, la transizione sarebbe un prodotto di questo conflitto simbolico, come a dire che l'esperienza delle persone trans sia riconducibile semplicemente a questo, boh, fantasma liberale, a una rimozione politica non risolta che porta le persone poi a non riconoscersi in una certa dimensione, a vivere male, eccetera. Ecco, l'accusa che gli è stata rivolta è che questa sia una visione semplicistica, che non per forza la transizione sessuale nasca da un conflitto inconscio tra simbolo, società, capitalismo e mondo, che le situazioni possono essere molto diverse, che anche per occuparsi di questi temi si debba andare con una certa delicatezza, con meno schemi, più analisi approfondite delle varie casistiche. E vabbè, su questo c'è stata anche una certa polemica, ma magari le cose cambieranno anche nel tempo.

Questo per dire delle polemiche, per dire delle diatribe attorno a lui. Come vedete, in ogni caso, che lo prendiate per buono, tra virgolette, per un avversario filosofico, eccetera, è un gran provocatore. Sicuramente uno che ti costringe a fare i conti con idee originali, con idee anche radicali, che però sono, e questa è una caratteristica che a me interessa, idee radicali sull'oggi, sui problemi di oggi, no? Eh, la filosofia deve sporcarsi le mani anche nel presente. Siamo partiti in questo video dicendo: "Ma esistono ancora i filosofi?". Sì che esistono. Poi a volte li si può apprezzare, a volte li si può criticare, ovviamente, ma esistono e a volte si occupano anche di tutti i problemi dei nostri tempi.

Ecco, questo era quello che volevo dirvi in un video anche abbastanza lungo per riassumere in maniera, spero, chiara il pensiero di Zizek. In descrizione trovate i titoli, i link degli altri video che ho citato, trovate anche dei libri di Zizek per approfondire. Se siete curiosi, ci sono i link. Se comprate i libri tramite i nostri link, voi non spendete neanche un centesimo in più. In cambio ci date una piccola mano per sostenere il canale.

Poi, sempre in descrizione, trovate anche i modi per rimanere in contatto col canale tramite i social network e la newsletter gratuita e settimanale, ve la consiglio caldamente. E poi, sempre in descrizione, trovate anche i modi per sostenere il progetto, perché, vi dicevo, capite, sono più di 1800 video, uno al giorno, impegnativi. Eh, costi e fatica, tempo, eccetera. Se vi piace, lo usate e volete sostenerlo, ci sono vari modi per poterlo fare. Si può farlo tramite donazioni, trovate il link in descrizione, tramite, in particolare, poi lo sconsiglio, l'abbonamento al canale. Voi versate, potete versare 3 euro al mese, potete versare anche di più se volete. In cambio avete dei vantaggi esclusivi, c'è un video in descrizione che spiega tutti i vantaggi, magari alcuni possono esservi anche molto utili.

E poi, ultima cosa, ma non per ultima, perché secondo me è forse anche la migliore, perché vi dà anche qualcosa di molto concreto in cambio, bisogna farlo anche tramite libri, perché i libri fanno sempre bene in ogni caso, eh, anche quelli scritti male fanno bene. Di solito, se sono scritti bene, ancora meglio; se sono interessanti, ancora meglio. Io vi consiglio questo tra i tanti, almeno oggi, eh, anche Zizek qualche numero ce l'aveva. Ve lo consiglio perché l'ho scritto io e quindi c'è un po' il mio stile. Parla di filosofi, non tutti, o alcuni filosofi del passato, soprattutto quelli di scuola scettica, però parla di questi filosofi spiegandone alcuni ragionamenti per trarne degli insegnamenti per affrontare il nostro tempo, la vita e i nostri giorni. Visto che vi ho detto la filosofia riguarda anche l'oggi, qui proviamo a fare anche qualche ragionamento a riguardo. Lo trovate in tutte le librerie, anche in formato digitale, se preferite.

L'altro libro che vi consiglio, invece, è un manuale di storia per le scuole superiori di terza, quarta e quinta superiore, quindi triennio. Si intitola "La storia in scena", Garzanti Scuola, appena uscito. Gli autori sono Patisso, De Lorenz e Carbone, ma questo è il volume uno, ma in ogni volume c'è qui segnato che ogni volume contiene, non proprio qui nel cartaceo, ma abbinato in digitale, video e podcast realizzati da me per presentare i singoli capitoli e approfondimenti di tutto quello che c'è nel libro. Quindi è un libro classico per studiare con tutte le sue belle parti, con i suoi schemi, fatto anche bene, ben più. Oltre al libro classico di storia per la terza, quarta, quinta superiore, appunto, ha questo apparato digitale aggiuntivo e inedito fatto solo per questo libro, quindi si vedono solo col libro e per vedere la storia anche da un altro punto di vista. E infatti, davvero, sono decine e decine, perché sono 50, una 70, no, più di 80, forse 90 video più i podcast. È tanta roba dall'anno 1000 fino ai giorni nostri, quindi dategli una possibilità e basta.

Ci vediamo presto. Parleremo ancora di filosofia ogni tanto, ma anche di storia, educazione civica. Ciao. [Musica]