Adobe Q2 2026 : voici ce que personne n'a vu (la VRAIE raison de la chute)

I hope you are doing well. We meet again today in a video in which we are going to analyze the results of AP which have just been published, which have just been published. They are truly exceptional. The business is growing, the AI part is growing, but the stock price, on the other hand, has collapsed by almost 10%. So, we are going to analyze in this video where this total disconnect comes from between the profits on one side and ultimately the reaction of the stock market on the other side. And you will see that personally, I think it is justified and personally, I am not "bullish" on Adobe. So I will really back up my point with, well, what makes me think and what allows me to have this opinion. That is to say, we are going to really, well, in fact, dissect once again the different segments of Adobe. We will compare it to other companies and we will do a valuation at the end. In fact, the central question of this video is really what will Adobe be in 5 years and in 10 years? And secondly, can we determine it? Can we determine what Adobe will be in 5 years, let alone 10 years? And that is the answer to which we must really, well, the question to which we must respond. When we value a company, so already we have a company that has collapsed on the stock market, indeed by 60%, and at the same time, we have once again profits that, well, revenue, so turnover, which has increased by 36%. So there are many people, "in quotes," even beginners, or perhaps people who have a very good level who have convictions about Adobe, but what I mean is that for the most part, when you are a beginner and you start investing, you say, "Wait, this is exactly what Benjamin Graham talked about in his book. We have precisely here, well, the market that is punishing a company whose profits are increasing, and therefore the market, well, the voting machine, the short-term voting machine, we are right in the middle of it." Once again, we will challenge this part since I do not agree. So if I just take the figures to show you in 30 seconds that Adobe is currently delivering. So we have revenue that is increasing by more than 11% per year. We have the stock price here, and as you have seen, it has collapsed in 5 years by -60%. The free cash flow part, even if we subtract stock-based compensation, we have, well, an adjusted free cash flow for stock-based compensation of 8.25 billion, which is excellent. In terms of ratios, it is also excellent, we have an operating margin, as you can see here, of 33%. We have a profit margin, so a net margin of 25%. It really delivers. And this year, they repurchased 7% and over the last two years, 5% of the outstanding shares. So in terms of return, well, your share of the pie, okay, it's growing, the number of shares, the value per share, it's increasing. And I will finish with the total performance obligation part. In short, here, you see, we are at 22.27 billion. It's very simple, it's subscriptions, okay? It's subscriptions, it's the subscriptions that people, okay, are almost obliged to pay and on which, well, on which they are already committed and therefore that Adobe will receive in the future. This is precisely the famous stable and predictable part of SaaS. Okay? So that's the whole point of having a SaaS, and this must really increase, and it is again the case currently at Adobe. So if I do a quick summary, well, instead of reading for 15 minutes all the slides, well, the main, the three sentences to remember from this quarter. So we have the ARR, Annual Recurring Revenue. Okay? So the annualized recurring revenue. The figure that matters most in the SaaS software part, which is 27.1 billion, up 12.5%, and in the previous quarter it was already +11%. So here too, we have an acceleration. The full year 2025 part, we have 23.67 billion in turnover, that's 11% more, and we have 10 billion in operating free cash flow. That's really huge. And they repurchased 30 million shares in the year. We saw it together in the figures, it's 7% of the market cap. And the famous, which interests everyone, the famous ARR, so AI first as they call it. So it's the new products born from AI that have tripled in 1 year and are currently over 500 million dollars. And again, why has the stock price collapsed? Well, the three reasons I have identified are, firstly, the executive departures, "in quotes," the CFO and the CEO. It is that we have the CFO of Adobe who signed the historical accounts on June 11th, and currently on June 12th, so yesterday, and who is leaving Adobe only 4 days later for Marvel. In 4 days, he will be at Marvel, a company in the semiconductor sector which is also publicly traded. Also in March, we have the CEO, so the historical CEO of Adobe, who stayed 18 years at Adobe. So it is really the person who made Adobe's success, announces he is also stepping down as soon as a replacement is found. So we have both heads, the CFO and the CEO. Okay. We would only be missing the COO to leave, and we would have 100% of the administrative team, well, the guys who really run Adobe, who will be changed, who will no longer be there. So again, well, we can say that the people who know best, who understand best, "in quotes," Adobe, we don't know why, but they are leaving at the worst possible moment. And these are signals that, even if it's a coincidence, must be taken into account. So when you put that on the scales, plus also the previous quarter, they revised all of Adobe's KPIs and in fact now, you can no longer see exactly all of Adobe's divisions by segment. They have now just packaged all of that into one big thing, in short. So we no longer have the precision we had before. Okay. And as an investor, I like to have a lot of precision on what I'm buying. We also have the official admission from the CEO. So the CEO. So who made this statement in the press release just now, officially. He said, in short, AI is accelerating consumer behavior at a speed we hadn't imagined. And we will also have to, we will have to evolve, evolve our strategy at the same pace. So they admit indeed that they can no longer predict consumer behavior and that it is evolving, but month by month it will change. And what the consumer wanted, what Adobe's typical customer wanted last month, with the new AI feature and the new AI startup that has allowed, I don't know if I take the advertising part for example, I will present it to you, well, that has released this, well, now this consumer wants, wants integration with this company. And in fact, he wants this power. So the problem is that, in fact, we don't know where it's going to come from. And here, precisely, if I talk to you about this, so this is a company, tell yourself that it was created at the end of 2023 by the person who managed the AI division of Snapchat. Okay? It was created at the end of 2023. It's a company that is valued today at several billion, well, a little over 1 billion, and that does incredible things. Here, if I show you the presentation, well, you will tell me, "But it's exceptional because precisely this company has partnered with Adobe on Premiere Pro." Okay? I've put it in fast forward. In short, it says, "Is it here, for example? Okay, are you able to determine if it's real or if it's AI?" I press play. Well, in fact, this was reality, and just before we had AI, and in fact, what's crazy is that to generate, and here, in fact, everything was AI, in fact, that's the ultimate goal of the video, but to generate all this, you simply need to enter a prompt in Premiere Pro with a car passing behind that you want to remove the car, and you put "edit the video," you put "well, remove the car behind," and you drag it instantly into the timeline, and the car is perfectly removed the first time. It's just crazy. You can also, for example, plug in a younger or older version of yourself into the video. You can also change the camera angles. I find it really amazing. You have a video with a single camera angle, okay? And based on that, you will be able to make changes of angles like this. It's quite impressive. Okay? And here, tell yourself that this is a company that was created at the end of 2023. And imagine the power of this in 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years. And in fact, what I want to tell you is, what is the moat of a company like Adobe? What is the moat of a company like Google or Meta? A company like Adobe, its moat is Premiere Pro, what Premiere Pro allows you to do. When you have an actor who came out of nowhere and who now allows you to do perfect edits with prompts. So yes, they need this company for Premiere Pro, but first of all, until when? Secondly, this company does not have exclusivity with Premiere Pro. Tomorrow, it will sign a contract to put it on DaVinci Resolve and so on and so forth. In fact, so what I mean is that in this sector, in this segment, the moat is not necessarily the platform, and that is precisely the issue when we talk about the commoditization of SaaS, is that the moat is no longer the platform, the moat is new ideas. The moats are plugins like this company that appears out of nowhere. And I repeat myself, but the fact that you have a company like this that appears out of nowhere means that there is no longer any moat, that you can have new entrants spawning everywhere. Okay? So, if you have such a moat, so such a database, okay, which allows you to always take all these new apps, all these new plugins, and integrate them directly into your large database to extract even more value, that's okay, okay? But that's not the case for Adobe because Adobe Premiere Pro, in fact, they are in competition with many other things, and also, well, to finish on this, the huge moat of Meta and Google, which have a database of 3.5 billion people who visit daily. So the AI part allows them to earn more money, better algorithms, better ad spend, and so on and so forth. Adobe, in fact, their moat is once again, by the number of users they currently have, its ability to keep this number of users at Adobe for their future, okay? So that was really, in fact, the parallel. Now, I could have structured it better, what I told you, but I think it was perfectly clear. And also, tell yourself that in fact, no one, if you are interested in AI, you must have honesty. You can, I don't think you can contradict me on this. I think no one can know where we will be in 2 years, 3 years, 4 years. Okay? So from this conclusion, well, in fact, buying companies that rely solely on a tool that can be commoditized, I don't think that's the most relevant thing. And that's why, once again, I prefer 100 times to buy companies like Google or Meta, which have a moat, but it's completely different, okay? Because AI allows them to extract more value from their user base, and this user base will not leave Meta because there is no alternative to Instagram. Guys, they have their business on it. Well, it's another game, okay? It's another deal. And yet, once again, Meta is trading at 10 times earnings. Adobe, we have 13 times earnings. Google, I personally bought it at 16 times earnings. Today, I have 70,000 dollars on Google with over 200% performance. So tech companies that are not expensive, I've bought them and made a lot of money on them. It's just that Adobe, yes, it's a company that today is exceptional, and again, I can't say otherwise, and I'm not saying otherwise. It's facts, it's factual, the results, it delivers, but I am unable to project myself 5 years into the future. And when I see companies like this popping up, well, appearing out of nowhere, I tell myself that the future will be quite difficult in terms of uncertainty. And when I talk about the moat of Google or Meta, it's that currently in e-commerce, there are guys who make almost 1 million dollars per day, I mean per day, with AI advertising campaigns that are precisely created by, you have it in the 1000, this startup. Here are the campaigns they are running. Here, here, I'm showing you a campaign right now. This is a guy analyzing a campaign where the guy put 100,000 more dollars per day. So, to whom does this money go? Obviously to Meta. So in fact, that's why Meta, this kind of thing, it benefits from it instantly. And indeed, that's precisely why it's so powerful, and that's why Meta's advertising part is increasing so rapidly and will almost always increase since we benefit from all the new tools. That is to say, imagine, you had, to give you an idea, in 2015, okay, cost per lead, so costs per person who sees your advertisement and signs up for what you are going to sell them in your advertisement, okay? just signing up, not yet paid, signing up, let's say 5 euros, 5 dollars. Today, it's 40. That is to say, if you currently come with a marketing strategy that people had in 2015, you are completely wiped out, okay? You will never be profitable, and therefore you will be ejected from the market. Except that precisely, there are clever people, "in quotes," who saw the loophole, who exploited the loophole. So, it's not ethical, we agree. But here, what did they say? They said, "Well, I'll generate, well, a person, well, this person, okay? And I'll sell products to sell collagen, basically for joints." So we'll target a whole category of the population who are, let's say, over 40, over 50, in those age groups, okay? Who, for some, are not precisely, well, are not used to seeing AI content and who will fall for it, thinking that this person is real and that it is indeed a real ad. So here, they present this person as a kind of doctor, and so on and so forth, who found the revolutionary thing, the revolutionary medicine, and so on. They put it in e-commerce, and they make a million a day, these guys, by giving back x% precisely to Meta, and Meta gets rich with this kind of thing. Okay? So, that was a bit of a digression to show you, and then otherwise, well, they had made a presentation. It's true that here, well, I think you're watching this video, we can clearly see that it's AI, but it's already much improved, and what will it be like in 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years? So again, that's why the conclusion here is that, well, the entire SaaS infrastructure is commoditizing, and what will remain is the ability to extract value, the value from your users. And it is in this sense that if tomorrow we can simply prompt an edit, why would we need Premiere Pro? Here, I ask you the question, okay? And that calls into question, well, 80% of Adobe's business. And that's why the second part of the video is the valuation part. I buy a company, when I buy a company, I speak in terms of a floor. What is the minimum valuation I could have? Okay? If I take, for example, the example of Google, it's that okay, the search part, there was a problem with the search part, that's why Google was trading at a discount. It's either the earnings. Okay, I remove the search part. What remains? Cloud, YouTube, the entire TPU part, well, and the DeepMind part, the AI part, that is valuable and that was not questioned at all. That would benefit the overall company. So even if I removed the search part at 16 times earnings, it was still interesting. If I take Meta when it was trading at 10 times earnings during the metaverse period, if I removed the metaverse part, the business model was not questioned at all. And now, if I take Adobe and I remove the part that is questioned, there is no more business. In fact, that's my point, my concern, it's precisely here. And that's why, even with record results, we currently have the market being punished because people don't know if Adobe will still be around in 7 years or 10 years. And the problem is that if you buy a company at 13 times earnings, it must still be there. at least for 13 years if there is no growth, or if the growth doubles in 6 years, well, you must, on the one hand, the company must redistribute 100% of its growth to you in 6 years, and the growth must double for you to break even, which is not obvious either. Okay? So if I play devil's advocate a bit, because again, Adobe is a good company. I think there is a ceiling of 20, well, of 25-30% of the company that is not really questioned. That is to say, the Acrobat PDF part, but even there, even playing devil's advocate, I'm sorry, but this part, well, all the part that comes out with GPT and so on and Claude and Anthropic, it competes with PDF summarization, it competes with all this part. Okay? And here, well, that's what I said, AI assistants, so Google, OpenAI, and so on, already read and summarize PDFs. So that's a bit of the problem. And then on the other hand, well, the real danger, well, Photoshop, Premiere, Creative Cloud. Here, in fact, we are at the epicenter, okay, of the sector that is being attacked head-on with generative AI, nano, banana, mjournée, XL. So this is what I just presented to you. And no one, not even the CEO, can guarantee the shape of this segment in 5 years. Can guarantee what this segment will look like in 5 years. Okay? And also, well, this was just something I found funny to show you. Well, funny, well, it's not funny, it's a fact. It's true that I find it curious that when you go to Adobe's investor presentation, when you go here to the partner model part, who is it? It's Google, OpenAI. It's also Anthropic from Cloud. So in fact, we see very clearly that Adobe is not leading the dance. Adobe is not a leader. Adobe will plug into those who precisely can cause its downfall and can disrupt it. Adobe will plug its models into its disruptors. So maybe we'll save time, but it's still not a guarantee of an exceptional moat. Okay? And then there is also another part of the business model. Indeed, here we have the subscription part, so classic SaaS that everyone loves, and a part that was also based on token consumption, your own consumption. Now, it's both positive and negative. Positive because it shows us that this token part has increased by 45% from one quarter to the next. So that means users are consuming more. So users are consuming and using the Adobe platform more currently. That's positive. But the problem is that here they are talking about freemium, so premium freemium. That is to say, they will first have free subscriptions and then monetize them like that. Yes, but again, you know very well that in investment and in the stock market, the profits that can potentially be recovered in the future, we tend to discount them with a high discount rate. So in fact, we don't take them into account. Well, that's a bit of the problem with this part. Okay, so I'm getting back to this. Well. So likewise, the dilemma for valuing the unknown is that the essential question is not whether Adobe makes money or not, because we know it does, it makes money, okay? But how much are you willing to pay today, now, for an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have currently. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well, it was still extremely interesting. That's why I positioned myself. And today, Adobe, 13 times earnings, we have a real threat to the core business. Okay? We don't have a solid floor, and we don't have the arsenal that Meta possesses, because here too, there are people who will tell me, Meta, we had Cambridge Analytica, Meta, we had iOS 14.6, well, again, YouTube, excuse me, when Apple arrived, they allowed all Apple users to check yes or no if they wanted Meta to use their data. Well, obviously everyone checked no, I don't want to. So, from that moment on, Meta had much less data, and therefore the ads they could send were much less targeted, and therefore the return on investment that advertisers had was lower, and therefore ad growth collapsed. At the same time, TikTok arrived, what did they do? Well, they released Reels, and in fact, they released, and with the AI part, each time they developed it even more advanced, better algorithms, and so on, which ultimately allowed them to overcome all these problems and have higher profitability. Okay? But again, it's because they have a base of 3.5 billion people who don't move and from whom they can extract value. Okay? That's not the case, again, for Adobe, because this user base can leave for anyone if the competitor is better. There is no longer, again, the switching cost as it was in the SaaS part, and as we had at the time. It is less and less present, and it is less and less quantifiable. Okay. Well, I think I've talked a lot. What else could I show you on this? Again, beyond the analysis we're doing, we don't really care about Adobe's current results, and the market shows us that clearly. The question about Adobe is not whether we are still making money, because we know we are, but how much are you willing to pay today to buy an operational future that has become impossible to foresee or predict, okay? Or at least, it is possible to foresee today, given the competitors we have. But the whole point is that we are unable to know the next competitors that there will be in a year or two. And we know there will be many competitors. Well, and again, these are not even competitors yet. That's where I want to go, that's where it's even more subtle, is that here, for the moment, it benefits Adobe, but for how long? Okay, for how long? And when, again, it has deployed this on all other Adobe competitors, and when, well, in fact, we see that it will be quite complicated to stand out. And that's why, well, that's why, again, we find ourselves with this valuation on the stock market. And then, and then, and then, if I make a summary table, indeed, in 2022, it was trading at 10 times earnings. We had no disruption to the core business, okay? We had AI that was purely offensive. That is to say, we develop AI at Meta to earn more money, whereas at Adobe, we develop AI not necessarily to earn more money, but to secure the business. We see that even with the tripling of ARR and first that they released, it's 3% of Adobe's revenue. Okay? So we still have room. So we are developing this part to try to de-risk. Okay. But we are still far from being, "in quotes," a leader in this. Then Google. Then Google in 2023 was trading at 16 times earnings. Well, we had a real threat to search, but when you do an SOTP (sum of the parts) valuation, where you segment and value everything independently, well,