Transcription
Welcome everyone to this briefing, brought to you by the ISUL Defense and Security Forum (IDSF). There is a lot to talk about, as always. For those of you who have tuned into these briefings this week, you know that on Monday, I asked Brigadier General Era's winner what his current assessment is of the relationship between the US and Israel visa v Iran. I asked the very same question to Brigadier General Amir Aviv yesterday, and we're going to get a third approach today. It's a great pleasure to welcome Ambassador Yoram Etinger. Yoram, thank you so much for sitting with me today.
>> Thank you. It's my privilege.
>> So, you have a tremendous amount of experience in public diplomacy in the US. What can you share with us? Right now, Trump is threatening to strike Iran. We've seen this threat many of times over the past number of months. Will that threat come to, uh, fruition? Is the US and Israel aligned right now in their goals in Iran? What can you share with us?
Well, it seems to me that to assess President Trump's conduct, uh, properly, one has to go back to his first, uh, term, where he did not want even to hold deliberations on, uh, regime change in Iran. He did not want to hold any deliberation on military strike against Iran. And here we are in June of 2026, a year after President Trump joined Israel in a war against Iran, uh, as a very significant departure from his conduct, uh, a few years ago. Uh, currently, he's involved with another war, uh, along with Israel against Iran, and that is a reflection, in my mind, uh, not of unpredictabilities, but, uh, rather, uh, reflection of the internal debate, uh, going, uh, within the brain of, uh, Donald, uh, Trump, uh, a debate between his, uh, uh, uh, uh, inherent or intrinsic state of mind, which is the transactional state of mind. Uh, erroneously, erroneously considering, uh, international conflicts, and this one in particular, uh, in Iran as another business transaction, which it is not. It has never been anything like a business transaction. But at the same time, he cannot ignore, uh, the daily assessments by, uh, the US armed forces, especially CENTCOM, namely the, uh, US military, uh, in the Middle East. Uh, and those assessments are more or less copy-paste of what he hears from Prime Minister Netanyahu. And at the same time, he also has the continuous so-called lobbying by his, uh, son-in-law, who indeed travels crisscrosses the Middle East, but in my mind, uh, doesn't really get it when it comes to the Middle East. He looks at the Middle East again as an investor, as a businessman. Suffice to watch, for anyone who is interested, uh, uh, Jared Kushner and Sam Witkov, uh, uh, Steve Witkov, interview on 60 Minutes with Lesley Stahl, where Jared Kushner literally said, problems in the Middle East, they are very simple. It's only the people who are the problem. I wonder what type of Middle East, what kind of Middle East he has in mind. Certainly not the real Middle East. And then also the statement that when it comes to the Middle East, generally most people want better life, freedom of religion, freedom of expression. They don't want, uh, to bring the rival, the enemy to submission. They prefer compromise. I wish that this would be the real Middle East. And as far as I know, and I don't know much about the relationship between the president and his son-in-law, but my assumption is that the son-in-law exerts much, uh, influence, which drives, uh, President Trump to an extent away from the military, uh, assessment. And then obviously, you have the isolationists in the Republican party, but at the same time, you have the vast majority of Republican legislators, House and Senate, who do understand that it's time to put an end to the story of negotiation and get to the real issue, which is regime, uh, regime change. Uh, a, a major problem which I, uh, detect is that, uh, there's much emphasis on the cost of regime change. How long will it take? How many lives could be, uh, lost? How many billions or trillions of dollars, uh, could should be invested in such, uh, proposition? But I don't hear, uh, much or any discussion of the cost of refraining from regime change. And, uh, I hear, I just came back from a month in the US, including a week in Washington D.C., most of it on Capitol Hill, and I hear the, uh, the the song, there's no appetite for regime change in the US. Well, uh, there, there may not be an appetite, probably because people don't take the time to present reality to the American people, to American legislators. But certainly, if there is no regime change, uh, one has to be ultra naive to assume that in a few years, could be maybe even more than 10 years, but 10 years in history, it's around the corner. Uh, refraining from regime change means nuclear Iran. That nuclear Iran is not just another nuclear power. Big deal. North Korea has a nuclear power. China has, Russia has, Pakistan. So, uh, Iran will also have nuclear capability. Uh, this is a very simplistic approach. Should the Ayatollah regime gain access to nuclear capability, this is going to be the first ever apocalyptic nuclear power. And apocalyptic nuclear power means catastrophic cost to the, to humankind globally speaking, which would dwarf any worst-case scenario of bringing down the Ayatollah, uh, regime.
Now, in addition to that, uh, there are other obvious, uh, costs to refraining from regime change. What would that do to emboldening China? Not only in the Atlantic, uh, uh, not, not only in the Pacific, uh, ocean, and not only in Africa, but primarily in Latin America, where China is already very, very deeply involved. Latin America, that's the soft underbelly of the United States, the backyard of the United, uh, States. How emboldened Putin is going to be, uh, when he is that President Trump or the USA unable to consume a marathon and able barely to consume a sprint, maybe 200 meters, maybe four or eight or 1500 meters, but no marathon. Well, global reality requires mandate marathon runners, certainly in the Middle East, certainly when you face the Ayatollah, uh, regime. And then obviously, we have the anti-US Islamic terrorism, which is already, uh, deep in the US through some say few hundred at least terror sleeper cells on US soil. And this is not my own assessment. This is the FBI and the Homeland Security Department's, uh, threat assessment for 2025, 2026, when they specifically refer to Iranian-controlled sleeper cells on the US in conjunction with Hezbollah and sometime in conjunction with China and, uh, and, uh, Russia. And last, uh, last and not least is the issue of negotiation that the US is currently involved in. And that reminds me of the old American country colloquialism. There's no education in the second kick by a mule. And the Ayatollah regime is not a mule. The Ayatollah regime is a satanic predator. And, uh, we're not talking about a second kick since 1979. For the last 47 years, the US has been kicked again and again and again and again, and pumping billions of dollars and deluding itself that there is a chance for the Ayatollah regime to accept peaceful coexistence, uh, good faith negotiation, abandoning its fanatic apocalyptic ideology, only to wake up following this Laland-type of policy to realize that indeed that, uh, policy has transformed the Ayatollah regime from the, uh, American policemen of the Gulf to, uh, the the chief epicenter of anti-American wars, terrorism, and drug, uh, and drug, uh, trafficking. And therefore, when it comes to negotiation, it's time again to do our best, or for the US to do its best, to spare itself of another kick by the Iranian, uh, predator. And this means abandoning the failed negotiation approach, abandoning the failed diplomatic approach toward the Ayatollah regime, and come to terms with reality, which means the only way to advance President Trump's overriding goal, which he enunciated on the evening of his victory back in November 2024, namely ending wars, minimizing wars and terrorism. The only way to advance it is by eliminating a chief epicenter of war and terrorism. Existence of the Ayatollah regime and the aim of President Trump constitute a contradiction in terms.
>> Yoram, thank you for that overview. Let me try to sharpen this a little bit, if I can. Uh, you know, if you were to try to get inside President Trump's head, or by extension, US foreign policy, is the goal right now in Iran to destroy the enemy or to get a good deal? Meaning, if you take a look at the, you know, the way Trump spoke about the JCPOA in the past, he spoke about it in terms of a bad deal. So, is that what's currently going on? Because there's a very big difference if the ultimate goal is what's good for the US and creating a deal versus, no, no, we have an existential understanding that the enemy must be destroyed. Are you able to parse that for us in terms of what's really happening?
>> Well, obviously, President Trump is driven by what's best for America, not what's best for Israel, and not what's best for the UN or for Western Europe. It's legitimate. Uh, America should come, uh, first, certainly for the president of the USA. Uh, the question is, does it serve American interests to have a so-called good deal with, uh, the Ayatollah regime, bearing in mind the track record of the last 47 years, which proves to us, proves to us that the apocalyptic, fanatic, 1,400-year-old ideology of the Ayatollah regime transcends by far any diplomatic consideration, any financial, uh, consideration, as proven not by statements enunciated by, uh, Iranian officials, but by the constitution of the Ayatollah regime, by the school curriculum of the Ayatollah regime, Friday sermons in, uh, in Iran, the official media of the Ayatollah regime, and certainly the day-to-day conduct of that chief epicenter, center of anti-American terrorism, drug trafficking, and wars. What more is required to prove to the American administration and Americans in general that the best interest of the US mandates the US to do its utmost to bring about a regime change? And as I said, refraining from regime change could bring upon humanity as a whole unprecedented, uh, uh, calamity when it comes. However, to the conduct of President Trump, I think one should make a distinction between Trump's talk and Trump's walk. Obviously, if you listen to President Trump talk ever since he reentered the White House in January of 20, uh, 25, uh, you're talking about a zigzag-like, uh, traffic of statements. And the question is, is that a tactic or or is that a strategy? My assumption, it's a tactic designed maybe to confuse, uh, to, uh, to fog the real intentions. The walk is the real thing. And as far as I'm concerned, the walk at this stage is the unprecedented military deployment to the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East as a whole, and the Mediterranean. That speaks much, much louder than any interview with Fox or or NBC or CBS or CNN or any, uh, rally anywhere in the USA. And obviously, again, the proof will be in the in the pudding. My assumption, and it's only an assumption, I don't have any, uh, uh, documentation for that assumption, but I trust that President Trump is a very, very smart person, or else he wouldn't reach the height that he has reached financially and politically. And he knows to distinguish himself, as he wants, from all American presidents, from Jimmy Carter, who was the chief responsible element for the rise of the Ayatollah regime in Iran, all the way to President Biden, in order to distinguish himself from that slate of Democratic and Republican presidents. He cannot afford to leave behind him, when he terminates his second term, the Ayatollah regime in, uh, place. Should he do that, he would then join this slate of failed presidents when it comes to tackling the Ayatollah, uh, threat. And the last thing that President Trump wants is to be remembered as another Obama, or another Biden, or another Clinton when it comes to dealing with, uh, with Iran. And therefore, my assumption is, irrespective of the talk, uh, President Trump listens to, uh, CENTCOM assessments. He listens to Secretary of State Rubio. He listens to Secretary of War Hex, and most, most Republicans in the House and Senate. And he indeed aims at reading the globe and, uh, and advancing American interests through the reg, through a regime change in Iran.
And if we can switch topics for a moment, you mentioned that you were just in the States for about a month, and you know, the whole question about the future support that will come from the US for the Jewish state. You know, President Trump will not be the president forever. At a certain point, it is inevitable. It is the nature of democracy that a, a new president, new administration will not necessarily have a favorable view towards Israel. What, what are you doing right now? What should Israel be doing right now, or, or, you know, advocates in the US to, to really position Israel for that moment, potentially, when the US does not have an administration favorable towards Israel?
>> Well, uh, traveling through through the US as I do three, four times a year, have been doing it since 1993. I keep hearing, uh, most of Israel's supporters echoing the notion that Israel is the most democratic ally, the most reliable, the most, uh, stable ally of of the US. And I must say, uh, it frustrates, uh, me because to be realistic, there's no dollar sign next to those intangible adjectives. Too few, too few, and I'm talking about single digits of the American population, a small minority on Capitol, uh, Hill, uh, do pay attention or do enunciate publicly the reality of US-Israel relations where Israel features as the most dollar multiplier and national security multiplier for the United States. And when I say dollar multiplier, many of us, so many Americans have become accustomed to the fact that there are some 200, 250 or more American high-tech giants that have established in Israel research and development centers, and that has become a natural reality. Sure, American high-tech giants want to leverage the brainpower of Israel. They want to leverage the Israeli response to unique challenges militarily and, uh, uh, commercially, uh, which has yielded many groundbreaking, game-changing applications, innovations, and they want to be there, uh, when Israel does present, does develop those new innovations, so to speak, at the lowest value of those valuations and then cash in when the valuation goes, uh, up. And certainly, those commercial high-tech giants invest in Israel, and we're talking 2025, uh, by far, by far the hottest year in Israel of, uh, American investment in Israeli, uh, high-tech. American giants are doing it not because of, uh, any lobby, not because of any friendship with some pro-Israel elements. They do it because of stockholder considerations, income statement considerations, and they know that having research and development centers in Israel helps them to maintain global leadership. The same thing applies, but in a much, much, much more formidable, uh, scope, applies to the defense and aerospace industry and American armed forces. Israel has been at least, uh, since 1967, the number one battle-tested laboratory, research and development center, and showroom of the American defense industry, and the number one innovation center for battle tactics for the American armed, uh, forces. Uh, this is the reality of the challenges facing Israel. And therefore, when the US provides Israel, uh, and this is highly, highly appreciated, obviously by Israel, but when we receive from the US the F-35, and the F-16, and the F-15, and the Apache, and the Black Hawk helicopters, and dozens, dozens of additional advanced military systems. This is not a one-way street. This is a two-way, uh, street which most Americans are unaware of. And the minute we receive it, the new, the advanced military systems go through the process of battle-tested laboratory, and every single day, there are lessons which upgrade the quality of those systems. The result, saving literally, literally hundreds of billions of dollars in terms of research and development cost to the US defense and aerospace industry. We're talking about an increase of scores or hundreds of billions of dollars, uh, of American defense, uh, industry and aerospace industry, uh, products. Certainly, we're talking about expansion of employment in the US. And when the US defense industry, US aerospace industry increases its economic output, it also bolsters the income, uh, tax revenues by the US Treasury. I don't claim that all of that is due to Israel, but being the only intense day-to-day showroom of the American defense and aerospace industry, we certainly share much of the responsibility for the increased export, for the cut of cost of, uh, research and development cost, for the expanded employment. Last year alone, uh, the F-35, uh, scored, according to Lockheed Martin, $40 billion export. And if I will be very moderate and I would say Israel deserves credit for 50% for that export, minimally, uh, due to the fact that when we received it in 2018, the F-35 was declared by the top avionics experts in the US as a failed program. But a year later, 2009, together with Lockheed Martin, Israel solved the Israeli Air Force solved most, if not all, of the mechanical and technical glitches. And from 2019 to 2026, exports have surged upward beyond the most optimistic assessment. Israel certainly has been the number one, probably the sole active showroom. The same thing applies to the F-16, and the F-15, and the Apache, and the, uh, Black Hawk, and as I say, uh, dozens of other military systems, uh, US air defense systems such as THAAD, which has been upgraded dramatically due to the very intense collaboration with, uh, with Israel on improving this American air defense, uh, system. And the bottom line, the bottom line is that, uh, US, uh, uh, annual investment in Israel, the $3.8 billion, which is misperceived as foreign aid, has become a huge bonanza for the American taxpayer. And again, it responds to American interests. Obviously, it serves Israel's interests, but serving Israel's interests and not American interests does not bode well for the bilateral relations. And I'm confident that most Americans who criticize Israel, criticize Israel due to lack of education, lack of information on the subject. The vast majority of critics of Israel are not, uh, Bernie Sanders-like Americans or Tucker Carlson or Candace Owens. We're talking about people who naively believe in what they read in some of the so-called elite media. And from my experience, once you introduce them to reality, they do, uh, enhance their appreciation of, uh, Israel.
Former Ambassador Yoram Etinger, thank you so much for sharing all of that. It's always a pleasure to hear your analysis of what is happening, uh, here in Israel in the US. Thank you to all our viewers and supporters for tuning into this briefing. We will be back with you tomorrow, 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time, 5:00 p.m. here in Israel.