Transcription
This will be a great puzzle to the future historian. You'll say, "What happened?" The western project succeeded globally, and the West is so depressed. Clearly, the West has lost its way in some ways. And the question, therefore, is what mistakes has the West made? And so, this is part two of my presentation, and I'll talk about the mistakes that the West has made.
Of course, you can list many, but I'll highlight what I call three strategic mistakes that the West made. The first strategic mistake was at the end of the Cold War, and as you know, the end of the Cold War was a major turning point for the West. There was, you know, you remember 1990, the West was in such a celebratory, triumphalist mood. The essay by Francis Fukuyama came out, "End of History." "The world history has ended. We all going to become liberal democratic societies. The West can now relax. The rest has got to struggle. But we succeeded. We made it."
One of the most cruel things I say in the book is that Francis Fukuyama's essay did a lot of brain damage to the West because it made the West complacent at precisely the moment in history, 1990, when China and India were waking up. And why is that so important? Because from the year 1 to the year 1820, for 1,800 out of the last 2,000 years, the two largest economies of the world have always been those of China and India. And it's only in the last 200 years that Europe took off and America took off. But the last 200 years of world history, when you view them against the backdrop of the past 2,000 years of world history, have been a major historical aberration. All aberrations come to a natural end. And that's happening right now, as you and I speak.
Just give you one statistic. In 1980, the United States' share of the global GMPP was 25%. China's share of the global GMPP in 1980 PPP terms was 2.2%. The United States was 10 times larger. Then by 2014, 2015, China's share became larger than the United States, and nobody noticed that the world had changed in the last 30 years, right? That's an amazing change. And in 2008, in PPP terms, India became the third largest economy in the world. Nobody noticed. So at a time when the world was going through a magnificent transformation, Francis Fukuyama's essay put the West to sleep.
The second strategic mistake happened in 2001. Another critical year in human history. I suspect when if I ask you all what happened in 2001, most of the answers I get is, "Oh, it's pretty obvious what happened in 2001. 9/11 happened in 2001, right? Osama bin Laden organized the operation. The World Trade Center towers came crashing down." Actually, my wife and I were in Manhattan when it happened. We didn't see the towers come down, but we were there. And it was a shock to America, a huge shock. And suddenly America began to get involved completely in the Islamic world, invading Afghanistan, invading Iraq.
And in the process, the United States failed to notice that something more momentous happened in 2001, much more significant. And what was that? It was China's admission into the WTO. And when China got admitted into the WTO, about 800 million workers were suddenly thrust into the global capitalist system. And then, as Joseph Schumpeter taught us, there was creative destruction. Jobs were lost. And that's how Trump happened, right? So if you don't pay attention to the real strategic changes and you get distracted by 9/11, you get the consequences.
And the third strategic mistake that the West made was an even bigger one. It failed to see that in the course of these past few decades, as a result of all the great transformations I described to you in part one of my lecture, that the world has become a small, densely interconnected global village. Everything now hangs together. Whatever you do, you have to look at the total picture and not try to view problems in their slices. Whatever you do has got consequences somewhere else. You take an action here, it has a consequence somewhere else.
And to give you a good example, if America had been strategically awake and aware, as I mentioned, it should have seen that China's admission into the WTO would have an amazing impact. China's economy will grow, and therefore America should have focused on China, right? Instead, I can tell you, as you know, the United States decided in 2003 to invade Iraq. And on the day when it after it admit, after it invaded Iraq, it discovered that it couldn't, Iraq couldn't export Iraqi oil because there were Security Council sanctions on Iraq. And therefore, America worked hard to lift the sanctions. It was difficult. The Security Council was badly divided at the time. On the day when the sanctions were lifted, I asked a senior American diplomat in charge of this, "Say, 'Who helped you?'" So I thought he would say, "Oh, Britain helped me. France helped me. Germany helped me." No, he said it was China that helped America.
And I tell you this story for one reason because it will show you how China was paying attention to the big picture, and America wasn't. Because by lifting the sanctions on Iraq, number one, the Chinese got immediate reward because America squeezed Taiwan. I can tell you more about that later. But more importantly, the Chinese wanted to legitimize the American presence in Iraq to ensure that America remained bogged down in Iraq while China kept growing. And I can tell you, I gave you the data in PPP terms. Let me give you the data in nominal terms, okay? It's an even more amazing story. In the year 2000, America's GMPP was eight times bigger than China's. One year before China got admitted into WTO. By 2015, America was just 1.6 times bigger. And within 10 years, China's will become bigger. So instead of paying attention to China, America got distracted, and that's why you have all these challenges coming our way.
So the question, therefore, now is, and I'll try to do this in five minutes, what should the West do? And I have proposed in the book that the West should adopt a new 3M strategy. 3M stands for, not for the Minnesota Mining Company in Minnesota, but it stands for three words beginning with M. The first M is minimalist. And this is a very critical point. In one way or another, the West has basically intervened in the affairs of the rest of the globe for 200 years, right? It's a fact. I mean, you, you in the Netherlands know this well. You colonized Indonesia, right? So far away, the other side of the world. You colonized them. You could do it today. It's inconceivable, right? But the habits of the 19th and 20th centuries continue to linger.
And as you mentioned, Paul, sorry, Yuri, they mentioned that, um, today the bombing took place. And how is this bombing going to help either the Syrians or you? Why don't you try to find alternative solutions? And in the book, I say that every time an American ambassador to the UN speaks, I have the exact words in the book, they would say, "This is a struggle between the democracies of the world and the tyrannies of Russia and China, right? It's a struggle between good and evil, black and white." Well, I say, "Okay, if you say this is a struggle between the democracies of the world and the tyrannies of the world, why don't you listen to the number one democracy in the world, the largest democracy in the world, which is India, or the number three democracy in the world, which is Indonesia? Why do you only speak of Western democracies?"
Let me quote to you what an Indian diplomat wrote down. He's probably the most, one of the most senior Indian diplomats. His name is Sham Saran. He describes what happens as a result of Western interventions. He says, "In most cases, the post-intervention situation has been rendered much worse, the violence more lethal, and the suffering of the people who are supposed to be protected much more severe than before. Iraq is an earlier instance. Libya and Syria are the more recent ones. A similar story is playing itself out in Ukraine." He says, "In each case, no careful thought was given to the possible consequences of the intervention." So if you really want to involve the democracies of the world, then why not listen to the largest democracy in the world, which is India, or the third largest democracy, which is Indonesia? And if you listen to them, your worldviews will change, and then you will know you won't have to get so involved in the affairs of other states. And let me emphasize one point. I must emphasize that your gifts of Western reasoning have worked so well on the rest of the world that these other civilizations will continue succeeding without your intervention, and they might even do better. So that's one, minimalist.
Second, multilateral. And here, it's again, I mentioned, I emphasized to you that the great strategic mistake was not realizing how we're becoming a small, interconnected global village. Now, when you become a small, interconnected global village, you need global village councils, right? And where there are, fortunately, there are global village councils. This is the gift, the multilateral order that the West gifted to the world at the end of World War II. United Nations, IMF, World Bank, GATT, World Trade Organization. These are Western gifts to the rest of the world. And amazingly, I know this. I was ambassador to the UN for 10 years. The United States has been steadily undermining or weakening global multilateral institutions. That's a big mistake.
And the person who points out that this is a mistake is a former president of America. His name is Bill Clinton. And I quote him in the book. He says, "If America assumes he's going to be number one forever, then just keep doing what you're doing. Doesn't matter. Be unilateral." Then Bill Clinton added a butt. He said, "But if you can conceive of a world where you're no longer number one, then it's in America's national interest to strengthen multilateral rules, multilateral procedures, multilateral institutions." He gave this advice in 2003 in a speech at Yale, 15 years ago. No one has ever repeated that advice since Bill Clinton did it. Second strategic mistake. Uh, and so that's the second thing that the West has to do: promote multilateral institutions.
And the third suggestion I have, I'll just mention it because I'm running out of time. It's also the one that is the most shocking. I bet none of you will guess what the third M word is. The third M word is Machiavellian. I know in the West, Machiavellian is regarded as an embodiment of evil. In fact, I quote one of America's biggest political scientists, Leo Strauss, as saying that Machiavelli is the embodiment of evil. But if you go back and read a wonderful essay by Sir Isaiah Berlin, a British liberal philosopher, who wrote a lengthy essay on Machiavelli, the New York Review of Books, you will find that Isaiah Berlin explains that the goal of Machiavelli, at the end of the day, was to promote virtue. His goal was to try and achieve better outcomes at the end of the day. And I actually believe, and this is a subversive thought I'm leaving for you at the end, that in some ways, paradoxically, if the West became more Machiavellian, more calculating about where its real interests lay, then actually the West will be better off, and the world will be better off. Thank you.
Can I ask you a few questions? We might sit down. Sure. Um, uh, to elaborate a little bit on, uh, the many things you said. Um, and then we asked Professor Paul Trevor to, uh, comment on the book and maybe even on what you just said because I saw him taking down notes. But, um, he is, um, >> I think he's taking down too many notes. Um, and just, just, um, uh, uh, to elaborate a few points you're making, and I've, I've been reading your books and other books, your book and other books. Um, so just, um, there are many things about what you write to like, and also the tone of voice you do it. You, you come as a very good friend, >> um, and giving advice, and that's of course a very nice way and the diplomatic way. You, you've been a diplomat for a big part of your life. >> Um, >> In what way do you really like the West? Is it just a way of, um, um, a way that you know that people will tend to listen better if you make them compliments first, or or are you really, really fed up by that? You're, you're basically saying, "Am I being macho?"
No, I, I, I would say that, uh, my admiration for the West is very genuine. Uh, because, I mean, and, and, and I say this quite honestly because, you know, uh, just to describe to you, I'm, I'm ethnically a Sindhi, you know, you know, Sindhis are a subgroup of Indians, you know, Sindhis. And if you look at, let's say, above my generation, right? My mother, my father, my uncles and aunties, and they, they are huge families, you know, they had my, each my mother and father had six, seven siblings. None of them went to university. No one in my family, none of my three sisters went to university. None of my first cousins older than me went to university. So in this old generation, all generation, generation four never went to university. I was the first one ever of all my relatives to enter a modern university, University of Singapore. And I studied philosophy, mainly Western philosophy. And it completely transformed me. It made me aware of how big the world is, you know. And, uh, and by the way, it doesn't mean that my first cousins failed. By the way, my first cousins are much richer than me. They went to business. They made lots of money. They consider me the man who failed. I went to government who makes money in government, right? And then, but then after me, all the, my children, all my nephews and nieces, and all the children of my first cousins have all gone to university. And who created, and this, this entrance into the university world opens your minds. I know this because I saw where my mind was before I went, how my mind opened. And this is a gift from the West. And, and the fact, and one reason why the human condition is becoming so improving, so much, is because all these Western-style universities are producing graduates who understand science and technology and cause and effect, and then setting up clinics in remote villages and teaching mothers how to wash their hands to get rid of germs. And you know what? As a result of that, infant mortality in the last 30 years has gone. They said, by the way, we have saved more babies in the last 30 years than in hundreds of years. You know, you want data? Go to Steven Pinker's book. So I, I, so my admiration for the West is not faint. It's real. Which is why I'm actually therefore, as a result of that, genuinely puzzled that the most successful civilization in human history, no doubt about it, has lost its way in the last 30 years and lost its way very badly. That's why, as my friends say, this is a love letter to the West. Wake up.
>> Yeah. Yeah. I read it like that. You, you say it's a provocation, but it's actually, it's much more of a love letter. It's much more, "How come that you've done so wonderful things and, you know, and stop doing them?" Um, um, and then then you say, um, but there's there's something which, um, also puzzles me because in a way, you could say that, like you pointed out in the beginning of your lecture as well, um, uh, the West succeeded that good governance sort of went all over the world. Um, there's hardly any real poverty, and maybe the last real poverty will be eliminated, you know, over the next decade or >> By 2030. >> By 2030. It's, it's probably, it might be really gone. So, it's, it looks like it really succeeded. But you could also say that, um, um, um, and you say the really important thing in 2001 is not the World Trade Center, but it's, uh, the entering, entering of China into the World Trade Organization. It's interesting that they're both sort of the same level. It's interesting the word "world trade" is in both. >> I must say, you just noticed it. I didn't notice it myself. >> And it's, um, uh, and, um, and you could say that's sort of a real achievement also of the Western institutions to, to, to have them enter. But then you're saying, um, Europe should, um, also help establish good governance in North Africa and the Arabic countries because that's where the real danger for Europe lies. And that's a real first, uh, task of, of, of European society. But isn't it, you could also argue that a lot of people in the West are arguing, arguing, "It's about time we stop helping everybody in the world," >> and start thinking about ourselves, which sounds a bit Machiavellian, which you say is supposed the West should do as well. So how should I look at that? >> Well, I think >> Isn't it about time we stop, you know, giving development aid and I mean, how, how does that fit into your >> Yeah. Well, I mean, I'm glad you mentioned North Africa because in my, my one of my very first essays, which I wrote, uh, I think in 1993, so 25 years ago, uh, was called "The West and the Rest" in National Interest was published. And I pointed out in 1993, I said, "Europe, watch out, because if you don't do anything about North Africa," >> Right. >> "very soon the, the people in North Africa are going to discover that, uh, the Mediterranean is a small pond, and the boats will come." So I spoke about this 25 years ago. >> Absolutely. >> Many, you predicted. >> But why, why, why do the boats come? It's interesting now, for a start. Okay. Whether or not you continue helping them or not help them is one question. But one thing you can do is not assume that by your intervention you'll make things better. And as you know, surprisingly, in the case of Libya, it was not America, normally it's America that's the interventionist country, but UK and France decided to intervene in Libya, and the result was that the Libyans are worse off, >> and in many ways, the boats are now coming from Libya. So be very careful when you intervene in other societies. But there's also a more positive message that I give in this book and other books, which is that at the end, and this is a very important psychological point I'm going to make. Um, the North Africans cannot learn about development from Europeans. They cannot, because culturally, you're very different. So how did the Asians succeed? Why did a, why were the Asians the first non-Western states to modernize? The reason is that Japan succeeded first. And when Japan succeeded, then the neighbors of Japan said, "Hey, if Japan can do it, maybe we can do it, too." So the Four Tigers, Korea, Taiwan, >> uh, Hong Kong, Singapore succeeded. >> Then the Four Four Tigers succeeded. And the ASEAN states said, "Hey, we can also succeed." So Malaysia copied Singapore, >> Thailand. >> Then Thailand copied Singapore, and then the, we succeeded. Deng Xiaoping came to Southeast Asia, and Deng Xiaoping said, "Hey, Southeast Asian states, vassal states of China, they can succeed, we can succeed too." And you know the ripple effect of such. So if you want to create a ripple effect of development in North Africa, and I mean this quite sincerely, find the best, the brightest young people from Tunisia, from Algeria, from Morocco, send them to Southeast Asia to see why Indonesia is so successful. Indonesia was supposed to break apart and become the Yugoslavia of Southeast Asia in 1997, 1998. Today, Indonesia is the most successful Islamic democracy. And Indonesia is doing so well that by 2050, it'll have the fifth largest economy in the world, your former colony. Amazing. So, but they will learn psych. You see, it's, it's all about the psychology of development. So I have actually lived in what I call the pre-modern world as a child, progressed into the modern world, and then began to realize the opportunities. >> Mhm. You just pointed it out very, um, uh, eloquently the way the Chinese sort of bogged down the Americans at the beginning of the century in the Middle East in Iraq, >> because the Chinese, um, kept their eyes on the ball, on sort of on the long, on the long haul. And, um, but on the other hand, and, and you're saying you're predicting, and you've been writing about it, that China will become the first power in the world, and that's very, very likely indeed. But you're saying, "I also take bets." >> Yeah. >> "Anybody wants to bet, I'll take a bet." >> Good, good bottles of fine bottles of red wine. >> Um, um, but, um, and you're, you're saying, "But yes, but, um, don't worry about that because the Chinese will behave." >> But if you, if I listen to your example, I mean, they're cunning, they're Machiavellian. >> I mean, I mean, isn't that sort of a bit much to just think that it will all be well? >> Yeah. Well, I think, you know, I'm so glad you asked that question because that's actually one of the points I didn't make to you all today is that I think that the next 10 years of human history are going to be among the 10 most important years in human history. And I, the reason why I'm writing this book now is that we have a small window of opportunity to shape how China emerges as number one. And to put it very simply, if you work with China now to set up a cooperative order that incorporates your interests and their interests, we will have a stable world. But if you provoke China now, then you're going to end up in a troubled world. And that's why Bill Clinton's advice is very apt. He's basically, I mean, he was being actually, the advice that Bill Clinton gave, as I say in the book, was very Machiavellian. What Bill Clinton was saying to his fellow Americans, if you read between the lines, what he's saying is, "Hey guys, wake up. China is going to become number one. We're going to become number two. Now, how do we make sure that we put the handcuffs of multilateralism onto China?" Simple. We put the handcuffs of multilateralism on ourselves first as America, and then when China becomes number one, you take out the handcuffs and you put on China. That's what he's suggesting in a very Machiavellian way. That's what Bill Clinton was suggesting. Now, if there were, you know, what I find puzzling is that America used to have big strategic thinkers. I give you some three examples: Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Kennan. They're gone. They don't have any of the strategic thinkers. And you know what? As I say in the book, when, when the United States began to push for the expansion of NATO, Kissinger advised against it. Brzezinski advised against it. George Kennan advised against it. So that means >> So therefore, how you treat China is very important. Now >> That means, so, answer to your question is, what you do to China will determine what China will do to you. And, um, given the fact that there might not be too much strategic insight inside the Pentagon or the foreign or the foreign office, the, the, um, the minister of foreign affairs, that bites a lot of bad weather, a lot of trouble. >> No, no. Unless they read my book. >> Unless they read my book. >> Yeah. Yeah. >> That they read my book, the world will be a better place. >> But that's a half-serious, half-joking point. >> No, no, no. You, I understand. But, and, and if you look at, but then again, if you look at, um, because you're saying the ways of the West are, are, um, the interference of the West with a lot of the world wasn't wasn't good at all, but the way they, they brought good governance and their, the reason, reason to the world, the enlightenment, part of that, a real important part of that of the success, probably is democracy. >> Mhm. >> Good. And in the book, you're saying, "Yes, um, uh, uh, Western democratic thinkers have pointed out that it's, um, uh, not such a good system, but better than all the alternatives," and that's sort of a literal quotation from. But how do you look upon democracy? Because you, you don't really mention that sort of the core value of what the West has brought. >> And you're saying it's important, but others, you're pointing out that you can have good governance without democracy. How do you, so how should we go about with a man like Xi Jinping, who, who gives himself eternal power? Is that how >> Yeah. Well, I'm, I'm glad you raised the democracy question, but as you know, it's a very complicated question. >> It is. >> It's not some, it's not a question you can give very simple answers to. But let me just make a few quick points. One, I believe in democracy. I would like to live in a democratic society rather than an undemocratic society. And I actually believe that eventually all societies will become democratic. Uh, although eventually, I don't know when it's going to be, especially China will be the big exception. Uh, because China clearly has succeeded without becoming a democracy, although, as I emphasized earlier, the government still considers itself accountable to the people, even though it is not a democracy. Uh, the second point is about, and the second point is that, uh, democracy actually has spread to the Third World. And as I mentioned, the world's largest democracy is India, the third largest democracy is Indonesia. So democracy is also flourishing and succeeding in the Third World too. It's not just undemocratic societies are flourishing. And the third point about, uh, China, actually, the Chinese government learned a major lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party, and they saw what happened to the Russian people. You know, the Russian economy imploded, life expectancy of the Russians came down, infant mortality of the Russians went up, and they said, "Hey, that can happen to us too." So the, the Chinese will not make an immediate transition to democracy, uh, under the present government. But at the same time, I also say this: in some ways, the Chinese Communist Party is doing the world and the West a favor by remaining in power. Because if you had a democratic government in China today, at a time when Chinese pride is rising and going up through the roof, a democratically elected Chinese government will be far more nationalist than Donald Trump, far more assertive than Donald Trump, and he will actually become a far more difficult country to deal with. So the Chinese Communist Party is actually delivering a global public good by bottling up Chinese nationalism. >> That's a very interesting point. Yeah. If you say bottling up, you know, um, then then it becomes sort of ominous in a way because things you bottle up tend to, >> Which is which is why, which is why if you look carefully at the record of the Chinese Communist Party, you know, and this, this will be the subject of a different book, is actually be proved to be very adept at managing China. I give you one simple thing. The conventional wisdom 20 years ago about China's economic development was that China can keep growing in the first phase of development because all it has to do is to copy from the rest of the world. But China will not succeed in the second phase of development because the second phase of development requires innovation, creativity. Now, if you have a communist government, you cannot have creativity and innovation. I don't know how many of you have been to China recently. If you really want to meet, get encounter some of the most innovative industries today, go to China. When you carry in China, if you carry cash, they think you're a dinosaur. Nobody carries cash. Everybody pays for everything. And I'm not exaggerating. Your smartphone does everything for you. Everything. And you can press your smartphone and within one hour, a hot boiled egg appears for breakfast at your doorstep. The smartphone. You want, you want mobile payments, you want, uh, e-mobile bikes, and also in some of the leading areas of science and technology, the Chinese have broken through. So what happened? How is it that the theory says in a communist party, you cannot have creative, creative and innovation? In practice, you do. Now, that takes a certain amount of skill, you know, and ability. And so I always say, yes, all you detractors may be right, China may collapse and fail. Of course, it can happen. Anything can happen. But if you're a betting man, I say watch. Well, if the Chinese succeed, be careful. >> And you're saying, um, rightfully, I would say, um, that Machiavelli is largely misunderstood in the West as, you know, being an evil philosopher on public policy, on on politics. I believe you're absolutely right. You know, that actually the first poem I ever wrote, I ever got published when I was 18, was a set on Machiavelli, praising Machiavelli. So I send you a copy. It's in Dutch, but it's, but I will. It's a sonnet on Machiavelli and how I really like him, but, um, because he does look for a better world in which citizens have more virtue to, to be able >> virtue, vu. >> But in, yeah, in Italy, vu. So >> But it's, um, so I do actually think you have a very good point. On the other hand, what would the West, if it becomes more Machiavellian? I mean, we, if you look at colonialism, that's been quite Machiavellian for a while. So, um, should, in what way would you say we would should have, or we should become more, um, um, >> Looking after our own interests? >> Yeah. I, I, my book is up there, but if you, any of you get the book, look at the last few pages. There's a paragraph in which begins by something like, "You're saying that I'm certain that my friends in Africa, Asia, and Latin America will be troubled by my call on the West to be more Machiavellian. So let me explain to them why I believe it's better for the West to become more Machiavellian because if the West becomes more Machiavellian and realizes where its real interests lie, it will intervene less in the rest of the world. So it's actually good for the rest of the world." And, and at the end of the day, you know, I believe that a strong and successful America is good for the world. So if an America loses its way and elects Trump, it's very bad for the world. But if America is in a good mood, confident, happy, successful, it's good for the world. I actually want to see a strong America. I don't want to see a weak America. So all my advice is that, and then one other statistic I have in the book, which is quite remarkable. United States, as you know, spends more on defense than any other country in the world. Much, much, much, much more. I don't know quite know why, because it's the safest country in the world. They only got to fight against Canada and Mexico. You only, you only need one battalion on each side. Your job is done. You don't need 11 aircraft carriers to fight Canada and Mexico. Whereas China has got to fight with Japan, Russia, India, and so on and so forth. Big difference, right? And, and in a country that is building 11 aircraft carriers, right? I think if the statistic in my book, if it's correct, is that two-thirds of American families do not have emergency cash, cash of $500 to spend. Two-thirds. This is the world's richest country. So clearly, if America did more to help its people, it did more to help the bottom 10, 20, 30%, and create a happier society. A happier America is good for the world. >> And that's what you call Machiavellian, and less intervening, less hubris, more, more looking after its own interests in that respect. >> Yes. Um, thank you for elaborating that last point. Um, wonderful speaking to you. I could have, I, I could be asking you, you know, 10, 20 other other questions. Thank you for sharing it with. We've asked Professor Paul Sheffer, public, one of our main public intellectuals, I would say, writing on, um, Europe, on the borders of Europe, on the world for decades already in the Netherlands and internationally, professor at Tilburg University, um, also being involved in a long, long study on China, India, and Brazil, looking at, um, Europe and we asked you to, to comment on the, on the books, on the book or books, and, um, on maybe what you've heard. Thank you for coming, Paul. >> Thank you very much for the invitation. It's a great honor and a real pleasure, um, to engage in this conversation. Um, if only >> Thank you for bringing all my books. >> Yeah, if, if only I just brought them just to emphasize that I've been teaching my students over the last seven years, um, with the help of your books. So, um, I've been reading them, rereading them, um, and I could say that, um, trying to understand the world with the rise of China, India, Brazil, how it affects Europe, it has been a great, um, challenge, what you write, a great source of inspiration. And, um, I would like to read to you because I think you fulfill the program of a famous British historian, Arnold Toynbee, who wrote in 1948 already the following efforts. "The paradox of our generation is that all the world has now profited by an education which the West has provided, except the West herself. The West today, 1948, is still looking at history from the old parochial, self-centered standpoint which the other living societies have been by now being compelled to transcend." And he went on to say that, "Sooner or later, the West, in her town, is bound to receive the re-education which the other civilizations have already obtained." So I think you're providing exactly this re-education by confronting, uh, Western societies, America, Europe, with the perspective, um, of other parts of the world. And, uh, I think it's basically, I think there cannot be any meaningful discussion about your basic, uh, assumption, that is to say, that the last 200 years have been, in terms of world history, an aberration. That is to say, the over-representation of a small part of the world's demography, world's population, in the world economy is historically seen an aberration, and it will come to an end. No, even if China will flounder, even if Indonesia will not become the fifth largest in by 250, >> because who knows what will be the world at that time. Still, the underlying basic shift that we are already seeing from the last 30, 40 years will, uh, continue. So I think there cannot be any meaningful contradiction when also Henry Kissinger was describing China not as an emerging power, but as a returning power. And I think that's true for India and for other, uh, countries as well. It's basically also a hopeful message you have, because the world is becoming a more equal place, with all the uncertainties perhaps that provides for Western societies having learned to look at the world in a very Eurocentric or Western-centric perspective. But it's a hopeful message because it entails the rise of so many countries and also the alienation of so many people from poverty. So I think there we basically agree. And I think what you've been writing in the 15 years about this, um, is hard to challenge. So I have four critical observations based on, um, on what I've just said. The first one is that you, um, assume that this basic shift is not being perceived in the West, that we are somehow oblivious to what is happening in the world. When I read the European integration and the history of European integration, I would say that already, um, in 1973, the Declaration of Copenhagen acknowledges the major shift that is going on in the world and says, "Europe has to speak with one voice, or it will fail." So the whole single market in the mid-'90s was just one big response to the rise of Japan. Japan is somehow absent in your recent book, not in the previous ones, but it's not very often, uh, quoted. But I can still remember very vividly that in the 1980s, the rise of Japan and the whole idea, "Japan is about to overtake the United States," was a major source of inspiration for European integration. So we cannot understand the underlying dynamic of European integration without this wider context, and simply claiming that this shift has been, uh, somehow not observed by Western elites is, I think, bordering on an overstatement. To go one step further, I think we cannot understand European integration without the context of decolonization. We have always told the narrative about Europe after the Second World War as European integration is the answer to war returning in Europe. It's basically the reflection on the horrible catastrophe of the Second World War. But European integration would have not been possible without decolonization. If France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy would have remained colonial powers, they would have never discovered each other as neighbors on the European continent. So European decolonization, the decolonization of Europe, was in a very fundamental way the precondition of European integration. So I think this whole power shift that is going on in the world was fundamental to understanding why European integration is going on for 60 years, because it's, it's not only a moral tale based on, uh, the Second World War, but it's also a tale, more Machiavellian, if you want, about how to unite to remain a relevant voice in a world that is changing beyond recognition. My second critical observation, uh, would be that while we could agree easily on economic convergence that is going on, that is to say, the relative rise of China, India, and others, the relative decline of Europe and America, the question is, and there I find more ambiguity in your writing, whether you also think there is a cultural convergence going on. Let me confront you with two brief quotes from your own work. On the one hand, you stress that there is a process of de-Westernization. You write, "The mindsets of the largest populations within Asia, the Chinese, the Muslims, and the Indians have been changed irrevocably. Where once they may have been borrowing Western cultural perspectives, now their perceptions are growing further and further apart." So here we have divergence. Then at the same time, you write, and basically that was the lesson of today as well, you say, "Asian societies are not succeeding because of a rediscovery of some hidden or forgotten strength of Asian civilizations. Instead, they are rising now because they have finally discovered the pillars of Western wisdom." And you say, "We are witnessing a convergence on a certain set of norms and on how to create better societies." So my question would be, and it's really an open question, because I think this is one of the most fundamental questions to ask about our world, >> whether beyond economic convergence, we see cultural, civilizational convergence, or is it the earlier quote that we're drifting further and further apart? To me, that seems one of the great questions of our time, because if we're really growing further and further apart, then the world is not becoming a more peaceful place. The third critical observation would be you have a, um, council to Europe saying basically, "Our strategic, first strategic question that we, uh, confront is a spillover of internal conflict." You quoted interstate, uh, conflict with Pinker, but of course, the deaths resulting from intrastate conflict are enormous. Half a million people died in the Syrian civil war. So there is a real turmoil surrounding Europe. And you rightly say, "Europe doesn't have, doesn't need a global perspective to begin with. Its first strategic priority should be what is going on in Northern Africa, the Middle East." And I would add also the forms of disintegration of some of the republics of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, you say, "American interest is elsewhere. It's China." So basically, your counsel to America and Europe are very different. You say America should disengage from this direct neighborhood of Europe, so to say, from the Middle East, from Northern Africa. It's not a strategic priority. Europe should engage more, in a peaceful way, an economic way, etc. But basically, you say there's no common interest anymore of the West. The West should fall apart. But if this is true, and if the world that is in front of us is a world that could be described as multipolar, which is basically when I go to China, is basically what people tell me, "We want a European Union that is strong as one of the poles in a multipolar world, and that is basically looking after its own neighborhood." The Americans should do that, China should do that, India should do that, Brazil should do that, South Africa should do that, etc. But if the world is really a world of China first, of India first, of Russia first, of America first, of Europe first, regional powers, basically from a perspective of self-interest, not engaging too far beyond their own reach. Isn't it also a world where nationalism would be thriving? Where Trump is indeed not an aberration that fits in a logic that is also at work in Russia. Russian nationalism is at work in China. I'm not that confident about the bottling up of Chinese nationalism, to be, um, honest. But isn't Trump in that way fitting into an overall logic of a multipolar world when he says, "We're not going to engage in Syria too much?" And are we not seeing in Syria what the world will be after the Pax Americana, which I do agree with you is obsolete, but the void will be filled, and it is filled by Turkey, by Iran, by Russia, by others, and that produces a civil war that's going on for seven years. So where is the multilateralism beyond these perspectives of regional powers looking after our own interests and being minimalist in a way, but what is the world then, uh, in that view? My last critical remark would be this, um, we have been talking about Japan for a long time in the '80s and '90s, I refer to that with a perspective of economic convergence. Now you say, "What has happened the last 30 years?" You project that into 2050. I think we should be a little bit, a little bit more humble in a way. Um, because you rightly say that who could have imagined the world as it is today 30 years ago, and I would add, who will be able to imagine now from where we are now, the world how it will be in 30 years' time? I think we should be a little bit more humble in these projections of shares of GDP to 250, because I've seen the projections about Japan in the '80s. I've seen similar projections about the Soviet Union in the 1950s. We're living, basically, the third version of a convergence theory, economically speaking. The two others failed, in a way. So, a little bit more, um, uncertainty there would be welcome. And I would say, I started my, uh, research with your books, very much with the idea of a decline of the West. And after visiting China, India, Brazil, talking to many, many people several times, I was confronted with a very self-critical analysis in those countries saying, "You haven't got the faintest idea how vulnerable we are, how much internal contradictions we are living. Don't think that the past performance gives you any guarantee about our future performance. We will stumble into unforeseen contradictions." And I can say that my reading of what's going on in China, the centralization of power that's going on in China, betrays a sense of vulnerability. It's not a, a sign of strength to accumulate so much power into one person. It's a sign, this, this overall sense of vulnerability, of weakness in the Chinese Communist Party, leading to a sense of control that is growing, growing also in the universities. People I met five years ago are now much more afraid to speak out openly than five years ago. So how do you look at those vulnerabilities in China? And the mirror of that is, I think, I concluded my research after five years with better understanding the hidden vitality of European societies in terms of their universities, in terms of their urban culture, in terms of a culture of relative equality, relative stable, uh, states, in terms of, uh, justice, not that high forms of corruption that you can see in, for example, in Brazil and some other examples. So there is a hidden strength in European societies that we shouldn't underestimate. That is why I think the love letter is sent to a good address because it will be heard. I think it has been heard already, at least in Tilburg, at the university. Thank you very much. >> Thank you. >> Thank you, Professor Trevor, for, um, observations and questions and compliments and remarks. Um, uh, four, in fact. Um, probably we start off with one or two and then >> Sure. Sure. No, I, I took notes, you know, because >> I, I thought these, these were, is it, I must say, these are excellent, uh, observations and very helpful. I'm truly grateful to you, you know, for for making them, because it's, you always learn more from, uh, criticisms, you know, uh, especially, you know, constructive criticisms like the one that you're, uh, offering. And I, I, I, I would say I agree with some of your points and, and maybe not with
others. So, um, but you're right about the the European Union project. The first point, uh, it is, I mean, it was a result of the rise of Japan, but it was also an effort, as you know, to counterbalance the United States. Also, uh, because, uh, the euro project really, >> was you didn't want to rely completely on the US dollar and so you wanted to have your own. So, and, and I, I, by the way, I should emphasize, I'm, I'm one of the greatest lovers of the European Union, you know. Uh, I actually think that the European Union has achieved what I call the ultimate pinnacle, uh, of civilizational achievement. And what is its ultimate pinnacle? Uh, and this is where I wrote a book on ASEAN last year, and in the book on ASEAN, I say that, uh, in Europe, you have zero wars. In ASEAN, you have zero wars. We don't fight each other, also. But in the European Union, you have gone to a much higher level. You have zero prospect of war, right? What happened? >> You touched your microphone. But I think it's okay. Jacket, my jacket, okay? >> I shouldn't turn so. Uh, so, um, the, in ASEAN, we don't have zero prospect of war yet. So we want to, our dream is to replicate what the European Union has achieved. And I actually think, I think a larger East Asia, let's say, if you can achieve zero prospect of war within China and Japan, within China and India, that would be a fantastic thing. So this is something that we can still continue to learn. Uh, uh, from the European Union. So that's why I also think that we need a strong, uh, uh, uh, European Union. And, um, uh, and, and therefore, I'm actually quite puzzled by the pessimism in Europe. >> Because, you know, I mean, frankly, if you look at the quality of life of the European citizens, it is far better than the quality of life of citizens anywhere, even in the United States of America. The inequality in the United States is far greater. I mean, if you ask me, what's a model society for the world? What I would like to see, let's say in Singapore, it would be something like Sweden or Denmark or, you know, uh, that, that's the kind of society that we want to replicate in the rest of the world. So what you have done is, yes, uh, it is, it is, uh, positive, uh, for the world. So please cheer up and look happy.
Uh, number two, on convergence, econom, you, you put your finger on a very critical point. And here, I would say that you have to slice when you talk convergence, you have to slice three different dimensions. On the economic side, there'll be a convergence. On the cultural side, there could be a divergence. >> But on the geopolitical side, it depends on the decisions you make. And to give you an example, example of how, uh, uh, the geopolitics can go either way. Uh, as you know, India has been very successful. India, Indian economy is doing very well. And what's interesting is that as India is doing better and better, you would assume that India would become to look more and more Western. But suddenly, for the first time in India's history, you know, most Indian prime ministers used to wear, like me, jacket and tie. Manmohan Singh used to go out in jacket and tie. But now we have a prime minister of India who doesn't want to wear the jacket and tie. He wants to wear Indian clothes. He went to Davos. Victor, you were there. He doesn't speak in English. He speaks in Hindi. That's cultural divergence. But at the same time, Modi is geopolitically the most pro-Western prime minister India has had. >> Because he's afraid of China. >> Uh, not, not just because of that. I, I think there are other reasons also. >> Uh, it's also a way of leveraging, uh, uh, Indian power. It's a, it's a shrewd calculation. >> But I mean, it doesn't mean he completely agrees with the West, because on Iran, he disagrees with your policies, for example, you know. >> Uh, American policies on Iran, he disagrees. So that's, that's, that's a cultural divergence in it. But in the case, the critical point you made is about the European Union and USA. Should you go apart or stay together? But let me give you one example. You, so far, I've only talked about North Africa. But I can tell you, Europe's long-term challenge can be captured in one demographic statistic. Okay. In 1950, Europe's population was twice that of Africa's, 400 million, 200 million. Today, Africa's population is more than twice that of Europe. By 2100, Africa's population is going to be 10 times that of Europe. So clearly, if Africa doesn't develop, then Europe is going to have a big problem. Huge. You'll have 4 billion people south of you. So what is Europe's long-term strategic interest? To develop Africa. What do you want to see in Africa? You want to see more roads, more bridges, more ports, more infrastructure. And guess who can be your partner to build infrastructure in Africa? >> China. >> China. So why don't you then work with China to develop infrastructure in Africa that retains Africans in in Africa and exports less Africans outside? But then, if you do that, the United States will say, "Excuse me a second. Whose side are you on?" So that's why, that's, that's the question. Who side are you on? Are you on your own side? Are you going to protect your long-term geopolitical interest in Africa, or are you then going to become subservient to America and say, "No, no, I'll join you in isolating China. It doesn't matter if I suffer." That's what I mean about calculating your own interest. And it doesn't have to be, and this is a very critical point I make also in the book, it doesn't have to be a zero-sum game, because America's growth, sorry, China's growth can also be good for America. In fact, one of the, when I had lunch with Henry Kissinger a few weeks ago, don't, don't quote this, please. I, I think he, I think he said this publicly, but I'm not absolutely sure. >> I will write it down immediately. >> Yeah. No, but you know, I tell you, he said, you know, as you know, when, when China is a fact, China, when China created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Obama administration opposed it. He made phone calls everywhere saying, don't join. I'm sure Den got a phone call, don't join. >> But Henry Kissinger said that was a mistake. United States should have joined the AIB. And I agree with him. >> Because an America, an EIB with an America inside would have much higher standards of good governance. So it is not a zero-sum game. So you therefore, you've got to do these calculations in a much more sophisticated and nuanced way than has been done. But as you know, that's not the case often in, in, in European policy. Then, if you want a very quick oneliner on your last point about projections, you're absolutely right. The projections can go completely wrong. China can collapse in the next 10 years and China can become like Japan. But let me emphasize one very critical point here. Okay. Everybody keeps saying, you look at Japan didn't make it. So China may also not make it. But Japan's population is what? 130 million. China's population is 1.3 billion. 10 times larger. All that the Chinese have to do is achieve 25% of the per capita income of Americans, then China will have a bigger economy. And if you assume the Chinese are one quarter as smart or one half as smart as the average American, they'll also succeed. And, but let me just add one very important point about China. China has its own cycles of going up and down. And when the down cycle comes, they go down for one or 200 years. You can go back and check. But when the up cycle comes, they're up for 300 years. So the Chinese cycle, >> so what you have seen so far, in my view, is the beginning 40 years of a 300-year upcycle. >> I'll, I won't be around to uh >> to take that serious. >> You won't be around either.
>> But perhaps one, there is of course so many things to say now, but, um, let me ask you one thing. You're describing the relative decline of the West, which is in itself something that is basically the outcome of a much larger rise of others. So that is, um, I think beyond dispute. But you somehow seem to have still great expectations about Western responses to this change affecting the world. For example, you're right. When the West wouldn't have humiliated Russia, Putin would not have happened. >> M. >> I think Putin was first of all a reaction to the disintegration >> of the Soviet Union and the the ruinous governance >> in the Yeltsin period. If you looked at Petersburg at that time, there was mafia all over the place. So first of all, it was an internal dynamic in Russia that produced perhaps, uh, a majority wanting strong leadership. Not so much, and it didn't, I mean, the answers were to be criticized. I do agree there was a too hasty, um, expansion of NATO, etc. But to saying that that was the determining factor >> for Putin's rise, I think it's overestimating our role. The same is true for Africa. That is of course that should be some worry if we could be the decisive factor. We can certainly contribute, but if I look at Egypt, the population of Egypt now, half of it is under 24, better educated than ever, with less prospects than ever. We can help to build infrastructure, contribute to universities, etc. But the turmoil in Egypt, first of all, starting with its demography. Secondly, was the effects of climate change on this very vulnerable delta and its people living there. The religious strife, the authoritarian solutions, etc. The West can help, but I doubt whether it can really make a difference, the difference in Egypt. In the end, it should be Egypt itself, Egyptian civil society, its leadership, etc., coming up with solutions. And that is, you have in many ways, you have still great expectations >> about the Western possibilities where I would say the lesson of this relative decline is indeed less interference, more reliance upon civil society elites in those societies. But this is a long, long work in progress, perhaps. I hope it's in progress, but it's a long-term perspective. And the short-term outcome of turmoil that surrounds us is of course migration, our refugee movements that Europe has to come to, uh, an understanding with, you know, has to accommodate to some extent, to confront in a way. But, um, so aren't you somewhat over optimistic about the role of the West still? >> Well, I, I wouldn't say I'm over optimistic, but I, but I do think there's one thing you, you have to be aware of. At the end of the day, the European Union is still the, if you combine European Union, either the largest or second largest economic >> power in the world, is, you know, it varies within US and EU. >> Um, and so, given your size, your economic decisions have ripple effects. So I give you an example, which I mentioned in my essay, 25 years ago, in with the West and the Rest, you had a common agricultural policy. >> And as a result, the common agricultural policy, you subsidized your agricultural products, and given your size, some of the products went to Africa and undermined African agriculture. When you undermine African agriculture, you create unemployed African farmers. Then the unemployed African farmers start walking north. So is it wiser for you to not subsidize your agriculture, or, or at least make sure that whatever you do inside Europe doesn't create unemployment in Africa, because you will suffer the consequences? And as you know, the Africans protested. >> But the Africans were weak, you were strong, you ignored their protests. That's why it's very unwise. So think in, in a, I must see, we live in a small interdependent global village. Given the size of the European Union, your internal decisions have external consequences. So think about the external consequences of your internal actions, and then ask yourself, will this have a positive long-term impact on my security? >> Or a negative long-term impact on my security? That's all I say. >> Yeah.
>> No, I mean, we could agree upon that easily. No, no, but, um, I doubt, and that still is my main worry. If I look at, um, Northern Africa now, or the Middle East, who's going to make the critical difference? And are these societies, I mean, the Arab Spring, to give that example, was of course a sign that all those who thought there was not a democratic ambition in the Arab world were proven that wrong. >> There is a democratic ambition. There is an ambition of civil society in those countries. Absolutely. The question is, why doesn't it lead to more stable solutions and outcomes produced by these societies? How do you read that turmoil? >> Apart from Western intervention? Because that is of course >> part of your explanation, but not the explanation overall. >> Yeah. If you don't mind, I'm going to say something very politically incorrect. Okay. >> Incorrect. Okay. Uh, because, you know, sometimes you got to say things that, you know, should not be said in in polite conversation, but have to be said if you want to understand the world. And I've actually told this to my Arab friends, okay? I said, the biggest psychological mistake that the Arabs have done is to keep thinking that their future lies in t in copying or replicating the European experience. Actually, if they try to learn from Europe, they will fail. But if they try to learn from Asia, they will succeed. But unfortunately, the Arabs, for some strange reason, have become colonized mentally much more deeply, you know. And I know, we, I was personally colonized as a child. As a child growing up in a British colony, I thought I, as an Asian and an Indian, was psychologically inferior to the British. You know, the British were upper class, and I was underclass. In my lifetime, I've seen the psychological confidence of Asians go up to be on par with Europeans. And now, quite dangerously, many Asians think they're superior. And I'm not exaggerating, by the way. So you can imagine the psychological revolution. So today, the, you know, you, you tell an Asian right to match the top brains in Harvard or or Caltech, they can do it. In fact, if you look at the, when, when you have a race-blind admissions policy in any leading educational institution, the Asians will come in. So this has given the Asians incredible amount of psychological confidence. You have the same policy. The Arabs go down. Why? Because they haven't learned from Asia that you've got to learn to take care of yourself and succeed. Don't look anywhere else. And that's why I told you, I told you my one of my first suggestions, send the Tunisians, send the Algerians, send the Moroccans, send the Egyptians to Asia. But they themselves, the Arabs don't understand this. And I can tell you, the Gulf, in the Gulf countries, one big problem in, let's say, if you go to, let's say, if you go to Dubai. >> Mhm. >> The only South Asians they encounter are the ones doing the construction work, the cleaning work, and they think, we Arabs are here. South Asians are here. Excuse me. The South Asians are running Microsoft. The South Asians are running Google. The South Asians are running PepsiCo. The South Asians are the dean of the Harvard Business School. Where are you Arabs? So you need a big change.
>> And what is the answer then when you? >> Oh, the answer then is they, they, the Arabs need a fundamental psychological revolution. I've been through that psychological revolution. >> They haven't. And so for them, that's, that's why I see, I'm, uh, uh, until the Arabs come to the realization that they have to learn from Asia, they won't change. >> So they might not change. >> Well, you never know. >> Or they might. >> But I mean, no one, no one predicted, by the way, how fast China and India will grow. >> That's right. >> Amazing. >> Absolutely. Yeah. Thank you very much, both for exchanging, uh, uh, ideas and taking notes from each other. Um, which is always a wonderful thing to say. Actually, one of the nicest things I think of both of you, um, that you take textbooks and ideas so very seriously. And I think we cannot stress that enough, how serious they are. Like just making a big compliment in a way to Fukuyama that he, that he, in a way, poisoned the Western mind or brain-damaged it. That's, that's a very nice way of taking texts and intellectuals very seriously. We've been trying to do this this afternoon as well. There might be somebody who like to ask or add or say or comment something to what's been said or ask a question to one of the professors, uh, around. Yes, please. Um, if I look at the aggression from China in the South China Sea, um, don't you think that you're, uh, picturing a very optimistic picture of, uh, making an optimistic picture of China? >> Yeah. Because they're pretty aggressive against the other countries. >> Uh, you're, you're absolutely right. China is not a perfect country. Uh, now, is China an angelic country? China is a normal country, and all normal countries, when they become powerful, become more assertive. So China has become far more assertive. But I wrote a column for the Financial Times saying there's a big difference between two English words, assertive, aggressive. China has become assertive, but it hasn't become aggressive. You know, in the South China Sea, that they don't, they're not islands, they're reefs and rocks. Okay? There are 30 or 40 of them. You know, uh, Philippines has nine or 10, Malaysia has got eight, Vietnam's got 12, China has got eight, and whatever, right? If China wants to, tomorrow, within 24 hours, you can sweep all of them, there's nothing that Vietnam or Malaysia can do. But take bets with you. China won't do it.
>> But, but, if you visit India, for example, and I've been talking to some people in the Indian army, for example, they are really obsessed with China's rise. >> And they are definitely of the conviction >> that the chance that it will remain peaceful >> from an Indian perspective, and of course, there has been a war between China and India in '62. >> They are mobilizing now in the border areas because they're not confident that China's assertions >> will not spill over into something less benign. >> Yeah. >> How do you see that? >> Let me, let me just finish South China Sea and then, uh, because there are two different dynamics here. Uh, on on the South China Sea. Uh, if you notice, by the way, that recently South China Sea has not appeared in the newspapers. Recently, there was a, there was a spade in which the Chinese became more assertive, and then I wrote several articles pointing out the mistakes that China had made in the South China Sea. And to my absolute surprise, I was invited to Beijing to talk about mistakes that China had made in South China Sea. And I always say, I've never been invited to America to talk about mistakes that America has made in its foreign policy. So Chinese have a capacity to learn. But there's no doubt that when China becomes a great power, the greater it becomes, the more assertive it will become. That you got to take for granted. All great powers are like that. The only question is, how do you try to maintain some checks on them? Now, India is a completely different issue, and you're absolutely right. I was in India in January this year, two months ago, to launch my ASEAN Indian edition of my ASEAN book. >> And, um, I was shocked, uh, by the level of paranoia about China. You captured it very well. It's there, uh, and I think it's, uh, it's a bit unhealthy, and it's quite dangerous because it's actually very bad for, uh, Asia. The two largest economic powers start squabbling with each other so early on, uh, in their development. Uh, but at the same time, uh, again, I can take a bet with any of you, let's say 12 months, we know cannot make longer, there'll be no war within China and India the next 12 months. I can take a bet with you, no problem. Because the, you know, that that border, no shots have been fired for over 50 years now. That's amazing. That's one of the most difficult and tense borders. >> There have been territorial incursions? >> No, no, there have. Yes. Yes. All there are all kinds of incidents. Exactly. But they've learned to manage it. >> And I can tell you that if you talk to the really thoughtful Indian strategic planners, they know that it would be an absolute mistake for India to be caught in a negative dynamic with China. And, and I was one article where I wrote is that I said, the next, the next great power triangle will be within China, India, and America. And the best place for India to be is in the middle, between China and America. So then you have the leverage to play, just as America uses middle position between Soviet Union and China, India can do the same also. So that, that is something that some of the Indian strategic planners, uh, are moving towards. But I also want to add that what's unusual about the China-India relationship today is that on the one hand, there is greater paranoia at the border, but the relations between Xi Jinping and Modi are very good. That was Kosaw Mababani speaking at the Bali Cultural Center in Amsterdam in April 2018 on the occasion of the Dutch launch of his book. Has the West Lost It? The original video runs close to two hours. What you just watched covers the section from his main lecture through the full audience Q&A, roughly from the point where he outlines the three strategic mistakes made by the West all the way to the final questions on the South China Sea. Let me give a brief recap and then share a few thoughts. Mababani's central argument is that the West, drunk on the triumphalism that followed the end of the Cold War, made three catastrophic strategic errors. The first was the invasion of Iraq, a war of choice that shattered Western credibility and drained enormous resources with nothing to show for it. The second was the expansion of NATO, a move that needlessly provoked Russia and destroyed any chance of building a cooperative post-Cold War order in Europe. The third was what he calls the most consequential, the failure to integrate the Islamic world. Instead of bringing Muslim majority societies into the global order, the West alienated them, creating a generation of conflict. While the West was busy making these mistakes, Asia was quietly rising. China, India, and much of East Asia lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, adopting the tools of Western modernity while keeping their own cultural foundations intact. Mababani's prescription is clear. The West needs to step back from the assumption that it has a monopoly on wisdom. It needs to engage China as a partner rather than a threat. And above all, it needs to stop treating the rest of the world as a problem to be managed. The Q&A that followed was genuinely interesting. Dutch professor Paul Schaffer pushed back hard, questioning whether Mababani's predictions about China's rise were reliable, pointing out that similar predictions had been made about Japan in the 1980s and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and both turned out to be wrong. Mababani defended his position with a simple but powerful observation. China has 1.3 billion people, and it only needs to reach a fraction of Western income levels to become the world's largest economy. The math is not complicated. An audience member challenged him directly on the South China Sea, accusing China of aggressive behavior. Mababani's response was characteristically sharp. If China truly wanted to seize those reefs and shoals, it could do so within 24 hours. The fact that it hasn't is evidence of restraint, not aggression. Mababani also made one remark he himself described as politically incorrect, that Arab societies would be better served by looking to Asia rather than Europe as a model for development. The psychological confidence that drove Asia's rise, he argued, is precisely what the Arab world needs. This lecture was delivered in 2018. We are now in 2026. Looking back, Mababani's record holds up remarkably well. His warning that provoking China would lead to a troubled world has aged into something that looks less like analysis and more like prophecy. The world today, with its fracturing trade order, its escalating conflicts, its collapsing multilateral institutions, is in many ways the world he warned about. His criticism of the Iraq War and NATO expansion has, if anything, become more widely accepted over time, not less. And his argument that Asia's rise was not a temporary blip, but a structural shift in the global balance of power has proven correct. Where Mababani was less accurate, however, was in his expectations of Europe. He placed enormous hope in the European Union. He called it the greatest achievement of multilateralism in human history. He argued that Europe had both the interest and the capacity to act as an independent force between the United States and China and to play a constructive role in shaping a more cooperative global order. That hope was not borne out. In the years that followed, Europe largely followed Washington's lead on China policy. It redescribed China from a partner to a systemic rival. It fell in line with American pressure on technology exports. It expanded NATO rather than questioning it. And when Russia invaded Ukraine, it chose escalation over negotiation. The result was that Europe found itself increasingly trapped, dependent on American security guarantees it could not afford to lose, and estranged from an economic relationship with China it could not afford to abandon. The irony is not subtle. Europe, which presents itself as the guardian of multilateralism and the rules-based international order, spent much of the past 8 years helping to dismantle both. Professor Sheffer, sitting on that stage in Amsterdam, challenged Mababani's optimism about China's rise. He suggested that concentrated power was a sign of fragility, not strength. Eight years on, the question worth asking is who has shown more fragility, the country Sheffer was skeptical about or the continent he was defending. Mababani said in 2018, "If you work with China to build a cooperative order, the world will be stable. If you provoke China, the world will be troubled." The West chose the second path. The world we live in today is the.