Transcription
George, welcome back to the course on US China relations. We've really enjoyed your observations in the first 3 weeks of this course, and we have just now completed 4 weeks of the course.
And in this week, we've discussed how other countries view the US China contest. And also, we tried to conclude by asking what can be done to to minimize or mitigate the damage that this contest can do. So, I'm going to begin by talking about how India perceives this contest and India's role, uh, in this contest. And and and I know that you were personally involved in the Nalanda project initiated by Amartya Sen. Sadly, it's just lost its way. And at the same time, Sino-Indian relations have nosedived since the border incident of June 2020. Do you expect Sino-Indian relations to get better or worse in the coming decades? And if you had to give an if you had an opportunity to advise Chinese Indian leaders how to improve their relations, what advice would you give to them?
>> [snorts] >> I don't see relations between India and China getting too bad because, um, what is at issue? The issue, the boundaries. Maybe Pakistan. Um, is it in China's interest to humiliate India or to weaken India? I don't think so. But China doesn't want India to be carrying water for other powers. Um, if it's just the border region, I think they can negotiate. It'll take many years. But these are very difficult terrain, not hospitable, not even inhabitable. So, and China's been able to settle its border everywhere else. So, I'm quite sure it can be settled within India. So, there's no necessary conflict at all between India and China the way we see some inevitable conflict between China and the US. And each regards the other as an ancient people. You can almost sense that each bows before the other. You notice that when Xi Jinping meets Modi or Manmohan Singh is Confucianist courtesy. There's no backslapping, hugging. It's very, very controlled. Almost a doffing of the head. Each knows that the other is an ancient people and not to be messed around with. Neither seeks to make the other what it is.
>> But at the same time, you know, especially after June 2020, I've actually appeared on several Indian TV programs and been heavily criticized for trying to suggest that India moderate its policies towards China. There's a very strong anti-China sentiment building up and followed by India getting closer to the United States, especially through joining the Quad. US, Japan, Australia, and India. How, how do you see you see the any danger that the Indians might move much closer to the United States to counterbalance China?
Well, the Americans will of course want to um use the Indians against China. But I think it's much more likely that India will use America against >> China. >> Against China for its own purposes. And if you look beyond the Quad to the deep relationships of military equipment, the Indians will never give up Russian equipment. And they're taking the delivery of the S-400.
>> So, they will not rely on the US. >> Oh, they would they would not. They have their own interests. >> And they and they know that US change in US administration policies can change dramatically. Uh, US attitude towards Pakistan has flip-flop. >> Mhm. >> And for India, Pakistan is is a constant concern. >> Mhm. >> So, I don't see relations getting >> Mhm. >> exuberant, genie-heenie, bye-bye. >> Mhm. >> But at the same time, I don't see them uh going to full-scale war. There could be border skirmishes, but but not beyond that.
>> But the other equally important relationship within China's neighbors, of course, within China and Japan, and you discussed it in the early weeks of this course. Uh, what advice would you give today to Chinese and Japanese leaders on how to manage their relations going forward in the 21st century?
>> Well, one must naturally expect that the Japanese people want to be a normal people. >> Mhm. >> They they want to do the things which other nations in the world are able to do. >> Mhm. >> The constitution that they have was imposed upon them by the Americans. >> Mhm. >> Uh, they have to accept it. Uh, they need the US nuclear umbrella. >> Mhm. >> Uh, so, so there's a set of them which knows that without the US, their position is shaken to its foundations. >> Mhm. >> But at the same time, it leads to a certain subjection >> Mhm. >> of their self-esteem by the Americans. >> Mhm. >> And sometimes when you watch the way Americans treat the Japanese, uh, it is painful. >> Mhm. >> Uh, I watched the way Abe, despite American insults, >> Mhm. >> wanting a close relationship with Trump, which he finally succeeded in doing. >> Mhm. >> I thought very few countries in the world >> Mhm. >> would be prepared to go that far to achieve a national objective. >> Mhm. But Abe is a nationalist. And there is a slow movement in Japan not to be too close to the Americans and to become a more normal country. So the attitude towards China is changing, but it's millimeter by millimeter. It will take time.
>> Changing in what direction? In how, how is it evolving within Japan?
>> In a greater balance. You do not find the Japanese now automatically taking the position of the Americans or the Western powers. They're they're more calibrated now. And Japanese corporate Japan knows that it's got vast interests in China. They could see the trends. For many years they thought that China would implode. And they were waiting for it year by year. It didn't happen. I think many now accept that China would become much bigger and become much more important to Japan. And the transformation of the tourism industry before COVID was dramatic. How even in many of the onsen the major market was Japanese was Chinese tourists.
>> So, you are a bit more optimistic about China-Japan relations then?
>> Well, China will in a sense facilitate it. Um, on the war on war wartime memories, so long as the Japanese don't go too far, they accept it. And their approach is, "Well, you may forget, I will not forget." So they've been building museums to the anti-Japanese war resistance all over China. So China will not forget.
>> Let's turning now to ASEAN, a region that you know very well and you played a very critical role in the formation and development of ASEAN in your many years as the Minister of Trade Industry and as the Foreign Minister. How do you think ASEAN will be impacted, number one, by this growing US-China rivalry? How can China, how can ASEAN protect its own interests, and can ASEAN play a helpful role? I mean, what would your advice be for ASEAN, a region that you know so well?
>> Well, ASEAN has been a remarkable success. I mean, it's kept the peace in the region for a long time. >> Yes. >> It's pretty good at balancing the major powers. And it is Singapore's first circle of foreign policy. With ASEAN, we can do much more. Without ASEAN, we are frequently exposed to the cold winds of big power politics. Of course, ASEAN is um is a motley bunch. I mean, we are we we are very diverse. We have a lot of internal problems. We are never fully integrated. Uh, I would say we are a loosely held together jazz band rather than an orchestra. >> [laughter] >> And sometimes there musical instruments which echo China's views and sometimes we echo the American views. So, it's it is not cacophony. >> Mhm. >> It hangs together. >> Mhm. >> And we have made ourselves very important, almost indispensable, to all the major powers. I was told by Singapore negotiators >> Mhm. >> that on the negotiation for RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, >> Mhm. >> China was insistent that ASEAN take the lead. >> Mhm. >> Because if China were to take the lead, the others would bristle. >> Mhm. >> ASEAN take the lead. No, they they like to patronize us. >> Mhm. >> But they say uh ASEAN is in the lead. >> Mhm. >> Uh ASEAN is uh ASEAN centrality. >> Mhm. >> ASEAN in the driver's seat. >> Mhm. >> Sometimes we ourselves can't believe the complimentary receive. >> Mhm. >> Why? Why us? Because they don't trust the others. >> Mhm. >> So better better us with thick lenses and poor psychomotor skills driving the car slowly and erratically than [snorts] somebody else will drive in a different direction >> Mhm. >> from the destination that they want. >> Yeah. >> So we have been able to play our weakness >> Mhm. >> and turn it into a profound strength. >> Mhm. >> And but there's a historical basis for this. >> Mhm. >> Because we are Tanah di bawah angin. >> Mhm. >> The winds in different parts of the year brought different influences. >> Mhm. >> Genetics, >> Mhm. >> culture, and we're a mixture. We're open. >> Mhm. >> We don't have an overly inflated view of ourselves. Not even Indonesia. >> Mhm.
Yeah, but the interesting thing is the uh Chinese are able to understand that despite us ASEAN's weakness, it actually has the capacity to to provide a platform that others trust. I'm surprised that the United States, which has access to much more information, has many more strategic think tanks, doesn't understand that ASEAN can actually be a huge asset for American policy initiation. As you know, American leaders consistently miss attending ASEAN meetings. So how, how do you explain to the American officials whom you know well that actually they should give greater uh emphasis to ASEAN in their policies. What would you say to the Americans?
>> No, I'm not surprised that this is American approach. >> Mhm. >> Uh, they don't have a deep history of connection to the region. Uh, they themselves are young nation. And for them the approach is a practical one. >> Mhm. >> I remember once meeting a US cabinet secretary in Singapore. >> Mhm. >> He was on his way to Azerbaijan because Azerbaijan is important uh for the US. But even as he told me that he was visiting Azerbaijan, >> Mhm. >> he sneered at the country. >> Yeah. >> Uh, that you know, it's like what kind of a country is this? And and I was shocked. >> Mhm. >> I said, I've no doubts when he visited Azerbaijan that he would be full of civility >> Mhm. >> and kind words. >> Mhm. >> Then I thought to myself, if this is his approach to Azerbaijan, >> Mhm. >> is this also his approach to Singapore? >> Yes. >> That in front of us there's civility and great respect, but behind us they sneer. >> Yeah. >> Now, I'm not saying the Chinese don't sneer. >> Yeah. >> But the Chinese have the advantage of record keeping over centuries. >> Mhm. >> So, when they look at Malacca, they knew how Malacca presented the tributes to China to their own people in the Sejarah Melayu. >> Mhm. >> When they deal with India, they go back to the monks who brought Buddhism to China. >> Mhm. >> So, when we deal with China, it's with historical memory. See Tommy Koh, my ambassador in Geneva, years ago in early '90s. >> Yeah. >> He said, "I don't understand, Minister. >> Mhm. >> Why is it when ASEAN ambassadors meet the Chinese ambassador >> Mhm. >> in Geneva, we're also respectful. >> Mhm. >> But when we deal with Americans or the Europeans or Japanese, no, we give them whatever they give us." >> [laughter] >> I told Ambassador Tommy Koh, I said, "Well, it's history. >> Mhm. >> You don't like to make China an enemy. It has consequences. >> Yes. >> And sometimes it's better to have China at a certain distance because if it's too close, >> Mhm. >> it can also be uncomfortable. >> Mhm.
Well, I mean, I'm really glad that you said that of ASEAN, but this course is also not just about the past and present, but also over the future. How, how can China help United States on these domestic issues?
>> Not creating new problems for the Americans, unless the impact on China's core interest. Taiwan, for instance, can lead to war. The Trump administration played with Taiwan as if it was just another card on the table. And the Chinese kept on signaling that no, this will lead to war. And they have an Iranian option. If you really move on Taiwan, we'll move on Iran.
>> How, how could they move in Iran? What could they do?
>> Well, since the Chinese will never say it, of course, but since the '90s I've always observed that the the Chinese approach to Iran was have been linked to the American approach to Taiwan. I think the Americans know that there's this linkage. Not the Trump administration, but I think the Biden administration will understand this. So, on Taiwan, it is not wise to play. On North Korea, China's help is very important. And China, to a certain extent, shares the same objectives. On the South China Sea, it's very important that we, Southeast Asia and China, sign the code of conduct and find a way to compromise on the exploitation of fishery resources and hydrocarbons. Uh, territorial claims, no one can unilaterally give up because it is not possible, so just set that aside. The Americans will try to build in the South China Sea. It depends on us in ASEAN whether we allow the problems in the South China Sea to get out of control and how we deal with China. American interest is good for us. Strengthens our hand. Beyond a point, it's not us making use of Americans, but Americans making use of us. And that's not to our interest.
>> Yes. And of course, at the same time, on climate, as you know, China has amazingly announced a zero carbon future by 2060. Do you see that as another another possible area of major convergence between US and China?
>> They work together, but every country on climate acts in its own self-interest. China finds that it is it is its own self-interest uh to phase out the internal combustion engine and to phase out uh the use of coal. Uh, at the same time, they're achieving uh uh very high positions in alternative energy. And their companies are are becoming uh very big, very important. They've got very advanced technologies. That in turn worries the West. Yeah.
>> [snorts] >> Actually, on this issue uh of clean energy and all, one of the things that really surprised me about China is their rather, I must say, amazingly inspiring goal of creating an ecological civilization. So, maybe that's a good note to add on what end on what, what's your sense about the Chinese goals when they announce this ecological civilization that China would become?
>> I've been involved in this from quite early when they established uh an annual conference in Guiyang called the, in Chinese, the Shengtaiwenming Guiyang Guoji Luntan. Translated into >> English. >> uh the annual forum for ecological civilization in Guiyang. >> Mhm. Uh, it in China, when you see a forum, it means thousands of people. >> Mhm. >> [laughter] >> There are trade shows and seminars. And I'm a member of the advisory council. >> Mhm. >> Uh, which is chaired by my old friend, the former state councilor for foreign affairs, Dai Bingguo. >> Mhm. >> And the director general who used to be the mayor of Suzhou when we started the Suzhou project, Jan Xingsheng. >> Mhm. >> he's very active. And we are in regular communications with each other. They are very serious. They they even um pull in the Vatican. >> Mhm. >> Because the Pope in his encyclical Laudato Si >> Mhm. >> uh the words of Francis of Assisi >> Mhm. >> praise be creation. >> Mhm. >> Uh uh in church teaching on integral ecology >> Mhm. >> and Chinese philosophy of ecological civilization >> Mhm. >> there is huge overlap. >> Mhm. >> That human beings are part of nature and almost custodians of creation. >> Mhm. >> And have that responsibility. So I think it's wonderful. It could It may well be a platform where all of us can find common cause. >> Mhm. >> Not just in a practical way but in terms of our higher moral aspirations. >> Mhm.
Well, that's a perfect note on which to end our discussions over these four weeks because given this all the doom and gloom that surrounds the US-China relationship, I'm glad that we are able to uh inject one possible note of optimism in the future of US-China relations. And we thank you very much, George, for your tremendous contributions to this cause. Thank you.
>> Thank you, Kishore. I think the future is full of exciting possibilities and in some ways full of hope. >> Thank you. >> Thank you. >> 大家好 我是 主播 周玉清 [music] 很多 的 朋友 告诉 我们 原版 的 太阳 星 全效 可菲尔 益生 菌 它 添加 有 羽衣甘蓝 健康 [music] 再 加分 feel, feel >> [music] [music] [music]