Transcription
Quiet today on the news. It's like I'm not used to it being this calm. It's very rare.
Yeah, we're used to the crisis by crisis by crisis.
Yeah, it's just become the new norm and that's concerning. But um, this is the first time me and you speak on this war and I think the first time we speak since the war in Gaza. So I'd love to kind of get your general stance on where we are today. There's just so much going on. Um, obviously focusing on Iran and how the region is going to look like, what's going to happen there next, what's happening with the negotiations, but just starting broadly, what do you think of the war now that we are here that he's walked, seems to be walking away, seems to be trying to reign in Israel. Would love to get your general thoughts.
We're in an interesting place. Uh, uh, what what I can say is I, I, I, I don't know in terms of this, these negotiations, thisou, this stage of the negotiations. As we know, the memorandum of understanding is just an agreement to, uh, that both parties will agree to begin negotiations. Uh, it's not even a solid framework. It's a pre-framework or just kind of a memorou. So, uh, there's a lot of ways that this could fail along the process. You're talking about a 24-month, uh, process. So obviously, it, it's in Israel's interest. They have publicly stated, many top officials, that they will, uh, do anything to undermine this process, which they see is fundamentally against their own interest. They have supporters in Washington saying the same thing, basically. Uh, so, you know, that, that plus the erraticism of, of the Trump administration and the really poor record, quite frankly, in actually doing any of these deals or taking the ball over the, uh, the finish line, uh, which is what Donald Trump campaigned on. That's the disappointment of a lot of American voters is he, uh, he hasn't really come through with the goods. There's a lot of reasons for that. One of them is they don't have any actually seasoned diplomats. There's no real diplomats. The advisers are quite frankly shocking. If you look at some of the faux pas by the president, normally in the US, we would have advisers around the president that would prevent him, uh, prevent the president from saying things out of turn or making state ridiculous statements or getting involved in, you know, painting reflecting polls. The these are things you'd want to keep the president away from. And it doesn't seem to be there with this administration. I think everyone's afraid to say no to the president. That's a big problem. And you can see that's going to spill into this, uh, high-level international negotiation.
So besides all of the potential problems and of course, we can talk about the pitfalls of those. Um, in terms of the geopolitics, uh, the reality is this. There's the, what we've witnessed, I think, is historic, especially over the last couple of weeks, is a fundamental shift in power, uh, in the region, uh, in the distribution of power, uh, and also in what I would call the status of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I think has moved up to a higher tier in terms of, uh, you know, global powers in a sense that they've done something, Mario, by including Lebanon in the package and enforcing that, you know, only super look, uh, to to be a normative power. You know, these are the top countries, China, United States, Russia. They, they can draw a moral red line. So they can say, please don't do that, otherwise we're going to intervene. And that's called the status of the normative power in international relations. But to be a superpower, you need to back that up with hard power. And what has Iran done? Exactly that. They, they've backed it up with a credible deterrence and hard power. So therefore, they've, they've established themselves, I believe, as the, uh, superpower of the region, and they've changed the, uh, order, uh, if you will, of, uh, accession to the top of the region. Before, I would, I would probably put Israel and Saudi Arabia at the top with Turkey on the periphery. But this is different now. And, and Iran has, has stood up to the world's number one military. Arguably, I don't think there's any argument, the United States is the most credible military power in the world, political and economic power. They've stood toe-to-toe with them. The Israelis are also regionally very powerful military, if not the best, uh, in the region. Both of them have have pounded Iran. And Iran, not only still standing, that they've managed to gain leverage to the point where Israel and the US are now having problems. They've created tension, and that's, that's Iran's doing by, by, by firing those missiles into northern, uh, Israel that started, uh, that prompted this, uh, you know, emergency negotiations. I would call it de-escalation. I, I think its proper name is de-escalation. Uh, that, that's, that's Iran's doing. And, you know, that's, that's a game-changer. That's a game-changer. The, who would think that the Iranians could set the US and Israel at each other's throats over this? That's because they included Lebanon, because Iran is, is doing what Egypt can't do, what Jordan can't do, what Turkey's afraid to do, which is to put their money where their mouth is when it comes to, uh, de-escalation in the region and coming, coming to some kind of a regional negotiated settlement. Maybe it's a long way away, but the, you're seeing the initial steps of it now. That's not to say the war is over, and, and that's not to say that fighting could, uh, begin or hostilities could begin again. Donald Trump's threats over the last 24 hours. This is just a perfect example of how, how unstable and volatile this US administration potentially is. But I think there are forces now moving into position that might somehow contain some of this, uh, erraticism by the Trump administration and really contain Israel. At the end of the day, I don't think this is going to be decided by negotiations or any deal anytime soon. But I, I do say that it will be a force majeure on the part of Iran, and they will impose a force majeure on the region whereby everybody has to recalculate their positions and move forward somehow, somehow, in some, the best possible fashion between the Gulf Arab states, uh, between, uh, uh, Lebanon, Israel, and the US is really a periphery actor in this, more and more so going forward. Because Mario, the US has lost its military footprint in the Persian Gulf. It's, it's very much inoperable, a lot of the bases, and that means the US have a much weaker position. That, that, that idea that the US could just threaten somebody just to threaten aggression would be enough for most countries to go, whoa, whoa. No, you can't do that with Iran because they, they've already threatened them, and they've already taken the beating, and they're, they're now dictating terms. So, I mean, Trump signed a surrender document in Versailles. I mean, the, the optics of that, uh, vis-à-vis Germany in World War I, is like, I think Macron was smiling during that whole thing. I, I think the Europeans got one over on Trump. He had his advisers had no idea what they, they were stepping into that scene. Uh, that's going to haunt the White House for a long time. It's, it's embarrassing for America that Trump did that in Versailles. And I can't believe any of his advisers didn't pick that up because we learned that when we were in like junior high school history, that Germany signed a humiliating surrender in Versailles after World War I. But, um, it's, it's, I think it's a very, I think we're seeing the beginnings of some serious change in the region, and it's happened very, relatively quickly. Relatively quickly.
Yeah, you've said a lot of the, yeah, I agree with so much of what you've said. Especially the last part. It is happening so fast. Actually, wasn't, who was it today? Joe Kent. I was like, man, like it's just all moving so fast because I remember me and Joe were talking, um, the first episode we did together, weeks and weeks ago, we're like, we were both advocating for Trump to just walk away and just let the rest of the world clean up the mess, and that's the best thing he could do. And then we were both thinking, like, imagine, you know, Trump has an opportunity right now to use this as a catalyst to take a U-turn on American-Israeli relations, to kind of change the entire way the US has dealt with, with Israel, given it that that level of, uh, um, that kind of that level of unconditional support, impunity over many, many decades. And Trump has a chance right now to turn this around because they've, they've, they've pushed it too far, you know, dragging the US into a war with Iran, causing havoc across the entire Gulf, American allies. Um, so that was what me and Joe Kent were kind of being hopeful about weeks and weeks ago. And to see that happen, but also to see it happen so quickly. There was a report that came out today in Israeli, uh, Channel 13. Essentially, Trump is increasingly restraining Israeli military actions across all fronts, not just Lebanon. We saw the reports in the last few days, including the ceasefire. Trump forced Netanyahu into the ceasefire. And reports yesterday that Israel may pull out of some Lebanese territory. That is just wild. The fact that Israel is pulling out despite because Iran wants them to and despite it being so politically damaging for Netanyahu, just shows the position they're in. Um, and it's just now it's happening also across other fronts. Apparently, the Israelis were planning an operation inside Gaza to disarm Hamas. Um, and Trump stopped, halted that operation. That's from a week ago. I saw the report, but they're talking about it again. Um, so it's, it's crazy. It's really, it's really, it's not something I would have expected. And I'm usually a very optimistic person. And the, the region is changing in so many different ways that you've explained really well.
But in in terms of those two flashpoints, Gaza and Lebanon, I think I, I would be very cautious. I think, um, you know, uh, premature, uh, to say that they've, you know, that Trump's imposed, uh, even a ceasefire in those, because, uh, people are still being killed, uh, over the last week in Gaza and in Lebanon. If you noticed, Mario, in the previous, uh, ceasefire phase, uh, Israel basically pivoted from air strikes and artillery and and so forth into basically planting explosives in, you know, many, many, uh, infrastructure in South Lebanon, homes, and then they, their excuse was, well, we haven't violated the ceasefire, but, you know, we have destroyed a thousand structures by detonating them, taking out whole villages and so forth. So, it, I, I saw a report, sorry to interrupt you. I saw a report that Israel. There it is. Israeli soldiers. That's today. So, very, very recent. Israeli soldiers received new directives on Saturday. According to the New York Times, Saturday is what, two days ago? Three, limiting operations in southern Lebanon to defensive actions. Under the updated orders, troops may only open fire in response to an immediate threat unless they receive authorization from military chief of staff. The instructions also prohibit soldiers from firing warning shots at civilians returning to southern Lebanon unless they approach military positions, quote, too closely. In addition, troops are no longer permitted to demolish homes or other infrastructure within the security zone without approval from senior commanders. Now, be, you know, we know that Israel's got a history of breaching ceasefires, but just the fact that they're even talking about it is pretty wild.
Yes. Uh, I, I, you know, that is, I don't, I don't want to say anything too positive about Israel's, Israel's record. It's, they, they violated the last ceasefire 15,000 times, as an example. But it is somewhat encouraging. And we say that today, this week, but with Israel, things could change. Uh, they have occupied South Lebanon twice before. They're back a third time. They could easily pull back and come back again. You know, Israel doesn't look at things on a week-to-week basis. They're looking at 10, 20, 30 years. That's the thing. And, you know, the political ball that we, that Washington, uh, talks about and and that we follow, the mainstream media follows, it's, uh, they're going moment to moment and, uh, you know, celebrating some major breakthrough. Like there's, I kept saying that it's, it's not confirmed that they'll actually have peace talks on Friday. Uh, and lo and behold, uh, you know, Israel obviously bombed Lebanon, and then Trump threatened the Iranians, and then the Iranians basically said, well, based on these aggressions and so forth, we're not going to, uh, be there on Friday. Eventually, they got them, uh, to the table in Switzerland. But that just goes to show you, there's just so many points of failure because the fundamental problem here, Mario, is that we're talking about the big news is US-Iran talks, but you can't divorce Israel from the US, and ultimately, they're going to determine whether these, uh, this peace process, this de-escalation process, is going to be successful or not. And, and that's out of Washington's control. Israel cats. Netanyahu himself said, "We are going to keep our troops in Lebanon as long as it takes." I mean, how long is that? How, you know, is that? They have, Israel has has occupied 13 different strips of land in South Lebanon since they're supposed to have left in 2000. That's the UN Blue Line, uh, territories. And many UN resolutions have been passed demanding they leave. And now they've gotten rid of practically all of the, uh, UN UNIFIL and UN DOF, uh, uh, observers and peacekeepers because for Israel, that's, they're just in the way, and they don't really, don't want any third party in there because to them, that's their business, and they're going to do what they do as they wish in South Lebanon. So the problem is, the record says that they, they're really not going to give up anything strategic, and the longer they stay, it becomes strategic. I mean, look at the Golan Heights. Look at Mount Hermon. These are the arguably the two most strategic pieces of real estate in the entire Middle East. Okay. And they're occupied.
Golan Heights. Really?
Absolutely. Absolutely.
I wasn't, I don't know about the strategic value why this.
It's the high, the high ground that this is, this is what the war between Syria and Israel has been predicated on. Uh, you know, as far back as 1967. Uh, if you really, uh, peel it back, and that if you can control the Golan Heights for Israel, then they, they don't have any potential challengers, uh, from mainly from Syria, of course. But for, for Lebanon, Mount Hermon, which is just adjacent to that, was hugely strategic for, uh, for Hezbollah, but also for the Syrian army. And by, by occupying that, that, that puts artillery, uh, it puts Damascus within artillery range once you get up past that point to Quneitra and so forth. So, I mean, that's a lot of power in the region. You know, that Israel is not stupid. That's exactly what their intention was. And so little by little, they can do this incrementally over a period of 10 years, and that's fine. You know, Netanyahu will be gone by then, but the agenda remains. And, you know, Mario, when you look back at the Lebanese Civil War, you have to remember, you know, the United States came in with, with an international force as, as a stabilizing force, mainly as a peacekeeping force. Menachem Begin and Reagan did not want them in there. They actively protested, told the Reagan government at the time, "No, we don't want American troops in here. They're, they're getting in our way. Uh, this is going to, uh, hurt our security interests." They wanted them out. They also basically, uh, undermined the, uh, US peace initiative. They wanted a regional framework, much like what Iran's talking about here. Here we are, what, 50, 40 plus years later, 46 years later, or whatever. Same, same themes. And before, it was the PLO was the terrorist threat in Lebanon. Now it's Hezbollah. I mean, does history not rhyme? You know, you really have to look at these patterns. So, what, why I say that, Mario, is that Israel is very consistent. They're very consistent with their objectives, their aims, and their behavior. And so the US, when you're talking about what Israel is going to do, just look at their record. They're, they, they do not budge from their objectives, and they're, they have a strategic, uh, blueprint, and they follow it. And they, even if it takes them, look at, look here, we are, what, 40 plus years later, there's, they're still at it, doing exactly what they did before, and for this, predicated on the very same kind of reasons, excuses, and so forth. Uh, so any potential challenger to their occupation or any ally of the Palestinian cause is, you know, going to be seen as a security threat for Israel. Is, can the United States actually reign that in? Can they actually restrain that? They have not proven that they can. And, and while JD Vance might have made a comment that, you know, every, of course, many people were happy with what he said in America and outside of America, finally, somebody gave, uh, gave Israel, uh, a bullicking, but that, that doesn't, doesn't fundamentally change the fact that the Israel lobby is still hugely powerful and influential, uh, in the United States. And, you know, while this might seem like an impasse right now, this could change in a couple weeks or a month. You know, all it takes is, well, I don't even want to get into the dangers of, you know, a bomb going off, an assassination, and, you know, and then the hype around that, the, the, the hysteria, and then who gets blamed. Because you have to remember, Mario, in the Lebanese Civil War, back in the early '80s, the excuse for Israel invading Lebanon was an attempted assassination of an Israeli diplomat who was, who was assigned to British, uh, and his name was Shlomo, uh, Argov, I believe. And they accused the Palestinians of doing it. Later came out, there was no evidence that the Palestinian, the PLO was involved. It was somebody else's attempted assassination. But by that time, Israel had already moved into Lebanon, and the rest is history. You see what the chain reaction of that. So, what I'm saying here is that a similar type of situation could emerge, as it did in the '70s and,
>> 80s. The gunman was linked to Abu Nidal organization, a Palestinian militant group opposed to the PLO.
Yes, exactly. Isn't it crazy though that that is one of the things that kicked off the Lebanese Civil War? And by the way, the PLO abided by all of the UN ceasefire mandates. You know, they, they, they've never violated the ceasefire mandates, but they're accused of by Israel and the US press ran with that, just like Hezbollah is very, very, uh, careful in the moves that they make. And you remember October 7th? You remember when the, the first skirmish between, uh, Israel and Hezbollah happened, and Israel claimed that Hezbollah attacked Israel, but they didn't. They attacked IDF positions in occupied Shebaa Farms. That was, and that's a Lebanese, quote, Syrian territory. Actually, the Syrians and Lebanese have an argument about the part of the Shebaa Farms, but that's where the Israelis were. They're out of Israel. But Israel claimed in the global media and Netanyahu that we've been attacked by these terrorists. And that's what kicked off all of this, uh, skirmishes and, and return fire and back and forth that we see right till today. It started on October 8th, and it was a, it was the Israelis, uh, based on a false premise. So, why I'm saying this, these examples, Mario, are important because we could have another situation like that crop up that could be basically pivot and turn this whole situation into a place where it's becomes even more complicated. And, you know, we have to be vigilant on that. And I would say the mainstream media, the press, have to be careful that they don't get sucked into, you know, another situation. There's too many of these that have happened in the Middle East. Uh, and so, I, I, I think that's worth mentioning because you, it takes, it takes some very smart and disciplined and, and, you know, uh, skilled diplomats in the US to to troubleshoot these sort of situations. But do we have those in the Trump administration? H, I'm not sure. I'm worried.
Yeah, there was an article I posted about it. Um, [clears throat] I'm not going to find it now. On Washington Post four days ago about how Israel will try to sabotage theou report by the Washington Post. According to officials, they're worried about Israel trying everything they can to sabotage it. Um, there's another report about Netanyahu rallying all the supporters he has, all the pundits, the lobbyists in Israel, sorry, in in the US to pressure Trump to sabotage the negotiations, sabotage the end deal. They've given up on the MOU. Now the goal is to sabotage an end deal that comes out of the MOU. Um, and also some reports about them waiting till after the midterms before starting their lobbying against any piece of the region. So my question to you would be, what can Israel do? What concerns you the most?
I mean, Israel can do a number of things. Um, they're, they're in a tough, they're in a tough position right now because they're really being hemmed in by political forces. And, you know, we have to acknowledge that there's a sea change in attitude towards Israel in the United States. The poll, the polling is undeniable. And Europe usually follows the US. They'll trail the US a little bit on this, but it will eventually, uh, it's, it's already showing in some European countries, but it hasn't made it up to the level of the political elite class or the Brussels level, although it's coming. Uh, other European countries have filed sanctions, uh, against, uh, Israel. And that's because, you see, if Iran does not budge from its positions, you know, if they're not, uh, they don't push them off of their center, and they just stick to their absolute principles, basically, what happens in history, if you study international relations and you look at these, uh, complicated scenarios and conflict zones with many different countries involved, the country that's, that, that stands firm on their principles, is able to defend itself and able to enforce their red lines. Other countries tend to conform to them, and they become a source of stability. And then all of a sudden, you get people opening up diplomatic relations with Iran and then filing sanctions against Israel. And if you look at, like, for instance, South Africa, the, they're all supported by the, the apartheid regime was backed by the US, it was backed by Britain, it was all the superpowers, they're all behind apartheid South Africa. It wasn't until sanctions started compiling that you started to see a massive sea change. And that's what ultimately changed the politics and the, uh, quote regime, if you will, uh, in South Africa. And I think the same will be true with Israel. Until that time comes, Israel is going to do what it's going to do. And they might pull back a little bit, they might wait, they could wait till after the midterms. I mean, Mario, we could see, you know, this, this lull right now, uh, we could see things fire up again after the midterms because I, I personally don't see any difference between the Democrats and the Republicans in terms of support for Israel, uh, at the moment. However, that could change with the, with the midterm results. If Israel's on the ballot, then you could see a weakening of the lobby after the mid, after November, and they would sort of be on the, uh, the, the descent, if you will, and that could be a game-changer. So, but I think right now, there's a lot of people jockeying for position ahead of the midterms and strategically. And the US needs time to re-arm. This is another thing. Israel needs time to re-arm, to restock, and so is the US. So, a lot of what we're seeing now is very convenient from a military point of view. Uh, and, you know, their attitude could be much more hawkish once the stocks are refilled, the Patriot missile batteries are re-restocked. You could see the hawks come out with a very strong, much stronger case. I'm not saying that's going to happen, and I don't want that to happen, but I'm being realistic because there's forces at play in America that are powerful. The Israeli lobby, the military-industrial complex, um, these are major forces to contend with in America. And I would argue they're driving a large part of politics in Washington.
You think that you think there's a scenario where Trump goes back to bombing Iran?
Uh, it's possible. Yes. Yes.
That that requires just insanity. That just because does not make any sense whatsoever because this is a, a complete contradiction from the shift we are seeing now. We're not seeing him now trying to walk away from Iran. We're seeing him give Iran a good deal, justifying the ballistic missile program, and going, criticizing Israel. And correct me if I get this one wrong, but I've never seen a president, an American president, criticize Israel to that extent. Am I wrong in saying that?
Well, I think JD Vance laid a much more direct criticism. Trump's was a bit in sort of conversation. There was innuendo. It was critical, but it wasn't sort of direct. Um, there is this kind of drama back and forth in the press. Uh, if you believe the reporting and Axios and these places, that there's a a major rift between Netanyahu and Trump. Uh, to to what degree that's true, who knows? But just in the last 48 hours, he has threatened to take over the streets of Hormuz, charge tolls to pay for the US military operation, take the oil, take Iran's oil, run all of their oil, take over their country, destroy their country, kill the negotiators. I mean, just that's just in the last 48 hours. So, this is the frustration with this president. He'll say good things. He'll look, he's moving in the right direction. Then he'll just basically flip, uh, a day later, and then back again, and then back again. And I think it's, uh, Iran's priced this into the equation. They, they know that the US is an unstable negotiations partner, but they have to go through the motions. They have to keep the door open because that's what normative powers do. They say, we'll keep the, we'll keep the door open for negotiations, but we're privately probably not expecting that they're going to be consistent. They could attack us at any moment. During last other round of negotiations when this started, Mario, they killed their head of state. They assassinated their supreme leader during negotiations. I mean, that the Iranians are never going to forget that, and they're never going to give the US a free pass anymore. That's why they're being very strict, and the US doesn't like it. Iran's not pulling any punches on these negot, they're not budging, and the US is getting frustrated because they're not used to dealing with a country like that. You know, they're not used to being told they can't have that, and they're still, JD Vance is still up there announcing all these terms that they're going to get when Iran hasn't agreed to any of them.
Inspection.
Yeah, IAEA inspection. He was a big announcement. What's going on there? Mario, JD Vance is campaigning for the, uh, he, he's started his 2028 campaign. He's on all the podcasts. He is, uh, making these statements. So, he wants to make, he wants to get publicity and and say good ideas. And I predict this is going to be, you can write this down, but if he keeps doing this, there will be a point at the end of the administration where he'll split with Trump. He'll move against Trump. And he'll do that to sort of increase his credibility, momentum going into the 2028 election. And because, because that's what the polling reflects. The polling is not supporting Trump. He's, he's very low, probably the lowest of any president in living memory in terms of his, uh, polling. So Vance is not stupid, and his, his, uh, advisers and handlers and donors know that that he's going to have to basically distance himself from Trump. I think that's why he's trying to make this big show at Geneva to show that he's a statesman. But everything, a lot of what he's saying is just a complete lie. You know, he's a great presenter. I, you know, he's a great, much like Obama, he's a very talented conversational, situational conversationalist, but there's no depth there because he's only 41 years old. He has no experience in international politics. So you can't expect that somehow he's going to be like, download, uh, international relations PhD level, you know, between all the other stuff he's doing. He really relies on his advisers. And I, quite frankly, based on the, the content of Trump and Vance and others, uh, you know, Rubio, I, I really don't think they have very good advisers. I think their advisers are lobbyists, quite frankly. And, you know, that's, you know, that's not going to net anything that's, I, I think substantial and, uh, with any integrity, uh, from, from a US sovereign point of view.
When you, when Trump calls the, um, Iranian government, they say they're a good government. They care for their people. I think that's a lot more significant than fighting with Israel or even criticism, um, of Israel or Israeli actions. When you say something like Iran, uh, has a good government, they care for their people, and they should have a ballistic missile program, it breaks taboos. The taboo before was not calling the Iranian government a regime. The taboo before was like, anyone that says the Iranian government cares, if you said they care for their people, look, are you a terrorist sympathizer, an anti-American, anti-Western, um, uh, commentator, whatever term they want to use. Um, anti-Semite, of course, is always that one. So I just feel like the, the things that Trump is saying right now are beyond rhetoric, and they do have an impact.
Yes, I agree. But you know how long of an impact? Because he sometimes undoes all the, undoes all the positive statements and encouraging statements that he makes. He'll immediately upend himself. And, you know, this is the problem. I, I have not seen any fundamental change, uh, in his character. He said some good things. I agree with you, Mario. You know, it's nice to hear, but it would be nice if he was consistent. You know, but you did point out an important one, which is that, uh, too, actually, that that he said that they, they should have, conceded they should have some, uh, missiles to defend themselves because all countries have a right for that, as well as, uh, enriched uranium. So, you know, civilian nuclear power program.
He said that too. You know, he, you know, you can't walk those two back. But he might, Trump might walk him back home.
But even if he does, once he says them once, a lot of other people can now reference it all the time. If you say, you know, if you say the Iranian government, you know, before whenever I do interviews, and someone's thought it was not a debatable point of how it's not if the Iranian government is evil, it's how evil they are. But when you have the president of the United States saying they're good, they're a good government, that care for their people, that now, you know, breaks that taboo, even if he walks it back.
Sure. But the, the, the problem the US have, they, they really painted themselves into a corner early on. If you remember when this conflict started, how it all began, this, this latest phase, you know, when I'm talking about February 28th, right? This latest phase, it began as, uh, Trump calling for the protesters to rise up and, you know, quite frankly, bogus claims of 50,000 protesters being massacred in the street. All of these numbers came from, uh, US, uh, CIA. How many was it? 7K? 6K? What was the number?
No, the, well, the official numbers were released by the Iranian government, 3,711, I think, and that list was public with all the names plus their details. Nobody, nobody in Iran has refuted or said that there are other names missing, by the way. And included in that, and by the way, I was in Tehran a week before the bombs dropped. Okay.
Oh, wow.
So I had a chance to do some investigation into the, uh, the riots, and the evidence is overwhelming. There were a massive amount of agent provocateurs. There were weapons trafficked in there. They torched buses, ambulances, fire trucks. They set fire and then attacked and shot the fire brigade when they showed up. What they call civil defense, uh, in the, you know, in the Middle East, what we call a fire brigade in the West. And nurses, uh, there, a lot of innocent people got caught in the crossfire. But I've, I've been on, I've seen these happen before in Syria, where snipers, or in Maidan, was where where snipers that nobody knew where they were from were shooting police and protesters, or that protesters are using the crowd as cover to fire at police, and then the police fire back, and all of a sudden, you have total mayhem, and it's, it's out of control. And that's what happened there. So the police got doused with kerosene and then set on fire, uh, by, by some of these peaceful protesters. And at least I saw eight of them burned to death. And these are young guys in their 20s, and it was really one of the most horrific things I've seen. Uh, the, and what I'm telling you, the police evidence, which I've seen, was also broadcast on Iranian national television, but not in the Western media, you see. So we, we live in our own information bubble. But suffice to say, Mario, that whole idea that the protesters need to rise up and take over other institutions. That's what Trump was saying. And the idea there, as with previous regime change operations, was that somehow they could weaken the government, weaken law enforcement, uh, the, the public order, and then come in with targeted air strikes after that, and then decapitate the regime, destabilize it, and then hope for a revolution, have some kind of, I would say, opposition figure parachuted in from outside. Could have been Reza Pahlavi, could have been a technocrat, who knows? Uh, and they had all sorts of other contingencies. The US wanted to arm Kurds and send them in. Donald Trump admitted they trafficked weapons to the protesters. I mean, he said that after the fact. So, that was, but that was the narrative first, Mario. Then it sl, it's, it's changed after that. Then it became the nukes. Then it became Iran can't be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. And all of a sudden, they revised that talking point. And then it became the missiles, and then they flipped back to the nukes, and then now that, then it's the Iran's proxies. But, but, but really the nuke one is, it that painted the US in the corner because the US's own intelligence assessment said that Iran was not developing nuclear weapons. The, they killed the person who issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the late, uh, Ayatollah Supreme Leader. And so the, the, but they stuck to this. This was the talking point. The reason the US, uh, hung it on that is because this is what the Israel lobby was focusing on, which was Joe Kent, famously said this when he came out in some of his initial interviews, that this zero enrichment policy became the dominating talking point in Washington, and they all went all in on this because basically that was the talking point that would, uh, enable the US to adopt a policy of zero, you know, allowing zero enrichment, must destroy the entire nuclear program, civilian, uh, nuclear program. There's still no evidence of weapons developed, and that's the, according to the US intelligence assessment. But that was a problem when Tulsi, Tulsi Gabbard, uh, uh, presented that intelligence assessment in the spring, and in, uh, in the summer, Trump threw her under the bus publicly, and she didn't, uh, protest or resign. She just kind of kept their mouth shut.
What, why did he say she's wrong?
Just very open to, I don't care what she said, she's wrong.
Yeah. So, and that's, that's a, that's a big thing to do for a president to put the director of national intelligence and just kind of chuck them under the bus on that. But that was clear that Trump knew, and the, you know, the forces were already committed to a war, which was quote, Operation Midnight Hammer, uh, at that time, and then again, it, they, they returned in February. So, but this nuclear thing, to hang it on nuclear weapons, because this is the only way you can sell this war in America. When I was in America, uh, just, just last month, you know, wall-to-wall, that's all the media talks about. Iran can't have a nuclear weapon, Iran's nuclear weapons program, but there's no evidence that it exists. But they've all basically hung their entire operation on that because it's a high-level, major national security issue that you can hang the whole war on. Without that, it's, it's, it's debatable even in American, uh, uh, political discourse whether you have a right or should be involved in this conflict anyway. But with, if, with, if there's nukes involved, everybody will generally agree in America that yes, this is worth, this is worth being involved in. Even if you don't agree with the war, they'll say, "Well, Iran can't be allowed to have nuclear weapons." So that talking point was powerful. I mean, this is a level of propaganda that is, you know, extremely powerful and potent, and it worked in this case for, for a while. I, I, I, I don't think it's working at the moment, though. That's the thing. It's changed.
Yeah. Exactly. It's much harder to sell to, to, to have that, um, to have that selling point when you claim you bombed their nuclear program in the 12-day war and you claim now that it's buried underground. They cannot take it out themselves. They need American machinery to take it out. Um, so I think there is, there's no justification for resumption of war. That's why I just don't see the scenario where the US would bomb Iran again. There's no justification. We know it will go wrong. We know they'll be able to close the Strait of Hormuz. We know that they are rearming. We also seen all the reports that their capabilities were not destroyed as much as was initially claimed or or or expected by intelligence agencies. And we know that the Gulf countries don't want a resumption of the war. We know the Gulf countries are improving relations with Iran. We know that Iran can bump the Gulf countries. Like the list goes on and on and on on why this is a bad idea. Like the, so to be able to see whether this is a good idea, if you look at it pragmatically, there has to be a good ROI for the US to do it. And what do they get out of it? There's really nothing except, you know, the only argument, and funny enough, the only people on my show that make the argument that Trump could go back to war are the economists because they talk about the importance economically of the Strait of Hormuz in the rivalry with China. But I think the, a scenario where the US could take over the Strait in any way or take control of Qeshm Island is just completely out of question. Even the most hawkish, uh, guests on my show, I, I struggle to get anyone on the show that talks about boots on the ground or capturing Qeshm Island. So that's why this for me, it just like, I understand if Israel decides to, to, you know, have skirmishes with Iran, um, maybe I just don't see any scenario where where Israel has enough influence to be able to drag the US into it. Trump, their most, uh, the most, um, supportive American president of Israel. If Trump and his administration are that critical of Israel, then I think this is it. They've peaked in terms of American support for their cause.
I think, uh, I think you're, you know, it would be insane to try to, you know, resume, uh, hostilities with Iran or try to take the Strait of Hormuz or Qeshm Island. Although, you know, Lindsey Graham and Jack Keane are on the news basically saying that, that just, in fact, Lindsey Graham saying that's going to happen in the next couple of weeks or whatever. So there, there's clearly pressure coming from that section in the US power structure that that wants the president to basically resume that kind of aggression on that. But that, that the Iranians are not going to sort of, you know, like be a matter and let them in. There's going to be, uh, pushback. There's going to be fighting. There's going to be losses by the United States. It's going to be hugely complicated. It's going to look bad globally. There's, there's no, in no, in no, there's no world where this is going to, I think, work out good for the US. But the problem, Mario, is if you look back in US history, the Vietnam War is a perfect example that the, the US got stuck in this kind of escalation loop politically, politically. And they, they, they kept doubling down and doubling down and said, and oh no, we just need to bomb a little bit more. We just need to go and take that, and that's going to be a game-changer. And this is generally what happens when you're in a downward spiral. In other words, you got into something that you really shouldn't have got into. You hadn't, hadn't been well thought out. The, they, they made so many huge misjudgments on Iran and underestimated Iran. I mean, the one of the other reasons I went there before, uh, a week before the war, was because I, I wanted to know what the public support for the government was, you know, in, in as best a way as I could. And, you know, the national day, uh, was there. I, I was there the week of the national day, and there was like, easily two million people on the streets of Tehran, and in around the country, there was 20 plus million people in the different cities. So for a country, the population of 90 million, that's like one out of four will come out on the street in support of the government. That's pretty good. You couldn't do that in America. Definitely. I don't know any European country that people will come out in those kind of numbers. And, you know, you see all sorts of people out there, women without headscarves, and it kind of destroyed some of the stereotypes that I had been told about, that, you know, they forced the women to cover their hair. And that's a big issue in the West, obviously. Um, you know, they, that's one of the most important issues for the liberal West is whether the women are allowed to show their hair or not. Anyway, um, but what I found, Mario, is that there is, there is a lot of support generally for the, the state, and the people do recognize that they've been brutalized by sanctions, that they have been attacked, they, assassinations, bombings, and so forth, and all that's galvanized more support for Iran. I would say in the last 12 months, the support from the public for the government, for the, you know, the, the political structure there, the Supreme Leader, I think it's increased, uh, significantly. And, and that's, and that's exactly the opposite, it's the opposite of what we're being told in the West. And these advisers are telling the president that, and they're all telling each other, they're telling the media, the media is telling the politicians, it's like a giant echo chamber. And if that's what they're, that, if that's what's informing their policy, they could, they've got it horribly wrong. And it wouldn't be the first time they got it horribly wrong. This does happen with all of the money we have for intelligence. We have potentially all of these great minds and think tanks. But in the administration, there's a sort of lack of intelligence, and everything's political. Nobody wants to present intelligence to Trump that might go against whatever the political winds are. It might be uncomfortable or, you know, upset the president or upset his backers. And hence, this is what happens. Mediocrity, bad decisions, bad policy. They reign supreme during times like this. And I think we're in one of those unique political periods right now, uh, in, in America and in the West in general. I, I, I could say, you know, the same thing about Ukraine. A lot of misassumptions about Russia and, uh, stereotypes and underestimating certain things. And it's, it's devastating if you, when this makes its way down to the policy level. It's devastating. And you're going to, you're going to have a lot of, uh, losses financially, politically, militarily, even, uh, because of these ill-informed positions by certain Western leaders.
Let's see if something happened while we're speaking because that I'm used to that. Wow, it is extremely quiet. Not one piece of news in 45 minutes of interviews. That is eerily quiet. And then later we start hearing about explosions in Qeshm Island. That's usually how it goes. Um, as a, as a final
question. As a final question for you, Khag, as a final question for you, Patrick, [laughter] what do you um?
>> So I see the war to be over. Um, and I think the balance of power is obviously been saying it for a while, shifted from Israel to Iran. I think that would lead to massive shifts in in the entire region. It will be seeing a new kind of axis of alliance between all these countries: Qatar, Saudi, Egypt, Pakistan, etc., um, Turkey. So that's one example. Another one would be um, um, you know, the countries like the UAE would seek uh different alliances to build deterrence against Iranian aggression. So while they'll improve relations with Iran, they also need deterrence against Iranian aggression. That's just the logical thing to do for any country. We just got a report today. Actually, I think I might have saved the report, but um, that the UAE has done a deal with India to improve their air defense. There is the Indian government is in talks with the UAE to sell its flagship defense system, Akashir and supersonic cruise missiles, Brahmos. So, according to Reuters, we also know that the Amiradis were importing um air defense batteries from South Korea. They've early on there were a lot of talks about them doubling down on that relationship with Israel. I think they'd be moving away a bit from Israel just not to alienate Iran as part of their normalization with Iran. Um, and we'll see the same thing happen across the Gulf. That's my speculation.
Now, where I'm not sure what would happen is the rest of the countries. Al Al-Shar is just trying to balance a very um, a very volatile, very tricky uh position and country in trying to get it all together. He's someone with a really dark past. Someone that, you know, everyone has every reason not to trust him. Someone that Israel is just waiting for the day to to assassinate him. Many people would want his head on a plate, including his his more hardline opposition inside of Syria that might not be too happy seeing him align more and more with the West.
Then you've got Lebanon, where Iran needs Lebanon as as their way to project um their influence in the region, also as their way to kind of control all the energy choke points out of the Persian Gulf. You've got the Strait of Hormuz, you've got the Red Sea, you've got the Mediterranean. So the Red Sea is the Houthis, Persian Gulf, sorry, Strait of Hormuz is Iran, and then Mediterranean is Hezbollah and Lebanon. So Iran would want to maintain their influence there. That's why Lebanon is such a big red line for them. But also Israel is not going to, I I understand they're being reigned in by the US, but you know, you can't see that that sudden shift. I'm sure they're going to try to sabotage the negotiations or try to project their power again. Just wait for the right moment, as they did in Gaza. Everyone thought the Gaza war was over and things are going to improve in this whatever 14-point plan, and they've now captured more territory and they're still bombing Gaza. So, I don't know what will happen. I just don't expect Israel to so easily pull out of Lebanon and Syria. That's kind of where my optimism starts to fade. Um, but it's looking like they may.
Um, so my question is u [snorts] what happens next and how's the region going to look like? I I don't I don't expect Israel to withdraw from Syria. Uh, absolutely not. It's just too valuable a strategic position that they've taken. They they have an agreement which uh Galani, stroke Al-Shar. Uh, they have an agreement. You know, they, Israel is absolutely happy with him being in power because he basically supplanted the one uh, you know, Arab nationalist government that they couldn't buy buy off, and that was had a credible defense of Syrian territory and was backing the Palestinian cause and supporting Hezbollah, which was the Assad government. So, Israel's very happy with Galani, even though Syria's a mess. Economically, it's it's a basket case and it's very corrupt. They ran pilgrims. They were killing uh Alawites in, you know, the uh Latakia and the southern Tartus and Bes and all all of these coastal areas. And it was very ugly what happened. House to house, pulling men outside, assassinating them on the street, taking their wives up to the bridal markets in Idlib to be married off to some uh, you know, Uzbek or Uyghur uh fighter. I mean, it's just really ugly what happened. And a lot of people left the country uh as well. And so, but the US is happy with Al-Shar because the US still have a military presence in Syria. They haven't withdrawn. And so, yes, this, this is this is going to remain.
Um, Trump said, "Well, we'll get July or we'll get I'll we'll get Syria to come in and sort out Hezbollah." I mean, that's just like begging for a violent civil war in Lebanon. I don't think that's going to happen. >> Already said no. He it would be a mess. But that kind of shows you Trump doesn't really understand the region at all. And he wouldn't say such an off-handed comment if he even had a little bit of understanding about it. But that's the former head of Al-Qaeda, the founder of Al-Qaeda in Syria, the the deputy of Albert Bakar Al-Baghdadi in ISIS. Not the type of person you really want to be doing business with. He was a head shopper and now he's in a suit, you know, 24 months later. Um, it's it's he's temporary. He already said there's going to be no elections for four years. So he's not really a legitimate leader. He was basically installed by a collaboration of the US, Turkey, uh, Israel, and you know, various other allies to that effect. But uh, you know, so that that's that. I'd want to give him a chance. I've been saying this like I um, I I'll read out, I'll read out a quote to give you an example why I want to give him a chance, even though he's got a very dark past and he might be horrible.
>> Exactly. Exactly. He's not someone you'd expect. Um, and I'm trying to get an interview with him as well because I'm really not that he'll be open. He's very, he's very. Now, I interview anybody. If Ben Gvir says yes for an interview, I'll interview him. But the I'll tell you why. I'm I'm I'm like I yesterday, Ben Gvir and him did an interview. I've said this on the show before, so the audience might have heard me say before. Ben says this in that interview, in an interview, the Iranians need to be bombed and then bombed again and then bombed again, and then the same with Hezbollah. Just keep bombing them and then bomb them again and again. That's how it works. He's saying negotiations don't work. You got to keep bombing them. That's Ben Gvir in an interview.
>> Exactly. Exactly. And then Al-Shar, who's former Al-Qaeda, he was um, does an interview as well, and he says this. He's he's asked about and all that. He says, "No, we're not going to deal with militarily." And then he says this, "I believe in dialogue, even between opposing parties. Dialogue should remain open and continue even during war, during conflict, during confrontation, because the alternative is war." So, you've got um, who would have thought in 2026, you got a former Al-Qaeda leader from Syria um saying something that everyone would listen to and say, "Oh, you know, he's speaking sense." Now, he might be speaking. I don't know. Actions speak louder than words. So, let's see. And then you've got someone, Ben, a democratic country that's allied with the US as part of the civilized world that everyone's meant to be defending. And it's got a diplomat that is gaining popularity saying, "No, we're not going to negotiate. We just ne we don't negotiate. We just bomb and then bomb again and then bomb again. And that's how we do it." It's um, pretty wild.
>> I mean, giving Al-Shar credit for a statement like that is like giving a serial killer credit for saying, you know, "I really feel like I should be making friendly approaches to people I meet." You know, it's >> No, he's denied. He's denied. Sorry. He's he's denied fighting jihad. He went to Lebanon last week and said, "I know I'm seeming like I defend him because I'm really optimistic about what he's doing there, but I next week he does something stupid, I change my position like this." But he told Lebanon, "Don't fight with Hezbollah. Don't fall into the trap with Israel." He told uh the name of the, I don't know the name of the prime minister in Lebanon. And then in spoken to people as well behind the scenes, understand, yes, he told that to Salam. And then in Syria as well, when the Alawite massacres were happening, he actually, it was he did not authorize it. He held the soldiers accountable. Now, I'm sure you know more about it than I am. Um, and there's been multiple reports where he's actually trying to do the opposite. So he's trying to bring a country together. A country is very sectarian. Are are you completely? So just I want to ask you a question here. Am I completely off the mark? Is it is it possible that he might be trying to do the right thing? He might be reformed, or you're certain he's not and and I should be a lot more skeptical?
>> I I think there's a difference between being reformed and wanting to stay out of trouble because you've got enough trouble already on his plate. He, I would be impressed if he said he wanted dialogue, national dialogue, and wanted to hold elections. Then I'm going to be impressed. Then I'll listen to Mr. Al-Shar. But until that time, um, he's he's being very circumspect and careful because there's he's surrounded by a lot of tripwires, actually. So I, you know, maybe he's a he's learning to be a smart politician, and that's fine. And I I I'm happy that he doesn't want to fight as well, quite frankly. So you know, I'll give him some consolation points for that, but I'm not going to throw a gold medal around his neck. Um, that's a little bit premature.
>> He needs to do it. Exactly. I agree. There needs to be a lot more for someone with his background to be considered reformed. So I agree 100% there.
>> Yeah. I personally, he'll be ousted um at the at the earliest. The US will get rid of him and Israel will get rid of him as soon as they have another sort of uh, a new chapter to open for Syria. He's gone. I can tell you right now. Yeah. People like people like this never they never last um because they came in on dubious circumstances and they're just tools of bigger powers.
>> As is often the case >> in the world.
>> I agree because I feel so sorry for that country. I really just I just want someone to come in and bring it back together. But go ahead.
>> Uh, it was together. You know, I was in Syria during the war. They, it's it's a, we strangled, the West strangled that country, suffocated it, and then occupied, gave their oil fields to ISIS, and then when ISIS left, the uh, the US took over, and Syria didn't have access to its own fuel, its own agriculture, couldn't do, you know, electricity. Uh, they didn't have power, they couldn't get the basics. And, you know, ISIS was poisoning the water supply running into Damascus. It was just insane what was going on. Oh, didn't all countries, all countries, all countries mess it up? Turkey did, Iran did, Israel did, the US did, Russia did. Is that fair to say?
>> Yes. 24 countries were involved in taking Syria down.
>> 24.
>> Exactly. And so, am I right to say that? Because I I speak to some people saying, "Yeah, the Americans messed it up." I speak to others say, "Yeah, the Iranians are the one that destroyed Syria." I speak to someone else, "Israel destroyed Syria." It's all of them advancing their interests, trying to get a piece of it. Is that fair?
But but but [clears throat] the main ones uh so what happened with Syria and listen, it's complicated, but and this was explained to me by Syria's ambassador to the UN, Al-Jafari, but uh, the the main countries involved in that were the United States, Israel, Turkey, and collectively NATO, I would say, you know, the main European powers. Um, they organized the rat lines for all the jihadi fighters, or you know, Salafist fighters coming from Central Asia, coming from all over the world. They came as far as the Philippines. They trafficked them all in. Turkey facilitated that to come in uh through the northern border. Uh, the the fighter, the Syrian Free Syrian Army, quote-unquote moderate rebels, were trained in Jordan by Western military. Okay, that was from the early days. And the other ones were trained in Turkey, and there are some trained in other countries as well, even in Europe. And uh, the the total number of fighters, uh, extremist fighters that trafficked through Turkey during the dirty war is about 250,000, you know. So, I don't know that many. And that, you know, that probably doesn't >> include ISIS. And ISIS was just a super well-trained, powerful fighting force, better than some countries' regular militaries. And they still managed to to maintain some stability in central Syria, but they they couldn't fight a front war. And that was the whole strategy was to uh keep the Syrian army busy. And then then the Russians came in to to assist them in uh October 2015, and they did stabilize the situation because, you know, Western media was saying Damascus was going to fall as early as December of uh 2013. And Russia's entrance really kind of delayed and and it, and the West were just furious that Russia came in and gave the uh air support that they did and helped to, you know, uh stabilize a situation, regained control of Aleppo and so forth. But really, it was just impossible. And, you know, there was the most brutal sanctions and embargo in history. The EU and the US had a joint pincer movement for economic sanctions on Syria, and it was designed to strangle the country. They wanted to topple that uh uh government by hook or by crook, however long it took. And eventually they did it. US occupied 25% of Syrian territory uh illegally, totally illegally, no protests from the UN, nothing like that, you know, not banning the US from Olympics or anything like that. Uh, so that that's the real situation with Syria. It was a big operation. The Gulf countries underwrote it um to the tune of I would say hundreds of billions of dollars over that period, um, and Qatar being probably one of the biggest contributors for that. But uh, all of them, Kuwait, Bahrain were involved. Saudi Arabia, of course, was involved as well, because there there's the ideological component of wanting to put in uh, you know, uh Sunni uh kind of Salafist or Wahhabi uh leaning elements into that country that is was a secular government. Syria was a secular government. It was an Arab nationalist government.
>> I think it's more it's more political. I think it's just getting Iran's stranglehold of the country, strategically very important ally of Iran, and getting that. This was before this started, before it's true, but and it that is part of it, Mario. Um, but before Iran even entered into Syria to assist the Syrian government, they they were invited in by Syria. The Goods forces and some, you know, top units from the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, that are Iraqi, by the way, not Iranian. But the the the main thing for Israel was that was the transit point uh for support for uh for Hezbollah via Iran through Syria. So that, so really, this is about Israel's security, the takedown of Syria first and foremost. First and foremost, it was about Israel was behind that. And if you look back at the documents, Mario, back to the Clean Break document in 19, mid-90s, very specific to take down Syria. That that was a chief among Israeli's major strategic interests. But it took a long time because the political system, the Ba'ath system in Syria, it's it's like a hard shell. It's very hard to crack. And it's it's an anti-hegemonic government, similar to the Bolivarian government you you have in South America, Venezuela, for instance. They have a lot of similarities, and they're the transition to to basically emancipate yourself from imperialism, former colonial states, and then once you become fully self-sufficient, independent, then you transition into a more kind of liberal government. But Syria never made it to that that last phase because they were at war with Israel on paper, at war with Israel for, you know, 50 plus years. So it's it's a tragedy. It's a beautiful country. I love it dearly, and the people are wonderful. It's terrible what's happened. And Lebanon, ditto with Lebanon. It's a country that I care very deeply about. That I have, I've lived and worked in Lebanon. You know, family in Lebanon. I've walked all the streets of all these places that are being bombed, many of them, and it breaks my heart. And I wish that uh people in the West realize that the the world UNESCO heritage sites in places like Lebanon and Syria are not just, they don't just belong to the Lebanese. And the Lebanese and the Syrians will tell you this is the world's history. You're all welcome to come visit. You know, they're very generous and hospitable uh in that regard. And they they say they're the stewards and custodians of humanity's history. But the Israelis don't seem to uh regard it. They're no better, really, than ISIS, uh, going in and basically destroying world heritage sites. Quite quite frankly, I don't see the difference. One's irregular and the other's a regular army, but the result is the same. Total devastation of of world heritage uh uh monument sites and and and Christian sites as well. There's a lot of Christians in America that support Israel, but they you hardly hear a peep from them after the IDF have blown up uh, you know, historic mausoleums, cathedrals, churches, and places holy sites from the New Testament in Lebanon. Lebanon is just basically replete with places and scenes from the New Testament. You know, it's it's the history in Lebanon, just in South Lebanon. It's it's unbelievable for such a small country. The amount of things that they have in terms of world heritage, it's it's crazy. Uh, it's only the size of Wales, and they have so much. But now it's it's being targeted, or these areas are being depopulated. Um, and there's layers of history in Lebanon, as you know, Mario. You've got uh uh Egyptian history. You've got Roman, you've got Byzantine, you've got Alexander the Great underneath some of that, as well as uh the Crusades and and and so many different uh layers of history uh that go way way way back, you know, Byblos uh in in Lebanon as well. Um, it's a very rich uh place. We, the world should be protecting Lebanon at all costs. And this is the problem. The country has been, I think, divided. It's been strangled. It's been used by bigger powers as a kind of fighting pitch for years. And it's it's created a mentality in the country that's very tribal because of all the sectarian division. And it's also made people with very low expectations for stability, and they they tend to coagulate into their corners, and then they end up sort of being subservient to the US and and taking, you know, drip-feeding grants and developmental grants, and "Please, can we have a billion-dollar loan?" That's the that's where Lebanon's at. They've uh, and and that's because the US uses Lebanon. They use it as a leverage point. It's a pivot, and Israel uh uh uses it as well. So that they don't want Lebanon to be sovereign. They do not want, if if the US wanted Lebanon to be sovereign, they would allow the Lebanese army to buy air defense and have jets. But they don't. The US audits every single piece of military equipment that goes to the Lebanese armed forces. That's why they can't defend the southern border. That's why Hezbollah exists. You see the problem?
>> Yeah. [snorts] Iran apparently wanted to arm the Lebanese military, but it was not approved. And the Iranian mil, the Lebanese military had to deny those Russia were going to sell them equipment as well. It was vetoed by Washington. And it wasn't by Washington, Mario. It was the Israeli lobby in Washington >> enforcing that policy. You see how that works? From Tel Aviv to Washington, back to Beirut.
>> That's the circle, basically. So Galibbuff just made a post as we wrap up. Uh, in one uh, in one of the good programs on, I saw them say that they wished Meahab airport had been closed so the negotiating team wouldn't go to Switzerland. I'll tell those dear ones, if we hadn't gone to Switzerland, every moment more blood would have been shed from the Muslims and Shiites of Lebanon. So he's responding to criticism about the negotiations. A lot of people, people don't understand in Iran, there's different opinions, and not everyone, even though the MOU seems so um, so uh, so uh, so much in in Iran's interest, a lot of people in Iran are not so ecstatic with it, and they thought the Iranian government or the IOGC should have held up held off even more before agreeing to the MOU to try to gain more leverage and get even better terms than what that's what than what's in there right now. So Galibbuff is responding to that criticism. He just made a post now. Um, Patrick, really enjoyed our conversation. I'd love to do it again. And uh, have you, have you um, have you covered the um, have you done a deep dive because you mentioned Russia-Ukraine? I know you've covered the war there. Have you also covered the Russia war in Chechnya? Do you know much about that?
>> I I do. I I have studied that, and um, and it's, it's uh, it's there are three wars in Chechnya, actually. Three different phases in that. So that's it's complicated. But what I can tell you, what what I can I can join that I can join that to Syria because uh Russia's air operation in Aleppo, which was called Operation Aleppo, that that was it was incredibly efficient and incredibly successful, and it was all predicated on all of what they learned in the exact same situation where you had embedded extremist Islamist fighters in Chechnya, many of them backed by foreign money and weapons. But in Chechnya, it just seems I just feel like what what Israel did to Gaza, and this is for me, I've never done a deep dive. What Israel's done to Gaza, what the West did to Syria, Russia to Chechnya, that's like [clears throat] my definitely not the same. It's it's more >> the same for more of the destruction, the death and destruction that I saw there.
>> Yeah, but it was it was a military operation, whereas Gaza is it's you can't really make the argument >> another extreme. Yeah, Gaza is another extreme.
>> Water, you know, it's just another, >> you know, but but The >> Chechnya war, Mario, is is worth studying, and I will recommend a couple of documents by the Rand Corporation that did a very, very good, very thorough analysis on that. And when you see that, you really understand um how Russia took that uh knowledge and intelligence, they've applied it to other places um in the world. And this is why they're very effective and efficient uh at what they do because they had to fight that very difficult situation there. The CIA were backing every single inch of the insurgency. You can be sure of that. They've been they've been working on that.
>> I've never done a deep, I've been wanting to do a deep dive into it for a while.
>> It's fascinating. And lastly, Mario, if you do get that interview with Ben Gvir, don't do a softball interview.
>> He's not he's not he's not >> Please don't do a softball interview. Go go go at him hard, you know, because he deserves >> I'll never I'll never get it. There's no way Ben will ever do an interview with me. Patrick, thank you so much.
>> You never know. You never know.
>> Trust me, I I know that one. You should see my tweets. That one I can be sure of.
>> Okay.
>> Thank you, Patrick. Appreciate your time.
>> My pleasure. Thank you, Mario.
>> Bye-bye. All right, guys. I'll be going live again. Malcolm N, we just rescheduled. We have Larry Johnson in one hour. I'll see you then. Bye, guys.