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A poll conducted by a Japanese, uh, uh, uh, nonprofit organization, uh, more than 93% of Japanese, I was stunned, uh, uh, you know, have a negative image, uh, about China, uh, or, or, you know, this sentiment of Japanese toward, uh, China has been deteriorated in the last two years, especially after when, uh, uh, the Chinese ship intruded into the territorial waters of Japan surrounding Senkaku Islands and intentionally, uh, uh, you know, clashed with the Japanese coast guard vessel. I am a bit afraid that this kind of, you know, sentiment, uh, how do you say that, unhealthy, you know, uh, nationalism, uh, if, if unhealthy nationalism flares up, it will become, you know, a kind of situation which is very difficult to control.
So, um, uh, I think, you know, I'm a bit worried about his way of putting that China has, you know, achieved its objective for the fourth plenary session, which will be starting in one or two minutes' time. The theme for the fourth plenary session is a new cold war in Asia. The, the focus is very much on the geopolitical dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region. By way of background, I, I should say that, uh, earlier this year, the organized for the 13th time the annual Shangri-La Dialogue conference in Singapore for defense ministers from 27 Asia-Pacific countries and from other states with vital interests in the security of the Asia-Pacific region. This year's Shangri-La Dialogue was distinguished, I think, by the robustness and the directness of the exchanges that took place there, and particularly the forthright response of the, uh, Chinese PLA's deputy chief of general staff to the keynote address by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and also the address by US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. Many of us who were present at this year's Shangri-La Dialogue thought that the discussions there quite accurately reflected what have in recent years been growing strategic tensions in the region. These tensions have been most apparent around, uh, China's maritime littoral where China's assertion of territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea has brought it into, uh, confrontation with Japan and several Southeast Asian states respectively. The United States, as the Asia-Pacific region's balancing power and as a security partner of Japan and several Southeast Asian, uh, states, is also, of course, an [clears throat] important part of the regional strategic equation. Indeed, I think it's true that from China's perspective, the American rebalance to the Asia-Pacific over the last several years >> [snorts] >> uh, is an important cause of insecurity in the region. These, uh, regional strategic tensions have, have raised the question for some observers of whether a new cold war is emerging in the Asia-Pacific.
What the, the running order for this, uh, plenary session will be: first of all, Yamamoto-san, and then Eric Lee, and, uh, thirdly, Sarah. So, Mr. Yamamoto. Uh, thank you, Dr. Hakri. I am Isao Yamamoto, former Japanese minister for ocean policy and territorial issues. I served at the minister from the beginning of the current, uh, administration in December 2012 until, uh, a few weeks ago when the prime minister reshuffled the cabinet. While no longer a minister, I am proud to be the first Japanese parliamentarian to participate as a speaker in the session at the IISS Global Strategic Review. My thanks goes to the International Institute for Strategic Studies for giving me an opportunity to speak in Oslo, an opportunity to speak in Oslo, a beautiful and vibrant, growing city with one of the highest quality of life in the world. I was also very much impressed by the fact that Mr. Lee, a well-known debater, knows that I am a singer-songwriter. I very much look forward to discussing with Mr. Lee and Miss Lane on this very difficult issue. Let me start by reiterating that Prime Minister Abe is not a militarist, as some of the media insinuate. I can assure you that such perceptions of Prime Minister Abe are totally unfounded. I have spent 18 years working closely with Mr. Shinzo Abe and I know him very well personally. I have no doubt that Prime Minister Abe is determined to pursue the path of a peace-loving nation which Japan has consistently followed since the end of World War II. Needless to, needless to, uh, mention, Prime Minister Abe attaches great importance to bilateral relations with neighboring countries in Asia, particularly China and Korea. Since the inception of the Abe administration, Japan has changed. Most Japanese now feel a sense of positive change with the strong leadership of Prime Minister Abe, and we have started to regain confidence. The Abe administration, with its high approval rating, is now, therefore, one of the most stable governments in the world. Its approval rating has increased even more after the cabinet reshuffle in the beginning of this month. Oh my god, without me.
As you know, um, very well, the security landscape in Asia and Europe has increasingly become more volatile. Japan views the situation in Ukraine as a global issue that would have a grave impact on the rule of law, providing the integrity and protecting the sovereignty of each nation in the present world. This is why Japan, unlike most of other Asian countries, has acted in concert with G7 countries by imposing sanctions against Russia and also providing economic assistance of $1.5 billion to Ukraine. The situation in Ukraine, as symbolized by the annexation of Crimea, has similar threats in the situation in the East and South China Sea. In both seas, there have been frequent attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion. In the East China Sea, we have seen persistent intrusions into Japan's territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. In November 2013, the world was stunned by the unilateral declaration of establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that unduly infringed on the freedom of overflight on the high seas in the East China Sea. The number of times that self-defense force aircraft scrambled in response to military aircraft approaching our territorial airspace has now reached unprecedented levels in recent years. In the South China Sea as well, there have been a series of actions based on unilateral claims, some resulting in physical clashes between the countries involved, and a sense of urgent vigilance is mounting among the countries. The fundamental issue that we face in those situations is an attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion. Such unilateral attempts are serious challenges to the rule of law and can no longer be limited to bilateral issues. How to address such behavior is a common challenge facing the international community. With such a sense of urgency, Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly called for the importance of strengthening the rule of law and of not condoning any attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in order to maintain the peace and prosperity of the world. In recent months, Prime Minister Abe made such an appeal at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, and other forums. I think his message was well received by those audiences to the effect that it has become globally recognized.
The theme of the session today is a new cold war in Asia? Question mark. I understand that some people like to view the current situation in Asia, especially in the East and South China Seas, as the beginning of a new cold war. I disagree with such views. At the same time, I strongly believe that we are standing at a watershed, a fork in the road where we may have to decide the future orientation of the international order in the 21st century. Either to seek a peaceful change building upon the post-World War II international order based on the rule of law, or to allow those who utilize their aggrieved status in the present international order to undermine and eventually transform that order in their favor. In today's intertwined, intertwined world, emerging threats have posed a rethinking of traditional approaches to security. At the same time, any threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could have a direct influence on the security of any nation. A case in point is North Korea. North Korea's provocative activities involve the risk of global proliferation of nuclear materials and related technologies to third countries. This is no longer an issue confronting East Asia alone, but rather a critical challenge facing the international community. In such a security environment, no nation can secure its own peace only by itself. Coordination with allies and partners, as well as within international forums such as the United Nations, has become increasingly significant. Based on such perception, Japan is willing to bear its burden for peace as a proactive contributor to peace while coordinating with other countries, including the United States and the European nations sharing the fundamental values. In this regard, the government of Japan has taken measures to strengthen its security posture and prepare itself toward that aim. A historic cabinet decision for drafting new legislation, including those for collective self-defense this July, is one of such undertakings. Japan has made considerable contributions to the peace and development of East Asia and the world for almost 70 years since the end of World War II as a nation anchored on peaceful orientation, democracy, and the rule of law. Looking forward, Japan and the Prime Minister with his leadership will seek to build upon existing international and regional order through peaceful means based on universal values. The criticisms expressed against Japan's recent efforts, such as militarization of Japan or tilting to the right, are completely unfounded and misguided.
I would now like to turn your attention again to the importance of maritime security for the peace and prosperity of the world. Prime Minister Abe proposed three principles of the rule of law at sea in his keynote address at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in May. His principles reiterate that in order to maintain maritime security, states need to make their claims based on international law. They shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims in the sea, and they shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. It was no coincidence that on the occasion of the flat lecture organized by IISS this January, well before Prime Minister Abe's keynote address, I proposed Yamamoto's three principles in dealing with the situation surrounding Japan's territorial integrity. Yamamoto's three principles are: the rule of law, the promotion of bilateral relationships with our neighbors, and the strengthening of the regional community. What I intended to reiterate through Yamamoto's three principles is the importance of promoting bilateral relationships with our neighbors and strengthening the regional community. The issue of territorial integrity should not be allowed to overly affect the bilateral relationships with neighboring countries. Let me touch upon Japan's relations with China and South Korea, the closest countries to Japan, both geographically and culturally. Japan has attached great importance to the development of our relationship with both countries. In fact, Japan has played a significant role in the economic development of both China and the Republic of Korea. Japan has consistently supported China's and Korea's development since the normalization of diplomatic relations. In the case of China, over the decades, China has received more than $40 billion in official development assistance from Japan to develop modern infrastructure, modern hospitals, and cutting-edge devices to preserve the environment. The Japanese private sector has also played a prominent role through direct investment, technology transfer, and worker training in the development of the Chinese economy. In the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Japan helped China and Korea, along with other Asian countries, to overcome the crisis through, among others, creating swap currency mechanisms. At the same time, I am appalled to hear the allegation that Japan is the one who tries to change the status quo of the international order internationally, mixing up the territorial issues and issues of recognition of history. I'd like to stress that the legal issue of territorial integrity and those of the recognition of history should be treated as separate issues that should not be confused. China is now the second largest economy in the world. In the last couple of decades, China has grown into a greater power, and there's no doubt that China will have great influence on the prosperity and stability of the region and the world. Japan is not trying to stand against China. Rather, as we have done in the past, we are making efforts to work with China as a more responsible member of the international community to contribute for the peace and stability of Asia. Japan believes it is truly important for the countries concerned to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to solve any issues that arise among them. Japan's door to dialogue is always open to neighbors, including China, at any level. Quite recently, Japan, China, and Korea, Japan-Korea foreign ministers met bilaterally in an informal or formal setting at the margin of the ASEAN Regional Forum. I hope that such moves will be the beginning of a thaw in Japan's relations with China and Korea. In that vein, I sincerely hope that the Beijing APEC summit and East Asia summit in November will be a great success, providing leaders with a venue to discuss the challenges facing the region in a candid and cooperative manner. Thank you so much for your kind attention. [applause] [applause] Thank you very much, Mr. Yamamoto. Um, I'm, I'm very struck by your, your emphasis on, uh, three points: uh, Yamamoto's three principles, the rule of law, promotion of bilateral relations in the region, and strengthening of the regional community. Uh, I think we'll come back to discussing those points later. I now ask Mr. Eric Lee to speak.
>> Good morning. Thank you. Uh, I'm Eric Lee from Shanghai. I'd like to start with a confession first. I'm a fan of Yamamoto-san. Not on the grounds of international relations, but on something much more universal for the human condition: music. If you don't know, you should Google him. He's literally a rock star. >> Thank you very much. At the beginning, I've invited Yamamoto-san to come perform in Shanghai for one of my companies called Youku, which is the largest, uh, video sharing, video TV, online video company in, in China, second largest in the world, 650 million viewers, and he has graciously accepted. Um, [applause] thank you. Second, I'd like to share a secret with you. It's confidential. There's no such thing as Asia. It doesn't exist. It is an arbitrarily drawn space on a map. That its essence doesn't exist as Europe exists, and not even as Latin America exists. So, so I think we ought to consider, is there going to be a cold war in Asia? We should consider that issue with that in mind. And today, I'd like to consider that issue at three different levels: first, the global context; second, a historic perspective; and third, strategic imperatives. First, China views its position and strategies in Asia only in the global context for the reason I mentioned. And what is that global context? First and foremost, the United States of America, China's largest partner and competitor in the world in just about everything. They, of course, differ in one crucial respect: the US is the current dominant world power that leads a global architecture that encompasses all aspects of world affairs, political, economic, military, and even cultural. The United States led the design and building of this global architecture after World War II and after the Cold War. And the Asia-Pacific is a part of that architecture. And China is a rapidly rising power that only became the powerhouse it is now in the past generation. Now, first, I'd like to make a quick stop, and I want to correct one misperception that's being reported around the world. If I, you open the newspaper, you will think that's what's going on, but it is not. China does not view the United States as an enemy. Uh, it's the biggest misperception out there. And I don't think the US views China as an enemy. These two countries are extraordinarily intertwined, and we can go into that, uh, at a later stage.
Now, back to the, the, the post-Cold War global architecture. It seems to be breaking down. It is breaking down for two reasons: one, the United States is in trouble. If you haven't heard, it is suffering from internal contradictions and the grave consequences of external overreach. The internal difficulties are perhaps the most serious America has faced in a hundred years, and they are structural. And external overreach in the past 25 years have led to failures and exhaustion. Two, the so-called rise of the rest, of which China is the most prominent one. America's share of the world's GDP has materially declined, and this trend will continue. Now, when you're the dominant shareholder, I'm a venture capitalist, I use those terms. When you're the dominant shareholder of a company, let's say you own 80%, you act in the best interest of the company. But when you own 30%, you act more in your own best interest. And of course, the rest are making claims that are often in conflict with the way the global architecture is set up.
Next, the historic perspective is also important in our understanding and assessment of the current state of affairs. China, the second largest economy, and soon to surpass the US as the largest economy in the world, did not participate in the design and establishment of the current global architecture. It has benefited tremendously by taking advantage of the system for its own development. But that does not take away from the implications of the fact that China's interests were never taken into account in the design and building of the current system. One example is the US-led alliance system that is the backbone of the global architecture and its manifestation in the Asia-Pacific. Now, many have argued that China, being so big now, must act as a responsible stakeholder in the world, as Yamamoto-san mentioned. Of course, that is correct in principle, but there is an inherent contradiction we should be aware of in the notion that someone is being asked to act as a stakeholder in a system that he did not participate in designing and building, and its constitution does not take its interests into consideration.
Next, the strategic imperative. China's strategies in the Asia-Pacific are based on its assessment of geopolitical, economic, and military realities. The global architecture cannot be sustained as is. Yet, the current architecture, like any other complex institution, is inherently rigid and cannot adapt to change. As a result, the United States is very, very busy and very, very tired at the same time. The pivot to Asia says it all. By definition, one can only pivot in one direction at a time. A couple of years ago, it was a pivot to Asia. Now, of course, we've got problems in Russia and Ukraine. Then again, the Middle East. It makes it very difficult for the boss of the system to sustain a long-term strategy in a particular region. China, of course, does have a long-term strategic objective. It is to reclaim a prominent, preeminent position in Asia. Given its history and its current position, it is an understandable objective and a wholly justified aspiration. Now, in order to do that, it must seek adjustments to the current global architecture in Asia. And this, of course, gives rise to tensions. Many say that China's assertive moves in recent years in Asia, in East Asia and Southeast Asia, have hurt its position. Many of the neighbors have now moved closer to the US in opposition to China. Now, I disagree with that assessment. One cannot get a bigger pie, a bigger share of the pie, and at the same time have everyone else happily obliged. I don't know about you, I've never experienced that in my, in the business world. In 25 years as a capitalist, I've never walked into a boardroom and said, "I think I deserve a higher percentage share in this company," and have everyone else clap and say, "Wonderful, take some more." It doesn't happen. So tension is natural. Now, when you try to get a bigger share of the pie, the upside is the bigger share, and the downside, of course, is the total breakdown which destroys the pie itself. In this case, it will be military conflict. Now, the very essence of strategy is to balance upside and downside and optimize your interests. So, on that ground, it seems to me that China has performed rather brilliantly in recent years. The objective is to realize adjustments to the status quo in its favor without leading to war. In both the South China Sea against the Philippines and the East China Sea vis-à-vis Japan, China has achieved that objective. In the East China Sea, with regards to the Diaoyu Islands, the status quo was Japan's denial of the existence of dispute and its near complete administrative control there. Now, China's moves have made dispute a reality and its presence there also a reality. But no war. In the South China Sea, again, China's presence near Hainan Island has altered the status quo in its favor. But no war. In this respect, I think China holds a significant strategic advantage over, say, Japan. You see, China is an independent player, and Japan is not. Japan is part and parcel to the US-led global architecture and is locked into its alliance system. For instance, Japan has worked very hard to make nice with Russia for several years. It was a priority strategy. Yet, once Ukraine happened, the strategy collapsed because it had to go with the priorities of the Western alliance. So Japan's priorities are subservient to a larger alliance, and China, on the contrary, has wide room for maneuvering, but Japan is boxed in at the strategic level. While Japan's counterparty may be China, China's counterparty is always the United States of America.
Now, this is Chinese anger towards Japan on historic grounds is genuine, but it is a moral imperative, not a strategic point. Between China and the United States, the US is, of course, much more powerful than China in all respects, but it is not when considering the size of their respective objectives at the moment. China's objectives in Asia are modest relative to its national capabilities. It's punching below its weight. America's objectives in the world are enormous compared to its national capabilities, and it, the internal problems it faces, it's punching above its weight. It is in that context China will execute its strategies, and the longer-term result will be qualitative recalculations by China's neighbors in the region. So, is there a cold war emerging? I don't think so. In Asia, China is deeply engaged with all its neighbors, including Japan, at all levels. It doesn't mean there will be no tension and unhappiness as China gradually gains a bigger share of the pie. But it's not a cold war. The, to the term cold war, of course, reminds us of the struggle between America and the Soviet Union. Now, in the world at large, again, China is totally different from the Soviet Union. China is deeply integrated in the world economy. In fact, it is the largest trading nation in the world and in history. China's engagement with the United States is extraordinary in breadth and depth and scale. America's future generations depend on China's stability and prosperity, and vice versa. I argue that never in the history of the world have two countries been so interdependent on each other as America and China are today. Are there risks? Of course, there could be accidents, unpredictable events. Now, I want to also correct a couple of misperceptions on how to deal with the issues at hand. First is the notion of the law, the so-called rule of law. Prime Minister Abe's centerpiece of his address in, in, in Singapore a few months ago. Of course, people refer to UNCLOS, and I heard UNCLOS over and over again in Singapore three months ago. I finally went back to Shanghai and I read the thing, page to page, every page. And to those of you who are interested in being tortured, I recommend it highly. But, you know what I discovered? UNCLOS does not address the issues at hand, which is a sovereignty dispute. UNCLOS does not address it. In fact, if you read history, when UNCLOS was set up, it specifically went around the issue of historical titles. Otherwise, the law would never have come into existence. Of course, sovereignty issues are fundamentally a political issue. That is why UNCLOS provides a specific opt-out for countries that do not want the law to become a circus. And China has taken that, that option. For instance, the ADIZ issue Yamamoto mentioned, there's no law in the book that would prevent China from establishing an ADIZ. So to mention ADIZ alongside law is disingenuous, to say the least. And let me remind everyone that Japan has the largest ADIZ in Asia, period. China's ADIZ is very, very modest compared with Japan's, even more modest when you, when taking into consideration China's the size of China's landmass, and Japan's. In fact, China's ADIZ that was declared only stretches a few hundred miles from Shanghai and Beijing, its industrial and political center, while Japan's ADIZ at its furthest stretches well over a thousand miles from Japan's political and industrial centers. But there's no law to prevent Japan from doing, of course, every, and, and, and Japan's ADIZ has been enlarged many times, multiple times in, in the past decades, every time unilaterally, without making a call to anybody, maybe to America. So, so I think there are rhetorics, but when we, if we want to resolve issues, we need to be clear-headed. Um, but short of accidents, we need to be patient. The global architecture is, by definition, rigid. It is difficult to make adjustments. Adjustments may be painful, and we're in the process of a long and complex negotiation between China and America. But China's strategies and America's own interests and their interdependence will lead to the gradual emergence of a new configuration. Thank you. [applause]
Four or five questions. Um, and I see, first of all, Sanjay Baru. Thank you, Tim. Uh, my question is to Mr. Lee. Um, you began by asserting that there is no Asia, and then you ended up by saying that China's, uh, goal is to seek a preeminent position in Asia. Uh, so what is this Asia you're talking about? Uh, East Asia, Southeast Asia, or Asia as is being suggested by the topic of the day? My second brief question is, um, you referred to the moral aspect of China's anger with Japan, uh, rather than political or strategic. But why did the moral issue not come up in the '90s when Japan, China was the largest recipient of Japanese foreign direct investment and aid? >> Thank you very much, Sanjay. Uh, Mr. Harris. >> Uh, thank you very much. Uh, Matthew Harris from King's College London, and, um, shortly. Um, one of the features of the Cold War, uh, the first Cold War, uh, was a, uh, preoccupation with the transfer of reputational concerns from one region to another. Um, so I'd like to ask, uh, Mr. Yamamoto. Um, what lessons Japan has, uh, learned, if any, um, from the crisis in Ukraine, uh, either about the resolve of the United States, uh, or about the, uh, use of economic instruments, um, in deterrence or norm reinforcement, or about the possible response to actions in the so-called gray zone between, uh, war and peace? Thanks very much. Thank you very much. Uh, Christian Lamir. Uh, >> Thank you, Tim. Um, a question for, uh, Mr. Lee. As a recent reader of UNCLOS, could you clarify whether you think, uh, China's nine-dash line is in line with China's very clear rules on maritime zones that can be claimed from, uh, land areas? And secondly, you talk about China trying to gain a preeminent position within Asia or even globally, but it seems to be predicated on a, an optimistic assessment of China's continued growth, almost in a linear fashion. Do you think there may be any, um, bumps in the road for China's, uh, economic and therefore strategic growth in the future? >> Thanks, Christian. Uh, William Chung. >> Thank you, Tim. William from the, um, question for Eric Lee. Completely understand your position that China intends to grab a bigger piece of the pie. But, uh, we can see that in its process of grabbing a bigger piece of the pie, as you state, it's led to greater tensions, and essentially, what we see is the Chinese game of chicken in the, uh, Asia-Pacific. So, what do you say when there's a reconstituted, reconstituted Chinese sphere of influence, um, in the South China Sea, East China Sea, uh, somewhat analogous to your nine-dash line, um, to see many unhappy constituents in the Chinese empire that is about to emerge in this part of the world? Thank you. >> Thanks, William. Takashi Maeda. >> Thank you. Uh, my question is going to Mr. Lee. You, you talk about that your Chinese counterpart is only the United States, but this rhetoric is the same rhetoric that North Korea is using in its nuclear deal rather than the, uh, six-party talks. On the other hand, you say that your China is now, uh, using a different rhetoric in terms of maritime security and South China against ASEAN countries, the China is going to deal with them on a country-by-country basis rather than ASEAN. So, what, what is the difference between the two rhetorics? >> Thank you. Uh, Ms. Eggborg. >> Thank you. Kathleen Eggborg, Swedish Ministry of Defense. Uh, I have a question for Mr. Lee. Uh, what are the changes to the current architecture that China is likely to seek in its negotiations, primarily with the US? Thank you. Mr. Raman. >> [clears throat] >> from Yamamoto principle to the Yamamoto principle. Quite impressed. Very briefly, I have problems in, uh, agreeing with, uh, what Mr. Lee has suggested in his brilliant, uh, exposition of the position of China. UNCLOS has helped Bangladesh, a small country, to resolve the problems of maritime boundary with India and Myanmar precisely through UNCLOS and the opt-out, uh, clause in UNCLOS, with which I was deeply involved, does not particularly give the permission to any country to go and occupy or kind of threaten or whatever. Just to make sure that there is no war. There is a war, it doesn't mean that there is peace. Absence of war is not peace. So that is something I would like to hear from Mr. Lee. Thank you very much. And, and finally, uh, Professor Schaffer. >> Teracita Schaffer from Brookings and McLarty Associates. Uh, I, this is really an extension of Sanjay Baru's, uh, question. I wonder if, uh, all of the participants could say where India figures in their discussions of tensions in Asia, um, and more broadly, where the Indian Ocean region figures in this. Thank you. We have, uh, uh, eight, eight questions there. That's quite a lot for our panelists to deal with. And so I'll, I'll give each of them the chance to, to respond to whichever of the questions they feel best equipped to answer. And I, I think, um, I think starting with, with Eric Lee, and then Yamamoto-san, and then, uh, Sarah, to, to, uh, wrap up. Eric.
>> Uh, thank you. Thank you for the questions. Uh, first of all, when I said Asia does not exist, of course, I was speaking metaphorically. It, of course, does exist on the ground. It, but, but I was making a point that it is qualitatively different from the way Europe exists or America exists. Um, and it is a qualitatively different, and, and we need to consider that in that context. Um, the, in terms of UNCLOS and the nine-dash line, the nine-dash line has a long history, much, much longer than UNCLOS, decades longer. Um, even, I think it was after World War II, the ROC government put out a nine-dash line, maybe I think it was a 12-line or something like that. So, so this has been a long-running dispute that predated UNCLOS, and UNCLOS does not deal with a nine-dash line. UNCLOS does not deal with sovereignty issues. I, I, I, I cannot find, I read it. I cannot find anywhere in there that deals with sovereignty issues, like who should own what. Um, uh, in terms of the, uh, China's trajectory, um, speaking as a businessman, um, I, I am cautiously optimistic. Um, it's the next phase of Chinese growth is not going to be double-digit growth like the past 20, 30 years. Uh, but I think China could comfortably grow at 7 to 8% for the next generation, by about 20 years, and it will surpass the US as the largest economy probably within a few years, maybe five years, six, seven years. Uh, it has already, it is already this year the largest economy in the world on purchasing power parity, according to the World Bank data. Um, so I think that will continue. Um, the absence of war is not peace. I think the absence of war is peace. I don't know how else to put it logically. If there's no war, there is peace. Uh, there are tensions, but tension doesn't mean there's no peace. Uh, a peaceful environment always has tension. Um, oh, ASEAN. Of course, China wants to deal with individual countries in ASEAN bilaterally because they could get a better deal that way. They're not stupid. Thank you. >> Are there any other questions here? Is there any other >> One more thing I want to, uh, with regards to the first question and, and several others afterwards. I believe I said China's objective is to reclaim a preeminent position in Asia. I believe I did not say the preeminent position. If I said the preeminent position, I stand corrected. I mean a preeminent position. But I, I believe I did say a preeminent position. Thank you. So does that imply a willingness to, to share the preeminent position? >> Well, of course, by definition. >> Okay. Yeah. >> Okay. Thank you very much, Dr. Before answering, uh, the question about Ukraine, I want to make some comments regarding the presentation, uh, made by, uh, uh, Mr. Lee. Uh, he pointed out that, uh, Chinese, uh, air defense identification zone is modest. Japanese ADIZ is larger than that of, uh, uh, China's, but the point is not the size of, uh, uh, the, you know, ADIZ. The concept that the Chinese government is trying to bring about as an ADIZ is very much different from that of ADIZ which was used in our context. Well, um, uh, China tried to, uh, uh, unduly, how do you say that, infringe on the freedom of flight on the high seas in the East China Sea, which is against the principle of international law. That's, that's one point which I'd like to make. And also, uh, well, Mr. Lee's presentation was very clear, powerful, but, uh, you know, I cannot agree with you with him that he's saying that China has achieved its objective, uh, uh, you know, in East China Sea and South, Southeast, South China Sea without a war. But I think it's a very dangerous game. Well, according to a poll conducted by a Japanese, uh, uh, uh, nonprofit organization, more than 93% of Japanese, I was stunned, uh, uh, you know, have a negative image about China, uh, or, or, you know, this sentiment of Japanese toward, uh, China has been deteriorated in the last two years, especially after when, uh, uh, the Chinese ship intruded into the territorial waters of Japan, surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and intentionally, uh, uh, you know, clashed with the Japanese coast guard vessel. I am a bit afraid that this kind of, you know, sentiment, uh, how do you say that, unhealthy, you know, uh, nationalism, uh, if, if unhealthy nationalism flares up, it will become, you know, a kind of situation which is very difficult to control. So, um, uh, I think, you know, I'm a bit worried about his way of putting that China has, you know, achieved its objective without a war. I, I think I, I'm very much worried. The most important thing between China and Japan at this moment is to, to make efforts to avoid unexpected conflicts. That's the reason why the Japanese government has been asking to, asking China to, uh, establish a kind of mechanism, some kind of mechanism for preventing and avoiding unexpected, uh, uh, crash or collision which may lead to a real, you know, conflict, for instance, through creating, uh, uh, maritime communication mechanism. And I think, you know, not only in the water, I think, you know, the space, airspace, uh, over the Senkaku Islands is more, you know, dangerous. And, and also, so these are things which I want to make a comment on Mr. Lee's, you know, presentation. And, um, what Japan has learned from the lesson of Ukraine, Ukraine, I don't, I have to, you know, make a short speech. I'm sorry on my English, but anyway, the, the most important thing which Japan learned from the Ukraine issue is that we should never allow any country to change, uh, the status quo by force or coercion. That is the reason why Japan decided to participate in, in the sanction against Russia, in spite of the fact that Prime Minister Abe has, you know, been maintaining a very good relations with President Putin, not because the United States asked Japan to do that. Uh, I, you know, feel also a little bit uneasiness when I learned that Chinese opinion leaders, including, you know, Mr. Lee, believe that, you know, Chinese, how do you say that, tacit support to Russia in the context of the Crimea issue is consistent with a Chinese, uh, long-term strategic, you know, thinking. I think this kind of world, a kind of worldview is a bit dangerous because it doesn't reflect the basic fundamental, uh, uh, uh, uh, values such as the rule of law, uh, uh, democracy, and human rights, and particularly human-centered ideas such as, uh, human security. Okay, thank you very much. And, uh, Sarah, you can, you have the chance to try and >> Three very quick points. Uh, one, a direct answer to your, uh, interesting question on where India sits in all of this. Uh, Prime Minister Modi's first visit outside of the Indian subcontinent was a five-day visit to Japan. Um, Prime Minister Modi is one of only four people that Prime Minister Abe follows on Twitter, at least the last time. >> I can follow him. Yeah. [laughter and clears throat] Um, and, uh, during that visit, we saw an upgrade of India-Japan-US trilateral talks to foreign minister level, uh, defense cooperation memo. So, quite some substance to a cultivation, if you like, of, uh, Prime Minister Modi that has been going on since his days as first chief minister in Gujarat. Uh, of course, we have now had the visit of President Xi, uh, to New Delhi. Uh, there was an interesting op-ed authored by, uh, Xi in The Hindu, which talked about the, uh, economics, uh, alliances, if you like, between China and India. India is the backroom office, and China is the factory of the world. But when I look at the substance in terms of foreign defense, uh, policy, strategic view of the world, I still see some, uh, considerable differences there. Uh, secondly, um, on Ukraine, if I may, there is a lot we could say on, uh, China, of course, and attitudes and, uh, interests in what's going on in Russia and Ukraine. Uh, but one just general reminder, in case any of us need it reminding, one lesson of Ukraine is that economic interdependence doesn't mean that you won't get conflict. After all, Europe is Russia's primary destination for its exports, which provide about 50% of Russia's government revenue, yet we still have the situation that we have in Crimea. And finally, um, just a brief, uh, thought on, uh, the domestic economic challenges that Christian, uh, rightly, uh, raised. Again, a lot that could be said, but to, alongside the economic challenges about which we'll know more when the fourth plan of the Chinese, uh, Communist Party takes place in October in Beijing, of course, are the social challenges and the doctrinal challenge. I think, uh, the interesting doctrinal challenge is what is going to come after Deng's dictum: "Observe calmly, hide our capabilities, and bide our time." And I think we still don't know the answer about what's going to replace eventually that dictum. And finally, the social challenges, bring it back to the, uh, cold war theme. I think one of the lessons that you, uh, see at the moment from President Xi's action, uh, of the, uh, reasons that, uh, the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, is that if you're going to do perestroika economic reform, you certainly don't do glasnost at the same time. >> Thank you very much, Sarah. And [clears throat] I, I need to bring this session to a to a close. Unfortunately, I think we could have, could have gone on for another hour or so. Um, these are, these are huge topics, but I, I must, uh, thank our panelists for three excellent presentations, each of which was, uh, was, uh, forthright, uh, in its own way. And I think, uh, I think this session very usefully carried forward, uh, the tradition that I think we've established at the Shangri-La Dialogue in, in recent years, of, uh, frank, uh, and at the same time hopefully constructive, uh, discussion of Asia-Pacific security issues. So thank you, thank, thank all of you very much. Forevench. Fore speech. It's toochee. Fore! Fore!chch! foreign. Byebye.