Transcription
Welcome back. We are joined today by Scott Ritter.
A former UN weapons inspector, a US Marine Corps intelligence officer, and a prolific author. So, thank you very much for coming on the program.
Uh, we appear to be entering very dangerous uh times. That is, the attacks on Russia are now intensifying. We saw massive drone attacks on Moscow over the weekend and, uh, before we logged on. Now, I saw that, uh, drones were also entering the space around St. Petersburg, very far away from Ukraine, I would add, uh, to the extent they had to shut down many of the flights going out of Pulkovo.
Um, how, to what extent, uh, is the West involved in this attack, in these attacks?
Let's make it absolutely clear. If it wasn't for Western, um, involvement, these attacks would not be taking place. The technologies being used are developed by the West for Ukraine. The intelligence information, uh, is provided exclusively by the West for Ukraine. Um, the manufacturing, uh, is done outside of Ukraine to avoid Russian interdiction. Um, again, this is not an example of Ukraine, uh, escalating against Russia. This is the collective West escalating against Russia. This is, you know, a, a reflection of the reality that, um, you know, NATO is actively engaged, or NATO nations are actively engaged in combat operations against Russia, uh, that is basically, you know, achieving, you know, an existential threat to the, you know, survival of Russia.
Well, I see in Europe, there's a lot of talk about the need to bring the war to Russia. There's a lot of talk about mass-producing long-range weapons to strike Russia. I guess when do they cross the, the point when for Russia to do nothing is more dangerous than, uh, hitting back, I guess? Because we seem to be crossing this, well, if we haven't already, we would cross it fairly soon, it seems.
No, it's been crossed a long time ago. You have, uh, major Western nations, Germany, France, Great Britain, and others, openly articulating the necessity, uh, to, uh, engage Russia in open armed conflict by the end of this decade, 2029, 2030. We now have Pistorius, the defense minister of Germany, openly saying that Russia is our enemy, and we need to prepare to go to war. And now they're preparing the weapons of war, specifically to conduct long-range strike missions inside Russia. So, I mean, again, I'm not a Russian leader, and there's a good reason why I'm not. A, I'm American, and B, um, you wouldn't want me to be your leader because we'd be at war with Europe right now. I'd be launching preemptive strikes. I'd be taking out production facilities. I'd be destroying decision-making centers, and I'd be implementing in full effect the Kaggon of doctrine.
Well, um, yeah, it appears though that, uh, yeah, know, it's, it's very strange. If you listen to the rhetoric four years ago, the, the caution and something that sounded like rational arguments and concern about being participants in the war, where, where the rhetoric now, it's, it's very far apart. Uh, but a lot of these attacks on Russia now appears, not appears, they evidently so, has, uh, gone through the Baltic states. Then we've seen, especially Estonia and Latvia. Of course, they have to transit through Lithuania as well if this is going to work. But, uh, uh, we also heard that, um, some statements from the Russian, uh, foreign intelligence services arguing that Ukraine is preparing strikes on Russia from Latvian territory. Uh, I mean, once the Russians make these statements, aren't they committing to something? Because if they say, we know it's happening from Latvia, but we're not going to do anything, it seems that this will become an impossibility.
Well, yes, it's, I think it's gone beyond the concept of a possibility to a probability, uh, and maybe even an absolute certainty. I think Latvia is being marked for death. Um, I, I don't believe Russia. Again, I, I don't pretend to know anything about the. I do know Sergey Karaganov. You know Sergey Karaganov, um, and, you know, that he's a serious man. Um, uh, he's, he's a rational actor. He's not an irrational actor, and he's somebody whose voice, um, has influence. Um, and, you know, Sergey Karaganov and others like him who advise, or whose opinions are, are heeded by the Ministry of Defense and Russian leadership, you know, have articulated a very sound, rational case for Russian military, um, intervention, decisive. Uh, I don't believe these people who speak of Russian military intervention are playing the game of, um, you know, managed escalation. I think we're beyond that. The reason why we're where we're at, and I don't blame Vladimir Putin. He was a genius, and he still is a genius. Um, you know, he has been managing the escalation ladder, um, in, in perfect form, because never once prior to, you know, this most recent, um, era and this war, um, did Ukraine pose an existential threat to the security of Russia. It was always the potential. But we know that the West has been articulating in favor of the strategic defeat of Russia since the beginning of the special military operation. We know this, and we know that they have been pushing Russia, pushing Russia, pushing Russia. Russia sets a red line, it gets, it gets crossed. Russia resets the red line, it gets crossed. Now, Russia, uh, you know, resets it for a reason, because the crossing of the red line, um, you know, was designed, you know, was, was done by design to get a Russian overreaction, uh, so that the West could mobilize support and solidify support on behalf of Ukraine. It was Russia's goal and objective to keep the West, um, you know, from being able to do that. So you don't overreact. You allow the red lines to be crossed because, at the end of the day, it didn't change the, you know, the ultimate calculation. Russia still prevailed on the battlefield.
Well, Russia's still prevailing on the battlefield today. The, uh, special inspector general of Operation Atlantic Resolve has published a report, uh, recently, just says Russia's dominating across the battlefield. So all those, uh, you know, pro-Ukrainian social media platforms, you'll stick it in your ear. Uh, you know, the special, the United States has spoken. Um, and even that report, you know, is, is very conservative in terms of, you know, giving a lot of credit to Ukraine and NATO that simply isn't reflected by reality. But their conclusions are: Russia maintains operational strategic dominance across the spectrum of this conflict. And that's what Russia has been seeking to do, to wear not just Ukraine down, but the collective West down through a war of attrition, and they're still succeeding.
But what's happened is, because Russia has allowed the collective West to cross red lines, they've crossed the ultimate red line. Because in the past, you always, as you said, the West always went, ah, we want to avoid being able to be categorized as an active participant in the conflict. We always want to create that air of ambiguity. Um, oh, there's no more ambiguity. They're just straight up doing it. Straight up saying it. Um, and now we again, we come to Sergey Keraganov. Um, we probably should do a good job of introducing him to a Western audience. Uh, this is one of the, you know, one of the premier political military analysts in, uh, Russia. A man who has advised Russian presidents from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. In 2023, um, he articulated in writing and spoken word, um, the need for the West to be decisively countered by Russia. He was in favor of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. That when the West articulates a strategy calling for the strategic defeat of Russia, Russia has a duty and responsibility to respond and nip this in the bud before it manifests itself in something that does real harm to Russia. And he, he, he famously said, um, that his calculation is that no American leader will trade Boston for Poznan, meaning Russia could just take out a Polish city with a nuclear weapon, and Europe will do nothing. It'll intimidate Europe, and the United States will do nothing because they don't want to trade Boston for Poznan. Vladimir Putin came out immediately and said, "Nah, I don't agree with Sergey Karaganov. That's not who we are. That's not what we do." In 2024, as the West continued to push, he appointed Sergey Karaganov to be the head of the review process for the Kremlin's strategic nuclear posture review. In 2025, the Russians published a new strategic nuclear posture that basically was the Karaganov doctrine, basically saying that if nuclear powers, um, provide conventional military capability to a non-nuclear power and use that to strike into the strategic depth of Russia, that that threatens Russia's, you know, strategic infrastructure, that Russia, uh, is therefore empowered to use nuclear weapons in response. They can treat this as a nuclear attack. Um, that's exactly what's happening. People need to understand that this doctrine was published last year. It was covered. We talked about it. Everybody talked about it. Everybody knew this. And yet the West is doing something now that is just flagrantly crossing that red line because they believe Russia is bluffing. And so now they've crossed the red line, and Ukraine is, is doubling down because Ukraine smells blood. Ukraine is dying. And for the first time, Ukraine's going, "Wait a minute. We're doing real harm here. Let's keep doing it. Let's keep doing it." Because they want NATO to become engaged. That's their goal. That's their salvation. And so Ukraine is just doubling down, doubling down, doubling down, throwing caution to the wind. You know, in a week and a half's time, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum opens up. This is like the premier, you know, thing. It's bigger than Davos. Everybody in the West knows Davos. St. Petersburg International Forum swamps it. It's bigger. More participants, more money, more everything. You think the Russians are going to let Ukrainian drones come out of the Baltics and threaten this? You think that's going to happen? You think they're going to let this happen? No, not at all. Um, I, I see nothing but bad things, bad tidings. Um, I think the West has gone too far. I think there will be hell to pay. Um, I don't know if Russia limits it to Latvia. Um, if I were the Russians, I wouldn't. I would take out the production facilities in England, in, um, in Germany, in Denmark, all identified production facilities associated with the FP5 and other drones. I would take out German, uh, companies involved in guidance and control. And I would even take out Ramstein. Maybe not. Maybe that's an American base. But I would threaten to take out Ramstein to follow on attack where the intelligence is, is gathered and disseminated. But the West has to be struck a blow. And I would eliminate Kiev once and for all. I think it's time to find out what a dozen Arashniks can do to downtown Kiev. Um, and I think it's time to show the, the Ukrainians that that's the fate of all of your cities if you want to continue this war. Uh, Russia, Vladimir Putin said on May 9th that he wants this war to wrap up. Uh, a lot of people went, "Oh, that's a sign of Russian weakness. Russia's willing." No, it's a sign of Russian recognition of their strength, and it's time to flex their muscles. Um, the day of restraint, I believe, is over. I believe we're moving to a very dangerous period because now we get to answer the question, what will the United States do when Russia strikes a NATO country? How will Article 5 be treated?
Yeah, I spoke to Karaganov last week and he, while on this program, and he was making the point that in the past, he was, uh, representing a small minority who said it's time to retaliate directly against, uh, the Europeans. But, uh, now he says he represents the overwhelming majority. So you already had all this pressure building up on the Kremlin that, you know, they had to choose a different path. This dilemma: do they, they retaliate against NATO and risk going up the escalation ladder, or did they, you know, look the other way and, uh, again, risk emboldening NATO? They always went with the second option, but now the pressure was mounting so much. And just at this point, when all this pressure is mounting on Putin to take a harder line, we see these massive drone attacks and just, uh, uncontrolled celebrations in, in Europe. And this is what's, yeah, so concerning. It's, it's as if they don't see what's coming next. I mean, you know, they use all these terms like, because bad for Russia, they think is good for us. Before, you used this term that, you know, the people online, the pro-Ukrainian bloggers or social media activists, is not even pro-Ukrainian. These are the people. If, if Ukraine had implemented the Minsk agreement, done anything like this, which they always opposed, uh, Ukraine will be intact. Now, this is, uh, these people are destroying Ukraine. It's quite insane. But my, my concern is what the Europeans are celebrating now, which is that they're having, uh, has the attacks on Russia is having a growing impact on Russian security. And this seems to, they seem to be making a significant dent in the Russian energy. Again, I'm not sure how much, but at least it, it seems to be enough to create problems for the Russians. And if this is the case, uh, that means the Russians can't afford to look the other way anymore. Uh, I don't know. How are you assessing the attacks on the Russian energy security or energy? Because I mean, this is the irony. We should be happy that we weren't making a dent. Once we start making a dent, the calculations seem they have to change, don't they? On the Russian side.
Look, last November, um, I was in Moscow and I interviewed somebody, uh, affiliated with the, uh, Russian Duma, State Duma, uh, involved in the, uh, committee on, you know, the protection of energy infrastructure from drone attacks. I'm sure it had a more Russian name than that. Um, but, you know, he, he was on it, and I was surprised by the frankness of his conversation. I actually published it on, uh, on the Russia House. I think many people, um, ignored it, uh, at the time because, you know, it's, it's people don't like to dig deep into, you know, fact-based reality. They like to live in their little fantasy worlds. Um, I'm going to republish it and, um, and ask people to listen to it because it's important what he said at the time. He said that these attacks were taking place, uh, but that the real damage done was minimal, that Russia was able to mitigate the damage and then repair the facilities and bring them back into order. So, you know, the strategic impact was not. Which is why again, it's not that Karaganov's, um, arguments became, uh, again, I don't believe Vladimir Putin responds to pressure from Sergey Karaganov or anybody else. That's not how the game plays, and I don't think Sergey Karaganov, uh, is, is, is promoting himself as a man who has intimidated Putin into changing his mind. Sergey Karaganov has taken a stance, um, and Vladimir Putin has said, no, we, uh, the damage being done doesn't rate an overreaction. But now that damage equation has changed. It's not that Sergey Karaganov's arguments, you know, that that Putin's been pressured. Putin's a pragmatic guy, and he's looking at it. The damage being done now to Ukrainian energy infrastructure is real, and it's not easily mitigated, and it's not easily repaired, meaning that when you do this damage, damage, it's long-term. Um, and Russia can't afford long-term damage. Um, you know, that again, there's things that happen in Russia that we're not aware of. And, um, you know, I, I believe Russia, you know, the idea that Russia operates on the margins is absurd. I believe Russia probably has strategic reserves, just like everybody else. And I believe that they're able to ride this out because you see a lot of people talking about Russia's, you know, export volumes haven't dropped significantly, but the potential for, uh, you know, the production of, you know, refined ex, ex products for export is, is being impacted. And at some point in time, the reserves run out, and if you haven't brought this potential back up, you're going to have that, you're going to have a gap, and it's going to be meaningful. It's not Vladimir Putin's job to allow Russia to get to the point where you have meaningful impact. His job is to prevent that from happening. So, you know, this is my way of answering your question. I believe that between 10 and 20% of Russia's export production capacity has been damaged to an extent beyond that which it was being impacted in November. That this damage will take months to repair. And that if Russia doesn't nip this in the bud now, by the time they repair it and bring it back online, the reserves that are currently carrying them through this pro, this process will be depleted, and then you're going to have a real and significant impact. Um, and that's why Russia needs to act now. Um, and I also think that the Ukrainians become more and more emboldened. Um, you don't want, we know what the consequences of an attack on the Kremlin will be, fatal for everybody. Um, but if you're a Russian, you don't want the Kremlin attacked. You don't want to wait for that to happen. You see the Ukrainians moving in that direction. This is the direction they are heading. It's inevitable. You see the West backing up. You see the rhetoric, and the damage is being done. This is the moment of decision right now. Um, if you wait, you allow the Ukrainians to do significant, meaningful harm of an existential nature. Right now, Russia has the capacity to absorb, um, repair, and move on if the threat could be terminated. So now is the moment of decisive action. Um, and I, I, you know, again, I can't, I don't want to speak on behalf of anybody. It's just assessments, and as we all know, assessments could be wrong. Um, but I, I have to say on May 9th, um, you know, the, the whole s, the whole scene around Victory Day was, I look, you're, you're a specialist. You lived in, in Russia. You know the Russians. This was a different May 9th than I've seen in the last four years since the special military operation began. This was a May 9th of, uh, deathly seriousness. Um, at the embassy, the, the ambassador spoke incessantly about unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender. Linking Nazi Germany and the Ukrainian government in a way that had never been done before. They spoke of Germany as a permanent enemy, not as a former enemy that we, Germany is the enemy today. Is the enemy. This was the language. Dmitri Medvedev, who has always been sort of the bad crazy cop to Putin's good sane cop, um, you know, wrote an article in RT. What's the importance of RT? RT English, it's an article written for the West to read. It, you know, it's designed for Western consumption, but it's, it's an article that, you know, speaks with the force of the Russian government. This is Russian state media. This isn't, uh, Medvedev putting a social media post out on X. This is RT, Russian state media, publishing a major article written by a man who used to be the president of Russia, used to be the prime minister of Russia, and currently is number two on the National Security, uh, you know, council. And the, and the article is devastating for Europe. Um, it pretty much endorses the Karaganov. The day before, had another interview that basically hammered home the same points. The sense I get in having watched Russia, monitored Russia, etc., is that Russia has reached the point of decision. And, um, unless something fundamentally changes, such as the unconditional surrender of Ukraine today, I think we're going to see decisive action before the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum begins to preempt any potential attack. I'd be curious to be a fly on the wall, although that's an insult to the Chinese. I'm sure their sanitation is such that there are no flies on the wall, but being there to be a fly on the wall in the conversations between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping about this because China was extraordinarily tough on Trump about Taiwan. And the Chinese know that Ukraine is as important to Russia as Taiwan is to China. And so, you know, the Financial Times playing their MI6 stupid mind games, you know, putting out this stuff about how, you know, Jinping told Trump that Putin overstepped. The simplistic stupidity of this, you know, Andrei Illarionov, former lieutenant general, advisor to Shoygu when he was minister of defense and the author of the concept of mental warfare. Um, you know, this isn't mental warfare. Mental warfare is actually carefully crafted, designed to get in there, latch in, and rip. What the British did here was just crude and stupid. And you could immediately see all the corrupted social media outlets that immediately jump on and say, "Aha." I mean, just brain-dead people. Um, no, that's not the case at all. But I do believe that this is a very important meeting, and that, uh, you know, look, Russia needs China. There's no doubt about that. Russia needs China, and China needs Russia. And there's no doubt in my mind that, um, this, this meeting may go down in history as sort of the, uh, modern-day version or the present-day version of the February 4th, 2022 meeting where Vladimir Putin flew to, uh, China to Beijing, met with Xi Jinping on the eve of the initiation of the special military operation. I have a feeling that there will be conversations had that, um, at least allow the Chinese to be positioned for, about what's that, for, for what is about to happen.
That's what I was thinking as well because, well, Trump just left, and Putin has arrived in Beijing. And, uh, I'm, I'm assuming if the Russians are now planning to, well, dramatically change their posture in this war, that they would, uh, tell the, well, discuss this, uh, at length with the Chinese first. So I'm assuming as well that this is something they're discussing because, uh, uh, again, there, there is no status quo which they can hold on to. The, the, it's not just where they are today, the drone attacks, but the, the Russians can see exactly what direction this is going. The Chinese can see this. So, uh, it's, I mean, it's so, I think the hatred of Russia in Europe has blinded them completely to, to what will come next. I mean, this is so predictable, the, the war we're walking into, and yet nothing, no debate, no discussion, no dissent, not a squeak. I mean, it's, it's extraordinary. I mean, this is must be the most ridiculous, uh, World War we're walking into here. But, um, uh, I, I did want to get your thought on something though. That is the defense minister in Latvia resigned after some, I think the Ukrainian drones were scrambled and they hit some targets within Latvia. What do you make of this situation?
It's hard to know unless you have, you know, access to the totality of information. I think what happened is there's embarrassment. There can be no doubt that, um, I mean, you know, there's, there's stupid games played all the time. Um, uh, implausible deniability is the coin of the realm when it comes to, you know, the official face of governance, but militaries and intelligence services often time engage in, um, covert relationships that are deniable or supposed to be deniable. I think, um, they got caught with their pants down, and, uh, it's an embarrassing situation. Um, and so he, he paid the price. He, he, he was relieved of his position, but, uh, the policy is not changing. Um, I mean, again, we don't know the, the details. I mean, you know, they're, they're saying that these are drones that are redirected by the Russians using electronic warfare. The Russians are saying that these drones were in the, the airspace. I think people have been tracking the drones and they see there's a definite Baltic corridor. So that's not an invention. That's not imagination. Whether the Russians were clever enough to take control of drones and target Baltic oil production is, is another thing. But again, if the Ukrainians weren't using a, a Baltic corridor, then the Russians wouldn't have to do this. Um, but I, I think what we're seeing here is that, uh, you know, there are political ramifications for being caught in failed covert policy.
Well, when the Russian Baltic coast was struck, the, the main argument was, uh, well, it's, they didn't use the, the Baltic airspace. This is Russian propaganda. But, but now we kind of turned the page on this because now they're saying, well, yes, they admitted that the Ukrainian drones over Estonia, Ukrainian drones over the, over Latvia, you know, again, unavoidably so. Then also Russian drones over Lithuania. So, uh, they're recognizing now that they are using this corridor. But it appears that the new narrative is that, oh, we, we haven't permitted it, and we, we oppose it. But again, this, it doesn't make any sense to me.
I want to point out that, you know, just as was the case when the CIA helped the Ukrainians try to attack Vladimir Putin in December of, uh, 2025, uh, during his famous phone call with Donald Trump, um, you know, drones are brought down intact, and the, uh, guidance package is recovered intact, and Russian intelligence is able to extract data that proves everything about the targeting. Um, and it, you know, when the Ukraine launched the amount of drones to do, yes, the Russians are shooting down a lot of drones, but we know that electronic warfare, for instance, let's take, if the Russians can take a drone and redirect it to a target, they can take a drone and land it. Um, and there's no doubt in my mind that the Russians have recovered intact a number of these drones and have reverse-engineered the guidance, and they understand exactly the path flown by the drones. Um, and they also by evaluating the data can tell where the data came from. Um, you know, what intelligence sources were used, etc. The, so I believe the Russians have a very, very full picture of, um, of what's going on, which is why when Narishkin publishes, um, you know, very pointed intelligence, um, I, I think, uh, we have to respect the fact that it's probably fact-based, not just rumor, speculation, or disinformation.
Well, uh, just as, you know, they couldn't get more, uh, reckless. So, we see that out of Lithuania, they're making the comments that we should now put more pressure on the fortress Kaliningrad. Um, and this is again, the Kaliningrad, you know, the enclave. It has, uh, it's stuck here and severed from the rest of the Russian Federation. But this still hosts a million, uh, Russian civilians. They also host nuclear weapons. Um, but we earlier on we had the, uh, well, it's been a while now, about the US general, Dunford, making the point that, oh, we can take Kaliningrad. Um, all, all of this rhetoric essentially about attacking, uh, Russia. I mean, how do you make sense of this? Because this is happening at the same time as the British now are trying to lead this naval, uh, group to confront the Russians. And I think it's quite predictable that they want to, if not put a full blockade, at least harass Russian ships in the Baltic Sea. So we see the escalation at every, at every level. Do, do you, do you see Kaliningrad possibly being a flashpoint? Or, I mean, there's so many possible flashpoints now, I guess. I mean, it could be, uh, because we're, we're talking about insanity. Um, you know, I publicly cautioned General Dunford, not that he would listen to me, but I said, the quickest way to ensure that you, um, end up being marked with a stone at Arlington, your body won't be recovered, but there'll be a stone at Arlington, is to attack Kaliningrad because the Russians will instantly kill you, your command staff, and everybody affiliated with this attack. Um, you know, it's just stupid. The, the Estonians making similar things, you know, Latvians threatening. Um, I tell you, the quickest way to make Kaliningrad not an enclave is to attack Kaliningrad because we're going to see the Baltics become Russian again, and they'll become Russian overnight. Um, you know, that's just the reality of it. Um, if that's the game they want to play, Russia doesn't want to do this. Um, but, you know, Russia's not going to yield on this point. Um, and if it does become a flashpoint, it's a flashpoint that marks the total eradication of the Baltic states, which will be interesting because then what will NATO do? Nothing. They can do nothing. Um, the Baltics have always been this exposed appendage, uh, that, you know, is Sweden now going to commit suicide, come in and save the Baltics? The Finns are going to make an attack on the Kola Peninsula and Vyborg to save the Baltics? No, because that would be the end of Finland, and that would be the end of Sweden. Um, I mean, these nations joined a failing military alliance that has no political viability and zero military, um, capacity to meaningfully project power. I, I just don't understand, you know, where is the commander of, you know, NATO forces, um, telling the military council to tell the yappy Baltic poodles to, or Chihuahuas, to shut up. I mean, because the, these, the, the rhetoric is, is fatal to, uh, NATO. If you want to have NATO totally collapse, show that Article 5 is absolutely meaningless. And the best way to show that Article 5 is absolutely meaningless is to provoke the Russians. What does the British fleet think they're going to do besides sink? I mean, it's, it's, it's stunning. They all believe Russia's bluffing. They all believe Russia's bluffing. I mean, and they, they, they misunderstand patience and pragmatism for weakness.
>> Yeah. No, I also heard the talks that, you know, Medvedev is putting on a show. Same as Karaganov, that he is just putting on a show. They really respect the, you know, they really deterred by NATO. But, you know, I don't think this is all for show as well. I've, I've been in Karaganov's office just one-on-one before 2022 when he made the point as well that he doesn't believe that, as you said before, that the US would risk New York for Tallinn or something. So it's not going to happen. So I, I, yeah, I think this overconfidence that the Russians can be deterred, that they wouldn't dare. I think that they were cautious because it would be reckless thing to attack a NATO country, but they kind of put the Russians in a position where it's, yeah, even more reckless not to do anything. And, you know, the, the idea you mentioned now that the Russians could take the Baltic states. I'm thinking a little bit about George Kennan. Gave this interview, um, with the New York Times back in '98 when he, he made the point that, you know, all the NAT push, people pushing for NATO expansionism, at at some point, the, the Russians are going to have to push back. And he made the prediction at that point, the NATO expanders will essentially say, ah, look, the Russians have always been imperialist, that's just how they are. And he was making the point that is flawed. They will respond to what we're doing now. That was his main argument. I feel now it's the same thing that is, the Baltic states, uh, you know, for the past four years, been saying, oh, the Russians might march on, you know, Paris or, you know, after done with Ukraine, they'll invade Latvia. You know, I, I always made the point that that's ridiculous. No one in Russia wants to go into Latvia. But, uh, it's now, it doesn't so look ridiculous anymore. I, I don't think they want to annex that territory. Sounds like a mess. But I do think that they will strike it, probably. I mean, I think we crossed that boundary as well. There's, there's no coming back from this. Uh, even if we stopped here and pulled back a bit, you know, but, but we're going to continue to plow forward.
>> Yeah, I, I, I agree. I mean, you know, which, which one of the republics is it? Estonia that has the large Russian population, or Latvia? Uh, they both have about, well, significant, uh, I think 20% or, um, yeah, at this, this is the, those countries, but they also have a, they also had the strictest, strictest laws where the ethnic Russians or Russian speakers, they can't, uh, hold government office, they don't get the voting rights, so they're kind of second-rate citizens. And, um, the whole argument when they were joining the, joining NATO in the EU in 2004 was, oh, Russia should be happy because, uh, you know, the EU, NATO stands for human rights. So now the Russians should be reassured that the Russian minority will get rights. But, again, we're now 22 years later, this, there's no, nothing has been done. They don't, so, yeah, no, I think, um, um, well, there's a higher concentration, I think, in, in a specific region in Estonia. So if they would, uh, in Narva, but, yeah.
>> I, I just think that, you know, they should study the history of the special military operation and understand the difference between, uh, Rossi and Rossian, um, between Slavic Russian people and the Russian nation. And understand that in Estonia, it's both Rossian and Rossi, and you're playing with fire. I mean, it's the, and you're giving the Russians the excuse to do something that otherwise they wouldn't do. Um, yeah, I, I'm, again, I'm, um, I'm nervous. I don't know about you. I'm a little nervous. I don't want to test Karaganov's thesis. I don't want to test it because, um, I know the outcome. I believe Karaganov is right that the United States will not sacrifice Boston or New York for Poznan or another city. But the United States can't allow Russia to create a new paradigm of nuclear deterrence where you have one power not only possessing nuclear weapons but having demonstrated the capacity to use nuclear weapons. Uh, the other power can't sit there passively and, and to be the same way. They must use nuclear weapons too. And then the United States now has carte blanche to use nuclear weapons against Iran. Um, and we will, um, because the precedent's been set by Russia. And once we begin these exchanges, it doesn't stop until there's a general exchange, and we're all dead. Um, this is the flaw. I call it the fallacy, the Karaganov fallacy. Um, I don't want to test it. I mean, you know, he, Sergey Karaganov is a man I respect. I'm sure you respect him as well. His intellectual capacity is, is prodigious and somewhat intimidating sometimes. So, you know, I, I, I don't want to claim that I'm smarter than he is, but on the issue of nuclear war and nuclear weapons, I am experienced. And my gut feeling, and as an experienced analyst, you sort of go with your gut feeling on the, on occasion, is that, uh, there's no containing nuclear weapons once they're used. Once they're used, whether it takes months, years, a decade, eventually we're going to have a general nuclear exchange that takes out all of humanity. And I'd prefer that not to happen. Um, which means I, I'd prefer no Russian conventional strikes. I'd prefer peace. I'd prefer sanity, reason. But the West is far, you know, is, is basically punted on that one. So, here we are.
>> Yeah. No, I always make that point as well. What's going to kill us all is the, the delusion of escalation control. Once we be, well, do what we're doing now, the, the belief that, well, we can just escalate a little bit more, a little bit more. If the Russians don't care for it, maybe we'll take a little step back and then push forward again. It's, I think this is the dangerous solution. We're going to lose very quickly control over, over this. And that should be the lesson of Iran as well, by the way, that you, you can't, you can't go back to status quo, essentially.
Marco Rubio needs to learn that lesson, um, but, uh, because he, I wish we could go back to this Barbara Tuchman's book, um, was it March of Folly that she wrote, or August? I think March of Folly, um, about basically the, uh, summer of 1914. Nobody believed that they all believed it was containable, that it wasn't, that you just have a little conflict with Serbia, it wasn't going to be a big deal. Don't worry about it. Next thing you know, you have a world war. Just got out of control. Um, and I think that's where we're at right now. I mean, Trump's in desperate. You know, one of the problems we have here is that Trump is not a rational actor, and he's already been humiliated by Iran. Can you really withstand another humiliation? Um, you know, again, these are theses I don't want tested. I don't want to test these. So, but unfortunately, I think we're going to test them.
Well, um, so you assume, you assume it's very likely, if not, uh, guaranteed now that the Russians will retaliate. How do you see them going up this escalation ladder? Do, do, will they go with incrementalism or go in very, go hard, essentially? Because, you know, they could do something from plausible deniability that is sending in Ukrainian drones, essentially down before they can do a conventional strike. I mean, they can do a tactical. I don't think a tactical nuke is, uh, you know, that would be far, far up the escalation ladder. But how do you see them, uh, retaliating or what would you expect? I mean, there's no, there's no Russian playbook, as people say. So it's not necessarily one thing that's true. But what do you think might be possible escalation strategies?
I believe that it's, I have to take off my military hat because my military hat says, you know, when, if you're going to do this, do it decisively. Um, I do believe that Putin will allow for escalation management. But the initial blows will be decisive. I, I think that Kiev will be eliminated, and, um, Vancova, and I believe that, um, a Baltic state will be struck decisively. Um, you hear the rhetoric, uh, the decision-making centers have already been identified. So I believe that there will an example will be set of a Baltic state. A decisive example, um, and then I think there will be, you know, very little wiggle room, meaning that zero tolerance for Western retaliation. Any effort, Western retaliation will bring the full weight of Russian military response. Um, but I do believe that, you know, I don't believe German factories are going to be hit in the first wave. I don't believe, you know, UK factories. I, I think that that will be left for, you know, follow-on wave if necessary. But, um, I do think that Russia will have to put a marker down, and that, um, it won't be just one or two attacks. I think if they hit a Baltic state, they will eliminate the Baltic state. Um, because you have to send a signal. You have to say, there, before the grace of God, go you. This is the future of Germany. And I do think that it's time for Arashnik to be unmilled in all of its awful, horrific reality. No single attacks anymore. Concentrated or Russian attacks the way the weapon was designed to create nuclear type devastation in an urban area, and the West needs to see this. It's so incredibly depressing. Uh, do you think there's any possibility now that we're kind of reaching or reached a point where we're going likely going into a direct war with Russia? Russia will at least retaliate in a big way. Do you think there's any possibility for a diplomatic path? I mean, what do you, what do you make of what the EU is doing now? Because, you know, they're discussing, you know, should we talk to the Russians? Who should talk to the Russians? Who, you know, what should we talk about? What do you make of this?
>> I, I don't see any hope in the EU in the short term maturing to the level, to the degree necessary for diplomatic intervention to be meaningful at this stage because at the same time they're speaking of diplomatic intervention, their militaries are talking about war. Um, you know, you need to shut down the war. I do believe that, um, China provides a very important diplomatic possibility. Um, that China, after Putin leaves China, will be able to contact Trump because there is connectivity there, um, and China will be able to contact the European Union and, uh, put them on notice that, um, this isn't a bluff. This is the real deal. You have no choice but to change the way you're going, or else the consequences will be, um, devastating. So, I, I do think there's still a window of, um, opportunity. Um, but the United States needs something to jump-kick it. And, um, you know, right now, we don't have effective, um, one-on-one with Putin. I, I think if China intervenes, then Trump may call Putin. Putin may call Trump. And, um, and pressure could be placed on Europe. And I'm hoping that that's the case. I'm hoping the United States puts Europe on notice that if they continue down this path, the United States will not be there for them. Um, that this is their problem, and they need to stop this right now. And the United States also needs to basically tell Ukraine, it's over. It's finished. You're done. Um, whether Trump could do that, like I said, if, if he had won Iran, maybe he'd have some, you know, political capital to spend, but he's a very weakened man. I don't, I don't see him being able to to take two defeats at once. But the smart thing to do would be to, um, stop this path towards war because that's what we're on. We're literally on a path towards the kind of war that, you know, I trained to fight as a, as a young Marine. I mean, this is, this is the war I trained to fight. And, uh, so I'm fully aware of what this kind of war means and what the consequences are if we ever cross that line of departure. Um, nobody in the military today, um, you know, unfortunately, they've all aged out. My generation is done. Um, you know, but we don't have, if there's any, we don't have any real Cold War years left. Um, so they don't know what the Cold War was. They don't know what the Soviet Union was. We don't know what it was like to be prepared to, you know, fight large-scale ground combat in Europe. Um, and it involved nuclear weapons. Um, we're getting ready to experience that today. And, um, I just wish people would listen.
Yeah, it's kind of sad that, uh, seemingly the only thing that can stop a war now is, uh, Trump calling the Europeans and telling them, you know, if you decide to continue this, escalate the war on Russia, you're on your own. Uh, it, that they will hit back, and we're not going to help you. And, I mean, if the future of the world is in the hands of Trump, we might all be, yeah, royally screwed already. This is, uh, I wish we had some more responsible people. That goes for the Europeans as well. He mentioned the, the crazy Baltic states. I mean, this was the main idea I think in 2022. That is, uh, once they decided, okay, we will essentially boycott diplomacy, who will make weapons will be the path to peace. That's when the EU thought it was a great idea to hand over the car keys to the most radical elements, that is, you know, Kaja Kallas, out of Estonia. I mean, this is, it's very hard to walk this back and, uh, suddenly demand common sense out of her. So, no, I think I don't know. I'm not very optimistic anymore. Uh, but, uh, yeah, I haven't packed my bags yet, but it seems like we're getting pretty close now. So, it's, um, Oh, it's, it's very, yeah. Again, so depressing we ended up here. And, uh, you don't get the impression, or do you, do you get the impression there's someone in Europe though who's understanding the severity of this situation? Because all I see is applause in the media. Oh, look, look, look how much, uh, how bad they hit the, the Russians. Yeah, we're winning. Ukraine is winning. And nobody ever defined what exactly does winning mean in a war against the world's largest nuclear power, who considers this to be an existential threat? No one. There's no discussions, just this ridiculous tribalism. The idea that, oh, if they're losing, that means we're winning. This is the extent of their logic. It would be like a goal of defeating America with drone warfare out of Mexico. Like, you don't want to win this war. You don't want to bring too much pain. It's, uh, it's suicide. But, um, yeah, here we are. Anyways, any final thoughts?
No, I mean, um, you know, I'm not religious, but, um, pray for peace. Pray for something. Hope something happens. Um, but also keep doing what you're doing, Glenn, because you are, um, you know, you're the, the interviews you have have a meaningful impact. I, I take a look at, you're interviewing the right people. You're asking the right questions. You're getting the right conversations, and, um, and it's resonating across the, um, the, the intellectual, uh, aspect of the, um, worldwide web. You know, we, we know that independent media that's internet-based oftentimes has zero quality control, and, um, it, it brings out the worst in us, but you bring out the best in terms of intellectual development of complex ideas. Um, just keep doing what you're doing because, you know, you and I can't solve all the world's problems. We don't have the capacity to, you know, to make decisions. But I can guarantee you that, um, you know, what you say, and maybe what I say sometimes, and, and what you get other people to say, um, resonates in certain circles that do have the ability to advise on policy. So, um, yeah, don't just pray because praying's passive. Keep doing what you're doing. And for all your supporters out there, keep supporting Glenn because you're, you're one of the more important voices out there.
>> Well, thank you. And, uh, yeah, I hope it does make a difference. So, thanks again for taking the time.
>> Okay. Thanks. Have a good day.