Transcription
It's absolutely clear over the past couple weeks that Trump is not operating from a preconceived strategy. He's winging it day after day. Uh and I think that's very dangerous.
We can welcome to the program. Ambassador John Bolton, former National Security Advisor to Donald Trump. Welcome to you, Ambassador. Glad to be with you. Thanks for having me. Uh do tell us, what is your best guess on what the president is going to be telling America and the world about his thinking on the war and ending it this evening? Uh I don't think it's possible to guess in any informed way. I'm not sure he really knows where he's going. I think you were mentioning this morning he put a social media post out saying that the president of Iran Pezeshkian, civilian leader, whom he called the new president, maybe he'd never heard of him before, but he interpreted what Pezeshkian said as asking for a ceasefire, which he said he would grant when the strait was open, which implies that he really does want a deal and he does want the strait open.
Uh I think it's absolutely clear over the past couple weeks that Trump is not operating from a preconceived strategy. He's winging it day after day. And I think that's very dangerous. I think it means that while enormous damage has been done to the Revolutionary Guard, the nuclear program, and other assets in Iran, that the goal of regime change, if it ever was a goal, and that's open for question, but that that goal is no longer what Trump is after. I think he's not motivated by strategic or international considerations. He's worried about the price of gasoline at the pump in the United States and their effect on the November election. And clearly an important option is the seizure of Iranian territory, whether that is Kharg Island, which is the the oil depot of of Iran, or whether it is land on these sides of the Strait of Hormuz. But in either case, you're looking at an operation which is clearly potentially perilous, Ambassador, isn't it? Despite the obvious expertise of US forces.
Well, it's all perilous, but but I think the the only way that the strait is going to open in a way that gives people any sense of security is if it's forced on the regime. They have taken what were their two principal threats, the nuclear threat and the terrorism threat, and now proven beyond any doubt what anybody looking at a map could have told you for the past several hundred years, that that strait and the Gulf as a whole are subject to closure and and being unsafe to sail. So, we we have ignored the risk for decades. There's been no risk premium appreciably priced into petroleum coming out of the Gulf. There there will be in the future. And to leave it in the discretion of this regime, if it stays in power, I think it's totally unacceptable to the Gulf Arabs and should be to us as well. We see reporting the UAE is now considering actively joining with the United States, assuming the US is still around to join with, in operations against Iran precisely to avoid that point.
>> And is then the calling an end to the war without getting some sort of deal with Iran to open the open Hormuz Strait? Is that even a feasible possibility? As you say, it would clearly leave Gulf allies feeling very seriously let down. It would leave an enormous question mark over the supply of oil and other commodities onto the onto the world market. So, that would surely affect the markets, you know, as well, the equity markets and and other markets, which is the thing that Donald Trump wants to get hold of and calm.
Well, it would be a mistake economically, but it would be a strategic mistake as well, because it would say to any other US ally that if Trump is willing to ignore the strategic reality on the ground in order to declare victory in the case of Iran, he's prepared to do it with respect to anybody else as well. And the blow to his credibility and unfortunately to America's would be overwhelming. I think although my instinct tell me tells me he wants to cut and run, that he's he's near meltdown at this point because he knows how dangerous it is. He didn't think through all the implications of this of these hostilities before they started. He's blamed others basically by saying, well, who knew they were going to close the Strait of Hormuz? Who knew they were going to attack the Gulf Arabs? The answer is basically anybody who's ever looked at this situation. I tried to convince him to adopt a goal of regime change in the first term. And and these were issues that were raised every time the subject came up. It's impossible to believe the Pentagon didn't brief him on the difficulties he's now facing.
Ambassador, on another another front, as it as it were, so many times, so often you have spoken of Donald Trump's wish, his desire to break with NATO, if that can conceivably be done. Now we hear the president speaking in such a way that that sort of language sounds more serious than ever. He also has Marco Rubio echoing that kind of that kind of idea. Should we now take this very seriously? Does it look to you to be a live possibility?
Well, I've taken it seriously as a live possibility since the NATO summit of 2018 when I sat behind him as he began to give a speech. I didn't know whether he was going to withdraw at that moment or not. Turned out he didn't, but I think the thought is always on his mind. And let's be clear, people say, well, there's this statute that Congress passed that said you can't withdraw from NATO unless the Senate and the House approve it. Marco Rubio was one of the sponsors of that legislation, which in my view in any case is unconstitutional. I think the president has the sole authority to decide whether to withdraw from treaties. It's a position I've argued and executed on behalf presidents on multiple occasions, withdrawing from the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty, withdrawing from the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty. Congress didn't say a peep, and if they had and it gone to litigation, I think they would have lost in the Supreme Court. So, if Trump decides to get out, that's what he's going to do. And if somebody wants to sue him under that statute, let's see how long that litigation takes to wind its way to the Supreme Court.
That's fascinating and concerning. Ambassador John Bolton, former National Security Advisor to President Trump. Thank you.
So, let's now turn to Jennifer Griffin, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Public Diplomacy. That's during the Obama administration. Hello to you and welcome. Hi, thanks for having me. And welcome indeed. Do you have particular expectations of what looks like a pretty important statement from the president well in the early hours of the morning here?
I I completely agree with Ambassador Bolton on this, that it is certainly hard to predict, potentially because the president himself may not yet know what he what he wants to say. I agree that he is clearly at this point looking for an off-ramp. The cost of this conflict in both American blood and treasure are rising. And so I I I think it's clear that he wants a way out of that. It is hard to make that case though as long as the Strait of Hormuz is closed. And so I think that he's trying to cobble together some sort of narrative that asserts that the United States has won the conflict, but figures out how to address the strait moving forward. Okay. He has just tweeted, of course, as you'll know, the the new president, as he described the president in Iran, he said he's asked for a ceasefire. He said the president said in his truth social post that he said no to that request for a ceasefire. But yesterday, just yesterday, he was saying he didn't need a deal to end the war, didn't need the Hormuz Strait to be opened before the end of the war could be could be reached. I wonder what you think about that.
There is an idea out there, isn't there, presumably among the president's supporters, that we're looking at a cunning strategy here of deliberate confusion, weaponized confusion is how it's been described. I mean, how do you see that? Do you buy that idea?
Well, I mean, I think it's completely in line with the messaging incoherence that we've seen since the start of this conflict. And we'd note first and foremost that of course there is no president, no new president in Iran. It's the same president that's been in place for 2 years now, and who has very little authority over types of international agreements like this. And so it strikes me as unlikely that that the president of Iran has indeed asked for for a ceasefire. But as far as the incoherence goes, again, I think that goes back to the president seeking any way possible to get out of this conflict. I think the reality of this though is if if he were in fact, as you say, to cut and run, which I suspect he certainly is at least thinking about, that leaves the strait closed. And as about as you were and Ambassador Bolton pointed out, it's not just oil that flows through there. It's other key commodities too, include for example fertilizer that are absolutely vital to food security throughout the world. And so if he were to leave, while that seems like a clean solution, the impact globally on the economy I think continues to only grow.
Right. I mean, what as and when the president claims victory in Iran, he will say that the the the option to create a nuclear weapon has been effectively destroyed, has been neutralized. I wonder what you say to that. The president has said a lot on this subject, including that he he argues that Iran was within 2 weeks of acquiring a nuclear device just just before the the bombing in last summer. It's a compelling argument if you believe it. What do you say?
So, you know, I left government a couple of years ago now, and can only say that based on everything that I I have known up until certainly that point, but have you know continued to understand since then suggest that it is not correct that that Iran was within a couple of weeks of a nuclear weapon. Indeed, the previous Iranian regime had previous supreme leader had never made a decision to weaponize the nuclear program. And so while their enrichment capabilities were were indeed growing certainly even more so after the United States with draw from the JCPOA, there was no weaponization. And so you combine that with reports from the president himself that Iran's nuclear program program was obliterated last summer. And it it creates a startling inconsistency. What I think is really concerning at this particular moment though is we are in a different place fundamentally than we were a month ago. And while the previous supreme leader had never made a decision to weaponize, I think this conflict will spur leadership towards a nuclear weapon in a way that we haven't seen before. And you combine that with the reported 200 kg or so of highly enriched uranium that remain within Iran seemingly untouched up until this point. And I I I think again, you know, we're looking at a more unstable situation today than when this conflict began.
Okay, let me put this to you then. If if if you argue and many now do that Iran may in the future with the regime in whatever form similar to the last regime survives, it will want to return to the ambition of building some sort of nuclear capability, a weaponized nuclear capability. Does that not reinforce the case for trying to seize the enriched uranium that the country still has in its grasp to set back that ambition as far as possible?
Well, I think you hit the nail on the head here and this is why I don't have a good feel for what the president will say tonight because on one hand he clearly wants to get out of this conflict, declare success, and move on. On the other hand, if you walk away today without addressing the the the nuclear program and the nuclear facilities, which have only taken some limited strikes in this conflict so far, then again, you are you are leaving a situation in place that I would seemingly permit the Iranian regime to move forward with its nuclear ambitions.
>> But does that does that not help the argument for does that not help the argument for sending in ground forces to seize those canisters of enriched uranium? It is a highly risky operation, but yes, I think that I that is why there continues to be discussion about potential ground operations inside of Iran. And if those are announced tonight, you know, it can go two different directions. It may be to try to force the Strait of Hormuz open. I've got I've got concerns about that as well. I think that is probably more risky than many might think. But the other option of course is that they will try to seize that highly enriched uranium in an attempt to deal yet another blow to the nuclear program, but that is a very very risky operation.
>> Yeah, and the risk of entanglement, the risk of it of it extending the the conflict. I mean, presumably, I mean, I'm no military expert, but if the president is tonight to be announcing a ground operation to seize Iran's uranium stockpiles, that could would have to mean the operation has already been launched. You would hardly give Iran notice.
Yeah, I completely agree. I think we'll see a signaling we'll see a signaling of whether he intends to further escalate this conflict or de-escalate. So perhaps that's a better framing of this. I agree that it's unlikely that he'll he'll announce pre- pre-deployment that that ground troops are going in. But I would note today that there is a third aircraft carrier that is headed to the region. That is relatively unprecedented. That is a huge amount of firepower and military asset from the United States to be heading into the region if the president doesn't intend to use that. And so again, I I there's a lot of incoherence in the messaging at the moment and in the actions.