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I would make the argument that we are on the edge of the precipice, uh, in terms of the state of the world economy because of this war. This war shows no, uh, signs of ending anytime soon, and already great damage has been done to the international economy, and more damage will be done the longer the war goes on.
So, this idea that, number one, Iran is a great threat to the United States is bogus. And number two, the idea that President Trump, uh, and his friends in Israel are making, uh, uh, a safer and more stable Middle East is a ludicrous argument. In fact, what they're doing is they're putting the entire world, uh, on the precipice of a disaster.
You know, one of the things I find interesting is when you kind of talk to war planners, strategists, cross Republican and Democratic circles, it's hard to find anyone, uh, that wouldn't have expected that Iran, uh, would shut down and use the Strait of Hormuz as a choke point. That, in fact, the Strait of Hormuz was really Iran's nuclear bomb. That if you wanted to create something that they thought was deterrence. I'm just interested in why you think this White House had had none of that input or, or just disregarded that element.
>> I actually think it's quite. Trump has said that he was forewarned that, uh, the, uh, Iranians were likely to shut down the strait. Uh, but he said that it didn't matter. And the reason that it didn't matter is that the administration thought that they could win a quick and decisive victory. Uh, they thought that they could launch, and when I say they, we're talking about the United States and Israel, uh, which I like to refer to as the tag team. The tag team thought that they could launch a shock and awe strategy against Iran, which would involve decapitating the regime. And because that regime had so little support in the general population in Iran, uh, the decapitation or the shock and awe strategy would lead to a revolution. The regime would be overthrown, and the new regime would either submit to, uh, uh, our, uh, demands, uh, or the old regime would remain in place and just surrender. Those were the two things that they thought might happen. But the point is that this shock and awe strategy would produce a quick and decisive victory. Uh, and therefore, you wouldn't have to worry about the Iranians closing the straits.
But what happened here, obviously, is that the shock and awe strategy failed, and we're now in a war of attrition. And in this war of attrition that we now find ourselves in, uh, the Iranians hold almost all the cards, not us. And that's why we are in desperate straits. It is interesting that President opposite, we have all the cards and Iran has none. Uh, so I take your point. But another element here is other big global powers, China, Russia. How are they looking at this moment? Is China fearful of a more muscular United States willing to deploy power like this, or is it basically applauding this moment as an opportunity for itself?
>> Well, I think from a, you, one could argue that what's happening is mana from heaven. Uh, that this is, uh, a case of the United States, which says that its principal threat in the world is China, and that its principal mission is to pivot to Asia, uh, and contain China, has now enmeshed itself in a war in the Persian Gulf that is causing it to pivot away from East Asia and weaken its containment strategy towards China. And I don't think that this war is going to have any effect on the distribution of power, uh, in the international system. Where this war really matters is in terms of how the United States uses the power that it has. And I think that under the Trump administration, what we have seen is that the United States has pursued a set of policies that undermine our ability to project all of that power that we have around the globe.
Now, what exactly am I saying here? I think if you're a great power like the United States, and you're interested in using all that power you have, it's very important that you pay attention to international institutions, which you, by the way, have created. You pay attention to international law, which you, by the way, have largely written. And you also go to great lengths, uh, to foster good relations with your allies, because institutions, international law, and allies are important for projecting power. And what the Trump administration has done, and it is doing very clearly in the case of the Iran war, is that it's undermining international law. It's undermining international institutions, both of which it needs, and it's doing great damage to its relations with allies in Europe, in Asia, and certainly in the Persian Gulf. So this war in Iran is disastrous for the United States. It's not going to undermine our basic power structure. We have lots of power, but what it's going to undermine, and of course, this is, uh, consistent with what President Trump has been doing since he first returned to the White House in January 2025, is undermine our ability to project power.
I think you framed it in a fascinating way that when I think about it, listening to you, you know, I think about UN rappers, I think of prosecutors of the International Criminal Court. They're the ones being punished in this moment. They're the ones that are being sanctioned and pushed. And that kind of raises this kind of question about the solvency of institutions, the solvency of international law. But I'm interested in the equation that you said after this is over, the distribution of power remains the same. But doesn't America basically suffer at all in a world where it has tossed out its own systems?
>> Well, the, the bit you want to keep in mind, Steve, is that the power that any country has is largely dependent on the material capabilities that it has. Uh, the two building blocks of power are wealth and population size. And you use that wealth and you use that population size to build powerful military forces. And the fact is that the United States is able to behave in a rather cavalier, and one could argue reckless, way, and that will not have any effect on those material factors. To give you a good example, the United States lost the Vietnam War. Between 1965 and 1975, we engaged in this war in Vietnam and suffered a devastating defeat. But it had no effect on the balance of power. The United States was not less powerful. We didn't have less people, less wealth, and a weaker military as a result of the war. And that's the same basic argument that I'm making here. This, uh, foolish foreign policy that President Trump is pursuing, as evidenced by what's going on in Iran, is not weakening American power. What it's weakening is our ability to project power because it's undermining institutions.
Just think about NATO. NATO is an international institution. The United States has depended heavily on NATO for many, many years, since 1949, to be specific. Is it in our interest to undermine NATO? Is it in our interest to undermine international law? Uh, is it in our interest to undermine the International Court of Justice? I think the answer is no. We need these institutions. We need allies. But President Trump, who is a unilateralist at heart, doesn't think that you need multilateral institutions. He doesn't think you need international law. And he's contemptuous of our allies. And in many ways, he treats our allies worse than he treats our adversaries.
>> Well, let's listen to President Trump say something to say about exactly this. Let's listen.
>> We're now totally independent of the Middle East. And yet we are there to help. We don't have to be there. We don't need their oil. We don't need anything they have, but we're there to help our allies.
He's basically saying, I agree with John Mearsheimer in that we don't need our allies. We don't need this. We can walk through the world, uh, as a single actor, uh, and be arbitrary one way or the other. But your thoughts, John?
>> Well, I mean, to argue the independent of the Middle East is ridiculous. The fact is there are three areas of the world that the United States cares greatly about. This is where our vital strategic interests are engaged. One is obviously Europe. The other is East Asia. And then the final one is the Persian Gulf because of the oil. It is a vital strategic area of the world for the United States. And to argue that we're independent of it, that it doesn't matter to us, uh, is a foolish argument to make. You know, President Trump often talks about leaving the war. What is he saying here? That we're going to leave the Middle East? We're just going to forget the Persian Gulf? We're going to forget that oil? Of course, we're not going to do that. We're going to remain there because it is a vital strategic area of interest to us. Uh, so I don't know what he's talking about. And with regard to allies, as I said, we need allies. We need allies in the Gulf. We have allies in the Gulf. We need allies in Europe. Uh, the idea that we are an independent actor that doesn't depend on allies is a foolish argument to make. The United States is a great power that tries to project power all across the globe. How do you project power all across the globe without allies? And the answer is you don't. And when you start slapping them around the way he does, you're going to find yourself in a well of a lot of trouble. And as is clear, we are in a well of a lot of trouble in Iran.
So, my guess, my question is, if you saw Iran as a nefarious actor in the world, why not take this kind of action now and use it as a moment to reorder those relations? So pick that apart. First of all, this argument that, uh, Iran is a great threat to stability in the Middle East, uh, and a serious threat to the United States is nonsense. You want to remember that the United States is moving Patriot and THAAD missile batteries out of East Asia. Uh, this Marine Expeditionary Unit that has just been moved to the Middle East came from Japan. So what you see, Steve, is that the United States is actually weakening its military capability in East Asia. Again, we're pivoting away from East Asia, and this is mana from heaven for the Chinese.
Furthermore, Chinese influence around the world, uh, is increasing. You remember I talked before about the ability of a state to project power around the world, uh, to have an effective diplomatic strategy. If you look at the United States and you compare it to China in terms of state behavior, in terms of which state looks like a responsible stakeholder in the international system, it certainly looks like China is the responsible stakeholder. The Chinese look like they are the adults in the room. The United States certainly does not look like a responsible stakeholder. The Gulf States, the Europeans, our Asian allies are all questioning, uh, whether or not the United States is playing with a full deck. All of our allies around the world can't believe what we're doing. They fully understand that we are threatening the international economy. We are threatening to take the international economy off a cliff, which is going to have devastating consequences for every state on the planet. Uh, so when you think about where China stands versus where the United States stands in the eyes of the world, uh, the Chinese have benefited enormously from this conflict.
>> Uh, UAE ambassador just published an op-ed recently in the Wall Street Journal. Able to do various things there. I just be interested to get your take on this because, you know, I think you said America has opened a Pandora's box of messes. Now, many people in the region say, "Well, you've got to continue what you're doing. Don't leave it like this." Where, what are your thoughts?
>> I think this is remarkable. Uh, both the Saudis and the UAE, uh, have indicated that what they'd like to see the United States do, uh, is, uh, finish the war, go full bore, and defeat Iran once and for all. Uh, first of all, we're not going to defeat Iran once and for all. And if we march up the escalation ladder as they would like us to do, there is a very good chance that the UAE and Saudi Arabia will be destroyed as functioning societies. You want to understand that these countries depend heavily on desalinated water. Uh, and there are a handful of desalination plants in each of these countries that are big fat targets that the Iranians can go after. And not only can the Iranians go after those desalination plants, they can go after their energy infrastructure, they can go after their oil and gas infrastructure, they can destroy those countries. Uh, and if the United States begins to, uh, attack, uh, a broader set of targets in Iran, the Iranians, who have been playing tit-for-tat all along, have made it clear that they will destroy or they will attempt to destroy. And I think they will destroy, uh, countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
So, if anything, Steve, what the UAE and Saudi Arabia should be doing is telling the Americans to back off and to work overtime to come up with some sort of negotiated settlement to put an end to this war. These countries, the Gulf States, that is, have absolutely no interest in seeing this war continue. They had no interest in seeing this war start, uh, in the beginning, and, uh, I, I just don't know what they're thinking when they're talking about getting America and Israel to up the ante. You know, other parts of the dashboard of this conflict right now are what's happening in Lebanon, uh, Israel's commitment to essentially occupy parts of Lebanon, what's going on in Gaza, and I'm just interested in how you see the other dimensions of the, the Middle East beneath the Iran conflict that are also parts of the puzzle that are moving right now.
>> Well, let's start on, uh, and there are two dimensions to the war in Lebanon. One is the ground war, where the Israelis are attempting to take more territory, and I think, uh, many Israelis, especially on the right-hand side of the political spectrum, want to annex, uh, the southern part of Lebanon, uh, from, uh, the northern border of Israel up to the Litani River. Uh, and in fact, if you look carefully at what's happening in southern Lebanon at this point, uh, the Israelis are suffering, uh, a series of tactical defeats. They are having one whale of a lot of trouble, uh, fighting against Hezbollah on the ground in southern Lebanon. And the idea that they're going to conquer all of southern Lebanon, I think, is wrong. And I think they're going to suffer a lot of casualties trying to do that. And they already are, of course.
Second point I'd make is that, uh, by the end of 2025, uh, it looked like Hezbollah had been defanged, and that the Israelis had done egregious damage to Hezbollah's ability to fire rockets and missiles into Israel. So, as you moved into this year, it looked like, uh, Hezbollah had been defanged and couldn't cause Israel any problems with its rockets and missiles because it had hardly any left. Israel had destroyed all of them. Uh, that has clearly not happened. And not only is Hezbollah firing rockets, uh, and missiles into northern Israel, uh, and even as far in as into Tel Aviv on a daily basis, but the Iranians are coordinating with Hezbollah, and the Iranians are firing missiles into northern Israel and into Lebanon itself. Uh, so the Hezbollah threat is there in spades.
With regard to Gaza and the genocide, there's no question that the Israelis have slowed down the genocide. But if you look at their behavior, they're very interested, for sure, in cleansing, uh, all of Gaza of Palestinians, and they're pursuing a genocide, uh, in hopes that that will, uh, allow them to get all of the Palestinians out of, uh, uh, out of Gaza. And if they don't get them out, murder them while they're in Gaza. And we don't want to lose sight of the fact, Steve, that on the West Bank, the Israelis are launching pogroms on an almost daily basis because they're interested in ethnically cleansing the West Bank as well.
So, if you look at what's going on here with Israel, Israel, uh, is deeply involved in a conflict in southern Lebanon and with Hezbollah. Furthermore, it's involved in a genocide in Gaza. It's involved in pogroms on the West Bank. And furthermore, it's constantly attacking Syria. And on top of all that, it dragged the United States into a war against Iran. Uh, Israel is by far the most aggressive state, uh, in the Middle East. One could make an argument, uh, that it is the most aggressive state on the planet. This gets back to our earlier discussion of whether Iran or Israel is the greatest threat to stability in the Middle East. I don't know how anybody could make the argument that it's Iran. The answer is it's Israel. And most importantly, you want to remember that Israel is committing the greatest of all crimes, which is genocide in Gaza. And no matter what you think of the Iranian regime, the Iranian regime is not committing genocide.
>> It's a messy world. And that's why we always love talking to you. University of Chicago political science professor John Mearsheimer. Thanks so much for joining us today.
>> It was my pleasure, Steve. Thanks a lot for having me.
>> This is going to be devastating for the Trump administration. I'm thinking though because, uh, Trump's whole bit, I think, was, uh, you know, what he was able to appeal to. He was, he is looking at the US relative decline, that is its power in the world, its military, its economy, the, the work of well-positioned people in society, and he essentially blamed this on weak and foolish leaders. So the weakness of Obama, the weakness of Biden, and also the foolishness of engaging in all these wars. So the solution was essentially strength. You needed a strong man. That was Trump. He was strong. That is, you know, if he was just tough, decisive, and assertive, this is, this is essentially the medicine that would bring America, you know, make it great again. And also his toughness would be matched with, you know, this intelligence, his high IQ, as he always says, because he wouldn't do these hard, this, uh, foolish forever wars. And, uh, but now, you know, he went in, the rhetoric was all about, no, no one else dared to do this. Trump did it. But there's a reason why no one else did it. And now, of course, he is the war president, and he did something foolish. I mean, his whole persona, his whole, the core of making America great again seems to have been damaged. And even he lost his key supporters, and you probably saw him scolding Tucker Carlson and, um, Alex Jones, Candace Owens, all of these people who had supported him when he was a peace president. So he essentially had a lot of problems already before this war, and all these problems are now much, much worse. So how do you think this is going to, you know, the international economy, of course, is a mess. The military defeat was an embarrassment. But what do you think this is going to do to the political situation within the United States?
>> Well, I think that this is all going to destroy the Trump presidency. I mean, he may, uh, remain in office all the way to the end of his term, but, uh, he's damaged goods in a truly serious way. But you want to think about sort of, uh, where we stand on the world stage today. Before this war started on February 28th, the Trump administration had already done enormous damage to America's position in the world, in large part because the president, who is the ultimate unilateralist, was, uh, wrecking international institutions, paying no attention to the rules that underpin those institutions. Uh, he was disregarding and disrespecting international law, and he was treating allies with unmitigated contempt, especially the Europeans. He was talking about invading Greenland. Uh, he was talking about making Canada the 51st state. Uh, and if he went to East Asia, the Japanese and the South Koreans, this is before February 28th, uh, had real doubts about relying on the United States for security. And of course, in the course of 2025, he had seriously damaged what had been good relations with India. US-India relations went south during 2025. So the United States, before February 28th, was in real trouble in terms of its foreign policy, and what's happened since February 28th has just damaged us further.
Uh, if you look at US-European relations, uh, you think about all the damage that was done over the Ukraine war, then all the damage that was done over Greenland, and now we have this situation where President Trump is effectively trying to blame the Europeans for the fact that we can't defeat Iran. He's implying that if only the Europeans had amped up, if they had come to our rescue, uh, we would have won the war. The reason we lost was because our allies failed us. Uh, and given that situation, what we should do is basically stop supporting them. Uh, will he end the alliance? Uh, just, uh, put an end to it? Uh, I don't think so. He might. Uh, but I think that he will so seriously damage the alliance, uh, that in the end, it'll be largely meaningless.
The other thing is, Glenn, he has what, two years and three months, uh, two years and nine months left in his presidency. Almost three years left. You know how much damage he's done in the first, let's say, 15 months? Can you imagine how much damage he's going to do in the remaining two years and nine months? Uh, it's going to be enormous.
Right. And in the meantime, in the meantime, the Europeans have to come up with some sort of defensive strategy for dealing with the Russians. I mean, you and I think their assessment of the Russian threat is completely overblown. But the fact is, the Russian elites, I mean, excuse me, the European elites do believe there's a serious Russian threat there. Let's take that as a given. And they also recognize that they can't rely on the United States anymore. The transatlantic partnership, uh, no longer exists. Call this a partnership. It's no longer there. So the Europeans, over the next two years and nine months, have to figure out how to deal with this situation. And that's going to push them to put NATO in the background, uh, and not take NATO seriously. So, I find it hard to believe that NATO will be a meaningful alliance, uh, in January of 2029, when President Trump, uh, steps down. Now, one could argue he may step down before then. He could be impeached, he could have medical problems, and JD Vance could become president. And who knows what Vance would do. I tend to believe that Vance, uh, would have a more positive attitude towards NATO, uh, than Trump would. But how much more positive is hard to say. We all remember his Valentine's Day speech in Munich in, uh, February of 2025. I mean, Vance didn't look like he was friendly toward Europe then. Uh, and if he became president, maybe he wouldn't be, uh, once he was in the White House. Who knows for sure? But, uh, the future of NATO looks grim, to put it mildly.
Yeah. Oh, it seems to be heading towards an end. Uh, but, uh, but by extension, what, what will all of this mean? That is, um, the, [clears throat] the, the loss in the Iran war, as well as, uh, all the weapons and money that was spent, the economic, further economic problems for the Europeans. What does this mean for the Ukraine war? Because, uh, I see Zelensky has been taking to Twitter and now that the Iran war is over, encouraging everyone to shift focus back to Ukraine. But, uh, it's going to be hard to see the, yeah, the appetite for Trump to deepen involvement there. Or how do you think, well, if, yeah, if you take into account all of these different variables, what would you expect? How would you expect the Ukraine war to be affected by the loss of the Iran war, but also the fragmentation now we see of NATO?
>> I think, first of all, I wish that Zelensky were correct and the Iran war was over, and we could now focus on Ukraine. I think we're going to be focusing on Iran, uh, for the foreseeable future. I mean, this is a catastrophic situation. Um, and, uh, with regard to Ukraine, uh, let's assume that I'm wrong and that two weeks from now the war is effectively over. Uh, I don't think that's going to happen, but let's assume that happens. Okay. And let's assume that we focus on, uh, Ukraine. What does that mean? Are we going to give Ukraine a whole bevy of weapons, uh, that are going to allow Ukraine to, uh, prevail on the battlefield or do well on the battlefield? I think the answer is no. I don't think they're going to get those weapons. We have run down the inventory to the point where the last thing we want to do is give precious, uh, weapons and precious, uh, military assets to the Ukrainians. Just not going to happen.
And with regard to the Russians, uh, we need Russian oil and global oil markets. It, we just need it, right, to head off economic catastrophe. And, uh, so the Russians are going to continue to do well economically, uh, at least in the short term. And I'm sure the Russians are getting ready to launch a major set of offensives against the Ukrainians. And the Ukrainians, as you and I have talked about many times, are in desperate straits. And we're not in any position to rescue the Ukrainians. And this is a perfect situation for President Trump to say the Europeans are responsible. As you know, he's been pushing in that direction for a long time. So, let the Europeans deal with the Ukraine situation, because you want to understand that if people like you and I are right, Glenn, and it's only a matter of time before the Ukrainians collapse on the battlefield and the Russians push them out of Donbas and the Russians conquer even more territory on the Eastern front, uh, President Trump is going to want to avoid being blamed for that, and he's going to want to blame the Europeans for Ukraine's defeat.