Transcription
In this effort though, to revive the empire, what would be the strategy or how, how can this be achieved? Even if it's not achievable, there has to be some battle plan going on. So, for example, one gets the impression that, well, just looking at some of the activities over the past two years, that controlling energy is seen as being an important source. I mean, you see this from the attacks on the Russian energy, you see it from the, yeah, the, the, the, the attack on Venezuela, the attack on Iran, and, um, even now, there seems to be some recognition among some European politicians that, um, um, gas exports might reopen again from Russia to Europe after the United States gets control over that, the energy infrastructure, because again, they did this is, um, you know, this is how the ones who destroyed Nord Stream, and now they want to essentially take over that infrastructure, and then gas can begin to flow again.
But is this, besides the energy aspect, uh, how, how else could the United States revive the empire? I don't see it any. I don't see the energy either. It seems to me the mistake, overreaching trying to control Iranian oil, has had the utterly unexpected consequence of putting Gulf state oil into question. I want, I want to make sure everybody knows. During the height of the war, Benjamin Netanyahu went to the United Arab Emirates during the war, trying desperately, and I have this, you know, from the Wall Street Journal and, and, and, you know, not left-wing sources or anything like that, went to the UAE to line up the UAE to join Israel in pursuing the war against Iran. And then the Israelis tried to line up the rest of the Gulf states to join. And the rest of the Gulf states said, "No. Absolutely not. We will not do that."
Okay, that means that the rest of the Gulf states have discovered A, that having an American base on your soil is not a protection, but in fact makes you a target of destruction. You can't, you can't continue with that. You can't rely on the United States with that. You can't. And they also see what, what China is. They're already selling oil to China, these countries in many cases. So they, they, if the United States even understands, it not only did not get Iranian oil, it lost the influence it had, or a good bit of it, on the Gulf states. They're going to end up having, you know, the United Arab Emirates, not even clear they'll hold on to Saudi Arabia, which you can see is putting its fingers in the air, trying to figure out which way the wind is blowing, and, and diversifying its, its partners in the world, because it is adjusting to what we, you, and I have been talking about here.
If that, if I'm right, and if, you know, it's Thucydides' trap, then the whole world, every country, has to rethink how it relates to the United States on the one hand. So that I would argue that this, this Iran misadventure is a crucial moment, because it is that effort of the United States which not only didn't work, but comes at a moment in which the results will cascade. Let me put it another way. The war in Vietnam, the United States pursued, and then the war in Afghanistan, were both lost by the United States. Cold stone loss. Right? The war in Vietnam was fought against the Communist Party of North Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. And who runs Vietnam today? That political party. The enemy of the United States is in charge. That means they won, and we in the United States lost. The war in Afghanistan, the other side was the Taliban. Who runs, uh, Afghanistan today is the Taliban. They won, we lost.
But because the world history hadn't evolved in the way it is now, at the time of, uh, 1970s for the Vietnam War, uh, and, and then much later in Afghanistan, those defeats could not play the role of shaking the consciousness of the world the way this defeat does. It's not that this defeat is larger or smaller. Those, those adjectives really don't apply. It's the context that makes the text speak the way it does. So, it's the context which was more on display in the visit of Trump to Xi Jinping. It's that context that gives us the meaning of the defeat in Iran. And that will survive, no matter what Mr. Trump says that he has a victory because of the regime change, which he tries to use as a euphemism for the assassination of one Ayatollah who is then replaced by another one with the same policy. This is going to be called a regime change. It's a joke. And it's a joke that doesn't work. And that's the worst joke. The worst joke is the one where the, the person telling it expects laughter, and everyone looks at that person because no one got the funny that's involved here.
I remember when the, >> [clears throat] >> when in the early phase of this war against Iran, Lindsey Graham came on the, you know, was on the news. He was part of the, you know, the, the, the crowd was doing the same talking point. That it's going to be a short-term pain for long-term gain. You know, everyone saw those, you know, those talking points being repeated every day. But, um, he was making the point that we're going to make so much money once we control of Iran's oil. And the, the assumptions they seem to have had in terms of how this war was going to end up. Collapse of Iran, all the, all, all the oil ending up in the hands of the United States. I mean, it was, it's quite remarkable. I'm not sure how one ends up with those assumptions.
But, but overall, what it, it achieved instead, as you said, it burnt down the Middle East as a region, uh, including the new United States and allies. Uh, and this is being seen by the Europeans, the East Asians, all are questioning to what extent is good, good strategy to make oneself a frontline state. But, uh, um, but, but this seems to undermine the wider strategy for the United States. A way it could have positioned itself after the rise of China, because I assume the, the States would try after globalization as a process, you know, of Americanizing the world, that as China rose, if they can't defeat the Chinese, then split into, you know, these exclusive geo-economic blocks. So, tell the Europeans, you know, you don't trading with China anymore, you're buying our technology, and essentially trying to divide the world along these lines. But, uh, but, but now that seems to be failing as well.
If, as you said, if this is really the lesson that comes from the war in Iran, that the Arab states should not have bet everything on the United States. Yes, they shouldn't have, and the Europeans shouldn't have done, shouldn't have done it either, but that's always the wisdom, you know, of hindsight. That's the wisdom that's imposed on you by what has happened. Let me go back though, a little bit on that oil. Lindsey Graham is, he is a good person to turn to. He really doesn't know or care or understand much about international affairs, but he's a good spokesperson for the most aggressive, we are the empire, the most aggressive, and nothing has happened to our empire, we are the dominant and becoming more so. And it's important because he's, he speaks for, as Mr. Trump does, a very significant, excuse me, portion of the employer class here in the United States. So, yes, their expressions may be over the top, they may exaggerate, but what they're saying is what is believed by an awful lot of people.
So, it, it's not an accident that you had the seizure of the oil-rich Venezuelan government, then the attempted seizure of the Iranian, oil-rich Iranian government. And I want to remind people that there was this bizarre bombing of a little corner of Nigeria between those two events. Nigeria is an oil. What you're seeing there is what you said a moment ago, Glenn. This energy for, we can, we can become the corner of the world's oil. That's a kind of empire fantasy. We are going to become able to control the world, in this case, by controlling its energy. And in the particular case, the oil, because look, we could do this, and we can do that. You know, grabbing Canada, that's another chunk of oil. Doing stuff in the Arctic Circle, that's another attack on oil. And then maybe our allies, the Europeans, can have a war with Russia, and we can dismember Russia and control its oil. Then we've got enough to. These kinds of fantasies are crazy, but they're crazy in the way you wouldn't be surprised if it's actually the obverse that's happening. It's a decline of their control that is the actual phenomena we're living through, and it has to be offset. You know, in psychology, it's reaction formation. It, it's, it's an attempt in the world of fantasy to compensate, to offset what is actually happening. And then to have your brain focused so you can have a bombing in the middle of Nigeria at a time when that makes to most of the world no sense. You can't tell the world what you're doing, obviously. So, you have to say we're intervening to protect Christians. You know, what? Yes, Christians in Nigeria. Because anything is, is crucial if it can be used to sustain the empire.
So, for me, and for many like me in the United States, our worry is what the United States will do, and what the {quote} {unquote} allies of the United States will do. I think, for example, that if there is much more European warmongering against Russia, you will, you may be surprised, you Europeans, that Mr. Trump will be backing away from you and be hostile to you more and more. Though he didn't want that. He, that's not anymore a priority. When they thought that they could win in Ukraine, and it would be the way to break Russia up, that fantasy, that play the game. But when it became clear to the Americans, this is not going to happen. Uh, and I think they'll do that in the Iran, too. They don't have a stomach for war, and that's not because of their lack of the fantasy I just described. That, that, that is unfortunately very strong. But they have this problem. The mass of the American people are not in it. I cannot overemphasize that, Glenn. People should understand, particularly Europeans. This is the first time that from the first day of this war, the majority opinion in the United States was against it. It didn't take months or even years. It did in Vietnam. It did in Afghanistan. It did in Iraq. But in the early weeks and months, and even the early years of those wars, American public opinion, uh, did its patriotic song and dance. Only over time, when it cost too much money, when too many young men and women came back dead or hurt or wounded, then you began, they, they understood. This time, there's no stomach for it. The demand of the American people is that the government help them economically, and they don't see [snorts] it. So, they have no patience now for grandiose.
The president is in trouble about the ballroom. The ballroom in the White House. That's a, that's a question of a few hundred million dollars, which in the United States today is nothing. It's like a coin in your pocket. If the coin falls out on the ground and, and you don't bother to pick it up. It will not change the experience of that day for you. Why are Americans, because it symbolizes that the money they would like to have spent on their problems is going to something. What? So, they don't want that. And for sure, if they don't want a $500 million ballroom, they certainly don't want a $2 million a day war in the Iran. I want to remind you, most American, my students here in New York City, where I still teach, if you give them a map, they can't find the Iran. Most of my students. It's not part of their universe. They're not interested. No one has ever interested them. It's too far away. It's, it's a murky. Very murky. They don't want government money spent on that. They don't. And, and that, if anything, loses the midterm elections to Mr. Trump and the Republicans in November, that will be the issue.
Yeah, no, I think this will go down as, uh, well, not to plagiarize Robert Kagan, but one of the, the greatest strategic defeat for the United States. There's so much going down the drain with this one, though. But, uh, again, I tend to look at, uh, US standing in the world as economy, the empire, but of course, domestically as well, there's a lot at stake, which is never a good thing, though, when this much is at stake. Politicians tend to do desperate things. Uh, anyways, uh, well, thank you very much for coming on and sharing your thoughts on this. It's, uh, yeah, it's hard sometimes to follow. The world is spinning at a very, very fast pace, so thank you for putting some perspective on it. And Glenn, it's my pleasure and >> [clears throat] >> I know I speak for many people, including many of my students who watch your programs, learn a lot from them. They're a very important service and I, on behalf of all of us, thank you. Well, thanks. Appreciate it.