Transcription
Welcome to the Aerospace Advantage podcast, brought to you by PennFed. I'm your host, Heather Lucky Penny. Here on the Aerospace Advantage, we speak with leaders in the armed forces, industry, and other subject matter experts to explore the intersection of strategy, operational concepts, technology, and policy when it comes to air and space power.
This week, it's time for the Rendezvous, our monthly look at what's happening in Washington, D.C. when it comes to air and space power, plus important national security trends we should be watching around the globe. So, we're recording this on Tuesday, May 26th, and if world events have developed since then, we'll catch that on the next episode. And with that, I'd like to welcome Laser Lazari and Sledge Harour, our Washington insiders. Laser, "Great to be back." And Sledge, "Glad to be here again." We've also got Gerald Depula. "Hey, it's great to be back. Thanks." Charles Sock Golreth, "Great to be back with you." Thanks. And Doug Berkkey, our executive director. "Hey guys."
Okay, so Laser and Sledge, let's dive into this because we're in the middle of budget testimony season. What are your top takeaways as you watch members of Congress engage with leaders from the Space Force and the Air Force?
"Sledge will appreciate this, uh, first comment. So, my old boss, Senator Renhoff, who used to sit next to during hearings, always preferred the one-on-one meetings, uh, with Air and Space Force leadership, vice the theater of the hearings, and and you guys all know what I'm talking about. However, that being said, looking back to all the hearings to date, I thought the hearings had gone very well, uh, once you take the rhetoric out. Sometimes it's better to read the transcript instead of listening to it. Um, but based on all the questions and comments from members and and responses from our Air and Space Force leaders, uh, I I I took away the following. I thought they were great and I think General Depula's ears were burning, uh, during some of this. Uh, divest to invest strategies have weakened combat capabilities of Air Force. I think we've heard that once or twice before. Currently to face climbing readiness, low munition stockpiles, and an overstretched industrial base. And I thought that was interesting, too, because not only did they talk about the industrial base, but that workforce that needs to be generated to get that industrial base o, uh, going, not just the funding that went in there. And they asked about the the workforce that was out there. They talked about the straining on our air and space forces, high uptempo, um, readiness and the found, which is the foundation of our capabilities and it being historically overlooked. And I think that played General, uh, very well and and to our Air Force leadership. And they talked about acquisition reform, innovate faster at scale, use of AI. Uh, they talked about accelerating acquisition F-35s, F-47s, 15s, E7s. I think that, uh, again, General Depulla listening to that one, and the Air Force is moving that direction. And then what we're doing with B-21s, as well as space-based sensors, command and control, CCAs, the whole bit. Um, I thought they did a great job about looking at the need for, and this came from more from Congress, pushing the Air Force to be cautious. And Sledge, you had a story a long time ago, uh, but, uh, cautious about pursuing overly ambitious and costly weapon systems that may not be technologically achievable. And I think they were pointing at Golden Dome at that point. Um, and then the really, the big piece is, and this came a lot from the appropriators, is justifying every dollar apportioned, uh, to the air and space forces, giving the rising cost of living facing Americans, the increased debt, which we talked about before. And then the last piece is is using reconciliation as a funding mechanism, which potentially, which I believe, and I think we've talked about this, funding gaps that needs to be fixed either through the base budget or in future, uh, appropriation cycles."
"Yeah. No, absolutely. And you know, I'll say one thing about the industrial base and the workforce. You can only get it healthy if you buy. R&D does not get the industrial base strong."
"Sledge, what do you got for us?"
"I I just really, I think Laser, uh, nailed it there. Really two observations, uh, you know, from low Earth orbit maybe here. Um, I I there was there was bipartisan disagreement, um, I think that's a polite way to say, um, over the, uh, the way the budget's going to be funded, you know, topline. Um, you know, some thought it was too much, some thought it wasn't enough. Um, and then general concern and confusion over the use of budget gimmicks, uh, to pay for, um, uh, for defense spending. And then the second one is, I I think there's a misperception that this budget request, the reconciliation, and any other, uh, supplemental funding that's going to be used solves our modernization and readiness problem. I know Chairman Rogers put out a press release saying this is a great budget. It stops the Air Force's divest to invest plan and it, you know, it, it stops that the downward spiral. I disagree. This is a great down payment, but this is going to take years and years of sustained investment to make things happen. So, those are my two takeaways."
"And can I, I want to, and and this ties right into what Sledge said. It's the multi-year. They talked about multi-year, the importance of multi-year to do what Sledge is saying, to make sure that we can get out there and continue. It's not just one budget hit."
"No, I'm really glad you brought that up, Laser, because the multi-year procurement is going to be, I think, absolutely essential to not only improving the industrial base, to help the industrial base to actually do that long-term fix for our modernization programs. It provides savings to the taxpayer, and oh, by the way, it's CR and politics proof. So, I'm hoping that we move in that direction, but I don't see how you do that with reconciliation or a supplemental."
"You really can't. And I I think a great example is the, uh, the people need to understand the difference between an authorization and an appropriation. You can you can authorize all day. Um, but until the appropriators put money against that authorization, it's hollow. Um, you know, and the the the saying on Capitol Hill is, you can't spend an authorization. So, it's great that we've got, you know, people in the NDAA that are wanting to do all this multi-year procurement, but there are specific requirements in law for a program to qualify for multi-year and advanced year procurement. Um, and if they don't meet those, the appropriators are not going to put the money against the, uh, the authorization. And the other thing is Congress is very, very reluctant to give up their power of the purse, right? And they don't want to commit themselves to a five-year multi-year procurement when they suspect maybe there's going to be a change in the administration, the who controls Congress, etc., etc. I was surprised to hear Chairman Rogers talk about, you know, we're done with the best to invest. We're retiring 149 aircraft and buying 108. That's still a death spiral. And so, I get it. He wanted to show positive energy towards the administration, but um, there's a great topline, but somehow the way the Air Force is executing that, definitely is divest to invest."
"Yeah. Okay. So we've talked a lot about these budget gimmicks and the and reconciliation supplemental, but gentlemen, what's your prognosis on reconciliation in the supplemental? Because I know we talked about it last time, but it's been a month. What are your takeaways going on here?"
"You know, uh, Lucky, I I re really haven't heard a whole lot on the, uh, the supplemental lately. Um, you I know, you know, Epic Fury's burning through a lot of cash there, so, you know, it's getting, uh, down to crunch time. Um, I have heard that, you know, originally there were somewhere around $200 billion they were talking about in the supplemental. Um, that's not going to happen. I think it's probably going to be somewhere down around $50 billion. Um, and then the big news on reconciliation really is they had to break up the second package of reconciliation into at least two different bills. Reconciliation 2.0, which is about $70 billion, will be the DHS funding bill. Um, and that's, you know, that's really because we have some national security events this summer with the World Cup and America 250 events that they've got to get some funding out there to, uh, to protect the sites and the people that are going to be, uh, enjoying those activities. The reconciliation 3.0, which is going to be the defense part of that, uh, will probably happen later in the year. I'm going to defer to Laser. My thoughts are that's probably not going to happen until after the election, which really makes the important thing that's happening right now more difficult. And that is in the month of June. So starting on the 4th, um, through the 24th, we should have the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee complete their committee work on the National Defense Authorization Act, and then the House Appropriations Committee should have completed their defense, uh, appropriations bill. That will be done before the end of June. Then I think those are going to just sit and languish until after, um, yeah, again, we're going to start FY27 under a continuing resolution. We're probably not going to get a lot of activity done until after the election in November. But, uh, that's kind of where we're looking now. And I'll let Leer clean that mess up."
"No, I I I think you nailed it. Um, I think number one, uh, politically, we got midterm elections, so that impacts everything that happens up in Congress. And then two is timing. And Sledge, uh, sort of hit on it. If you look at between now and the August recess, you got a total of eight weeks in the Senate and six weeks in the House of in session time. And that's hardly any time at all. You've got nominations. Uh, talked about reconciliation 2.0. And then we have NDAA, online safety, farm bill transfer. All that stuff has to get done. So, and I do know that there is support. They understand DoD is burning through money, uh, and their support to try to get a supplemental through, but I I just don't know if they have time to get it done before they go into the August recess. Next opportunity is when Sledge talked about as a continuing resolution, which will be in September. And we've done that before. We've thrown on a supplemental with a continuing resolution, but you have to have sweeteners on there because you need 60 votes in the Senate. And you're not just going to get defense spending unless you get non-defense spending. And we've talked about that before. So, you know, maybe, uh, there's a possibility. I think if DoD, you know, or the Pentagon makes a case that they need the funding before the August recess, maybe there's an opportunity to get something down around the $50 billion point before they recess. It's going to be difficult. Again, I said September is a possibility. And then I agree with Sledge, uh, that 3.0, if it's going to be a possibility, and it's going to be a tough one, is not going to be until after the election. But then it's the point of who's going to be in charge in '28 and then how does that play out of trying to get everything done? At the same time, we're trying to get FY27 bills done. And if you're pushing through another reconciliation 3.0, which is a partisan bill, how does that impact your ability to pass appropriations bill? So, it's going to be a touch and go all the way through the end of the year."
"Um, moving along, we got members on both sides of the aisle voicing concern regarding Operation Epic Fury. Whether it's a lack of a clear resolution or War Powers Act concerns, what are you seeing regarding how they're handling the budget requests?"
"Yeah. Uh, it it's bleeding through, uh, is really the bottom line and how members are looking at the defense budget and sis already talked about that base budget, supplemental, reconciliation. How do they all blend into each other? The extent of the impact is going to depend on the timing and the outcome of the operations. And we've seen it and we're going to see it again. Both House and Senate have repeatedly voted on Iran War Powers Acts. Part of it is messaging from the upcoming midterm elections. That's a given. Part of it, frustration with the administration, and I think, uh, Sledge and everybody's already talked about that. It's a lack of transparency on what's going on. A lot of frustration, I think, from the appropriators. And then part of it is constitutional authorities. You know, the power of the purse, uh, the authorization to go do this. So members in both party have complained they're being kept in the dark on the scope, the strategy, duration. I mean, you can have arguments, uh, either way, but we've also seen some Republican members break from the White House over that lack of clarity and duration. So, um, I I think that Congress feels that due to that lack of transparency on the cost or when it's going to end, they are going to make decisions. And the funding decisions instead of, oh, I want to fund defense, are being made, uh, funding for against the war. And again, as I said, uh, the appropriators are openly frustrated with the Pentagon with limited cost reporting and unclear estimates. And I think in the end, Congress could use the defense budget votes to put constraints, reporting requirements, and guard rails on the Pentagon."
"Yeah. And I I would throw a partisan spin on this. I mean, the party that's not in power now currently sees the War Powers Act as a cudgel they can use to thwart any of the actions by the president. For the party in power, the war in Iran is a liability for the midterms. They want to get this wrapped up as quickly as they can successfully. I mean, they don't want a bad deal to come out of this just to to solve a a near-term problem, but I think that's the pressure and that's that's also part of the underlying tension you see between the White House and the Republicans on Capitol Hill. The last thing I'll point out here though is because it's really, really interesting. Congress really has failed to hold any previous presidents to task on extend, you know, going beyond. So, it's it's really kind of curious to see Congress asserting their power under this this act. And I lied, that wasn't the last thing. The last thing I'm going to say is the big problem with this is, um, you know, we can't get time back. And every day that they're, you know, they're voting on a motion to proceed in the Senate to the War Powers Act is a day they can't be working on the FY27 authorization and appropriations bills or reconciliation or as was mentioned several times in testimony by, you know, leadership of the Air Force and the other services, because of the ongoing operations, the department's going to run out of money this summer and Congress is going to have to figure out a way to keep the lights on in the Pentagon."
"You heard it here. Switching over to space. Charles, I want to um, focus on GP Sand, who is now the director of Space Development Agency and Program Acquisition Executive. So the PAE for all missile warning and tracking programs. Talk to us about the significance of that appointment and the vector that you expect him to take because you hosted him at our Space Power Security Forum earlier this year."
"Yeah, he's he's an incredibly smart man and a good leader for the Space Development Agency. So he was the acting U. So it wasn't a surprise to have him be the the new SDA director. But the addition of the PAE responsibility for all missile warning was, uh, a new twist, if you will. Okay. But when you look at the acquisition reform that's happening across the Pentagon and particularly on the space side with the establishment of PAE, they are restructuring the way we've looked at space, um, uh, previously, and and this consolidation will enable him to, uh, focus resources, uh, and technology efforts on on the new areas to support, uh, the more stressing threats, uh, such as cruise missiles and and hypersonics, etc.,, uh, but do it in an integrated fashion where you're not just looking at the low Earth orbit, but medium Earth orbit and and higher, uh, geocynchronous and others. So, this consolidation is really going to be helpful, I think, in delivering the missile warning capability that we need, uh, not just for Golden Dome, but for all of our, uh, capabilities around the world."
"Excellent. Well, we look forward to watching where he takes that entire portfolio."
"So space fleers have also said that they need a third heavy launch site. Yeah. Walk us through that context. What drives a location pick? What is it about accessing certain orbits?"
"Um, yeah, so we've been talking about the need to increase the launch capacity and capability, uh, for a couple years now, actually, here at the Mitchell Institute. Yeah. Dynamic space operations. Well, so that and, uh, look, the previous year did a paper on launch itself. So capability, capacity, links in the show notes. Yeah. Criteria, etc. So, um, the need to expand beyond the eastern and western range exclusively, uh, Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Space Force Space, uh, that has been a long-standing, uh, requirement. The fact that in 2025, there were 175 launches from the eastern and western ranges. So that that's a new benchmark in terms of number of launches. That rate is expected to increase by as much as 300% uh, over the next decade. So it's not just that the launch sites are are saturated, but it's the infrastructure that supports those launch sites that's also saturated. So when you talked about access to orbits, the eastern range is is the primary launch location for, uh, geocynchronous orbits, you know, the Vandenberg is primarily for polar orbits. So if we look for another site, which one is the higher demand? I think based off of the proliferated low Earth orbit constellations that, uh, we're projecting that to will be the driver, I would suspect that it would be an eastward launching, uh, site that would be selected for the third. Um, so this will be, uh, helpful in terms of alleviating the congestion at one spaceport, um, primarily potentially the eastern range, but it will also be a huge increase in the resilience of our launch architecture, uh, from potential attacks, as well as from natural disasters that both coasts obviously can can suffer. Uh, so this is a, a good acknowledgement by the Space Force that this has to occur to increase the launch capacity and capability, but, uh, we'll see how long it's going to take to get it and, you know, if we're, if we're stuck in budget battles like we are this year, which I suspect we probably will be every year. U, how long will it take to actually develop that as a capability?"
"Hey Socks, if I could throw in a space nerd question here. So, if you had, and you don't need to pick a location, but based on, you know, if you were to just say latitude-wise, if you had a preferred location, where would it be to get the certain inclinations, the type of orbits that you need? Just just thrown out there hypothetical. And it doesn't have to be in the United States."
"Well, I mean, good grief. So, uh, the Europeans launch out of French Guyana, closer to the equator. So, that's that's really helpful, too. Uh, if you're looking for, uh, other launches, New Zealand's not bad. Uh, there's some polar opportunities in in the Scandinavian countries as well. So there's I'm glad you opened the aperture to to not just United States. Could we launch out of Hawaii? Maybe."
"So we're seeing all these, uh, commercial spaceports pop up all over the country. Are they of any use?"
"Well, so absolutely. So there's, uh, Wallops has has in Virginia has long been a launch site. Kodiak out out of, uh, Alaska continues. Now there's also the New Mexico spaceport. Uh, Elon Musk is obviously launched from Texas. Uh, so there's there's potential for, uh, other other locations. Now these these ones at Kodiak and Wallops and New Mexico, those are smaller launch locations. And so if you have a smaller payload, um, that that would be"
"So it's not going to give us the heavy lift."
"It's not going to give us the heavy lift that we need."
"Okay. So, last week your team also released a new report explaining that it might be time to think about sending guardians into space. So, by the way, we'll include that link in our show notes as well."
"All these links."
"I know. It's going to be, it's a space theme. So, but, uh, tell us, what's the theory of that case and what are the steps we need to take to get there?"
"Well, so the the driver is potentially the moon. And we've talked about the moon and cis-lunar security before. Uh, but when you're talking about, uh, resource extraction from the lunar surface or key terrain that might be useful for scientific or, uh, or national security missions, the fact that there aren't a lot of existing policies, uh, for the moon and how to how to treat that area, um, and we've seen how China has really gone out with their elbows out, so to speak, in in the, uh, western Pacific. Uh, we expect them to be similar, uh, in the, uh, cis-lunar race. Why is that? It's because the PLA, the People's Liberation Army, is the one who runs China's space program. So even though they might say it's a scientific effort, um, their ability to transition to a military posture, uh, could be remarkably rapid."
"Well, civil-military fusion, right? I mean, absolutely, pretty much indistinguishable. It it is, uh, on the Chinese side, and we have the a bifurcation on the United States. And, you know, there's been some press saying that we're advocating for a, a blurring of those lines. I don't know. I think it's a, a step up in the need for additional national security capabilities in the future. We know at some point there will need to be guardians in space. That's just, uh, I think everybody fundamentally believes that. But what will be that tipping point? When do we need to start getting after it? We believe the moon could be that tipping point. And in order to have the resources and capability and capacity necessary to secure our interests in the cis-lunar domain, we need to start that look now. Uh, because it is not a, a light switch that you turn on and you have a capability. It's going to take decades, uh, to get there. And so, uh, the the paper written by Kyle Pomroy, Puma, is a really thought-provoking piece that looks at this question, looks at the potential, uh, avenues to increase this, uh, pipeline, if you will, and and what it could be used for beyond, uh, the cis-lunar domain."
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"Now, Charles, it was really fascinating how you talked about that sort of bifurcation. Doug, I know that historically we've seen that in the past. That's actually what led to the CBS."
"Yeah. So, first off, hats off to Charles and the team for doing this report. When I look at it, I think it's going to stand up historically as a very important one. Putting a mile marker out there like what Charles' cis-lunar one did a few years ago, where people kind of do the RCA dog look at it, what's this? And then, you know, you look back and it's where the service is going. Yeah. Yeah. And it's it's one of these things where we're almost back to the future with old exploration rules, what we saw hundreds of years ago, where if you put national interest, the potential of economic gain, uh, national prestige, military power, you put that all together and explain to me where that didn't lead to conflict in in the past. And so I don't think human nature has changed such that all of a sudden it's going to be peace, love, and happiness up there. And in many ways, we don't want there to be overt conflict, but you have to have a deterrent force to set norms and standards so people don't escalate. And if it's just unmanned systems up there, yet the Chinese have have military tyonauts, they're going to kick your your drone over pretty fast that's rolling around up there and and mess with you."
"But why is it necessary to have guardians up there with the Title 10 authorities?"
"Yeah, it's it's all about what is is in Title 10. Train, organize, and equip. So, a really good story on this is at the eve of World War II when that kicked off, we were relying on Panama contract construction crews to build out some of the islands we had in the Pacific. Wake is the keynote example. When the Japanese invaded Wake, a good portion of the American forces that had to defend that island and were eventually killed or taken prisoner were Panama construction contractors. It was immoral to put them in that position and they were set up for complete failure. It was a disaster. Within three weeks, the US Navy came up with the idea for the CBS, Title 10 construction engineers that were also trained to fight. And I think this is a similar zone where NASA astronauts or civil astronauts, they're great, but they are for peaceful circumstances. If you're with Title 10 tyonauts, it's a different lens and and you got to set people up for success. And Doug, I just want to reemphasize, you brought up the point that we need Title 10 in order to enforce the norms and standards that are that are agreed to because without that, it is somewhat chaotic, right? Uh, and so the military force, whether we're on the moon or whether we're in the Straits of Hormuz or whether we're in the Pacific, we're there to open the trade to ensure that peaceful activities can occur. It's it's a defensive capability, uh, and it's a means to protect those accesses that we would all like to have."
"Yeah. A defensive deterrent and ensures the global commons."
"Absolutely."
"So, General Depula, over to you. The Air Force recently pulled a KC-135 out of the Boneyard to backfill the one that we lost over Iraq during Epic Fury. And the service also just regenerated a B-1 from the desert to backfill a loss in that fleet, too. What's your take on this?"
"Well, I'm glad that we have aircraft in, uh, desert storage, uh, or storage out in the desert, uh, that can be regenerated when the Air Force needs them. Uh, AMARG exists for a reason, and in this case, it's, uh, providing a real operational backstop. But this ought to set off warning bells. When we're pulling aircraft out of the Boneyard to backfill losses in both the tanker and bomber fleets, that tells us about the force structure crisis that the Air Force is in and just how thin the force structure margins have become. Let's take a look at the KC-135. The aircraft they pulled back, tail number 58. That's the year 1958-011 was built during the Eisenhower administration. It's a veteran of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, the Cold War, Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and on and on and countless other operations. That's an extraordinary record of service. But it also tells you something. We've got to get to a point where our best option is not bringing back a tanker that first flew more than six decades ago. Congress has maintained a tanker inventory floor. And thank goodness it has, because the nation needs every tanker it can operate. Operations like Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury show just how quickly the tanker force can be stretched. Now, think about a fight with China. That would demand far more. So, we need to accelerate tanker modernization. We've got to get the KC-46 fully fielded and effective, and then move on with urgency, uh, to end gas. Now, the same issue applies on the bomber side. The B-1 force also has a congressional floor, but it suffered multiple accidents in recent years, and we keep having to go back to AMARG to regenerate capacity. We never should have allowed the bomber force to get this small, because long-range strike is one of the most important missions the United States Air Force provides, not just for the U.S., but for the entire free world, and it's always in demand. Now, I'm encouraged that the Air Force has indicated, uh, that it's going to extend the service lives, the B-1 and the B-2. That certainly helps, but it's not the real answer. The real answer is more B-21s and faster. So, yes, it's good that AMARG can help, but we should not confuse that with a healthy force structure. This is a symptom of an Air Force that's been asked to do too much with too little for way too long."
"Doug, swinging over to you. The Department of War in the Air Force appear to have brought back the E-7. Why is this such a big deal?"
"No, we're everybody is really pleased to, uh, to see this. And you remember how hard we came out on this last year when when the program was under threat. It just comes down to the ability to understand the battlespace in a real-time fashion and execute command and control. It's just crucial. And this is different than intelligence. Air battle management is about calling plays in minutes and seconds and helping forces see zones of opportunity and avoid threats. It's not about days, weeks, or months, which is more where intel goes. So, it's important to recognize these are very different things. You know, the AWACS fleet is down to 15 aircraft. We unfortunately lost one of them with that Iranian drone strike, um, recently. The J-STARS is completely retired. We are fans of the space solutions out there for airborne moving target indicator and ground moving target indicator. I think that's going to be really, really important, especially when you look at the threat we saw to our forward bases and in a lot of those complex systems coming into attack. You don't want a single zone of failure that's forward in theater. At that same time, I would argue that you don't want a single point of failure in space. And so whether that is actually kinetically going after those, uh, enterprises or if it's jamming or or degrading them somehow, it's about having multi-domain solutions so you don't oversimplify the problem for the enemy. And there are different advantages you get from the air, too. I mean, space, it's a direct look down with an airborne system. You get different look angles. You can be unpredictable, dynamic, all of that stuff. So, it's really, I think you add two and two and you get five."
"Yeah. And I I absolutely agree that an element of battle management, airspace control. I think I don't think we can overemphasize how hugely important those experienced personnel are because they're not just calling the near-term tactical plays, but they're also managing all the assets, whether or not that's moving tankers, uh, launching alert fighters, and doing all of that because of the situational awareness that they have. So, there's so much more that they bring to the D. And Heather, I mean, look at it. When we really were strained with so few E-3s in theater and we had that unfortunate midair, and we don't have hard evidence on this right now between the tankers, but I would probably suggest that that might have been the result of a lack of situational awareness in theater, which really speaks to the challenges that we have. And you look at how fast they surged in that Australian E-7, the Navy E-2s, they had to get it in theater. So I think this is just clear as day. And I'm glad you mentioned the people. We've effectively asked the air battle management community to take a knee for darn near a decade. When you look at the J-STARS sunset, you look at the AWACS fleet cut in half. We have gutted their ability to train and equip themselves to go do their jobs. And that is a disaster. This is a very skilled community. It takes years to develop this stuff. It's an art. This isn't just, you know, push algorithms. Yeah. We have to treat the battle management community like we treat our combat air crew because that's essentially what they are. The level of expertise, experience, and like you said, it's an art. So, we need to be able to have that experience, not just in training scenarios, not just in simulators, but they need real-world reps, too."
"Yep. Got to have equipment."
"Yeah. Uh, so speaking of equipment, MQ-9. There's a lot of talk about it both in current ops and its future. Doug, uh, walk us through what's up."
"Okay, so you saw, uh, Chief Staff of the Air Force General Willsbach endorse the, uh, the aircraft here pretty directly in recent testimony. And here's why. What we are seeing is a sensor shooter RPA collaborating with space with intel assets up there, then other combat aircraft to yield one of the most powerful sensor shooter complexes we've ever seen in the history of air power. And the real proof of this was that we executed in Iran one of the most successful mobile missile and drone hunts in history. I mean, Heather, you did this during your time in Iraq when OAF kicked off. It is really hard because these threats can hide and they're ungodly difficult to find. They will scoot and shoot and then be gone again. The persistence that MQ-9 provides is a game-changer though. And the fact that they both have all of those sensors and you have, uh, missiles there real-time. I mean, that's something that we didn't have back in '03."
"Yeah. And the the kill chain that you got using the space imagery to give you general situational awareness and then the MQ-9 sensors could give you targeting quality ability to take a shot and they got the weapons organically. It it just crunches that kill chain down to single-digit minutes, if not less. It is unreal. And I would argue they could only do that kind of integration between space and the air layer is because they had the ground control stations and you had the entire operations there, um, being able to do that kind of fusion that you might not be able to get in any other kind of platform."
"Yep. And when they ran out of missiles or Hellfires, they could call upon other aircraft and direct them in for strike. So ungodly powerful. On the other hand, though, the aircraft has taken a lot of criticism and there have been a lot of headlines that they've lost probably just over two dozen of them in theater and then they lost more in Yemen before that. And I get it. I don't think anybody wants to say we should be flying MQ-9 a decade from now. However, there is nothing else with this kind of capability. And bringing Cassie into fight and realistically, the losses were not above historic norms. So in Desert Storm, which we think of, you know, King Kong, air power and all for the United States, we lost just over 30 aircraft. They were prisoners of war. They were killed in action. We didn't have any of that in Epic Fury. I mean, so yes, you lost these airframes, but you did not have Americans being dragged through the streets of Tehran as political prisoners and, you know, horrible hostage videos and all of that. And we were not using these aircraft in a similar fashion to how we used the manned counterparts. So for example, the manned types were going in with more protective strike packages. They were not being put in some of the high threat zones as much. The MQ-9s are being put in the heart of the threat and they did not have support from other assets. So they were way more exposed and it was being done on purpose in many ways because they were willing to take that risk because there was not aircrew on board. And so that was tremendously powerful. So I get it, loss is unfortunate, but in many ways, Heather, you've led all these war games where we talk about collaborative combat aircraft and other elements. This is exactly the proof of case for what we've been saying on CCA, which is where this should go to next in the evolution, and that is use these things differently than you would use an F-35 or an F-22 or F-47 or F-15X. It is a different set of attributes. The manned aircraft has certain strengths and weaknesses. The unmanned have strengths and weaknesses. You add the two and that is two and two equals six. You don't want the unmanned just chasing to be a direct replacement for an unmanned F-35. You leave so many benefits on the table if you do that."
"Yeah. We've talked about this, but I mean, there's a big difference between CCA and MQ-9s. And, you know, we're talking about the future. We don't need to continue to. We need to evolve different TTPs, but there's got to be a middle ground, you know, between, you know, what we're seeing for CCAs, which we've talked about the expense. We need expendable and and again, there's this borderline more capable, uh, but still attributable, right? I mean, you know, so where is that going? Because I I think that everybody agrees with you, but I I just don't need to be flooding the zone with a bunch of MQ-9s that are getting shot down. I need something that's like an MQ-9 but a little more survivable, uh, as well as bring the cost down if I can."
"Yeah. And I think that's where the Air Force is going right now. I would argue if you can buy more MQ-9 right now just to shore up the base, something's got to be healthy in the inventory and fighters, bombers, everything else is so strained right now, do a near-term plus up because this might be the only good money you have for a while. But long term, it's exactly what you're talking about. I don't think it'll ever be a direct one for one replacement. I think you're going to see a variety of different systems in that zone, whether it be more on the munition side, whether it be CCA, other elements, but I think it all is about that sensor shooter piece is is hugely powerful."
"And is that where these disruptors come in and, uh, fill those?"
"I think so."
"Yeah."
"But I think it's in the out years. The Air Force was likely set to try to divest MQ-9 in the very near term due to budget pressures to divest to invest. That would have been a huge mistake and I think they should just stabilize this thing out for a while."
"Yeah, because MQ-9 is a mature platform. We've got personnel that understand how to employ that. We've, uh, created the connectivity across other domains and across the entire Air Force enterprise to make the MQ-9 successful. And so using that to hedge our risk, I think will be important, especially because Doug, as you mentioned, commanders can use MQ-9 in ways that buy down risk for the rest of the force. Um, but talking about risk briefly, I mean, we saw the incredible CESAR. So that thing was absolutely unbelievable. And what I would just say is we talk about the power of the strikes we're executing and all of that. If you actually want to see a power of or symbol of the power of American airmen and military power, it was that CESAR exercise. No other country in the world could have executed that. And yet there's a danger here due to topline budget pressures. What are we doing? We've been cutting the CESAR by aggressively. MQ-9 was part of that. That was probably on a chopping block in earlier versions of a budget. There are other elements of that force structure that that have been slated for divest to invest. We're starting to to consume the bone here when that is absolutely fundamental. But the bravery of those crews to go that deep into Iran was unreal and is just astounding."
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"So, Sledge and Laser, Lieutenant General Taber indicated that we might see a revised B-21 inventory number in next year's budget. How do you expect Congress to respond to that, especially if we see midterms flipping?"
"The reception so far has been generally positive. And I I think there have been voices on Capitol Hill for a while that say we need more B-21s than originally projected. Um, you know, you can go back to when General Rand was the commander of Global Strike Command. They were talking about numbers that exceeded that. And the the positive reception that B-21 gets on Capitol Hill right now is because there's a perception that the program is being well-managed. And and that's going to be the key that underpins everything. The questions in the debate, regardless of who has the gavel on the committees there, are going to be, you know, can industry deliver the numbers that we need and how do we pay for it? And and those are, yeah, I mean, there's so many variables there. But if I were to give, uh, the leadership of the Department of Air Force, uh, advice, I would say there's three things that you need to be doing now. Number one is execute flawlessly. You got to deliver the B-21 on cost and schedule. It's got to perform the way, uh, it was designed to perform. And and a lot of that's going to be, you know, learning lessons from the B-2 program, too. So going forward there. The second thing would be make sure that there is a powerful argument for why the United States needs this strategic access, uh, or asset, rather. So it needs to be linked to the national defense strategy. And then the third thing I would say is now is the time to start building your congressional champions if you're not already doing that. I'm sure they are. And and that is full and open, uh, transparency with the defense oversight committees. Let them know what your plans are, what your intentions are, what you want to do, and then start working congressional champions primarily at the locations. These will be bedded down. But anybody that has equities in the supply chain for the B-21, get it done."
"Yeah, I wholeheartedly agree with Sledge. Congress is not going to be the barrier necessarily to a B-21 fleet. I think as Sledge said, they're moving in that direction, uh, but and and it was his last point, uh, is analytical justification, uh, controlling the spending pace, you know, over time. We talked about multi-year, but how do we execute that? And then using the appropriators to help shape the outcome. Uh, in the hearing, General Taber said that the Air Force will be able to show our homework, and I think that's going to be key. Then the next thing is again, how many aircraft? And we were seeing in some numbers out there. I think if it's way over the top, the question is going to again get in the sledge said, how are you going to pay for it? How are we going to get it in the budget? And then what is the requirement? But I think the bottom line is we learned. I think Congress learned. I think hopefully the Air Force learned, and Congress learned about the B-2 fleet about having a small-sized fleet that's aging. We just don't want to repeat that that mistake."
"And Heather, I would just jump in here. I think there's a really, really important point where the Air Force should not put a topline on this in terms of production numbers. I I'm a big fan of what the Navy did on Super Hornet with the FA-18, and that's called it depends. Nobody knows where budgets are going to be or the security demand is going to be 10 years from now. So artificially constrain yourself just because you need to make your Excel sheet balance out. Guys, don't do that. You can say, 'Hey, this is kind of where we think we're going or circumstances will change,' but do not dial this in too hard now."
"Well, especially because they're depending on the B-52 and the re-engining to extend the life of that aircraft. And we don't even know yet how that's going to turn out. I mean, the B-52 re-engine could work out like the C-5, right? We end up opening up those wings and it's suddenly a structural problem that nobody anticipated. Schedule and and budget goes way over cost and suddenly we're now shrinking the B-52 fleet. So, I think you're right."
We've got to be able to keep that open and say it depends on numbers. But at least here at Mitchell, we've said we need over 200.
That sounds a good good trip to Tinker Air Force Base so we can go look at B-52s going through depo.
I'd be fascinated to watch that.
No, it's going to be an event there. We sure as heck need it though, so I hope it works out.
Yeah. Yeah.
And Heather, you brought up the industrial base earlier, but okay. How does this industrial base handle that increased uh uh development, increased production and the workforce behind it?
It takes it takes procurement dollars. It takes contracts and takes stability over time because you can't expect a industry to do self-investment, get the workforce, do the production line tooling, train that workforce and experience and have them produce quality articles if they don't have the stability to be able to make those investments over time. So that's again another reason why these multi-year procurements are so essential or at least for the Air Force. Pick a viable number, not a minun number, but pick a viable number that is going to be uh operationally and strategically relevant and stick to that. Like what we've seen here for F-35 where the Air Force only requested 24 initially and then we saw um OSW bump that number up to the 38. That is a ridiculously small number for what the fleet needs and it's just really not what we need industry and the supply chain uh to experience if we want to get the industrial base healthy and be able to sustain the kinds of numbers and recapitalization that we require.
So Heather, I want to pitch you on your way. The budget shows more EA37s per cured than last year's forecast. Why is this a good thing? I mean, we're huge fans EW. I got to tell you, I was so excited to actually see the Air Force come out and say, "We need to have more aircraft." So, um, we all know when EA37 first popped up on the radar, there was a lot of advocacy for it. But the Air Force really, um, I think brought down artificially what the real strategic requirement is to 10, right? So, that's what we got. Uh then in 2026 we saw that Congress added two and that I thought was a huge win to be able to keep that production line um open and alive because we saw the Air Force completely divest it electronic attack and EW capabilities in the 1990s. So when we we did that whole divestment and the peace dividend, we handed over the EW mission to the Navy uh and the Growlers. And what that did was it completely decimated uh our experienced personnel, our war fighters, and how to be able to employ that. Uh much like we're talking about with the battle management community. So the the emergence of the EA37 is is going to be huge in terms of really reinvigorating the compass call community and expanding what we can do for electronic warfare. So the EA37 uh really can battle manage the entire electromagnetic spectrum, which is hugely important. So now we're seeing the Air Force saying we need to have 22. So that's nearly double um what they've got right now and they're flowing that out through 31. I would actually say the real requirement for potential multi-theater conflict is far more than 22. we probably need upwards of 30 even if we see a future family of systems where EA37B is able to uh quarterback some of their own electronic warfare CCAs and things like that which I think would be really smart because doing this uh and we need to have the numbers to provide the scale and scope of dominating uh the electromagnetic spectrum across the Pacific and anywhere else we operate. Glad to see the Air Force moving this direction.
No, I think it comes down to simple math. You just do the what's in in test and training or at depo and then you divide the remaining force by kind of the rule three where you might have set of assets on mission. You got a set of assets coming back and then a set chin up to go out. You divide that and you were down to single digit numbers real fast. Then you you know take that across the expanse of the Pacific and it is really thin and you consider then multi-theater demand on top of that. You got to be kidding me. And this is a binary you have to have it kind of requirement increasingly. And so I I like what you said about CCA. Can you deconstruct elements of what EA37 has and and put it on CCA to go talk with with MQ9, allow them to take more risk or do different things with the the the strike force going in? But we need more EW, not less. And I think this is great, but we're going to need a lot more.
Yeah. and and you and I were talking about uh the same thing only you're coming from 22 and then what does that actually mean operationally and I'm coming from the operational requirement and then how does that grow the total force but you know ultimately when you take a look at EA37 that aircraft is going to be able to generate a lot more swap sey so size weight power cooling than you would with a CCA so when we're talking about a family of systems where you disagregate electronic warfare across the battle space know that you're going to have to have very low signature management on those CCAs because they're not going to be able to generate a tremendous amount of power which means that they need to overcome their signature to be more effective and you're going to be able to get the techniques and apertures off the EA37B that you really wouldn't be able to get off of CCA as well. So, they are complimentary, but just because you add CCA to the mix doesn't negate the need for a robust EA37B uh fleet.
Okay. So, sir, um, let's swing back to you. Um General Dip Chuli, you've been to Ukraine multiple times and you recently spent time with a group of Ukrainians tied to the war effort. What are your main takeaways at this juncture of the conflict? Because it's encouraging to see more deep strikes into Russia.
My main takeaway is that Ukraine is not just surviving this war. It's adapting the character of the war. Too many observers measure Ukraine's prospects by lines on a map. How many miles were gained or lost on the ground? That matters, but it's not the only measure of strategic progress. is just one part of it. What Ukraine's doing now with long range strikes is very significant. That's because they're taking the war deep into Russia to attack the systems that allow Russia to continue the war. That means refineries, export terminals, airfields, air defenses, command and control nodes, so on and so forth. That's classic strategic attack. Identify the critical nodes that sustain the enemy's war effort and impose cost disproportionate to the weapon used. And I'd add one point on terminology. These things are often called drones, but these are in reality lowcost cruise missiles, one-way long range systems designed to deliver a warhead against a target. And Ukraine is using them with ingenuity, precision, and strategic purpose. That's encouraging because a nation that can only defend at the front is condemned to absorb punishment indefinitely. But a nation that can reach the enemy's archers, arsenals, refineries, airfields, and production base can change the logic of the war. It forces Russia to defend its homeland, disperse its aircraft, move air defenses away from the front, absorb economic costs, and explain to its own population why the war is no longer distant. Now, this doesn't mean that long range strike alone is going to win the war. Strategy determines whether that technology matters. But what's important is that Ukraine is using these systems according to a coherent strategic logic. Make Russia's aggression more costly, reduce Moscow's ability to generate combat power, and improve Ukraine's position for an eventual settlement. Now, the United States and its allies should also understand this lesson. Long range strike is not a luxury. It's a strategic necessity. Ukraine needs the ability to continue holding Russian war making capacity at risk and we should not be intimidated every time Moscow calls that escalatory. Unfortunately, uh, that's what's happened over the last four years, and it's forced Ukraine to come up with their own means of long range strike since the United States and our allies wouldn't provide those capabilities to Ukraine properly bounded and focused on military and war supporting targets. This is a means of shortening the war, not widening it. I also think we need to apply pressure on Russia beyond the battle space. Russia's war machine runs on cash and energy exports are central to that cash flow. That's why pressure on Russian maritime revenue, especially through a disciplined Baltic air and naval sanctions enforcement campaign could be so important. Um we we just saw how or we're seeing how effective a blockade is in the Persian Gulf. Now, we don't need to declare a blockade in the Baltic, but the United States, NATO, and the UE EU can use port state controls, sanctions enforcement, insurance scrutiny, customs law, and air and maritime surveillance to target Russia's shadow fleet in the financial network sustaining the war for them. The broader takeaway is this. Ukraine has shown extraordinary resilience, but resilience alone is not enough. The West needs to help Ukraine impose accumulating costs on Russia militarily, economically, and politically. And that means more long range strike capacity, better air and missile defense, continued intelligence support, and a much, much more aggressive approach to constraining the revenue streams that fuel Putin's war. So, I'm encouraged by the deep strikes. They demonstrate adaptation, strategic imagination, and resolve, but we shouldn't treat them as isolated events. They're part of a larger campaign to change Russia's calculus. Now, the objective should be to make continued aggression by Russia unsustainable and to give Ukraine the strongest possible position to end this war on terms that preserve its sovereignty and security.
Boss, thanks so much for those insights. So, folks, that's all we got for now. Thanks everyone and we'll see you next time. The rendevous.
Hey, great session, Heather. Uh, really appreciate it. Have a great day.
Great being back.
Thanks again. Always a pleasure.
Thanks, Heather. Always great to be with you. Uh, and thanks for the great discussion, everybody.
Thanks, guys.
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