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Let's go. Thank you so much for tuning in, guys. Whether you're watching on YouTube or Rumble, we are with our friend Safar Nad from Iran. He is one of the most knowledgeable people when it comes to Iran, especially. He understands the domestic dynamics always have its impact on the foreign policy of Iran.
Today, we're going to walk through several important topics, especially the talks or the negotiations, whether directly or indirectly. There are a lot of rumors, reports, and lots of carrots, actually, in the mainstream press that they are feeding the audience certain information, and sometimes they are feeding them certain information for economic reasons in order to manipulate the markets. So today, we're going to ask Eran how he perceives all these uh talks and all these rumors uh in the international media orbit, and we will try to walk through all of these allegations and see which ones are and which ones are not. Thank you so much, father, for coming again to s analysis. Always appreciate you. The pleasure is always ours, actually. People come to Syrian analysis many times, especially to listen to your thoughts, and we would like to understand. There is a lot going nowadays in the in the press, basically, both in the traditional and also on social media platforms. On the American side, we always hear, "We are too close for a deal," but there's a more cautious approach from Iranian officials. Those statements, at least in the press, where is the truth? Have the Iranians and the Americans wish to certain understandings? Were they close for a deal, or this was more media hype?
You like to prioritize saying new things on different shows. So, I, I generally talked about how things are, how the deal looks from the Iranian perspective on the paper. Uh, you know, on another show that I was like yesterday or the day before that, on Rachel Bleven's show, which is who is a mutual friend of ours. Uh, so rather rather than, you know, saying what the deal actually is, because right now, people are generally knowing about the situation on the ground, which is much more important than what's written on the paper, right? Uh, you know, you might write a very good deal on the paper, but on the ground, it might be something completely different. So, let me start by saying this. Uh, before the announcement of the uh ceasefire or the memorandum of understanding, there was an attack on the IRGC boats, speedboats, uh, that was sort of kept hidden from the media, uh, in order to prepare the situation or basically prevent a, in, prevent an unstable situation from presenting itself so that the two countries can, you know, sign the memorandum of understanding. Last night, you had the again bombing of the port of Bandar Abas, and uh, the Iranian side, uh, basically retaliated by launching, uh, you know, anti-fire, anti-ship cruise missiles at the American vessels. So, there was a tit-for-tat policy there. They attacked our speedboat. We attacked their vessels. Uh, there was a drone, MQ4C Triton, that was violating. Now that I said this, I actually am not sure whether this was a Global Hawk version, which is for the US Air Force, or the naval version. So, don't quote me on that one, but it was an MQ4C drone that Iran shot down. Iran also fired at an F-35, uh, that was forced to flee the scene. Uh, and then you had the bombing of the Iranian, um, missile sites on the coastal areas, which Iran then again responded by firing cruise missiles at the American vessels, right? So, this is the ceasefire, and I think that this surprises no one that, uh, you know, the United States does this. In fact, the Centcom had the audacity to put out a statement and calling these strikes that were completely, uh, aggressive. They were offensive. They called them, "These were defensive strikes." So, they attack you preemptively, and then they call it a defensive measure. But this is not. Sorry, you want to say? Absolutely. Absolutely. Uh, but this wasn't something that was not expected by the Iranians. I, again, I, I like to take a different approach on your show so that it would be worthwhile of those who listen to me on different shows. Uh, if you listen to General Sari, when he was asked before everything that I just mentioned happening, a journalist asked him, "What do you think about Iran and United States reaching a deal or nearing a nearing an agreement?" He said, "I don't know. I don't know. I don't know what the deal is." And he didn't mean that, "I don't know what the deal is." He meant that, "I don't know at this current juncture, considering the fact that the United States twice in the last year has violated, uh, the spirit of negotiation, and they attacked us while we were in the talks. I don't know what you mean by a ne, by negotiation or talks." You know, this shows you the mentality and the mindset of the Iranian military operators and the decision-makers in the military brass. So, this wasn't something out of the ordinary for the Iranians. We expected it. I mean, it doesn't make it okay, but we expected it.
So, the question becomes, if you know that the United States will not honor a deal, why are you negotiating, right? Why are you negotiating? The, the answer should be divided in different parts, right? When you have a complex situation, you have to divide different portions of the question apart and then address each of them individually. So, first of all, I address the fact that, uh, you know, in Iran, no one trusts the United States, right? No one trusts the United States, and the military is completely aware of the shenanigans, the tricks that the United States military, uh, tries to use in order to basically get the Iranian military apparatus, uh, caught off guard so that they would deliver a surprise attack. So, that's one portion of it. But with regard to the negotiation, the job of a diplomat is to negotiate. You know, in our foreign ministry, there are diplomats who receive money, and their job is to literally negotiate, right? That's their job. It's like saying, "Okay, there is a storm, and the storm will bring about the leaves." >> Yes. >> "Why would the sanitary workers of the municipality clean the streets?" Because it's their freaking job, right? But the fact that they're negotiating doesn't mean that they have, they themselves trust the American side, too. While we are negotiating with the United States, it's very important to understand that the day after, uh, the announcement of the deal, uh, or basically, uh, you know, the United States president claiming on social, uh, that, uh, we, you know, the two countries are nearing a potential deal, the deputy foreign minister of, uh, legal affairs, uh, of the Iranian foreign ministry, uh, went to Oman. They started talking and holding bilateral meetings about how they are going to control the Straits of Oman. So, you have on one hand, Iran and United States saying, I mean, the United States says to Iran, "Open the Straits of Hormuz," and Iran says, "Okay, I will open it." Uh, because the official, >> the position of the Iranian foreign ministry, >> is that the straits are open. >> The straits are open. So, it's about the definition, right? These definitions are very important when you're negotiating, right? >> Yes. >> I said that the straits are open. Uh, if you don't think so, well, I'm going to sell it as a concession to you, right? But at the same time that you're saying, "Oh, okay. I will open, uh, the Straits of Hormuz." You go and negotiate with Oman. What does it mean? It means that you don't trust the word of the US administration. >> Yes. >> At the same time that you know the Americans go around and they say, "Oh, there will be no toll in the set, in over the Straits of Hormuz, and the passage through it will remain free." You have the Iranian, uh, spokesperson of the foreign ministry saying that, uh, "Yes, we're not going to receive at all. What we are going to receive is an environmental fee or the administration fee of the, uh, straits, because we are providing navigational services to the vessels that cross through, uh, the waterway." Right? So, what do these two things, these two instances tell you? That yes, Iran is negotiating with the United States because it doesn't want to lose the moral superiority, the moral high ground. >> But at the same time, there is absolutely zero confidence, zero trust in the words of the American administration. So, that's the situation inside Iran. >> But this doesn't lead anywhere, right? This doesn't lead anywhere if you don't trust your enemy. And of course, at a certain point, it is impliable to trust the words of the American officials because they are known for inception. For them, democracy is how I can, um, continue with my enemy or push them as close as, uh, possible to the cliff and then push them, uh, down, right? However, in this particular situation, when the United States is still a superpower, and they are basically having very, how to say, maximalist demands from the Iranians, and if you see the power on the ground and check the possibility of the United States achieving any strategic breakthrough inside Iran itself, and this comes basically to a mission impossible, then, uh, this is a, a situation where Americans have to compromise, and the Iranians have to, of course, keep the strategic, let's say, um, whatever they have gained from this war in, in the, in, in the docket, uh, of the Iranian diplomacy and also the military. In this, however, there has to be somewhere, some understanding, because neither the United States will be able to defeat Iran, and Iran does not have interest in having continuing this war, basically forever, with, with the Americans. This is also draining their resources. So, where do you see at least a ground which you could say this is a mutual ground that the Americans and the Iranians could meet somewhere, at least a future deal?
Okay. Look, talking about this, and I'm sorry, I don't mean to take a jab, and I don't mean to be a sort of impolite response to your question, but that's the equivalent of asking, uh, you know, "How do I get a unicorn?" Well, unicorns don't exist. You know that. Like the, the US politicians, the US officials, they're way too arrogant to consider the possibility of making concessions against the Iranian government. They, they're not even willing to make concessions against Russia or China. What makes people to think that they are willing to, uh, make concessions against Iran? And yes, what you said was completely true. United States can't defeat Iran militarily speaking. Iran doesn't have any, uh, sort of Iran is not so much psyched about, uh, attacking the United States and going on a full-on war against the country. So, that's, that's true as well. But unfortunately, I do believe due to the pressures that are exerted by Israel on the United States and, you know, the way that Donald Trump has drawn himself into a corner. Unfortunately, what will happen in the future is the continuation of the war. >> Yes. At least that's how the Iranian military, uh, you know, sees this entire episode between, uh, United States and Iran. But the thing is that the same way that they are trying to buy time, they're trying to waste time in order to make preparations, we are doing the same thing as well. M >> Yesterday, the top Iranian military strategist, that's the chief of the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters, which is basically the person who decides, uh, what strategies Iran is going to use against the United States in the war, right? >> This is, you know, the Iranian military is very, very complicated, right? The top Iranian general isn't necessarily the top Iranian military strategist. >> We're talking about the person who actually dictates the rules of engagement, uh, during the war, right? >> He said that, uh, "We have improved our capabilities in terms of, uh, you know, you know, shooting the US aircrafts, uh, in, in our airspace. Uh, we had a significant jump from the 12-day war in comparison to the 39-day war, the Ramadan war, and we are, you, we are continuing to improve our weapon systems, and in the future, we are going to use more advanced military hardware in order to intercept the American aircrafts." Right? So, the same way that they are using this period in order to, uh, improve their logistics, come up with new strategies, we are doing it. We are doing the same thing as well. You know, if people have watched, like, I don't know, movies like Lord of the Rings, right? Or like any of these fantasy movies, >> they, they know that like in the movie, the way that two armies fight one another is that they just charge into one another and they just start killing each other. But actually, the, the ancient war wasn't like, wasn't like this, right? So, you had like, like, I don't know, five, like, uh, platoon, battalion, or whatever, standing near the commander. One, one of them would go into the battlefield and start fighting the enemy, right? And then they would have like all these strategies, the pencil strategy, and if, you know, additional forces were needed, they would be dispatched to the military. They would go and, uh, take position on different hills, on different, uh, geographically strategic points, in order to make sure that the enemy wouldn't, uh, like bypass them or try to, you know, use any particular tactic against them. That, that wasn't the case back then. It's not the case right now, right? So, we are fighting this war, and it's a very high-intensity war. I've said this earlier. If you look at the number of missiles, the number of airstrikes, uh, on Iran, and the number of missiles that Iran launched on, you know, US bases all throughout the Persian Gulf, the Arab Zionist countries that are located there, the number is staggering. The number is quite staggering, right? Uh, such is not the case when it comes to the war in Ukraine, right? It's a totally different war. You can't keep fighting this war at this high intensity for a long duration, right? You have to go back, remobilize. You, you have to start, uh, you know, bringing back your missile bases to the operational capabilities. You have to work on the factories, the logistics routes that you used to have, but they were bombed on United States in order to be able to continue the war, right? Uh, recently, an article was published on one of these mainstream media outlets, and they mentioned that 30 out of the 33 missile bases that were hit, >> along the coast of, uh, you know, Iran, >> were brought back to the operational. >> Yes. New York Times. >> Sorry. >> It was in the New York Times. >> Yeah. Yes. >> And Donald Trump called it fake news. >> Yes. So, so these are actually the fake news, that even the stats that you're reading in these outlets are, uh, like highly underreported. There was a CIA report that came back, came out, and it said, like, Iran has maintained, like, 70% of its missile capabilities, and, you know, it was way more than what we thought it was. I'm going to confess something. Before the start of the war, >> I knew the exact number of the, not the exact exact number, but I knew the ballpark of the number of Fateh missiles, Fateh-1, Fateh-2 missiles that were produced by the Iranian military. Mhm. >> I, I mean, I didn't tell anyone that, and I, I'm not going to say it right now either, because of obvious reasons. >> Yes. >> But the number has increased even from what I knew. So, just then, the numbers that you are reading, they're false. They're like, even the numbers that come out, and, you know, Donald Trump calls them like fake news. Even they are published in such a way in order to do damage control, but at the same time, reflect a little bit of the reality on the ground, but at the same time, you know, do not create panic inside the population or inside the individuals who are decision-makers, right? So, just like they are complete garbage, but I, I tend to use the stats that come out of mainstream media because I like to stay away from mentioning anything that I might know and might help the enemy to, uh, basically hurt Iran. But, >> the point is that there is no, uh, solution, a diplomatic solution to this conflict. We have to fight a war and win that war. And, >> what is a win for you? What is a win for you? And I mean, military win. We have a military win, and then we have, at the end of the day, there is going to be a certain deal that you would come and say, "This is acceptable." And what would be unacceptable for you? Like, so how do you see a victory? This is the first part of the question. For Iran, we're talking about military victory. And secondly, what would be a diplomatic victory for you? What would be an acceptable?
First of all, I love the fact that you mentioned that even if you have a military victory, because you sort of said that, me referring to me, I sort of mentioned that the military victory during the 39-day war wasn't enough in order to bring us to the negotiating table and reach a deal, reach an actual deal. But I love the fact that you, you're a realist, and you understand that even if we win this war, whatever that notion would be, which I'm going to talk about, you still have to negotiate and you have to write something. This is exactly how the wars are fought, and how, in the aftermath of them, some sort of understanding is reached between different parties, right? It even happened during World War II with the Nazis, right? This is something that happens. It really kills me when people say, "Why is it Iran? Why is it that Iran is negotiating?" Well, Russia is also negotiating. Why don't you go and like start wagging your finger at Russia? Right? Dimitri Peskov, I'm sorry, I don't know how to pronounce his name. Russian names are very difficult for me to pronounce. But he's going, he's just focusing on negotiation so much that it's completely, uh, incomprehensible for the Iranians, considering the fact that Russia is a nuclear power. And by the way, for the people who think that, I know that I'm digressing, but I will reach out, reach to the question that you asked. Uh, for the people who think that Iran can create a deterrence by fighting the United States, they're completely delusional. Look at what is happening inside Russia, right? Uh, I think it was last week that a refinery in Moscow was, uh, was targeted. Yes. By the, yes, by the Ukrainian forces. So, even if you're Russia, and you're fighting against Ukraine, you know, Russia, not Iran, and you're fighting against Ukraine, not the United States, >> I hope that these hand gestures made it clear what I'm talking about. But even if you're in that situation, you still can't really, uh, pose a deterrence against another country during the war. What you will be able to do is setting up these small time periods or time frames in which you sort of discourage your enemy from, uh, attacking you, right? I mean, deterrence inherently is a time-based concept. Everyone who knows anything about, uh, geopolitics, international affairs, understands this. But I, I even don't use that term. I, >> you know, very, very willingly and knowingly refrain from using the term, uh, deterrence, and use the term, you know, >> dis, disencourage your enemy from attacking you in a short span of time. And this actually sort of is the perfect segue in order to, uh, address what you were talking about. I don't think that we will win a war with the United States in a manner that would be decisive enough so that, uh, you know, they will come to a negotiating table and they will sign a deal with us that would preserve the national interests of the Iranian nation. So, that's the first thing. But I do think that we will be able to reach a point which we, uh, basically inflict enough damage to the United States military to the extent that this period of discouragement, or whatever you want to call it, becomes big enough that we will then address some of the fundamental flaws that we have inside the Iranian armed forces, right? So, how would that situation, uh, look to the Iranians? Well, it's a situation in which there are different elements to this situation. One, you shoot down enough of the US fighter jets that it becomes a scandal, and then the war becomes completely awful for companies like Lockheed Martin or, uh, you know, Donald, Donald Douglas, I want to say, manufacturer of F-5, F-15, >> and and companies like that, Boeing, paying, you know, different companies. So, this is one of the things that we can do in order to discourage the US military. The second thing that Iran can do, >> and this unfortunately comes at a very high cost, is to create a Yemen-type kind of situation. Why is the United States not really willing to go to war with Yemen? Because Yemen was much stronger than Iran? No, because there is nothing left there inside Yemen to be bombed, >> right? You can bomb them. You use these very expensive ordinances in order to target different buildings inside Yemen. >> Yes. >> But the Yemenis don't really have anything to lose. But whenever they hit you back, you, you lose more than what you targeted, which was a barren land. Yes. >> So, unfortunately, another point of it is that through sheer resistance, uh, against the United States and being, being willing to absorb the shock, uh, on your infrastructure, on your power plants, on your, uh, refineries, you create a type of situation in which you, you reach an equilibrium that, uh, you, you move past the equilibrium to the point that, uh, you know, the enemy is losing more than you are losing, right? So, these, these two things, you know, uh, targeting, um, the, the aircrafts or the military-industrial complex, that's one thing. The second thing is by, you know, again, going past that point of equilibrium by being willing to create a barren land of your own territories, >> Yes. >> which is a very, sort of like, a very, very drastic measure. >> Right. Uh, which I hope would act as a sort of wakeup call for all the people who say, "Oh, I just don't understand why Iranians don't restart the war. What kind of a ceasefire is this?" It's very easy for them. And I'm sorry, I know that this is, uh, not, uh, something that you asked me about, but, uh, because of the messages that I have received very recently, this is something that I like to get out of my chest. Yes, >> I know that no one cares about my experience, the way that I grew up, or like my background, right? But, um, I'm a Shia, right? >> And I'm a very devoted Shia. >> Which means that, >> uh, since I was a child, >> we, we used to go to these Hosenias. Hosenia is a building in which religious ceremonies are being held. >> Yes. >> Sort of like a mosque, right? And every, every year during the month of Muharram, we would mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Imam Hussein taught the Shia that life with dignity, apologies, death with dignity is better than life with humiliation, right? >> Yes. >> And there is this very famous quote, Hartman. >> No. >> Never with humiliation. Mhm. >> We won't, we won't accept the humiliation. So, this has had a very strong effect on me and my mentality and the way that I grew up, like reading about Imam Hussein, the way that, because he was the grandson of the prophet, right? And when they, when the ruler, the tyrannical ruler of that time, asked him to pledge an alliance to him, he had this, he was, uh, between two options. One was to basically give credibility to this tyrannical regime by pledging an alliance, and the other one was to revolt, right? And not concede to the demands of the tyrannical ruler and not giving credibility to his rule. And actually, he had a saying, he said, >> No. >> "Someone like me does not pledge allegiance to someone like him," which was actually the quote that he said in the last public appearance that he made, right, before the start of the war, right? He said, >> Meaning that, because actually the lineage of goes back to Imam Hussein, right? >> Yes. >> So, he said that, "Someone like me does not negotiate with, does not bow down, >> Yes. >> to someone like, uh, Donald J. Trump." >> Yes. >> Right? Basically, what his >> uh ancestors, right? >> Okay. During the war, like, just imagine that you're someone like me, religious, you know, you love Imam Hussein, and you grow up with those principles. During the war, I started noticing something without even realizing. Every time that I would see a building being bombed, I would get this guilt inside me, right? I would look at those videos, you know, you had these elderly people with bandages around their heads, >> you being bloody, their arms would have, >> uh, like been injured and so on and so forth. People who were mourning the death of their loved ones. A brother who was standing in front of a building that, uh, you know, its rubble were, uh, collapsed on the shoulder of his, his brothers, right? >> Yes. And he had to wait for the first responders to help him. So, I was seeing all these images, and I would think that, "Why is it them? >> Yeah. >> Why is it them who are getting hurt, and why is it that I'm living inside my house? >> Yes. >> And nothing is happening to me?" Apparently, it's called survivor guilt. >> Yes. >> Uh, it's like when you, when you survive something, but other people don't make it. It, it's called something like that, right? Uh, so, I, I never knew that something like that could happen to me, right? But living inside Iran, despite the fact that I was living inside Iran, because of the fact that I'm pro-resistance, >> Yes. >> I firmly believe that we should never bow down to anyone except for God, right? >> I, I felt guilty. So, it's very strange to me how me, someone who is living inside Iran, despite the fact that the next target could be me, has that guilt inside him, has the empathy for his compatriots. But then people inside the United States, inside the European countries, they, they are just calling Iran, "Oh, you Iranians are soft. >> You Iranians, you're you're stupid. Why do you negotiate with the United States? Do you have any empathy inside you? Like, what kind of creature, what kind of parents raised you that you are completely devoid of this feeling to understand the kind of situation that the Iranians are dealing with?" And by the way, I felt the same feeling about the Syrians and the Venezuelans. >> Yes. >> I just don't understand how people are so quick to judge other people.
Son, but this is very important what you said about, I just want to reiterate because what you're talking about is, um, goes deep also in psychology and how do people feel and perceive things based on, um, their upbringing and the school of thought that they have adopted in life. And, uh, you're asking the question, "How were they raised?" I, I think this is touching the, the core of the issue, the core of the issue, not only in Iran, outside of Iran, in Syria, in the West, in many of these countries. Um, when I see, for example, a collective moral decay in Syria among a big segment of the Syrian society, unfortunately, due to multiple factors, but the first thing I ask myself always is, um, "How were they raised at home?" This is the first thing that comes because everything starts at home, from the education you receive at home. The way you, you were told about your country, the way you were told to treat your country. For example, when I was a kid, my father has never let me throw, um, let's say, a garbage on the ground in, in the street because he said, he always used to ask me, "Like, do you throw garbage in your home?" And the answer is no. Then why do you throw it in the street? And then you see other kids, for example, playing around, and their mother is walking with them, and then they're like eating this shawarma or anything, and then they toss it on the ground and they step on it. And in any way, it is haram to throw food on the ground, on the floor. Anyways, but you, you get the point. This always starts from the family. And this, um, in the Shia, what also I have personally noticed is, yes, this family upbringing is important, but you have, because Shia in the region are not the majority, and you have a collective, um, consciousness that you can see patterns among many Shia in the region. And I'm talking about the moral value system, one of which you mentioned and said, "This is hatman nazil," for the people who don't know, like, um, they would reject, like, to bow to submit, except for God, in this case, um, but in this, in this particular value, um, that is, you don't want to bow to the tyrant, right? People in the region, and you know, there are many of them, say, "Habibi, we don't want to face, we don't want to resist. We don't, we want to coexist. Let's go partying in Tel Aviv. Let's get a beer on on the shore in Haifa or somewhere else. Let's just live our lives and continue. It's only one time. Why are we fighting for?" How would you respond to these people? Because I think, um, nowadays, there are many of them also inside Syria after the regime change. I see an increasing number of people are saying, "Like, I don't care about what's going on in the region. And I just want to live. And if it's Israel, let it be. I just want to, it's one time. I have already wasted 14 years of my life, and I just want to have, you know, a stable life."
Okay. Actually, I, I love this question. By the way, I do truly apologize for going off the rails and talking about that. That's, that's an amazing conversation, actually. Uh, you know, it explains the behavior of the Iranian also diplomatic and military apparatuses because where do these people come from? This is something that is important for the Western audiences to notice and to understand that the, what they call the regimes, what they call the, for example, in this case, the IRGC, they designated as a terrorist organization in different places in Europe and in the United States. They have to understand these people come from the people. The same thing goes to Hezbollah. They are from the people. Like they believe in this, their their own propaganda. And that is Hezbollah is an alien to the Lebanese society. You know, we have to remove, in order to remove Hezbollah, you have to kill one and a half million in, in Lebanon. Like, like those are the Hezbollah who are the Hezbollah who are these fighters fighting against Israel? Have you even watched their photos? Like, look at their faces, and those are just like, like people like us, you know, like we're talking here now, and they're just like us, and they're fighting.
Can you just, just one thing to quickly piggyback off of what you said? Uh, there is this video of, uh, Ahmad, >> Yes. Uh, Ibrahim, and Fuk. Like, these are these three individuals are legendary people, and like everyone within the axis of resistance just loves them, right? >> There's this video of them, and it's like the 1980s, right? >> When, uh, I don't think that the video is from the 1980s, but you have to understand how these three people came together. It was in 1980, right? When, uh, obviously Israel attacked Lebanon in 1979, before the existence of Hezbollah, right? Back then, Hezbollah didn't even exist, and they were just, you know, pushing through. They were coming, uh, toward, they were going through Beirut, where they were stopped in this place called, >> Yes. Which is like a village. >> Sorry. >> It's, sorry. Yeah, I'm, I'm really bad at pronouncing Arabic names as well. >> And these three individuals, they stopped, you know, basically the Israeli war machine, >> right? And it was completely incomprehensible to them how they did it because these people, they didn't receive like advanced military technique, training, or whatever. >> Yes. >> And I can just like give you another example. During the, uh, Saddam's invasion of Iran, >> when, when Saddam attacked Shah, right? There were these individuals, 72 men from Isfahan, uh, accompanying the Imam of one of the mosques inside the, inside, I think that it was the Imam of the Friday prayers. So, they went through to Khuzestan and they met with Ayatollah, who back then was sort of like the person in charge of, uh, basically coordinating the efforts between the military branch and the Iranian leader, right? And he told them that, "Okay, Saddam has invaded the country. You guys have to go there and you have to stop." Yes. >> Funny thing about them was that they didn't even have military equipment. They just started going there while wearing sneakers, you know, jeans, and things like that. >> And then somewhere along the line, they didn't even have like RPGs or something like that. Somewhere in the long, someone gave them an RPG, like they, they were able to get their hands on a few RPGs and stuff like that. >> And then they started experimenting with the RPG, and that's how they learned to shoot it, right? To fire the, the, uh, sort of missile, right? And they went to, and they started fighting. Right. One of the people who was there is called Mortaza Orbani. >> He's now a very senior commander inside the IRGC. That's how the resistance gives birth to these individuals, right? As you mentioned, these are ordinary people who just go there, like one day you're nobody. You, you, you're absolutely have no interest in fighting, >> but then the next day, out of the necessity, out of the fact that someone has invaded your country, >> Yes. >> you start taking up arms, and some of these individuals become like great military commanders. Did you know that General Qassem Soleimani, before going to the IRGC, he was an employee of the, uh, water system of the city of Kerman? >> No. >> He was an employee of the, he was someone who would go to the work at 7:00 AM in the morning and then come back at 2:00 PM to to his house. But then he had to go and defend his country. And that's how you had one of the most powerful, most brilliant commanders of, uh, the 21st century. This is in the 80s. >> Yes. Absolutely. Yes. During the, during the 80s, but, uh, I, I sort of was talking about like the role that he played in Syria because that's when he sort of really matured, right? >> Yes. But, uh, going back to what we were talking about earlier, you know, uh, I forgot your, your, >> what, what, how do we respond to the people who respond to the moral system, let's say the value system of the Shia who say, "Hey, we don't want to submit," which means this is a constant resistance in life because life is always full of obstacles, and life is always full of enemies. Even if, if the Iranians or the Shia nowadays, let's say, politically or diplomatically emerge victorious from this, there is going to be other challenges in the future. So, the resistance will always continue, and this means there is always a clash. That's why these people say, "Let us leave. We want to live. We don't want to continue fighting." >> Yes. It, it can be very, very terrifying seeing, uh, the people whom you love being killed. Again, during the war, I would look at my father, my mother, my mother, my brother, my sister, my cousins, my aunts, uncles, and I would look at them very carefully, and then at the back of my mind, there was this thought that, "You do understand that you might lose these people." >> Mhm. >> "You might lose them." >> Yes. >> "Because of the fact that you're pro-resistance, you, you say never to humiliation, and you don't like to bow down to the United States. You don't want to allow them to control, uh, the resources of your country." But there is something else as well. As terrifying as that thought is, we know that the price of capitulation is actually greater than, uh, the price of the price of fighting. We saw what happened with, uh, with, uh, I'm sorry, his name was literally in my mind like a second ago. The person who signed the Oslo Accord with Rabin. >> Yes. We saw what he did. Like, he sort of accepted, uh, to disarm himself in a way, and he, he also, like, like, did all those concessions, but at the end of the day, they, they came to the understanding that, "Oh, you can't live, you can't coexist with Israel," not because you don't want to, because they don't want to. Yes. >> This is, this is the, the same way that we have our own, uh, you know, ideology. They have theirs too. >> Yes. >> And their ideology is an ethnic supremacist one. Yes. >> Right. They believe in ethnic supremacy. They believe that other people are, >> like, even the fact that they have a word for us, >> Yes. >> is just like really telling. Like, >> it sounds like a cattle when they speak about Goyim. >> Yes. Like, I, for example, I'm a Shia. You're an Armenian. Yeah. >> I don't have a particular word for you. >> Like, you're Armenian. You're not, like, we don't have a word for non-Shia. >> Yeah. >> You have to say non-Shia. There is not a word that, >> derogatory word. Yeah. Derogatory word to describe others. Yes, but they have it. And language is actually very important for the way that your psyche and your mentality works. There is this tribe, uh, that they don't have, uh, word for north, east, south, west, right? Uh, I'm sorry, they, they, they have words for those, uh, geographical directions, but they don't have words for forward, backward, >> left or right. So, whenever they want to address something, they, they sort of use the geographical location, right, the geographical direction, which can be really confusing because depending on where you're facing, like, it changes, right? Uh, and that's why these people are very good at navigating. They're very good at navigation. Mentality, mindset that you have is very important. Uh, uh, on the, the language, the kind of language that you use is directly influencing the type of ideology that you have. And this is the language that they have, you know, they refer to us as Goyim, uh, as, like, I don't know, they have actually Gentile, I think there's another word, Gentile. They have a few words, not just one, >> to refer to us. >> And they have been very, very forward with the kind of, uh, terms that they have used. They, they call us Amalekites. >> Yes. >> Right? >> Uh, which is like this biblical reference, and that's how they are. The price of resistance, the price that you have to pay for resisting, is actually less than the price that you would pay once these people get, get a hold of your country. The price that the Syrians had to pay, you know, following the collapse of the, uh, Assad government inside Syria, was really great. They started just destroying anything bigger than a Kalashnikov that existed in Syria. Because even if you are someone who says that, "I don't plan to join the axis of resistance. I don't want to fight Israel." Remember ISIS apologized to, uh, Israel when they, >> surviving. Yeah. >> Yeah. And it was a coincidence. It wasn't even intentional, but they apologized for it. So, even if you're like that, they will not accept you. They will never accept you. And the same thing is with, uh, you know, the countries, uh, in the Persian Gulf, the Arab Zionist countries. They don't understand that once they're done with us, they will go after them. Turkey, you, you know, you're very knowledgeable about Turkey. You do know how they are, uh, still exporting steel to Israel. >> Yes. They're exporting, uh, the oil and and basically, uh, you know, petroleum products through their pipeline to, uh, Israel. They, they claim that, "Oh, it's an Iranian oil that we are, >> exporting," but it, it doesn't change that you're not even willing to take a step, uh, in the direction that would upset, >> Yes. >> uh, the Israelis, not really hurt them significantly, but even upset them, right? But despite this, you have to see the kind of rhetoric that they use against Turkey. Like, "After, after Iran, it will be Turkey's turn." And I know that considering everything that has happened to Syria, and how Turkey and Qatar basically fought Iran and the axis of resistance for the sake of Israel, I know that it sounds weird, and some people don't really believe it, but trust me, like, if you know how the Israeli mindset works, Turkey is the next. And they think that they can fight against Israel. They can't. They can't. I'm, I'm dead serious. Turkey can't fight Israel. But, uh, they don't see it. Some, somehow, they can't see it. They can't see that the pro, if they allow this authoritarian, this, uh, this regime that is an ethnosupremacist one to just grow inside the region, which, by the way, they make no excuse and they don't make it, uh, like a secret. They are very forward about the plans that they have for the Greater Israel. >> Yes, that's true. >> Uh, so, they, so on one hand, you have these people who are saying, "Oh, we're going to kill you. We're going to take your land. We're going to take your, uh, basically resources." And on the other side, you have these idiots. I'm sorry to use this kind, this type of language, but they say, "Oh, probably they don't mean it." >> Yes. >> "If we, what are you talking about? They're very open about what they think. Yes. What? Why are you making excuses for them?" So, this is what, this is how I see these individuals. I see them as people who justify the actions of Israel when the Israelis themselves are not willing to, uh, sugarcoat what they do. They every day they talk about invading Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, I don't know, Iraq, uh, Saudi Arabia. They're very open about it. >> Yes, they are. >> And somehow these people are missing it. As an, um, I think, um, it would be a great, uh, way to, um, continue this conversation with you only to one, uh, more direction, and this would be the last part, and that is, we have nowadays, as we started this conversation, there are talks. We don't have an agreement. Israeli talking heads and the Israel-first crowd inside the United States went hysterical on social media platforms pushing against any possible deal with Iran. It seems that there is a rift in the administration, or they're trying to pretend that there is a rift. That Trump is pushing towards a peace, and it's the Israeli lobby who is trying to sabotage it. We don't know what type of games they're playing here. We don't know how much the resignation of Tulsi Gabbard is part of this psychological operation they're playing. It's like sometimes people say the, the snake changes its, uh, skin, you know, like they're leaving one part and forming another group of people who claim to be now anti-war, or they say they were against the war in Iran. But had the Americans achieved their goals, I don't think they would have resigned by now. I think it's the result of this failure. And whether this is controlled opposition or not, I think we have to ask, uh, the strategic question, and that is, it looks to any objective observer that Iran is not going to be defeated. There is no way militarily they're going to defeat Iran, but diplomatically, this is going to go to a direction where at the end of the day, there is going to be a deal. Whether it gives both sides, um, satisfaction or not, that's irrelevant. I think at the end of the day, Iranians will gain more than the Americans, because that's what the outcome of the war is on the ground. Unless, of course, some, uh, mysterious, uh, diplomatic, how to say, non-smart move happens from the Iranian, from the Iranian side. Sorry, Eran. You know, things happen always at the last moment. But do you see Iran is basically changing, withdrawing the Middle East, the the geopolitical map of the Middle East? Is Iran finally emerging as a relevant, above regional power? A power that they cannot basically, um, dismiss, look over, continue threatening, continue sanctioning, continue talking, um, down to Iran? Has Iran already gained its self-right position as a dominant, let's say, regional power?
Just a quick thing, uh, before I start addressing your main question. Uh, you, you mentioned how, you know, unless something very strange and very stupid happens, uh, during the negotiation, that's almost certainly a possibility, right? If you remember, we were winning against the groups that are currently controlling Syria, but then, uh, the Rouhani administration, >> uh, Russians and Turkey, they decided to sign the Astana agreement. >> Yes. >> And that changed everything.
So what you're talking about is not some hypothetical, unlikely situation that has never happened before, right? So just kudos to you for, like, phrasing the situation correctly. Thank you.
But when it comes to, uh, you know, Iran emerging as a power or not, look, uh, I think that these things happen in a very long span of time. And considering the fact that we humans live for, like, I don't know, the, what's it called, um, the, average, the average life expectancy inside Iran is like 78 years old or something like that, 70. You know, we might not get to live, uh, you know, to the point that we see some of these things come to fruition, but we are most certainly heading in the right direction, right? This is the right perspective.
Uh, I always wanted the Iranian government, the Iranian administration to, yes, negotiate with the United States. Okay. But at the same time that you're negotiating with the United States, negotiate with Russia, China, negotiate with South Africa, negotiate with Venezuela. Do not underestimate these countries. And what we are seeing right now is this attempt to bring the countries to the negotiating table in a bilateral fashion, right? For example, our negotiation with Oman is a very good thing, right? So we're trying to resolve our problems not in a big macro deal that everyone thought previously in Iran we should sign. There is no magical one deal agreement that you would go and sign and then it will automatically solve and resolve any problem that you have. No, it's, you know, multiple, uh, deals that you can sign with different countries, and you have to actively work with each and every one of these countries in order to address, uh, the disagreements and the grievances that you have with them. So this is the correct mentality. This is the first thing that I wanted to mention. Fingers crossed that they don't go back to the factory setting and they don't just sort of unlearn everything that we found out during these wars. So hopefully that would be the case.
But when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz and the mentality and the mindset that the Iranian leader, Hussein, has, I'm, each day I'm growing more fond of him because, yes, his mentality, his mindset is correct. He's very firm on the control over the Strait of Hormuz, he's very firm on the nuclear issue, and these are very good things. But going back to the control over the Strait of Hormuz, this will enable Iran to do many things, many things. I don't know if I have mentioned that on your show, so please feel free to stop me if, if what I'm about to say is, uh, repetitious or I'm repeating myself. Yes. Uh, but the control over the Strait of Hormuz will enable Iran to do many things that people might not even understand. Apart from the toll that you receive, which can be a very good source of income for you, right? And this is something that everyone is mentioning right now. It can provide you with different, uh, plays, with different leverages over different countries, which would then solve your problem. What do I mean by this? Look, one of the reasons that the United States is able to impose sanctions on different countries is that, uh, they hold the world's reserve currency, right? They have this rule called U-turn, which means that any dollar bill that is traded in the world should be verified by the United States. Yes. And to be honest, this actually makes sense. If you want to, uh, fight forgery, money laundering, the support for terrorism, you actually need to do this. But the problem is the misuse of the American regime of such a mechanism, of such a law, right? So what if we do not trade in US dollars? And that is something that the countries might have to do when we are talking about Iran asking different countries to open up a bank account in the Iranian banking system, in the Iranian Rial. Well, when they have to pay Iran money in order to cross the Strait, you will create credit for them, right? You will give them credit. Then they will spend that credit. You will purchase or start importing things from their country, right? If the trade is done in the Iranian Rial, it will have two effects. One, the Iranian currency is strengthened as a direct result of more people wanting to use that, right? So that's one of the advantages that it has. The other advantage is that, you establish a sanction-proof, uh, you know, regime structure which can't be, uh, basically dismantled or, uh, you know, sanctioned. Basically, you can sanction it. You can also sanction. Yeah. And, and you can have trade with different countries. So being sanction-proof and increasing the Iranian, uh, the strength of the Iranian currency. If you remember, the Secretary of Treasury of the United States, Scott Bessons, yes, bragged about how he disrupted the dollar-Rial exchange ratio through the means that he had, which was the starting point of the protests in late December 2025, in the Iranian bazaar, that later on became actual riots, and then later on it even became terrorist attacks by the Kurdish terrorist forces that are residing in the Kurdistani region of Iraq, right? So by doing this, you will automatically neutralize one of the great weapons that the United States has against you.
But it doesn't, uh, end there. Imagine that, I think that I've said this. Imagine that Australia wants to, apologies, exile your ambassador. Right? Yes. Because there is a report by the Israeli Mossad that Iran is behind the attacks on the synagogues in Australia. This is something that actually happened, right? Well, back then they, they exiled, they declared the Iranian ambassador as persona non grata. Yes. And they just, you know, kicked them out, right? Well, now if they want to do that, and they, by the way, they know that it's nonsense. We have never attacked any synagogue around the world. But you know who has done it? Israel attacked the synagogue in Tehran. That's what they did. Yes, that happened. Yes. But, uh, going back to what I was saying earlier, if they decide to do that, then maybe we decide that certain shipments that are heading towards, towards Australia, and they're crossing the Strait of Hormuz, maybe we decide to inspect them further. Yes. Right. And maybe this period takes longer than it was supposed to take, right? This is a leverage that you have over them to bring them to the negotiating table and start, you know, talking to them, you know, start reasoning with them.
Another thing, remember the time that the European countries decided that it would be a good idea to follow the footsteps of the United States to declare the legitimate, well-established military of Iran as a terrorist organization? As a terrorist organization. Well, if they decide to do that, all you have to do is to say, well, wire the money to this account, right? Which happens to be the account of the IRGC naval force. How are you going to go back to your country and explain to your population why you, uh, you know, basically wired money to the group that you have declared and designated as a terrorist organization? Yes. These are just some of the few things that Iran can do with the Strait of Hormuz.
But it's not just that. I think that because of the pressure that, um, the, the Arab Zionist countries experienced in the war, they actually learned that they have to sort of coexist with Iran. And by the way, can we just take a moment and, uh, you know, actually point out to the fact that these people refuse to live with Iran, like the UAE refuses to live alongside another Muslim country, Iran, but somehow it is justifying its coexistence with the Israeli regime? These are excuses, right? No, they're not justifying. They're not only justifying, they are justifying to become Zionist. They're not justifying their normalization with Israel. They are calling on other Arab people to Zionize themselves. The UAE has gone a few steps further from what is used to be known as normalization with Israel. It has become like a Zionist state, basically, in the heart of the Persian Gulf. Yeah, absolutely.
And, uh, but like other countries like Qatar, by the way, I've always said that I think that we have been too lenient on Qatar for everything that it has done. Sometimes I have that sort of back and forth inside my head, you know, because if you remember, you once told me that you think Qatar is worse than the UAE because the UAE is very open about what it does. Yeah, it does blatantly. Yeah, they do it blatantly. At least we know what they're doing. Not like Qatar. Yeah. So like sometimes I, I wonder and I go back and forth about, oh, is the UAE worse? No. Is Qatar worse? So like, it's just very hard for me to make up my mind which of these two countries I hate the most. But, uh, like they try to at least, you know, find some kind of leeway, you know, some kind of understanding that they shouldn't maybe be overtly aggressive towards Iran. And I think that these things might help them later on in the future. You know, we're talking about things that will happen across again, years. It will take years for them to bring them to the table and then, you know, have, uh, basically mutual ventures that they later on would see as being, like, any attack on Iran as being a threat against their own investment. Right? So these are the things that we can potentially do.
But if I have learned anything is that, uh, and I, by the way, I learned this thing from Ali back then when, when initially the war between Ukraine and Russia broke out, there were people inside Iran sort of happy. Not happy because people were dying. No, that wasn't the case. But in their mind, they would see this as a very uncomfortable situation. But they would say that, oh, if NATO is focusing on Russia, then maybe they would just leave us alone. Yes. Right. Yes. Back then, when everyone was like optimistic, and you had people talking about multipolarity and, you know, Russia, China, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization. You couldn't listen to a YouTube video in which people wouldn't bring up BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or, uh, like even the European Eurasian Economic Union. Yes. Uh, they would constantly talk about these things back then. And I'm, to a certain degree, guilty of that. That's why I said I learned it. He was saying, I foresee a great deal of pressure and a very painful future in the upcoming years. And he was right. He saw through everything that was happening and, uh, he reached the same, he reached a very correct and very unbiased conclusion that actually showed itself to be correct.
And by the way, this brings us to this final thing that I'm going to mention. There are many people in the United States, in Europe, that they really like to see Palestine being liberated by Iran, right? And they sort of project their own wishes, their own desires on Iran because, you know, at the back of their mind is that if Iran liberates Palestine, if the Zionist entity is dismantled in West Asia, that regime can't take our own governments as hostages, and then our tax money will be spent on us. Yes, that's true. They think that way. Yes, exactly. I'm very happy that you said this. America First. Yeah. Yeah. It's never going to happen. If, let's say hypothetically speaking, tomorrow the Zionist entity is dismantled, where do you think the people who have lived in this ethno-supremacist state that have lost their privilege as first-class citizens, where do you think they would go? They would go to Europe, France, Germany, Britain. Majority of their billionaires are already living in the United States. But, you know, more companies will, uh, return to the United States. Which means that your neighbor, your future neighbor, might be the person who once set up his chair in order to watch Israeli fighter jets bombing the Palestinian territories. That you might have to live alongside that person as your neighbor. Those people who go back to their country, to those countries, and I think that Britain and the United States will see this to a greater extent. They will start spending more money in the American elections. That already resulted in the unseating of basically the only sane person in the US Congress that I could think of, Thomas Massie. Yes. I don't buy into the notion that, apologies for saying this, I know that my opinion doesn't really matter, but Rashida Tlaib, Hakeem Jeff, AOC, I'm not buying these. No, I'm not buying. Yeah, I'm not convinced by them. I think that Thomas Massie, you know, you know, despite the fact that he was unseated, he did a much better job than what they did. And that's precisely why he was unseated. Had you had done even half a good job, half as a good job as he did, you would have been unseated too. Which was actually something that AOC used to say. AOC said that AOC used to say, "What if I'm a representative that would remain in the Congress only for one term?" Yeah. Oh, how did that happen? Yeah. Uh, AOC. But again, please do not project your wishes. Please do not put this on the shoulder of the Iranians that we should be the ones to fight your war. You know, it sort of reminds me of the Israeli mentality, right? The Israelis, they say that, yes, we have to fight Iran to the last American blood. True. Right? And then you have these people in Europe that are sick and tired of your governments imposing more draconian laws against them, curbing their freedom of speech, the same way that you have been targeted by all these groups in your country, the same way that other people have been targeted. They are sick and tired of their tax money going to military aid to Israel, going as military aid to Israel. And they want us to fight the Israeli regime up to the last Iranian person. Yes. I'm sorry. This is too much. This can't happen. And, uh, it's very sad. You know, you have to do something for yourself. We can't be the ones to act as your savior. They have to also, first things first, know why are they projecting these, let's say, fantasies on Iran and why do they have this expectation from Iran anyway? And I think the core of the issue is inside the United States itself. This has to be reformed inside the United States so that Iranians, Palestinians, Syrians, and the rest in our region, including themselves inside the United States, would be relieved from the burdens of these wars. So it's not Iran who would liberate the Americans. Americans have to liberate themselves first from their own government before projecting their their fantasies on other people.
Um, Hassan, I would always love to continue this conversation with you. Unfortunately, um, I also have to leave. My wife is waiting for me here on the corner. Just by the way, just a quick thing. Kev work was kind enough to send me certain bullet points that we were going to discuss. Then we went, I derailed the conversation to the point that everything just went sideways. So this was, this was an amazing, this was an amazing conversation actually because it also answers, um, the choices of the, um, Iranians in their own country and also in foreign policy. It's always important to understand the mentality behind the people who are making these decisions, the psychology, the collective consciousness, and also what are the alliances, the ideology, the basically value system. Those are the things that usually answer the choices, the, um, the policies that are made inside Iran. So we're very grateful for you guys. If you are also grateful for analysis, insights, brilliant, basically geopolitical conversation here with him. You could go to the description below. There is his ex account and also his YouTube channel. After this stream is over, of course, they we will pair this through cooperation or what they call collaboration. I don't like the term collaboration. It feels like collaborating with an enemy or something. I don't know. I use that word always in a negative sentiment. So I would like to say cooperation with him. It will be also said, but you can now just go and hit on his political aficionado YouTube channel and follow his YouTube channel because he's also, um, posting his, um, interviews with on other channels that are very highly valuable as well. Guys, if you liked also this stream, please hit the like button, subscribe to Srian Analysis. Help this channel grow. And if you only can and only if you want to support this independent journalistic work, you can become a patron. The link is calling on the screen, patreon.com/sriananalysis. If you don't like using Patreon, there are different other means in the description below. Thank you so much, Johan. And thank you so much, Max, for moderating the live chat. And I will see you tomorrow, guys, with Andy from the radical thinker. He's not that radical, but he's, this is his YouTube channel. So what, what can we do about it? Thank you so much, brother. Peace be upon you.