Transcription
The regime is dying a death by a thousand cuts. Any one of which could prove fatal. It could subside, but it could very easily tip over.
I see the Islamic Republic still very much in command and control. Is this part of maybe a cycle of protest that can eventually become revolutionary? I think so. But I I certainly don't think that the system is going to just fall overnight.
Will Donald Trump intervene militarily as he has threatened to do? Yes or no?
[Music]
Hello and welcome to the forecast. Iran is in the grip of its most intense unrest in years. What began in Tehran's bizarre over soaring prices and the collapsing currency has spread across 27 provinces with inflation above 50% and the government struggling to contain anger over corruption and falling living standards. Human rights groups now say that at least 25 people have been killed, more than a thousand arrested as police move into universities and the judiciary warns that any period of concessions is now over.
And into this crisis, just a few days after US military strikes against Karakas and the abduction of President Madura and his wife, comes fresh intervention from Donald Trump, vowing that the US, yes, the US will defend Iranian protesters, prompting Tehran to accuse Trump of psychological warfare.
Well, joining me now to discuss all this is Professor Ali Ansari, a leading voice on Iran's modern history, and Dr. Sanam Vakil, director of Middle East and North Africa program at Chattam House. Welcome to you both. Let's try and first of all get some sort of idea of what's going on inside Tehran, inside Iran, those other 27 provinces. Ali, first to you. How serious is this and compare it to the unrest of a few years ago when people descended on the streets of the big cities in terms of of of numbers involved?
They're probably not as large as they were in 2022 or indeed in 2019, but they seem to be broader. Um they certainly became much more violent much earlier uh than they had in in previous occasions and you you you know you certainly get that the mood music is is is turning again. Um it this is not a sort of a call this is a this is a a protest that's erupted from economic obviously discontent but it's rather swiftly turned into a political uh you know, a political challenge to the regime. And it's just yet another you know cycle of protests that the regime is having to cope with. And it's it's you know, every time these protests emerge it gets weaker and weaker. I mean, it it has less room for maneuver. It has rest less capabilities to deal with things. And you know, the real problem for the regime here is that now it's decided now is the time to reform in the middle of a fully fledged sort of like political crisis. And you know, most of us observing Iran would have thought that the time for serious structural reform would have been much much earlier uh certainly several years ago and and not now. So the threat to the regime really is that its own response to what's going on, its inability to respond in some ways or its unwillingness to respond is actually going to make matters much much worse. And so, you know, I I often use this phrase that the regime is dying a death by a thousand cuts and any one of which could prove fatal. So this is the way I I tend to look at things that it it could subside, but it could very easily tip over.
Sam, I remember from my very vaguely from my Iranian revolutionary history that in the revolution in '79, it was the bazaris, the merchant class of big cities like tan turning against the sha that made all the difference. Is that what we're seeing right now? And explain to us the the context of this economic crisis.
Sure. Well, happy to be with you for this important discussion. Um, let's start first with the revolution. Um, because you referenced the importance of the bazaar and I think certainly strikes and um, the support of the bazaar has been important for um, the revolutionary momentum um, going into 1979. But the principal protests that began were actually in 1977 and 1978. 1979 um, was the sort of end of um, the Sha's monarchy and the beginning of um, what was an unknown um, for Iran. Um, I think the protests that we're seeing are um, being very much um, instigated by um, huge uh pressure um, on um, Iranians from um, an economic crisis. Uh, currency collapse if you will. Inflation is above 50% um, week by week prices of basic staples from eggs to milk to rice are just increasing in extraordinary ways and and um, this just is making um, life incredibly hopeless if not um, sort of at a dead end for Iranians and I think that's what precipitated um, the what began as strikes quickly spread into universities and then spread out into um, small towns primarily on the western side of Iran, but not solely. And uh, you know, I think there are different dynamics at play, but what's driving the protests are economic issues, hopelessness, people that feel like they have nothing to lose. Um, and uh, this the system the Iranian um, elected and unelected system have um, taken a new approach that Ali referred to trying to um, acknowledge that they've made mistakes trying to appeal um, for mediation um, engaging in some important subsidy reform and currency um, exchange rate unification. Um, but those measures on their own aren't um, real um, solutions. Iran's problem is structural. It's systemic. Um, and it requires um, the Iranian political establishment to align, to unify, and to agree on negotiations with the US administration. Um, it's only through a uh, protracted negotiations that Iran can solve its economic crisis by time with um, its population that is deeply frustrated and had enough as well as of course address um, its regional and geopolitical challenges.
I mean, Alli, you mentioned a thousand cuts there, and you know, we've been talking to people inside Iran all day long, you know, on the phone, and what they're basically telling us is that this is the final store. They put up with so much, you know, nonsense over the years with so much repression, so many kind of failed opportunities, so many limited horizons, and along comes this, you know, renewed version of a longstanding economic crisis, and they've simply had enough. Is that accurate? And and when it does boil over, you know, when that thousandth cut appears, is it decisive?
Well, I think it I think it could tip. I mean, this this this is the issue. I mean, it could have tipped earlier. Um, they they've managed to sort of uh uh to contain previous protests, but the fact is, you know, as San was saying earlier, they haven't actually dealt with any of the serious structural issues that that affect the um, the Iranian political economy. And I mean, there's massive corruption. And of course they will always look abroad and say well we have a lot of pressure from abroad and the sanctions and of course that doesn't help but I don't myself see it as the central cause behind uh the the the problem in in Iran which is which is essentially that you have a an exemplary case of bad governance. I mean, it's it's enormously bad and they they've managed somehow to sort of maintain a a sort of an ideological um, I suppose a conviction among it among those core supporters to keep them going but I think you're quite right and it's the sense I get from people um, often you know, not very politically minded people but they've just had enough and there's a huge amount of anger uh among people now some will go out and demonstrate others will just sit tight and wait to see what happens others may go on strike I mean I think we have to keep an eye out for the strike And I think ultimately you have to see what happens with the security services and and and and those those tools that the regime has to keep matters suppressed. We know for instance in the mass amin uh uh demonstrations and protests that in some cases you know there was a lot of reluctance among some elements to actually indulge in some of the repression going on. So we have to watch closely and see what happens now. And I think the longer this drags out with everything else that's going on and you know we mentioned earlier the international environment isn't terribly good. um, you know, it it's a you know, it it's it doesn't bode well. I mean, we should add here also and I mean I know this is a it it's certainly interesting as a historian I can tell you that there's a huge amount of path heavy nostalgia going on in the air and it is nostalgia >> for the family of the former shark. >> Yes. I mean, so basically they they've been fed a steady diet over the last 10 or 15 years of sort of films and other things of what was going on prior to 1979. And you know obviously this has you know told a younger generation generation you know, the the younger generations that they um um that life could be different. You know, it's as simple as that. It's it's a visual treat. And of course you know what you're seeing 46 years after the revolution. A chance that I think many of us would never have really thought would be heard again in Iraq which is you know long live the king. I mean, it's quite extraordinary but it's a very sad indictment I have to say if you want to look at it that way or a poor indictment on the way in which the Islamic Republic has run affairs.
S two two questions. The first one is briefly do you think repression still works in Iran as it did a couple of years ago?
Absolutely. Um, the repression and the repressive capacity of the state is very much underway. you yourself outlined the very many tragic deaths um that we are learning about um, the detention and arrests of of over a thousand people. So far, I expect it to go higher. Um, what um, the Islamic Republic has um, developed through decades of managing protests um, is a crackdown playbook and um, they are using it and with every protest they um, learn and and they adapt and um, at the same time they round up the centers from within the system itself. So, um, I fully expect that repression to still be an important tool um, for the system survival and without um, all of the features of a revolution which include um, a breakdown of the elite um, shifts from the army or the security services. I I see the Islamic Republic still very much in command and control. And while this protest is indeed threatening um, and I think was certainly inevitable, I don't think that this is the one um, that everyone is hoping for. Um, is this part of maybe a cycle of protest that can eventually become revolutionary or lead to a change in the regime? I think so. But it's not going to be the one that necessarily leads to the collapse um, of the Islamic Republic. I think that is something we're living through and witnessing. Um, but I I certainly don't think that um, the the system is going to just fall overnight. I think it's important to walk through um, what is and was is not possible for Iranians. I think certainly there's nostalgia, but I think that nostalgia isn't necessarily based on reality. It's it's based on sort of myth. Young people um, clearly haven't opened their history books and perhaps they should read one of um, professor Alians's history books to remind themselves of life under the palvi monarchy a palevi monarchy that um, was certainly um, more secular and certainly socially liberal but one that also had a security force that was quite um, brutal um, and arrested and and detained plenty of students a pani monarchy actually also I'd like to remind people in the region of the Middle East that are also nostalgic for the Palavis. Palavi monarchy didn't just sit tight within Iran's borders. Iran Palavi monarchy supported proxy groups in Kurdistan and in southern Lebanon. The Palavi monarchy took the um, islands from the UAE in 1971 and also laid claim to Bahrain in 1969. Um, questions that I've also asked Reszo Palabi himself. But if we talk about Resop Pali himself, it's important to think about his biography, what he brings to the table. Um, there was an opportunity after the Masa Amini protest to bring together a group of the Iranian diaspora that very much fell apart because of competition because of Raza Pahavi um, didn't want to work as part of a team. Um, and I'll be very honest as someone who is regularly trolled by monarchists who can't stand that I would like to see a more democratic Iran rather than a monarchical Iran. Um, I find um, the people around Resa Palvi to not really reflect or demonstrate the values and principles um, that are needed um, in a sort of new governance structure um, that would come after the Islamic Republic. So I I refuse to think that he is the best and the brightest. Um, and I certainly think that Iran um, and Iranians that have exported themselves across the world um, have um, uh definitely produced um, more sound and capable people than someone who sat in the in Bethesda for 46 years really actually not developing his credentials.
Okay. Ali, do you think is there any evidence at all that the Trump administration is talking to uh the son of the late Sha about a possible transition?
I mean, it's it it is interesting because you do get, you know, the odd commentary coming out of the Trump White House, but on the other hand, it seems to me also they they they are alert enough to the notion that any change or any significant change will come from within the country. And I think most people are are aware of that. I mean the the nostalgia is is is really developed on the back of you know in a sense as Sam Salam says the sort of social and economic development of the country over the 50 years prior to uh uh prior to the revolution and and of course the revolution basically inherited a fairly powerful state. I mean we we shouldn't we shouldn't underestimate that. Um, and you know, it took both the good and the bad of that state and and and basically I think made made discarded the good and made the bad very very much worse. But it's it's it's a you know that there are clear indications for people as we were saying earlier who are quite desperate about you know, what's going on. Um, you know, that the the general economic um, uh the the situation of pah Iran is is is obviously attractive to them and and you know, those were the days for instance in a very simple way that the Iranian passport could get you to many different countries without a visa for instance. I mean now it's it's basically impossible. So there's all that, but I also agree that, you know, I think that Raza Palavi would make his would would make his position considerably stronger, shall we say, if he actually developed a good constitutional platform and a democratic platform in which he, you know, in which he wanted to pursue. And of course, you know, we haven't really seen any of that so far. So I mean, it doesn't, you know, I think the nostalgia is precisely that. It's a sort of a rather vague notion of the fact that, well, things were better once. and and as I said it's it's it's a reflection really of how bad things have become.
So let's get on to Donald Trump then. I mean, is it is it possible do you think that he will come good on his threats first to you Alli of some kind of intervention in Iran and if he does so will he do it through his proxies in the form of Benjamin Neti now because that is the other thing that's changed in the last few years we had that mini 12-day war between Israel and Iran with American intervention.
I mean, it's certainly very possible but I mean I think the most important thing here is that he's he's basically said um, in only the way that he can say it has to be said that you know we're watching and you know obviously he says then we'll take action um, and I think that probably has done quite a bit in Tehran I mean particularly after the whole Madura business that you know people have realized here that there is there is a you know we have to remember that when President Trump was first elected there was quite a lot of enthusiasm in Iran about the fact that they thought they could do business with a businessman basically that uh uh here was a Republican who didn't give two hoots about um, human rights and you know and and he was a businessman so you know the art of the deal sold very well in Persian translation it has to be said so initially they had some quite positive notions and of course when they were dealing with Witco and others prior to the prior to the war there were a lot of very positive voices coming out of tan about the Trump administration and rather less um, complimentary commentary coming about the Europeans Now, I think they've sort of realized that that just isn't, you know, that isn't going to happen. And and I think, you know, the the whole Trump intervention is just another problem for them to try and accommodate and to try and sort of factor into their decision-m, which I have to say at the moment, I mean, they they I still think they're, as someone said to me, you know, badly concussed after the 12-day war, and they still really haven't decided what they're doing. So um
Salam one of the things of course uh one of the reasons why this the 12-day war was fought the ostensible reason was to try and contain Iran's nuclear program and then of course Donald Trump got very huffy uh and puffy when it was suggested to him that actually not all the nuclear capability had been totally obliterated as he claimed. What do we know about Iran's nuclear program since the the June war? You know had they started rebuilding? Have they started to regroup? Do we know?
Well, um, what we we do know is um, that um, the US and um, intelligence agencies more broadly agree that Iran has halted enrichment. Um, and um, the the the program as we knew it is is frozen. Um, obviously we don't know if there's anything incendiary happening underground but certainly I would imagine that Israel and um, the US are of course keeping track and and using satellites to monitor these facilities. Fordo hasn't been touched and the international atomic energy agency hasn't gone back into Iran um, to examine the facilities as well. So, for the time being, Iran is actually playing ball and and um, appeasing Trump with this narrative, whether it's true or untrue, that um, the nuclear program is is frozen in time. But that isn't on its own going to prevent perhaps um, another strike or another round between Israel and Iran because Prime Minister Netanyahu was in Mara Lago um, and even prior to that making a case that Iran is re um, capitalizing its ballistic missiles. Um, and indeed, of course, the Islamic Republic is preparing, building back its defense capabilities for what it is calculating will be a more deadly, but perhaps a needed round um, to create balance between Tehran and Tel Aviv, but also um, to create the conditions for talks, which is ultimately what Tehran needs. Iran is calculating that it has um, the ability to um, withstand a longer fight than the Israelis do. That's one. And two, um, they think that, you know, obviously if they can survive and come out um, less bloody, that would create a more level playing field for negotiations. But, you know, this is the year where that could certainly play out. um, the Israelis might um, be misreading the protests in Iran and and think that the system is weak and thereby um, this is a great opportunity to weaken it further.
Right. Um, I interviewed the Iranian foreign minister who died in that helicopter crash a few years ago. And my final question to him and he didn't like it was are you more afraid of a Donald Trump election or your own people? And he said you know we're afraid of the people love us. We're a great democracy and we are not afraid of Donald Trump. whatsoever. I wonder Sam, if Trump were to repeat his threats, if you're an oppositional figure inside Tehran, is that helpful or is that unhelpful?
It's a tricky one. I think that um, you know, Donald Trump's threats and what we have seen over the past few days in Venezuela is a cautionary tale for the Islamic Republic and for Iranians, for the opposition, for those aspiring for something different. If um, you know, certainly with young people out on the streets and really have had enough, yeah, maybe they feel more emboldened um, and they think um, Trump could be on their side. But I wouldn't trust Trump too much because at the same time removing Ali Kam without actually sort of dismembering the structure of the Islamic Republic isn't going to provide um, or or you know, give Iranians maybe what they seek. And so um, I think that we should be arguing for a more nuanced um, approach, nuanced analysis. Obviously whatever change in the regime that is going to come through the death of hommin or the agency of Iranian themselves um, should come actually not with just thinking about getting rid of them but thinking more deeply about what comes next.
Right. Ali, I mean, we haven't talked to Al Kame um, the supreme leader at all. He is a very old man by all accounts. He is a very frail man and he's come out of his, you know, um, summer bunker during the war looking even more frail. You know, are his days literally numbered? Is there a succession plan? And if there isn't one, is that an opportunity for the regime to fall and the them, you know, the opposition to take over?
Well, I think he's he's definitely um, uh frail. I mean in in in the sense that you know sooner or later obviously the um, the succession will have to to kick in. I mean, it's uh uh and and it's been a bad year. I mean, it's been a bad year for him and he's uh and he's suddenly certainly when you when you listen to him he's he's less sureooted than he has been in the past. Even in these current protests for instance you know the the the crackdown and the violence that took place took place well before he even got a word in. I mean normally he comes out and he says something. He has said something since but um, originally you know obviously decisions were made without you know him him actually making any public statements on it. I've always felt and I've said this very clearly in the past that I think he his his um, preferred succession is to hand over to his son. But I I have to say I think it's it's probably less likely now. I mean I I think there are many people probably looking at the Islamic Republic and um, the whole concept of the the the supreme leader um, and probably thinking that when Harmon dies that might be the opportunity for some sort of serious change. Now how easy that would be absent any other sort of um, development and I'm, you know, I'm less convinced that the Islamic Republic is as stable as as as maybe Sanam suggested earlier. I mean, I I think they're much much more fragile than that. So depending on the decisions they make and how they go forward. Um, yes, I mean, I I think there could be an opportunity on his on his passing um, for some you know, some of the internal opposition if you will to come forward and and and and and start to provide an alternative. It's going to be painful by the way. I mean, this is the problem. These deep structural sort of problems that Iran has are not going to be solved overnight. And I I draw attention to the fact, you know, that we haven't really talked about about the environmental crisis hitting the country, which is enormous. I mean, it's far more catastrophic than I think people realize. And you had this
What do you mean by that?
Essentially, they're running out of water. I mean, you know, they they have so mismanaged the water resources, which has been something that Iranian states from ancient times to the present have always been, you know, basically it's their primary task is to manage the water resources of the Iranian plateau. And basically the Islamic Republic through over farming, poor planning, building dams in the wrong place, so on and so forth, has basically drained much of the aquifers underneath the Iranian plateau. So they're in a very serious problem of being unable to supply um, many of the major cities with water, not on a regular basis. And and we came precariously close to what people called day zero, where they were actually going to be running out of water in total in some of the major cities. Now they've had a period of sort of um, snow and rainfall in others but again it's part of the fallacy I think that occurs even within Iranian you know governmental outlet that they think that you know a couple of weeks of rainfall are going to solve the problem it just isn't it might delay the problem but it's not solving the problem and even those um, you know, insiders such as Kantelli who was the old minister of agriculture I mean he's basically done a mayor kulpa and basically said you know we screwed up I mean we screwed up very badly And we should have planned 20 years ago for various sort of like uh uh environmental projects, dam building, irrigation and others which we didn't do and the aquifers are now are down and they will not recover. He said they will not recover to their previous levels.
Interesting. Salam and let's talk a little bit about Iran's friends. I mean George Bush used to have this phrase the axis of evil and Iran was very much part of that. Um, you know, are they getting a lot of support from the Russians? I know they've been providing the Russians with drones. Are they getting a lot of support from the support from the Chinese? I know the Chinese have been buying Iranian oil. You know, what's that relationship like? And are those friends of Iran motivated enough to support what could be a crumbling regime?
I think the the foreign relationships are certainly interesting to watch. Um, I mean, I think the principal um, network of friends are Iran's counterweight to the axis of evil. It was called the axis of resistance. um, the the terminology developed in reaction to um, George W. Bush's um, uh sort of cute phrasing. Um, and the axis of resistance is the Iran sort of backed and built network of states and non-state actors um, that support resistance against Israel and resistance against the United States. That's included Hezbollah, the Houthis, groups in Iraq. Um, and there have been serious setbacks in
And they've all been massively weakened by the Israelis, haven't they? I mean, the Israelis have really destroyed Iran's kind of regional empire, if you like.
Um, weakened. I I wouldn't say destroyed. And so, this is where I think the nuance is a little important. Certainly, there have been huge setbacks. I think the primary setback has been in the context of Syria, where for over four decades, Iran cultivated a relationship with the Assad regime. And with the Assads now hanging in a dasha and um, Moscow um, Iran has you know, lost all of that investment. What's happened also in Venezuela um, with Maduro um, you know, obviously being removed is another loss for Iran because that was a relationship that Iran cultivated in the US's western hemisphere. Um, so there have been real setbacks um, in in that grouping. Um, but um, to answer your question more specifically, uh ties with Russia and China are humming along. They're neither overwhelming. Um, but they Iran has not been abandoned by these partners either. Um, China continues to provide these sort of economic um, lifeline for the Islamic Republic. Um, and there have been s some suggestions that China has helped Iran um, recapitalize its ballistic missile program since the war last year. And the Russians are important more important um, than are is often reported in security um, intelligence and military ties and of course um, the economic nature of the relationship is limited but still one where the two countries collaborate. Let me just add one more thing about the region. Um, while Iran's non-state-based relationships have certainly um, been less um, u beneficial for Iran, Iran has improved its ties with almost all countries across the Middle East and North Africa and that has been a positive. Iran's normalization with the Arab world um, is in a stronger footing than it has ever been.
I just want to ask you both, you know, to do something outrageous, which is a little prediction. I'm going to give you a couple of nuanced um, possibilities. So, first you Alli, do you think by the end of the year we're going to see regime change in Iran brought about either by Donald Trump's intervention, by the people uprising against the regime as we're seeing bits of happening right now, or will the regime carry on perhaps rebooted by some kind of deal concocted by Steve Whit Ali?
Uh well on on the qualification that historians never predict, Matt. So I I want to put that caveat in there um, very clearly. Uh I mean I think I think your former is more likely than the latter, but I'd want to be quite specific about the notion of regime change or regime collapse. I mean I think that there is a serious possibility that there's going to be an economic collapse and that economic collapse will will bring all sorts of things along with it. um, whether that entails a a sort of an element of sort of very direct regime change you know that that's a little bit more uh debatable because you know those within the system will fight till the last minute I suspect but it could lead to a sort of an internal um, collapse of one sort not I should say and let me emphasize this of the country per se but more of the system it's the political system really that I'm thinking about and and one of the things we have to be very careful when we discuss these things I think is to make clear you know what we're what we're defining here because I think too many people conflate Iran with the Islamic Republic and and the Islamic Republic is a political system. I don't think the polit the political system of the Islamic Republic as it is currently configured has a future.
Salam, what about you?
Um, I would say we could most likely see a change in the regime. Neither regime change. Um, uh I don't see that as viable, but a change in the regime.
A rebooting a regime reboot.
Well, it could be a reboot, but it depends on who comes up in the reboot. Um, the international order and um, leaders around the world seem to be quite comfortable with pliable, amendable, and um, uh sort of rebranded leaders. We saw that in 2025 and I think that that could very likely be a scenario we might see in Iran where you know an Egypt model or a Syria model could work out as well for for Iran. But I do think that talks are still out there as a viable solution. I'm not sure the Islamic Republic is a able or capable to deliver a deal. They're good at they're or they're supposedly good at negotiating, but I think we have to bin that um, idea at this point. And um, but I, you know, the talks I think are still a possibility for this year as well.
And now that I've broken the ice and got you both into the prediction game, one final line. Will Donald Trump intervene militarily um, on behalf of the protesters as he has threatened to do? Yes or no, Salam?
No.
Okay. What about you, Ali?
Uh I think actually he he's set himself a red line and he's very likely going to have to deliver on it either through himself or his uh or his allies, Israel.
So that's I mean I I think if they continue in this way, he will um, he will find himself having to deliver something. Now, what that means, you know, I who knows. Uh, but uh, yes, I mean, I think he he's he's laid down a red line very clearly there, and he'll look very silly if he does nothing.
Well, we've got you both on the record, and we will get back to you if and when it is necessary.
I hope Salam is right.
Okay. Well, who knows? Thanks very much to both of you. San Bakil, Alian, Sari, it's been a pleasure speaking to you. It's a really big issue at the moment. We're all focused on Venezuela, but this is this is another gathering storm. We can't take our eyes off it. Thanks to all of you for listening to the forecast. That's it from us here in Washington today. See you next time.