Transcription
The party's performance track record, uh, gives the party its legitimacy. And I mean, I saw your TED talk. You actually referred to the Pew Research and Financial Times survey to show, like, the incredibly high approval rate of the Communist Party by the citizens. Then, if the party is incredibly popular, as you say, why does the party feel the need to regulate the media and the internet, restrict freedom of speech and right to protest, and arrest dissidents? I mean, if they're so confident, they can just hold elections.
>> Hello, my name is Singan Lee and I'm a former president of the Oxford Union and Asia Society. Um, I would like to first thank my friend Eric for giving me the honor of interviewing him. As Paris said, Eric is the most successful and one of the very first, um, French capitalists from China. Um, and what's even more amazing is that he's also the most interesting and the most talked about public intellectual from China after his viral TED talk. Uh, I had a similar discussion with Eric at the parliament yesterday, and actually, one of the audience members, um, in the talk was Lord Jeffrey Howe, and he came up to Eric after the talk and said it was one of the most thought-provoking and profound talks in China he's ever been to. You probably would not agree with Eric's subversive views. Um, but I hope that you can feel the same way as Lord Howe did yesterday. So, Eric, I would like to first begin by asking you this. You spent your youth in China at the height of the Cultural Revolution. And in your viral TED talk, which most of the audience members have probably watched already, you say you were disillusioned by the failed religion of your youth in China and went to America to learn about the West. Uh, you worked your way to get degrees from Berkeley and Stanford and became a successful salesman in Ross Perot's company. You even got involved in, uh, Ross Perot's presidential campaign, um, and seriously participated in American liberal democracy, as we would all expect from your democracy-loving speech. Um, uh, you seem to have drive in the West, but you now are very skeptical of the idea of liberal democracy, and even more skeptical of the idea that, um, liberal democracy is desirable for China and is compatible with China. Um, how did this shift in your view, um, take place?
You know, when I was your age, I knew everything. You know how it feels. I do, because I was there. And when I knew everything, and when you knew everything, you are predisposed to buying into neat formulas that explain all of the world. And you're predisposed into believing that there's a solution to every problem, and there's a grand solution to the grand problem. And of course, I knew everything when I was growing up, and, and, and, and I grew up with the narrative that there was a certainty in this world, and the whole world was moving in the same direction. And it's for certain that we will go from primitive societies through slavery to feudalism to capitalism, and ultimately end up in the communist utopia. It didn't quite work out that way. And of course, when I was coming of age and, and was a student in, in America, I was still young and was fed another story, and that was neat, too. A beautiful formula where the individual will emerge as a sovereign unit of all societies, and, and 1.3 billion or six billion individuals will vote ourselves to paradise. And it was a beautiful story, too. But then, of course, I left America. I returned to my native country, and I traveled everywhere, and I studied. I went to Africa. I went to Southeast Asia. I grew my business in China, and the world turned out to be more complex than that, and more nuanced than that, and more interesting. I think, um, the, the, the, the, the formula that was devised after the Cold War, where every country must follow to, to, to achieve prosperity, didn't really work out for most of those countries that prescribed them and followed them. Uh, you can go to all those countries in Africa, in Southeast Asia, they followed the playbook. They, they did everything by the book. But it didn't work out for them, and they can't go back. They're in trouble.
>> Also,
>> China didn't do that.
>> Yeah.
>> And it did work out to some extent. There are many problems, of course. Uh, but the fact is still that it led to, like I said, the greatest, most significant improvement in the way of life for the largest number of people in the shortest time in history.
Um, also, during your speech, you said one might be very counterintuitive to audience members here. You said, "What did they get wrong? It turned out that the party has not been holding back or reacting to China's modernization, but leading it. Self-correction, the ability many attribute to democracies, has been a hallmark of the party's governance." And you've been actually arguing that the Chinese political system is at least self-correcting as Western liberal democracy, if not more. But how does the party self-correct their policies? I mean, in the absence of institutional liberal democracy, of free press, uh, judicial oversight, popular vote, what is the mechanism through which the Chinese model informs the party of being wrong about their policies?
Um, you know, let me first address the second half of your, your, your question, which is, you know, the, the overriding assumption in the last few decades by political scientists is that democracies self-correct. Democracies are uniquely capable of changing courses and reforming themselves to adapt to the times. It turns out the facts are, if you're political science, how many are political science students here? I don't know if you're political science students. It turns out, at least so far, the evidence indicates that electoral democracies are extraordinarily rigid. They can't change course. So many interests are involved. Um, you know, Frank Fukuyama, my friend, the political scientist, calls the American system a vetocracy. Everybody can veto everything. It can't, can't do anything. The, the, in fact, Karia, another great American commentator, has recently written that, you know, the American political system should change itself into a parliamentary one because the circumstances in America are such that a parliamentary system could work better. But of course, it's simply not possible. It will not be done. So even within democratic models of governance, it is nearly impossible to change from a parliamentary one to a presidential one or vice versa, let alone any wider range of changes. And I think political reforms, reforms are badly needed in America and Europe. But why is it not happening? Because these systems are extraordinarily rigid. The Chinese system, so far, is not going to be forever. The one-party system happens to be very agile. I use this one particular example. For the 10 years before the 18th Party Congress last year, we had nine members in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which is the highest ruling body in the country. And it turned out that the power was too diffused, decision-making process was dragging, and didn't work quite well. So what did they do? At the 18th Party Congress, they took it down to seven. Imagine taking the US Senate from 100 people to 88. It won't happen, regardless how urgently needed it may be. So the Chinese system is very, very agile. And now, the reason why I would advance the case that it is agile, because the Chinese Communist Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic and upwardly mobile political organizations in the world today. If you conduct a good analysis, the leadership of the party emerges from the grassroots. Yeah, I know there's a lot of talk about princelings and what have you, but if you really take a look at the numbers, yeah, I, I studied the Central Committee before the 18th Party Congress. Haven't gotten around to study the current one, but I think it generally holds true. In the, in the Politburo, in the last Politburo of 25 people, only five of them came from so-called princeling background, any background of privilege, whether it's wealth or power. The other 20, including the president and prime minister, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the Central Committee, in today's Central Committee, the percentage of people who come from a background of any privilege is even smaller. Compare that to the US Senate, for instance. How many are sons of senators and sons of, come from wealth? Compare that. I, I would say if we conduct a survey, if you conduct a study and compare the Chinese ruling elites at the Central Committee level or whatever level you want to choose, and compare that across the board against developed countries from America to Europe, against developing countries from the Philippines to South Korea. The entire country of South Korea, we're just there, was run by princelings from politicians to travel CEOs to university presidents, who are all sons of university presidents. Um, so, so if you make that comparison, I would suggest that the party, the, the percentage of people who come from the grassroots in the upper echelon of the party is probably the largest, period. And it is this ability, if you go to any Chinese university, I was studying for my PhD at Fudan, and the, the party recruits at the very grassroots level, the best and the brightest students who come from the countryside. They join the party, and they move their way up slowly, step by step. Um, and it's the, the selection process is very meritocratic. Uh, and it's very tough. Even for Xi Jinping, the new General Secretary, he's a princeling, happens to be a princeling. But let you know, it's, it's, it's amazing. The party has been in power for 64 years. He is the first, he is the first head of state, head of the party who comes from a background of political leadership. No one else has. So, but even for him, the career path took 30 years. He worked his way up from village chief, county chief, mayor, vice mayor, mayor, provincial. By the time he made it to the top, he had managed 150 million people and a couple trillion dollars in combined GDP. The track record is amazing, and you don't make it to the top unless you go through that grinding machine of the, of the party system. So, so I think the ability to recruit people from the grassroots, regardless of their background, and allow them the upward mobility to move up, is the key to the party's ability to adapt because the upper echelon, the ruling elites are the same generation of the people they're ruling and come from the grassroots. So they know the conditions of the country.
So you think the rise of princelings is a fiction?
Well, I, I think the numbers indicate that, um, if it's simply there, and I think the numbers will continue to indicate that, even to a greater extent, if you analyze the next lineup, the ministerial level cadre and the mayoral level cadre, the percentage of princelings is dropping. Even now, it's small.
>> But it will continue to drop. If you, if you look at the, the future lineup for the next 20 years, uh, there are hardly any princelings. I, I see two actually, th out of thousands.
>> They have any hope of making it to the top.
>> I mean, you mentioned in the speech today that the party's performance track record, uh, gives the party its legitimacy.
>> And I mean, I saw your TED talk. You actually refer to the Pew Research and Financial Times survey,
>> to show, like, the incredibly high approving approval rate
>> of the Communist Party by the citizens. Then, if the party is incredibly popular, as you say, why does the party feel the need to regulate the media and the internet, restrict freedom of speech and right to protest, and arrest dissidents? I mean, if they're so confident, they can just hold elections.
Um, good question. You didn't ask that yesterday. This is how you get me. So, I think it doesn't have a lot to do with popularity or confidence. I mean, I think it has to do with the idea of, of free speech, really, freedom of speech. Um, and I would like to suggest that the degree of space for debate, for public debate, for public speech, should be calibrated by the conditions of a society at particular times. And I think history will tell whether China's current degree in space are conducive for its long-term success. But to simply say that freedom of speech is, I think, oversimplifying. Um, you know, that, the, the modern Western political ideology of so-called freedom of speech, I think, is a fallacy. It doesn't exist. It's, it's no society has absolute freedom of speech, and every society, based on conditions, regulates speech. It's based on the, the, the ideology of freedom of speech is based on the, the idea that somehow free speech is not act, therefore it's harmless, therefore it should be allowed absolute freedom. But of course, it's contra, it's, it's contrary to human experience over thousands of years. Speech is act, and speech has been capable of doing harm and have done harm to human societies since time immemorial. In Europe, one does not have to trace back further than 1933 to remember a case where powerful speech by one man, amplified under the right conditions of the time and the place, ended up doing great harm and destruction to millions. In today's Europe, they're still grappling with with the same situation. In Greece, blood and death was involved with speech. In France, is a speech to cover your face? Does that hurt social cohesion? In Germany, because of its particular conditions, particular history, publishing certain books is banned. So, let's come back to China. Contemporary China is experiencing social transformations of which the speed and scale are unprecedented in human history. Under such conditions, the fragility of social stability can be easily disrupted by amplified speech. So, I think responsible governance should take that into consideration. And, and whether, whether the current range of freedom is proper, I think history will judge.
I think you give a good account of the past track record of the party, and we cannot deny the pace and scale, the economic miracle that the party has brought to China. However, I think we are all of us here are not only interested in the past but also in the future. I mean, most of the East Asian countries that achieved first-world status in the last half-century.
>> Let me guess, South Korea and Taiwan.
>> Yeah, achieve, I mean, achieve them, authoritarian regimes, but once they reach, once their income got higher, they turned democratic. Do you think that's going to happen for China in the future?
The, the, the presumption of that question, uh, is problematic. The, the question presumes somehow that income has something to do with the desire for a particular political system. It's, of course, not the case. Um, say, after the Cold War, many, many more very, very starving poor countries adopted democracies. It didn't do anything for them. But so, yes, South Korea and, and places like Taiwan, and a few places, income has risen, and they wanted democracy. I, I would argue under unique circumstances. You know, South Korea was a semi-sovereign country, and Taiwan, they were under the umbrella of the Cold War, and, and they made that choice. They had to, I think. But that's a longer and more complicated discussion. But, but my point is, there's no link between income and a desire for a particular political system. There are many, many more very, very poor countries, didn't make a dime, >> and wanted democracy, right?
>> I mean, then, then how long do you think the system is going to last? I mean, just
>> Well, I think it, it, it depends on many, many, uh, variables. Uh, can they continue to perform? I think they will continue to perform for some time, probably within my generation. And second, will democracy continue to fail? I, most, most countries look at cases. I mean, most countries, most of the non-Western countries who adopted electoral democratic regimes did so not because of faith, as the West has. I would argue democracies are outgrowths of religious and cultural traditions. But for non-Western countries, they adopted them because they thought it would work. And they looked at the presidents, look at those cases. And now the cases have reversed. Democracies are not working in most places. In fact, it's doing great harm. So, will it continue? If that trend continues, then the probability of China adopting democracy will be, uh, will be less. Who would be that stupid to copy something that doesn't work?
>> I mean, then do you think the Chinese political system is an alternative to Western liberal democracy?
>> Well, it's an alternative for China. I mean, I, I don't think I do want to make the point that the Chinese political system at the moment is suitable for China under the current conditions, and it is not exportable. Because I mean, I, I think political systems work when they work, they work because they are suitable for the cultural conditions and the times, and they are unique across different cultures, in different times. And, and the Chinese system seems to be optimal at the moment. But, but I would say that I think the only thing that's exportable is the idea that there are alternatives. And each country, if you want to succeed and you want to prosper, should look for a path that's suitable for your own circumstances and not blindly copy others. And that is exportable, but, but not the model itself.
I'll just ask a couple more questions of, um, for about international relations. I mean, during your talk in South Korea, you predicted the coming of new world disorder and you cleverly used the phrase, uh, phrase "Waring States" as a metaphor for our time. And you said the following: "The world is not coming together under a unified system. Its underlying narrative is dead. Its underwriter is no longer able to pay for it. The most significant rising power is not interested in making a new one. Um, perhaps Waring States is a proper metaphor of our time. The Chinese seem to be looking ahead and beginning to formulate a new framework. What presidency proposed to President Obama during their California summit as great power relations? Why do you see the coming of new world disorder and an era of Waring States?
Um, since the end of World War II, international relations have been dominated by what I call a narrative dichotomy. And a narrative dichotomy is a single fault line story. What it says is, and, and, of course, of historical determinism. So after the, after the World War II, the narrative dichotomy is that the whole world is divided by a single fault line: Soviet communism against liberal democracy and capitalism. And they both armed themselves to the teeth and took their ideas from continent to continent, caused untold suffering by many, many people. And in the end, Soviet Union collapsed, hence the American century. So that's the first phase of the narrative dichotomy. The second phase is after the Cold War. Then was assumed that the world is moving towards a different utopia, the utopia of liberal democracy. And, and there's a single fault line. The single fault lines are between those who are democratic capitalism and have adopted that system, and those who are not, refuse to, or are not yet. And it's a struggle between these two. And I would argue that we are at the end of that phase. The narrative dichotomy, the single fault line narrative, no longer reflects the realities of our world. It just does not. If the best example would be, say, the Middle East today. Human conflicts, conflicts among nations, states, and groups are now driven by multiple fault lines. Um, the, the Western Alliance led a decade-long project to remake the Middle East. It turned out the world is much more complex now than than a narrative dichotomy. That the ethnic, religious, cultural fault lines, nationalist fault lines prove to be much more consequential than the single fault line between democracies and dictatorships. And we're witnessing that again in Syria. And in, in Southeast Asia, in East Asia, the same thing. I mean, is the fault line between democracy and dictatorship going to define the conflicts among China, Korea, and Japan? Of course not. Nationalist fault lines prove to be much more persistent and consequential. Um, so, so, so the current global architecture, which is underwritten and paid for and run by the United States Western Alliance, is based on that narrative dichotomy, of that single fault line story. And that, that story no longer reflects realities. Therefore, it's costing the captain of the global architecture, America, much more now than the benefits. Um, so it's, it's, I think it's a matter of time before America begins to, the American people begin to ask for their country back, and they already are beginning to do so. The British people are asking for their country back. I think Syria is a, is probably a watershed event in, in that, in that perspective. Um, and so, so, so, so what I'm saying is, we're, we are entering a phase I call Waring States, meaning there is no pre-designed architecture that you could plug in and run your policies. Different states and different participants, different actors are behaving in their own interests, whether it's nationalist, economic, or political, ideological, or ethnic, or religious, whatever it may be. And so we're, we're in uncharted waters, and we'll go through decades of that period, and we'll see what emerges.
>> Also, during your speech there, you said China is not a revolutionary power, and it is not an expansionary power. I mean, as a South Korean, we know that at the core of Chinese tradition, um, there is so-called the belief Jong Hua,
>> right?
>> Which refers to the Chinese belief that China is the center of the universe. I mean, if you see the past history, South Korea, Japan, and other neighboring nations were categorized as barbarian nations and had to pay tribute to China and conform to Chinese culture, tradition. I mean, I think this conflicts with your view of China as a non-expansionary power. I mean, what is your take on this?
>> Well, I think we've got to distinguish between theories and a factual statement. Like, China is the center of the universe. I'm kidding. So, the, I, I like to, I want to make a real distinction here between an outlook of centrality, which is the Chinese outlook, it's been around for centuries and thousands of years, and an outlook of universality. These are two very, very different outlooks. Centrality meaning I'm at the center of the world.
>> Keep barbarians out, but not invading them.
>> Are you kicking me out?
>> Yeah, that's right. Keep, uh, but maybe if they pay tribute, we'd take them. Uh, but at, at most, at most, I, so if you compare, if you took, if you look at the last two, three thousand years, there have been centuries, centuries when China was, I don't know, a third of the world's GDP or something, maybe half. I don't remember the numbers, okay? Check Ferguson's book, it tells you, it has a chart. And what during those periods, what China did to other countries. And compare with other empires, whether Rome or Britain or other empires, when, when their share of the global power was half of what China's share was, and what they did to other countries. And so I think it's a matter of degree.
>> Yeah, this is my last question. Um, you suggest a non-interventionist policy to the United States, other major powers of the world, and you say, "Give China time, allow it the space and independence to continue on its own path, live and let live. Perhaps that would produce an outcome more suitable to all." And you also pointed out during your lecture that America can no longer afford to spread democracy, freedom, and liberalism around the world, and can no longer afford to save countries in humanitarian crisis. I, I, I know that you predict the so-called new world disorder, but is that a desirable outcome? I mean, do we actually want to live in a world where we can no longer rely on the international organizations and America and other major Western powers to sort our humanitarian crisis?
>> Well, I'm a businessman and I'm a political scientist. So, I'm not interested in normative statements. I'm interested in analytical statements where we analyze what will happen, not what should happen. I mean, the, the question, what should happen, is so complex. It's influenced by, by how we grew up, the religions we, what church you went to. It's, it'll take weeks. The analysis today, and the analysis I'm interested in, is what will happen. And, and I think what will happen is not whether it's good or bad. I mean, I actually think it's more interesting. I wouldn't use the word good. It's more interesting. Uh, it's more interesting to let an architecture emerge without pre-design, without a foregone conclusion. A foregone conclusion has to be enforced, has to be coerced. People have to be coerced to accept it, but without a foregone outcome. And I think that's the more interesting world. But it could cause more suffering. Uh, but that, who is to say that the, that the, that the current process of forced convergence is not causing suffering? For, for.