Part 2- Blueprint of PSIR - Revise Complete PSIR Paper 2 Section B - by Vivek Waghmare

Moving the video forward, there is an important announcement that I want to make here. The first batch of the PSR Foundation Course is already ongoing. It started on the 16th of June. That batch is already ongoing, and our second batch is starting on the 11th of August. So, in the PSR Foundation Course, our effort, our intention, is to understand each and every concept in a very systematic manner with real-life examples, so that there is conceptual clarity and our concepts are built in such a way that we can internalize PSR. So that our answers have that naturalness, that organic quality, and we can enjoy PSR and study it well. This is our intention. For more details, you will find separate videos on our YouTube platform, on Sarathi's YouTube platform, and also on my YouTube channel, PSR by Vivek Agam. You will also find separate videos about this, and for the detailed schedule, you can visit our Sarathi's portal. So, it is starting from the 11th of August. The 11th of August is the orientation session. And let's see you all there in the orientation session. So, let's move the video forward now. If we talk about recent developments in India-Myanmar relations, if we talk about recent developments, then recently, look, we are focusing on border security here. In border security, India has planned to fence the Myanmar border in some way. So that we can control illegal migration and the threats related to insurgency, insurgency-linked threats. At the same time, the refugee response to the ongoing conflict in Myanmar, the ongoing conflict in Myanmar, that has led to a refugee influx into Mizoram, into the Northeast, because there is connectivity with the Northeast, so whatever conflict is currently ongoing in Myanmar, due to that, the influx is coming here, coming into Mizoram, and therefore, India is providing humanitarian assistance, but at the same time, we also need to take care of security, we also need to manage security. Secondly, there are some strategic projects, like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Corridor, that are ongoing, and despite delays from local conflicts, this is a very important project from the perspective of the Act East Policy. From the perspective of the Act East Policy, this is quite important. So, this is one of the recent developments. Also, there is diplomatic engagement. India continues to dialogue with the Myanmar Junta. Myanmar Junta, basically, this new government that has come, basically, after overthrowing the earlier government, this new government that has come to power through the military, we basically call it the Myanmar Junta. So, just as we are engaging with the Taliban, regardless of the nature of the government, in a similar way, we are also engaging with the Myanmar Junta. Because ultimately, we have to maintain diplomatic relations with the country, irrespective of who is actually representing it. So, we have to actually balance the strategic interests of both countries with the support for democracy. We still support democracy there, and we basically support human rights there. So, now, this issue of the military coup in Myanmar, that issue, let's see. The military coup in Myanmar in 2021, in 2021, the military coup overthrew the NLD government of Myanmar, which was led by Aung San Suu Kyi, basically a democratically elected government. The Junta, which is actually led by General Min Aung Hlaing, faces resistance from ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy civilian forces. So, you understand that earlier there was a democratic government there. After overthrowing it, the military there formed its own government. But it also faces resistance. Definitely, it will face resistance. From the side of ethnic armed groups, from other groups, there is opposition. At the same time, there is resistance from the pro-democracy civilian forces as well. At the same time, there are some parallel exile governments also there. Basically, these are parallel governments that are also seeking global recognition. They are seeking recognition at the global level so that they can get recognition and represent the country. In a similar way, here, India's, but here, see, what is the problem? What is India's dilemma? India basically has a dual-track approach. First approach, dual-track approach, meaning basically what is it? That here we are engaged with the Junta, but not necessarily that we support it. There is a difference. One is, like we are engaged with the Taliban. That doesn't mean we support the Taliban government. We will support the democratic government in that country, which is elected by the people. But because we cannot interfere in the domestic matters of that country currently, so for the time being, we have to engage with whatever government is in any country, so that we can pursue our security interests, first of all, our security interests are important. And secondly, we can collaborate in the development of that country. For this, irrespective of who is representing the government, we have to engage. We have to engage. So, in a similar way, here too, we are following a similar approach, just like we are following a dual-track approach in Afghanistan. We are following it here as well. Because our connectivity projects and our Northeast security and overall South Asian security, keeping these in mind, we have to engage with the country, irrespective of who is leading the government. But at the same time, we support the democratic principles there, we support democracy. So, we are not trying to promote democracy there, we are not doing the work of democratic promotion, but it is just that in principle, in principle, we support democracy. We support democracy. For this reason, we cannot support a government which is non-democratic, but still, we have to engage with it, because for security reasons and connectivity reasons. So, this reflects a realpolitik strategy. This is our quite realistic approach where we are balancing our ideals as well, and at the same time, trying to pursue our strategic interests. Because our strategic interest is security. Okay? But our ideals are democracy. So, democracy is not here. There is no democratically elected government here currently. But still, we are engaging with them, because we are trying to balance our ideals as well as our strategic interests. What are the challenges here? First of all, security spillover. Due to the conflict, refugees are coming into Myanmar, and because of that, insurgent recruitment is happening a lot in the border region. So, this is a security threat here. Secondly, strategic projects that we were basically trying to develop are now at risk. Like IMT, IMT highway, this is one, and there are many other infrastructure projects. Thirdly, China's influence, which is a perennial issue in every country here in South Asia, that is present. So, India has to somehow counter China's influence. China is also basically deepening its ties with the Junta. Because China's approach is completely realistic. They don't even balance realism and ideals or principles. They have no ideals. Their approach is simple. They can collaborate with anyone. China collaborates with the military of Pakistan, or with anyone. So, they can deepen their ties with the Junta. China can deepen its ties with the Junta. And here, we will have to counter them. We will have to counter China, because the more China's influence grows in other countries, the more our space will somehow decrease. And the third important issue here is the Rohingya issue. This is quite a big refugee crisis that is still unresolved, and it is still destabilizing this particular region of South Asia. Talking about global image versus reality, look, India's values, democratic values, are tested by its military engagement in Myanmar. Engaging with the military, with the military rule in Myanmar, how challenging it can be to maintain our democratic values. This is basically an example of that. Here, we can see the views of multiple scholars. But here, look, let's see Rajiv Bhatia's view. According to Rajiv Bhatia, he suggests that we should use forums like ASEAN, BIMSTEC, and go to the UN to put pressure on the Junta government and work for democratic restoration. This is what Rajiv Bhatia says. Now, what are India's policy options in this entire scenario? First is that we should deepen our diplomatic outreach and our democratic actions and ethnic groups. Okay? Through these, basically, we should deepen our diplomatic outreach. Secondly, we should engage with ASEAN. We should actively engage with ASEAN countries, and we should also establish military-to-military channels. Thirdly, we have to establish people-to-people ties through education and humanitarian outreach. Talking about recent updates, look, in economic relations, trade has declined due to Myanmar's instability. Connectivity projects like Kaladan Multi-Modal, Sittwe Port, etc., there is some decent progress there, but still, there are delays. Projects like IMT have some delays. India has provided a line of credit of 500 million dollars to Myanmar for their renewable energy projects, so that we can counter China's influence. From the perspective of strategic and security cooperation, India has abolished the Free Movement Regime in 2024 and has started fencing the border to counter insurgency and illegal migration. We are also conducting some exercises like IMNEX and IMBEX, joint patrols at Sittwe Port, so that we can maintain our maritime security and our presence in the Indo-Pacific. Operation Brahmastra in 2025, through Operation Brahmastra, India has given a good example of humanitarian leadership in the crisis that occurred in Myanmar. Talking about cultural engagement, look, India has launched the Bodhi Program at BIMSTEC 2025, which actually offers scholarships and training to Myanmar students. We are providing scholarships to Myanmar students through this. Despite the termination of the Free Movement Regime, FMR, the Free Movement Regime, despite its termination, India is trying to connect people-to-people ties through Myanmar's friendship projects, trying to promote them. The Rohingya crisis, we have discussed this crisis quite a bit. India offers aid but denies refugee status. We cannot give them refugee status due to security reasons, but yes, we can definitely provide aid. We can definitely provide humanitarian aid. In BIMSTEC 2025, India basically pushed for repatriation and Rakhine development. For the development of Rakhine, the Rakhine state, and for the repatriation of refugees, the Rohingyas, India is making efforts. Talking about multilateral engagement, in BIMSTEC, India supported the Bangkok Vision 2030. India supports this Bangkok Vision, and with IOR and UNODC for maritime crime cooperation, for cooperation in maritime crime, we are all together, including Myanmar. Myanmar is also included in this. Talking about the military coup and India's policy, look, for now, the Myanmar Junta controls about 30% of the territory. They control 30% of the territory, due to which there is some risk of cross-border insurgency, and at the same time, India has also hosted the BIMSTEC Security Dialogue, and it has a dual-track diplomacy, which we have discussed before, that we should engage with the Junta, but we also support democratic restoration. So, this is India's stand. The Free Movement Regime, we know what it basically is. Okay? So, in this way, let's see India and the Global South. In this way, we have looked at the overall neighborhood and the overall relations of India with its neighboring countries, and what challenges South Asia is facing. Now, let's look at India and the Global South. This is very important. India and the Global South, if I want to give you some highlights, then in India and the Global South, some important things are important. We will look at the details later, but I want to give a brief highlight. Global South, first of all, when we say Global South, it is basically so many countries that are going through a phase of developing nations. They are developing nations, least developed countries, and developing countries. These are basically in the Global South. Correct? Global North, basically, the developed countries, Western democracies, and Western countries, industrialized countries, they are basically Global North, we can call them. So, Global South, we actually connect more with the Global South because we also belong to and are a part of the Global South. We are a part, a section, of the Global South. Why? Because first of all, there are some common things between the Global South countries. First of all, our challenges are common. Like poverty, climate change, terrorism is a global problem for everyone, but poverty, hunger, these are all our problems. And our history, somehow, is connected to a particular thing, which is the struggle against colonialism. Our struggle against colonialism, correct? The way European countries and the northern countries established colonies here and exploited, the exploitation of resources, which is still continued even with new capitalism. This is still continued today through new capitalism. For example, if we talk about the new international economic order, our economic and financial setup, global governance, if we talk about all these, then even if we look at the United Nations Security Council, there is underrepresentation of the Global South. So, somehow, this is injustice. Global injustice is being talked about here. There is injustice. Our resources are being exploited. All the things of our countries are being exploited, and the benefits of development are going to the Global North. But the impact of climate change, its more serious impact, is being felt by the Global South. So, there are multiple reasons. That is why NAM is still relevant, because it is the single largest platform that accommodates the Global South, which can strengthen the voice of the Global South for equality, for global justice, for the voice of the Global South. That is why NAM is important. NAM is important for this reason. At the same time, our concept of South-South cooperation, because our trade, issues related to trade in the WTO, are common to us. Correct? Other financial systems, global financial systems, issues related to them are also common to us. Our challenges are also common to us. That is why South-South cooperation makes even more and more sense for a country like India. And here again, one important thing is that India is also going through a transition where India is also becoming a part of elite groups. India is becoming a part of elite groups. But at the same time, even being a part of elite groups, we are facing challenges. We are facing challenges that are basically similar to developing nations. The challenges that developing nations face, we also face the same challenges. So, the first one is, look, South-South cooperation. This is basically a process of collaboration. Here, we are collaborating among developing nations in various areas, especially in the economic field. So, this form of cooperation is driven by commonalities. There are commonalities. History of colonialism and economic exploitation. Our history is that we have been economically exploited, and we had colonial establishments, and because of that, we have to address these common challenges. And like many problems, poor economic infrastructure, illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, lack of technology. So, why South-South cooperation? Why South-South cooperation? Because first of all, due to all our challenges being common, collective resistance and shared interests have developed as a response to this. Our collective resistance and this South-South cooperation, how did it develop? It has developed as a response to colonialism. Colonialism came first. Now, it is neo-colonialism. So, in response to this, we have developed South-South cooperation. And what is its function? South-South cooperation is basically not an institution. South-South cooperation is an idea, is an idea of collaboration. Through this, we promote unity. We try to promote unity among all developing countries. Which is inspired by movements or through movements like NAM. We try to implement this through NAM. Next is the shared history. We have a common history and we have a common historical struggle. Our struggle, common colonial legacies, we carry them. We are mostly all post-colonial countries, and our economic struggle is also common. And that's why there is some empathy and there is trust because of the commonality. Okay? So, South-South cooperation, in this way, we are trying to promote an alternative narrative. So, like Edward Said, Edward Said is also a post-colonial thinker. In the way he suggests, we need to promote a counter-hegemonic thinking here. Secondly, economic sovereignty and equity. This is also an important inspiring factor for us, a driving factor. So, the aim of South-South cooperation is to rectify historical economic exploitation. How will we rectify it? By promoting the trade that is happening today and the development models. Let there be fair trade. If there is fair trade, just, fair. Just like we see the concept of Rawls. There is a difference between equal treatment and fair treatment. In the same way, we need fair trade. Fair trade deals. Considering all.

Our historical injustices. So the Fair Trade Bill that we need, like in 204, there was a summit of G7 plus China. In this, India proposed the Global South Trade Framework, whose work is to reduce the dependency that we have on the West. To reduce it. Then we have a goal of South-South Cooperation, and an important factor is that South-South Cooperation actually encourages our trade, our investment, our technology transfer, all these things to happen, and we can achieve regional integration so that we can build a mutual and self-sufficient economy. So, our collective goal is to be self-reliant. Another, another is that we have to tackle common developmental challenges. We have already seen this before. Our challenges are common. So we have to tackle them. For example, India and Brazil in 2024, under the BRICS initiative, introduced drought-resistant crops to fight for food security. They brought these things. So in this way, we solve our common problems ourselves. We become self-sufficient. This is an important aspect. Then, alternatives to aid dependence. Developing countries, the countries of the South, they are dependent on other countries for aid, on the Northern countries. So SSC, our South-South Cooperation, offers a self-sufficient model. It is a self-sufficient model as an alternative to the traditional North-South aid structure, which traditionally, traditionally, North provides aid to South. We don't need it. We don't need that aid. We need to be self-sufficient. So, in this way, we should help each other instead of taking aid from the North. So, India has given a grant of 5 million to ASEAN for renewable energy. So, we can help each other. Now, let's see how this South-South Cooperation evolved. In 1955, the Asian-African Conference, the Bandung Conference, where we basically laid the foundation for South-South Cooperation. Okay? And this actually goes parallel with NAM. Just as NAM evolved, the idea of South-South Cooperation also evolved parallel to it. In 1964, UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development, was established. So as to assist developing countries. This was done to assist developing countries, in which trade policy, promotion, and all these things were to be promoted, especially among developing nations. This UNCTAD was established. Then the United Nations also supported South-South Cooperation by adopting a resolution for a New International Economic Order. This is a very landmark event. When the UN supported this resolution for a New International Economic Order, it signifies that it actually documented the support of the UN, global support, for South-South Cooperation. This is why it is a landmark event. After that, if we talk about 1982, if we talk about 1982, a meeting was held in New Delhi which emphasized SSC, South-South Cooperation, as a key principle of collective self-reliance. This is important. When we talk about the South, about the Global South, collective self-reliance is an important concept for us. Collective self-reliance is important for us. Then in 1985, the Global System of Trade Preferences was established to promote South-South Cooperation in trade. We should also have South-South Cooperation in trade. Collective self-reliance is basically South-South Cooperation. Let our economies become collectively self-reliant, and let us, as countries, become self-reliant, instead of being dependent on other countries. Then G15 was created as a catalyst for greater cooperation among developing countries. And then in 2003, many other developments took place. For example, IBS, this is a vehicle for South-South Cooperation where India, Brazil, and South Africa are involved. Okay? So, if we talk about COPS 2024, currently, India hosted the third Voice of the Global South Summit. The third summit of the Voice of the Global South Summit, we have just had it. We just hosted it, in which our focus was basically on climate finance. Why climate finance? First of all, let's see why climate finance. Because if I explain it briefly, climate change is a global problem. Everyone is facing its consequences. But if we look at who is responsible for it, currently, the climate change that is happening, its seeds, its reasons, its causes are not from today. They have been happening for decades. For that, something like industrialization, and the economic exploitation and degradation of resources that is happening, the major responsible countries for this are the Northern countries because they developed themselves. They developed. They exploited resources. But now everyone has to bear its consequences, including developing nations. So, somewhere now we are seeking, because now, see, the impact on developing nations is greater because we don't have the technology to deal with climate change. To deal with climate change. That's why we now need better resources to deal with problems like climate change. That's why we are demanding climate finance. Demanding climate finance. So that we can mitigate the impact of climate change and somewhere restore a better environment, restore what has been degraded. And for this, definitely, our developed countries in this global world, the developed countries, have a greater responsibility to contribute more financially first, because they are financially well-off, they have enough resources and technology, and most importantly, they contributed more to climate change. The degradation of climate change, global warming, the most contribution to this is from developed countries. And because of this, our principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Of course, the problem is common, but our responsibilities are differentiated because we are developing nations. We have just started our development path, our process. But you started this 50-100 years ago and contributed more somewhere. Industrialization, then utilization of coal, or degradation of forests, all these things, where did they happen first? Who did it? So, definitely, developed countries did it. Hence, climate finance, and secondly, digital inclusion for developing nations. Now, because we don't have digital tools, digital inclusion, and digital literacy everywhere. In developing nations, it is quite lacking. So, for its inclusion, and at the same time, digital sovereignty. Digital sovereignty is a very important idea today. We need digital sovereignty. Because most of the digital companies, whether they are social media platforms or any digital tech companies, they are owned by developed countries. Developed countries own them. So, the problem here is that developed countries own them. But the data, a lot of data from developing countries, like a lot of India's population's data, is here. So, here, data privacy, data privacy, and our digital sovereignty, that our government should have our data and the authority over it, rather than some private entity or some transnational organization. So, the problem here is? Multinational corporations and transnational organizations have all this data, and they actually own all these digital platforms, and that's why here, other countries and all these MNCs and transnational corporations, mainly they are from developed nations. Developed nations. So, because of this, our digital sovereignty is being compromised somewhere. Now, let's talk about recent summits related to South-South Cooperation. One was held in 2019, the second High-Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, that was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Argentina. The aim of the conference was to reinvigorate and strengthen our South-South Cooperation, so that we can contribute to achieving our role in this entire sustainable development, our role, our agenda. After that, the BRICS Summit took place virtually, bringing together the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, all the leaders came. And the summit provided an opportunity for a dialogue. Here too, we talked about South-South Cooperation. After that, the Sixth India-Brazil IBSA Summit. IBSA is basically a platform that carries forward South-South Cooperation. So, its virtual summit also took place, and here too, we focused on the fact that our trilateral relationship, bilateral is two countries, trilateral is three countries, and more than that is multilateral. Nowadays, the concept of minilaterals is also very important, like QUAD is a minilateral. Now, probably it won't be covered here, but I'll mention it now. The idea of minilaterals, multilateral organizations are very important. But see, at the same time, minilaterals are also important. Minilaterals. This is the era of minilaterals. Why? Because, see, the way India's overall approach was, like NAM's overall approach was non-alignment. But now we are somewhere focusing on issue-based alignment, strategic alignment. Why? Because there are small issues that are not necessarily applicable to all countries. Like maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, or ensuring our strategic security in the Indo-Pacific. So, who does this matter to? Of course, it matters to everyone. But now, like-minded countries, like India, Australia, Japan, USA. We four countries are coming together to form QUAD, and through QUAD, we are trying to secure our Indo-Pacific, maritime security, and overall trade routes. So, this is for a particular cause, we are coming together. Not multilateral, meaning more than three or four countries, when many countries come together, it becomes a multilateral forum. But this is a minilateral because there are only four countries, and mainly it's not about the number of countries but also the issue. Here, the issue is a single issue. A particular issue. It's not that multiple issues will be solved here. It's not like that. Like WTO is a multilateral institution because it's not just about trade. It's about other things besides trade. So, in this way, between multilaterals and minilaterals. Now, minilaterals are very relevant because with minilaterals, you can solve small issues. Small issues. Okay? In 2023, India hosted the second Voice of the Global South Summit. That also happened. After that, the third Voice of the Global South Summit, that also happened in 2024. Correct. So, India and South-South Cooperation. Now, we have seen what South-South Cooperation is, how it originated, its overall journey, and its aim, its purpose. We have seen the purpose of South-South Cooperation. But here, let's talk about India and South-South Cooperation. What is India's overall role? First of all, let's see development assistance. Development assistance. India supports Least Developed Countries. How does it support? By giving grants, or by giving concessional loans, or by giving infrastructure aid. Examples: 300 million in grants for climate-resilient infrastructure in Pacific Island nations in 2024. So, the first thing is development assistance that we provide in South-South Cooperation. What is India doing for South-South Cooperation? We are talking about that. India Technical and Economic Cooperation. I mentioned this initiative before. We will see it further. This is basically an initiative of India. If you go to the Government of India's website, you will find India Technical Economic Cooperation. It is quite important. We think it's not just an initiative. It's not just an initiative. It is basically an initiative at the global level that India implements in multiple countries. When it goes to any country, we provide skill development and many other things through this for their technical and economic cooperation. Okay? So, here, as an example, we expanded to include AI and cybersecurity training for over 5000 Global South professionals. For all the countries of the Global South, we have provided things like cybersecurity and AI professionals, AI, to more than 5000 people. So, secondly, lines of credit. One is ITEC. Before that was developmental assistance. Then lines of credit. India provides low-interest credit for critical projects in developing nations. So, for critical projects in developing nations, like infrastructure, renewable energy, important projects of this kind, we provide lines of credit. Basically, line of credit means low-interest loan, okay? So, then we also engage multilaterally. We engage at the multilateral level too. Like IBSA, BRICS, BIMSTEC, SAARC. By engaging in these multilateral forums, we try to reinforce our solidarity and our shared goals for development and our shared commitment. An example of this is here. Then technology transfer. India also shares its expertise in IT, or in agriculture, or in healthcare. Whatever our expertise is, like during COVID-19, through the Vaccine Maitri initiative, we provided a lot of aid, medical aid. We tried to transfer technology. So, whatever better technology we have, we try to transfer it. Our NavIC, which is basically a satellite mission, through that too, we try to provide the benefit of that technology in the South Asian region and wherever needed. Then, talking about strategic outlook, C. Raja Mohan also recognizes here that India's development diplomacy is a key pillar of our foreign policy and a very important tool. So that we can counter-balance major powers, especially China, if we talk about China here, it is a very big tool. So, these are the things we are doing in India and South-South Cooperation. But what are the challenges in South-South Cooperation? What are the challenges? We are contributing to South-South Cooperation. Lines of credit, ITEC, developmental aid, we do many things. Okay? This is just enough for answer writing. For understanding and more knowledge, we can go beyond this. But since we have to revise, understand things, and these points are enough for answer writing. What are the challenges of South-South Cooperation? The first challenge is the pressure of globalization. See, now the global economy is integrating, due to which our collective economic agenda, especially of the Global South, is diluting. Now, here, the important thing to understand is global economic integration. What is globalization? It is economic integration. In this, all economies are integrating. When all economies integrate with each other, a common market is formed. A common market is formed. So, here, those who are more competitive, those who have better technology and more capital, benefit more. Correct? And those who don't have such better technology, who are economically a bit weak, their vulnerabilities are exposed to the global economy. That's why globalization is not necessarily beneficial for every country, not necessarily. Yes, as long as a particular economy is self-sufficient, then definitely globalization might not be that beneficial for it. But because, yes, due to globalization, we can export, we can import. But somewhere, if we look today, the scope of exports for developing countries is very limited, and imports are more. If you look, mainly the USA, its currency, the dollar, why is it the most powerful? Because it is a hot currency. Now, why is it a hot currency? Why is it a hot currency? Because it is a hot currency because it is in most demand. Now, why is that currency in most demand? Because the most trade is happening with that country. Now, why is the most trade happening with that country? Why is the most trade happening with the USA, or with other European and developed countries? Because, see, it's a simple matter, like Apple phones, if you look, or Facebook services, or Instagram services, everything, it's somewhere, meaning most of the important things, most of the things, computers, Microsoft, many such things originate in the USA. So, there are many such goods, services that we require more, and we have very few things to offer to the USA. And that's why we might not be that important to them, but they are more important to us. So, because of this, our economic vulnerabilities are exposed due to globalization. And especially for the economies of the South, the Global South, globalization is challenging. For example, CPTPP has challenged South-South unity. But India has responded to this by promoting protective policies. By promoting protective trade policies, India is challenging this somewhere. Secondly, neo-colonial economic control. Neo-colonial economic control. Developed countries, even today, even today, developed countries, their dominance is in economic agreements, or organizations, multilateral issues, they dominate. They dominate. Whether it is trade, financial systems, they dominate. IMF, World Bank, WTO, developed nations dominate in all these. Because of this, developing nations do not benefit much. Rather, due to their economic control, they can easily exploit, and we are becoming more and more dependent, even more than before, if we see. Then, inactivity of NAM. NAM, the Non-Aligned Movement, is the most comprehensive vehicle for South-South Cooperation. But its momentum has also somewhat reduced now because its ability to coordinate Global South efforts is decreasing. It has decreased. But India is trying to push it somewhere. India is trying to renew or reinvigorate the NAM summit. Definitely, see, when we talk about India, especially in the context of the Global South or South-South Cooperation, we have to portray India as a leader. Because yes, definitely, India is a leader. Even though India's capacity, definitely, compared to many other countries, compared to the global powers, India's capacity is definitely less. But then

Whatever capacity we have, within that capacity, we are trying to offer something better somewhere. For the efforts of the Global South, South-South cooperation, and to raise the voice for the Global South's interests, whether in the UN or WTO, we try to raise our voice there. For example, India has also pushed for digital cooperation recently.

Then, look at another problem: the Bretton Woods institutions, like the World Bank and IMF. As I mentioned before, they have a lot of dominance, and they are quite biased towards Western interests. Because, you see, bias – we have seen political science, political theory – how can we talk about bias? Now, look, on what principles are the IMF and World Bank based? They are based on neoliberal economic principles. Neoliberal economic principles, and if we know that, it is very much famous, or perhaps infamous, for its inequalities. It is more famous for its inequalities. Its outcomes are based on inequality. Correct?

And that is why, not necessarily, but because of the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after that, the unilateral, basically, the hegemony of the USA that came, meaning, basically, the unipolar world that was created, and the American hegemony came, because of that, and their allies, the European Union, and the other members of Europe, because of them, somewhere the impact of neoliberal policies has been further strengthened. And because of that, even today, all these institutions, actually, they are the institutions, the economic institutions, the IMF, World Bank, and other institutions, they actually dominate the world economy, and they actually dictate the global economic order. The global economic order is being dictated by the IMF and World Bank. Meaning, they are deciding the overall economic order of the world. How the entire global market will be, what will be in the global market, all those things are being dictated through the IMF and World Bank. The IMF and World Bank are dictating this.

But here is the problem. Of course, there has to be an economic order, and there is an economic order. But the problem is, the point is, this economic order, this economic order is dominated. It is biased by the West. And that is the clear example of how capitalism is still in its new form exploiting and, and basically reinforcing new imperialism. New imperialism, new capitalism. Correct? So, that world-system theory, which we basically see in comparative politics, world-system theory, somewhere, that is even relevant, what Immanuel Wallerstein and others talk about. Correct?

So, India and Brazil have launched a Global South Fund for this, so that they can finance infrastructure initiatives, especially in least developed countries. In least developed countries. Okay?

Then, unregulated MNCs. This is again. MNCs. Whose MNCs? Not of developing countries. Multinational corporations where people work, multinational corporations, they are not of India. Developed nations own them more. So, these MNCs, some of them have a turnover greater than the GDP of some nations. If we look at their overall turnover, their basically overall financial standing, then it is more than the GDP of the economies of many countries. Correct? So, here, developing countries are facing challenges in controlling MNCs. We are unable to challenge MNCs. We are unable to control their operations. And that is one of the examples of how sovereignty is challenged in a globalized world. In a globalized world, in a contemporary world, how the sovereignty of the state is challenged, this is the best example, because we do not have control over these MNCs. Although their operations are here, but the control over their operations is somewhere from their headquarters. From the headquarters. So, because of this, and those headquarters are not here. The headquarters, you see, are in developed countries, in America, in England, in London. Correct? So, therefore, we cannot control them, and because of this, basically, we cannot avoid the exploitation done by them. We cannot avoid the exploitation done by them.

For example, India and Nigeria have collaborated, somewhere, on tax evasion by MNCs. Tax evasion is a very important problem. MNCs evade taxes. They establish themselves in such a way that they do not have to pay taxes. So, they will earn from here. They will exploit resources from here. But they will not pay taxes here. They evade taxes. In economics, you must have seen how tax evasion happens. The uneven gains of globalization, the benefits of globalization, even those benefits of globalization are not equal, within a country or in the global world. Meaning, even at a global level, some countries have more benefits, some countries have very few benefits. Correct? So, because of this, the intra-South disparities are also increasing. The North-South divide, well, that is one thing. The North-South divide, developed nations benefit more from globalization, developing nations do not benefit as much. But within the Global South, among the countries of the Global South, this problem also exists. The benefits of the global economy are uneven. Some countries are getting more benefits, some are getting less. So, globalization, ultimately, is a neoliberal principle. Correct? Globalization is ultimately a neoliberal principle. And because of this, its benefits, inequality is a very structural outcome. As Karl Marx said. Karl Marx said this, didn't he? Karl Marx said that the capitalist system is inherently, inherently based on inequality. Fine.

So, now, let's look at one country at a time. One country. If we talk about one country, then let's talk about India and Africa. The depth of the connection between India and African countries. African countries, basically the African continent. African countries have been pillars of India's foreign policy, leading to a strong emotional link. Africa is considered a foreign policy priority by India. For India, it is one of the important foreign policy priorities. And India's support for Africa has always been without any conditions. And we have never had any hidden agenda. Like other countries have. We do not have any hidden agenda. Our support is unconditional. India's relations with Africa are deeply rooted in centuries-old ties of cultural kinship and commerce. Both India and Africa, both share the spirit of cosmopolitanism. We both have a cosmopolitan spirit, meaning, in African countries and in India too. So, here, here, look, for example, our, their, the African ideology, Ubuntu. Ubuntu is a very important word. I have also spoken about it on my Telegram. If you search for Ubuntu on Telegram, you will find Ubuntu. Okay? Ubuntu, and then here, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, like India's. So, both are cosmopolitan, basically, looks. Cosmopolitan ideology. So, this bond actually fosters mutual understanding, cooperation, and a shared vision for a brighter future. According to Hamid Ansari, he gives four imperatives for cooperation between India and Africa.

First of all, we have common historical experiences and cultural links. Secondly, our strengths and capabilities are complementary. The third important thing is that our approach to meeting our developmental challenges is common. We are looking at what are the four important, basically, imperatives between African countries and India, in which we can cooperate. We have seen these three. The fourth is that our perspective on looking at global matters has convergence. Our perspective on looking at global matters is somewhat converging, because, you see, the challenges are the same. Because the challenges are the same, obviously, our perspective on looking at them will be similar, somewhere converging. There will be no divergence. So, this is a very obvious thing. So, these are the four principles. Now, some principles, we need to keep in mind, because on the basis of those, we can create answers. Even if you know only these four points, you can derive your own answer. You can write your own answer about India and Africa.

Now, if we talk about the importance of Africa for India, for India-Africa trade, let's look at the importance from every perspective. Let's look at the geo-economic dimensions. So, if our partnership, our trade partnership, the trade partnership between India and Africa, has reached somewhere around 100 billion by around 2022-23. In which our annual trade growth is 18%. It is 18%. If we try to count it from 2003, then here, our main trade is in pharmaceuticals, petroleum products, and mainly with SADC countries, basically, South Asian developing, basically, developing countries. With them, our trade is 30 billion dollars, through the vehicle of exports and mineral imports. We import minerals from there. African countries have minerals. The required minerals, and our vehicles, or other exports, we are doing.

First important thing, why is Africa important for us? Geo-economically, the first important thing is the mineral wealth in Africa. Okay? It is for India's energy and India's tech. India's tech, meaning, basically, like semiconductors we need. Technology, all electronics technology, digital technology, these are semiconductor-based. So, we need semiconductors. We need semiconductors, so for semiconductors, basically, for minerals, we need minerals in the tech sector, and for our energy sector as well, like thorium, or some other things, like for the nuclear energy we create, the minerals for that, we get them from Africa somewhere. Like here, look, lithium, cobalt. So, here, they actually, we gain from Zambia in 2024, reinforcing our clean energy transition. Because we are shifting to renewable energy now completely. Our renewable energy target, the target for renewable energy, is being revised day by day, and is increasing a lot now, because we have to rely on renewable energy now. So, for renewable energy, we need the minerals. Those minerals can be obtained from Africa.

The second is the growth potential. The most important thing here is that Africa's recovery is at 3.5% growth. Meaning, after COVID, their recovery is happening. Good recovery is happening. Especially if we talk about countries like Rwanda, there is a lot of scope for investment there. We can invest there. By investing, we can do quite good trade with them.

The third is that we can reduce our dependence on the Gulf. Look, there are always disturbances in the Gulf countries, something or the other. The Western, basically, the West Asian countries, there are always some conflicts going on. Now, there was Israel-Iran, now there was the Israel-Gaza issue, the Israel-Palestine issue. Something or the other keeps happening there, and whenever something happens there, then definitely, because that region is disturbed, oil prices skyrocket. Oil prices increase a lot, because of which, because of which, inflation and its economic implications are seen here. So, somewhere, we can reduce our dependence. So that their impact on us is less, and we can somehow insulate, swap that impact. So, for this, we have to diversify. Instead of, you know, importing all the oils from the Arabian countries or Gulf countries, it is better that we actually diversify our import of oil. We should diversify the import of oil. So, we can reduce the dependency. India has basically signed an oil exploration deal with Nigeria now, because of which our over-reliance on Gulf countries will decrease.

The fourth is food security and agricultural cooperation. Because concerns about food security exist in all South Asian, basically, all countries of the Global South. So, India, by partnering with Ethiopia, we have launched a joint pulses production program, which ensures mutual agricultural resilience.

Geo-strategy. Now, these are our geo-economic factors. Let's talk about geo-strategic dimensions. Maritime security and anti-piracy efforts are important for us. India's naval cooperation with African coastal nations. With the African coastal nations, we have naval cooperation for maritime security, which we can see in the joint naval exercise with Kenya in 2024, that can boost security in the Indian Ocean. We can boost maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

Then, India's role as a net security provider in the oceanic region. Especially in the Indian Ocean, if we look, in the Indian Ocean, regarding maritime security, the role of a net security provider, we can reinforce that here. So, our stabilizing presence. India has deployed a patrol vessel to Mozambique in 2025, signaling a proactive maritime engagement, because we have to play the role of a net security provider. Do not forget this. We have to play this role.

The second is our peacekeeping commitment. Our contribution to UN peacekeeping is the highest, and it is in many African countries. Our peacekeeping operations, the UN peacekeeping operations that run, in which we contribute, are mainly in Africa, and there are many missions there. So, we are strategically contributing there somewhere. For example, India's long-standing role in UN peacekeeping was reaffirmed in 2024 by deploying 500 additional troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo, highlighting India's dedication to African peace missions. We can highlight our dedication to African peace missions here. Because we provide, we contribute a lot to UN peacekeeping.

Let's also talk about defense and security cooperation. Look, China's influence is everywhere. Meaning, leaving Asia aside, it has not spared Africa either. China's presence is everywhere. So, to counter China's influence, India has supplied drones to Tanzania, which can enhance, or is enhancing, our overall regional surveillance and our defense diplomacy.

Next is shared global governance goals. Global governance. Now, this is also an important point. Global governance. In comparative politics, we will see global governance. In global governance, basically, so that there is no bias in global governance, and there is inclusive representation, inclusive participation, this is necessary so that the institutions of global governance truly become effective. For example, if we talk about the UNSC, in the United Nations Security Council, the presence of other countries is not there. Meaning, the presence of all countries, basically, of all continents is not there. So, because of this, the goals of global governance, like India and African nations, they collaborate on international platforms to amplify the Global South voice. To amplify the voice of the Global South. For example, India and Africa have jointly proposed UNSC reforms, which are not happening at all. Reforms in the UN Security Council are not happening at all. We are just raising our voice for reforms. Reforms are not happening. We are actually raising our voice for equitable representation and global institutional reforms. But it is not happening at all. But okay, no problem. We will keep raising our voice continuously. There is no problem.

Then, challenges in India-Africa relationships. Now, look, what are the challenges in India-Africa relationships? We have seen where we can collaborate. But challenges. First of all, there is no cohesiveness in our Africa policy. Lack of a cohesive Africa policy, unlike India's defined regional strategies, like our Act East or Look East. Right? Or like our consistent strategy, a well-defined strategy for the region, like for the countries of Southeast Asia, we have the Act East policy. For neighboring countries, we have the Neighborhood First policy. There is no cohesive strategy like that defined for Africa. That is one of the problems. That is one of the problems. And that's why the strategic direction that our relationship should get is not being received here. Although a preliminary framework was drafted in 2024, emphasizing trade and security, it awaits finalization by 2026. China, China gets a slight extra edge there. China's massive investment is there, which is almost 45 billion, compared to India's 18 billion, and that has expanded its economic and military influence. Its military influence is definitely there, but China has also established its economic influence there. So, India is trying to counter this somewhere by launching defense training programs in 10 African nations, especially in the context of cybersecurity. But its presence is quite limited. Quite limited, beyond the anti-piracy role. Beyond the anti-piracy role, its role is not much. India's role is not much. So, we have to increase our role somewhere, so that we can counter China's defense engagement there and its economic engagement.

If we talk about investment and trade, there is a significant gap in investment and trade. Despite India's FDI rebound to 18 billion in 2023, it still lags behind China's 45 billion. China's trade, investment is more there. Trade is also 100 billion, but India's export-heavy pattern is continuous. That's why there is an imbalance. There is an imbalance. Correct? Trade volume, whereas if we talk about China, China's trade volume is definitely much higher than ours, it is 220 billion dollars.

Geo-economic pressures. Regional trade blocs like RCEP, it has significantly reduced the leverage India could have had, or the benefit India could have received, because definitely, we have withdrawn from RCEP negotiations. But RCEP's overall, basically, trade, being a regional trade bloc, so its leverage is higher compared to India. So, to counter this, India has tried to negotiate somewhere. India negotiated trade exemptions with AfCFTA. Africa's concern, basically, is this. So that we can increase our bilateral trade resilience, by increasing our bilateral relations, we can create resilience, and reduce our dependence on multilateral Western-centric treaties. Multilateral Western-centric treaties, correct, by reducing our dependence on them, we can increase each other's trade resilience.

Political instability and security risks. This is also a...

This is an important challenge. There is persistent instability in the African region due to terrorism and piracy, which complicates India's engagement. This risk also brings limitations or invites them in implementing our infrastructure and defense projects, and in deepening our intelligence sharing mechanisms.

The second important problem is the perception issue. Attacks on African nationals in India. African nationals or citizens, sorry, not nations, African nationals or citizens, the way they have been attacked in India in the last few years, due to these examples, our perception has taken a dent. A dent has been made to us. In response, India has introduced an awareness campaign and also introduced legal protections in 2024. So that we can develop trust among the African community, who come here to study, and improve our image. But yes, definitely, there are challenges regarding perception, there is a perception issue. Okay? Corruption concerns, like scandals involving the Gupta Brothers in South Africa, have tainted India's business image. So, due to this Gupta Brothers issue, India's business image in South Africa has been somewhat dented, which has led to many concerns regarding our ethical standards in bilateral economic dealings, and all these things need to be addressed.

We have discussed ITEC almost many times here. Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation. We are discussing this more in the South-South aspect here because ITEC is an initiative whose leverage and implementation are most extensively done in African nations. So, it was basically launched in 1964 and is India's flagship development cooperative initiative. Cooperation initiative. What we focus on here is that wherever we implement it. For example, in developing countries, we try to implement it. So, building the capacity of their nationals, their professionals, providing them technical training, sharing knowledge, so that they become more capable and their employability increases. At the same time, promoting South-South cooperation and showcasing India's soft power here through affordable and targeted programs. This also strengthens our people-to-people ties. Because we provide training to many African students and professionals here. At the same time, we also provide scholarships to many African students. So that they can, you know, come here to India for studies. We do many things. Therefore, this is an important initiative. Mentioning this initiative in the answers for South-South cooperation is mandatory. We must do this. Okay?

Then, if we talk about recent initiatives by India in Africa, let us try to understand what our recent initiatives are. African countries are among the foremost beneficiaries of India's Navy's. Our humanitarian assistance disaster response operations have greatly benefited African nations because India has undertaken many such initiatives and operations. Secondly, the Africa India Field Training Exercise took place in 2019. After that, the India Africa Defence Ministers' Conclave was held in 2020, through which we adopted the Lucknow Declaration, which pertained specifically to defense, military, and security cooperation. India has also participated in several UN peacekeeping missions, as we saw earlier, such as in the Republic of Congo, Mozambique, and similar African countries and nations, India has participated in their peacekeeping missions. The good thing here is that India has not just participated in peacekeeping missions in conflict zones or conflict-driven countries, but also provided medical aid as peacekeeping. Because our belief, our understanding of peacekeeping, is not just military-based, but it is developmental-based. We also provide medical aid from a medical perspective. So, our perspective is quite different. This is a good thing. Here, we have also collaborated on bilateral institutional mechanisms like joint defense cooperation committees and Memoranda of Understanding and agreements in the context of defense. Due to this, we are undertaking many defense initiatives. For example, the India Africa Defence Dialogue, Def Expo, adopted at the Gandhinagar Declaration. We adopted this at the Gandhinagar Declaration, through which our military training and counter-terrorism efforts and cooperation with African countries are being enhanced.

Talking about new developments, look at the economic and trade growth. India's and Africa's trade, which is approximately 100 billion dollars, and growing by 80% annually from 2023, is actually driven by petrochemicals, sorry, petroleum and pharmaceuticals. So, we actually need to diversify this because the main dominance is of pharmaceuticals and petroleum. We need to diversify a bit. Any trade should be diversified, and trade should not be limited to a few commodities. So, this is an important point here. Talking about strategic engagement, India hosted the 19th India Africa Conclave in 2025 with 30 nations, focusing on green energy and digital infrastructure. This is quite important for both nations, African nations and Indian nations. Green energy and digital infrastructure can play a very important role in South-South cooperation and the developmental agenda of developing countries. Green energy and digital infrastructure because we are shifting to renewable energy. We need to reduce oil dependence. Secondly, digital infrastructure, because we need to talk about digital sovereignty here. The main impact of climate change, which is related to green energy, and digital sovereignty, is more on developing nations. Secondly, infrastructure support. India has completed 20 solar power plant projects across 50 African nations by 2024, which has enhanced developmental cooperation. Then, in capacity building, India has definitely offered skill training to the African students there. We have established IIT campuses in different countries and different places. And talking about healthcare collaboration, India has provided 2 million vaccines in Africa for the outbreak that occurred in between. So, continuing its role as the pharmacy of the world. India is known as the pharmacy of the world. So, it is continuously playing this role. Talking about renewable energy, India and Kenya have jointly launched solar energy projects. So, this also reinforces our sustainability goal and Africa's sustainability goal. So, a way forward to move forward and to understand how we can conclude these India-Africa relations. So, definitely, there is a lot of scope. We can diversify trade further, we can cooperate in more different fields. And most importantly, counter China's influence. And the main thing, image maintenance, is important. If any African student faces any problem here, then definitely in African nations, that trust in India, which we have gained from historical times with a lot of effort, struggle, and a lot of cooperation, because it is especially important for us that we consider ourselves as leaders of developing nations and the Global South. What do we call it? Leader. Correct? We want to portray ourselves as leaders. So, these things should not happen from a leader. Therefore, our image should also be that of a leader. Just calling ourselves leaders is not enough. Our image should also be that of leadership. For this, our behavior must be very civically responsible as citizens of India. At the same time, we must act as a responsible player, as India.

Talking about the way forward, we should engage the diaspora and CSR. We should use our CSR fund, the fund under Corporate Social Responsibility. Then, the problem of delivery deficit, Mahesh Astadev stresses this, that India should fulfill its commitments, and the perception, because China delivers, India promises, China diversifies. This is a very important point here. This is actually a big problem. India promises, China delivers. And because of this, you must be seeing that China is not foolish. If China's influence is so much everywhere, if there is so much economic trade and defense engagement, then we cannot underestimate China. China does not just promise. China delivers. That is one of the key things. So, India should deliver. So, this line by Mahesh Shadeva, "India promises, China delivers," is very apt, very relevant. We need to pay some attention to this. We should focus on our strengths, the strengths between both nations. Harsh Pant argues that India should focus on its comparative advantage. Like IT, pharma, capacity building, these are actually our strengths. So, we should focus on this, rather than directly going head-on with China. Instead of head-on competition with China, we should modernize our overall ties and focus more on the fields where we have our comparative advantage. The next thing here in the way forward is that there should be a tailored approach. Shiv Shankar Mukherjee basically warns against a one-size-fits-all policy. Our policy should not be one-size-fits-all. We need to define country-specific engagement strategies. And India has followed this. India has also followed this, and to some extent, for example, for Nigeria, IT, with South Africa, our agriculture, in this way, we have tried to customize our approach. Then we should focus on people-to-people contact. Sanjay Baru recommends that we must combat stereotypes. The image in the minds of Africans, from the perspective of students, that students are beaten and killed. If such an image exists, we must somehow eliminate it, combat it, and increase engagement at the grassroots level. So that the ties between India and Africa are renovated, rejuvenated, and improved. Then strategic alignment. India's Africa policy aligns with Africa's Agenda 2063, which aims for a unified and prosperous continent by 2063. So, Rajiv Bhatia suggests that by using platforms like AfCFTA, we can deepen our economic collaboration.

So, here, if we talk about India and Latin America, the most important thing is that Latin America is considered the last frontier of Indian foreign policy. Why? It's not because of geography that our relations are not that engaged. It's not because of our geography. But somehow, somehow it is because of psychology. It is psychological. Despite the barriers. But look, despite so many barriers, there is untapped potential in these Latin American nations that we can utilize. So, before utilizing it, let's try to understand what are the challenges. Geopolitically and geo-economically, this region is quite important. Talking about geopolitical convergence, India and Latin American nations have an alignment on this issue because both are South countries, both belong to the Global South, and there is South-South cooperation and South-South solidarity. Because of this, their challenges are common. No doubt, the challenges are common, concerns are common. Because of this, they support, they are aligned in the agenda of UNSC reforms, global governance reforms, and also in support of India's bid for the UNSC. At the same time, they are also in support of the NSG waiver, the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver for India. For example, countries like Brazil, Mexico, all these countries have also supported India's G20 presidency. So, that reinforces South-South solidarity.

Then talking about geo-economic synergy, obviously, Latin America's entire economy is quite large. So, India's strategic trade and investment opportunities are found in Latin America. Because it is a very large economy, a very large market. Then our bilateral trade has also improved, it has also increased. By 2024, it is up to 45 billion dollars. Especially, our trade relations with Brazil and Mexico are quite good here. But the potential is quite high. We can increase it further. There are also complementarities. Look, for trade to happen, it is necessary for both economies to be complementary. Especially if we talk about our strong sectors, pharmaceuticals, energy, and service sectors, and there is a greater need for them. So, definitely, we should explore this opportunity. Strategic resource cooperation is one of the important areas because of which Latin American countries are important to us. For example, lithium, we have actually secured lithium deals with Argentina and Chile in 2024. So that we can boost our EV production, electric vehicle production. And we have secured oil contracts from Guyana. So that we can diversify our energy. We saw in the previous topic that we need to diversify energy. Our dependence, oil dependence, and energy dependence, basically oil is basically energy. So, oil and energy, overall energy, a broader thing, compared to oil. So, our energy dependence needs to be reduced from Arab countries, from the Gulf countries. Because of disturbances and political instability. So, Latin American nations provide us a much better opportunity. If we talk about food and energy security, then Brazil's role in supplying 20% of India's soybean oil and Venezuela's vast oil resources and reserves are quite important for us. Even Latin America's contribution to India's food and energy strategies is very significant.

Now, let's see how India and Latin America's relations have evolved. First, during the Cold War, India's engagement with Latin American countries was quite limited because of its inward economic policies, geographical distance, and US dominance in the region. So, due to multiple factors, our engagement during the Cold War was not that much, it was very limited. Because inward economic policies, globalization was definitely not there. Liberal policies were not there. We were not engaged with many countries. That is one reason. Geographical distance is a very big reason. Because there was not so much globalization. So, trading in such geographical conditions so far was very difficult, or it was out of sight and out of mind, and that's why the interaction remained limited. But after the Cold War, there was a big shift. After the Cold War, our engagement, India's engagement, India's private sector's engagement, especially in the IT sector, pharmaceuticals, has happened. And at the same time, through groupings, institutional groupings like IBSA, BASIC, BRICS, our engagement with Latin American countries has increased. Then our engagement and further initiatives like the India-CELAC summit in 2012, and at the same time, free trade agreements with MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR is basically a trade group there. Through this, the free trade agreement with it has expanded our trade engagement with Latin American countries. At the same time, our collaboration, our cooperation, is now moving into telemedicine, e-governance, and similar aspects. We are also moving into space technology. So, our collaboration and cooperation have expanded.

Talking about strategic diversification, look, both Latin America and India need to reduce their dependence on the West. Their dependence on Western countries needs to be reduced. And that's why India is emerging as a trusted alternative, compared to China, amidst concerns over Beijing's exploitative practices. This is a very relevant fact. And here, India can get a winning point. India can get a winning point here. Because of China's and Beijing's exploitative practices, especially in the economic domain, India can get a winning point here. So, India is emerging as a trustworthy, as a trusted, basically alternative to China.

Talking about recent developments, by 2024, many developments have occurred. First of all, they have expanded their trade with MERCOSUR. They have opened embassies in Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. TCS and Infosys like firms have provided employment to many people there. They have provided employment to almost more than lakhs of people. In 2023, there was also a Memorandum of Understanding with Brazil on satellite use, which reinforces the growing space collaboration. We had a Memorandum of Understanding with Brazil on satellite use in 2023, through which we are trying to foster our space collaboration to some extent. We are trying to explore it a bit. So, overall, if we look at India's relations with Latin America, there has been significant growth, significant progress. In which both regions are trying to strengthen economic ties, trying to explore new opportunities, especially space technology, as we saw earlier, they are exploring it, and we are diversifying our partnership to meet global challenges and achieve self-reliance and reduce Western dependence. This is basically the agenda. But yes, of course, there are challenges in this relationship too. Diplomatic gaps. India's engagement with Latin America has historically been quite limited. Very limited level of high-level visits like Prime Minister or Chief Minister, basically Prime Minister or External Affairs Minister, or high-level secretary meetings, diplomatic meetings are quite limited. And there is no comprehensive policy of any kind. Just like we have the Act East policy for Southeast Asia, and Neighborhood First policy for our neighbors, we do not have a comprehensive policy for Latin America, due to which there is a perception that we are neglecting it, or that we lack a strategic direction in the context of Latin America. So, that perception definitely exists there. Trade and tariffs are also challenges. There are also many challenges in trade and tariffs. For example.

The trade imbalance is quite significant. India's overall trade volume in 2024 was 45 billion dollars. In comparison to China, which has become a very dominant economic player everywhere, China has traveled a very long and difficult economic journey. China's trade volume is $400 billion. So, this gap, somewhere, we will have to reduce this gap. And this is also because 65% of our tariffs are 65% tariffs, whereas China's tariffs are only 12.5%. So, this is a very big barrier here.

Regarding investment and infrastructure constraints, Indian investment in Latin America is only 50 billion dollars, mainly focused on renewable energy and mining, which is quite modest. It's not very good. Okay? And along with that, our limited consulates, our embassies, and consulates are limited, and there are very few direct flights here, which hinders logistics and connectivity significantly.

If we talk about recent corrective measures, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited in 2024. S. Jaishankar also visited in 2023. We have also launched some direct flights. At the same time, we have also proposed Panama as a logistics hub. So, somewhere, and in 2024, we also launched the LAC strategy paper in the context of Latin America. We have also released the LAC strategy paper. Which indicates our renewed efforts to fill the policy and infrastructure gap. And the overall gap, we can also call it a diplomatic gap here. So, we can write diplomatic gap. Because the diplomatic gap was one of the major reasons. So, we are also trying to fill the diplomatic gap here.

To strengthen this relationship, the way forward is that first of all, we should focus on academic and cultural exchange. We should enhance it. India has basically tried to promote Latin American studies, especially at JNU. We have also launched student exchange programs in 2024, and at the same time, we are trying to leverage the popularity of Bollywood through film festivals. Due to the popularity of Bollywood, the benefit we can get, for example, in Brazil and Peru, we have tried to leverage it through festivals. So that our soft power and our mutual understanding between countries can improve.

Economic engagement also needs to be boosted. So, what has India actually done in this context? It has supported private investment. If there is any private investment happening in Latin America, it has been supported through EXIM Bank's 500 million credit. Through EXIM Bank, the 500 million credit that is there, we are somehow supporting investment through that. Then we launched the India LAC Business Conclave. After that, we also initiated PTA talks with Colombia. So that our trade relations can deepen further.

Regarding institutional and diplomatic strengthening, we need to sustain high-level visits on dialogue platforms. So, we are having high-level visits. We also need to sustain the dialogue platforms. And in 2023, as an example, we can see that through the India-SLA C and India-SICA summits, we have sustained our dialogues, and we should also use proactive economic diplomacy. We are doing it, there is no problem. But we need to be more proactive in diplomacy. We need to be proactive in economy as well. Proactive economic diplomacy and proactive political diplomacy too. At the same time, at the cultural level as well.

Now, if we talk about important developments that have happened in recent times, India-Latin America trade has reached, especially it has increased quite a bit. See, it is in the range of approximately 45 to 50 billion dollars. Our strongest engagement is with Brazil and Mexico in multiple sectors like automobiles, although these are limited sectors, this is an important point here. Automobiles, energy, mining, pharma, these are in limited sectors, but definitely, these are our strong sectors because automobiles are also one of our strong sectors. Energy and pharma are strong sectors. IT is a strong sector. We can work a little more in all these.

Regarding strategic and institutional engagement, India has deepened ties with forums like these. We have seen these forums recently. We are also collaborating in infrastructure and renewable energy. India has invested in power and solar energy there. A project worth millions of dollars in Panama and Chile in 2024. So, our developmental footprint is also increasing. Even if it is through power projects or energy projects, but yes, our infrastructural footprint or developmental footprint is increasing.

We need to address trade challenges because 65% of the tariff is very high. So, somewhere we need to work on that, we need to reduce it. So that our market access, for them and for us, becomes easier, we need to solve these trade challenges somewhere. We need to focus more on cultural exchanges. For example, we recently held the India-LAC Cultural Forum in New Delhi. Through this, we are trying to increase mutual understanding. By boosting goodwill through various measures like academic partnerships, we are basically trying to increase our engagement through our soft power.

From the perspective of scholars, see, Manish Chand says that India should take decisive actions. Taking small measures will not help. We need to be more aggressive in our foreign policy. In fact, I personally feel that somewhere, see, there are barriers, geography is one of the important barriers. Distance is a very big barrier in the context of Latin America. But if we look at it, nowadays, with so much digitalization and so much connectivity, it is fast, so instead of considering geography as a barrier, if we take it as an opportunity, because despite so much potential in the South Asian region, we are not able to trade much due to instability and many other challenges that are very specific to the South Asian region. We should actually look further. We should actually look beyond South Asia and focus on our own growth, prosperity, and economic development.

If we talk about Deepak Bhojwani, he highlights that India needs to expand its ties with Latin America and basically beyond the Caribbean. We need to go beyond the economic aspects of Latin America and the Caribbean. And we need to increase engagement at the political level. We also need to work on other strategic dimensions. Then there were many other scholars. But let's look at Shyam Saran here. He proposes the idea of an India-Latin America summit model after the successful India-Africa summit. So, just like the India-Africa summit was successful, we should also have an India-Latin America summit on a similar model. So, we are South-South, because in South-South, we have a decent presence in Africa. We have decent engagement in Africa. But relatively less in Latin America. And that's why, as seen in the beginning, it is called the last frontier of our foreign policy. It should not be the last, because it has a lot of potential.

So, Deepak Bhojwani highlights that political ties between India and Latin America have significantly improved, although. Recently, Modi ji also visited. S. Jaishankar also visited. So, this is very recent. Because of this, our overall ties at the political level have also improved. But there are still many limitations. So, we need to focus on that a bit.

Here, we need to look at another important aspect, IBSA. India, Brazil, South Africa. This is a platform for South-South cooperation. This is important for us because Latin American countries are also present here, which makes it a bit important. Now, when did this happen, how did it happen? This is an important vehicle for South-South cooperation. Its origin, it was established in 2003 by India, Brazil, and South Africa, and its aim was exactly this. It was established for this purpose to promote South-South cooperation. Because after the Doha Round, there was some dissatisfaction. So, somewhere, we needed a non-anti-Western platform for India, which could lead among the developing nations. We needed a platform that could provide a leadership position among developing nations. So, we somehow created this platform.

But what is the focus area here? What is the focus area? We need to reform global governance. Because obviously, if we have to lead South-South cooperation, we have to take their issues. And in global governance, especially our problem is the dominance of the West, which we need to reduce somewhere. For this, reforms in global governance institutions are very important for us. So, reforming global governance, democratic multilateralism, in multilateral institutions, the representation should also be inclusive so that it sounds more democratic, and every basically multilateral institute or any multilateral treaty or agreement should have democratic participation because developing nations should get as much benefit. But there is neglect, marginalization, and that is the problem, and that's why there is South-South solidarity. So, we should do development cooperation, and that is our goal.

So, we have launched some initiatives like the IBSA Fund. The IBSA Fund, India, Brazil, South Africa Fund, which basically in 2024, has financed many important projects like Haiti or Sudan. We have tried to implement important projects there through it. Now, talking about its significance and achievements, the IBSA Fund was awarded the UN MDG Award in 2010. The Millennium Development Goal award was given to the IBSA Fund in 2010 for its developmental activities in the countries of the Global South. That showcases bottom-up development approaches. Grassroots level. Okay? In 2023, IBSA issued a joint G20 statement advocating for debt relief for developing nations. Now, this is a very important issue. Developing nations are drowning in debt. Developing nations have a lot of debt. And whose debt is it? It is the debt of multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank. So, somewhere, to reduce inequality, we should restructure that debt. By showing it as a developmental benefit, we should somehow reduce the debt burden of developing nations a bit. So that they can actually focus on growth because much of our finances, much of our funds are actually diverted and diluted because of the debt. Because of the debt, we are not able to focus on social welfare. This is the similar situation for all developing nations and countries of the South, countries of the Global South. So, this is an important challenge here.

Then, talking about challenges and stagnation, see, the forum has seen inactivity since 2012 due to shifting priorities and geopolitics. This is a very big challenge. Geopolitical divergence. Geopolitical divergence. See, each country has its own geopolitical priorities that change slightly. So, because of all these things, there has been some geopolitical divergence. Despite this, Brazil's G20 presidency in 2024 and India's proposal to host a deferred summit signal revival efforts. The future relevance of IBSA depends on what we focus on. So, the focus should be on climate and trade. It should be on climate, it should be on trade, and it should be on technological cooperation. For example, we had a virtual summit on AI and Green Tech in 2025. We should make such efforts. We should focus on new areas.

From a strategic perspective, Manjari Chatterjee, this analyst, according to her, and even Harsh Pant, they recommend that IBSA should prioritize digital governance. And so that we can align with it. Align with the G20's climate and trade agenda. So, Harsh Pant says that digital governance is an important thing, and the G20's climate and trade agenda are two important things to prioritize. So that we can counter the dominance of BRICS and gain strategic traction and strength in overall South-South cooperation, and among the countries of the Global South. So, according to Harsh Pant, if we want to conclude, this IBSA, its potential, it can be an alternative, especially in the context of the decline of non-alignment. In the context of the declining relevance of non-alignment, IBSA can also serve as one of the important and potential South-South solidarity platforms. But yes, definitely, we cannot say that NAM is irrelevant. But yes, as there was a problem with NAM, NAM was primarily reactive and non-aligned. Correct with the West. So, we cannot be completely non-aligned with the West, nor is it necessary to take a completely anti-Western stance. Somewhere, like IBSA, it is working as a platform for proactive cooperation among emerging economies. So, because of this, it can serve as a good platform for us.

So, recently, our External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited Latin America. What are the key points? First of all, expanding trade and investment. Our trade is basically around 50 billion dollars, and it is a diverse basket, including pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and other industries, and all the components are there. Along with that, we have done export reforms to increase competitiveness after the COVID-19 era. Basically, after the COVID era, we have reformed our industrial competitiveness to improve it, so that our exports can increase, especially manufactured goods.

Then, vaccine diplomacy, reinforcing the image of the pharmacy of the world. India had supplied vaccines to nearly 100 countries, including 10 million doses to CARICOM in 2023. Basically, in the Latin American countries, if we look at digital and tech collaboration, India's digital transformation has created a new partnership. We are collaborating a lot with countries of the Global South at the digital level, in digital technology. For example, digital health. So, we signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Panama and Colombia in 2023 in digital health and other aspects.

Then, manufacturing and project delivery is an important aspect. Project delivery has always been an important aspect in India's relations with other countries. India's execution strength has attracted Latin America's interest. This is a very good thing. And that is exemplified by Indian-led road projects worth 200 million dollars in Guyana in 2024.

Second, agricultural and brand strength. India's agricultural progress and growth, and along with that, India's brand visibility, is increasing our economic appeal in this region. Strategic logistics and engagement are happening. India has advanced its talks for developing logistics hubs, meaning the logistics hubs in Panama. We are working on it. We are trying to create a logistics hub in Panama by 2026. So that signals deeper regional integration. We understand deeper regional integration from this.

Then, high-level diplomacy is also important. Now, PM Modi himself visited in 2024. G20 engagements with Brazil and Mexico have also happened. So, all these things can clearly indicate the deepening strategic and economic ties in the region. So, overall, the visit aims to strengthen. S. Jaishankar's visit, Modi's visit also happened recently, but S. Jaishankar's visit was very detailed and comprehensive. So, overall, our engagement on political, economic, and multiple fronts should grow.

Now, here, the most important thing is the WTO. The solidarity of the Global South, the South-South solidarity. If there is a common important agenda among the multiple agendas, the top agenda, one of the top agendas, is the reform of global governance, but the most important is the New International Economic Order, and along with that, the WTO. So, what is the connection between India, WTO, and the Global South? Let's see. India's leadership role in the WTO for the Global South, to represent the concerns of the Global South, to raise its voice, what is India doing in the WTO? That is something that is a very commendable thing that should come in our answers.

Now, see, development-centric advocacy. What is India doing? Development-centric advocacy. India champions a development-oriented agenda at the WTO, pushing for policies that promote economic growth and sustainability in developing nations. India is advocating for such policies at the WTO that can promote or help economic growth and sustainability in developing nations.

Second, Special and Differential Treatment. Special and Differential Treatment. India demands flexible terms for the Global South in trade agreements. There should be some flexibility in trade agreements, especially in the matter of subsidies. The different subsidies that we provide or that developing nations provide, which are required, which are required to promote our trade, and at the same time, to strengthen and enhance our food security, to ensure it, these subsidies are necessary. But somewhere, developed countries oppose these subsidies. But they are necessary for us. So, the conflict here regarding subsidies is a genuine, genuine, basically an important thing. An important thing for developing nations. Subsidies are important. They are also necessary for developed nations, but they are more necessary for developing nations. So, India raises its voice about this. During the Trade Facilitation Agreement talks, it secured phased implementation rights for developing countries. For developing countries.

Then, yes, these agricultural subsidies, which I was talking about. Reform in agricultural subsidies. India challenges the trade.

Distorting Subsidies by Developed Countries. The most important problem with subsidies from developed countries is that developed countries have better technology. So, their efficiency in production is already quite high. Because of this, their production cost is already low. With subsidies on top of that, and the quantity of subsidies they provide depends on the percentage. So, the amount of percentage which their countries and their governments are providing in the form of subsidies might be looking even similar, but because the size of the GDP, the size of the economy of their developed countries is so high. The size of the economy of developed countries is so large that even their 4% is much more than the normal average GDP's 4% of developing countries. So, that is one of the problems. And what happens because of this? The more you subsidize, your products are already competitive from a cost perspective and also from a technological perspective. And in that, how will India and developing countries compete with that competitiveness? Because we will have to give more subsidies to be able to compete. So, the problem regarding agricultural subsidies in the WTO, the trade distortion that is coming in the WTO due to the subsidies of developed countries, is basically unfair. It is unfair for developing countries, for countries like India. So, India challenges this. And why are we discussing this now? Because this is not just from India's perspective. This is trade-distorting for all the countries of the Global South. It is threatening to their agricultural trade. Because of this, the effort to raise a collective voice on this is a prime example of global solidarity. So, we are, in a way, working in favor of the small farmers of the Global South.

Market Access Push. India calls for reduced tariffs. The tariffs and non-tariff barriers, tariffs and non-tariff barriers should be reduced within developed countries, and developing countries should get some extra access there. So that we have a fair trade deal for us, and we get the benefit of this entire globalization and market integration. At the same time, the framework of IPR, Intellectual Property Rights, should be balanced. India defends access to essential medicines and technology by issuing compulsory licenses for generics, promoting affordable healthcare. So, when there is IPR, obviously, only when the IPR expires can we pursue it in the name of generic medicines. And only when there are generic medicines will they be affordable. Due to IPR, their prices increase significantly. So, India is, in a way, defending this IPR framework in favor of developing nations, or doing whatever reforms are needed for it.

Then India emphasizes the need for financial or technical aid to help developing countries participate effectively in global trade. To participate effectively in global trade, we need to get technical know-how. We need to get the technology that developed countries have. That technology should be transferred to us. The know-how, the capacities, should also be built for us, so that we get a level playing field in this entire global trade. That is why India is raising its voice on this as well. At the same time, talking about South-South cooperation, India fosters partnerships and knowledge exchange among Global South nations to enhance collective trade and investment capabilities.

Leadership in WTO Negotiations. India actively engages in negotiations within the WTO so that we can build a coalition, raise a collective voice here. Then, what is the role of the WTO in promoting the interests of the Global South? According to Jagdish Bhagwati, according to his view, what he says is that the WTO offers the Global South the larger market, the entire global market, and foreign investment, and at the same time, technology transfer. Access to all these things is available to the Global South because of the WTO, or it is facilitated because of the WTO. So, this is what Jagdish Bhagwati says. Obviously, he is a supporter of globalization, so this is his perspective.

Second, Special and Differential Treatment. The WTO has granted a longer transition period and preferential access. So, the WTO has, in a way, given some benefits in trade to developing countries. And that is how developing countries can, you know, get the benefit of all these things. Second, the WTO also provides technical assistance to developing countries, such as for implementing agreements or in areas like IPR, which are somewhat complicated. In such areas, the WTO provides some technical assistance here.

Then, Capacity Building. Obviously, the WTO helps in increasing the trade capacity of developing nations in a way. This includes policy analysis, improvement of their competitiveness, and improvements in their customs. The WTO works on capacity improvement and building for developing nations in multiple areas like this.

Then, Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Developing countries have used the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism or system, and have successfully challenged unfair trade practices by developed nations, which are basically trade practices that seem unfair to developing nations. The WTO's dispute resolution system has been used for this. So, this is also an overall positive benefit obtained in the WTO. So, overall, if we look at it, the WTO has tried to promote inclusive trade, which is basically important and necessary for the Global South. Okay?

Ongoing Reforms. There is a necessity of reforms, and they are ongoing. For example, in the dispute resolution body, its hiring or recruitment, and its composition, there is a need for some reform, and there are many areas where reform is needed. But yes, it cannot be said that the WTO is completely biased. Some benefit has been obtained.

Now, let's talk about the leadership of the Global South in the G20. With three consecutive presidencies of the G20 from the Global South. Obviously, the G20 is a very important group here. It is a group of very powerful economies. We can call it an elite group. So, its leadership has been consecutively given to countries of the Global South for the last three leaderships. This is a very important significant shift in global politics, where the Global South is gradually, albeit slowly, getting respect, dignity, and representation. This definitely has to be acknowledged. We cannot deny it. So, basically, the development of leadership for development, these opportunities are being given to the Global South, and through this, we are advocating for the Global South. For example, under successive G20 presidencies, countries of the Global South can prioritize developmental needs, fair trade, or problems like inequality, sustainability, and climate change. These are the issues that matter the most for the Global South. So, when they have the G20 presidency, they will definitely prioritize these issues.

If we also look at policy influence, these developing nations have collectively tried to influence. And they have collectively been trying to push for reforms that reflect their interests. The interests of the Global South, the interests of developing countries, they have suggested policy reforms in that way to reflect them.

Now, let's look at India's leadership in the WTO. So, see, what is India doing? India is advocating for fair agricultural trade and reforms in subsidies. It is working towards that, raising its voice. Then, India also led the support for the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), which is basically for supporting small farmers in terms of imports. This is also seen in economics. You can see this in detail anywhere. Then also, digital sovereignty and inclusive e-commerce policies. E-commerce policies should be inclusive because e-commerce has spread widely in today's era and has a significant presence in all countries, including developing countries. So, here, India has championed the cause of digital sovereignty. Then, India is also proposing technical assistance for small and vulnerable economies. So, India is doing many things in the WTO. It has also pushed for aligning trade with climate goals. It has also tried to work towards aligning its trade with climate goals. For example, green technologies.

And if we talk about its G20, then under India's G20 presidency, the concerns of the Global South were brought to the forefront, notably in digital infrastructure and climate action. So that actually reinforces the leadership in a reformed multilateralism. Reforming multilateralism. This can play a very big role in reforming multilateralism because the WTO is multilateral, and India believes in multilateralism. So, in multilateralism, reforms are necessary with time, and those reforms should be inclusive and in favor of everyone, not biased towards a particular section of countries, like developed countries, benefiting only them.

If we talk about recent times, then in the WTO's MC13 in 2024, India played a leadership role. India led over 100 developing countries in demanding a permanent solution on public stockholding because it is essential for food security. Public stockholding is maintained in India as well, to ensure our food security. So, this concern, regarding this concern, India recently raised its voice at the WTO's MC13 in 2024. It presented its stand. India has been advocating for agriculture all along. Peace clauses, which we also see in economics. Peace clauses, which basically again, are for subsidies for rice or welfare measures, which are necessary for developing countries. So, in the context of that, there is this peace clause. India has also spoken about this to implement that peace clause.

Then, WTO Reforms and Support for Least Developed Countries. So, India backs WTO reforms. Reforms should happen in the WTO, especially the narrow decision or declaration, which actually talks about eliminating export subsidies, which can benefit the least developed countries. India says that all such decisions, all such reforms within the WTO, should happen. We have talked about digital sovereignty. Then, we have also talked a bit about green trade, that India advocates for tariff-free trade in green goods, because we support sustainable development, and sustainable development is very important for all developing nations, as we want to counter the impact of climate change. So, we are supporting sustainable development. Therefore, mainly, you will see that we are collaborating a lot with countries of the Global South in renewable energy projects, and should continue to do so. Because if you look at our overall engagement, our policies, and our policy priorities, they are overall driven. Our evolving foreign policy ethos is not just about non-violence. Sustainable development has also become a main agenda in our foreign policy ethos. Digital sovereignty has also become a main agenda. So, these are now key pillars of our foreign policy, and keeping these key pillars in mind, we are trying to drive the solidarity of the Global South. And that actually provides India a moral leadership. A leadership of a new age. A leadership of a new age, because digital sovereignty, climate change, these are all new issues. And here, even when we talk about disarmament, we talk against terrorism, we talk about countering it. So, basically, even against cyber terrorism, we are trying to develop a framework. So, this new age leadership, if any developing nation can provide it, it is India. So, India is capable of providing a leadership of a new age for the new issues and for the new concerns of developing countries.

Global South Advocacy via G20. Through the G20, during India's presidency of the G20 in 2023, we launched the Green Development Pact, allocating $143 trillion for Global South infrastructure. Brazil continues to, you know, Brazil continues the agenda in 2025. Talking about South-South solidarity, India launched the Global South Center of Excellence in 2024, and also supported African nations, the African Union, African nations in WTO fishery talks and to protect and support small-scale fishers. So, agricultural subsidies and trade facilitation, we have seen all these things.

So, overall, to conclude on the Global South, the most important thing we can talk about is the South-South solidarity of the Global South. This is actually driven by the common challenges faced by all developing countries, such as poverty and their developing status, and unfair trade practices. These are all common challenges that we face. So, by collaborating in different forums, first of all, by improving our engagement with each other, and by collaborating in different forums, by reforming global governance institutions at the global level, India can play a role of leadership at the global level for the Global South. Okay? Which India has always tried to do through NAM. Now, India can also do it through I2U2, and also play a very important role in raising voices on issues within the WTO and reforming them. Okay?

Now, in International Relations, if there are the most important players, they are the global players. Global players are very important, such as the USA, Russia, Japan, China. If we look prominently among these, Russia, China, and the USA are very important. And because they are global powers, global powers, therefore they are global poles of power. Global poles of power, and therefore, polarization happens because of them. If these three countries go in three different directions, then three different poles of power are created here. Therefore, power polarization, now the current multipolar world order is because of the multiple powers present in the current global order. But at the same time, the multipolar world order, of course, in comparative politics, we see how stable it is or not. But the most important thing here is that in multipolarity, among the multiple poles, the polarization that is happening, polarization, especially due to rivalry between countries, whether it is trade rivalry, for example, between the USA and China, or strategic rivalry, for example, between Russia and the USA. So, overall, this is something, these rivalries among the global powers, that is something which actually drives the entire global politics. And other players, middle powers, peripheral powers, but these are main powers, and they actually decide and actually dictate the entire global political order. The global political order that we have, they completely dictate it. Therefore, understanding these powers overall, and in this entire dynamic, in this entire global political order, where India lies, and how India achieves its overall national interest by maintaining relations with all countries, all global powers, including China, through strategic autonomy, is very important to understand here.

So, first, let's understand India and Japan. India and Japan. See, India and Japan are partners in peace with a common interest and a complementary responsibility for promoting the security, stability, prosperity of Asia, as well as in advancing international peace and equitable development. International peace and equitable development, which our former Indian Foreign Secretary characterized the Indian-Japan relationship as passing through a cherry blossom phase, suggesting a phase of warm and blossoming ties between the two countries. So, our more or less relations are, we will see them, but they are quite good relations. The former Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, in his book "Towards a Beautiful Country," he said that he saw that India and Japan are natural allies in the pursuit of common interests and shared values. So, this is what we can introduce. We can write the introduction in this way.

So, how did the evolution happen? How did this relationship and this friendship between India and Japan evolve? So, first, let us try to understand the Cold War period. During the Cold War, there were some constraints. The India-Japan relationship remained lukewarm. Why? Because during the Cold War, India leaned towards the USSR, and Japan was aligned with the USA. Correct? So, this was an important thing. Second, then the next phase was civilization and cultural connect. We somehow had it because we shared Buddhist heritage and cultural exchanges like Rabindranath Tagore's visit and Bollywood's popularity in Japan created historical affinity. If we look at an example of this, then in 2024, both countries launched the India-Japan Cultural Year, featuring Buddhist heritage promotion and film festivals. So, this is one point that basically drives us towards friendship. There were other points as well. Uh, then if we look at after the Cold War, what actually happened? 1985.

There were some challenges initially. For example, India was a closed economy. Poverty was very high in India. It still is, definitely. And most importantly, we were non-signatories to the NPT, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And due to all these factors, one, a closed economy. Poverty, poverty, well, that's not such a significant factor here in the relationship. But due to our economy being closed and us being non-signatories to the NPT, our engagement with Japan remained quite limited, and Japan remained cautious, especially after India's nuclear tests. After the nuclear tests, Japan's perspective towards our country was a bit cautious. But under Rajiv Gandhi, if we talk about the phase from 1985 to 2000, somewhere in this phase, this outreach of theirs, actually in 1985, their outreach, along with India's Green Revolution and improved global image, India's image improved a bit after 1971. So that actually began a thaw in the relationship. A bit of incremental progress, basically, started happening in the relationship between the two. And that lent a foundation for future cooperation. Future cooperation. So it's not like our relations were only from the Cold War. In the beginning, the way they evolved, we are seeing. But if we talk about after the year 2000, then our relationship started to deepen a bit. Because of strategic convergences, due to strategic convergences, India's economic liberalization happened, China's rise occurred. See, there are some factors here. The rise of China is one of the important drivers of a strategic relationship between India and Japan. Because when a common concern emerges, then countries come together even more. So this is an important driver. So China rose. India also basically, the economy that was closed before, has now opened up. Liberalization happened after 1990, and along with that, India's Look East policy, which we launched, and which is now Act East policy, so due to this also, our focus shifted towards the countries of Southeast Asia. So that actually marked an emergence of a strategic partnership. A strategic partnership started growing between us. Then, if we talk about bilateral agreements, then see, there are some key agreements like the Civil Nuclear Pact and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, which reflected growing trust and alignment. Now, why is this important? This is important because, see, due to India's nuclear tests, Japan's perspective was a bit suspicious towards India. Correct? And our relations were not that good either. Despite that, if we have a nuclear pact with a country like Japan, which shows how credible India's image as a responsible nuclear power is. How credible it is that the very country that was suspicious of India because of its nuclear tests. And especially Japan can be discussed more in the nuclear context because Japan has, in a way, seen its consequences. It rebuilt from there. That's why Japan is a bit suspicious about countries in the nuclear domain. So here, after India's nuclear tests, if there is a pact for civil nuclear cooperation with India today, it shows how India has maintained an image of being a responsible nuclear power. Then, if we look at recent times, high-level summits were held between India and Japan in 2024. And among them, there was a meeting of PM Narendra Modi and their basically PM, Kishida, and Ishiba, who is their PM, and that reinforces their Special Strategic and Global Partnership. So this basically introduced what we can use as an example. See, what are our examples in cooperation? Japan has provided us with a US-2 amphibious aircraft. It is also providing us with spare parts. So that actually boosts India's surveillance. India's surveillance can improve significantly with this. And our rapid response can also improve. Especially if we talk about the Andaman and Nicobar region, what is happening overall with this? Our maritime cooperation between India and Japan has increased. First thing. Secondly, if we talk about economic and urban collaboration, Japan's commitment of $50 million in 2025 to India's Smart Cities Mission is an important collaboration. Particularly for Varanasi, and also for sustainable infrastructure enhancement, they have made investments. Strategic investment in Northeast India. In Northeast India also, to counter China's CPEC influence, Japan has invested $200 million in Assam's road connectivity project. Also, it also focused upon the digital links in Manipur via the 2024 Japan India Coordination Forum. The Japan India Coordination Forum, also the Andaman Smart Island Initiative in 2025. Both nations, 2025, basically means the current status is being discussed here. Not necessarily that it was launched at this time, but here, India Andaman Smart Island Initiative is important. Both nations have launched this. This is a $1 billion plan. So that we can develop renewable energy and digital infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Also, civil nuclear and NSG support. Now, NSG is important. How China does not want India to become a part of it. Because it is the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is a very prime group, an exclusive group. So here, Japan, by supporting India's global nuclear standing, has spoken of supporting it. It has reinforced its support and also provided backing for NSG membership in 2024 at the G7 Summit, which actually deepens civil nuclear cooperation. Our civil nuclear cooperation can increase or is increasing. If we talk about trade and comprehensive economic pact, then here the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement has facilitated. Our bilateral trade has increased. Through this Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. In 2024, talks about this have been revived, and somewhere we are trying to remove our trade barriers, overall barriers in trade, trade, non-trade, whatever the barriers are, and trying to ease them a bit, and trying to boost our Indian exports so that our trade can deepen further. Then, the high-speed rail project, we know this. There is also a high-speed rail project, and Japan also has investments in industrial corridors. For example, the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train, 2025, this is not a train of today. Definitely, this is the current status of this program. The current status is that 50% of the land has been acquired, and this project is underway. Also, we can talk about the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor here. They have investments there too. And after that, we also have collaboration in the Indo-Pacific vision and the Quad. For example, India and Japan co-hosted a Quad summit, and they also launched a new cybersecurity task force in 2024, reaffirming commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. Now, this is a main key driver of our relationship here. Indo-Pacific, free Indo-Pacific, free and open navigation in the Indo-Pacific. And free and open Indo-Pacific is very important for us. Equally important for Japan and India. And somewhere, the threat is coming from China, which is also a common threat for both. So this is something foundational, one can say, a foundational pillar of their partnership. Also, countering BRI is an important agenda for both countries, both countries actually, to counter China's BRI, the Belt and Road Initiative. And for this, the Asia Africa Growth Corridor project has been launched by both countries in Kenya. So that we can counter China's BRI. Or if we talk about defense cooperation and naval exercises, then we collaborate in the Malabar exercise with advanced anti-marine drills, anti-submarine drills, and we are trying to strengthen our maritime interoperability, our interoperability, we are trying to improve it. Then, the Vision 2025, which is upgraded, the bilateral roadmap was updated to include collaboration on AI and green technologies. Meaning, very recently, we have, in a way, revived our future collaborations and our future partnership to upgrade them to a next level, to have a roadmap. What will be our future cooperation? In which domain will we cooperate? So specifically, we want to focus on AI and green technologies. Rare earth partnership, this is also an important domain. India increased its export of rare earth elements to Japan by 20% in 2024, supporting Japan's electronics and tech sector. So this is also an important point here. Now, if we talk about current developments, in 2011, our CEPA, our basically agreement, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, due to this, our bilateral trade has increased significantly. Japan has become one of India's top investors. And by 2024, Japan's FDI has reached approximately $43 billion, which has also expanded. Now, see, recently, as we talked about rare earth metals, due to which their electronics sector is getting help, so we are exporting that too. So we are also expanding our collaboration in semiconductors and green energy, and the way the Vision 2025 document has been updated, the agenda has been updated, collaboration in AI and collaboration in cyberspace, all these aspects are being added to it. Japan is one of India's largest bilateral donors and collaborators. And in this, they also collaborate on the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative. This is important. Australia, these three together, the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, meaning the supply chain should not be disrupted and should remain resilient, for this, they are working for better logistics. Here, if we talk about strategic and defense cooperation, then as G4 members, we should know G4. If you know, tell me in the comment box. What are G4 members? Pause the video and tell me in the comment box what the G4 group is for. So as G4 members, both support UNSC reform. See, although this is an agenda of the Global South, South-South cooperation, but an advanced economy like Japan, an advanced country, also supports UNSC reform in a way, and they also engage in two-plus-two strategic dialogues. Regular military exercises are happening between us on strategic dialogues. We are also engaged in the Quad, that underlines how common our Indo-Pacific goal is and how committed we are to a free and open Indo-Pacific. In 2025 also, a new defense consultation body has been established so that our coordination, especially concerning China's assertiveness, regional assertiveness, can be better coordinated to counter it. For this, we have established this basically defense consultation body, Japan and India. If we also look at technology and skill development, then Japan and India have both provided technical training in the India-Japan Japan-India Institutes of Manufacturing (JIM). And JIM has been expanded so that we can now train 10 youths in AI and robotics, which also aligns with India's digital vision. So this cooperation is now expanding in space, digital innovation, advanced technology, etc. So that is a good thing that we are diversifying our collaboration, engaging deeper, and trying to engage on multiple fronts. If we look at nuclear and climate cooperation, then peaceful nuclear collaboration has now resumed, and along with that, the clean energy partnership and the joint crediting mechanism, through the joint crediting mechanism, we promote low-carbon growth. So in 2025, a $300 million solar project in Gujarat has been launched by us, which was launched under CEPA. Under CEPA, we have launched it, which advances our climate agenda, our climate goals, which is our shared objective. We are also collaborating in climate. Memorandum of Cooperation on Sustainable Urban Development that promotes smart city planning and disaster resilience. All these things have happened, which actually reinforce our development thrust of the partnership. So what are the challenges now in the relationship? That is the thing. First of all, the growth of trade is quite slow. Our bilateral trade is still only about $20 billion, approximately $21-22 billion in 2021-22, with a persistent trade imbalance. The trade imbalance is quite significant. India's exports remain very modest due to market access issues. Due to market access issues, our access to them, our exports are quite limited, and along with that, technical barriers are quite high. Technical barriers. It is important to note here. Technical barriers. Among trade barriers, non-trade barriers, technical barriers mean the technical standards of a country regarding a particular object, when they are high, they become a barrier. But see, overall trade, we are underperforming in terms of trade compared to our potential. Compared to the potential trade between both countries, we are trading quite less. Second, delayed infrastructure projects and initiatives, such as the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train, whose target was set for 2018, and the Asia Africa Growth Corridor. All these infrastructure projects have implementation delays. Second, there are differences in the Russia-Ukraine matter as well. Divergent positions. Japan has imposed sanctions on Russia, but India has maintained a neutral stance on this, which creates some friction from both sides. Because our overall agenda of Indo-Pacific cooperation is creating divergent views. Second, investment and regulatory friction. Indian firms struggle with Japan's stringent, one, Japan's standards, sanitary-phytosanitary, basically non-trade barrier standards overall, are quite high, due to which, somewhere, our Indian firms are actually struggling to improve their exports, enhance their export share. There is a shared commitment, but that is one of the things. Despite the challenges, despite so many challenges, both nations remain committed to strengthening their strategic partnership, their economic partnership, and overall their regional roles, their regional domains like the Indo-Pacific, because of the converging interests. There is a convergence of interests, because of mutual concerns about China. Regarding visits, see, PM Fumio Kishida, Kishida, PM Kishida visited India. So what points emerged from the visit? Indo-Pacific vision. First of all, Indo-Pacific vision. Region. Japan unveiled its renewed FOIP, FOIP strategy, positioning India as a key partner. Their strategy regarding the Indo-Pacific, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, in that, they have considered India as a key partner. Because balancing China's assertiveness. Now, see, this is actually a key pillar on which our relationship can strengthen even further, strategically. Second, strategic convergence, India, Japan, Australia trilateral cooperation, and along with that, coordination in G7, G20. Third, defense and security shift. Japan removed its 1% defense spending cap, becoming the world's third-largest defense spender. So this is an important point here. The rest is not that important. But Japan becoming the third-largest defense spender is in the context of India. Because now, in aspects like space, cyber, economic security, etc., we are diversifying our economic cooperation a bit. Then, if we also look at economic and infrastructure cooperation, then the next tranche of funds for this bullet train project has arrived. And the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, the Supply Chain Realignment Initiative, Japan aims to shift high-tech industries from China to India. This is a very important thing. This is a very important thing. They want to shift their high-tech industries, which are basically in China, from there to India, which can somewhere develop supply chain resilience. Then, in people-to-people ties as well, we are trying to expand our cooperation in language education, skill development, through cultural and academic exchanges, and defense ties. If we talk about defense ties, then yes, definitely, through joint military exercises, we are trying to enhance our cooperation. So together, both countries are key linchpins for the free and Indo-Pacific Ocean. This is an important point. Second, which also reinforces their overall collaboration in the global geopolitical landscape. So as both countries continue to strengthen their ties, their joint efforts have the potential to shape the future dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. Okay? Now, there is one more thing here. See, in defense cooperation, some things are being missed here. See, Dharma Guardian exercise and then counter-terrorism drills. Due to these also, our interoperability, plus-two plus-two dialogue, through this, we are also condemning terrorism, including the Pahalgam attack in 2025. Japan is definitely with us in a strategic vision, also in defense and military exercises. If we talk about trade and investment, then here, trade of $21.5 billion has already happened. We saw this earlier too. So some points are a bit repetitive, but that's okay. If we look at strategic engagement, then see, both countries have reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. But see, the Myanmar issue, the overall stand regarding Myanmar, and the overall stand on the Ukraine issue, due to this, some concerns are arising. But yes, on global security, we will not compromise at all, somewhere. We will work together. Both countries have shown commitment to this cooperation with each other. If we talk about infrastructure and technology, then Japan is continuously funding and supporting high-speed rail, basically, and metro projects, like in Pune and Kochi. And also in upgrading radar, for example, a Memorandum of Understanding has been signed regarding the Unicorn Mast. Then, in clean energy collaboration as well, see, under the Clean Energy Partnership, CEPA project, which we mentioned earlier, under the CEPA project, Japan is investing $200 million in the wind project in Tamil Nadu. So this is also a clean energy collaboration happening. And then critical technology.

Cooperation is indeed ours. For example, a joint semiconductor research and development center has been launched in Bengaluru, and our cooperation is expanding to other places as well, which we have seen before. Okay? In cultural and educational ties, too, look, we are providing Japanese language education to 50,000 students in Indian schools. Basically, 50,000 students are trying to learn the Japanese language in this. Looking at Quad and global initiatives, India and Japan have jointly led a climate resilience initiative for Pacific Island nations under the Quad. Under the Quad, a climate resilience initiative to make the climate of Pacific Islands a bit more resilient, to protect them, we have led an initiative together in collaboration, and we also co-sponsored a UN resolution on CCIT with support from 30 other nations. So, speaking of expert opinion, according to C. Rajamohan, Kishida's visit, the visit of their Prime Minister, has provided an opportunity. So that the vision of India and Japan, especially regarding a free and Indo-Pacific, can be an opportunity which is based on democratic values and a rules-based order. This rules-based order is an important aspect. Japan also supports this rules-based order. India also supports this. So, in the way our Indo-Pacific vision is common, in the same way, the rules-based order can also be a common driving point for us. Look, the relationship between India and the USA, India and America, is basically a very fundamental chapter of our entire foreign policy. It is a very fundamental chapter. Let us try to understand instead of wasting time discussing much about the introduction. Let us discuss what is here. We will try to understand through this. But yes, we have to acknowledge the fact that the USA, because the USA is a hegemonic power. Even today, it is a hegemonic power. Although there are challenges to its hegemony, it still continues to be a dominant player in this multipolar world order. It is again a unilateral, basically a player that wields a lot of power economically, militarily, in defense, and from all perspectives. PM Modi is quite innovative. He always brings some good keywords with him. So, according to him, the future is AI, America, and India. A very interesting future is AI. So, the relationship between India and the USA is basically people-centric and people-driven. Very much people-centric and people-driven, and is important for the most important relationships of the 21st century. The most important relationships of the 21st century. The future is AI, America, and India. This is one of the important relationships of the 21st century. It is particularly important here because, look, our relationship, the relationship between India and the USA, has gone through quite turbulent phases and has always faced challenges. But now the geopolitical reality has changed so much that it has become a compulsion for both to be with each other, because for so many reasons, and what those reasons are, we will try to understand. In February 2025, recently, Modi ji's visit took place during his visit to Washington. Modi emphasized a $5 billion trade target. We have set a trade target of $5 billion with America. We will try to achieve this by 2030. Which highlights AI and defense as key pillars. Now, this AI is Artificial Intelligence, not America and India. So, AI and defense as key pillars of "Make India Great Again." Now, this is like "Make America Great Again" is theirs. Similarly, we also have a mega initiative, which is "Make India Great Again." Now, by staying with Donald Trump a bit, Modi ji is also learning a few things. Anyway, Modi ji himself is very innovative. There is no doubt about that. So, the Quad summit, the commitment of the Quad summit, Modi's attendance at the September 2024 Quad summit in Delhi, that reinforces AI-driven innovation and maritime security cooperation. What do different leaders say? Let's try to understand the India-US relationship. Vajpayee ji called the USA India's natural ally. He said this. Speaking of Obama too, look, India and the USA is the most defining relationship of the 21st century. Even Modi now says that we have now overcome the hesitation of the past. We have ended the hesitation of the past. Trump also, Trump's endorsement, what did Trump say? In February 2025, President Donald Trump, Mr. Trump, he described the India-US relationship as the strongest it has ever been, citing a personal rapport with Mr. Modi and shared security goals. Our security goals, such as keeping China at the center, our security goals, and overall terrorism, which the USA did not acknowledge much before, but yes, later on, when it also faced terrorism, then now our security concerns are also common. So, let's see how this relationship evolved. How did the relationship evolve? If we talk about 1947 to 1970, our relations were lukewarm because of India's non-alignment. Because of India's non-alignment and the way the USA supported Pakistan in the 1971 war, our relations were definitely not good. And also, the USA's concern was India's nuclear ambition, which also concerned the USA, and our clear tilt towards the Soviet Union, which was clearly visible to the USA. Because of this, our relations were somewhat lukewarm. But in the 1980s and 1990s, in this decade of the 1980s and 1990s, it was a transition period because the Cold War had ended. India had also opened its economic doors through economic reforms for better engagement. For better engagement, and then our trade and strategic interests also started aligning. Our trade and strategic interests also started aligning. Then, a strategic shift from 2000 to 2010, in the next decade, there was a very big strategic shift. The landmark agreement, the 2008 Civil Nuclear Deal, is a very big landmark event in India's foreign policy, and especially in India's overall nuclear, basically, foreign policy, in the nuclear aspect, in our overall policy, in nuclear policy. Why? Because, first of all, let's complete this point. The 2008 Civil Nuclear Deal, the strategic dialogue in 2009, and then the 2+2 dialogue, which happened in 2018, significantly increased our trust and cooperation. Defense and Indo-Pacific focus, let's see. After 2010, our focus, India designated as a Major Defense Partner. In 2016, the USA gave India the status of a Major Defense Partner and expanded joint military exercises. Through joint military exercises and Quad cooperation, our bonding in Indo-Pacific alignment has become quite solidified. Speaking of recent developments, recently, from 2023 to 2025, in the last two years, we have resolved at least six WTO disputes in trade resolution, which has boosted our confidence in each other. Then defense has also boosted. A deal of $3.9 billion has been approved. That is MQ-9B drones, and we have also started F-35 jet talks. We have also started talking about F-35 jet talks. Then the Compact Initiative, which was launched for military and tech cooperation, continued collaboration on climate, counter-terrorism, healthcare, and China's containment. This is containment. Containing China in the Indo-Pacific. Just as we saw in the India-Japan relationship, how it is an important pillar. It is also an important player in the India-USA relationship. Look, if we look at the current status, India and the USA are now both very comprehensive global strategic partners. And this partnership is rooted in shared democratic values. First of all, shared democratic values, important economic complementarities, and regional security goals. These three important things you need to keep in mind. You can also write them in the introduction. Shared economic, shared basically democratic values, economic complementarities, and regional security goals. So, trade frictions still exist, but our engagement is still strong and multifaceted. So, let's look at the areas of cooperation in recent times and overall. USA and NSG support, the USA has reaffirmed its support for India's permanent UNSC seat and NSG membership, just as we saw in South-South cooperation, where the Latin American countries also supported. Then Quad and Indo-Pacific cooperation. What have we done through this? We have tried to strengthen the Quad through 2+2 dialogues. Through 2+2 dialogues, we are actually trying to support the initiatives of our Quad. The USA has also joined India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. And at the same time, we have launched an initiative together, joint coast guard operations, basically we can say. We have launched this in the 2024 Quad summit. Then BRI, China's Belt and Road Initiative, an alternative to it is basically the Blue Dot Network. So, to counter China's BRI, the USA is also supporting this initiative. Then counter-terrorism, jointly we are condemning terrorism, including the recent attack, basically condemning it. Both countries condemn it. So, obviously, the USA is also supporting continuing counter-terrorism efforts. Then, then in 2025, the extradition of Tahawwur Rana marks a milestone, this is also an important incident that has happened recently. Speaking of Indian Ocean strategy, look, the Indian Ocean Strategic Venture 2025, basically, the timeline is not important here for now, but the Indian Ocean Strategic Venture has been launched. So that we can boost our connectivity and maritime security. Then APEC invite, PM Modi was invited to APEC 2024 by President Biden. When President Biden was there, he was invited. That also signals the deeper Indo-Pacific engagement. This covers our geo-strategic and geo-economic cooperation. Let's talk about our trade target, we have set a target of $500 billion by 2030 for bilateral trade. Currently, our bilateral trade is quite low, approximately $77.5 billion, almost $80 billion, we can say. But yes, India enjoys a trade surplus. This is important. There is a surplus. This is an important point here. Okay? Then, speaking of the digital tax agreement, digital tax agreement. So, both countries agreed on a transitional solution on equalization levy for digital services. This is important. Because many digital firms, digital tech hubs, are in the USA, this collaboration also matters a bit. Defense industrial tie-ups also exist. GE's F414 jet engine is to be jointly co-produced. So, India and America are now coming into co-production. Even in the matter of semiconductors, Micron's $825 million facility in Gujarat, the semiconductor facility in Gujarat for $825 million, will basically start operations very soon by late 2025 or maybe we can consider it by 2026. So, this is good cooperation in semiconductors. Then, speaking of critical minerals, India joined the Mineral Security Partnership. This is important. India has joined the Mineral Security Partnership. And also, this basically targets lithium and cobalt processing. Through what? Lithium and cobalt processing, which are basically critical minerals for our nuclear, for our nuclear domain, they can also be useful, and they can also be useful in the overall semiconductor and electronics industry. Speaking of health and tech collaboration, US-India AI-based research on cancer and diabetes through NCI collaboration. This is a new initiative. Then, cultural cooperation, let's try to understand the cultural property agreement. There are ongoing talks to prevent the illegal trafficking of Indian cultural artifacts. To prevent the illegal trafficking of Indian cultural artifacts, especially happening in the USA, we have signed a Cultural Property Agreement. Also, antiquities repatriation, the US has returned 578 antiquities since 2016. And 297 alone in 2024. In 2024 alone, in one year, 297 antiquities have been returned, which is also enhancing our cultural diplomacy. Then, if we talk about educational linkages, more than 3 lakh Indian students contribute $8 billion to the US economy, strengthening our people-to-people ties. Most people go to the USA, we know. Speaking of technological cooperation, health research, joint AI-enabled research on cancer and diabetes, which we saw earlier, with the US National Cancer Institute. Semiconductors, we saw this. Critical minerals, we saw this. Here, speaking of space collaboration, India signed the Artemis Accords. The Artemis Accords have been signed, and also the NASA-ISRO Axiom Mission, so that we can send Indian astronauts to the ISS, the Indian Space Station. So, the NISAR mission is also upcoming between India and the USA. Indus Innovation Launch, this is also an initiative we have launched, which can promote AI, space, and basically the energy sector. Then Autonomous Systems Alliance, Asia Autonomous Systems Alliance, many initiatives have been launched between India and the USA. This is also an AI-based initiative for defense technology, which includes and which includes collaboration between Ariel and Mahindra Merit. So, this is also important. Here, if we talk about overall future cooperation, in which areas we can cooperate in the future, then look, from a geo-economic perspective, in India, there is talk of a demographic dividend. So, India offers vast potential for technology transfer, manufacturing, and investment. Also, in terms of supply chain resilience, we can strengthen through the Quad. Through the Quad, we can strengthen our supply chain resilience. Also, IMEC 2025 MoU on rail and cable projects. Then, if we talk about infrastructure investment, the US is also encouraged to invest and support the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which was jointly launched by Japan and India. The US wants to support this. The US also wants to invest in this. So, this is a good thing, and this is basically the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. This is a very good initiative for global South solidarity. At the same time, to counter China's overall BRI initiative, this is a good, one of the infrastructure projects, we can say. Then, in joint projects as well, we are trying to launch Indian Ocean infrastructure in collaboration. We are trying to do Indian Ocean infrastructure. We are trying to do joint projects in this. So that we can counter China's influence in the Indian Ocean and even in the Pacific Ocean. If we look at geo-strategic cooperation, the aim is common, that is, a free, open, rules-based region, the Indo-Pacific, which is free, open, and has a rules-based order. So, this is our common concern in the geo-strategic aspect. In maritime collaboration as well, we are collaborating on the blue economy domain awareness, and also in 2024, the Quad launched a joint coast guard patrol and port project. Then I2U2 expansion, that is, planned, basically a Middle East security initiative, its expansion is planned. So, there is also a possibility of collaboration in this. Then, speaking of technology collaboration, technology cooperation, a bilateral investment treaty, which is proposed to boost trade, so that our objective, the target we have set, the $5 billion target, basically by 2030, please understand this a bit, it is by 2030 here, okay, it is by 2030, please correct this. Through this initiative, the Trust Initiative Partnership in AI, this is an initiative, through this initiative, we want to partner in AI, semiconductors, quantum technologies. Quantum technology is a very emerging technology, in this we want to partner, and there is also a trade deal framework. In 2025, the US has recently proposed so that our trade by 2030, which we saw earlier, increases. Speaking of scholars' opinions, according to Aparna Pande, shared democratic values and converging strategic interests, which we saw at the beginning, will definitely continue to bind India and the USA together as partners, despite some friction points in the relationship. There are some minor friction points, but yes, our shared democratic values, all these things, will somehow keep our relationship going, and our relationship will deepen further. According to Arvind Panagariya, realizing the full potential of the ties. If we want to fully realize the potential of this India-US partnership, then it will depend a bit on how India undertakes structural reforms in our economy and overall country. And the US dispelling concerns over reliability as a long-term partner. From the US side as well, how are the concerns about reliability as a partner resolved? What are the challenges? Look, let's try to understand the challenges. In geo-economic concerns, first, IP disputes. India remains on the US Special, their special report comes out, the US Special 301 Priority Watch List, India is still on this, although reforms have been made in 2020. Reforms are the tension. Some reforms have been made in India, but in IP dispute matters, their US Special 301 Priority Watch List, which includes countries about which they have concerns, there is also a bit of a problem in WTO positioning regarding non-trade barriers, because India aligns with the Global South. And that is very natural. So that, so that we can push developing nations on the development agenda, on the Doha Development Agenda. On the Doha Development Agenda, on the commitment that was made, we can push on that. So, there is a divergence here as well. Then trade bloc exclusion. Neither India nor the USA is part of major regional trade agreements. Both countries are not together in any major trade agreement. Where China is, they want to come here, but both countries are not together. Then tariff friction. Trump, in 2025, the reciprocal tariff policy, okay, it is basically because of this, its reciprocal tariff policy. We saw this in the news recently, it was quite important. So that actually, India's overall exports are at some risk because of Donald Trump's reciprocal tariff policy, and India has basically cut tariffs to mitigate the tension. To mitigate this tension, tariffs have been cut a bit, but yes, there is some friction regarding tariffs here.

Certainly. Here is the translation of the provided Hindi text into English, adhering to your rules:

It is necessary. If we talk about the geoeconomic strategic concerns, then Russian arms dependency here is again a strategic economy. The way India maintains it, look at the limits. This Russian arms dependency of ours limits Indo-US defense interoperability because trust issues arise due to India's reliance on Russian equipment. India still has defense relations continuing with Russia, and we still rely on Russian equipment. Because of this, the USA might face some trust issues in further increasing our interoperability with them. This is an important factor.

Then, the China factor. Look, mutual concerns over each other's engagement with China affect deeper strategic trust. It affects the deeper strategic trust that we could have had. But our mutual concern over each other's engagement, how we engage with China, this is a somewhat suspicious point. At what level does India engage with China, and then how much does the USA respect our concerns about China, and then how much does India respect the USA's concerns about China? This matter is somewhat where friction develops.

The Kashmir issue is also an important issue. The US's political commentary on human rights, in this, Kashmir is an issue where India basically faces some risk regarding the Kashmir issue. This is a problem because some allegations are made against it on the overall digital and overall media platforms of the USA.

Then, instability in Afghanistan. The USA has basically withdrawn, but due to this withdrawal, it may have spillover effects on regional security. This is quite an old point now, but yes, that is relevant. This is happening somewhere because of the USA.

So, the second is the Iran and China nexus. The USA has imposed sanctions on Iran. Because of this, India and Iran's ties, because the USA has imposed sanctions on Iran, India and Iran's ties, India and Iran's relationship, are being somewhat compromised. Because of this, there has been increased proximity between Iran and China. Now, this is a problem for us. Because of the USA's sanctions, we cannot have deeper engagement with them. But China, basically, China is not affected by the USA's sanctions. So, China's proximity with Iran is increasing. So, this is a problem in which the USA has an important role.

Then, in the Russia-Ukraine war, India has also taken a neutral stand. The Modi visit to Ukraine in 2024 reflected a strategic autonomy, unsettling the USA. We take our steps according to our strategic autonomy and guide our foreign policy. So, here the USA might have a problem because the USA would want us to take a stand against Russia. But definitely, we have taken a neutral stand there.

Then, the Chabahar Port, correct? Sanctions were also imposed on this. The US recently imposed sanctions on Indian firms in 2000, meaning recently. Because of this, our port deal, India's port deal, a 10-year-old port deal, despite this, sanctions have been imposed on it. The US has imposed sanctions on Indian firms in the context of Iran.

Then, diplomatic strain. We have tried to avoid it. The allegations made against India in the 2023 Sikh assassination plot have now been resolved, efforts are being made to resolve them. But yes, this has actually saved us from a major fallout. Otherwise, this could have escalated into a big issue.

If we talk about geopolitical concerns, then there are data sovereignty issues. India has opposed the US's CLOUD Act, and there are also some concerns about the Osaka Track on free data flow. So, what has India actually done? It has expressed concerns regarding all these, the Osaka Track, the US CLOUD Act, because of digital sovereignty and privacy matters. So, partially this issue has been resolved, but it is still... meaning, we have tried to resolve it partially. It has not been completely resolved. But through the digital trade dialogue, we have tried to resolve it partially.

If we talk about trade tensions, then India losing GSP benefits is an important one. This was an issue in between. The GSP initiative, the GSP benefits that are basically given to developing countries, the way India provides benefits in trade, in trade, we have lost that a bit, and mutual tariff impositions have also developed economic friction because of this. Because they imposed quite high tariffs on India's basically exports, this issue has occurred. But look, GSP restoration talks are ongoing. Take a look at what GSP basically is and what its implications are. But it is not very important. But yes, from a trade aspect, it is important. This was a very big issue in between.

If we talk about other geopolitical sensitivities, look, in the context of Pakistan and Kashmir, US concerns over human rights in Kashmir and instability in Afghanistan, which affects strategic comfort. Because of this, the strategic comfort that could have been between us is not there. Because somewhere, if not the US government, then at least some other members, some other players, they actually put allegations on India about this Kashmir and overall issues. So, this is important.

Then, in the context of Bangladesh, India has raised its voice a bit on minority protection issues. And also, it expected US support on attacks against Hindus in Bangladesh. But what is happening on this now, that needs to be seen. From a scholarly perspective, from the perspective of scholars, we have basically demanded US support in the context of attacks happening against Hindus in Bangladesh. From the perspective of scholars, according to Tanvi Madan, India's Russia ties and economic policies, okay? And human rights records, that limit deeper strategic convergence. This is an important point. We have also seen that regarding Kashmir and in the context of Pakistan, the US's overall stand towards India, or the perception there, is an important point. In economic policies, the way these barriers have been imposed by the USA and the withdrawal of GSP, because of this, there are trade frictions as well. So, overall, these are all the issues.

If we talk about Varun Shivaram, according to him, there are some divergent climate change responsibilities that are a point of friction. This is an important point. Look, because the USA, being a developed country, and India, being a developing nation, our stance on climate change is definitely diverging. We want developed countries to finance more. We want them to contribute more to climate finance. But definitely, the USA, especially under the presidency of Trump, is not that pro regarding climate finance. They say there is nothing like climate change. There is nothing like climate change, Donald Trump says.

Here, we can see other scholars as well, like Subo Lakshmi Dutta. India's strategic autonomy. India's strategic autonomy, which we reinforced in the context of Russia. We also reinforced it in the context of Chabahar because the USA had imposed sanctions there in Iran too. So, by enforcing our strategic autonomy, we have taken decisions according to our national interests. But because of this, the alignment expectations with the USA have become complicated. They have become complicated.

If we talk about recent visits, the PM recently visited. So, what was the purpose? What was the focus? Let's see. The purpose was that the visit was seen as a transformative moment, again Modi's... Modi's geo-ping moment with implications for India's geoeconomics. So, overall, what was the purpose, what was the focus, what did we achieve in the recent state visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the USA? Let's look once more. Although we have seen many of these points in an integrated manner above, let's look once. The strategics of this meeting, this visit, is seen as a transformative moment with implications for India's geoeconomics or geopolitics. The core agenda was to improve our economic, defense, and technological ties, specifically, particularly through critical technology cooperation and defense industrial collaboration, which we are also doing co-production of many defense equipment. Initiatives that were launched, we saw ICET and Indus-X, such initiatives which promote innovation and critical, basically in emerging technologies, the critical initiatives in emerging technologies, we have tried to launch them here.

The GE 414 jet engine, an agreement was also reached on this. Agreement for license production in India. And second, the US-India Compact and Trust, this was basically signed, which targets AI, trade, and defense collaboration. Our AI, overall trade, we have also seen that before. The major outcomes of this visit are that we are focusing on defense co-production. Especially here, we are going to focus on intelligence sharing for Javelin missiles and Stryker vehicles, particularly in the context of Indo-Pacific collaboration, its security, its surveillance, in that context.

Then, space cooperation is also there. Confirmation of the NASA-ISRO Axiom Mission. NISAR, which is basically this, we also launched NISAR. And the NASA-ISRO Axiom Mission, we also saw this a bit earlier. So, overall, this is basically summing up.

Here, if we talk about strategic significance, then there is geopolitical alignment. India's role in US efforts to counter China, because if the US has to counter China, especially in the Indo-Pacific, because it is necessary. China, India, so the USA has to maintain its hegemony. So, to maintain its hegemony, it is necessary to counter China's aggressiveness, China's assertiveness, and China's growing influence. For that, if there can be a credible partner for the USA, then it is India, and they have recognized this in their policy documents, security documents.

So, if we talk about defense and self-reliance, then look, balancing the import of US tech while boosting indigenous defense manufacturing. This is also one of the agendas. Then, intelligence cooperation is also on the agenda here.

Challenges, we saw barriers to technology transfer due to US regulations that limit India's access to sensitive technologies. The sensitive technologies there, which can basically be transferred and brought here, there are limitations due to the US's strict regulations. Then, alignment in expectations is also something to consider. Where balancing strategic autonomy leads to some friction even now.

If we talk about Indo-US cooperation, in defense, we saw economic trade, how much it is and what our target is. We also talked about clean energy technology. Then, we also talked about strategic dialogue. Somewhere, we emphasize democracy, basically here, and human rights, and there are joint stands on Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East conflicts, deepening the Indo-Pacific coordination.

Here, if we look at scholarly views as well, the analysts agree that yes, our strategic convergence, our strategic convergence between India and the US is growing, especially in the context of the Indo-Pacific, emerging technologies like quantum technology, etc., and in our defense industrial cooperation, defense industrial cooperation. But yes, there are divergences, but despite this, yes, there is alignment in various segments and various sectors.

In the India-Russia matter as well, look, we have continued cooperation with Russia. Although our defense cooperation with India and the USA is increasing significantly, we have seen many initiatives. But that doesn't mean we have ended our cooperation with Russia. Our defense ties with Russia are also continuing. Our energy and trade ties are also continuing. Our connectivity projects, everything of ours is basically continuing. So, this is what, overall, these are our overall initiatives regarding India-USA. There are quite a few initiatives. But here, the perspective is more important. You can use a little bit of content from this, but understand the perspective. There are challenges, but further deepening is happening. But overall, India is maintaining its strategic autonomy and is acting like it is walking on a tightrope. This is a situation like walking on a tightrope. We are collaborating with Russia, and we are also collaborating with the USA.

Among the global powers, another important power here is Japan, we have seen that. We have seen the USA. Russia is very, very, very important. India considers Russia a time-tested ally from the Cold War era. It has been a time-tested supporter of India since the Cold War era. It has supported India in many places, like at the UN and in many other issues. So, our cooperation is in defense. Primarily, we have significant collaboration in nuclear energy and space exploration. Definitely, we will see what the challenges are going forward. But yes, our collaboration needs to be diversified a lot. Because earlier and even today, the pillars of our collaboration are constant, and they are not expanding beyond that. That is one of the important things.

According to PM Modi, every child in India knows that Russia is our best friend. That is the level of, you know, friendship with Russia. Russia has been a pillar of India's development and security. India and Russia's relations have been a constant in a world that is constantly changing. The world is changing in such a way, the dynamics are changing completely. Despite this, our relationship with Russia is a constant in this entire dynamic world affairs. According to PM Modi, to quote him, the resilience of India-Russia relationship is based on the fact that it rests on the principles of equality, trust, and mutual benefit. So, let us try to understand how this relationship evolved.

If we look at the post-independence era, there was an ideological divide here. Relations were distant due to Stalin's rigid ideological stance. Due to Stalin's rigid ideological stance, our relations were somewhat distant. There were also global divisions, due to which our early engagement was somewhat like this. We kept a bit of distance from each other. We maintained distance. But during the Cold War, we saw a slight strategic tilt. India leaned towards the USSR without a formal alliance. The 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation symbolized a quasi-alliance. Meaning, not a complete alliance, but yes, somewhere there was definitely a tilt. So, the USSR supported India in developing core industries, which were our core industries at that time. Defense cooperation, and at this time, Russia supported us. But after the Cold War, the transformation was quite tremendous. After the Cold War, the transformation that happened, the relations evolved into a comprehensive security partnership, moving beyond the buyer-seller defense model. Earlier, our overall engagement was that we used to buy defense equipment from them, so we had a buyer-seller relationship. But later, it became a comprehensive security partnership.

So, what does a comprehensive security partnership mean? It means we don't just share or import/export defense equipment. We actually include other aspects of security, like intelligence sharing, or if we are facing common issues, then solving them together. Many such things are what we try to do in our comprehensive security partnership.

Then, Russia, India, China, this is a trilateral. This has also become very important now. Supporting, basically, we support multipolarity and multilateralism. So, let us try to understand.

After that, if we talk about strategic partnership, then in 2000, we formalized our strategic partnership. It existed before as well, but not in such a formal sense. There was a tilt, but not a formal partnership. Following a similar move with France, deepening cooperation across sectors. Then, in 2010, we upgraded that relationship to a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership, which reflects the elevated multidimensional nature of the relationship.

Let us try to understand the areas of cooperation between India and Russia. If we talk about strategic cooperation, then annual summits are held, meetings are held. The Indian Prime Minister and the Russian President have regular meetings. High-level institutionalized dialogues are held. Along with this, we have elevated our relationships to a Special and Privileged Partnership, which we actually did in 2018. After that, if we talk about other governmental commissions, then here, trade, economic, scientific, technological, cultural cooperation, military-technological cooperation, we are cooperating at the governmental level in this as well. There is engagement at the governmental level here.

Also, Russia's support for India's permanent seat in the UNSC and for NSG membership, and in BRICS, SCO, and projects like ISTC, the International North-South Corridor, Russia has active engagement with India in such initiatives. And there is cooperation against international terrorism. We cooperate against international terrorism. Drug trafficking, and for that matter, other issues as well, we cooperate in them.

If we talk about geopolitical cooperation, then jointly we are involved in the research, development, production, and advanced defense items. And then, the S-400 air defense missile system, then joint military exercises like Indra, all these defense deals we are doing with them. Then there are joint programs, for example, we are also involved in co-production. Co-production means making something together. So, like the BrahMos cruise missile or the fifth-generation fighter jet, Sukhoi Su-30 MKI, we have launched such joint programs with Russia.

Now, look, Russia also plays an important role in India's submarine programs and aircraft carrier operations. Also, if we talk about India's space program or joint satellite launches and navigation systems, then Russia is also involved here. Space and defense are both prominent sectors where Russia is engaged with India, and that too at a very high level, at a deeper level. Peaceful use of nuclear energy and joint nuclear power projects. And the third is, look, we saw defense, after that we saw space, and here nuclear energy, Russia has collaborated in many nuclear power projects.

If we look at geoeconomic cooperation as well, geoeconomically, our bilateral trade, which was $25 billion, has now increased a bit due to oil purchases. We are diversifying our energy sector from Russia. We are also importing some oil from Russia. Bilateral investment stands at $30 billion in 2080. Russia's...

India's position is that it is the largest arms supplier. In the name of collaboration, if we look, we have collaboration in economic, scientific, technological, and cultural spheres everywhere. And we are also basically involved in the North-South Corridor internationally. We have participation. Talking about collaboration and cooperation in science and technology, there is collaboration in basic science in the Russian Indian Network of Universities. Then, if we look at joint research, the joint research we are doing in the Arctic, Antarctic, and other basically these poles. Here, we are jointly collaborating in its scientific research. Then, in India's main mission, Gaganyaan, there is also collaboration, and then satellite launching, navigation systems, outer space applications, etc., India's space program, we have also seen this. Talking about cultural relations, Indian languages like Hindi, Tamil, Marathi, etc., are taught in Russian institutions. Indian culture is also promoted there. Dance, music, yoga, Ayurveda, all these things are also promoted in Russia. Looking at cultural exchange programs, "Namaste Russia" is an educational brilliance sharing program through institutes like JNU. Jawaharlal Nehru, basically not JNU. This educational brilliance sharing happens through Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centers, and then some exhibitions commemorating Mahatma Gandhi's 150th anniversary, connections with Leo Tolstoy in Russia, all these exhibitions also take place, and about 20 Russian institutions teach Hindi to approximately 1500 Russian students. So, this is our people-to-people contact, and our ties are with Russia.

If we talk about the Russia-Ukraine crisis, which is very much in the news right now. So, what is India's stand in the Russia-Ukraine crisis? Let us try to understand from the scholars' perspective. According to Sumit Ganguly's understanding, India's stand in the Russia-Ukraine war crisis is quite complex to understand. Why? Because a considerable part of it, India's decision to avoid taking a clear-cut position stems from a dependence on Russia on a host of issues. In many issues, such as diplomatic, military, and energy-related, India does depend on Russia, and it is not just because of dependence that India will try to escape its strategic autonomy, which is basically an independent decision. Somewhere, somewhere, there is also a sense of gratitude towards Russia, due to the constant collaboration and support Russia has provided to India throughout its past history, this stand is not very clear-cut. Strategic Ambivalence: India is trying to basically balance the ties with both. With Russia, and in this Ukraine scenario, the West is supporting Ukraine. So, here we also have to maintain our relations with the West. We do not want to get into trouble. But we also have to maintain ties with Russia because Russia has always been an age-old friend, a time-tested friend. So, we have to maintain that stand in both. That is why we are taking a neutral stand in the Ukraine crisis, in the Ukraine conflict. Neutrality is also under Western pressure, despite US and Western pressure, and because sanctions are imposed on Russia, and obviously, there is pressure on India too. But still, India has avoided condemning Russia. That actually shows how assertively we are using our strategic autonomy in our foreign policy choices. How assertively we are using our strategic autonomy in our foreign policy choices. And why are we doing this? Because, look, why are we not condemning Russia? Because somewhere, there is historical pressure here. Historical reliance, basically, sorry, not historical pressure, but historical reliance on Russia in our defense and energy sectors, and we acknowledge this. We appreciate this. There is gratitude. Acknowledging the divergence, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has admitted that yes, there are differences over Ukraine at the G20. At the G20, there are differences between our stand and the US's stand and the stand of other countries regarding Ukraine. But that reflects India's pragmatic diplomacy, focused on a peaceful resolution. Then, dual engagement: India maintains open channels with both Russia and the West. We are maintaining relations with Russia, and we are also maintaining relations with the West. So that our unique position is maintained. Why? Because we have good engagement with Russia, and we also have good engagement with Western countries. So, in such a scenario where there needs to be a bridge between the West and Russia, India can be a better choice. India can be a better option.

Talking about Global South focus and peace. See, PM Modi emphasized peaceful resolution, correct? He talked about peaceful resolution. And he also prioritized Global South issues like food security and development at the G20. We have talked about all these issues. We want that war is like, see, we do not support war at all. So, this is not the era of war. By saying this, we have clarified our stand. We do not support war. But definitely, we will not condemn Russia either. Because there is historical dependence on Russia. Western sanctions have been imposed on it. They were also imposed during the Cold War. So, even at that time, India had to take support from the Russian military. We had to take the support of the Russian military, and because of that, our current basically position is influenced by that support. But India is gradually reducing its dependence on Russian arms, and we are trying to improve our defense partnerships with the USA and Australia. So that we diversify our defense procurement or our defense relationships. At the same time, Russia's closeness with China, the way it is increasing, this also affects India's strategic calculus. Because now, there is a tit-for-tat situation here, because we were dependent on Russia, we were basically very reliant on them, but now we are diversifying our dependence. Although we are not reducing our defense and military engagement with Russia, it is there, but at the same time, we are also increasing our defense engagement with Australia and the USA. So, our reliance, the exclusive reliance that was there, basically it was never exclusive, but yes, too much reliance on Russia, we are trying to reduce that. But simultaneously, as the dynamics are changing, the dynamics of global politics are changing, China is emerging, and given the conflict with China regarding our border and many other divergence issues, Russia's closeness with China is very obvious for Russia. Because Russia has very few friends left, due to Western sanctions and US conflict. So, Russia has very few options for friendship, so going with China is natural. But this has actually complicated India's strategic calculus, especially given India-China tensions. So, this is it, basically India's strategic ambivalence reflects its balancing diplomacy, aiming for autonomy, peace, and multi-alignment amidst shifting global geopolitics. As global geopolitics is shifting, we support multi-alignment here, not any kind of power politics. We want to maintain a multi-alignment strategy here. At the same time, we want to maintain our strategic autonomy, and we support peace. But why does India have such a stand on the Russia-Ukraine crisis? This is not a thing. Yes.

So, overall, why is our neutral stand in the Russia-Ukraine crisis? We have looked at the factors. Let's understand the factors a bit more deeply. Historical ties: we have understood our historical ties with Russia. We have had solidarity since the Cold War. We also have common anti-colonial sentiments. So, basically, a long-standing nationalist leaning is in our favor with Russia. Correct, instead of Western alliances. We were not supporting Western alliances that much. So, our inclination is towards Russia from the beginning. But energy security also: talking about energy security and oil imports, India's high energy demand means that our imports are also at discounted prices, the oil we are getting from Russia is at discounted prices, due to which our energy imports are increasing. And that's also ensuring economic and geopolitical gains with a tacit acceptance from the US due to market dynamics. Dependence on Russian arms: Russia remains India's primary defense supplier, and with the legacy system and modernization needs, we need to modernize our military, our defense equipment. For that too, Russia is necessary because we have procured many equipments from Russia earlier. So that shows that diversification is there, despite growing purchases from other countries. Other countries are like, for example, our USA or Australia. Our purchases from them are increasing. But at the same time, we also have diversification with Russia from a defense perspective. Geopolitical strategy: In the context of China, India's top concern is Chinese aggression, especially along the border. And along with that, Russia's growing closeness with China is concerning, but India needs to balance the relationship with Russia. And also, India's stand in the Russia-Ukraine crisis, we saw it just now, but let's understand it a bit more specifically. India has tried to maintain a balance with both Russia and Ukraine. We are also engaged with Kyiv in peace dialogue while acknowledging its historic friendship with Moscow. We have tried to balance with both Russia and Ukraine. We have seen these imports. Then, defense dependence diversification, we have also seen this. Our strategic calculus, in the context of China.

Talking about recent developments. In Russian developments, if we look at recent developments, Russia remains a key supplier, despite its share dropping from 64% to 45%. See, our defense dependence on them has definitely decreased from 64% to 45%. But the two summits we had expedited the delivery of our S-400, production of AK203 rifles under Make in India, and our tri-service Indra exercise. And India has cautiously tried to diversify this, and our defense deals, our defense procurement with the US, we have tried to diversify with the US. USA, France, East Australia, Israel. But Russia offered S-57E fighters with full technology transfer. This is a very important thing. Because that shows, why is it important to write this example? Because that shows the trust, the confidence. The trust and confidence that Russia has in India. Because no developed country transfers its technology fully. Then, talking about energy trade, the trade is basically seen here at $65 billion overall, largely due to discounted Russian oil, because we are importing 23% of India's imports from Russia. So, our energy trade has increased. It has increased significantly. You can confirm the numbers a bit, but yes, energy trade has increased. So, here the European Union is criticizing Russia. Why? Because their refined oil exports, because of the refined oil exports, the European Union is criticizing it. But okay, that is something else, which is not that important. According to Pankaj Saran, he states that we should actually boost exports to Russia. We should boost our exports to Russia, improve trade. In the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors. In the context of nuclear energy also, like the Kudankulam reactor, the Kudankulam nuclear reactor, which is ongoing, we are planning for 12 more projects. So, here, the plan for nuclear cooperation is being upgraded. We are jointly implementing the Rooppur project, a nuclear project in Bangladesh, with Russia and India. So, this is basically enhancing our energy security and also countering China, especially in the context of energy. In space cooperation, Russia helped in the training for the Gaganyaan mission, as we saw. Then, their GLONASS, when we launched our joint satellites, there was also integration of GLONASS, which is their basically Russian space mission, space technology. We have also planned an Arctic research mission, and through this, our technological self-reliance can increase because it is co-production. Our technological self-reliance can increase because, first of all, technology transfer is complete in many aspects, and co-production is happening, due to which we do not need to be completely dependent on Russia. So, this trust that Russia is showing is quite important for us, and our stand in the Ukraine crisis, we have seen that. But in Ukraine, see, India has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine, which is irrespective of, see, India's stand is quite rational. Because Russia is our time-tested friend, we are not taking any stand against it or condemning its actions, but at the same time, providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine is necessary for humanitarian cost. So, this is our pragmatic balancing in the dynamics of Russia and the West. A pragmatic balancing of ours in the dynamics of Russia and the West.

Talking about strategic and economic ties. See, here Russia has strategically supported the US bid in BRICS. Here, Russia has supported it. In BRICS, it has supported it. Also, 25 Russian institutions teach Hindi. We have also seen this. We are also launching joint projects in AI and quantum research. So, basically, these are all initiatives. We have a lot of collaboration with Russia. But engaging with Russia is like walking on a tightrope situation. Because it is a situation of walking on a tightrope. Why? Because engaging in relations with Russia means developing friction with the USA somewhere. So, in such a situation, we have to maintain relations with both countries very smartly. Because here, we are countering China with the USA. But there, our friendship with Russia is there. But the problem is that Russia's collaboration with China is becoming quite integrated, quite deep. So, we have to maintain our relations by keeping all these calculations in mind, keeping national interest at the center.

Now, let's talk about India and the European Union. India and the European Union are not very important here, but let's have a brief understanding of it. The ties are built on shared principles like democracy, rule of law, multilateralism, and a rule-based international order, a rule-based world order. If we talk about India and the European Union, our cooperation is also broad-based. Because our engagement is in diverse areas like trade, investment, climate change, and science and technology. Along with that, our strategic convergences are growing. Our common interests are growing. Their interests and ours are common. Why? Because India basically now recognizes Europe as a potential to support domestic capacity building and resilience and foreign policy goals. We acknowledge that Europe has the potential to support our foreign policy goals and our capacity building at the domestic level. And in diplomatic priorities, we have given significant importance to the European Union because of our foreign policy priorities. Okay? Which is completely reflected in our engagements, high-level engagements with the European Union. Also, we have a complementary interest. For example, the European Union supports India in infrastructure, resilient supply chains, emerging technologies, and even in defense and security cooperation. At the same time, the European Union also aims to boost its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. India's naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and especially supporting India here in naval presence. The European Union is also supporting this. So, basically, the European Union supports in many different areas here. According to Rajiv Bhatia, according to Rajiv Bhatia, this relationship between India and the European Union is at an inflection point, with the potential to shape a multipolar just global order. Why? Because of the values, democratic values, rule of law, rule-based world order. Because of all these things, whatever Rajiv Bhatia says, that is the point.

Areas of Cooperation: If we talk about the areas of cooperation between the European Union and India, then see, political and geostrategic cooperation was initiated in 1993. From 1993, we initiated and institutionalized our relations with joint political statements. And the framework of the 2000 summit, there we upgraded this relationship and changed it into a strategic partnership in 2004. Then, in 2018, the European Union's strategy on India recognized the European Union's strategy on India, this basically document, there they recognized India's global role. And along with that, the European Union also influences. They have also influenced India's digital legislation, digital laws, digital laws, including our data security mission, the guidelines they recently made regarding GDPR, regarding digital security and digital sovereignty. Then, if we talk about economic and investment ties, the European Union is India's third-largest trading partner. And that's why it is not that we should learn it here, and more than 6000 European Union companies are operating in India. The European Union's FDI is also quite, meaning double.

It has happened. It is almost 18% of the total. So, therefore, a broad-based trade investment agreement is also in negotiation. It is also under negotiation. And due to our investment facilitation mechanism, our trade flow is also being boosted. If we also talk about security, defense, and climate cooperation. So, in all these areas like counter-terrorism, maritime security, climate action, we are collaborating, and in all these aspects like clean energy, climate partnership, and joint work on renewables, we are currently increasing our collaboration and engagement even more. For example, even naval drills, defense industrial cooperation also show this growing strategic relation. It indicates. Talking about science and technology, in science and technology and maritime collaboration, ISRO has contributed to the European Union's Galileo. Basically, in the same way that we have our satellite mission here, they also have their satellite mission there. So, joint work on AI, biotech, space, and 5G, 6G. We are also working on the 5G and 6G model in the telecom sector. Annual science and technology committee meetings and cooperation on freedom of navigation, freedom of navigation, and the UNCLOS-based maritime order. This principle is common to us, Japan, USA, and along with that, basically Australia also. This is common for us. And talking about digital and data regulation, we have a continuous dialogue on data adequacy, AI ethics, and cross-border flows. We get a lot of insights from there, from the European Union. And our digital partnership, the digital partnership between the European Union and India, basically focuses on secure and ethical tech development. We are trying to focus on tech development being ethical. Also, this aligns with global standards. Now, if we talk about challenges here, what are the challenges? There are economic and trade barriers. The bilateral, basically this treaty, the bilateral trade, this BTIA agreement, BTIA negotiations, these are stalled. And at the same time, there are many regulatory hurdles. There is a huge trade imbalance, and the European Union's ties with China are quite strong. Here too, China is, in a way, becoming the villain. And economic ties with China are quite strong. Because of this, our deeper cooperation, which could have happened, is being hindered in some way. It is stopping there. Then the second challenge is political and diplomatic frictions. India's internal policies, like regarding Jammu and Kashmir, or our Citizenship Amendment Bill, due to all these things, there are some frictions related to our domestic politics. And then, expectations at the global level, the European Union's expectations, because they are Western countries, they expect us to condemn Russia's actions. But because we have to balance, we have to balance relations with the West as well, and balance with Russia as well. So, there is some friction here. Then talking about geopolitical and strategic convergence, due to Brexit, the European Union's unity has weakened a bit. And because of that, our views on the world view, on multipolarity, and on global governance are not necessarily similar. Not necessarily that our views on global governance are similar. Because in global governance, we would definitely want more representation for developing nations. But they are Western countries. They are developed countries, and this stance is, in a way, contradictory to developed countries. So, therefore, our differing, basically divergent world views, and the European Union's engagement with China, including in the BRI initiative, also poses a challenge to our strategic convergence, divergence is already there, but the convergence that should happen is facing a challenge at multiple levels. And then there are security and multilateral gaps. Limited cooperation beyond trade restrictions, beyond trade. Our cooperation beyond trade is quite limited. Quite limited. Especially concerning global security problems like cyber attacks, terrorism, we have diverging priorities. Because of this, our multilateral efforts, multilateral efforts mean that we and the other countries of the European Union come together and follow a consensus-oriented common agenda, or push an agenda, something like that is not happening because our priorities are somewhat diverging. Our perspectives are diverging. And this becomes a bit complicated among the important ones. If we talk about recent developments, we recently celebrated 60 years of diplomatic ties in 2022. What did we do? Celebrated. Underscoring the long-standing partnership based on democracy, multilateralism. Democracy, multilateralism, and shared values. Here, we have established and upgraded the strategic partnership between India and the European Union. We have also upgraded our institutional engagement, and in trade and economic engagement, our bilateral trade has definitely reached approximately 150 billion, plus 150 billion dollars. And the best thing about this is that India has a trade surplus. FTA negotiations have also gained momentum. Definitely, our negotiations in the BTIA agreement are a bit stalled. But yes, talking about Free Trade Agreements, we have resumed our talks on trade, on Free Trade Agreements, by excluding some sensitive agricultural products. Then talks on investment protection and geographical indication (GI tag) are also ongoing. We are seeing some progress there. There is some progress on the issue of Basmati rice and the issue of cheese for the European Union. But the challenges are, one is the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. Because of this, India's steel and cement exports have faced some problems. Because, you see, what is this? Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism means what? That like India's steel and cement industry, the resources we are using to produce this. Because of this, the carbon extraction that happens. So, this mechanism, you must have read about it in Prelims. This mechanism is related to that. You can Google it a bit. Then talking about the Trade and Technology Council, we launched this in 2023. So that our trade, and our cooperation on technology and strategic policy can increase. Along with that, in 2025, we focused on the second TTC. Here we talked about AI and 5G. After that, we talked about hydrogen and batteries. We formed a working group on resilient supply chains and digital trust. So, we are doing multiple initiatives here. Climate and energy cooperation, I mentioned this earlier. India and the European Union are expanding the clean energy and climate partnership and including joint projects in this, such as offshore wind, green hydrogen. We are doing all these initiatives together. Then talking about defense and maritime security, we conducted the first joint naval exercise. This is a first joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean. We are talking about the Indian Ocean. We conducted this in June 2025, recently, meaning we can consider it last month. We conducted this basically under Operation Atalanta. Under Operation Atalanta, our cooperation between India and the European Union in the Indo-Pacific has increased. European Union firms are exploring options for co-production of maritime surveillance and technology in India. They are exploring options for co-production. Talking about research, innovation, and connectivity, we had a high-level dialogue on research and innovation in 2022. Then AI and biotech, 5G, we have seen all this. The European Union's Global Gateway initiative has pledged or committed to support 300 million euros for digital projects in India. There are euros here, okay? 3 million euros. The Global Gateway initiative has pledged or committed to support 3 million euros for digital projects in India. Talking about geopolitical and diplomatic dimensions, obviously, on the issue of Ukraine, the Russia-Ukraine issue, we have affirmed strategic autonomy. So, there is some divergence there. But the European Union wants alignment on global governance issues. But definitely, they are developed countries, we are developing countries. So, we have some divergent views. India remains cautious about this. The ITTC, which we saw a little while ago, that can be seen as a mechanism to bridge the differences, and also that can help institutionalize the convergence. Let's look at expert opinions. According to scholars, the role of the TTC can be used in positioning India and the European Union as ethical tech leaders. But strategic autonomy, in the overall relationship, whatever happens, India's strategic autonomy remains a sticking point, but viewed pragmatically amidst shifting global alignments. See, the European Union might have a problem with India's strategic autonomy. But for us, as alignments shift, in such global flux, to pursue our national interest and our standing, because we are not a football of anybody's opinion, and that's why we have to have our own firm stand, and that's why strategic autonomy is our important thing, irrespective of what country it is. So, in the way forward, let's talk about what Sameer Saran says, that an ambitious India-European Union FTA could boost this FTA, our partnership, investment, trade can be boosted. Definitely, especially in areas like 5G, AI, biotech, renewable energy, climate areas, our partnership can increase. Okay? Then we talk about India-China. So, basically, we are looking at the relations between India and global centers of power. Where we saw India-USA relations. India-Russia relations. India-Japan relations. We also saw India-European Union relations. And now let's look at the relationship between India and China. Let's talk about it. See, here, India, USA, India, Russia, and India, China. These three players. Although Japan is important, the European Union is important, but the most important here are Russia, USA, and China. And among them, especially USA and China are more important. So, let's try to understand China. China is also more important because geographically, China is in a very proximate position. We also have border disputes with it, and the important thing is that China's dominance has emerged as a problem for us everywhere. That's why China becomes the central focus of Indian foreign policy. China becomes the central focus of India's foreign policy. Because everywhere, literally, if you look in the neighborhood, China is there. If you look in Latin America, China is there. If we look in Africa, in other blocks of South-South cooperation, China is there. In the context of the USA, China is also there. And China is not just on land. China is also in the oceans. In our maritime security, China's context is also there. So, China is like, we have a phobia of China. China is everywhere, and in most places, it is in a conflicting position. There is very little cooperation. But let's try to understand China. India's relations with China involve four Cs: conflict, competition, cooperation, and containment. The most important here, like with the USA, in the Quad, we are somehow trying to contain China. With Japan also, in Africa, and elsewhere, we are focusing on containing China with other countries. Second is competition, but in competition, China is ahead in many areas economically. Cooperation is in limited areas, but conflict is continuous, ongoing. Okay? So, Manoj Joshi says that these four Cs can define our relationship with China: conflict, competition, cooperation, and containment. According to Shyam Saran, in his book "How India Sees the World," he said that India and China have fundamentally completely different world views. India, when it looks at the world, sees it from the perspective of Bharatvarsha, a perspective of pluralistic harmony. Our world view, our perspective on the world is that of Bharatvarsha, which signifies pluralistic harmony. Where China sees itself as the Middle Kingdom, someone who is at the center of a hierarchical world. In this entire hierarchical world, China sees itself in a centrally dominating position, where we believe in pluralistic harmony. So, our perception of the world, our imagination of the world order is completely different. Whereas China's world order is from a dominating perspective. And ours is a multipolar liberal world order perspective. So, we can see this here. Especially if we talk about Xi Jinping, then Xi Jinping's assertive nationalism, especially post-Galwan, that actually hinders trust building. Because of this, our trust in China is not being built because their approach is a bit different. According to Sameer Saran, China seeks to dominate Asia as the sole continental power. Its commitment to multipolarity is global, not regional. See, here China also believes in multipolarity. But here, see, on any particular principle, not necessarily that you believe in it because you want to follow it, because you cannot do anything about it. You cannot do anything about it. Like in multipolarity, China also knows that Russia is definitely a power. There are so many other powers like Japan, the European Union, the USA. So, with so many powers, definitely, even if China does not like a multipolar world order, it will definitely support a multipolar world order. That is something. But because, see, its hypocrisy, its duality, is clearly visible to us. Clearly visible that at the global level, you believe in a multipolar world order. But when it comes to the region, here you want to create a dominating world order, where you yourself want to dominate. Talking about Asia, the continent of Asia. So, this cannot happen. If it were possible to dominate at the global level too, China would definitely dominate. So, that is inherently a dominating nature because their Middle Kingdom perception of the global world order or a world view clearly signifies what their inherent intention is. "The proverb 'one mountain cannot contain two tigers' reflects China's unwillingness to share regional influence with India, as seen in its growing sway in Bangladesh to curb India's dominance." It is clearly understood from the way China is trying to increase its dominance to curb India's dominance that it absolutely does not believe that two tigers can live in one jungle. Two tigers can live on one mountain. So, according to Shashi Tharoor as well, if we look at it, the India-China ties have historically been marked by cold peace. A very good keyword here. You should definitely use such keywords. In this entire session, in this entire video, you will find many keywords. Note them down. Basically, this is the last source for your revision through which you can revise. Because current affairs are also here. We have discussed all dimensions. You can make running notes where, where, meaning, there is no time to make notes now, but definitely where there are some keywords, some important mind maps, etc., you can refer to this for your last-minute revision. And I would also say that by watching this video multiple times, while walking, getting up, sitting, eating, drinking, sleeping, definitely comment, share, and subscribe to the channel. All these things have to be said. But yes, this video will definitely be very helpful to you. So, India-China ties have historically been marked by a cold peace. Now worsening into an icy chill. Icy chill. Correct. So, these keywords, Shashi Tharoor, he always has some excellent keywords. These are also good keywords. We can use them. If we talk about the 2024 border agreement, this is a cautious step forward. Definitely, we have adopted a de-escalation move recently. So, this is a cautious step forward. This is a temporary peace, basically. Not necessarily a permanent solution. A permanent solution has not come, but yes, a temporary respite, so to speak, has happened. But the deep mistrust, the deep mistrust remains due to China's expanding regional imbalance, its expanding regional ambitions are continuous, and because of this, deep mistrust definitely exists. Now, see, we talked about cooperation at the beginning itself, Manoj Joshi said. So, let's try to understand, is there really cooperation? How much is there? If there is, then see, the first important thing is in multilateral organizations like SCO, SCO, right? BRICS, here we collaborate. In BRICS, we collaborate on institutions like the New Development Bank, CRA. Correct. CRA, in this, we basically collaborate. In the Kazan summit of 2024, both talked about Global South solidarity, and together they launched a development aid fund of 500 million dollars, a development fund. After that, in SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, here too, both are present. India supported China's 2025 chairmanship and also co-hosted a counter-terrorism exercise in Xinjiang province. They co-hosted a counter-terrorism exercise in Xinjiang province. In a way, China is showing that we are against terrorism. But the Masood Azhar issue, you must know that in that, China is biased towards India's counter-terrorism stance, and it is not ready to expose Pakistan, as we can say in journalistic terms. RIC is also there. RIC, Russia, India, China, this is also a multilateral platform where both countries collaborate. Jointly, they discussed Afghanistan's stability. Both countries discussed Afghanistan's stability under RIC. Also.

Somewhere, by talking about the stability of Afghanistan, the converging interests regarding regional security are visible. So that is appreciable. Then the Asian Infrastructure, which is basically the bank, AIIB, which is basically the bank, both are basically its founding members. AIB has approved a fund of $1 billion for India's renewable project, and this is basically co-funded by China. China has also co-funded it. So there are some good things. Even in the WTO, there are many points to write, but they don't come to mind at the moment. So just keep the perspective in mind. After that, BRICS, SCO, RIC, WTO, AIB, basic, just remember the names. Revise, revision is important until the last moment. And your revision, slowly, if this video becomes even 10-12 hours long, I don't know how many hours it will be. But if this video becomes even 10-12 hours long, you can quickly revise it and then watch it in fast forward. Then its notes, its notes, I will definitely share on my Telegram channel. On the PSIR Civils Front Telegram channel, I will share its notes. You can see them there. Definitely not in this format, but in a format that we can normally read, because this is very long, about 400-odd pages. So if we do it in a normal front, in a PPT format, it will definitely be about 90 to 100 pages. You can use it for revision. So I will share this. Otherwise, in the WTO too, both countries coordinate with each other. They have a coordinated opposition to developed nations. Both together coordinate and develop nations' trade subsidies, which we, the Global South, also learn to link. Content is limited in IR, very limited things, only those need to be discussed, you just need to be able to link things. Linking things means that whatever you write for the Global South, you write the same things. Then everywhere, the perspective is the same, so the content is a bit limited. If you do it multiple times, you will understand. Otherwise, there are basic groups here too. See, COP 2019, for which both countries jointly called for greater climate finance, greater climate finance. So there is a finance segment and a trade segment where both countries collaborate and cooperate. If we talk about geostrategic cooperation, which is a bit surprising, but yes, there is geostrategic collaboration. So the ongoing political, economic, and regional dialogues facilitate this, and in this way, through them, we are trying to prevent the conflicts that are ongoing between the two countries. We are having economic dialogues. In all the ongoing political or regional dialogues. If we also talk about diplomatic relations, we celebrated 75 years of diplomatic ties in 2025 at an event that was basically in both countries, Delhi and Beijing. And then there is high-level engagement. Modi and Xi Jinping, both of our leaders, meet very often. They meet many times. In 2024 also, they had a meeting at the BRICS summit, and they formed a six-point consensus. So that bilateral relations can be stabilized. At the same time, talking about geoeconomic cooperation, our trade relations, our bilateral trade was approximately $118 billion, $118-120 billion in 2023-24. And in this way, China is our largest trading partner. This is an important thing to understand here. There is quite a contradictory relationship here. On one hand, if we look from a geostrategic perspective, there is conflict. Our border disputes are there, everything is there, and they keep happening continuously. But surprisingly, our economic engagement is not seen to be decreasing anywhere. Our trade is so much that for India, China is the largest trading partner. Especially in electronics and pharmaceuticals. Then talking about investment cooperation, mutual FDI in sectors like IT, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles is also rising. Mutual FDI. Mutual FDI. Then talking about green tech ventures, joint ventures in clean technologies have been explored. We have explored joint ventures in clean technology. And we are trying to leverage the complementarities of each other's domestic markets for our benefit. Besides this, there are other areas of cooperation. For example, if we talk about science and technology, we held a joint AI research workshop in 2025, which focused on smart agriculture. Also, the Indian IT corridor in Dalian, a region of China, where this IT corridor has been expanded to 20 firms, to 220 firms. If we look at the cultural and educational level, then in cultural and educational exchange, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra has been resumed. Then China also offered 1000 student scholarships to Indian students. In people-to-people mechanisms too, see the resumption of direct flights boosted tourism and cultural ties. Then on defense engagement too, see Hand in Hand, the joint military exercise that we basically revived in Rajasthan, and with a focus on counter-terrorism cooperation, keeping counter-terrorism in focus, we have also resumed our military exercises, Hand in Hand. See the name, these answers should not seem generic. Here, all these data facts that I am mentioning, like the Hand in Hand exercise revived in Rajasthan in 2025, these facts will make the answer interesting. Then, see, there are many challenges in this relationship. We have seen cooperation, but let's understand the challenges. Border disputes and military tensions are the most important. Unresolved border disputes in Aksai Chin, which is basically the western sector, there, this is actually, basically, in the region of Aksai Chin, this region of Aksai Chin, this border dispute is unresolved. Along with that, in Arunachal Pradesh, which is basically in the east. Okay? Here too, due to all these border disputes, continuous friction develops. And along with that, periodic standoffs like Doklam in 2017, the Galwan Valley clash in 2020, have also damaged the trust. Damaged the trust. There is a bit less trust in China now. Through the border patrol agreement in 2024, we have brought partial de-escalation in Depsang and Demchok. But full disengagement is still incomplete. Full-scale disengagement is still incomplete, especially in friction zones, so disengagement has not happened completely yet. Second, our competing national interests, our national interests are competing, and we also have strategic rivalry. Strategic rivalry means if we look at the South Asia region, in many places China is countering many of India's efforts. Correct? Especially if we consider their CPEC idea, it violates our territorial integrity. So this is a very big point of strategic rivalry. So both nations are vying for regional dominance. India also wants to dominate regionally. Dominate in the sense of becoming a responsible player in the region, and India is already a responsible player. But India wants to achieve a leadership position. But particularly if we talk about South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, China also wants the same thing here. So because of this, there is a problem. Our national interests are competing. China has invested $200 million in Bangladesh, then in Sri Lanka, and Pakistan has also developed ports, like Gwadar Port in Pakistan. So all these efforts can be seen from the perspective of reducing India's influence. And here, strategic divergence is also intensifying. The divergence between the two countries, which is basically, we can say, a conflicting perspective, is intensifying. Why? Because India's ties with the Quad are deepening. And obviously, we know that the central objective of the Quad is to counter China's influence and China's aggressiveness and assertive tendencies. So if we look at China's Belt and Road Initiative, from China's perspective, it is an acquisition for us. So both have clearly divergent strategic interests. In 2024, China's media tried to portray India's Indo-Pacific vision as an anti-China containment effort. Whereas it is not so from our perspective. So, see the perspective here, establishing rhetoric, creating a discourse, the work that the media does, and creating perception, can be quite dangerous. Then talking about economic imbalance and trade issues. See, our trade with China is quite high. But the problem is that the trade balance is in China's favor, and the imbalance is not in India's favor. So we face a very high trade deficit. And that persists due to India's dependence on China's electronics and machinery. Due to our dependence on China's electronics and machinery, the trade deficit is quite high. Indian exports also face barriers in the Chinese market. Our Indian exports face barriers in the Chinese market, and to counter this, India initiated 37 anti-dumping investigations in 2024. Then we also have concerns regarding their Chinese FDI, because Chinese FDI, which is basically in the technology and telecom sectors, is a bit concerning. Concerning. And India has also, in 2024, relaxed FDI in their non-strategic sectors, while maintaining scrutiny in critical areas. Scrutiny in critical areas is there. Political differences and diplomatic friction are continuously ongoing, such as India's refusal to endorse CPEC. China, basically, sorry, India's, basically, talking about political differences, India's refusal. Talking about political differences, India's refusal to endorse China's One China policy concept. One China policy means they do not consider Taiwan and Tibet independent, they consider them part of China, and we do not accept this. We do not accept this. We see them as independent and somehow support their autonomy, which irritates China a lot. And India's neutrality on Taiwan's 2024 elections was criticized by China. They want us to somehow take their stand, but why would we take their stand? What is, is. We will say that. Therefore, China's situation now is that what irritates India about them, and what irritates them about us, let's see that too. China opposes India's permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. China opposes India's permanent membership. So recent diplomatic signals suggest conditional flexibility. A little bit of conditional flexibility, like you support us here, we will support you there. This kind of conditional flexibility is somehow visible. But yes, their opposition in the UNSC, even if we talk about NSG, the nuclear point might come later, so in NSG too, they are opposing us. China is opposing us a lot in this. Talking about regional and global power competition, both countries are vying for influence in Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. In all these countries, both countries try to increase their influence. Because of this, there is competition between both countries in their infrastructure and investment projects. In all these countries, specifically in this South Asia region, in 2024-25, India has launched quite a few counter-investments. To counter China's efforts where they have done things, to reduce their influence, we have also made our infrastructure and investments. Indo-Pacific rivalry, this is a very important point. Indo-Pacific rivalry is an important point, and the USA, Japan, and Australia are also involved in this. So the Indo-Pacific rivalry sharpened as India conducted naval drills with ASEAN in 2024 to counter Chinese expansion in the South China Sea. To counter China's expansion in the South China Sea, we conducted naval drills in the Indo-Pacific with ASEAN countries, which has somehow further sharpened the Indo-Pacific rivalry, which already exists. And then talking about historical and strategic perceptions, the legacy of the 1962 war between India and China, and our unresolved disputes thereafter, have continuously increased mistrust. So India's commemoration of the war in 2024 drew sharp criticism from Chinese media. The commemoration we did was heavily criticized by Chinese media. And along with that, the fear of being encroached upon by each other's actions remains an underlying fear. So China has basically created new administrative contingents in Tibet, and along with that, that was seen by India as a strategic encroachment. We see this as a strategic encroachment. Then talking about cybersecurity and technological security. India accused Chinese state-backed actors of cyberattacks. Chinese state-backed actors are carrying out cyberattacks, including the 2024 attack on its power grid. India is accusing China for the attack on its power grid because their role can definitely be there. And along with that, tensions have also escalated regarding 5G technology. India has excluded their Huawei company, which is a telecom sector company, and we have prioritized domestic firms and partners from the West. Prioritizing some partners from the West and domestic firms, we have excluded their Huawei firm from this 5G technology matter. Then talking about environmental and water disputes. China controls the upper riparian rivers like Yarlung Tsangpo, which we call Brahmaputra. So China has control over the upper riparian region of the Brahmaputra, which increases our water security concerns. Along with that, the mega dam projects that China has approved have also triggered protests in India due to ecological and geopolitical risks. Then environmental cooperation, if we look, is also limited. Although joint initiatives on air pollution have seen some progress, but again, this is very limited. Then talking about military modernization and arms race. Talking about military modernization and arms race, both nations are actually pursuing rapid military modernization. We are also modernizing our military. But China is also modernizing its military. Especially if we talk about missile systems, nuclear power, and high-altitude warfare, both countries are modernizing their military equipment, defense equipment. Which is actually something where there is a competition, a competition that you also do your military modernization, we will also do it. The continued militarization of the LAC, which is the Line of Actual Control where we have disputes, is continuously happening from China's side. That increases the risk of miscalculation and conflict escalation. The possibility of conflict escalation and miscalculation, our miscalculation regarding each other's strength and future prospects and future actions, the risk of this increasing is here because militarization is happening a lot on the LAC. Then talking about the India-China border dispute. First of all, let's understand the complexity of this issue. What is this issue? First of all, talking about the Eastern Sector, in Arunachal Pradesh, China claims that Arunachal Pradesh, particularly its Tawang region, is part of South Tibet. It says it is part of South Tibet, citing cultural and religious ties. With cultural and religious ties, for example, the birthplace of the Dalai Lama. By citing all these factors, it is claiming the Tawang part of Arunachal Pradesh as its own. India, however, is definitely very firm about its territorial claims and its sovereignty, and protecting our unity, integrity, and our borders is our national interest, for which we can do anything. So India firmly controls Arunachal Pradesh, and we completely reject any such claim by China outrightly, and we are showing our assertiveness very strongly on our sovereign Indian territory. Then the McMahon Line, which India considers a legal boundary. China does not recognize it. This is a problem. Even in 2024, China has renewed claims. It is basically trying to say the same thing repeatedly, which reignites tensions. If we talk about the Middle Sector, in Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, basically Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh, then Sikkim, once disputed, was accepted as Indian territory by China in 2003. So basically, Sikkim also had a slight dispute, but China accepted it. Then Nathu La Pass was also reopened for trade. Then minor disputes still persist in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh. Although this sector is relatively more peaceful. It is a bit peaceful, so it is not discussed much. India has also increased its infrastructure near Nathu La Pass, so that we can boost our trade and ensure border security. Although there are some mild objections from China, but yes, it is relatively peaceful. Talking about the Western Sector, if we look at Aksai Chin, the core dispute is over Aksai Chin. It is a cold desert region, and basically, this is controlled by China but claimed by India. Something like that is going on there. So there is a dispute in Aksai Chin in the Western Sector too. So, there are many such disputes. Overall, this region is strategically important. Overall, this region is strategically important for China as it connects Tibet via Xinjiang via an all-weather road, which connects it through this all-weather road. Because of this. But India considers this an extension of the Ladakh plateau. China sees it as part of Tibet. Now that

It is a problem. So, the complexities in this are that, first of all, all these historical disputes, all these historical disputes, if we look at their origin, it is the treaties of the colonial era and our different interpretations, especially regarding the McMahon Line, due to which all these problems exist.

Then, if we talk about cultural and political claims, sovereignty is asserted by both sides based on cultural and historical claims. And along with that, if we also talk about strategic geography, the disputed regions are quite important from the perspective of military advantage, infrastructure development, and security posturing. And as an example of this is India's Vibrant Villages Program and China's Modern Border Villages initiative.

If we talk about regional dynamics, then China's ties with Pakistan and India's growing strategic alignment with the US. Our growing alignment with the US through the Quad, and our growing alignment with the Quad, and China's growing alignment with Pakistan. This intensifies the rivalry between us.

Then, if we also talk about security tensions, regular military build-ups, infrastructure upgrades, and occasional clashes also pose a risk of escalation. These minor matters that keep happening, they upgrade their infrastructure. We also do. Military build-ups keep happening, and military modernization keeps happening, and whatever occasional minor clashes keep happening. Due to this, the risk of escalation is increasing.

If we talk about diplomatic flashpoints, in 2024, China released a map where it tried to claim Arunachal Pradesh as its own part. It tried to claim some part of it. So, that map, the disputed map they released, due to which our diplomatic tensions increased even more.

Then, if we also talk at the level of economic potential, that too would unlock a resolution somewhere. If we unlock a resolution on all these factors, cross-border trade would be possible, but security concerns and mistrust still persist. We can do much better at the economic level. But then, due to all these problems, the problems are continuously persisting.

Now, if we talk about what has happened up to 2023, or basically overall in the last year or so? So, firstly, persistent frictions and escalations, there were clashes in the Tawang sector, clashes occurred in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh, that reflected continued tension. No fatalities, but underscored volatility. Then, in 2024, due to the border patrol agreement, minor clashes were reduced, but major de-escalation has not happened yet.

Talking about 2025, look, despite diplomatic channels, tensions are still continuous. Although there was a limited diplomatic thaw, a little limited diplomatic peace was established. But at the same time, consensus from a special representative dialogue is also happening here.

So, talking about infrastructure and military build-up, India's strategic response included the construction of 20 roads along the LAC. We tried to do this. Then, countering China's G219 highway, China's G219 highway, its upgradation is happening, we are trying to counter that. Then, the completion of the Sela Tunnel is happening, due to which military mobility, especially in Arunachal Pradesh, can improve. Then, the way India has improved its military presence. We have increased military presence. And then, we have also tried to increase logistic infrastructure. So, we can somehow match China's advancement along the LAC.

Then, in diplomatic stalemate and limited engagement, bilateral diplomacy is minimal, restricted mostly to multilateral platforms. Meaning, mostly we are not meeting bilaterally so dedicatedly, but through SCO and BRICS, we are meeting a little. We are saying hello there. Obviously, if someone is seen from the front, we cannot ignore them. So, the Six-Point Consensus in 2025, that was basically that marked a slight improvement in the diplomatic tone. A slight improvement in the diplomatic tone is visible from this Six-Point Consensus that happened in 2025. But still, some substantive resolution mechanisms are still lacking.

Talking about strategic and geopolitical posturing, India's closer alignment with the US, we have seen this point. China's criticism of India's growing Indo-Pacific cooperation reflects geostrategic mistrust. China's geostrategic mistrust is towards India, but we can't do anything about it. Then, a volatile but managed landscape. While military and diplomatic efforts are aimed at basically stabilizing the situation, the core issues remain unresolved. The core issues are still unresolved. SCO and BRICS engagement in 2025, basically this happened. Here we are engaged. That indicates cautious optimism in managing bilateral volatility.

Tensions escalating along the India-China border. What are its causes? Why are tensions escalating along the India-China border? We have seen a few points, but let's look at it again. First of all, what is the reason? The reason is this. Historical friction already exists, but recent flashpoints have also occurred. For example, the Galwan issue that happened in 2020, the Tawang skirmishes that happened in 2022, due to this, a somewhat serious escalation in India-China border tensions is visible there.

Then, talking about the Tawang clash that happened in 2022, hand-to-hand skirmishes occurred on the LAC, basically in Tawang, but yes, no firearms were used in any way. That shows tactical restraint. Tactical restraint is a good keyword. Tactical restraint. No major clashes were reported in Tawang in 2024-25 either, which reflects basically the impact of border agreements and adherence to the no firearms protocol. Adherence to the no firearms protocol is visible somewhere because no major flashpoint like that happened there.

Talking about the strategic and cultural significance of Tawang, Tawang is strategically and culturally very sensitive. But China refers to it as its Southern Tibet. This is basically a very big friction point, a clash point. India firmly rejects this claim and reiterated its sovereignty in 2024 after China's release of a new map asserting claims over Arunachal Pradesh. In 2025, China's cultural claim over Tawang continued to complicate the dialogue. Their claims, whatever they have, they keep making continuous claims, and due to this, the dialogue between us is getting complicated. It is not happening because they are bringing unnecessary things here.

Talking about border infrastructure and disengagement challenges, both sides are rapidly upgrading their military. Despite 70 rounds of talks, full disengagement remains elusive. It is still not happening. We have seen all these points.

Trust deficit and diplomatic paradoxes. Due to the Tawang clash, India's mistrust towards China is increasing, and our efforts for border reconciliation are becoming complicated. The surprise timing of the 2022 incident, the clash with parallel diplomatic engagement, including Modi-Xi talks along with the BRICS summit, which later helped reduce tensions.

Talking about military escalation, both countries recognize that there is a low likelihood of uncontrolled escalation due to nuclear deterrence and existing protocols. Post-Galwan caution. Talking about post-Galwan caution, see, post-Galwan caution prevailed in 2025, but with both sides deliberately now trying to avoid fatal incidents, reinforcing the strong restraint. This is reinforcing restraint because after Galwan, nothing major was expected to happen there.

Now, what is the comprehensive strategy? India's response to this border situation with China, what is India's comprehensive response? What is India trying to do? What efforts has India made? First of all, military readiness and deterrence boosted border infrastructure. We have tried to boost border infrastructure with 50 LAC roads completed, improving troop mobility. So that troops can go very easily, their mobility can increase, for this we have built many roads. So, we are preparing at our level. At the same time, maritime posture through naval deployments to Andaman and Nicobar, so that we can deter China's Indian Ocean activities. For this, we are slightly improving our maritime posturing. Then, we are even investing in advanced defense technologies, so that we can create a credible deterrence. At the same time, we are trying to leverage China's strategic vulnerabilities. Due to China's strategic vulnerabilities, such as Tibet and the One China policy, there is increased diplomatic pressure, and India's 2024 UN remarks on Tibet drew strong Chinese protest. The Chinese protested strongly, but it's okay, we can't do anything about it. Strategic signaling to communicate India's deterrent capabilities and diplomatic leverage. Then again, expanding strategic focus beyond the LAC. We are trying to expand our focus, especially our strategic focus, beyond the LAC. For example, broader regional engagement, especially in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean region. Now we are trying to counter them a bit in the maritime zone as well, so that we don't focus only on the LAC. So, they also need to be diverted a bit. If we keep them stuck only on the LAC, it will be a problem for us. Then, 2025 joint naval exercises with Japan aim to balance Chinese maritime influence. We are also trying to balance China's maritime influence. And deepening global partnerships, support to neighbors affected by China's policies. For example, the $1 billion aid given to Sri Lanka, countering China's debt diplomacy. To counter China's debt diplomacy, we have given $1 billion aid to Sri Lanka. So, we are supporting our neighboring countries somewhere, so that we can reduce China's influence. Along with that, promoting regional integration through SAARC. To promote regional integration, India has proposed a SAARC trade summit, so that we can counter China's regional reach. Then, we also strengthen the USA. We are trying to strengthen our relationship with the USA. We are aligning with the Quad. So, our strategic convergence with the USA is increasing. Which can be signified, which can be understood from a $4 billion defense deal, also active collaboration with Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, especially through Quad-led maritime security initiatives.

Talking about long-term strategic posturing, here we have leverage. India has asserted its influence in the Indo-Pacific by using its democratic credentials, its economic growth, and its strategic geography. At the same time, we maintain a firm multipronged approach to counter China's expansion while ensuring regional stability. While ensuring regional stability, we are using a multipronged strategy to counter China's influence and expansionism. But we are also trying to maintain our firmness in this.

Talking about India-China trade relations and trade imbalance, first of all, what is its reason? Import dominance by China. We are importing quite a lot from China. Approximately $101.8 billion, around $100 billion worth of imports we do from China, due to which China is India's top trading partner. Major imports include electrical machinery, nuclear reactors. So, India is gradually trying to diversify its dependence on imports from China. But here, imports are very high, but exports are very low, and due to this, there is a trade imbalance. India's exports to China stand at only $16 billion, where only iron ore, pharmaceuticals, and engineering goods are included. So, here we need export growth. But due to market access, due to the restrictions in China, this is somewhat limited, and due to this, our trade deficit is increasing. But somewhere, China dumps its goods here cheaply, so we have also initiated anti-dumping measures, due to which their unnecessary dumping can be reduced somewhere. Especially in the steel segment, we are trying to do this, so that we can counter unfair Chinese trade practices.

Then, talking about structural trade challenges, India's export basket is basically raw material heavy. But China's exports are high-value finished goods. So, here, exporting raw materials and importing high-value finished goods from China, there is a difference. We should actually export high-value finished goods. We should build that capability. If we talk about other barriers, there are non-tariff restrictions. China's manufacturing dominance and India's infrastructure constraints are important reasons. One is China's manufacturing dominance, which is tremendous. China is the industry of the world in manufacturing, as we can say. So, that is one thing here. But along with that, we are unable to compete with China's manufacturing dominance. Second, there are many other constraints in India's infrastructure, and along with that, due to non-trade barriers, our trade is not favoring us so much.

Then again, the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative led to increased domestic electronics production. So, that is slowly trying to curb import dependency. We are slowly trying to reduce import dependency on China, especially through the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, through which we are domestically producing those electronic items that we are trying to import from China.

Now, the second issue is China's Brahmaputra dam and the water dispute. This concern is an important concern. First of all, let's try to understand. China claims that its dams on the Brahmaputra are run-of-the-river dams, and yet India fears long-term strategic and environmental risks. India still fears, even though they have called them run-of-the-river projects and left it at that. But still, India has some long-term strategic and environmental risks. So, here, the mega dam, which has been approved recently, has intensified India's concerns. If we look at India's concerns, first of all, water diversion. Due to the dam, the fear is that China might divert water to arid northern regions. It can divert this water to its northern regions. Second, the risk of weaponization. Dams could be used to trigger artificial floods during conflict. If there is a conflict, they can use the dams to create artificial floods. Then, seismic vulnerability. Due to construction in seismic zones, there is also a possibility of catastrophic flooding. So, there are many risks here, due to which India's concern becomes genuine. Military utility. Talking about military utility, dams could also support military logistics, raising strategic alarm. Dams can be used for military logistics. So, China can get its advantage from it.

Talking about the geopolitical significance of Tibet, Tibet is a region. Tibet is the origin of major Asian rivers. See, Tibet is strategically very important because major Asian rivers originate from Tibet, including the Brahmaputra. So, it is the source of rivers, but along with that, many reserves, many resources like oil, gas, minerals are also abundant there. So, due to this, it becomes a strategic region. Suspicion persists over China's diversion plans via dam building projects.

Talking about data sharing and cooperation, India's dependence, while most Brahmaputra water on the Indian side comes from rainfall upstream, Chinese control still matters. Due to being upstream, China can control the water flow there. So, here, the data, which we basically, the data of water, the data of water should be shared with us. Then, here, see, there is a lack of transparency. China is basically reluctant to share timely hydrological data. I am talking about hydrological data. China is a bit reluctant to share hydrological data timely. And China is also a bit reluctant to share water release information timely and transparently. In 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed. India and China signed an MoU for river sharing. For sharing river data. The river's hydrological data was to be shared through this Memorandum of Understanding, which aimed at promoting trust and transparency.

If we talk about some recent incidents, see, the border dispute still persists. No significant breakthrough has happened. But this is a bit old. If we look here, in 2024, in October, due to the border patrol agreement, there was some partial disengagement. We can say that. So, tensions have slightly reduced. Our diplomatic progress is limited. China remains wary of India's growing alignment with the US, Japan, and Australia, so as to counter China, to counterbalance China. So, China is somewhat suspicious about this. But now, the Six-Point Consensus that we have reached in the Special Representatives meeting, that actually marks a minor diplomatic milestone. A little diplomatic ease has indeed come.

Talking about regional and economic competition, China continues to expand its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, but India counters with its own strategic partnerships. India tries to counter it with its own strategic partnerships. Then, military modernization efforts, we have seen them. Military modernization efforts, we have seen them.

So, overall, if we conclude, there are multiple scholars here. But let us try to understand from C. Raja Mohan's perspective. What he says is that he suggests taking a balancing approach formula for China, that is, cooperate wherever possible and containment wherever necessary. Cooperate wherever possible, and containment wherever necessary.

We should do containment wherever it is necessary. So, we basically need to use a balancing tool, a balancing approach. That is what C. Rajamohan suggests to conclude. Again, if we talk about Manoj Joshi, he suggests that border tensions notwithstanding, India cannot afford hostile relations with China, given the deep economic interdependence and unresolved boundary issues. Because of unresolved boundary issues and our economic interdependence, India cannot afford to have hostile relations with China. But okay, again, progress will happen with time. Let's see. So, this is all about India and global powers. If we talk about India and global powers, this is one of the most important topics. A major topic. China, Russia. All the important players who appear in some form or another in every answer of IR are present here. Now, let's talk about India and the UN system. When we talk about international relations, we don't just call it international relations. We basically call it global politics. Global politics. Just like we have domestic politics, in domestic politics, we have Parliament and other institutions that oversee, look at, control, and regulate the overall politics. So that domestic political affairs remain in a regulated manner. Because whenever it is a matter of authority, the job of authority is to ensure regulation. So as to regulate public life. There are some institutions at the domestic level, for example, the government, the state, the sovereignty of the state, and Parliament, etc. These are the institutions. There is the judiciary, police, etc. In a similar way, comparatively, if you look, domestic politics is more or less sovereign, which leads to regulations and controls. But if we talk about global politics, is there that regulation, that control in global politics, or is global politics just about anarchy? So, to answer this, we have to understand the fact that yes, global politics is relatively more anarchic compared to domestic politics. Because there is no overarching authority that can control things very well, manage things. But still, World War I, II, and the entire period after that, by establishing organizations like the UN, world leaders, global leaders, have somehow ensured the global order, political stability, and have made some effort to ensure regulation here. Global politics should also be regulated. There should be no anarchy. Correct? Because peace and stability at the domestic level can only be ensured when there is peace and stability in global politics. So, considering all this, keeping all these factors in mind, global leaders have established the United Nations and its institutions, and along with that, some other institutions that deal with overall different matters like peacekeeping or financial matters. So, there is a kind of global governance. Just like we have bureaucracy, just like we have centralized institutions that regulate from a top-down perspective, similarly, at the global level, there are institutions of global governance, and the most important, the primary one, is the United Nations. So, let us try to understand how important the United Nations is for us. Let's also try to understand. If we talk about the philosophical foundation of the United Nations, then the United Nations believes in resolving conflicts through diplomacy. Because when it is politics, when there is a divergence of national interests, then conflicts will arise. Conflicts will arise, and then violence, war, or other things can happen. But resolving any matter peacefully is basically beneficial for everyone. It is beneficial for all countries. If for every second thing, countries start going to war, that would create a chaotic situation, anarchy, and no country would be able to grow, prosper, and literally, nobody would be able to enjoy life and liberty. And that's why resolving any conflict peacefully is a very, very important thing, and that is one of the reasons behind the establishment of the United Nations. Secondly, the optimistic vision of progress towards a better cooperative international order. We can establish such a cooperative international order, a better international order. This is the vision, and with this vision, the UN has been established. Also, inspired the creation of a Pacific Union for Lasting Peace, this perpetual peace, Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace concept, meaning a constant peace, a peaceful environment, a peaceful political environment. To inculcate this purpose, UN institutions have been established. Also, Woodrow Wilson's 14 points. Woodrow Wilson, who is basically a liberal institutionalist. So, his 14 points, the most important aspect of liberal institutionalism is the UN, because liberal institutionalists believe that if there are institutions of global governance, they will help us cooperate, they will help us collaborate on different issues, and they will also help us promote dialogue. Dialogue and discussion. And when we engage in dialogue and discussion, then definitely there are less likely chances of conflict erupting. The chances of conflict erupting become quite low. So, Woodrow Wilson also emphasized self-determination, collective security, and post-war peacebuilding. After the war, peacebuilding is now an important thing, a primary thing, and that we should collectively work upon. And that is how, from these Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, getting inspiration from perpetual peace by Kant, and having some of these objectives, the United Nations was established. The United Nations was established. Now, what are the key achievements of the United Nations from 1945 to 2025? Now, this is an important thing. Questions can be asked on this. What are the achievements of the United Nations? Questions can be asked on this. Fine. So, what happened from 1945 to 2025? First of all, this is important. You have to memorize all the points that achievements are important. Achievements are important. First of all, because the ultimate goal is peacekeeping, the ultimate goal is peacebuilding. So, let's see what happened in this aspect. More than 60 missions have addressed over 170 conflicts by the UN. Just if we talk about 2025, 74 nations participate in training and upgrades. So, this is a first achievement. Decolonization. The UN supported the independence of over 80 nations. The UN has taken a stand for the independence of more than 80 nations to gain independence. And ongoing engagement in post-colonial development challenges also. See, for post-colonial states, where colonies were established, the UN has helped them gain independence or achieve independence. At the same time, after independence, post-colonial states also need restructuring. Just like India needed nation-building and integration. Correct? Nation-building and integration are needed. There are developmental needs, many needs where help is needed. The UN needs to help. So, the UN has not only helped countries gain independence but has also helped them pursue their post-independence growth trajectory. Human Rights. Very important thing again. Human rights violations should not happen anywhere, irrespective of the states. Which state it is, whether it is North Korea, China, Pakistan, India, or any country. Nowhere should human rights be violated. Because human rights, every person, every individual should be able to enjoy human rights irrespective of the states and the nature of the state. Whatever the system of government is, whether it is authoritarian, democratic, monarchical, or any other type of state, no matter what the system of government is, every individual should be able to enjoy the rights because it is a natural right, it is a natural right according to John Locke. So, every individual should be able to enjoy the rights. So, the protection of human rights is very important. The 1948 UN Declaration remains foundational and actually guides the human rights regime, human rights discourse across the globe. The discussion of human rights all over the world, this UDHR, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is basically where we derive it from. But in 2024, we have seen that in conflict zones, there is a greater need for monitoring. Because where there are conflicts, especially if you look at West Asia, look at Myanmar, look at Bangladesh, look at Pakistan, look at the Balochistan region, everywhere, if we look around, there are conflicts. The world is in conflict. And we have to think about it: are conflicts in the world, or is the world in conflict? Everywhere we look, there is conflict going on. The Russia-Ukraine crisis has lasted for a long time. Something or the other is happening everywhere. So, there are more chances of violation of human rights when there is conflict. When there is conflict, human rights violations happen very easily and in large amounts. So, therefore, monitoring human rights violations, if something is happening, is important. Nuclear Proliferation. Now, this is also one of the important things, even an important achievement. See, when we talk about UN achievements, we often don't remember anything specific. You simply think about what is there in nuclear proliferation? What has been done from the concept of human rights? What has been done in peacebuilding? What has been done against colonialism? If you just keep these four keywords in mind, you can write the rest. So, the International Atomic Energy Agency, basically, has expanded its inspections, but still, concerns about missile testing and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which we will see in the next topic, the concept of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the treaty, is not being complied with. So, nuclear proliferation is continuously happening. Nuclear proliferation is continuously happening, and that is a problem. And that is a problem. So, yes, through its agency, the IAEA, this agency, through this agency, it somehow monitors, inspects, and discourages nuclear proliferation, or the efforts for disarmament related to nuclear proliferation, it works to encourage them through this organization. Then UNHCR, UACR. Through UNHCR, refugee support has been provided. 120 million displaced people, basically, due to different crises. When crises happen, people get displaced. In crisis-ridden situations, people cannot live there. There is no food, no healthcare, no medicine, no facilities. So, people get displaced, they migrate. So, a refugee crisis develops. Because, let's say, like the Rohingya crisis now. The Myanmar government has made them stateless. So, in such a situation, it is very obvious that they will go to neighboring countries. Because they don't have private jets, they don't have airplane tickets. They have to leave on foot, taking whatever they could carry. Where will they go? They will go to the neighboring countries. So, in such situations, they take refuge in other neighboring countries like India, Bangladesh. And in that situation, this refugee crisis increases a lot. And because these refugees don't have food, shelter, or any facilities, they are going through extreme poverty. In such a situation, crime increases, peace is disturbed, instability arises, and especially in the region where they go, for example, if they go and live in northeastern states like Assam and Mizoram, then when there is a large number of displacement, the demographic inversion happens there, due to which conflicts continue to occur. So, therefore, the refugee crisis is not a small crisis. It is a very big crisis. We have to keep this in mind. The refugee crisis is not a small crisis. And who will solve it? Who will solve it? Correct? Individual countries can solve it by talking to each other, but ultimately, we need a mechanism at the global level that can address the refugee crisis dedicatedly. Their rights, because they are refugees, so what? They are also human. They are refugees, so what? They are also human. Some country has expelled them, driven them away. But any country, any country, let's say, making a particular population stateless from a country is a violation of human rights. Because definitely, this is not fair. This is not fair at all. So, someone has to take responsibility for this. We need a dedicated mechanism at the global level to basically resolve these conflicts. So, there are so many refugees in the world. Then the developmental goals. Earlier there were Millennium Development Goals, now we have shifted to SDGs, Sustainable Development Goals. Sustainable Development Goals, which are basically about gender, gender equality, political participation, democratic decentralization. Sustainable development, renewable energy, food, hunger, malnutrition, all these aspects are dealt with by sustainable development. So, you can link sustainable development with the capability approach, that if sustainable development goals are implemented properly in any country, then a person's capability, the opportunities they get, the capability to fully utilize those opportunities can be improved if sustainable development, if we have achieved the SDGs. So, SDGs are important. So, this is an important concern. Then, talking about environmental efforts, there is UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme, under the United Nations. Then there is UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. So, there are so many things. And in this also, it works in environmental aspects, in controlling climate change, and then in climate finance, in such different aspects. If we also talk about social impacts, then UN agencies, UN agencies have improved education, health, gender equality, and poverty alleviation. UN publishes some reports. There are some UN indices, correct, which basically deal with things related to human development. Then, talking about nutritional security, WFP, World Food Programme, and FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization, they have expanded food aid in climate-affected regions. Climate-affected regions mean that due to climate or climate change, agriculture has declined there, or food security has been hampered. In such situations or places, from the perspective of nutritional security, these organizations work through these organizations. So, through multiple organizations, in multiple domains. Talking about cultural preservation, see, UNESCO is continuously in the news. We keep seeing it. UNESCO has recently added 24 new heritage sites. So, it keeps adding them. It does something every year. See, we talked about achievements, but what about the underachievements of the UN? What are the underachievements of the UN? Meaning, some things that the UN has not been able to do successfully. Although the UN tried, made efforts, but it has not been very successful in it. So, see, despite the notable achievements we have seen above, the UN faces critical limitations that threaten its effectiveness and relevance, demanding urgent reforms. Now, this is very important. See, the UN is making so many efforts, trying to achieve success, but due to some limitations, those achievements or those goals, the intended objectives, are not being fulfilled. Because of this, the relevance of the UN is being questioned: is the UN really relevant? Is the UN relevant for the objective for which we created the UN? Can it solve problems? So, the answer is quite partial. Partially, we can say yes, it is relevant. Partially, we can say it is losing its relevance. So, somewhere, when the relevance of any organization, any institution, is questioned, the first thing it should do is reforms. Reforms are needed. When the UN reforms itself, it will become more effective. When it becomes more effective, when it has more effectiveness, then it will be more relevant. When the relevance of any organization ends, its credibility ends, then it has no purpose. So, definitely, if the UN has to survive, remain relevant, then reforms will definitely be needed. First of all, talking about underachievements, see, peacekeeping failures, mixed success in maintaining global peace. In maintaining global peace, see, success has not been much. The UN has taken good initiatives in some places. But still, the power politics of the P5 nations of the UN Security Council always dictates this, due to which they cannot take very effective measures. Most of the time, see, it is not important what you do after the conflict. What do you do to prevent conflict? That is one of the important aspects of peacekeeping. Because here we are talking about peacekeeping. You have to maintain peace. So, you have to maintain peace. It's not that you will go after the conflict happens, just like in India, after some crime happens, the police go and manage all the post-crime things, do inspections, and then wrap things up. But that is of no use. Usefulness comes when you prevent the crime from happening itself. There should be deterrence against committing crime. Similarly, in global politics, there should be deterrence against war and conflict. There should be deterrence, and there should be a dialogue mechanism, collaborative efforts, so that the situation of conflict never escalates. It never escalates. So, this is very important. Secondly, here, see, the violence in the DRC in 2025 exposed the inability of the basically DRC, the Democratic Republic of Congo, so the violence that happened here.

He could not stop him, the UN, and that actually exposed the lacunas in the UN. Okay, then ineffective conflict resolution, persistent failures in resolving major crises, like those that happened in the Korean Peninsula, in Palestine, the India-Pakistan conflict. So many conflicts are continuously happening. Despite that, their conflict resolution mechanism or their capability to resolve conflicts does not seem very effective. After that, there was the invasion of Iraq, and then the recent regional tensions that are also there. So, if we look at all this, despite the UN being there, conflicts are still ongoing. In fact, we will look at the West Asia topic a lot, where we will look at Iran-Israel, the Israel-Palestine Gaza issue. All of that will be seen, so they are ongoing, and in that, there is a very dangerous level of human rights violation happening. What is the UN doing? What is the UN doing? The P5 nations of the UN, whose responsibility it was to come together and to resolve the conflicts going on in the world because they are powerful and they have a lot of power, so that they can stop the conflicts. But they themselves are involved in it. So basically, the wars that are going on, we think that let's say if there is a war between Iran and Israel, so we think that it is a war between Iran and Israel, but no, if you see, the war is not between Israel and Iran. These are basically proxies. The members driving the war, the members in the background, are, you see, the US, Russia, China, who are basically the major powers, especially the US. The USA is someone. The USA is the one who holds all the strings and is doing everything. So, in some way or another, you will see that their rivalry, their power rivalry, reflects and escalates into proxy wars. Meaning, it is not a direct conflict. It is not a direct confrontation. Even during the Cold War, they did not have a direct confrontation. Even during the Cold War, their wars were proxy wars. They were fighting each other through other small countries. In this, you see, the citizens of the US are not facing any problems. But where the conflict is happening, the citizens there are facing the problems. So, these are all important aspects. Understanding global politics is very important. It is very important. For now, it is our paper, so we are looking at it from the perspective of the paper. But otherwise also, it is very interesting. It is very important to understand. Human rights lapses are happening everywhere. See, the inability to safeguard rights in crises like Syria, Rohingya, Africa. The crisis in Syria, the Rohingya crisis, the crisis in Africa, the crises happening here, their human rights, we are basically unable to protect them right now. For example, 16.5 million Syrians needed aid amidst severe funding shortfalls, but they could not do it. Then, if we talk about developmental setbacks, we still struggle. There are struggles to ensure equitable development. Equitable development is also an important factor. Because, you see, the world is completely divided between two: the equals and the unequals. If Marx were alive, he would criticize this entire global scenario even more, where there are such glaring inequalities. So, there are inequalities. The world is divided between this North and South. The North-Western countries are developed and well-off, and developing countries are struggling with so many problems like poverty, hunger. Forget about other countries, India itself, India itself, India itself is a very big example of poverty and hunger. So many people, millions and millions of people, are under poverty, and they are also dying of hunger. So, this is a clear-cut violation of human rights. This is a clear-cut violation of human rights. So, conflict-induced. Now, you see, during the COVID-19 period, it was exposed what the limitations of the WHO are. How effectively could the WHO manage COVID-19? This is a subject of critical analysis that we can analyze. But its limitations were definitely exposed here. Then, conflict-induced poverty reversal. Due to conflicts, there is displacement. Displacement happens, so people, their homes, their property. Now, wherever you are living, if a conflict occurs, you will leave that place. You will leave overnight. So, whatever property you have, whatever your property is, your land, your house, overnight you will become homeless, you will not have property, and the very next day you will have the question of where to live, what to do, what to eat. Such a situation arises. Like when India was partitioned, many people left from here, taking only a few clothes, a few small things, and all their property remained here. Some people from there who came here also left their properties there. So, in such situations, displacement-induced, conflict-induced poverty, ultimately that person was not poor. They had a lot of wealth. They left their palace and came here. Such a situation can arise. So, yes, this is a situation. So, conflict-induced poverty strains the US coordination and credibility. Need for reforms. We need reforms now. It is power politics. US dues default and 2025 budget cuts. The budget cuts, the job losses happening, that has heightened the calls for structural reforms and resource accountability in the United Nations. Also, there is a crisis of credibility, increasing irrelevance without adaptation to evolving geopolitical realities, similar to the decline of non-alignment. Just like we talked about the decline of non-alignment. Is it relevant? Although it is relevant, especially in the concerns of the Global South, when we talk about the Global South, we have discussed it. So, in the concerns of the Global South, it is relevant somewhere. The UN is also relevant, but we have to question it because we have to question its credibility. Its credibility crisis is also ongoing. Okay? The credibility crisis is ongoing. So, somewhere, because this is not evolving with the changing geopolitical realities. It is not evolving with them. For example, see, if we talk about the UN and Russia conflict now, sorry, the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the UN, and its relation with the UN, let's try to understand it. So, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, because of that, in the collective security aspect of the UN, because providing collective security is the UN's job. To provide collective security to everyone, this is the UN's job. So, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has exposed its limitations regarding the collective security system, and because of this, it is becoming clear to us that reforms are very much needed in the UN. First of all, the UN's effectiveness, first of all, geopolitical divisions, lack of global consensus, and divided voting patterns. The divisions in voting patterns, and the lack of consensus in the UN among the powerful five members and many other members, because of which its response to any conflict, for example, the Russia-Ukraine war is happening, some conflict is happening, but here, you see, the US will understand, the US will say that this war should stop, but Russia itself is a part of it, so Russia will show its veto, use its veto power. Because of this, consensus cannot be formed, and because of this, the UN's capacity to stop any particular war has limitations. Then, veto power. Veto power, like Russia's veto power, especially in 2024, blocked the condemnation of annexation attempts, paralyzing the Security Council's action. The Security Council's actions have five members, and even if one member vetoes it, uses their power, veto power, and suppose four people, four countries are in support of, you know, preventing that particular conflict, but one particular country has its own interest in not preventing it, so then in such a situation, the UN becomes ineffective. The UN becomes ineffective. Secondly, complex interdependence, European economic dependence on Russian energy. First of all, you see, European economies depend on Russia's oil, energy, because Russia is a leader in the energy sector. So, because of that dependence, even if Russia does something, if Russia is involved. Now, you see, Russia is involved in Ukraine. Okay? It is so involved in the Ukraine war. Even then, we are not able to impose as many restrictions, limitations on Russia because, somewhere, the European Union also depends on it. So, because of that, it becomes very difficult to impose any decisive sanctions on it. Correct. After that, the enforcement mechanism, the UN's inability to enforce compliance with international norms. It is the UN's job to ensure compliance with international norms. But the UN is not able to do this. This is a very big, important lacuna. Then, the UN's position, the UN's, sorry, if we talk about positive contributions, then the UN has definitely provided essential support to over 3.6 million Ukrainians in 2024, despite restricted access to the conflict zones. The UN is working on monitoring abases. Then, it is trying to facilitate dialogue. It is trying to facilitate dialogue between the countries that are in conflict. Also, promoting humanitarian law, advocating for Geneva Convention compliance and civilian protection amidst intensified violence. So, the way forward is that we have to empower the UN General Assembly somewhere, because in the Security Council, there are continuous deadlocks due to veto power. So, we have to empower the UNGA. Because, first of all, why is it important to empower the UNGA? In reforms, you can write that why is it important to empower the UNGA, the United Nations General Assembly, which is basically the UN General Assembly, why is it important to empower it? First of all, its membership is larger. Like the UN Security Council's membership is only five. This, the General Assembly's membership is larger. It is wide, inclusive, and there is participation from everyone. So, consensus-based decision-making, majority decision-making, of course, ultimate consensus is rarely achieved on many issues, but yes, majority decision-making, democratic decision-making, can happen through this. And because in the UNSC, there are mainly deadlocks. In 2025, calls for text-based UNSC reform negotiations gained traction to enhance UN responsiveness in crises like Ukraine. To improve the UN's responsiveness in crises like Ukraine or many other crises, definitely the negotiations about reform are being talked about. Let's talk about UN reform now. See, reforms are very important. So that we can ensure that institutions like the United Nations evolve, they do not become saturated, they do not get stuck, they do not become irrelevant. If its credibility is not to be lost, then we need to reform it a lot. For any institution to adapt, to evolve, and to remain continuously relevant, reforms are very essential. Because, you see, global politics is continuously dynamic. It keeps changing continuously. So, for an organization to remain relevant in this continuously changing dynamic of global politics, it is definitely very important that these reforms happen. Now, why should reforms happen? Let's look at that in a little detail. See, since the UN was formed, the UN has seen a fourfold increase in membership and transformation. First of all, when the UN started, there was not so much membership. But later, gradually, the UN's membership has increased a lot. So, the first thing is, the membership then, let's assume for example, if we understand, let's say the UN's membership was 50 then. Now, see, it has become 200, so the membership has increased so much. So, first of all, this is a very big structural change. Correct? A very big transformation has happened. Secondly, geopolitical things have also changed a lot. When the UN was there, there was a bipolar world order during the Cold War. Then it became unipolar. Now it is multipolar. At that time, economies like India, or other economies, did not even matter much in global politics. Not that they didn't matter, but yes, their significance was not so much. But today, if you look, India is the largest democracy, India has become a very big economy. So, in such a situation, there are some other countries that have become powerful economically and otherwise politically. So, geopolitical realities have changed a lot. Meaning, in the middle period, we saw that the UN, the UN's, there was a unilateral hegemony. USA's unilateral hegemony. We were living in an America-driven world. But now, if you look, there are many countries challenging America on different fronts, including China, Russia. Correct. Even India, India does not work according to the UN's dictation. India does not work according to the US's dictation. India works according to its strategic autonomy. India is assertive about its strategic autonomy, irrespective of whether the US has imposed sanctions on Iran. The US has imposed sanctions on Russia. We are still maintaining our relations with both Iran and Russia. Why? This does not mean the US cannot dictate our foreign policy right now. So, because the US's power has decreased, it's not that. The point is that the power of other countries has increased. So, other countries have become powerful. So, the geopolitical reality has completely changed in the last 50 to 70 years. Completely. But the UN's reforms are not happening. So, in such a situation, completely, because, you see, in five or ten years, things change so much, but if we talk about 50-70 years, so many things have changed that we need to completely reform it. PM Modi, at the 75th session of the UNGA, the General Assembly, Prime Minister Modi emphasized that only reformed multilateralism anchored by a reformed UN can serve humanity's aspirations. If we want to serve humanity's aspirations, all the aspirations of the entire global level, of all global citizens, then only an institution that has reformed can serve them. One that is stuck, saturated, cannot. So, that is an important thing. What are the key structural reforms? What structural reforms do we need? What structural reforms do we need? First of all, you see, the UN General Assembly, correct? So, in that, first of all, strengthening the coordination of the Security Council is important. It is important to strengthen it. The Pact for the Future highlighted peacebuilding. The recent Pact for the Future is a good initiative that is basically peacebuilding through follow-up remains. But see, we are trying to take this initiative somewhere, but yes, the progress on it is still sluggish. But yes, we need better coordination in the UN Security Council. Then, the membership of the UN Security Council needs to be increased. We will look at this in more detail. Okay? ECOSOC, basically, we need streamlining to eliminate redundancy and enhance coordination. We need to eliminate redundancy and increase coordination. Meaning, there is a need. Okay? Digital tools face bureaucratic hurdles. There are many digital tools that we need to adopt with changing technology. Then, for example, the Trusteeship Council is largely defunct. There is a proposal to repurpose it for managing climate governance, and it has yet to materialize. See, we have somewhere, because it is defunct, we are trying to give it some other work. We are trying to delegate it to manage climate governance and so on. But yes, this thing has not materialized yet. Then, if we talk about the Secretariat, we need greater transparency, efficiency, and inclusion of developing countries into the Secretariat. So, this is the thing that we need. Functional. These were somewhat structural reforms. But if we talk about functional reforms here, then expansion of the Security Council is necessary. Why? Because the Council remains static. Since 1965, the Council has 15 non-permanent members and five permanent members. In this way, this structure, because of this structure, despite the expansion of the UNGA, the General Assembly has expanded, the membership of the General Assembly has expanded, yet these are still only five members. Meaning, somewhere, their hegemony, their collective ownership is working. Because of this, the representativeness and legitimacy of that organization, the UN Security Council, and overall the UN, is in question. If we look recently, there was a discussion where there was momentum for new permanent seats for, say, Africa, India, Brazil. This discussion continues. It's not that this discussion is in 2025. It is basically about what is the current status. So, what is its status in 2025? That is what is being talked about. But this discussion about including new members in the UN Security Council, as advocated by Shyam Saran. So, Africa, India, Brazil. Because the representation of South-South countries, Global South countries, is very low, which is needed. Then, we also need reforms in veto power. Like the P5 are still powerful. But because of that, our decision-making has become paralyzed. Because by using veto, people, the other countries, we cannot take effective decisions. Like Russia's veto on Ukraine, because of that, humanitarian resolution was blocked. We wanted to do some work on humanitarian grounds in Ukraine, but because Russia itself is involved in it and Russia vetoed it, that thing could not move forward. So, the question here is, then what is the meaning of the UN? What is the meaning of the Security Council?

The correct meaning is then, for those countries that are basically in the P5, who have that veto power, they will do as they please, they will do things in any way because they know that taking any action against them is very difficult because they have that veto power in their hands. They can neglect any possible action in any way. So there is a proposal now to include, you know, allowing the General Assembly's supermajority to override the vetoes in the crisis. So when there is a crisis situation, when there are crises, then the policy paralysis that is done by using veto power, in such a situation, the majority decision of the General Assembly should be more important than the US P5 decision. So they are trying to do this, and this is definitely correct because the larger members, the body with larger membership, like the General Assembly, should have its presence here, and its majority decision should definitely have the power to override the decision-making of any of the five members, only then can we call it democratic. Otherwise, how is the UN completely democratic? The UN is not democratic at all. The UN is not democratic at all because, according to all countries, nothing is happening in the UN. Everything is happening according to only five powerful members. So basically, we can call this a feudal system or an oligarchic system where only a few people have power. It's not even an elitist democracy. We can call it an elite oligarchy. Even in oligarchy, there is elitism, where it's not like if it's an oligarchy, then there are some 100, 50, you know, 20-25 members. Even in that, there are only five members, whereas there are so many countries in the world.

So now the UN Charter and its provisions are outdated. We will have to modernize it. Because the UN today still recognizes enemy states from the time of World War II, like Germany and Japan, as enemy states. So now we have discussed it, we are basically discussing it, and somewhere these kinds of obsolete references need to be delayed. Also, we need to update the assumptions of monarchical sovereignty somewhere. In financial reforms, the UN is dependent on the funding of its members. It's not self-financing. This member funding, and the member that funds more, somewhere the UN's autonomy is compromised because funding influences decision-making a lot. So we need to make these financial reforms. For example, look at the US defaulting. The US has basically kept its funding on a bit of default, due to which there have been 20% budget cuts. And because of that, so many jobs, almost approximately 6 to 7,000 jobs, have been lost within the UN. So according to the rocket suit, here we need to have a predictable sustainable financing mechanism so that the UN can be financially autonomous. This is very important. We also need to streamline bureaucracy. So there are calls for rationalizing the size and improving the coordination between UNSC and decentralizing the UNGA remain unresolved. We should decentralize the UNGA. And to coordinate with the UNSC, we will have to make some reforms in bureaucracy as well. Then there is a need for reform in ECOSOC and the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. For example, the Economic and Social Council is facing issues of inefficiency and duplication. Because their functions, many functions of the Economic and Social Council, some functions are with UNESCO, some functions are similar. So due to duplication of functions, there is a need for clear delegation of power and clear alignment of functions, so that their functions are decided. If they are decided, there will be no overlap, and the organizations will be able to work very well. If we talk about the Trusteeship Council, it is mainly defunct, so we have seen that. Its purpose needs to be repurposed. Reforms are also needed in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping missions are facing operational gaps. They are facing operational gaps. So we need to have some new training protocols. We need to have accountability mechanisms, and we need to have some discipline among the troops so that we can continue to be effective in peacekeeping operations and our credibility does not get hampered. We should also strengthen SDG implementation. Here, it has been noted that only 17% of the targets were tracked due to climate disruption and conflict. Due to conflicts and climate disruption, we could not track the remaining factors. We are only able to track 17% of the overall targets. So, because of this, we will have to leverage private sector partnerships and financial mechanisms somewhere. So that we can properly implement SDGs. So there are other challenges here as well. For example, the UN lacks frameworks for AI. For emerging challenges like AI and cybersecurity, the UN does not have any foolproof, proper framework. Or for transnational issues related to transnational actors or non-state actors, we do not have any proper framework for the challenges related to them. So now the Secretary-General has said that we need urgent structural upgrades so that we can address multilateral challenges and somewhere we can find a solution. Even if we look at India's position, Prime Minister Modi has said all these things. We have seen before that we need reform multilateralism. We are actually talking about reform multilateralism with reform in the UN's center.

So what are the challenges? What are the challenges in this reform? See, we want to reform. We want to reform. We want to make the UN better. But what are the challenges facing the UN? First of all, see the ongoing crises in the Middle East. There are crises in the Middle East. Crises are ongoing in Africa. There are crises in Asia as well. Because of this, the entire region is destabilized. For example, if we talk about Sudan, DRC, then violence happens continuously here. But the US peacekeeping resources. Now, because of this, if there are problems, conflicts in multiple places, then the UN's peacekeeping mission will also become ineffective. Because where will the limited troops be? How many places can we diversify the limited troops? They will be diversified in multiple places. So definitely, the capacity to ensure peace will be hampered. If we talk about terrorism and extremism, then global terrorism is definitely continuously increasing, and it is a core threat to all countries globally. So recently, the UN has launched a new initiative against online radicalization, and somewhere we need to emphasize that the UN has also emphasized that we need to enhance cooperation in our international counter-terrorism efforts. Cooperation needs to be enhanced. If we talk about the risk of nuclear proliferation, there is a persistent nuclear threat, growing tensions with non-compliant states. Those states that are non-compliant, that are not complying with the NPT or other aspects. So we should disarm, and we should stop proliferation. This is also a very big challenge. Along with this, see, there are some emerging challenges that are non-conventional. We have seen conventional ones. Non-conventional, like climate change, is a very big challenge. Climate change is a challenge. Then population pressure is continuously increasing. Urbanization is continuously happening. The burden of population is continuously increasing, due to which food, water, healthcare, basically resources. There is so much pressure on resources and urban infrastructure that our idea of equitable resource distribution, that resources should be distributed equitably, but it doesn't happen equitably because when there is a large population, there is also more poverty, more inequality. And in such a situation, the well-off are the ones who are able to possess more resources, they actually own more resources. And somewhere, monopolization of resources also happens. So here, then other resources, for example, if we repeatedly talk about the Oxfam report, according to it, if we look at India alone, let's say a few percent, the top 10% of people own 90% of the wealth. You can see the exact figures for this kind of calculation, but a rough estimate is that the remaining 90% of people have only 10% of the wealth. So how much inequality is there? So this equitable distribution of resources is a matter that we need to solve. Then we have seen displacement and refugee crises. Pandemic preparedness, due to COVID-19, we understood what challenges exist in our global health security, our global health framework and infrastructure, especially which is led by the WHO and driven by the WHO. So here, pandemic preparedness, if any new situation of this kind arises tomorrow, if any new pandemic of this kind arises, then how our supply chain was completely disrupted, our economy went into some trouble, our health emergency became so severe that many deaths occurred. The UN's basically, during the COVID-19 pandemic, there were many deaths globally, worldwide. We were continuously seeing the number of deaths changing, increasing every minute. So in such a crisis, we can handle it. We cannot predict when a crisis will come. No matter how much you do, a crisis will come, but preparedness for a crisis is important. If you are not prepared, the impact of the crisis will be more intense. Any crisis will come, but see, like the COVID-19 crisis came, but if global leaders had ever visualized that such a health emergency would come, what should we do? How can we be prepared? Then the impact of the crisis that came would not have been as much as it was due to unpreparedness. If any crisis comes in your life, but you are prepared for it, then you can handle it. Its impact will not be that much. But if there is no preparedness, its impact can be very devastating.

So if we talk about the way forward, then see, we need to focus on institutional capacity and funding autonomy, and strengthen institutional capacity. We need to develop better effective mechanisms to achieve global consensus and cooperation. We need to ensure and enhance coordination among regional bodies, civil society, and private actors. See, the important thing here is that the involvement of private actors is very important. In today's time, where capitalism is actually ruling the world, capitalists and private players are actually ruling the world. They are the agents of transformation. They have become the agents of transformation. For example, if we talk about the digital space, security frameworks, climate change aspects, even if we look at overall big economies, the major transformers, the major people who have a role in transformation, are basically private players. So their collaboration, because private players have efficiency, innovation, creativity. So they can solve problems in a much better way. So their inclusion, their involvement in the developmental path, cooperation of private players along with the public sector is very necessary, so we need to explore that somewhere here. Okay? Now, if we talk about India and the United Nations, India is continuously talking about reforms in the United Nations Security Council. And we should get a position in the United Nations Security Council. We should get a seat. Because we are also a big economy. We are also the largest democracy. We are a responsible nuclear power. There are many such factors. And today's global reality has changed so much that why do these people have power? And why do we not have a seat in the United Nations Security Council? What is the problem? Because in Asia and overall if we talk about the Global South, because India also holds a leadership position in the Global South. India also contributes to UN peacekeeping missions. So many things are in India's favor, yet why is India not a member of the UNSC? Because see, the civilizational legacy, India's ancient civilization and cultural contributions, justify in every way that India should have a role in global decision-making. India should get a seat at the global decision-making table. If we talk about geostrategic and demographic weight, then being the world's most populous country and a very important South Asian actor, India's position in solving global challenges is central. Understand that India has 140 crore population. The largest, basically, today, the largest population is in India, we can say. A country with such a large population has no role in the P5. Whereas small countries, like even France, or others, what is their role here? I mean, if global challenges come, pandemics come, climate change comes, then the impact is most on India because the largest population is impacted, so India is impacted. So here, India has no role in decision-making. So this is wrong. This is wrong. Great power aspirations. India, see, due to rapid economic growth and military modernization, we are also doing military modernization. We have military modernization. We also have many good achievements in space technology. We see NASA, we see ISRO's achievements, India's achievements. If we look at the last few decades specifically, our achievements are quite strong in space technology as well. If we look at all these things, and India's contribution to the UN, see, we have been actively participating since 1935. India is the largest contributor to peacekeeping troops. Also, we support every initiative of the UN. Because this is India's long-standing commitment. We want to ensure better global governance and at the same time, our commitment to global peace is clearly visible in how we have continuously contributed to peacekeeping. Then, if we talk about recognition and prestige, why do we want the UNSC seat? Because it creates a symbolic identity that you are a global power. And when we have every possibility of being a global power, but due to not having a UNSC seat, we do not have that prestige, that global recognition. So that's why we want it. And this enhances our diplomatic prestige, our diplomatic standing, and helps in shaping international outcomes. So security interests too, if we get a seat, then a seat allows India. If we get a seat, then we can definitely safeguard our national interests because of the Kashmir issue, China sitting next to us, Pakistan sitting next to us, and the way they, without any concern, the way China's CPEC is violating our trade sovereignty, and we haven't been able to do much about it because we don't have that much power yet. So if we had this UN seat, we could pursue our self-interest in a much better way. So this is an important thing. Also, voice for the Global South. India is the voice of the Global South. In 2023, under its G20 presidency, India included the African Union. So this shows how we strengthen the voice of the Global South, and we try to advocate for its causes and concerns at the international level. We try to address them. Even major powers support us. For example, if we talk about France, the US, the UK, they actually support us. They actually support us. Correct. So we have support here. Then, if we talk about multilateral engagement, then due to the permanent seat, India's role across all UN organs, other UN organs, our role will be strengthened. Because of this, we will be able to influence global governance to some extent. And especially if we look in the context of China, with the way China's dominance is growing across the South Asian region, the Asian region, the way it portrays itself as a dominant power, then here, especially here, if we want to counter China, then if we get the UNSC seat, it can help us a lot. But what are the challenges? What are the challenges? First of all, see, structural reform is needed for UNSC reform. There should be consensus among the past five members, but this is very difficult. Even if all countries agree here, China will try to stop this in some way, which it is doing. Veto politics and rivalry, China's ambitions and opposition are a very big hurdle for our UNSC seat and overall reforms. So the reform debate is still slow, and there is not much support for it. So we have seen why India should get it. We can talk about Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, which aligns well with the UN's ideals and India's foreign policy ethos. Then India's long-standing engagement. We have also seen this. From the time of the Cold War, the leadership position we have taken in non-alignment, and through non-alignment, how we have worked for a peaceful global order, for a peaceful global order.

The advocacy that has been done is that our democratic credentials are quite strong. Despite being the largest democracy, India is, somewhere or the other, a resilient democracy. Our democracy has not collapsed yet. If we talk about intrinsic strength, our economy is the fifth largest economy. We are a responsible nuclear power, and we are also a leader of the Global South. Our contribution to peacekeeping is quite significant. The economic position is there, of course. Let's talk about the G4 initiative for reform advocacy, where other countries like Germany, Brazil, Japan, and all these other countries are supporting us. So, what has India been doing to achieve this? Now, what efforts are we making from our side to gain a seat in the UNSC? We have already seen our credentials. First of all, whatever things basically happen in the UNGA, we support them most of the times. For example, when we talk about Global South leadership, India leads G77. It leads NAM, and in platforms like the Voice of the Global South summit, it promotes the position and interests of developing nations. Through participation in the L69 group, which is basically a group of 42 countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, India is trying to collectively demand UNSC reforms. Meaning, what is India doing for UNSC reforms to happen and for India to get a position there? There is the G4 coalition. There is participation in the L69 group. India is also doing Global South leadership. India has also tried to leverage the G20 presidency for UNSC reforms. And somewhere or the other, India has also tried to endorse and support text-based reform proposals. Along with that, what India is trying to do is to diplomatically reach out to the P5 members and influence their position. India is trying to gather their support. At the same time, India highlights its democratic governance. India's democratic governance, its responsible nuclear posture – due to all these factors, by enhancing its credibility and its image as a responsible player on the global stage, India is further increasing its credibility for the UN Security Council seat. Also, India is also trying to address global challenges. For example, if we talk about counter-terrorism efforts, or climate leadership, like the International Solar Alliance, or other climate-related initiatives, India is playing a leadership role everywhere. India is playing its role in doing positive causes, the positive things. But what are the limitations here? What are the challenges for India? What challenges is India facing in getting a permanent seat? First of all, structural and political hurdles. One is that there is no clear criterion for a UNSC seat. So, the absence of objective standards for permanent membership makes the process opaque and politicized. Secondly, lack of global consensus. There are deep divisions among the UN members. Most of the UN members agree to expand the council, and they are also supporting the candidatures of countries like India. But there are many countries that are reluctant about reforms, as well as those who are opposing UN membership for India. For example, if we look here, the existing permanent members feel that adding more members will slightly reduce their power. That is why they are somewhere or the other opposing a meaningful expansion, an actual substantive expansion. If we talk about geopolitical opposition, China is opposing us here, and there is a group of members called the Coffee Club, or Uniting for Consensus, which basically includes Pakistan and Italy. Especially Pakistan and this Coffee Club are basically a group of countries opposing the G4 proposal, the proposal of the four nations that want membership here. So, this group also opposes it. Then, some P5 members are trying to create polarization among the aspirants, basically those aspiring for the UNSC seat, by creating divisions. Then there is the financial aspect. India's UN budget share has increased a bit, but it is still quite low. So, our financial contribution is not very significant. However, the issue of human rights criticism also arises here. Amnesty International's reports have often raised issues and concerns regarding human rights violations in India. Also, there are diplomatic resource constraints. In India, due to limited bureaucrats, more hiring should happen, and more UNSC seats should be available. But due to limited bureaucratic and financial capacity, India's lobbying efforts appear somewhat less. And there are also strategic and normative gaps. For example, relying solely on moral and historical claims is insufficient. Now, this is the point: moral leadership, moral authority alone is not enough. Normative ideas alone cannot drive reforms. It needs to be realistic. Realistic ideas are also important. So, India's constant talk about our cultural ties and our morality, etc., may not work that much there, may not have that much impact. India will have to adopt a strategic and realistic perspective somewhere or the other. So, what are the perceptions of scholars? Here we see C. Raja Mohan. C. Raja Mohan says that we should be cautious against being lured by Western powers into transactional offers for UN membership. We should be a little cautious about the offers that Western powers are trying to make to us for UNSC membership. Also, Professor Ramesh Thakur proposes tactical non-cooperation with the UN to highlight India's strategic value. Just as we use tactics of ignoring to get our own value recognized, similarly, India should use the same tactic here. So that the UN understands how important India is. According to Chinmay Ghare Khan, he advocates for a pragmatic alternative like semi-permanent membership. Semi-permanent membership. Well, if permanent membership is not being obtained, let's explore an alternative solution so that the reform deadlock can be resolved. So, somewhere or the other, this question of semi-permanent membership has also come up. Then Antara Chakraborty, she recommends leveraging India's G20 and Global South leadership. We are already doing that. We are already doing that. What engagements have happened in the UN recently? There has been cooperation between India and the UN in the sustainable development framework. India is also cooperating with the UN in forest conservation efforts, for example, the Green Credit Program. If we talk about AI and disarmament, artificial intelligence and nuclear disarmament, India co-chaired the 2025 UN AI Disarmament Summit, proposing global AI governance norms. India's progress report on SDGs – actually, we have made some progress, not a lot, but yes, there is progress, and we have a role in disarmament. What is India's role in UN peacekeeping? This question also comes up. That's why we are looking at this topic. After this, our topic will be mostly over. UN peacekeeping, the UN mission, peacekeeping since 1945, is an important mission that is continuously evolving because interstate conflicts have increased, and non-conventional security threats like terrorism have also increased significantly. Because of this, peacekeeping has become a central agenda for the UN. Now, let's look at the phases here. The first phase of peacekeeping was basically peacekeeping through agent nations, for example, like the Korean War, the Gulf War. There, the UN's autonomy was quite limited. But yes, somewhere or the other, we tried to do peacekeeping through the prominent members of the UN. But what happened later? Classical peacekeeping during the Cold War. During the Cold War, neutral troops came. It was difficult to call them neutral here because we tried to enforce peacekeeping missions by sending some agent nations. But here, we were able to manage somewhat neutral troops. And after that, Phase Three, peace enforcement, in the 1990s. So, we basically targeted civilian conflicts, and also targeted terrorism and sociopolitical instability. Meaning, earlier, our peace efforts were limited to war-like situations, wars, and conflicts. But now, even in sociopolitical tensions, civil wars, or civil unrest, there is peacekeeping. So, the UN has broadened its peacekeeping horizon somewhat. Then the Peacebuilding Commission also came here, and its focus was on post-conflict reconstruction, development, governance, and reconstruction, which became its ultimate goal. If we look at India's role, first of all, it is the largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, with over 2.5 lakh personnel in 49 different missions since 1948. So, this makes it more credible. It is important to write this data there. And yes, it's not that we only sent military in peacekeeping; we sent military personnel, doctors, female doctors, and female humanitarian aid supporters. This is because in conflict zones, it's not necessary that all are men; there can be women. So, our troops should be somewhat gender-centric or gender-sensitive. So, we sent our engineers because we need engineers for peacebuilding. We sent police, civilians, we played the role of civilians. So, our deployment has been quite diverse. It's not that we just showed guns by sending the military, by sending the military, we just tried to stop the conflict. That's not the case. We provided injections, medicines, and all that help. Through this, we tried to build peace. The contribution is historic. The 60 Parachute Field Ambulance served for three years, and there are other contributions as well. We have tried to mediate in many prisoner repatriation commissions. We have played a leadership role in different countries in this aspect. There is also global leadership. First, the all-female formed police unit in Liberia and an all-female platoon sent to Abyei. We have done these things. If we talk about recent efforts, in 2024, 5900 troops across 12 missions joined Indo-US training for 1200 African peacekeepers. We are doing so many things here. 182 Indian fatalities since 1984. Many of our people have died in these peacekeeping efforts. So, our sacrifice is quite significant. India has also received awards for this. UN medals and many other awards have also been received. And we actually call for better consultation with troop-contributing countries, for timely fund disbursement, so that UN peacekeeping missions can be more effective. For this, we have talked about reforms for troop consultation and timely financial contributions. Zero tolerance policy on misconduct. There is absolutely no tolerance for any kind of misconduct. But what issues is India facing in peacekeeping? What issues is it facing? See, first of all, there is a shortage of equipment. It was found in a UN probe that 2200 Indian troops in South Sudan did not have protective gear. India later allocated 100 million for this, but this is one of the concerns. We are sending our soldiers, our heroes, for peacekeeping, to resolve conflicts there, but they don't have enough equipment. This is the situation, and what are the P5 nations doing here? They are doing nothing. See, they will do nothing. Limited UNSC influence. Despite being a top troop contributor, India's influence in UNSC decisions is limited. UNSC decisions, peacekeeping missions, UN peacekeeping missions, mainly there, decision-making, the UNSC, despite our contribution, in that decision-making, so we are only becoming human resource providers, not decision-makers. This is a very big problem. This is a very big challenge that India is facing here. Resource constraints. Cultural barriers, because of limited understanding of local culture, we don't know the culture there. Because of this, our effectiveness is somewhat reduced. And then China has a strategic edge in this because China has significantly increased its peacekeeping diplomacy in Africa. It has deployed 1800 troops there in 2024. So, yes, China is also trying to work here somewhere. According to C. Raja Mohan, he asks India to counter China's African diplomacy, the peace diplomacy that China is doing in Africa, the 1800 troops it has sent, India should try to counter this by aligning with Western partners. By coming together with Western partners, by supporting them in training and logistics, we can counter China here. So, in recent initiatives, India has basically trained 2000 African Union peacekeepers. We have also increased our defense budget to support UN peacekeeping. And obviously, we have also received recognition from the UN. We have received recognition from the UN. The way India supported, the way India mediated in Sudan peace talks, we received UN recognition for that. So, if we talk about the India-US peacekeeping pact, it is a joint training initiative for six African nations, which shows a shift towards strategic peace operations. So, we are looking at how our overall perspective is shifting towards strategic peace operations. What is our contribution to UN peacekeeping? What is the need for UN reforms? Why are they necessary? And what is our stand on it, we have also seen. Why should India get a place in the United Nations Security Council? Why should it get a position, a seat? How capable is India for that? And what challenges are arising in it? And who is opposing it? We have seen all this comprehensively. And overall, what is the need for UN reform? What reforms should happen? We have seen all this. It is very important. One or two questions definitely come on this, and with this much of the video, which is basically almost one and a quarter hours of UN, you can definitely solve the questions 110% or 101%. So, let's move towards the next topic. Our next topic is India and Nuclear Questions. Okay? Here, another important topic is India and Nuclear Questions. India and Nuclear Questions. The nuclear era has transformed global security, strategic doctrine, and international diplomacy completely. Balancing peaceful nuclear use with preventing proliferation remains central to modern policymaking. In today's modern policymaking, preventing proliferation and using nuclear energy in a balanced and peaceful manner has become an important and central feature of our foreign policy or overall foreign policy or the global political landscape. Now, why do nations actually acquire nuclear weapons? That is the central question. Why are nuclear weapons basically acquired? Because here, we need to understand this. Before we proceed with the topic, we have to understand the fact that we have to understand the fact that nuclear weapons, India is not in support of nuclear proliferation. We want disarmament. We want no nuclear proliferation at all, and everyone should disarm. Because due to nuclear proliferation, the deterrence that is developing, and due to which peace is actually being maintained, it is like a time bomb. It can destroy the world at any moment. It is like a finger on the button of a nuclear weapon. If someone's mind goes haywire, it can destroy the world at any moment. So, for this reason, for this entire reason, India wants disarmament. In the Cold War era, see the concept of security dilemma. We have also seen the concept of security dilemma in comparative politics. Because there was a dilemma regarding security, states did what? They acquired nuclear weapons basically to deter aggression and ensure national security. To prevent any kind of aggression against us and to ensure our national security, countries started acquiring nuclear weapons. Then see the logic of deterrence. Nuclear weapons serve as a tool to prevent conflict through fear of retaliation. Through the fear of retaliation, it will deter the other country from attacking us in any way. So, due to nuclear weapons, a deterrence will develop. Then see the balance of terror. Superpowers acquired nuclear arsenals so that strategic parity could be achieved and a balance of terror could develop. Balance of terror, for example, the US and USSR, this is a very important nuclear polarity, we can call it. It also became a symbol of prestige and power. If there is nuclear capability, then that becomes a symbol of great power status. So, this is also a reason. Then vertical proliferation. So, this is not limited to a few major powers, but that actually proliferation remained controlled. Proliferation remained controlled and was initially with a few major powers. Later, after the post-Cold War, you will understand the situation now. So, first of all, new security needs. After the post-Cold War, security needs changed. For example, countries like India, Pakistan, and North Korea also developed nuclear weapons for deterrence and their diplomatic leverage and autonomy amidst challenging alliances. Due to challenging alliances, to maintain autonomy, other countries like India, Pakistan, and North Korea also tried to acquire nuclear weapons. Then, if we talk about great power behavior, continued reliance on nuclear weapons. The USA, Russia, China – they have continuously relied on nuclear weapons. Because of this, the decisions of smaller nations were also influenced by this. Then, if we talk about technology diffusion, globalization made nuclear technology more accessible. Due to globalization, see, globalization happened. Interconnectedness increased. So, accessing technology, the technology to build nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology, its access...

It became quite easy, especially after the collapse of the USSR and after that. And another important thing here is that terrorism has risen significantly, due to which the chance of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of, you know, the wrong people, wrong hands, wrong hands, has increased here. So if this comes into the possession of non-state actors, it can become even more threatening. Secondly, arms control has eroded. The end of the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty ended in 2018, and because of this, the global security framework has basically weakened, and because of this, instability has increased a bit. Now, let's see why nations do not use nuclear weapons. Why does no nation use nuclear weapons? See, this is an important question. So, the non-use of nuclear weapons is shaped by both strategic deterrence and international normative pressure. Firstly, there is international normative pressure because using nuclear weapons can be very disastrous. It can essentially destroy the world. So, this normative pressure is definitely on everyone at the international level. It is on everyone. And secondly, strategic deterrence. If the opposing country knows that we have nuclear weapons, then definitely they will be deterred. They will not go for any kind of aggression on another country. So, this actually ensures global stability. That is an opinion. This is a perspective. This is a perspective. Let's look at the realist view here. See, the realist view, that of Kenneth Waltz, basically states that deterrence theory, nuclear weapons, any kind of aggression will not happen due to the fear of retaliation. Due to the fear of retaliation, no country will commit aggression. And because of this, any kind of war, they will be deterred from waging war. So, due to nuclear weapons, a deterrence is created. Secondly, there is also mutually assured destruction here. See, it ensures that neither side uses nuclear weapons as it guarantees mutual annihilation. Because nuclear weapons serve as a weapon of peace by maintaining the global, you know, balance of power among the states. So, nuclear weapons basically serve as a weapon of peace. Because deterrence and MAD, due to the principle of mutually assured destruction, deterrence is maintained here. Then, social constructivists say that the nuclear taboo, the nuclear taboo is a powerful form of discouraging, a powerful form, basically a powerful norm discouraging the use of nuclear weapons on moral and political grounds. Stigmatization, nuclear use is heavily stigmatized, leading to potential diplomatic and reputational fallout. Talking about norm entrepreneurs, see, these are actors who actively promote anti-nuclear norms and global disarmament. So, they are actually shaping state conduct. That is actually shaping state conduct. So, these are multiple perspectives. But together, the strategic logic of realism and the social norms logic of constructivism have collectively prevented the use of nuclear weapons. Now, nuclear terrorism, basically, what is nuclear terrorism? The risk of nuclear weapons or materials falling into the hands of non-state actors or perhaps irresponsible actors who have no accountability for anything. So, this is a very big threat to our global security, which basically challenges the non-proliferation regime. Okay? So, what are the key international efforts to stop this? What efforts have been made? UN Resolution 1540. This binds states to prevent support to non-state actors seeking, they seeking these WMDs. WMDs. Then Resolution 1373 mandates states to criminalize terrorism and cooperate on counter-terrorism. So, these are some resolutions. UN Role and India's Proposal. So, basically, there is a call for a comprehensive global convention on nuclear terrorism. We should have a comprehensive global convention on nuclear terrorism. India has advocated for a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. This is also an effort. There are US-led initiatives as well, such as the Nuclear Security Summit. Then there is gift basket diplomacy. What is gift basket diplomacy basically? Nations voluntarily commit to specific nuclear security actions, including donations, sharing, and joint capacity building. So, these are some initiatives to counter nuclear terrorism. Let's also look at the growth of nuclear energy. The growth of nuclear energy basically involves two things: the use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes and for military purposes. So, see, it should not be for military purposes; it should be for civilian purposes. And India is actively, basically, because we get renewable energy from it. So, India is advocating for the civilian use of nuclear energy, nuclear, basically, material. So, India aims to triple its nuclear energy capacity by 2030. So, the key additions here include the Kakrapar units, then the Kudankulam units, all these things. And all these facilities are under the safeguards of the IAEA. They are under IAEA safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency, its safeguards are for the civil use of nuclear material, the civil use of it. Then, Enhanced Nuclear Security at ICONs 2024. India showcased upgrades like 25 radiation emergency response kits and real-time tracking of radioactive resources. So, these are all things, basically, talking about civilian use here. However, let's talk about the important part here. Legacy of the Nuclear Security Summit. India fulfilled its 2016 NSS pledges by joining Interpol's anti-nuclear smuggling initiative. We joined Interpol's anti-nuclear smuggling initiative and also trained our port authorities so that we can detect this smuggling. Then, talking about strategic nuclear dynamics. See, despite regional tensions, despite regional tensions, India has stuck to the no-first-use principle. We have maintained our image as a responsible nuclear power. And obviously, we will continue to do so. So, with an estimated 180 warheads, India shows restraint amidst China's projected 15,500 warheads by 2035 and Russia's New START suspension. So, the threat from non-state actors, we have seen that. Now, the Nuclear Summit status is not important here. The INF Treaty termination date is important. The termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which happened in August 2019, highlighted the absence of a concrete security architecture, raising concerns about stability in the international nuclear domain. Stability in the international nuclear domain is a concern because there is an absence of a concrete security architecture. So, India and the nuclear question, first of all, this was a brief background about nuclear, so it was not that important. But from here, let's look at some important things. PM Nehru. If India's first PM Nehru, basically, what he said is, "If India is threatened, it will defend herself by all means at her disposal." If anyone threatens or intimidates us, we will defend ourselves by any means available to us, by any instruments we have. Even if it is nuclear, it was not the case at that time, but it came later. So, this statement justifies it. Okay? So, C. Raja Mohan's view on this is that India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was a strategic calculated risk aimed at ensuring security and strategic autonomy in a volatile region. We pursued this nuclear weapon to maintain our security and strategic autonomy in a volatile region. This is a realist perspective. A pragmatic perspective. So, the nuclear program reflects a pragmatic and cautious approach, which is shaped by regional threats. Because Pakistan is here, and China is also nearby, and in the dynamics of global powers, one cannot say when anything might happen. So, considering all these threats, it is, in a way, fine to have nuclear weapons. So, the timing of nuclear weaponization actually aligns with national security needs and foreign policy objectives. The things that happened at that time, the developments that occurred, like China's aggression in '62, and after that, other things were happening. So, by the time we realized that we need some security, and that we have gained from this, basically, nuclear program, nuclear weapon. Now, let's talk about our nuclear program. Let's look at the phases. Beginning from 1947 to 1974. We started the nuclear program for peaceful purposes under Homi Bhabha, and we developed a full-scale, basically, full nuclear fuel cycle here. In 1974, we conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion, which led to international backlash. We faced international backlash, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group was formed at the global level, the NSG, in the context of this. The formation of the NSG basically happened because of this, and we still haven't gained admission. China is opposing it. Keep that in mind. Then, gradual weaponization. If we look at the period from 1974 to 1998, there was delayed weaponization. Post-1974, PM Rajiv Gandhi authorized weaponization in the late 1980s. India submitted disarmament plans to, basically, the UN and registered unequal treaties like CTBT and NPT. Treaties like CTBT and NPT, which are basically biased, basically, basically, what is biased, we will see that later. So, let's see that later. The Pokhran-II tests in 1998 officially made India a nuclear weapon state. Then, nuclear power emerged from 1998 to 2009. First, we released the Nuclear Doctrine in 2003, which is based on no-first-use and minimum deterrence. Minimum deterrence. Then, landmark events started happening. For example, the US-India nuclear deal happened between 2005 and 2008. And that culminated in the 123 Agreement, and we basically got the NSG waiver in 2008, through which, because of which, we could engage in nuclear trade. Then, we established ourselves as a nuclear power. The IAEA Convention was basically ratified in 2016. So, there were 26 reactors under safeguards by 2019. So, we focused a bit on nuclear power, nuclear renewable energy. Then, we also signed multiple nuclear cooperation agreements with various partners. And now, let's look at the perspective. One is the minimalist perspective. Minimalist perspective. Talish and Subramanyam advocate for a limited nuclear arsenal sufficient for credible deterrence and strategic stability. So, some people agree with this, that yes, a minimum should exist. A few actually suggest a middle path. They support an adequate force structure, adequate force structure, more than minimal but short of an expensive arsenal, expensive arsenal. The maximalist approach, basically, Bharat Karnad, here, he is a very important scholar. Bharat Karnad is a very, very important scholar. He calls for a large arsenal, including thermonuclear weapons, to project great power status and counter threats from both China and Pakistan. So, whether it is China or Pakistan, to counter any threat from them, we should have, basically, larger arsenals. And then, talking about flexible deterrence. According to Satish Chandra, he recommends an open-ended, threat-based arsenal capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on adversaries. Reading the statement, you would have understood its intensity. So, now, let's see, what are the basically drivers behind India's nuclear weaponization? Why did we acquire nuclear weapons? First of all, the security concerns with China. China has nuclear capability, and its assertive attitude made us feel that we need it. Then, disillusionment through the NPT. India rejected the discriminatory nature of the NPT in the global proliferation regime. The NPT basically drives it. The NPT basically commands it, and we rejected it because it is basically discriminatory, and we cannot support anything discriminatory. The second important thing is that we felt, in a way, that P5 nations can acquire it, but others cannot. How can that be? We will do it. And we did it. That's it. Then, Pakistan's nuclear threat. According to intelligence reports, we came to know about Pakistan's nuclear buildup, due to which India sensed that vulnerability could also come from here. And then, the USSR's nuclear umbrella also ended because after the Cold War, after the Cold War, the USSR basically collapsed, and India no longer had a Soviet nuclear backing. The Soviet nuclear backing that existed before was no longer there, which increased our strategic insecurity. CTBT pressure. India resisted US-led pressure to sign the CTBT. The US exerted pressure for us to sign the CTBT, but we saw it as a threat to our nuclear sovereignty and did not sign it. Because if we sign it, our nuclear sovereignty, nuclear sovereignty means in the nuclear aspect, whether we want to weaponize, not weaponize, acquire, not acquire, this should be our sole decision. Why should we lose our sovereignty, nuclear sovereignty, by signing the CTBT? Why should we lose it? After the economic liberalization in 1991, under the new economic policy, our confidence to endure sanctions, even if sanctions were imposed, we would not have much problem. So, because of this, our fear of sanctions diminished, somewhat. Due to this, we asserted our nuclear autonomy. You have heard of strategic autonomy. Nuclear autonomy is also important. We asserted it. This suffering is somewhat necessary. Domestic factors were also there. National sentiments were such that, obviously, Indians, you know, if they see a threat from elsewhere, they will say, why shouldn't we have nuclear weapons? We will also make nuclear weapons. So, this sentiment awakened in our country. Political ideology and the pursuit of global prestige. Obviously, we also want that we should have prestige. So, due to all these factors, we basically acquired nuclear weapons. Criticism. When India acquired nuclear weapons, there was criticism regarding this. Firstly, it initiated a regional arms race. Due to India's decision, a nuclear arms race was triggered in South Asia, which led to tensions with Pakistan. Pakistan was scared, you know. As soon as Pakistan found out, it was scared. Then, global non-proliferation was also undermined because overall, we had to achieve non-proliferation. We had to achieve non-proliferation at the global level. But obviously, if other countries are not non-proliferating, why should India take responsibility? India is not a contractor. So, India's nuclearization undermined global non-proliferation efforts and also undermined the NPT, it is criticized. Then, proliferation concerns. Due to India's action, concerns were raised about nuclear proliferation, and Pakistan also took assistance from North Korea and started its own nuclear program. In West Asia too, due to political tensions in the region, anxiety about nuclearization increased due to political tensions in the region. Then, questions were also raised about the effectiveness of deterrence. Critics questioned the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Because there are some incidents like the Kargil conflict, etc., where nothing could be done despite having nuclear weapons. These conflicts did happen. So, deterrence did not happen. Deterrence was of no use. Then, the risk of nuclear terrorism. Criticism also arose on this point that nuclear weapons, there is a possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors. It is a major worry, it is a major problem. And its opportunity cost. The resources we devote to the nuclear program could be used for development purposes. This is also a point of criticism. And then, the impact on disarmament efforts. India's nuclear status could weaken global disarmament efforts because by possessing nuclear weapons ourselves, we cannot lead the calls for disarmament. Basically, we acquired it, and there was a lot of criticism regarding it. We have seen criticism on multiple points. Let's look at the key drivers here. India's nuclear policy. Now, let's look at our nuclear policy. We have acquired weapons, so what is our policy regarding them? Let's look at that too. So, the key drivers of India's nuclear policy are: First of all, nuclear capability is seen as a symbol of global prestige and major power status, that is there. Then, from a security perspective, the primary focus is deterring threats. Deterring threats from nuclear-armed neighbors, especially China and Pakistan. Talking about domestic politics, obviously, public opinion. So, we have seen all these things. Then, how our nuclear doctrine evolved is important here. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999 emphasized credible minimum deterrence and no-first-use. These are our two driving principles that basically guide our, basically, nuclear policy. Officially, we did not adopt it, but it formed our foundation. Then, the official Nuclear Doctrine, which was formed in 2003, reaffirmed the NFU. But at the same time, we added the point of massive retaliation against a nuclear attack. If a nuclear attack happens on us, we will retaliate massively. We added this point. And retaliation to chemical and biological weapons also. If there is any kind of chemical or biological weapon attack, we will also retaliate with nuclear weapons. So, here, we adopted the no-first-use policy. This is a component of our overall nuclear, basically, our overall nuclear doctrine. The dominant view here is that NFU enhances our image as a responsible nuclear power, promotes stability, and reduces the risk of escalation because we will not use it first, so the possibility of escalation is, basically, reduced. However, the opposing view says that this, this basically NFU, limits India's strategic flexibility. Also, critics call for a conditional NFU to deter nuclear-armed adversaries. There should be a conditional NFU. Conditional NFU means we decide its conditions ourselves. Then, talking about credible minimum deterrence. It is widely accepted and basically supports a modest but effective deterrent force as a deterrent force. However, the problem here is that because we lack clarity on the arsenal size and arsenal posture, adversaries do not have it. Therefore, clearer operational guidelines are needed here. Because credible minimum deterrence means what? This is still not clear. Nuclear response to CBW attacks. Credible minimum deter, basically, attacks, credible, basically, here, the CBW attacks, basically chemical and biological weapon attacks, the nuclear response to them. Now, in this, critics can raise concerns about proportionality and strategic stability. If a biological or chemical attack is happening from there, and you will launch a nuclear attack, is this proportional?

It is not. But the supporters see it as a deterrent. So, any kind of CBW will not be used against India. There are other factors like massive retaliation, which we have seen. So, overall India's nuclear doctrine, which is, we have seen what are its perspectives. Now let's look at credible minimum deterrence. What does the moderate view say? It supports it. It supports a limited arsenal. But the expansionist view, the expansionist view says that having a larger, flexible, and dynamic arsenal, basically, we need ICBMs, ICBMs, correct, ICBMs. So, this is one perspective. Then here, they call for rethinking minimum deterrence based on the evolving threats. As the threats are evolving in this manner, then somewhere, we need to rethink minimum deterrence. So, here are the scholarly opinions. Bharat Karnad, basically, he rejects CMD and calls it a liability. It is a liability. He advocates for a larger, or rather, basically, it should be larger. What is this CMD? CMD, CMD has no meaning. Even Rajesh Basu is important here. He also points to doctrinal drift, wants India may be shifting from deterrence to compellence. Deterrence to compellence. We are shifting from deterrence to compellence. Jayant Prasad's statement is also important here. Overall, what he said is that he recommends clear articulation. We should have a clear articulation of minimum credible deterrence. Then, no first use, as we saw above. So, we have seen no first use. Here, yes, nuclear triad in India, aligning triad for deterrence. So, look at India's nuclear triad. India's nuclear triad, what is in it? Land, air, and basically sea-based nuclear delivery systems that we have, from which we have credible and diversified deterrence. Diversified, not just from air, not from sea, not from land, from all three, basically, we have it, like INS Arihant. India's first SSBN recently completed a sea patrol, actually a sea patrol, marking progress in sea-based deterrence. What are the challenges? One is limited sea-based capability that we have, and only one SSBN, and unclear if it was nuclear-armed or not. So, these are all things. So, here, let's look at its regional consequences. These are done. Now, India's global disarmament role. This was all basic. Now, let's look at India's global disarmament role. First of all, India maintains an independent yet constructive position in the global nuclear order. Just like our international economic order, just like our political, political order, similarly, there is a global nuclear order. In the global nuclear order, we will see, it will be understood here. So, we are not a part of NPT, but we promote responsible nuclear conduct and non-proliferation, which is clearly reflected in our doctrine, nuclear doctrine. And our behavior so far in the nuclear perspective, in the nuclear context, in the nuclear landscape, clearly shows that we are a responsible nuclear player. Talking about key elements, if we talk about our disarmament role, what are the key elements in India's disarmament role? First of all, we advocate for total disarmament. We want, we support the idea that basically, there should be a nuclear weapon-free world in the world. This is the first thing. Second, non-proliferation compliance, strong export controls, and safeguards. Basically, the export control of nuclear materials, their export, their control, and their safeguards, there should be strong compliance with them. Next thing, FMSCT support. So, this actually pushes for a very favorable treaty to halt fissile material production, which is talking about nuclear-grade material here. And the second important thing is the no-first-use doctrine. Not just us, others should also use it. So, the NFU, this actually underlines India's restraint and strategic maturity. So, this shows India's strategic restraint here. Restraint. Meaning, we will not use it first. We will use it later if it is used against us. So, this shows strategic maturity. So, this is our basically overall stand on disarmament. Active multilateral engagement. This is also an important point. India participates in UN and basically CD forums, CD forums for consensus-driven arms control. There should be consensus-driven arms control. It's not that someone dominates it, like in the NSG, where India has no role. And also, we want UN-led disarmament support. So, we actually back equitable multilateral approaches. Then, talking about conventional arms control here, we also support reducing military spending and conventional weapons. We are not just talking about nuclear; we also want to reduce other military arms, overall our conventional, traditional arms, not just nuclear arms, but traditional arms as well. We want a peaceful world. But here, talking about the nuclear non-proliferation regime and India, the most important thing is that India has consistently advocated for global nuclear disarmament. We have always wanted disarmament at the global level since the inception of the concept of the United Nations. India also faces two nuclear neighbors. India has two nuclear neighbors. One is our Pakistan, and the second is China. However, India remains committed to the idea of negotiating a universal, non-discriminatory. We still, look, what have we done? We have two nuclear, basically, power neighbors. Despite that, look, we want to negotiate. A universal, basically, non-discriminatory if there is a principle, an effective, verifiable treaty that basically bans the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and bans all other nuclear explosive devices that are produced, any such treaty that is non-discriminatory, we are ready to negotiate it. But India is still outside CTBT and NPT. First of all, let's understand NPT. What is the aim of NPT? To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament, and somehow encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy. But all these intentions, aims, objectives are very good. But then, this principle is for everyone except these five members. And it is not for the five nuclear weapon states, the P5 members. Okay? It is not for them. So, India will absolutely not tolerate this kind of discrimination. India's position is simple. India is not a signatory to it. India has refused to join it. Why? Because first of all, it is discriminatory in nature because it allows P5 nations. Second, security concerns, because China and Pakistan are our neighbors. They have nuclear weapons. So, then they should sign the NPT, they should get out of it. NPT should basically do disarmament from the perspective of nuclear weapons. So, we see, and the third important thing is strategic autonomy, which we need to maintain, and the lack of disarmament progress. There is no progress in disarmament. NPT has been signed. Despite NPT, NPT has been completely ignored. And we are also ignoring it, definitely, because there is no progress in it. And the most important thing is that our focus is on self-reliance. We need to develop our nuclear and energy capabilities ourselves. And most importantly, look, there is strong public and political support for this particular nuclear stance. So, there is domestic support for it. Then, even regarding CTBT, the situation is similar. This is the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. India's stand, again, here too, India has not signed it. India has refused. Because its current form is also discriminatory and strategically restrictive. But yes, we voluntarily maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing. We basically maintain it. So, what are the reasons for its opposition? There is discrimination in this too. There is no timeline. There is no clear timeline of any kind. And the clause for entry into force, which requires 44 specific countries to ratify, giving undue weight to others. So, this discriminatory nature is visible here too. But there has been a lot of pressure on India regarding this. But yes, India has refused to comply with it. Now, look, there is a debate about joining it, what benefit will we get? If we join it, sign it, we can easily get NSG membership. These are debatable, basically, arguments. Also, we can get access to IMS data, correct? We can get access to IMS data. We can get access to global nuclear monitoring. Particularly, we can track Pakistan's overall nuclear program. But still, now, look, now, look, India will sign it only when it is non-discriminatory. But due to its discriminatory nature, India does not sign it. Now, if we talk about recent developments and the current status, then look, there is a multilateral export control regime, which is a voluntary, non-binding agreement among major suppliers, basically, among the major suppliers of nuclear material. This basically prevents the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, weapons of mass destruction, and tries to regulate exports. Now, India's membership is in three out of four. India has membership in three out of four. For example, the first is the Missile Technology Control Regime, in which India has membership, due to which India gets access to advanced missile technologies. Second, the Wassenaar Group. India got access here in 2017. So, what is its function? It regulates the export of conventional arms and dual-use technologies. So, due to India getting access here, India's technology access is basically obtained here. Then there is the Australia Group, in which access was obtained in 2018. So, this focuses on controlling exports related to chemical and biological weapons. It focuses on this. So, due to its membership, India's ability to curb CBRN proliferation, chemical, biological proliferation, in that, basically, India's ability is helped by this. India's ability to curb it is enhanced. So, what is its significance? First of all, India's status. Now, India has gained entry into so many groups. We will also see why it did not get entry into NSG. But due to India gaining entry into so many groups, India's image as a responsible global actor in this non-proliferation regime, in this ambition, goal, vision of non-proliferation, India is a responsible player. This image has been created. Also, due to this, legitimate trade and technology transfer in the nuclear aspect is obtained here. Also, it supports India's goal of self-reliance and defense modernization. Because military modernization, defense modernization is our goal. We have to do it continuously, and we need self-reliance, not balance of power or anything like that. Self-reliance. We also have nuclear weapons. Now, look, talking about India and NSG, India deserves NSG membership. Why? Because India is a nuclear, responsible nuclear power. And along with this, we have used nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We have been using nuclear energy from a civilian perspective. And also, precedent exists. Look, France joined NSG before signing NPT, showing that non-NPT entry is possible. So, it is not that because we have not signed NPT, we should not get entry into NSG. China also has it. China is also part of P5. Let's take France's example. France is a member of NSG even without signing NPT. Second, we are getting broader support. Major NSG members like the USA, Russia, Japan, Switzerland, all these support India's position here. Also, disarmament advocacy. India is continuously advocating for disarmament. So, it is a responsible player. But what are the obstacles? One is the non-NPT status, which should not be an obstacle. But the major obstacle is China's opposition. What does China want? China is demanding that non-discriminatory rules should be for all non-NPT applicants. So, China has opposed this, and China's opposition is very obvious because China is basically our adversary country. So, China is demanding norm-based entry. Norm-based entry. Then, if you look, if you allow India, then allow Pakistan too. This is basically what they are saying. So, the way forward is that Harsh Pant, who basically says that India should persist in making its case even if its membership is imminent. Imminent, whether its membership comes or not, we should continuously try. So, here, the no-first-use policy debate is done. The global disarmament issue is done. Then, multilateral export, we have talked about all these regimes. Looking at the conclusion, the conclusion is that India's nuclear strategy should be a balance of CMD, credible minimum deterrence, strategic autonomy, and global disarmament engagement. These three, and basically four, technological advancement. Keeping these four aspects in mind, we should balance our nuclear strategy. Look, now, although internal doctrinal debates will continue, India's posture reflects pragmatic diplomacy and regional deterrence, and pushes for energy and security resilience. India's nuclear doctrine, India's nuclear policy is very important here. For civilian purposes, we definitely suggest it, but in the nuclear, global nuclear order, there should be disarmament, not non-proliferation, and no discriminatory treaties of any kind. If it is non-discriminatory, then we are ready to sign. In fact, why sign? We want complete disarmament because we want peace, and we also want the peaceful use of nuclear energy for renewable energy targets. So, overall, this is India's stand. Then, our last topic is recent developments in Indian foreign policy. Let's try to understand this. First of all, let's talk about India-Afghanistan relations. If we talk about India's relations with Afghanistan, let's try to understand the strategic context. Afghanistan has been a long site, has been a long site of a great power rivalry. There has been a great power rivalry here for a long time. But for India, its proximity to Pakistan, as well as its proximity to Iran and Central Asia, makes Afghanistan play a very crucial and important role for India in the context of its counter-terrorism efforts and regional security concerns. In the context of regional security concerns. Especially after the Taliban's return. After the Taliban came, this has become even more important here in terms of regional security concerns. We have development-focused engagement, regardless of the regime. Whatever the regime is here, irrespective of the regime. Earlier it was democratic, now it is Taliban-led. Meaning, whatever the regime, irrespective of the regime, we actually prioritize the development agenda. We actually prioritize the development of Afghanistan and the stabilization of Afghanistan because it is for us and it matters to us. So, in Afghanistan, basically, we are focusing on infrastructure, health, and education. Since 2024, we have resumed, we have actually resumed the aid delivery which had gone into a pause mode. We have actually, for example, tried to deliver 11,000 vaccine doses. Then, technical support is also being provided for key projects like Salma Dam, Afghan Parliament. We are providing key support here. If we look at the security and strategic perspective, according to Shivshankar Menon, Afghanistan tests India's aspirations to be a regional or a global power. If we are a regional and global power, then how we maintain our ties with Afghanistan and the overall crisis in Afghanistan, that is a test. That is a test for India. According to Vivek Chadha, Afghan stability is very vital for curbing terrorism and extremism. If we want to curb terrorism and extremism, then Afghanistan is important from that perspective too. According to Brahmachary, he advocates leveraging Iran as an access point to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. We should use Iran. So that we can access Afghanistan or even Central Asia. And in this way, we can bypass Pakistan. So, from this strategic perspective, Afghanistan is again important for us. Here, if we use a principled approach, then India actually supports the Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process. We support the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. There were many discussions in between when this Taliban issue arose, and after that, there were many discussions, and on this Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, there was a lot of discussion. So, we actually maintain, we are actually trying to maintain a commitment to Afghan sovereignty. We leave it to Afghans. Meaning, basically, the global power rivalry that happens here, the global powers that show involvement regarding the stability of Afghanistan. So, here we want that whatever peace process, whatever solution, it should be an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. The next thing is that from the perspective of the liberal institutionalism lens, we look at it a bit. We look at it from the liberal institutionalism perspective. India's reconstruction aid reflects, we are actually providing reconstruction aid there, through which our commitment, commitment to multilateralism and regional stability can actually be reflected, and that actually shows the long-term soft power image of the country. If we talk about Afghanistan's importance, how important is it for India? Let's look at geo-strategic relevance first. Afghanistan serves as a buffer zone against the threats from the northwest. Afghanistan is like a buffer zone against any threats coming from the northwest. Historically, invasions that have come into India have come through this route. Due to this, Afghan stability has become important for India's defense. Then, from the perspective of security concerns, we share a border. Afghanistan, basically, shares a border with Pakistan, and therefore Afghanistan could become a second front of terrorism and anti-India activities. If Afghanistan becomes destabilized there. If there is no stability in Afghanistan, then it can become a zone for anti-India activities. It can be used as a platform. So, therefore, its stability is important for us. From the perspective of geo-economic potential, it actually positions itself as a transit hub between South and Central Asia. Afghanistan, from the perspective of South and Central Asia, acts as a transit position, a transit hub, and Afghanistan is important from the perspective of India's connectivity and trade goals. Especially through Chabahar Port, we try to go there through the Chabahar Port. So, and here, the mineral wealth in Afghanistan, copper, iron ore, lithium, these are also very important for us. We can get long-term economic benefits from this. Talking about India's policy approach, India actually emphasizes that there

We basically emphasize the development, humanitarian aid, and the capacity building there. So that we can promote peace and stability. Basically, Afghanistan is surrounded by major powers. Afghanistan, which is surrounded by major powers, remains a geopolitical hotspot. This is a good keyword, geopolitical hotspot. We can use this. Afghanistan is a geopolitical hotspot because, you know, it is surrounded by all the major powers and is involved in it. Historically, it also became a zone of proxy wars. Historically, proxy wars used to happen here. Because of this, great power rivalries have been influenced from here. Let's try to understand India's strategy in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured it. India, driven by national security concerns, has refrained from recognizing the regime but has adopted a flexible strategy involving informal engagement, addressing security threats, and maintaining people-to-people exchanges. This is very important. Here too, our perspective is somewhat similar to the Myanmar context, where we will engage diplomatically. We will engage at the diplomatic level. We will engage with whatever regime is there. But somewhere, from a democratic perspective, if our democracy, because our values are democratic, then we become a bit more pro-democratic regimes. But we have to maintain engagement anyway, irrespective of the regime, as we saw at the beginning. But yes, definitely, whatever the regime, we are maintaining our engagement at an informal level. Because we have to address the security threats, and we have to focus on people-to-people connections, because it's all about people-to-people connection. The relationship between two countries depends on the relationship between the people of both countries, because governments will come and go, regimes will change, democracy will come, anything can happen, things keep changing, but people-to-people exchanges, the relationships, the deep ground-level relations, should remain. India's actions include providing emergency humanitarian aid. We have also provided emergency humanitarian aid. This recalibrates India's Afghanistan strategy. Irrespective of anything, we provide humanitarian aid in times of emergency. We provide it wherever it is needed. In January 2025, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the acting Foreign Minister of the Taliban in Dubai. This was also in the news. Basically, he met their Foreign Minister in Dubai. That marked a significant step in informal engagement to discuss security and humanitarian aid. Because our concern, our main concern is security, and along with that, humanitarian aid for the development of the people there, the development of Afghanistan, is our main thing. What is our approach after the Taliban? First of all, non-recognition with strategic engagement. India has not formally recognized the Taliban regime due to security concerns, but it maintains informal contact. We maintain informal contact. For example, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar had a call with Amir Muttaqi. That marked the highest-level contact since 2021, focusing on counter-terrorism and disarmament. So this is the first thing. Secondly, humanitarian aid, as I mentioned earlier, security and humanitarian aid are also important. Humanitarian aid without legitimization. India continues to provide emergency humanitarian assistance. We are continuously providing emergency humanitarian assistance, such as food, vaccines, and medical supplies. We are doing all these things. We are supporting and repatriating 80,000 Afghan refugees from Pakistan, while reinforcing goodwill without endorsing the regime. We want to generate goodwill without endorsing the regime, and continuously maintain goodwill. From a security concerns perspective, India is basically concerned about the Taliban's ideological influence and its ties with Pakistan. This is a very concerning factor. And that's why we fear that terrorist spillover can happen into India. Terrorist spillover can happen into India because their ideological inclination is with Pakistan, their ties are with Pakistan. However, the border clashes in 2024 between the Taliban and Pakistan provided a strategic space for India to assert its influence. There are also some disputes between them, so India can get some leverage from that. If we also look at new leverage opportunities, the Taliban's acceptance of Indian aid via Pakistan and its condemnation of the 2025 Pahalgam attack. See, this is very interesting that the Taliban condemned the 2025 Pahalgam attack. That shows a willingness to engage with India's security concerns. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan is willing to collaborate and cooperate regarding India's security concerns. We can see this from here. And if we talk about regional diplomacy, India actively participates in regional conferences. India actively participates in regional conferences and dialogues, where, for example, Taliban-hosted events, India is participating in all these Taliban-hosted events. And we are also coordinating with the USA to maintain regional stability. We are also trying to design pragmatic future strategies. India is actually pursuing a cautious yet strategic policy focused on security, humanitarian aid, and regional infrastructure like Chabahar Port in cooperation with Iran and Afghanistan. So, what is India's stand in recent times with respect to Afghanistan? Diplomatic re-engagement. India has resumed its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, focusing on humanitarian aid and economic cooperation and trade via Chabahar Port, bypassing Pakistan. We are continuing our trade through Chabahar Port, bypassing Pakistan. We are resuming many of our diplomatic ties. There was a disturbed region. A disturbed phase came because of the Taliban's takeover, and it took some time. But now, visa services for Afghans have also reopened, and Afghan trucks have also cleared from Chabahar, due to which trade is now boosting. Then, talking about humanitarian support, India has maintained non-political engagement with the Taliban, and we have also provided aid in health, education, and infrastructure. Recently, in May 2025, we provided 11,000 vaccines, vaccine doses. And we are also receiving public appreciation from the Taliban. Basically, we are receiving public appreciation from Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. Talking about economic and transit cooperation, India-Taliban discussions emphasized the strategic value of Chabahar Port for Afghanistan's trade. How important is Chabahar Port for Afghan trade? This was discussed in our India-Taliban discussions. Then, after that, talks between the regimes, between both countries, included reviving stalled India-backed projects, like the Salma Dam, which is basically to support Afghanistan's agriculture. Talks to resume such stalled projects have now continued and resumed. Then, looking at regional diplomacy, India participated in Taliban-hosted regional conferences in Kabul. We also participated in conferences hosted by the Taliban in Kabul. And trilateral talks with Iran and Afghanistan are also ongoing, which reinforces its role in regional stability and strategic connectivity through Chabahar. Talking about security and governance issues, India engaged in global discussions on Afghanistan's governance, advocating for inclusive governance and women's rights. We are talking about women's rights there and better governance, inclusive governance. The global consensus on Taliban recognition remains divided. Some people are recognizing them, some are not. But talking about diplomatic engagements, what happened in 2024-25? First, the Misri-Muttaqi meeting took place in January 2025. We had a meeting with their serving minister, the Foreign Minister, and we discussed humanitarian aid and security. After that, there was a Jaishankar-Muttaqi call. This is actually the first high-level political contact since 2021. Here too, we discussed countering anti-India propaganda. And in 2024, there was a regional conference in Kabul, in which India also participated. So, all these developments show India's cautious but strategically important re-engagement with Afghanistan. We are re-engaging with Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, where our focus is particularly on economic cooperation, security, resilience, stability, humanitarian aid, and then, from the perspective of various scholars, according to Rudra Chaudhary, India's approach to the Taliban has been one of cautious engagement, focusing on humanitarian issues. So, it's the same thing. Now, India's approach to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is characterized by flexibility, pragmatism, and a focus on security concerns. Because ultimately, what matters to us? Obviously, if there is no democratic rule in a particular country, that doesn't mean we cannot engage with that country. Because regimes are dynamic, they will keep changing. But the relationship with the country, especially the development, prosperity, and growth of that country, and the growth and goodwill of its people, is important to generate. So, in this context, our policy is flexible, pragmatic, and our main focus is on security concerns, because the more stability there is in Afghanistan and the more our security concerns are resolved there, the better it will be for us. While we have not officially recognized the regime, yes, we are engaging with them informally so that we can address our security threats. So, these are the same things. After that, if we look at the opinions of scholars, if we look at Vivek Chibber's opinion, according to Vivek Chibber, who was the former Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, India has undertaken cautious diplomatic engagement with the Taliban to safeguard its substantial investments and intelligence assets in Afghanistan. Protecting our substantial investments in Afghanistan is definitely our job. And basically, well, this is half, we can add more to this, but the main things are humanitarian aid, economic cooperation, which includes trade and connectivity, the Chabahar Port connection is also there, and somewhere, humanitarian aid there, all these things are important here. Then, according to Mihir Sharma, there are opinions of multiple scholars here, but let's look at Mihir Sharma. According to him, India's quiet outreach to the Taliban through visa reopening and trade facilitation leverages cultural depth to counter China and Pakistan's influence. This is also necessary to counter China and Pakistan's influence. Talking about Rabia Akhtar, India's re-engagement with Afghanistan exploits Pakistan's strained ties with the Taliban, creating a strategic space for New Delhi. This is important. This perspective is somewhat important here. Because exploiting Pakistan's strained ties with the Taliban in Afghanistan is quite necessary here. So, now, let's look at Afghanistan. Now, let's talk about West Asia. Overall, if we talk about West Asia, according to Mehr Dhawala, India's vision to establish itself as a powerful and prosperous state in West Asia has led it to lay down various paths in terms of foreign policy towards West Asia over the years. New Delhi has adapted its foreign policy to suit the evolving needs and conditions of global politics, from ideologically driven non-alignment to a policy based on greater pragmatism. According to C. Raja Mohan, with respect to the change in the Modi government's policy towards the Middle East, the Modi government's policy towards the Middle East has changed. If Delhi's approach to the region in the past was defined by political considerations, then pragmatism now shapes the Modi government's outreach to the Middle East. So, basically, our policy is very pragmatic. How pragmatic it is, we will try to understand through this entire chapter. How is India's stand in West Asia changing? Let us try to understand. First of all, let's understand the geopolitical context. India's past success in balancing a tripolar West Asia has transitioned into greater strategic autonomy. Now we are emphasizing strategic autonomy more. Whether it is West Asia or global political rivalries between superpowers, there is no compromise on strategic autonomy. So, earlier, we were trying to balance a tripolar situation, but now we are shifting entirely to strategic autonomy, which is enabled by the current multipolar global order and regional alignments. So, there is a shift in foreign policy under the Modi government. We are actually, under PM Modi, we have linked and act West. Just as 'Act East' is our policy, similarly, our approach is to link and act West. So, we are now following this approach. India has moved from an inward-looking stance. Now our stance has focused on active regional engagement, emphasizing economic diplomacy and strategic cooperation. Then, talking about bilateral engagement trends, India-Israel relations have deepened. Since 1992, they have strengthened further, and we have strong ties in defense, agriculture, technology, and water management. If we also talk about India-UAE, a strategic shift is clearly visible there. Growing trade, tech collaboration, and cultural ties are happening here. And that's why the UAE is now central to India's geoeconomic diplomacy. The UAE plays a central role in India's geoeconomic diplomacy. So, the other thing is, earlier we were following strategic restraint, now we follow strategic autonomy. So, this shift, from the perspective of West Asia. Overall, this is also our global Indian foreign policy. Our foreign policy in overall global matters was like this: strategic restraint, but now it is assertive strategic autonomy. So, India's policy has moved from non-alignment and strategic restraint to multi-alignment and issue-based partnerships, focusing on geoeconomics over geopolitics. This is very important. If there is a question from the first chapter of Indian Foreign Policy about the economic determinant of foreign policy being important, then we can clearly say that our focus is now on geoeconomics over geopolitics. We are focusing more on geoeconomics than geopolitics. So, this entire line is important for us. Strategic recalibration. India now engages cooperatively with rival states across West Asia, driven by pragmatic interests in security, energy, trade, and technology. Now, the rise of minilaterals. I also mentioned this minilateral thing. Forums like I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US) reflect India's flexible diplomacy, facilitating joint projects and global problem-solving without rigid alignments. We can solve problems through minilaterals without any rigid alignments. Talking about strategic objectives, our strategic objective is to basically leverage the Gulf wealth for India's economic growth. Simple. Our preference is geoeconomics more than geopolitics. We need to keep this in mind. So, we use the Gulf's wealth for India's economic progress. This is our strategic objective. Along with that, we strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation, and we also deepen our defense ties with the Gulf states. The key assertion is that India's strategic autonomy in West Asia reflects a broader foreign policy vision, which balances economic interests, connectivity through Chabahar Port, and security cooperation, while championing globalization in a fragmented world. So, in this fragmented world, in this polarized world, while championing globalization, advocating and supporting globalization, India's strategic autonomy in West Asia and in the entire world, our vision of strategic autonomy, our broad foreign policy vision, is to balance our economic interests, connectivity, and all security interests. That's it. Now, let's see what is the significance of West Asia for India. What is the significance of West Asia for India? According to Shiv Vishwanathan, India's growing interest demands an end to traditional detachment. We no longer need our traditional detachment. Now we need a more engaged West Asia policy, where we can engage more, engage at a deeper level, and have a multifaceted and comprehensive engagement. For example, now, from a geostrategic perspective, West Asia is India's extended neighborhood. It directly impacts India's security. For example, the Arabian Sea connects both regions, West Asia with India, and India with West Asia. Therefore, it is necessary from the perspective of mutual stability needs. Talking about economic priorities, our energy security remains very critical with India's heavy dependence on West Asian oil. Our dependence on West Asian oil is quite high. After that, our Indian expatriates also contribute significantly in the form of remittances, and 7 to 8 million Indians are living there. So, this is also important. Then, West Asia is also important for us to secure the maritime trade routes in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Then, talking about maritime security, the regional shift provides an open space for India to assert its naval presence, for example, anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. This is also important from a maritime security perspective. Then, talking about internal security, religious extremism and terrorist groups like ISIS threaten our regional and domestic stability. For this, it is also necessary for us to cooperate with West Asia so that we can counter them. Because the recruitment of Indian youth by extremist groups is growing, and this is an important concern for us. Then, talking about geopolitical relevance, sustained economic growth requires a peaceful periphery. And the instability in West Asia hinders this.

It can disrupt. Look, if India wants stability not just in India but in the region, and if India wants to grow peacefully, then definitely peace in the peaceful periphery, meaning the countries around us, is essential. And in this context, if there is stability in West Asia, it is beneficial for us. This is the most important point here. So, India can use its soft power, and basically use soft power in West Asia through cultural diplomacy and exchanges.

Then, talking about strategic connectivity, West Asia serves as a gateway to Central Asia. To go to Central Asia, to go to Russia, to go to Europe, West Asia serves as a gateway for us. For example, the Chabahar Port and our North-South Transport Corridor can increase India's regional outreach. The regional reach can increase. Then, India can benefit from existing Chinese-funded infrastructure to improve connectivity and influence. For example, according to Talmiz Ahmad, the stability of West Asia is very important for India's economic and political resilience.

If we talk about recent developments in West Asia and their impact on India, then first of all, the Rupee-Dirham settlement system has been streamlined, which has enabled trade between India and the UAE. Transactions can now happen directly in local currency, which has reduced dependence on the dollar and increased the efficiency of our bilateral trade.

Then, talking about security and defense, India has expanded defense ties with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. We have expanded our defense ties through various initiatives like joint military and naval exercises and strategic agreements signed with different countries in different domains. This can increase and enhance our regional security presence.

Looking at healthcare and space technology, after COVID, India has signed health Memoranda of Understanding with Oman, Jordan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. And also, we have deepened our collaboration in space technology with the UAE and Israel. From this, we can clearly see how our tech diplomacy is flourishing.

Talking about the impact of regional instability, due to the Israel-Hamas conflict, the regional geopolitics is currently being reshaped, which necessitates diplomatic recalibration. But here, despite all these tensions, the UAE's reaffirmation of the I2U2 project's continuity is a significant development. Because I2U2 basically includes Israel. And after all this, the Israel-Palestine and the Gaza issue, the UAE's reaffirmation for the continuity of I2U2 actually signals the partnership's resilience, how resilient the partnership is.

Looking at climate cooperation, at COP 28, which was held in the UAE in 2023, India showed its climate leadership through the Green Credit Initiative. This aligns with West Asia's environmental goals because West Asia's aspirations and ambitions regarding the environment are also similar. Both global climate diplomacy and their environmental goals align, their aspirations align.

So, if we look at it from Shiv Shankar Menon's perspective and conclude it overall, the chapter is not concluding. We will also look at the latest updates. But what he advocates is a more active and forward policy in West Asia. We should have a slightly more active and forward policy in West Asia so that India's rising geostrategic interests and our growing capabilities can be aligned with it. According to Manoj Joshi, he wants that due to regional divisions, the regional divisions in West Asia, this is a very important point here, due to regional divisions and political sensitivities, India must proceed cautiously to maximize benefits while avoiding entanglements. We need to ensure that no friction develops in any way, and we basically need to try to maximize our benefits, the benefits for India, in the Indian interest, cautiously.

Even Rajiv Bhatia notes the pragmatism shift in India-West Asia relations from a Cold War ideological alignment to post-Cold War pragmatism, now entering a phase of satisfaction and strategic maturity. This is important. Keep this in mind. This is important.

If we talk about the latest updates, then look, the Link West Asia policy, India is pursuing a multi-alignment with Israel, with Israel, UAE, and Iran. We are adopting a somewhat multi-alignment policy with Iran, Israel, and everyone, while maintaining neutrality in regional conflicts. We are neutral in regional conflicts. We basically cannot take anyone's side because there can be problems. So, the External Affairs Minister, at the Raisina Dialogue in January 2025, said that India is basically a bridge between West Asia and the Indo-Pacific. And India's participation in IMAC aims to cut shipping costs and boost connectivity. However, regional stability hampers this progress somewhat.

Talking about India-Israel relations, basically, the trade between India and Israel is around 10 billion dollars currently, with 2.5 billion being defense imports. So, despite the Israel-Hamas conflict, India is continuing its ties, condemning Hamas. Even after condemning the Hamas episode, the ties have been continued and maintained, and we have also tried to provide humanitarian aid. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2024, which enabled 10,000 Indian workers to replace Palestinians in Israel. So, this was basically a Memorandum of Understanding signed to replace Palestinians in Israel. Then, we have also tried to expand counter-terrorism and drone-focused intelligence cooperation. So, look at our relations with Israel. Although we condemned the Hamas issue, we continued the relationships.

Overall, if you analyze the whole thing in other contexts as well, more or less, this strategic policy of ours, our policy of strategic autonomy, and our aspect of pursuing our geo-economic interests will be continuously visible. According to Harsh Pant, he highlighted that India's bridging role via Abraham Accords, that is very pertinent. That is very pertinent. Look up Abraham Accords once. This is also somewhat important. Just two-three lines about what it is and its significance.

Then, we saw this with Israel. If we talk about India-UAE relations, our trade has reached over 85 billion dollars. And here, basically, due to the Rupee-Dirham settlement, our investment has boosted, and our reliance on the dollar has decreased. Then, UAE's 5 billion dollar investment targeted renewables and logistics. So, that is also a very pertinent thing in the development of India-UAE relations. PM Modi inaugurated the BAPS Temple in February 2025, which symbolizes the strong cultural ties between both countries. Also, naval exercises, for example, 'Zayed Talwar', through this naval exercise, both countries have jointly tried to enhance our maritime security. Here, 3.5 million Indian expatriates, who basically are our Indians living there, through them, the remittances we get, especially from the UAE, are also quite significant.

Then, talking about the I2U2 initiative, it has advanced despite Israel-Hamas tensions. Despite the tensions between Israel and Hamas, somehow through this initiative, the partnership is sustained, and that is a very important aspect for this time. This is a very new development in West Asia at this time because, look, when there is disturbance, when there is conflict in West Asia, especially the Israel-Palestine issue, divisions become quite strong. But after I2U2, there has been some maturity in the polarization there. Polarization is not happening as much now, even though such a big issue has occurred. But still, we will see. Time will tell. Here, space collaboration, for example, remember the Artemis Accords as an example for space collaboration. There is a 2 billion dollar UAE investment in Indian food parks. Look, UAE has also invested in our food parks, India's food parks. Then, a 330 million dollar hybrid energy project in Gujarat. These are all key milestones. A space collaboration, a UAE investment in Indian food parks, and this hybrid energy project. So, these are all our milestones. Israeli agri-tech targeted 20% food waste cut by 2026. So, these are all milestones. What is happening through I2U2? What is happening with the UAE through I2U2? What are we doing overall with Israel through I2U2? For example, we are collaborating on agri-tech, the target of which is basically to cut food wastage by 20%.

So, after that, COP 28 and climate diplomacy, which basically COP 28 took place. There, India launched the Green Credit Initiative. We saw this before as well. Remember, this initiative, in the IR paper, if even 70% of the facts discussed here come into your answer, you can score very well. You already have content, but there should be some fresh content too, because there is no point in using the same old content. So, talking about COP 28 and climate diplomacy, India launched the Green Credit Initiative and also committed to 500 gigawatts of non-fossil capacity by 2030. UAE's Altera Fund has placed 500 million dollars for Indian green energy. UAE, through its Altera Fund, has placed 500 million dollars of investment in green energy.

Then, we have already seen diaspora remittances. If we also look at the details of the I2U2 summit, then this summit took place in July 2022. It is a natural extension of the existing bilateral ties among India, Israel, and the UAE, which facilitates key projects with the United States, including a 2 billion dollar UAE investment in Indian food parks. We have already seen this.

Now, let's talk about India-Palestine relations. We have seen a part of the Israel aspect and will see more. Talking about historical significance, India's engagement with Palestine holds deep historical ties and significance with its concentric circles of foreign relations. The Israel-Palestine nexus, the Israel-Palestine conflict, due to this, India's relations with both nations are linked. Our relations with both nations are linked with this conflict, and this conflict has always been ongoing and continuous. Because of this, the dynamics in our relations also change somewhat. But through our strategic autonomy and dehyphenation perspective, and our principles, we take a balanced stand, a principled stand as well as a realistic stand. Where we have to support Palestine, we support Palestine. But where we have to maintain relations with Israel for our benefit, we do that too. So, we are managing this stand while maintaining relations with nations in conflict.

Now, how has India's approach evolved? How has our approach towards Palestine evolved? First of all, before the Cold War, what was it? Our visionaries like Gandhi and Nehru showed some empathy towards the Palestine cause, equating it to India's struggle for independence. Then, after the Cold War, the Nehruvian consensus led India to support the Palestine cause. We showed solidarity and focused on their capacity building, and we opposed the establishment of Israel. However, India later, India later recognized Israel in 1950. Then, after the Cold War, under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992, India established diplomatic relations with Israel, which marked a significant shift in policy, reflecting changing global dynamics. Because the global dynamics were changing in that way, we established relations with Israel. So, this is basically a brief, very short, but very effective way we tried to understand.

If we talk about recent changes and balancing, then look, how are our ties with Israel? India has fostered strategic ties with Israel. We still foster strategic ties with Israel, exhibiting a partnership while maintaining a degree of diplomatic distance. This is a very pertinent keyword. Degree of diplomatic distance. We have a partnership with them, and we have also tried to maintain a degree of diplomatic distance, which is evident from our action of abstaining in a UNHRC resolution against Israel. We abstained from taking any action in the resolution against Israel in the UNHRC. So, somehow, India is very smartly and very realistically not saying a clear no, but not saying a clear yes either. So, India is utilizing its foreign policy stand very smartly here because it is very difficult for any country to take sides in global phenomena, in global forums, because if you support one country, it naturally creates conflict with another country. So, in such a situation, you cannot support any country very boldly. That is a part of global politics. Therefore, India's stand is very pragmatic. That is very sure. So, we should appreciate it.

Then, talking about the Palestinian position, India's stand on Palestine has evolved. It has evolved, refraining from explicit support for claims on Jerusalem and maintaining an independent stand in international forums. Maintaining an independent stand in international forums is our current position.

Talking about strategic calculations, India's dynamic role in West Asia overall is influenced by its bold actions, balancing regional dynamics such as Saudi Arabia's and Israel's concerns over Iran. We are trying to balance the regional dynamics, balancing Saudi Arabia's and Israel's concerns over Iran, in a very bold manner. And also seizing opportunities emerging from international realignment.

Now, what are the challenges and considerations? Look, balancing economic interests is the most important thing. India's relationship with Palestine must be harmonized with its robust engagement in the Arab Gulf, encompassing energy imports. We need energy imports. Our labor also works there, and we need to maintain economic collaboration. So, we have to balance economic interests.

Along with economic interests, regional stability is also important for us. So, cordial relations with Iran, and somehow the stabilization of Afghanistan after the American withdrawal, how important the stabilization in Afghanistan is for us after America withdrew. We need to understand this. These things are very integral to India's West Asian policy. Especially after America's withdrawal, stability in Afghanistan and cordial relations with Iran are very important for India's West Asian policy because these are somewhat sensitive regions, due to the regime and also due to the overall geostrategic position.

So, India's intricate approach to Palestine and Israel epitomizes a well-calibrated balancing act. The way we balance Israel and Palestine is a peak of foreign policy pragmatism. It can be an example of the peak of foreign policy pragmatism. While India maintains its historical solidarity with Palestine, concurrently we also foster strategic relations with Israel. And this approach addresses the complexities of regional dynamics and India's multifaceted interests, underscoring the adaptability of Indian foreign policy and the sophistication of Indian foreign policy in the ever-evolving and ever-dynamic West Asian panorama. In this West Asian panorama, where things continuously change, India's foreign policy stand is completely commendable.

Talking about India-Israel partnership, if we talk about India-Israel relations, according to Harsh Pant, he observes that there is a strategic shift in India's Israel policy under the Modi government. Yes, under the Modi government, our foreign policy, especially regarding Israel, has seen a significant shift. For example, earlier there was hypocrisy. Earlier there was hypocrisy. Moving away from that past hypocrisy, we are now engaging more openly and pragmatically with Israel. We are also recognizing Israel. So, this is a very big shift, especially under the Modi government, under Modi's foreign policy. And here, we need to understand one thing: Modi's foreign policy is defined by assertiveness, boldness, and strategic autonomy. Strong emphasis on strategic autonomy.

If we talk about our relations with Israel, look how it evolved initially. There was early hesitation. From 1950 to 1992, India had recognized Israel in 1950, but a full diplomatic tie, even allowing a consulate in Mumbai, was delayed due to India's pro-Arab stance. Because India's stance was pro-Arab initially, and therefore, recognizing Israel was a big deal. We had recognized it. We had established a normal consulate in Mumbai, but due to the pro-Arab stance and our anti-colonial solidarity, because we do not tolerate or basically support the establishment and capture of any colony anywhere, due to all these principles, there was some hesitation initially. Then, in 1992, we established formal diplomatic ties. We normalized relations, but the engagement remained cautious. It remained cautious.

But what was the turning point? The visit of President Pranab Mukherjee in 2015 marked a deeper political engagement. This is one point. Secondly, Modi's...

The visit was in 2017, a historic visit, the first ever Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel. Because of this, Modi's foreign policy is quite bold, quite basically bold. Correct, because he is the first ever Prime Minister to visit Israel, that symbolizes a decisive shift and strengthening of bilateral ties. Israel was quite happy. Then, reciprocal diplomacy in 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, he also visited and, uh, India. He also visited India and he reinforced mutual commitment and deepening relations. Also, our cooperation has broadened. It has become multidimensional. We have broadened collaboration in many aspects like cybersecurity, economic development, agriculture, innovation, water tech, and many other areas. If we talk about Kanchi Gupta, according to him, uh, so basically, sorry, according to Kanchi Gupta. According to Kanchi Gupta, look, India does not plan on abandoning its traditional support for Palestine. The important thing here is that India has not abandoned its stand regarding support for Palestine. It has not abandoned that stand. We are reminiscent of the ideological trappings of India's West Asia policy at a time when strategic partnership between India and Israel has emerged well above traditional defense and trade relations. Now, our basically overall engagement with Israel is not limited to defense and trade relations. It has risen quite above that. So, in this context, it indicates that domestic politics and ideological inhibitions still underscore Israel policy. Benjamin Netanyahu, he aptly characterized the strong India-Israel relationship as a marriage made in heaven being implemented here on earth. A very, very important. This can basically be written as an introduction. Uh, we can quote Benjamin Netanyahu directly. So, these sentiments resonate well with the growing ties between the two nations. The complete resonance of how ties are growing between the two nations is visible from this statement. And then the I2U2 concept, involving India's talent and I2U2 concept, basically India's, uh, talent and Israel's technology. Okay? I2U2, India's talent and Israel's technology, this concept, I2T2 is different. I2U2 is different. So, this concept, that comes to completely the essence of their partnership, which aimed at shaping a better tomorrow. Shaping a better tomorrow, it is quite clear here how we can shape a better tomorrow. So, talking about recent developments, India, basically in the context of Israel and Palestine, now comes the main topic, because this is what has been happening for the last two-three years. This is what has been happening for the last few years. Although this is not a new issue, but the magnitude this time, the magnitude this time is important here. Humanitarian crisis, Gaza faces severe shortages due to Israel's blockade. Due to Israel's blockade, there were shortages there, and 90% of the population experienced critical food insecurity. So, fuel shortages occurred, due to which essential services halted, including water treatment, which further deepened the human disaster and intensified it even more. Then Israel's airstrikes, which targeted Hamas infrastructure, often located in civilian areas. Israel targeted this, which caused widespread destruction of homes, schools, hospitals, due to which civilians had to face it a lot, civilians had to face it. Basically, a huge humanitarian loss, a humanitarian crisis developed there, a very big humanitarian crisis. And then, if we look at its political repercussions, this violence has threatened the stability of the Abraham Accords and normalization efforts with Arab states. The normalization efforts between Israel and Arab states through the Abraham Accords received a big blow. It may reshape Middle East geopolitics. Middle East geopolitics, it may not, it has already reshaped Middle East geopolitics with global powers like the USA and other global powers actively involved in mediation efforts. Now, from a regional security perspective, settler violence in the West Bank has increased, leading to casualties. Many casualties occurred, displacements happened, and due to this, tensions and instability have increased a lot. So, here, although there are perspectives of many scholars, here, if we basically look at Nishant Motwani's perspective, he highlights that there are deepening India-Israel strategic ties post October 7th attacks under Modi's leadership. This date is also important. If you write this, it will be more impactful in this kind of answer. Now, let's talk about India-Iran relations. We will discuss the current contexts further down. India and Iran share a historically rich and strategically vital relationship, often described as a natural alliance under the Mandal principle due to Iran being a neighbor's neighbor. This is an important point here in the Mandal principle. Then, what are the dimensions? One is civilization and our cultural ties. Deep-rooted links include, basically, shared heritage, Persian influence, and India's significant Shia population and Parsi community that actually fosters strong people-to-people ties. So, this is the first thing. Talking about strategic significance, Iran's proximity, its energy resources, and its location, which actually borders Pakistan and Afghanistan, makes Iran very crucial for India's security, energy security, and regional connectivity perspectives, especially as an alternative to Pakistan. Okay? So, from the perspective of an alternative route to the route from Pakistan, Iran is important for us. Talking about regional and ideological convergence, our ideological history is a shared ideological history. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini's influence and alignment in multilateral forums like NAM, we have alignment there too, and we have a cooperative stance, a cooperative stand on global issues, our stand is cooperative, so our relationship is more basically driven by this, derived from this. What is Iran's view of India? So, look, India serves as a major oil buyer and a balanced actor in West Asia. India is seen as a balanced actor in West Asia by Iran, offering Iran strategic depth and diplomatic support, particularly as a counter to Pakistan, Saudi, and US alignment. This is important here as a counter to the alignment of Pakistan, Saudi, and the US. According to Meena Singh Roy, what she says is that future potential hinges on resolving issues like, now, all these basically our future engagement with Iran depends on how we resolve the issue of the Farzad B gas field and how we deepen our sub-regional ties. Now, let's talk about current accords in West Asia and their impact on India. In this, let's first talk about the Abraham Accords. What are the positive impacts of the Abraham Accords? First of all, strategic autonomy is strengthened due to the Abraham Accords. For example, it validates India's dehyphenated approach. Here, you should know what a dehyphenated approach is. What is a dehyphenated approach? Now, I cannot explain all this here because the dehyphenated approach is simple. If you Google it, you will find it. But India's dehyphenated approach, where India is able to engage independently with Israel, Iran, and Arab states. It's not like that. Although there are some conflicts between them, it is able to maintain independent relations with all of them. So, this strategic autonomy is maintained by India. Then, talking about regional stability, if Israel-Gulf ties, if Israel and Gulf ties improve, because the intention of the Abraham Accords is that these ties, Israel's ties with Gulf countries, should improve, then this is its ultimate goal. And for this, if Israel-Gulf ties are basically improved, if they improve, then stability in West Asia can be enhanced, and if it is enhanced, then obviously who can benefit more from it than India? So, India can benefit a lot from this from economic and security perspectives. Then, greater diplomatic space will be available because India expands this. This Abraham Accord is basically that it expands India's room for maneuver and multi-alignment in the complex region. In this complex region, where there is so much conflict, if the Abraham Accord is implemented, then we can maintain independent relations with all countries because there will be a kind of agreement between all countries. But here are the negative impacts. Look, our ties with Iran are strained. If there is convergence between Israel and the Gulf, it can complicate our vital energy and connectivity ties, especially with Iran. Look, there are very difficult political dynamics here. Because from Iran's perspective, the Chabahar Port is important for us. So, from the perspective of connectivity and energy, Iran is necessary for us. But if there is convergence between Israel and the Gulf, through the Abraham Accords, if things become simple, easy, if relations become cordial, then Iran might have some problems. Second, India must carefully navigate increasing Shia-Sunni tensions aggravated by the Accords. This is also a dimension we need to keep in mind. Also, keep the Pakistan angle in mind. If there is a shift in the ties between Israel and Arab states, it can basically influence Pakistan's regional choices, which can indirectly affect India. It can indirectly affect India. Fine. Then, balancing act with Israel. India must ensure that growing Israel ties, if ties with Israel grow, that they don't overshadow its broader West Asian interests. So, we also need to keep our West Asian interests in mind. So, we actually have to balance this. According to Stanley John, these Accords can help balance India's "Look West" approach. So, this is a somewhat positive outcome. Although there are some negative outcomes, but overall it is a positive development. But now, because so much drama has happened in West Asia, due to this, the intentions and basically the purpose of I2U2 or the Abraham Accords may be delayed a bit, and we don't know the future. So, according to Harsh Pant, these Abraham Accords could diversify India's energy and connectivity options. Because if collaboration between the Arab states and Israel improves, then obviously India's energy and connectivity options can become even more diverse. If we talk about recent developments between India and Iran, first of all, the Chabahar Port actually helps regional connectivity because it bypasses Pakistan and counters China's Gwadar Port. So, this is one thing. But what are the challenges? US sanctions and China's interest in Iran. We saw both these things. Due to US sanctions, if India's interest withdraws from there, which cannot happen because India will not compromise its interests in any way through strategic autonomy. But if this happens and China engages more with Iran, then it can be a difficult situation. And it may be a lose-lose situation because of the USA. Due to the USA, it can be a losing situation for India. And then, another problem here is the instability in Afghanistan, which also hampers the overall progress of the Chabahar Port and the progress of India-Iran relations. Then, talking about security convergence, yes, countering terrorism and stabilizing Afghanistan is in the interest of both India and Iran. And the second thing is that India faces a tightrope walk between Iran and the US-aligned Gulf-Israel bloc. Look, the Gulf-Israel bloc here, some Gulf countries and Israel, which basically come together or are coming together with the mediation of the US, then with the support of the US, there is a lot of polarization, a lot of friction between this bloc, Israel and the Gulf, and Iran. Balancing this, because Iran is important for India. India definitely needs the USA and other Israel and Gulf nations as well. This politics is quite dangerous here. Now, let's talk about the origin and development of the term "New World Order" in India-Iran relations. Sorry. Now, look, we have seen all these things. We have seen all these things. Now, let's look at this "New World Order" because in this topic, another very important sub-topic is the New World Order. World Order is important. First of all, let's understand what World Order is. What is World Order here? World Order is basically like unipolar world order, bipolar world order. Unipolar basically means that America was here. Earlier, there was a bipolar world order. Now, there is a multipolar world order. So, here, how many powers and in what way, how many influences, how many powers influence overall global politics, depends on what the overall world order is. So, look, this term was coined by HW Bush. He emphasized a world governed by the rule of law. We need such a world here, a world that is governed by the rule of law and based on international cooperation, after the post-Cold War. So, how did the global order evolve? First of all, a Westphalian multipolarity. That was the Westphalian order at that time, which was a multipolar basically world order, in which instability was quite high. After that, we entered the Cold War. We entered the Cold War, and bipolarity came there. Bipolarity came. Then, post-Cold War, unipolarity came. The collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and somewhere, unipolarity came. And then, the current phase, the current phase is basically marked by multipolarity. Multipolarity. So, yes. Rise of Asia. What developments happened? What things changed? One is the rise of Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Earlier, Asia was not so risen. Asia was very, basically, the dominance was normally of America and other European countries. Asia did not have such a big role. But if we look now, especially the Indo-Pacific, it is also emerging as the epicenter of global politics, due to which the US's pre-eminence, the US's basically hegemony, how it is challenged comparatively, this question also comes, and we can get some answer from here as well. So, the US's pre-eminence is being challenged because the Indo-Pacific zone, the region, due to its maritime significance, its trade significance, and its navigation significance, the Indo-Pacific is a very important region. Along with this, so many players are now emerging in Asia, like China is here, India is also here, so due to this, the unipolar scene is converting towards multipolarity, and the significance, the just strategic significance, is shifting. Like the shift to the Indo-Pacific. Geostrategic significance shifted to the Indo-Pacific. Then, from the American Century to the Asian Century, there is a shift. We can see a shift from the American Century to the Asian Century. So, India is viewed as a central actor in reshaping, in shaping the emerging order. India is basically an emerging order, which is based on peaceful coexistence and democratic values. This is important. India wants a world order where there is peaceful coexistence and where there are democratic values. India wants a world order based on this. And India can play a central actor's role in shaping such a world order. Because now, from the American Century to the Asian Century, there has been a shift. There are big players in Asia. So, what is India's vision? India basically wants a multipolar world order. Historically, India has advocated for multipolarity. For example, India has consistently called for a multipolar global and Asian order. Whether it is Asia or global, if we talk at the regional level or at the global level, India has always preferred multipolarity. Because it ensures a strategic balance and avoids any dominance. Because we do not want any single country or a particular two or three countries to dominate the entire world. We want multiple poles so that the balance of power is maintained somewhere, and there is no dominance of anyone. After that, talking about a civilizational worldview, our basically idea of Jambudvipa is inspired by this idea. Our basically idea that actually emphasizes pluralism, multiculturalism, tolerance, unlike China's hierarchical Middle Kingdom model. So, there is a lot of difference in the worldview, which we have seen before. Then, strategic autonomy and flexibility. India prefers engagement with multiple powers. What India wants is to engage with multiple powers. We have issue-based alliances. We can make our alignment based on our interests. Because engaging with any single country cannot fulfill all our requirements. So, we have to align with multiple powers rather than aligning with any particular single or hegemonic bloc. Okay? Or hegemonic power and then any particular bloc. Then, coalition building against hegemons. We do not want any hegemonic basically player to emerge. We want coalitions to be formed. So, we basically support countervailing coalitions to prevent the rise of any unilateral power and maintain a systemic equilibrium. So, we want to maintain systemic equilibrium. We do not want any unilateral power to rise in any way. That is why we want to counter it through coalitions, by putting in countervailing efforts, and not let any unipolar basically rise. And a significant example of this is why we need to counter China. We need to counter China for this reason as well. One is China's growth, China's rise, which is very threatening for India and also very threatening for the global order. Because China, although it says it supports a multipolar world order at the global level, but the way it is trying to create dominance at the regional level, it is not possible.

If it has the capacity to create a unipolar world order and become its important dominant player, then definitely China will become that, and that can be quite dangerous for us because we have many conflicts with it.

Now, let's look at the rationale behind India's multipolar approach. What is the basic logic behind it? First of all, our civilizational self-perception, as Shyam Saran said, according to him, India sees itself as one of the four petals of the Jammu Dvipa, signifying plural and inclusive leadership. That's the first thing. Then, second, alignment with national interest. What happens with multipolarity? India's ability to strategically maneuver without constraints from hegemonic powers is enhanced. That ability is enhanced. It means in multipolarity, we can actually connect with and engage with multiple players. And any hegemonic power's constraints, like the USA, if we talk about a unipolar world order, if it's the USA's, if the USA's dominance, its hegemony, is as much as it is now, it has degraded a bit. But if it were as strong as before, it would have been quite difficult for us to challenge the sanctions imposed by it. So, in such a situation, our strategic autonomy gets eroded, and we would never want that.

And we need to diversify partnerships. Look at India; India's broad spectrum of interests requires collaboration with multiple global actors, as I mentioned earlier, that it is in our interest to engage with multiple players because there is no single country that can fulfill all our requirements. We need China for some things. We need Gulf countries, UAE, Iran for some things. We also need Israel for some things. So, the European Union, Japan, and all other countries are needed for certain aspects. As we did the entire IR, we saw how our engagement, dependence, and basically collaboration with different countries are based on different interests and different domains.

Proactive role in the global order. India needs to play a proactive role in global order formation. India aspires not only to participate but to shape the evolving order. Now, this is very important. We don't just want to participate in this entire process; we want to shape this entire order through leadership and consensus building. We want to shape it through consensus building and leadership. So, this is a very big thing for India.

If we look from a scholarly perspective, what are the scholars' perspectives on India's vision of multipolarity? First of all, let us try to understand what S. Jaishankar says. He highlights the decline of traditional powers and the rise of new centers. One is that the traditional powers are declining, and new centers of power are rising. And here, he advocates for India's proactive engagement through strategic partnerships and multi-alignment. This engagement of India through strategic partnerships and multi-alignment should be proactive. J.S. Jaishankar emphasizes this point.

If we see Barry Buzan here, what are his views? Here, he describes the global diffusion of power. The global diffusion of power, meaning power is not concentrated in one particular country but is diffused, distributed among multiple people. So, this, Barry Buzan, he sees this as the rise of the rest. Rise of the rest. Correct. Rise of the rest. A very important keyword. So, here, India is navigating both challenges and prospects in a non-hegemonic order. Now, this is an important term. Hegemonic order, because in a unipolar world order, the US was the hegemon, there was US hegemony, and we do not want a hegemonic order. That is the thing. We want coalitions to form. We want consensus-oriented things. We want a multipolar world order. We do not want a single hegemon to develop, whether it's China, America, or anyone else. We want a non-hegemonic order. This is also a very important keyword. Instead of writing "multipolar world order," we can basically also say "non-hegemonic world order" because, ultimately, there should be no single hegemon for us.

According to C. Raja Mohan as well, if we look at it, he observes that India's shift from non-alignment to multi-alignment reflects an adaptive strategy in the fragmented global landscape. How we are maneuvering with our adaptive strategy in this fragmented global landscape is reflected in this. What is reflected? Through our shift, our transition from non-alignment to multi-alignment.

Then, we can also look at the perspectives of other scholars.

Then, let's look at leveraging cultural heritage. India's cultural heritage is a unique contribution. First of all, India aims to shape a multipolar world order. We are talking about the multipolar world order and the vision of a new world order here. How is cultural heritage contributing and can contribute to this, which is a unique contribution to the world? So, India aims to shape a multipolar world order grounded in its civilizational ethos. Its civilizational ethos is multiculturalism. Because even today, if we look at India, there is a lot of diversity. There is pluralism. And we have tolerance. We have tolerance. We have always maintained that unity within diversity. We have always maintained unity in diversity. So, our civilizational ethos is not a modern liberal idea of today; these are our civilizational ethos that have existed since ancient times. So, multilateralism, tolerance, pluralism, and the middle path. The middle path that Buddha showed. Okay? So, the middle path. So, all these things have always been the ethos of our civilization.

Then, according to PM Modi, what has PM Modi said about the vision in practice? Through global platforms like the World Economic Forum, Shangri-La Dialogue, etc., PM Modi has openly stated India's commitment towards the liberal international order, the rule of law, the rule-based liberal international order, or our commitment towards rule-based internationalism. Correct.

Then, let's also look at the Panchamitra doctrine. According to Anirban Ganguly, according to Anirban, basically Ganguly. According to Anirban Ganguly, India's foreign policy under Modi is actually based on five principles. First is Samman, which is honor. Samman, which is dialogue. Samriddhi, which is prosperity. Suraksha, which is security. And Sanskriti evam Sabhyata, meaning culture and civilization. This doctrine, which Anirban Ganguly calls Panchamitra, is what we follow. So, that actually defines India's soft power-led global strategy. Soft power-led global strategy. This is very important, and it is quite necessary for India because what does India have to offer? Although there are many things to offer, a soft power-led global strategy is one of the important aspects that India possesses in a unique way. India has this uniquely because it is ingrained in India's ethos, its civilizational ethos. Therefore, these values are not adopted or imported; these values are our civilizational values. These values are our historical legacy.

Secondly, let's talk about strategic opportunities. After Ukraine, global flux is seen as a moment for India to recalibrate its economic and geopolitical approach. So, India is actually seeking to evolve from a balancer. Now, we do not want to act merely as a balancer. For example, the USA saw India in the Indo-Pacific as a balancing partner in the context of China. Because who is there to balance China? It is India. So, we do not want to remain just a balancer. We actually want to become a leading state that basically defines the poles of a multipolar world order, shapes it. We want to give it shape. We do not want to just participate in it; we want to give it shape. So, we should also consider our ambitions, our aspirations, and other countries should also consider them.

So, let's also talk about internal and external levers. India's global leadership aspirations require addressing internal communal tensions to project itself as peaceful. Because, look, peace is necessary in India. If there is peace at the domestic level, if democracy is sustained very well, and if there is prosperity, then only can we increase our standing a bit at the global level.

And so, India must proactively leverage its civilizational strengths, strategic flexibility, and diversified foreign policy to claim its place at the global high table in a contested and evolving world order. In this contested and evolving world order, if we want to place ourselves at the high table, then we should diversify our foreign policy claims. We should leverage our civilizational strengths, our civilizational ethos, its strength.

Now, let's talk a bit about the Israel-Iran war in 2025. This is quite important. A question on this is important because we are talking about West Asia, so it is necessary to discuss it here. First, let's understand that before 1979, before 1917, strategic partnership under the Shah, Iran was among the few Muslim-majority countries. Iran was one such country among a few Muslim-majority countries that recognized Israel. This is an important point here. We are talking about the Israel-Iran war, and recently, tensions between Israel and Iran have been quite severe. But the point to understand here is that this was a Muslim-majority country that recognized Israel in 1948. They engaged in oil, military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and all such things as part of Israel's periphery doctrine to counter Arab hostility and Soviet influence. Iran cooperated here as a periphery doctrine, as a periphery doctrine to counter Soviet influence and Arab hostility. This is quite interesting to understand.

But after 1979, after the Islamic Revolution, hostility increased. In Iran, basically, Iran's 1979 revolution marked a sharp break. Israel was declared an enemy of Islam. Israel was declared an enemy of Islam, and Iran's backing, Iran started backing anti-Israel groups. Iran started backing anti-Israel groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and such anti-Israel groups. So that to bolster its ideological legitimacy and regional clout, it started doing all these things.

From 1980 to 2020, basically, proxy warfare continued. The relationship evolved into a long-standing proxy war. Continuous proxy wars went on. Iran armed proxies across the region, while Israel carried out assassinations of Iranian scientists, cyberattacks, etc., all such things like Stuxnet in 2009-2010, and airstrikes on Iranian assets, particularly in Syria. So, all these developments took place. Israel views Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat. Israel began to see Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat, especially after 2018, after the US exit from the JCPOA. When the US exited this Joint Cooperation initiative related to nuclear matters, Israel felt a threat here.

And then, in 2024, there was direct confrontation. In between, there were proxy wars, killing each other's scientists, and supporting anti-Israel groups from both sides. All these things were happening. But then, in 2024, there was a direct confrontation for the first time in decades. The conflict escalated into a direct missile exchange following Israel's strikes on Iran-linked assets and targeted killings of key figures like Hezbollah's Nasrallah and Hamas's Haniyeh, intensifying regional volatility and setting the stage for the 2025 war. The stage for the war that was to happen in 2025, which has happened or is happening, was set due to this direct confrontation between Israel and Iran.

What are the underlying drivers? One is the rivalry, which is rooted in ideological opposition. First of all, Zionism and the Islamic Revolution. This is basically their ideological conflict, their rivalry. Then, regional power competition is also an important factor here. And nuclear brinkmanship. Nuclear brinkmanship. Nuclear brinkmanship. So, all these factors have been exacerbated by the erosion of Iran's proxy strength after the 2023 Israel-Hamas conflict. The Israel-Hamas conflict happened, because here you can see that Iran tried to support anti-Israel groups, but after Israel-Hamas, Iran's strength, its strength in proxy wars, has become completely questionable. And because of this erosion, this conflict has turned into a more direct confrontation.

Recent developments. In June 2025, Operation Rising Lion, Israel's basically offensive posture. Israel launched a large-scale airstrike campaign on Iran's nuclear facilities, IRGC targets, including General Hossein Salami, and military sites to delay Iran's nuclear program by two to three years. Israel attacked them to delay it by two to three years. And then the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, condemned it. Condemned this attack for violating international norms. Then Iran retaliated. Iran responded with ballistic missile and drone strikes using Houthi Qassem missiles, killing 28 Israelis. 28 Israelis were killed here. So, Israeli strikes reportedly killed 610 Iranians and injured 4746 Iranians that week, weakening the proxy network and limiting broader retaliation options. So, basically, by weakening Iran's proxies, weakening the proxy network, it limited the broader retaliation options.

Now, US involvement happened here. US involvement and a ceasefire. So, the US bombed Iranian nuclear sites on June 21. This bombing basically happened on June 21, due to which Iran's program is basically delayed by only months. So, Iran responded with a symbolic strike on the AI UDIID airbase. Trump brokered a ceasefire on June 24, which was breached by both sides. It was breached again by both sides, and tensions further deepened.

So, let's talk about the regional and global implications. Iran's axis of resistance, basically Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, this axis of resistance, has suffered major losses, and trade disruption in the state of Homuz and AI-driven disinformation has complicated the entire situation. All these disruptions in the state of Homuz and AI-driven disinformation have made the situation even more complicated. Oil prices have stabilized, but security risks still exist here.

So, India's response to the Israel-Iran war is actually shaped by its strategic and economic interests. So, first of all, look, India maintained neutrality by evacuating citizens from both Israel and Iran. We evacuated our citizens from Israel and Iran. S. Jaishankar argued for dialogue but avoided condemning Israel. Israel was avoided condemnation, and at the same time, distancing from SCO statements critical of Israel. We also maintained distance from statements critical of Israel. So, somewhere here too, we are trying to maintain neutrality.

What are our economic stakes in West Asia? West Asia contributes 54% of India's oil imports and 40% of the remittances we receive from the diaspora. Therefore, regional stability is quite important for us. If we talk about Iran, our trade with Iran has dropped since 2017 to the current level, from $14 billion to $0.4 billion, also due to US sanctions. Now, but if we look at our trade with Israel, it has also basically reduced from 2022 to 2024 because of instability there. So, disruption, it is clearly evident to us that due to instability and disruption, our economic ties and trade decline significantly. These numbers tell you that.

Let's talk about strategic complications. Look, India relies on Israel for $128 million annually in defense imports. While Iran's support for India, especially on the Kashmir issue at global forums, is also important for us. For example, scholars like Bansal and Ranjan recommend using platforms like BRICS or SCO as mediation platforms, which can help India in its regional influence role without aligning with any bloc. India's regional influence role can be helped by this. So, this is a problem. We saw the Iran-Israel war.

Then let's talk about the Gaza-Israel conflict. This is also an important conflict. Look, let's first see its historical evolution. Look, before 1948. The tension, Zionist immigration and Arab resistance, this tension increased. But in 1947, the UN's partition plan proposed a two-state solution. It was rejected by the Arab nations. But Israel was created in 1948. That led to the Nakba, meaning the displacement of almost 7.5 lakh Palestinians. 7.5 lakh Palestinians were basically displaced here, and Gaza came under Egyptian control. I am giving a little bit of history, as it is almost ending now. I will give a little bit of history so that we understand, so that we don't have to look at it separately again, what this is. What is the background behind it? For us to understand overall. You don't need to remember all the points, but yes, in the answer, this historical trace might sometimes need to be mentioned.

In the era after 1967, after the 1967 war, Israel captured Gaza, and the 1967 war happened, in which they captured Gaza. The UN resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal. It talked about Israel's withdrawal. But settlements were expanded. Hamas emerged in 1987 with Iranian support, as we saw a little while ago, Iran supported anti-Israel groups. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza, but Hamas took control there after the 2006 elections, which led to Israel's blockade, which was somehow inspired by this. Motivated by this, Israel's blockade was created there.

From 2008 to 2023, multiple wars occurred in 2008, 2012, 2014, 2021. Multiple wars occurred. Iran tried to militarily aid in all these wars in some way. The blockade in Gaza led to a humanitarian crisis, and because of this, hostility developed. If we fast forward to the October 7, 2023 attack, Hamas killed 1195 Israelis and took 251 hostages, triggering Operation Iron Swords. Operation Iron Swords was triggered there. Then Israel responded with a total blockade, airstrikes, and a ground invasion. Israel caused a massive destruction there. By mid-2025, over 58,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, were killed, and 2.5 million people were displaced. So, basically, there was a humanitarian collapse. Israel disrupted and destroyed 70% of Gaza's infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. Severe aid restrictions led to famine. There were aid restrictions, a blockade, which led to famine-like conditions there, and the Nezarim Corridor was also built to control internal movement. So, after that, targeted killings and resistance. Hamas leaders, key leaders of Hamas, basically Mohammed Sinwar and other leaders, were killed, and that had weakened the group. The group weakened. Although resistance continued. But the Rafah offensive, the Rafah offensive displaced 1 lakh more civilians. This Rafah offensive that happened there in 2025 displaced another 1 lakh civilians.

So, here, look, Hezbollah opened a northern front. Hamas and Iran-backed militants attacked Israeli and US assets. So, all this continued. The US supported Israeli military, but faced backlash for vetoing the UN ceasefire proposal. It faced backlash for vetoing the UN ceasefire proposal.

Now, let's talk about its global repercussions. Due to the war, global opinion has become quite polarized. Because of this, many protests occurred. Rising antisemitism. Antisemitism and Islamophobia increased. And criticism of the proposed Palestinian relocation, the basically Palestinian relocation, also faced a lot of criticism. In June 2025, this violence surged again, despite the Israel-Iran ceasefire. Israeli strikes in Gaza intensified, killing over 200 in 48 hours, and civilian infrastructure and aid sites were also basically hit, and that has actually worsened the humanitarian crisis. It has further intensified the humanitarian crisis.

India's position, if we look at the Gaza-Israel conflict, we have maintained strategic neutrality here as well. India abstained from the 2025 UN ceasefire vote. India abstained from the UN ceasefire vote. And it aligned with the US while distancing from BRICS and SCO allies, reflecting the growing defense ties with Israel and a cautious approach.

Economic stakes. This prolonged instability threatens India's oil imports and Gulf remittances, and trade with both countries, Israel and Iran, has also declined, as we saw in the numbers.

Domestic and diplomatic pressure. Public sympathy for Gaza and India's non-aligned tradition have triggered debates. Now, this is very important. The upcoming BRICS summit will reveal how India's diplomatic balancing act works.

Now, let's link the Gaza and Iran conflicts. We have seen all these things. Now, perhaps we don't need this much. So, let's talk a bit about India's G20 diplomacy, its presidency. What has been the contribution to the new world order, our vision for a new world order, an inclusive world order? Let's look at that and then we will finish.

Philosophical foundation. First of all, rooted in Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam: One Earth, One Family, One Future. This is our basic approach. So, India emphasized human-centric globalization and inclusive development. We focused on this during our G20 presidency. We tried to address global challenges. PM Modi identified climate change, terrorism, pandemics; these are all our problems. India's rising leadership is also evident from this G20 presidency. This G20 presidency projected India as a responsive, rising power, blending ancient and civilizational wisdom with modern policy leadership, which actually shaped the post-pandemic global order. The post-pandemic global order is also an important keyword because the global order shifted significantly after the pandemic. So, now, by blending ancient civilizational wisdom and our modern policy leadership, India has spared no effort in projecting itself as a responsible rising power under the G20 presidency.

So, let's talk about the major outcomes of the G20 summit in 2023. First of all, the inclusion of the African Union happened here. Because of this, the representation of the Global South, India's image in South-South solidarity, has significantly improved, and because of this, we have also made a collective call for global governance reform and global governance structures. Then we launched the Global Biofuel Alliance. Then we also introduced frameworks for digital economy regulation, such as cybersecurity, cryptocurrency regulation, and digital trade infrastructure. And then we talked about climate and social commitments. Here, we aimed to triple the renewable energy capacity. We have committed to tripling the renewable energy capacity by 2030. Also, cutting emissions, policies that support gig and platform workers. Platform workers mean people working for companies like Amazon, Zomato, etc. And then the economic corridor, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, as a strategic alternative to China's BRI for enhancing connectivity and trade, this was also proposed here.

Now, let's talk about recent updates. India's West Asia engagement and strategic balancing. We have seen this. We have seen Iran's relations. Okay, we have seen this too. India's economic and environmental leadership. We have seen this too. Then strategic posture and global vision. Okay. So, in this way, in this way, overall, we have discussed all these things.

So, I hope that this video, I don't know how many hours it will be. I will release it after editing. I am extremely sorry that the video is a bit late because I couldn't get time due to regular lectures. I also procrastinated a bit, was a bit reluctant, and initially, it took me time to consolidate the content while creating it. But eventually, somehow, when I recorded it, I tried to record everything in just two days, even while continuing the lectures. So, I definitely put efforts into it because I recorded it by being involved for 8-10 hours continuously. So, I hope that these efforts, my efforts, will be helpful to you. I hope this video will be helpful in building your perspective for your exams, in adding value to your content, and especially in revision. And I will try to record and release the other two videos soon so that you get time and especially it helps you in last-minute revision. So, thank you very much for all this and for your love and support. I hope you continue to love and support me and do subscribe, share this basically this channel, and comment to me whatever your views are about this entire lecture. Thank you very much. See you in the next video.