Richard Feynman: Quantum Mechanical View of Reality 1

[Music] [Music] we got everybody here who's coming I guess but I see somebody who isn't here how do you like that now that's an old philosophical question isn't it whether you can see somebody that isn't here I remember arguing in Princeton with The Graduate students for hours and hours the philosophy students as to whether what you were talking about when you said there was no chicken in the ice box yeah well it's philosophy so much of you you outgrew that pH that's why yeah I have nothing to do with philosophers ever uh we thought that it was prob possible that there's still people who don't appreciate the difficulty of this uh this thing with the boxes and so uh we'd like you divide you into two groups those who are perfectly confident about it and don't want me to go over it 16 more times and those who have like me to go over it well at least two more times so can we uh we're going to divide this system this thing up uh and we'd like to know how many want me to go over it a couple more times till they really fully feel the difficulty all right we have two three customers something like that so what we'll do is that Ralph over there who's an expert and my assistant Guru will uh take care of you in the meantime the guys who have been asking me very technical questions about perturbation Theory calculations and other matters of this kind will have a chance to talk to me because we have such a difference in the backgrounds of people we're going to separate temporarily uh so the ones who are having trouble before we have caught we'll catch up and see why it's interesting because that's the whole purpose of this is to understand that if you don't understand that we're not going to understand anything else I mean we don't there's no problems so that's essential thing after that it's very easy it's going to be easier it's just like k a mountain and from then it's to get a view you see the view and now you climb around down on the ground and have fun so that's what it is but we have to get you up to the mountain right so Ralph will climb help you climb to the top of the mountain in the meantime these guys who think they're there already will waste time by answering the technical things and complicated things so which the others w't be interested in anyway all right so can we do it that way so he's over there I'd like to the table all right how about that so those who are having you're not going to miss anything in other words because it's just going to be some specific problem yeah so we'll just uh take care of that and the other ones will be uh we'll talk about other things please then I'll come back when they're all back all on the mountain then we'll go back to the top of the mountain and show what the views are from there on okay so the present questions would perhaps be best if they're not directly attached to this question question of the 2/3 we'll delay those until uh friends come back from the mountain okay oh brownie in motion uh that of course is fun it's an you mean what do you want me to do about it you know about it I know a little bit about it and I was thinking in terms of what you said uh yesterday about um reason I came up to mind was you said well the atom doesn't have to act the way we act yes on a side because of different scale and I was thinking well where would Randomness be in the cell I was thinking living cells you mean in Liv yeah ter biological process I was thinking of diffusion right and uh I reformulated the question of that by saying talk about Browning emotion yes there's a kind of Randomness uh which is but that Randomness is not involved in quantum mechanical Randomness you're quite aware and uh it's uh due to the complexity of things that there's so much stuff and there all atoms are bouncing against each other and the in a kind of chaotic manner so that the in for example liquid like water the molecules are uh we we can take a normal view of molecules as little balls or little shapes of different kinds and all the same kind actually they're all water molecules and that that they're piled together and jiggling all the time next to each other and this Perpetual jiggling is a molecular motion browni and motion is uh observable such it's possible to see this jiggling if you uh put a small particle very fine particle of dirt as a matter of fact I did it with toothpaste it's it's rather nice with toothpaste if you haven't got a very powerful mic good microscope it's easy to see if you put something like toothpaste or something that's a little powder in it then the very fine particles keep jiggling about all the time under the microscope perpetually in the case of the toothpaste they are flat the one that I happen to have were very good because they were some kind of flat little crystals and my microscope wasn't even big enough to see them but because they would turn and the light would come just right it would reflect and there' be these little flashes all over so it's kind of but it's easy with a good microscope and U it's very much like I always I haven't seen this for years but there used to be sometimes tremendous push balls that they had enormous ball great big thing and they put it on a field with people trying to push it to some direction the other team is trying to push it the other way and the whole ball moves and there's this crowd of people underneath all pushing one way or the other and the ball just Jiggles and if you look at it from a distance you could imagine it was so far away you couldn't see the individual people but could still make out the little ball and you'd see this little ball jiggling from which you can infer that the people are jiggling so in the same way what you're looking at is a very large mass of atoms when you look at a particle that you can see because a particle you can see even in the microscope is a billion atoms or so a great big thing but it doesn't stay put because it's being bombarded All This Time by the little atoms and it it therefore Jiggles a little bit and that's called Brownian motion it was discovered by Robert Brown a biologist uh that when he looked through microscope he saw this jiggling motion being a biologist you would think that he would decide that this motion that he saw must be a form of life but he was a good biologist and uh made the necessary experiments and ultimately discovered that the Motions even existed in the water that was enclosed in a quartz crystal that you could get from the ground that had been there for millions and millions of years and he looked in it was still jiggling inside there so he concluded that couldn't be life that that was a a universal phenomenon of of uh nature and it is that we look very calm we look at things that they're permanent they're stationary but as a matter of fact of course they're made out of piles of atoms which are always jiggling our eyes are can't see the delicate jiggling but that is a way that you could make a random generator you could amplify such jiggling the electrons and wires jiggle too everything's jiggling that's yes that's right and so they make electrical voltages which fluctuating so if you have a good amplifier you can get a rushing noise all the time and it's easy to measure and so on as a matter of fact uh the first determinations of the sizes of atoms was made by measuring how much of jiggling there was because you can imag you can see uh that uh how much this thing Wiggles depends upon how big the molecules are and so on and how many there are so at of course in the beginning when there was a theory of atoms there was a lot of evidence for it but there was no way of measuring or estimating how big they were at first uh the first estimate was made I think by the intensity of the blue of the sky which I is curious but the more accurate one is the one Bund the jiggling Einstein made a lot of mathematics for the theory of browni and motion this jiggling and these equations were used to compare to experiment to determine the sizes of atoms since then there are much better ways of measuring the size sizes that what else can we say about the jiggling do you have any other points yes I mean I don't want to get too technical we can now because we've got all the untechnical people when I was a student was an experiment I was to set up for the dualism of of uh you know wave and particle I wonder how that is today it's a two slit yes you know you if you have one slit yes I know I want to discuss the two slit experiment in detail later on a few days from now because I was actually setting up the the counters okay you know and I was yeah well we're going to describe that very experiment but therefore if you don't mind I I keep seem always every one of your questions I always seem to put off but let's say it this way they're very relevant to what we're talking about and I had planned to talk about them that's not I'm not going to leave you off at and I'm not cheating you yes okay so my question yesterday was regard to the I it's not clear to me why time and diagrams should actually manifest when we look for them because because because you know the actual exact solution is an infinite sum that we can't do of all terms right right in in in in theory so why in nature do we find the terms because we're finding the answer so to something let let me uh show you something okay suppose that the right answer to a mathematical problem is 1 / 1us 1 100 and suppose I don't know how to divide because it's very difficult this is imaginary this is analogy the analogy is they have very complicated equations I can't solve directly but there are certain other operations that I know how to do more or less easily so yes now we could say that this would be equal to 1 plus 01 plus 01 * 01 plus 01 * 01 * one which we write is the three times you know that's the cube and so on now the fact that and and so on forever it's never correct if I stop anywhere but if I keep on going let's say it goes 01 * 01 * 01 * one four times or you know what this Cube means I presume four times and then it there five times and so forth okay now if I wanted to see whether my theory agreed with experiment so I measured something that the theory says it's this big all right but I can't really calculate that because I don't know how to divide you understand it's an analogy of course I know how to divide but I do know how to multiply and add and so I would measure this let's say I'd measure this and I'd find out the result was 1013 or something whatever I want to know if it agrees with experiment I mean the theory let's say it went to here that many places that's not a decimal point that's that's that means I got it that accurate like I got it accurately and I'm these are significant I measure it again and again and it always agrees with that now we want to find out if it's correct then we could do it this way we'd say well if it was a sloppy measurement the answer is one that means I drop all this stuff but I could do better by adding another piece which is the first piece but the next piece turns out if you multiply it out to be double double double one and the next one if you worked it out know one * 0 one four four Zer 6 Zer it's five zeros and a one and so on now maybe to make the analogy better it gets harder and harder to calculate the I'm it's hard for me to multiply it takes a lot of work here I have to do more multiplying and more multiplying okay so I can only do a few of these terms nevertheless you see if I do a few of them I get an excellent approximation to the answer so you say why is it valid it's valid for the following to do to leave out some terms when really the correct answer is a sum of all the terms the answer is is that the higher terms are contributing less and less we hope anyway we can't calculate them exact we're not going to compute them exactly that we're going to stop somewhere but by a mathematical argument or by guessing or by noticing how each one is going down so well we suppose that the the higher ones are smaller and smaller so if we forget some that only the first four say then we we would get an answer that was presumably rather accurate we can estimate that the next one is hund time smaller than that perhaps of course all these estimating and so on are unnecessary we actually can carry it out in this example but it's by analogy we imagine it's hard to do all the arithmetic then we would say the end is 1011 and could conclude for examp o1 let's say and could conclude from this example that it disagrees with experiment or if it agrees depends on what the experimental result is it could be agreed it could agree uh the point is we don't have to calculate mathematical quantity exact L the theory is complicated we have other mathematical rearrangements which are equivalent that's all it is and the perturbation Theory socalled with the diagrams is simply a way of calculating the successive terms of a series like that clear to me I'm not clear why the specific terms manifest because we started with something that we know here a formula that produces these terms that's what the theory is the way I'm hearing the question is each one of those terms a findan diagram and he's asking why should the individual terms manifest as physical process individual term all the terms are there like a particular one of those terms might be a particular kind of scattering no a particular kind of scattering is the sum of all the terms all the things are happening when there's a scattering you've broken it up into Elementary subps to an analyze it each diagram represents a a piece of an analysis you could say in this case uh if you wanted to right you could say this is called a schanus okay now the theory is complicated it says no any number of schanes can occur I can analyze it by saying either there are no schanes the Pro the contribution from the no schanus effect is one the contribution from the one schanus effect is 01 and two schanus is 0.1 and so on but in any real situation there's un arbitrary number of schanus and they're in the formula here we look at decay of a neutron Decay electon neutrino yes simple but there are higher terms that's right that means that the formula for the decay of a neutron is a complicated expression which is being expressed as a sequence of approximations understand the first uh the first order term yes is a finding diagram and the second order is a is is second order terms another more complicated fin di that's right represents a more complicated we look in nature and we find the first order term plus the second order ter plus second order whatever it is we play them all okay we find them all as nearly as we can measure if if we only measured a six a certain number of figures that I can't be sure that these are here but they were invented because this is what we were trying to express we know this side and we represent it this way and uh we just say there at these terms and these terms are left out because they're approx they're so small I don't know what the problem is yeah I know well maybe we can talk together sometime and get it to clear have everybody back or no I see there's still somebody work is we're all back J K oh okay so you're all back you mean you've all been educated everything okay oh great well that was easier he said it would take a half an hour but apparently you were closer to understanding it uh than he thought or he was clever at explaining it that or else he gave up in despair evener term right okay well now that we all are together on on it and see that there's something deeply puzzling about it I review the phenomena for just a moment and say a few words about it and tell you things the idea was we discovered this that we can get two boxes Each of which has three buttons on it there's three buttons which we say one or two or three and we can push a button and it lights a light which is either red or green you mind I changed the color from red and black the black light is a little Annoying analogy doesn't light it's no good so here's the measuring light that uh comes out you push yes you could do it many ways you push this and the light's red or you or green this is button one button two button three like likewise on this box and just to review Once finally more goes like this the boxes set up and I give you charges for them or I give you the boxes think I have once they were together they can be taken anywhere now it goes like this if you push any button here the light will light up either red or green and it's about 50/50 if you push a button here and then push a different button on the box then the light agrees with the other one only a quarter of the time time that is if this one gives red and then you push the other one this will only give red a quarter of the time or it gives black the opposite color 3/4 of the time we've said it both ways right and that's very curious if there were well we've explained the Curiosity of it too many times now the situation is here that this uh box has the same prop that this box will always agree with this one if you push a button on both of them then the buttons will give the same color lights this doesn't have a light yet so therefore it won't work yet all right I'll put the light on it good now if you push button two on both boxes then the lights are both red or both green they always agree with each other no problem and uh but what's odd is that if you push a button one here and get red and push button two here it'll be black 3/4 of the time and after a lot of thought and much study we've discovered that that's very strange okay we can get two-thirds of the time without any trouble but not three quarters of the time so I would now like to dis to say what where the UN what the uncertainty principle is I said it once before I'll just say it again to make it clear to everybody who now understands it what Bell's theorem is and what the Einstein Podolski Rosen Paradox were supposed to be okay and a little bit of the history of it first forget the second box first and think about this first one if when I push this button I get red and green then if I push this one and it agrees or disagrees let's say 3/4 of the time that's impossible unless if we imagine there were cards under there or something like that that were set that when we started out that this was going to be red if we pushed it and if we push this one let's say it was going to be green and this one green then sometimes when we push a pair of buttons like this pair we get them to match and that would be a third of the time because we could pick the buttons in every pair combination and there are three out of all of the six different ways of choosing three different ways of choosing pairs one of them match that that one would give a match that would give a not match and that would give a not match so if I picked two buttons at random I'd expect they'd match one3 of the time but actually they only match one quarter of the time the easy example would be if but they didn't match at all then you would have to say sir in either case that something happens that when you push this button if they were red green green was a set that they would have made if I had pushed them that when I pushed this one I must change it somehow because the experimental result is a quarter of the time so when I push this the only way to explain that is to have a machine that if I push one button it changes the ones underneath now if we go to Nature and look at it and say well what happens if I looked at all the buttons at the same time that I pushed this and got the result and pushed that and push that and found all the results were always repeat for example nothing would ever change then I'd been in a pickle so but it is true that we're only allowed to push one button at a time and furthermore it does turn out that when we push a button let's say this one and gets red then this one turn is green say and we push this one again it's no longer red so we have experimentally noticed that it is true it's quite possible and perfectly true that we could imagine it this way that when we push the buttons they change the colors of the other lights I remind you if you push the same button again and again it always checks out the same color I start out make sure this is Red by pushing it eight times then I push this one it's green it'll stay green all the time see then if I push this it's possible that it be green now okay otherwise i' never be able to explain this one3 change yes yes if you push the same button it never changes the result if you push it again push the same button again wait a while yes it in a particular circum obviously this is set up for a particular measurement yes it can be made so that it doesn't in general doesn't change and you can push it as much as you want there are situations where things change but there are situations where they don't yes you can push it as many times as you want in succession and nothing about that button changes we don't know what's happening in the other ones because we can't see when you push another one then you see it's changed so you could still imagine that there were sort of potential or cards underneath there or some kind of thing that determines what color is going to be but now we have a new rule that when we push it it changes what's under the other buttons and furthermore we can't assume that it doesn't change because if we assume it doesn't change we're going to get in trouble with the one quarter result or three quarter so therefore we would have to say that if this Theory well experimentally it's right the theory is right but when the early days when it was first discovered all the experiments weren't done yet but when the theory came out that would predict results like this it was obvious that it was necessary for such results that if there were such a thing as the potential non lights that were going to light I mean the potential cards under there that by pushing buttons you're changing the results that you would get for the other buttons and experimentally it does turn out just like we said it's all right everything's okay if you push this and get red then you push this and get green it is possible when you push that to find it's changed in fact it's necessary that you find it change because if we keep on thinking about this we would get twoth thirds otherwise and we don't for different two thirds of the time they would be different they would change and and and one/ third they would be the same but it's rather 3/4 than one quarter so we have to have it change and God thank God it does change but that's a very simple view then there's nothing wrong with that with to say that there were these things were under here but they changed now to say there were things under here that is ahead of time there there's potentiality to be red or green or green without looking at it yet we can talk about such an idea we're going to call a classical view that means an old fashioned View and what Heisenberg said was that the oldfashioned view if it's tried to be maintained at all would have to have in it an additional new feature that it shall be impossible to determine what color this one would be without changing the potential color that the other one would be in other words by measuring that by pushing that button number two you've got to change the colors under number one or three if you wanted to picture it with color and we see why we have to do that otherwise we would get 1/3 and we wouldn't get the result today of experiment and of that time of theory historical however Heisenberg's statement wasn't measured with this particular box business and he didn't have this nicely which took 40 Years of patient thinking to get the simplest possible example he had a more complicated example which was measuring uh something called a position of a paracle which is an idea that anybody classically would think a little ball or electron or a particle would have some kind of position and you can measure what it was it would be a number it would tell you how far it is from the East wall but three numbers if you want plus that wall plus that wall but let's talk about motion just this way there'd be a number which would tell how far a particle was from a wall there was another thing one could measure in classical physics which was something like the speed actually it's called the momentum it's the speed times the mass it's a thing that tells you how well it coasts and uh you could also measure the momentum something obviously you can measure its speed and you can measure it as accurately you want and the position as accurately you want as you want but according to the mathematics that he discovered Heisenberg discovered he saw that the implication that you could measure the speed and the position both simultaneously and know them and that they would check when you measure them again and again was impossible it was contrary to what it would the theory would predict he claimed then that it would be like this that if you measure the position very accurately and then try to measure the speed or momentum I should say more precisely it's the speed times of man then if you measure the position again it would be different it would be possible to have something standing still so if you measure the speed measure the position again and again it's always the same but then if you measured the momentum even if it's supposed to come out zero when you measure the position it wouldn't be exactly the same in other words it's not like the classical particles in a normal sense is is possible only if you allow that measurements are going to disturb the system that is if you're you measure the position and then try to measure the momentum then new position is is irreversibly jiggled if you want by the momentum measurement and then when you measure position the momentum that you determined before is now screwed up so if you measure the momentum again it's not the same it's completely analogous to our boxes we measure let's say this and then that we measure this by pushing this button it's always red we can check it's perfect we got a nice measurement of that now we try to measure this we measure this and we see whether it's green and we keep checking it's nice and green then we go back and see if this is still red if it were red before I forgot to say let's suppose this were red this is green we look back it might sometimes be green in other words it can change this is a lot easier than positions because positions can have all kinds of numerical values could be here or here or here or here and here we have only two values red or green that's why this is kind of fun it's easier to work with than than numbers which can have all kinds of values and Mathematics is more complicated but here it's much easier but you see then that the theory must predict that if you measure something you if you thought classically that there are these things under here that you're measuring that this whatever it is this is the greediness of this thing when you push two whatever it is then you must allow that when you try to measure one you change whatever it is the greenness or redness for a two measurement in other words you can't measure one and then measure two and expect that it doesn't affect number one okay and that's the general idea of the uncertainty principle which is more generalized says there are pairs of quantities such that if you measure one you cannot allow that you try to measure the other one you it doesn't change the first one okay yeah that's what I said it I meant that was an informal way of saying it changes the value right in a way that can't be undone that's completely lost that the information is now lost or partially lost it's like shouting way IR you mean it's irreversible change that a peration that you can't reverse it's true it's it's true anyone who's married knows that all of the arguments that they've ever had through the entire married life come out in one great well on the next argument [Music] the out that there is a too much of a focus on the jiggle because there a lot of systems at the atomic level where you only get one shot at them you only get one measurement what you do is you prepare a situation and you for instance in a beam you can say I'm going to have half of them I'm going to do position measurements the other half I only get one measurement that's right and the jiggle doesn't make any difference it says I can only there's limitations on how I can prepare the system uh that's another way of speaking of it uh the preparing means that you want to be able it's a different idea but it's the same idea suppose that I said that I have some way of setting it in that's preparing it so I know what their red or green are going to be the answer is I can set it in the way I want this idea that I'm setting them in like this won't work if even if you allow I'm only allowed to push one button I'm going to get in trouble in saying that I can set in particular numbers underneath it's the same you see you're talking about predicting and preparing but preparing is always done by can be thought of is by measuring something else to get it right it's another way of preparing I could make sure that this is a red by pushing this button checking that it's a red if it's a green I throw it out I try it again until I get a red now I know I prepared it so this is red now when I measure this I change my the preparation is screwed up that's what preparation means is this applicable only to single events single particles or is it applicable to massive numbers at once it it's applicable to any system at all the system may contain only one particle to contain three particles or 25 particles how about a billion particles it's perfectly all right numbers are no problem it uh yes it could be any number of particles where you have beam collisions you got billions of this particular set of numbers with the 3/4s in the one was with one particle and in this case with two and I had two boxes and we're studying what happens with two the difficulties the character of this thing is is in the particle and if you have a billion particles each one or them are all doing the same kind of terrible thing right so it's a universal difficulty you're still done Disturbed one of these guys that knows too much I'm not going to use ter I'm use your boxes okay uh I could generate a situation in which I have boxes that are making themselves available for me right these let's forget the other box for a moment these yeah they keep coming out right right right now I can create a situation that uh certain combinations of that box have less probability of coming out what do you mean by certain combinations uh those boxes in which uh only I can make it to the only a third of the time you'll get red out of uh uh door number one and two third of the time why don't we make it easy we always get red out of whole number one is that satisfying no the easy case is the trivial one I'm trying to make the non-rival what one and that is where I can put a bias on on what the measurements are going to Res right without ever having made a measurement well that may be whatever you say whether you've made a measurement or not but there is another way of putting a bias is there by just taking the by checking the what's in the box and if it's right sending it out that's equivalent it's equivalent because the forces which you're making the separations are equivalent to but the point I'm trying to make is you don't have to do that okay and if you don't do that then you canot what do you do you see and it's a little we we we get into some complications as to how we do that with these boxes um kind of pulverizing filters or filters over yes yes you can load the boxes with some particular Prejudice yes but it's very much equivalent your filters are equivalent to my taking boxes and checking something about the just a minute checking something about the I didn't say push a button checking something about the boxes and letting them through if they were okay but that process is not one in which a measurement is made whatever and that that's the planum raising no it's not it's the equivalent it's equivalent and measurement could have been made without any further disturbance but it's only when a measurement actually is made that you can attribute what happens to the fact that there was a jiggle took place you're talking about the uncertain relationship being due to the I've already got all of the difficulties with the other box I don't need to take this other example it doesn't add anything okay it doesn't add anything so uh what a way of speaking would be to say one of the things is either I see what you want to say I I I know what you're trying to say which will make more clear when I take the case of two boxes let me just get to it in my own way and then we'll come back the original one way of thinking about the uncertainty principle which I which I made which is a less subtle than the regular way of describing was to say that if we tried to imagine that there was such a thing as the red green green if we pushed a button on one of these things to determine it it has to change the other one and it's like that if we imagine that a particle had a position in a momentum then if we measure one we have to disturb the other okay distur zero in certain circumstances by luck but not with position and momentum no if you measure position you can have to disturb the momentum information disturb but statistically it disturb that's what I'm talking about so any prediction that you had made previously is not necessarily right so your information is lost I think it would help the discussion if you tell how you measure position and how you measure momentum I don't have to because I have an example where I'm measuring something else with buttons I say you push the button and see whether the light's red or green that's I'm talking about the electron I know but I'm talking historically the situation is I've tried to simplify this thing if I tell went through the whole thing historically we would go all through all the confusions and all of the difficulties that people have had for all these years to try to understand this clearly so what I've tried to do is take a simpler example and if I go back now and take all the confusing examples and go and explain all of those I've made it much more complicated than it need be what I'm trying but I'm telling you only about the history so you can find out what fits into what you just learned what words belong to what what I'm trying to say is that the uncertainty principle is the statement that if you thought that you knew that you could say what was under here that if you pushed a button it's necessary that if you push another button it changes that button in other words what under here becomes uncertain or is changed by in an uncertain way because it's probabilistic by pushing this other button that's the idea that's the that's an example of the uncertainty principle the uncertainty principle applied to this example which we've been using as our primary example of the behavior of quantum mechanics but the original statement of the uncertainty principle was more General and wasn't on this particular thing and one of the examples was position and momentum measurements we could go through the EXT standard way of describing Heisenberg's uncertainty principle but I think that we would only go much slower than if we went this way yeah I just want to get clear you push if you push the first button you get red you push the second button you get green and then if you push the first button you could get either red or green cor be the uncertainty principle that's right it is if you not only do you get it either red or green yeah but you get it red or green with a What If This Were let's say this was red then this was green you push this button it's different than this button 3/4 of the time the same one quarter of the time and that is always the same numbers no matter what there was here before you understand what I mean the fact that what you've measured here before becomes Irrelevant for future predictions after I push this button situation something like that yes if you push this and it's red or I don't care green whatever now you push this and it's green either way the chance of this one being red or green is still If This Were green one qu red 3/4 green uh sorry one4 green 3/4 red the fact it's 3/4 is red Prejudice toward red is not because it was red before but because this one was green for instance If This Were red and this accidentally were red when you pushed it then this time this is more likely to be green 3: one 3 out of four and red one out of four okay but the proportions for this are completely independent of what your previous measurement was so in this particular case it's an example that measuring this means that any information you had about that other one before is completely irrelevant in future predictions okay that's the nature of the you say when you P the second one the first one would be the opposite no I didn't mean to imply that I meant only that it was opposite 3/4 of the time in other words it behaved exactly the same way whether or not it what I really mean and I made not now clear and thank you for your question is that pressing the second one loses the information that any information that you had about pushing the first one however pushing the first one doesn't lose information if you want to measure the first one again directly without pushing any other one because if I measure again it always agrees so I've got the information so you say nice write it down now you push another one I don't need to worry about what I had before all future predictions of this one are independent of what I had before okay so memory is outside the system in this particular system no not outside the system because if I push button one I have a memory I can find out what it is again by pushing it again that's the only one no it isn't because if I push button two and I knew that was red then button two uh is got to be green three out of four times on the average but it doesn't know that but it happens you know no no I try it and it works that's what I mean well who knows what I mean the point is no it's question of memory that is to say the system the system is behaving in a way that dependent on what happened in the past if this was red and then I push this one it's likely to be green three out of four times and that's is a is different than If This Were green so that it has a remembrance of what this was if you want memory is crazy but what's true is that it doesn't remember three steps back if you push a different button you destroys the information from before okay pushing two destroys the information you had from pushing one and that fact that that has to happen that if we had discover so in other words suppose that in the early days when this was first uh measured you say there are different ways I don't have to push the button I can look inside the Box by some kind of other trick I got other methods I scatter neutrons I I hokey Pocus I do something else to determine what this but button would have been if I pushed it after all there are switches in there after all I can look at the way the thing is loaded before I push the button that is I make a different kind of measurement by a different method which is to give me the same information now if I could Define describe a different method which would have found out about these which would not destroy those numbers I never could get the one quarter results that we were talking about it's impossible well seen B's uncertainty principle went on to say well that not only does it change the measurement but that no other way can exist to measure things that will disturb it less there was a minimum amount of screw up that you had to make when you measured button two about the information of one okay now this kind of a picture was a kind of a classical picture and Heisenberg was talking about the relation of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics really Heisenberg's principle can be looked at it another way there was old ideas of classical physics quantum mechanics is now different it would be useful for people who were so used to classical physics to tell tell them when their ideas will fail and his statement would be another way of saying it would be if you try to talk about something so you simultaneously talk about the position and the momentum you'll get in trouble the logic will be wrong something will come out wrong in the same way in our case if we start to say that we could say that behind here is a red thing and behind here is a green and behind here is a green and that's what determines the the things and nothing changes and they're definite then we're going to get in trouble the logic that we make after that is going to fail so that's another way of saying it so really it's a statement of protection a statement so to speak of where the new mechanics that you might get away roughly with the old Mechanics for a large regions approximately but you've got to watch out particularly if you're trying to talk about things which involve in this case in his case position and momentum at the same time in our case what's going to happen if I push this and what's going to happen if I push that simultaneously without worrying about the fact that when I push one it sort of changes the other but this idea that there was something here which is being changed when I push

The other button is still not satisfactory. That's what you wanted because we discover that we can make two boxes. And instead of finding out what's in here by peddling around in here, by, we remember one way was to push the button. The other way was to look underneath the switches or whatever. But whatever way we did it, it had to be true, otherwise we have an inconsistency. That if we determine that this would have been red and check it with the button, it, yes, it's red. Check. Yes.

Let's, let's take another. Suppose I found another way to look in here and look inside the switches if there were any and determine whether this was going to be red. All right. Now, if it's any good after I've determined it was going to be red, then I can push the button and check whether it's true. Always works. But in the same way, I would be in trouble if after I determined that it's not. We get in some trouble with the chances. We know that we know if we can determine this without changing these, we're going to get in trouble because we're not going to get the three quarters. But there is a nice way.

So you could always say now with Heisenberg that any attempt to measure this by any method at all is going to affect it. And that's perfectly happy and satisfactory. If you would say, well, that's very easy. I'll just imagine any ping that you're doing there inadvertently screws, turns something in the air. But there is a way, a magic way of determining what's here without touching this one. Just a different way, which is to measure this other box, which has been correlated with it, that we talked about. We have the special circumstance that we can arrange things so that what this one gives can be determined by pushing that one.

Now, because this box can be anywhere in, inside of cylindrical blockhouses or whatever else, it's a bit of a strain to suggest that when you push that, it changes this. And so we've, we have this puzzle that, uh, we would like to say that when we met, when we determine what's in box number one, uh, we would, uh, have to change things in twos and threes. If we took this whole view that there is a potentiality that there are cards inside or something like that. So that the idea that there's cards inside or something like that, there's two ways of doing it.

You can either say there's a marvelous force that exists at any distance instantaneously through blockhouses, through copper walls, through quartz. There's nothing you can do to affect it by doing something in between. Or simply to say that the old ideas are completely wet, that we can't talk logically about there being potentialities for red, green, and green, or for any other potentialities until we push the buttons. That to say what they might have been before we push them is no longer going to be permitted.

We can't start to think, well, let's see. In the beginning, it could have been that when I pushed, whatever I set it in, when I set this in, I can say something like this. This is where all our trouble comes from. We say, let me see, I haven't pushed them yet, but there's various possibilities that when I push that, it would be red, that one green, and that one green, or that this one would be red, red, red, or whatever. But these potentialities, we do not, physicists do not permit themselves to talk about anymore. They just say, after we push it, what it was. And don't try to talk about what it might have been if we had pushed it, if we haven't pushed it.

In other words, the only things that can be described are the things that have already been measured. And not things that are potential. There's always chicken in the ice box. Perhaps there is, but you can't tell until you open the door. And opening the door may make the chicken disappear or maybe not with certain probability. But there's always chicken in the ice box. Now, whether that's true or not, we can't say. That is, in other words, even if we made up a theory that there was chicken in the ice box, we'd open a door, we'd get into difficulty because we can find another ice box by which you can determine whether the chicken's in there by opening its door. That's this one.

And so you're really right about this chicken in the ice box door business. And so when it isn't, when the door's closed, we can't say whether there's chicken or not in the ice box. We try to say, I don't mean we can't say there's chicken or there's not chicken because we don't know. I mean, the whole idea of saying it's either got chicken in it or it hasn't got chicken in it produces a failure. The other one is say, irreversibly jiggle. No, you can't use that anymore. You can't say that it's, that it is either one way or the other. And when you open the ice box, it changes because we can find out what was in the ice box by another measurement. And that gets inconsistent.

We, yes. So the old game of trying to figure out if the light is on when the door is closed on, yeah, it's gotten worse. You see, because with the old thing, the question is whether the light is on or the light is off when the door is closed. Seems like a legitimate, it seems legitimate to say the following. Either the light is on or it's off. There are two possibilities. Now, let me start thinking. Okay, the beginning step is no longer allowed. Before we push the button, we can't say. If we do, we're going to get into logical trouble and not be able to understand how nature works. If we, so we have to train ourselves. And that's what physicists have done. They train themselves in a negative fashion to be very careful not to say things like, well, let's see, this is either red, green, green, that, what would happen if I push the buttons? Or else it's green, green, red, or else and so forth. Those are possibilities. Now I'll push the button to see what I got. The whole statement that these are the list of possibilities is no longer permitted.

We have to be very careful with the logic. Okay, what I'm going to show you in the next days is what kind of machinery we actually do use and what kind of thinking we actually do use in order to predict results like this, because we can predict them. You see, we do have a theory for all this. It's not that chaotic, but it's not at all like what you're used to. Your simple ideas of logic, the simplest idea that, that these are the possibilities and let's see which one it is, is not permitted. You get into trouble. What is permitted and how you can do it so you don't get into trouble will be described in the future workshop sessions.

Okay, now I wanted, but now I'm trying to, to explain to you why I claimed in my workshop advertisement that I would tell you about the uncertainty principle, in Bell's theorem, and Einstein's paradox, because I have just done so. It's all finished. But you will not be satisfied because you don't know where each of the pieces are. So first, I told you where the uncertainty principle was, the statement that by measuring something, you got to disturb the predicted expectation for something else. But it's more subtle. You're not allowed to have an expected predict for something else anymore and say it's changed. You have to have it be more abstract in order to be able to understand this situation.

There, of course, is another way, and people have proposed it. And that is to say that when you push this, there's a, a marvelous influence. It spreads instantaneously through all the world and changes those other things which were correlated that you expect to measure. Okay, uh, this is possible. And that's a model that you might prefer over the idea of saying, uh, that there's no, you can't talk about the possibilities before you make the measurements. That, uh, has turned out. People have tried to do that. There are two, two directions in which you can go. You can say, yeah, there's always this instantaneous action, and it does, does exactly the right thing, and it doesn't depend on the distance. But that's an unnecessary complication, so to speak. I mean, it doesn't help any. It's perfectly okay. But since it action can go at any distance without any effect, there's no laws about it except that it does just exactly what you want. So just describe what you want and never mind saying that it's done by some special law or some special magic, because that special high-speed interaction is only to protect your prejudices about the way you like to think about things. That's all it was for. It didn't change any results of what you'd expect for any experiment, which is what physics is about. And so don't bother to say it. It doesn't make any difference. You want, if you want, you say this is so puzzling. I like to say there's an instantaneous action that goes at infinite speed everywhere and is not affected by anything, only to make the answers come out right. Okay, is okay. You want to, okay. But it doesn't make any difference, right? Because it, the answers come out the same. So, yeah, so we just don't bother with saying it.

Most physicists now, however, there's another possibility. And that is that there really is such an action. But it isn't, as I said, that for short distances, it's independent of distance. But for long distances, it disappears. That it takes a little bit of time. That it does, does something. Then the predictions will be changed. For instance, if these boxes are pulled further apart, then this will not agree with that anymore. Or if I measure this too quickly, or not quickly enough, early enough, I can't predict what that one's going to be. And so on, because there's delays of this character to the interaction.

As soon as the interaction has character other than this universal marvel that goes at all distances at all speeds instantaneously just to get the right answer, but is more complicated, you say it takes time to go, or it weakens with distance, or anything like that, it makes new predictions. So in the earlier, some people, early on, not many, but some proposed just that. They couldn't take it. And so you said, there must be an interaction. And they can't take it that the interaction is so fast and what they call nonlocal. It doesn't propagate. It really doesn't take time to go anywhere. It doesn't go through anything. It does nothing you can affect it with. So it must be affected by something. And made various predictions of what it might be affected by. And then would propose experiments that you would do, have to do, to check out whether or not this magic force was, uh, doing the slightly different thing they wanted it to do than to be perfect. Okay. And these experiments that have been proposed never work so far.

Now, say, oh, well, I can certainly invent one which works over the entire range that's so far been checked. If I'll tell you what it is, right? You can just make the rules so that it'll go further on that. It'll happen only one light-year apart. You've got to move these a light-year apart. You'll never see any effect. Okay. We can't do that experiment. It's still possible, possible you could have it if you wanted. But there's no evidence for it. And all attempts of this kind to make those suggestions, which were not stupid, because this is so peculiar, it might have been that the prejudice about the way the world worked that you had previously was in fact right. And that there was some delay in the interaction. It's a good suggestion, only it isn't so far true.

So, so what we do in physics is we take what we find so far and try to extrapolate it to see over a wide range of experience to see if it works. It's, it's always possible the theories be wrong. That there really is an interaction. That this really doesn't work what I told you with the two boxes when they're a light-year apart or some other distance. It's always possible. We're not trying to find out for certainty what the world is like, but just what we've seen so far. And we can summarize everything that we've seen so far by saying that this interaction is instantaneous and magical and does exactly what we want to get the answer over here. Okay. And so we just don't talk worry about it yet because we have seen no effects on various things. People, however, are aware of the possibilities and are making suggestions for experiments. But so far, all of those experiments have failed. My personal opinion is that they're all going to fail. That the logic is wrong. That there was the prejudice that you had a rather deep one, of course, about the potentialities for what's going to happen before you push that, that must mean something. That the chicken in or out of the ice box has got to mean something. There's the only two possibilities. But that logic is wrong. I think that's really the way the world is. That our ideas that came from experience in the large scale world are that wrong. That that's all it is. But that's an opinion held by most physicists and perhaps incorrect. But, uh, we'll find out someday if the thing doesn't work. So far, it works. So let's talk about so far.

Okay, your way of changing L. I'll show you how we have to think logically. Yes, yes. We have to just be careful not to make some statement like, see, it isn't the fundamental logic like you say. I'm going to assume a variable X can have two values. That's not what we're saying. We're saying there is piece of chicken in an ice box or else it isn't. But we're not going to start to talk about what's in unless we open a door. Such ideas may not mean anything. It may not be an inside to the ice box, much less whether it's lit or not. As soon as you close the door, there's no inside or whatever. So it's not logic. It's a question of what you're going to allow yourself to talk about. So you're being rigorously operational. Yes, it has to be more operational.

The other point that the uncertainty principle makes causality relevant because since you can't determine with the present. No, no, you can. If you measure the, whether this is a red light or not, it's perfectly all right. It's just that attempting to measure another thing about the present simultaneously changes what you found before. Yeah, but you have to know where you are, where you're going in order to determine where. Yes, ah, to determine exactly. But you remember how I said that, uh, there would be probabilities that we're not able to predict the future exactly. We only predict the probability of different events. And if you want to say that, you see, we're not in a situation where we know this present and that determines exactly the future because it's not the way it appears to be. We can set up the present as perfectly as we want, and the future becomes uncertain. It's only probabilistic. So it's consistent with the thing.

Now, just to continue with this identification of words. All right. It was Einstein. After, uh, Heisenberg talked about the uncertainty principle of position and momentum measurements, uh, most physicists understood it and everything, okay, and took this point of view. But Einstein, uh, and Podolsky and Rosen didn't like it particularly. And they wrote a paper saying they didn't like it. And that's what it amounts to. What they didn't like. They took the analog of this experiment except for position and momentum measurements. They pointed out it was possible to get two particles separated. So by measuring the momentum of one of them, you would know ahead of time by the correlations that that would determine the momentum of the other. Just like if we push this button here, it would be just equivalent to pushing that button there because they're always agree. So you could make a pair of objects so that the momentum of this would always agree with the momentum of that. I, the momentum were opposite directions, but that's technical. You could put it through a mirror. You can make it so the momentum of this would always be the same as the momentum of that. And the position of this would always be the same as the position of that. So you measure the momentum of this one and the position of that one. And that was against the uncertainty principle, they said. Because by measuring the position of this one, surely you can't be changing the thing over there. And Heisenberg would have said, in the other way of speaking, if I would be crude, that by measuring the momentum, you jiggle and make unpredictable the position because of some mechanical effect. We have to deny that now. We have to, we can't just say it's a mechanical effect. As we now noticed that we can't say it's easy to understand. If you push this, you might have some wheels turning that change that. But if you push this, you have wheels turning over here to change that. No.

So they just pointed out this little difficulty that, uh, you can't take the classical point of view that a particle has a position. Well, then if you measure the position, that there is a position of momentum. When you measure the momentum, you change the position. That's too crude. Because you can measure the momentum of this other one, and you can't, it won't change the position of that one. It's just this is a completely analogous. It's an example of an Einstein Podolsky Rosen setup. The idea is that by measuring over here, where it's practically inconceivable that this could be affecting that, you get, uh, you can determine what this would have been if you didn't push it. But we don't like to talk about what it would have been if we don't push it anymore. That's the way we escape from that. And it was already known by the time Einstein and Podolsky wrote that that was what people were saying. But they were objecting to that. And they said that that's not an adequate description of of reality. Perhaps it's not an adequate description of reality, but it's an adequate description of whatever we're able to predict. And people who've tried to increase the reality of this by making this a real wave or something like that have always produced predictions which don't agree with experiment. So that's where it stands. And that's now we've talked about the uncertainty principle and Einstein Podolsky and Rosen. It all they said was there was such a situation which we've already used.

Did you have a question? Yes. Always. I've always been impressed by the fact that and not seen very many comments on the philosophical premises laid down by EPR, which is, if I can predict something with complete certainty, there's an element of reality that I can attribute. Basically, what you're saying is that's the piece of the action that you have to let go. Create the DMA. Right. That's right. You got that. Yeah. Just, just because I can measure. Yes. Right. Classical reality, fixed. And this reality is not. It's a different kind of reality. The world has to look different. Yes. Is that saying to that it's not a matter of the logic yet? That we haven't gotten to the new logic? But that right now we have to let go of the assumptions. Are other ways? Yes. There are two ways always of doing it. When something doesn't work, you can either say that you're not allowed to make certain steps of logic or to make certain perfectly obvious assumptions that look perfectly reasonable. Both of them are difficult because we're not, don't like either of them. The logic looks good. There's two ways of doing it. The easiest way, and the way that we've all chosen for practice in practice, is to say the, you can do as much logic as you want, but you got to be very careful about the kind of assumptions that you make about what's real and what's there, especially about potentialities. The whole thing is summarized this way. You can't say that this thing has a potential for producing red, green, and green. That's there before you push to check it. Okay. Uh, Wheeler has said, in a way, it's, it, one of these beautiful aphorisms that are shorthand, which you can only understand after you finally, finally understood the whole. Oh, you want me to wait a minute for your tape? Okay. I, uh, Wheeler has made one of those lovely aphorisms to describe this, which you'll only really understand thoroughly when you understand the whole thing. But, uh, it helps to remember. He says, there's no phenomenon. A phenomenon is not a phenomenon until it's an observed phenomenon. In other words, you can't tell what's happening in there, or there's no chicken or there isn't chicken until you look to see. So you only talk about what, what you're going to look to see. Wheeler, John Wheeler. I don't know. Is that Wheel? Maybe I don't know.

And then finally, in the list of, uh, things that are in the prospectus for this workshop, taking care of there was Bell's theorem. Huh? Taking care of all business. Yeah. I want to take care of the business I advertised and I have to show you that I've already done it. The other one is Bell's theorem. I've already told you about that, I think. And, uh, that says is simply a mathematical statement of the fact that situations like this can arise where the actual probabilities observed are impossible to explain by a classical type of, uh, card filling boxes scheme. If the odds had been 2/3 that we would get a different color and not 3/4, we could have explained it easily with all this logic would be okay. But that in quantum mechanics, some of the probabilities that would be predicted by quantum mechanics would disagree with the simple arguments in a situation like this that you'd get by thinking about cards being in the box. In other words, quantum mechanics would produce effects like this. The mathematical theorem is more complete. It tells you how much the effects are and where to look for them. But we have an example of such an effect. And that's all we need to show that something that quantum mechanics is odd. You don't also need a theorem to tell you how odd it's going to be in every case, which is what the theorem was. Okay. The theorem was in fact inspired by such discussions of this for special examples, but not quite as simple as this one where we have only three measurements, but measuring spins of electrons that were correlated and so on, where you can measure something that has, or, or the polarization of light, where you can measure a whole lot of different possible places. It's, if we had boxes with lots and lots of buttons, the point would be that some of the odds on the buttons were against the common sense, old-fashioned common sense. Yes. I was just going to point out that that actually Bell's description is very much like this description in the sense that in his setup, you actually do have to look at three different, uh, polarizer settings in order to get the inequality. Just, just as you have to have the three buttons. You need at least three before you get into trouble. You can show that there's no situation where you can measure just two things where the probabilities are not something that you could imitate with cards. So that's why it involves three in his theory. Yes. Yes. Whether thing is done general or you have a special example, there must always be a parallel between a general theorem and the special example of a kind. In fact, my personally find different people are different. Some people think abstractly right away, very well. I don't. I always have to have examples to understand something the first time I hear it, and then I kind of generalize from the examples. Other people like the general thing and then try to use it on examples. So I like this way of thinking of things, a nice simple example where all things are perfectly clear and there's not a lot of mathematical stuff that confuses me. Well, what if I study hard, I can sort of check out. In fact, what I do is the opposite. I take the mathematical scheme and try to find a case like this. I didn't find this one. I found one with six buttons. Okay. I mean, my original one was more complicated than this one of Mermin, which is beautiful, beautifully simple. Mine had six buttons. It was almost the same, actually, but it wasn't quite as good application of the theorem. The way you talk about the sun, the moon, and no, no, no. We've talked about it. There's nothing magical about it. It's just a mathematical statement that there are situations in the world where you make measurements like this, which will have this kind of paradoxical probability answers. You know, the answers will be not understandable by supposing it was done with cards that were shifted and stuff like that. Okay. That this kind of a thing can happen. That's all it is. It's a statement that this kind of a thing can happen. Who added this non-local reality? Day? I don't know about non-local reality. What two sets? Huh? You mean the two sets are different? Two sets of, uh, boxes? Right. Well, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen are the ones that emphasize this, uh, situation. It was already known to others what would happen in this situation. In fact, they could use the mathematics of the theory that existed for this kind of situation, but they didn't like the result. And they simply said that they said, can quantum mechanics be a complete description of reality? Because, as you pointed out, they made an assumption about reality, which was that if you could determine what was in that thing, that had to be somehow real. And if you could determine by doing something over here which didn't affect that, it couldn't affect that because there was no, no, independent of distance and simultaneous. And so then that was somehow real there. And they wanted to make it real. That insisted, in other words, that we'd be able to say that there was some sort of potential cards in here that are determining what happens. And that's just what we don't say.

So, yes, yesterday described that if you go through this process of pushing number one, it's red, then you push number two, and it's green. Yeah. Then you push number one again, it could be red. But now, if you go to the second box, it still hasn't changed number one. Correct. Although number one here may have already changed. Would that preclude any forces between them and any operating? Because obviously, in a kind of way, it does, doesn't it? It means that, yes, that's true. That if you were to say in some mechanical way that when you push this, you change that, then you would think that if you kept pushing the other ones, it would keep changing that. Okay. But it doesn't. Any further actions over here have nothing to do with what happens there. The only thing this is good for is permitting you to know what you would have gotten if you pushed, or rather better, I should be careful, permitting you to predict what would happen if you push the same button. Period. That's all it's able to do after that, the first time. And after that, nothing. That's an interesting point. And, uh, I have not analyzed that very carefully. And I don't know what the people who invent these waves have done with that aspect of it. Okay. Why it disappears after the first measurement? It's an interesting point that I have not studied. Thank you. I'll have to look that up into that. So that sort of helps to make it impossible, makes these waves get more and more complicated to explain what a result which we can describe over here and forget about this if we wanted to. It's just that this is correlated with it. Okay. So, oh, I guess that takes care of all of the three things. Okay. Now I've advertised. I've sold you what I advertised. And now I would like to, uh, well, we're not finished yet. Okay. Uh, we can talk about a few other things. And that's this. Let me ask this question. See, you don't know what can be done and what can't be done. So I'm going to tell you something. Maybe, maybe we could make a copy of this box without bothering it. That way we can make another box over here. Three boxes. Oh, what a wonderful idea. Three boxes. And let's make it so that is it possible this also has a one, two, and three? Is it possible to make three boxes such that the following happen? That if I wanted to find out what this would do, I remember last time with two boxes, I could push that. If this is red, that'll always be red after or before. Make it three. I could push this one also to determine whether this would be red. For example, if this is red, then this is red and this is red. Can we make it work with three? In other words, in nature, is it possible to arrange that there are three boxes which have the following property? I could look at any box to determine whether this was red by pushing any one of those buttons, not necessarily this one, and they'll always agree. All three boxes always agree. Likewise, if I push button two, all three boxes would always agree. Or if I push button three, they would always agree. Then we were going to get in trouble because it, it takes a little thinking. I haven't thought it out to make it simple. But because we have another box by which we could make another measurement over here, so to speak, without touching it, we're going to find it's just, it's impossible. Now, it's not impossible simply because it's logically impossible, but I mean it's, uh, logic. But if you count the number of cases that you get, that is, you measure this box, this box here, and this box here, and then ask how many times the pairs differ, they have to be a third. You see, this time I would be able to make three measurements, and I could list the three measurements. I could tell you what was one, what was two, and what was three. Now, we would have, maybe it would turn out that one time it would be red, black, black. Those were the results. Or green, green. I guess those are the results of measuring three different boxes. They're all available. Another time it could be green, red, red. The three different boxes. Or maybe red, red, red. Because I have an experimental situation with three boxes and I push one button on one button, number two on the second box, button number three on the third box. So this is number one on box one, or box A. This is number two on box B, and this is number three on box C. There's nothing wrong with that. So here's the three boxes, A, B, and C. Remember that whatever I get on C would be of the same if I pushed it on A, same number. Now, if I make this long list of possibilities, which are all measured now, those are numbers that are in notebooks. They're not in boxes anymore. I pushed the buttons and I wrote the answers down. Okay. After I've done this for a week and I've got thousands of these, I go back and I count. Count nothing has nothing to do with the boxes. Nothing. I count how many times do I get out of all this, a pair, two pair, one pair equal, and one. I got to get at least one pair equal out of every three. See, I could think of all the, I just have to count. Let me see. What do I count? I count how many times a pair that match appear. And here's one. It depends how many times. Okay, let's say how many times a pair match appear in the cab, in the column one, two, plus how many times a pair appear in a column 1, three. Well, how many times in 2, three? And I'm counted all the pairs. And you see, there can't be any less than 1/3 that pairs match. This is a pair that matched in this case. These didn't. In this case, this pair matched, but the other two different. So I must get at least one third matches. I can't get only a quarter matches because I've written them down. That's, that's impossible. So it's impossible. Therefore, something would be wrong if I could do it with three boxes and nature doesn't permit us to do it with three boxes. It's not possible to arrange in a quantum mechanical world, in the real world, in other words, three boxes which have this property that if I push any one button, I can determine what the others two would do. Any button, right? What is possible? It's curious. What is possible is to arrange three boxes such that they all agree with hole number one. Say, for instance, button one. I can take three boxes. In fact, I can take 3,000 boxes. I can make as many boxes as I want. Let's take three first because you get nervous. So if I push button one and say it's red, it'll turn out that any of the other boxes, if I push one, it'll also be red. Right? All right. But if I push number two on this box, and it's green, say, it doesn't mean that it's green here or it's green here. It doesn't agree in general, necessarily. All right. You understand? I can make it so that this box will agree with all the other boxes if I push one. So I can use any box I want to predict what one is going to do on any of the other boxes. Was the first one, number one box, I got special arrangement. I made a special arrangement with a number one connection system. Yeah, where I make multiples of these boxes, say three in this case, or five if you want, but which have the wonderful property. Let's make a lot of them. Okay. I keep doing this. You can go 3, 4, 5. I'm jumping too fast, but you can. It's the same idea. And I have a lot of boxes. And it's possible to arrange it by to get things set up. First position, first position. No, first, first button, first button, and first p. No, any number of pushes. If you just, if you don't push and it came green, would all the rest of and two C's the first push be? No, let, let me say exactly what happened. You're probably guessing right. Let me, let me just say it then. Yeah. You push one here and it's red. Let's say. Then you can predict that if you push one here, it'll be red. If you push this one, it'll be red. If you push this one, it'll be red. If it's number one, whole. Okay. However, right? If you push number two now. Oh, was one here and two there. You can't predict what it's going to be. But 3/4 of the time, you can guess it'll be different. Okay. Nor can you predict what'll happen on this, this one. They wouldn't agree. In other words, let's say I push this red. I got red. I look in this box. I push this with it's green. Okay. This does no longer have to agree with this. Uh, I could push this. It wouldn't help me to know what this is. And pushing that after I pushed one doesn't do any good. Nor, in fact, is it true this way that if I started this out and I know they all agree in one, by pushing two, I can find out what I would get on the others? No, I'm not allowed to do that. If I do that, I get into trouble, as I told you, because I make a list and I would be in trouble. A different kind of trouble, much worse, because it's on a notebook with there it is. I count them and it's impossible. Yeah. You say it's the only the left hand position. Yeah. For instance, you could make it for the other positions and you can make other kinds of correlations. But let's say it's possible to make a perfect correlation, but only for one position. Okay. A perfect correlation means that you can determine any other box by pushing one. You can only do that with one position. You can't do it with more than one. When there were only two boxes, we had the wondrous fact that we could do it with all three positions correlated perfectly. But no longer. Not when we try to make multiples. In fact, if you made multiples that have this property, that are all built so you're guaranteed they've been built by the same process all the time, so the number ones all agree, which I'll call number one correlated boxes. Okay. If you arranged to make a large number of number one correlated boxes and you don't push number one. Okay. But you ask yourself, what happens if I push two? Let's say I push two on this box, it's green. And I push it on this and I record it. I push it on this and I recorded. I make a whole record of all the green, all, all number twos. You know what's going to happen? Not all green. No, because if they were all green, then they would agree. And I said I can't do that. Although I get going to get into trouble. Three. Yes, sir. Three of one kind and one of the other. And which kind after you determined for a number of these boxes, let's say you've used, you had a thousand boxes and you used 900 to determine what it was, and it was 3/4 of the time green. Then you can guess if you push this button on the other ones, it's red. And they all agree. They've been loaded. Okay. You can even determine what that is by measuring the others and measuring probability. But only by probabilities. All right. This correlating many copies on the same thing is what's really called measurement. Because when we measure something, we are able to make records and write it down somewhere else, somewhere else, so that if we wanted to get the answer, we can look at the writing. So making a copy is analogous to making a record. I could play around with these boxes and throw them away and still find out what I, what this one would have was by measuring this one. Any one of the boxes, they'll all agree. Still the ones that are still left. So this copying process, in this particular case, a copying process which sustains the correlation in, in hole number one, or button number one, is called measuring what the result of one is. And the measurement of one precludes a perfect correlation in two. It insists, if you've made such a thing, that number two, that's 3/4 of the time green and one quarter of the time red. It's saying the same thing again. Instead of making the same button measurement on the same box all the time, just making many copies. Yes. I don't always use box number one as the first button you push because then there's the, uh, possible confusion between the box label, the location of it, and the fact that it was the first button you put. Oh, I see. Oh, you mean using 1, 2, and 3? I push button one. You might be confused with whether it's the first button I pushed in time. You mean first in time or first on the box? Well, I'm sorry that I made that error. We could have called the buttons A, P, Q, R, or something. It would have been better. Side or the left button. That's a better idea. The central button, then the right button. Good. Okay. That's better. Now, if there was any confusion, I'll say whatever I wanted to say again. I've arranged things so that the left button is correlated. If you push it on any of the boxes, the left button will give the same answer as on any other box. Thank you. Still the same problem. Say, initial. Don't you think? What's the problem? I don't understand it. I think that I think it's probably mostly cleared up, but it's looked as if you were always correlating the thing on the left side. I was, or the one with number one, whatever I. Maybe you can't correlate the one on the right hand side. It would be better to kind of randomly jump around and say, well, P, no, one. If I randomly jump around, I see. Yes. Okay. And then we two time and some time random choose number three. No, just a moment. No, just a moment. Let me just say something and see whether there's a misunderstanding in reality or just in words. Okay. Uh, what's possible is to make copies by a certain process which I can call, for instance, one of the processes of making copies would be, hell with it, don't pay much attention to what's in the other, and they're all correlations of laws. What's in one box has nothing to do with the other. That's a lousy way of making copies. The one of the best ways of making copies with the most amount of correlation is there is a special way. I mean, a special kind of interaction that you have to make to make these copies. It's a process, the printing process, whatever, which makes the copies a special way so that the, what happens with the left button is correlated perfectly. That I can push any one of these boxes and it'll agree. But only for the left button. But you can make it so that, however, there's another process by which I can make another thousand sets of boxes. But I have to have the interactions different. I have to know what I'm doing. I had time. So I make the copies. The process of making the copies is different. And for that one, it's the central button which is correlated for all the boxes. And the third way of making the copy, the correlations could make the third one agree. And there are other ways of making it things so the correlations aren't perfect and so on. But the more perfect ones are the more interesting one. Is that what you want? I can do one or the other or another. But, and I can make, we can discuss other possibilities. But I wanted to clear up. Does that clear up this difficulty? Say, instead of left button, any specific button? Yes, I could choose any specific button. But I can't choose the button after I've made the correlation, sir. The process for correlating it depends on what button I'm aiming to correlate. Okay. I got to know that ahead of time. There's a left correlating measurement scheme. You can't take a population where number one correlates and mix it with the population where number two correlates and then do experiment to find out which is which. Well, I don't know. I have to think about that. If I mixed them up and then I tried to check where which were pairs, I might be able to figure out which is which. I don't know. Yes. Do you mean that you don't mean like in our problem, it's not the initial button, but a specific location? Yes, left, right, and center. We've been using that one. So we can only choose one of those locations. But it's not the initial press that. Because in our example before, it was the initial press, no matter which position. That's correct. That's right. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. I see now. What was good? Good. Now we get the problem. Yes. Yes. Last time it was the initial press that was correlated. But if this is correlated on the left, you remember, however, that although it was the initial press that was correlated, it's still true that if you don't push any other button, they're still correlated. You can measure either one again and again and again, they always agree. Right? It's just that the pressing some other button screws it right. Now, with this setup, you can push this button on any one and it'll tell you what it'll get for any other one. And you can push it again and again. And if you want, okay. If you pushed another button over here and found out what that was, you could still find out what this used to be by pushing one of these boxes that hasn't been touched before, or has, depends on how it's been touched. So those boxes are all loaded. That one take of a position, there's a constant, so to speak. That's right. In one position, left, there's a complete and perfect constant agreement. But not if you change. Not if you can. You change the correlation in a given box setup to say from number one to number three? No, you've set it up. You set up initially with one. Yeah. And now I manipulating. But no. Yes. And no. I'll tell you how you have to do. Okay. He wants to do something. We'll come through a lot of things. We have a fun discussing this. This will take a time out. It's, it's nothing. We've already understood everything. But this is just to tell you attempts to beat the game by making copies doesn't work. And this is what you. But you can do something with copies. Okay. His idea was, we've got the left ones copied. Can I do something to this box so it gets correlated to the right end? Not by touching just this box. I can by taking a whole bunch of boxes into my room and doing something with them. Turn the whole system into the other.

Kind, but I can't do it if I only got a few of the boxes. I have to know, I have to have all the boxes. You say you, but I'm only interested. Can't you just make these few correlator? No, because I haven't got the other boxes. I can't turn these. I have the entire population to turn any of them so they're correlated any other way.

Okay, I can only disconnect the correlations by touching a few. I touch a few, I can screw them up, of course. In fact, an easy way to screw up the correlation is to measure. That we know it changes the odds on that one. But if you say, "Oh hell, so I screwed this box up, so I'll throw it away," I still know what number one's going. I just use another box to measure it.

Could you at some point say how you actually prepare this? I probably will if it gets a little technical. And I don't know, I haven't prepared that. I'll have to think of a way of describing it in a simple way. A precise example of such measurements, right? Yeah, that's what I'm waiting in the EPR. You might have way longer than I think. Experiment when you talk in terms of just two of them, okay? When you talk in terms of if you measure, if they're identical in Opp, even in opposite directions, using mirror image to make it the same.

And so, what was that assumption based on though? That that you could, in fact, produce identical, so that you can measure one aspect of it? Was based on the equations that the quantum mechanics that had been developed at that time. The Schrödinger equations would tell you what would be the result of various kinds of experiments. And they still the same equations today. And so they would use those equations, and he explained how those equations would produce this effect. You could, you in nature, produce yes, two particles? Yes. That one where you could measure and and one? Yes. How do you know?

Okay, all right. I have to think about how one knows that there are, in fact, identical, other than saying they are identical. Well, we don't know. When the particles don't have to be identical, all that is needed is that one measurement predicts the other one. Sorry, complication. Well, I'm identical in the sense that that that what I mean by ident, what he's worried about. Tical? Yes. That that's okay. Well, that's because the mathematics predicts it, then you check it, and it works. Uh, what he meant by the identical, this box doesn't have to look exactly the same as that box. I can make the same thing with a blue box here and a green bad, using those colors, a blue box here and a purple box there, or a square box here and a round triangular box there. The particles don't have to be the same. The objects that I use to load them don't have to be identical, but they have to have three, you know, states, so that I can make this measurement and, uh, load, charge the boxes. But I be charged with this correlations that we've been talking about previously or now. So the, the identity of the boxes is not an essential feature at all. Okay. The identity of the results is what counts in this discussion. So, uh, because of this, it means that we can do what we call measuring what this button would give, which consists of making this kind of special left-hand copying system and sending you one of these boxes, or two, or four. You want to know the answer too? I'll send you another group of boxes, three or four boxes if you want. And if you want to know the answer, I'll send you another three or four because I made thousands of them. Could these are micro circuits? H. Could they be used underwater? Yes. Anyone can be carried underwater and done anything you want it with it, and it'll work. Of course, you got to be careful there's no leak or the water gets inside. I mean, it's possible to screw it up, but if you protect it, it's okay. But it doesn't be any distance. You are, you in the business of manufacturing these in general? We are. That's called measuring because what we do when we measure, we say we have an atom and we do something with it, and then we're able to publish what the result was for its spin or for something else. In this case, what would happen if we push button one? Can I order 10 boxes? Yes. Not this particular can press, certainly. Yes, yes. They can dolphins could press the box. Computers can be designed with random number generators to decide which one care when you're trying to which one of these buttons is pushed and, uh, record all the results and so forth. So it doesn't require mankind to do it. You say, but sooner or later, the man has to look at the notebook. True, because otherwise, we aren't going to know. You can't be us who know unless we look. Right. So therefore, man is essential to all observation? Yes. For all observation that he wants to know about. A perfectly understandable philosophical principle with no depth, but great profundity. I'd like to see you and a dolphin facing up to one another. Well, that would be fun. Yes, we can arrange it. Conne? Yes. This last example. Yes. You're telling us now that one of the position is is perfectly Carling, right? And the rest of the story is that then in the other positions, you'll get a three-quarter, one-quarter? Yes. Yeah, they're not correlated. I push one here, I might get green. Another one, however, will not necessarily agree. It might be red. If I made lots of boxes and just measured all of these second, central, rather central buttons, I'll get greens and reds, either one-quarter, three-quarters, or three-quarters, one-quarter, or something else. It may be as sloppy connections, but let's say three-quarters, one-quarter, one-quarter, three-quarters. And from which way it is, I can determine what I would have got from one. In other words, if it's three-quarters green and one-quarter red, I can conclude that that means that this was proberbly correlated, that that's when red. See, knowing that these are correlated, suppose we know how we made them, so we know they're correlated, then we know that all these buttons are going to agree one way or the other. H. Either reds or greens. And I can determine which one it's going to be by checking the second button only. That's finding out whether it's a predominantly green or predominantly red, three to one. If it ain't three to one, I'm screwed. Something went wrong with the experiment. It'll always be three to one, one way or the other. And when you measure with enough of them until you're convinced it's about three to one more for the green and for the red, you know why I say you have to measure a large number, a reasonable number, because accidents can happen. Then after you've determined as three quarters green, you can predict what'll happen if you push red. Not on the same box that you've used, because you know when you measure that one, you screw up that one, so it isn't going to help any. This one's then three-quarters the other way. However, a box that you haven't touched yet, you haven't used in yet, in order to get the statistics on the second, on the central button, if you push the left button on that box, it'll be red. Not on the box that you played with already, because in those boxes that you played with already, they're the universal rule, they're all independent. Then you see that if this is green, the chance of that one being red is again three-quarters. Yes. And if this is red, then the chance of that being red is only one quarter. I thought they were all perfectly Corel. They are. They are. So what information does that really give us? That only information gives us is that we know what we would get for any box by looking at any other box for left pushing it. Allows us to separate them without without? Yes. So that you can publish what you observed, you say about the first, the first box, the early box. S your assumption back? Yes, yes. What happens? That's right. And and what happens in nature on a large scale? If there's any, it's always this kind of correlations that at least that are interesting, unless it's just chaotic. So all of the physical world which we analyzed before where we found laws and so forth at a large scale, we're always in situations where had millions of these things correlated, and therefore the reality looked like it meant something to say that that was red or that was green or that because we could check it all the time by looking at any other place. So it looked real and only like real because we have so many copies. But what we've discovered is that we can't make copies are more than one thing at a time, which is another way of saying making copies is a measurement. We could say, in a way, so we can't make copies of two that are correlated on two different lines. Is a statement we can't make measurement of the two different quantities simultaneously. That's the uncertainty principle.

Okay, I just want to compare making a measurement with these copies. You say, what has that got to do with what this, what's the matter with pushing this button and looking at the light? Pushing the button and looking at the light really was making copies because a white, a real physical large bulb puts photons out in all directions. You looking at the bulb can see it's red, and I'm standing over here, I can also see it's red. He can see it's red. He can see it's red. Everybody can see it's red. That's an example of the correlation. It doesn't make any which box you look at, which photons over there or over there or over there, they're always the same. That's this kind of correlation. So what we used to talk about crudely is pushing a button and reading, looking at a bulb was really a mechanism for making this type of correl copy. Okay, that's the same thing. And the laws of interaction of of matter permit us to make such copies. Uh, but of do not permit us to make copies by which we can determine what the make a correlation that works both for the first button and the second button perfectly. We can make it perfect for the first button, but only three-quarters perfect for the second button. Mind you, there is a correlation in the second button, just isn't perfect. The first button is all agreed, but the second button, they don't all agree, but three-quarters of you is more likely to agree than not. Okay, that's what I meant. It's more likely to agree with each other than not. Yeah, I said it right. She a beautiful model for me. Yeah, it's getting better. Right. Good. We're getting somewhere now.

If you had an observer that had a very peculiar visual system in which when it showed red, he would sometimes see green. Yes. Okay. Oh, sometimes. Then let's say I have a, oh, then this fell wouldn't be so hot at making observations of the world. They would be drunk most of the time. No, but then he, it's like asking for a drunk observer. He doesn't make a, no. Then he would correspond to box number two. A, oh, he would make number one into a number two, but he make number two into something totally different. He couldn't observe number two because his three-quarters probability up. Yeah. Whenever he observed, he's not very well correlated with. Right. He's only partly correlated. There are observers like that. Yes, yes. There are, uh, in fact, in certain. Yes, but also in a certain sense, we are observers like that because we can only amplify certain aspects of small things. This is an example, and so we are sort of seeing crudely. Right, right. Seeing crudely. And so one way of looking at the uncertainty in the the world is to try to suppose that we could that these things are there, but we only see them crudely. This idea we have to get rid of doesn't work because the whole discussion of these pair of boxes was this idea that there are red, green, and green, or green, red, red already, but we can't make it out very well. When we push buttons, it changes it, screws it up, and that doesn't work. That's not enough. World is still worse. We can't say we can't really understand the quantum mechanics by saying they're all, all these things. It's either one that's red, green, and green, or whatever combination. We just don't know what it is, and we look, we don't see too well. That doesn't quite work because of this business of correlating these boxes has demonstrated. Well, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox demonstrated. So the early ideas, if anybody first had them, that it was that there were these things like position and momentum, but you couldn't just quite make them out simultaneously. It's not enough to understand the character of quantum mechanics. You can't say that there's both a position and a momentum simultaneously and be logically consistent in your predictions after that. After you've made that assumption and use normal logic with what we observe. So we have learned not to say things like, "A particle has to have a position, have some position, I don't know what it is, but some position and momentum at the same time." That statement starts out by making an assumption which sounds perfectly reasonable because I can measure the position, I can measure the momentum, but I can't measure both at the same time. But the suggest therefore that even though I can measure one or the other, that they're both possible. There is a, is a thing that we don't say now, and then we can use normal logic and get away with it without falling on our face too much. Okay, or at all, in fact. You're not allowed an and you must have an either or? No, we're not even allowed an either or in a certain sense. It depends. Yes, we can't. Uh, it isn't quite an either or because there are other combinations. It's a little more subtle, and I'll try to explain the subtlety, uh, in the next lectures. But I believe that we are really all here with together in appreciating, and I think it's marvelous that we can understand this, uh, that we appreciate this, uh, reasonably. It's quite good. Thank you.

Okay, if you're if you're obeying this rule, if state which says that you now allowed to make certain statements and believe? Right, right. Uh, what do you made a statement which earlier which sounded to me like you making exactly that same statement? You said, "No doubt because I often slit that that, uh, particles, particles, uh, don't have to be identical, but they have to have three states." Okay, what does it mean to say that particle particles have three states? What I meant was that these these boxes don't have to be identical, but each box has to have three buttons, three things that I can measure, so I can talk about the correlations. In order to be boxes that I'm interested in for this discussion here, that's all I meant. Nothing very deep at all. In other words, all I said is, no, I never went to states are cared particles. No, I didn't mean to say anything about particles having three states, and I doubt if I ever said that, because in fact, this is not the way we describe that. So I probably didn't say that. I wrote it down as soon as you said it. All right, then in that case, I was trying to get an example of a situation that we not not supposed to say that the particle's either in this, this, or this condition or whatever. I didn't mean that. What I meant when you asked me about identical particles or identical boxes merely this, that all I really needed for this discussion was not that this box be exactly the same as this box. It could be a triangular box or something else, and the particles that went in there might have been different, but they're correlated. And in each one, you can measure one of three things with these boxes, and they give these results that are correlated together perfectly with three different button pushings. Well, okay, that's what I meant. That's correct. Anyway, whatevering with it's, it's the having wording with. Can we say a particle has a state? We can say particles have states. Yes, and we do say that, but in a new way, a way which I'll explain later on. In this particular example, believe it or not, this is done with a particle which has two states. So it's therefore not the kind of thing I would say, okay, that it had three states. If I did say it, I made a mistake. No, no, no. Yeah, I mean, I made an error, and you're right in asking. I didn't mean to say that. So it's a mistake. And the thesis here is in fact an attribute of the experimental setup. Yes. The three here was simply a particular choice with a particle with two states. There are many different buttons that you could measure, many different things you could measure. The situation can be more more complicated, and the probabilities, however, always have this horrifying aspect that they're impossible to explain by supposing this kind of a pictures. And I've just taken three to make it easy for you, so you don't have to deal with complicated numbers. Actually, there are other things I could have measured about this object which would have interfered with the measurements here. It's as if I had 17 buttons and give you a long talk about 17 buttons here, 17 buttons there, right? The same particles, as a matter of fact, were given. I even gave you the exactly the same pair. But the particular machinery for making measurements is more elaborate. There are 17 things you can try. Then it would be a story. It would go something like this: If you measure any one of the 17 possibilities, okay, the left, center, by left, by left, center, possibly, and you make the same left by left, center, the measurement over here, they always agree. If on the other hand, you measured, let's say, number 11 here, and then check 12 over there, they would agree with a probability 79 or whatever. Okay? And that's, you know, and with number 10, there would be another number, and so forth. And that measuring 12 changes the chances of for number 11 to such and such with a big complicated numbers and all kinds of stuff. But it's much easier to take the three cases with the one number, three quarters, which we always come back to, to explain the character. The character of the phenomenon occurs again and again, that these numbers that I would have have to give you for the 17 case would have this property that they're inexplicable by supposing you have cards with 17 different, with with red and green faces, and there are 17 cards in there, and so on. Okay? But the number three, therefore, is exactly what you said, simply a choice made for exposition or pedagogical purposes to make the simplest possible example. But isn't this true of all of all statements about about states? That it's always really a statement about the the preparation setup? I don't know what you're saying. The particle itself? I don't know what you're saying. All I've ever said is what happened when you push buttons, or what I should have said. But since we're trying to discuss theoretical explanations of what happens when I push buttons, I may have some of the time said, "Let us suppose that it's in one of three conditions or whatever." But that was a way of thinking. Yes. The of the ambiguity here. We got have three states meaning we got to have three things to measure or three? Oh, yes. We do have to have at least three things to measure in order to see a paradoxical situation. Oh, is that right? Oh, well, whatever I'm sorry if I confused this thing. Okay, well, maybe you're worried about something you already knew before you came here. If that's the case, we're not allowed to discuss it. No, I think there's something. I think there's something that you'll probably clarify what you're going to say later on. Let me. Yes. Well, let me get a chance at it, and then if you're still unhappy, we'll be very happy to try to explain. Okay, so what's the big deal now about Bell's? The, what do you mean big deal? That we've told you the deal. Big deal. He showed, show, we showed you. Think it's a big deal. These funny numbers. I do think it's a big deal. That's all the deal is. Okay, that's the big deal. That's the big deal. Bell's theorem is in a contribution to that deal, which is to point out mathematically that it has to happen. People knew it had to happen before. All he did was demonstrate it. It is not a theorem that anybody consists of any particular importance in quantum mechanics. We who use quantum mechanics have been using it all the time, pay not much attention to it. It's not an important theorem. It's simply a statement of something that we know is true. A sort of a mathematical proof of it. Is once you've seen this example, you know it's true that you can get situations that you can't explain. All of this is a demonstration mathematically from the original equations that this can happen, which you know it can happen from this particular example. So it is not really a theorem that stands in a big deal in the middle of the of the subject and represents a big contribution. That before we had Bell's theorem, there were things that we couldn't figure out, and after we have Bell's theorem, was a new light? Not at all. It's just a mathematical statement of something, a more precise statement of something we all knew. Okay. People trying to test this, are there tests going on? As I understand? Well, they're always trying to test whether some of these predictions of the quantum mechanics that seem paradoxical from the point of view of classical thought, or these making this assumption that a thing has to be this way or that way before you look at it, that such an a, they want to not break down that and think that maybe some of the things that are predicted by quantum mechanics are false. And so every time we take an example and discuss it, and they don't like that example, they think it can't happen, it's too crazy, then they try to, they insist somebody ask somebody to check it, or they try to check it. But none of these things have ever failed to work as expected. I really do believe that the quantum mechanics is fundamentally correct, and that all this is simply a psychological trouble that we we have. Uh, it is extremely difficult to get used to it because it's so much common sense and common knowledge that predict that gets this idea that when you're not looking at something, it's either this way or that way. And to be able to say that, my God, you can't even say it's either this way or that way when you don't look at it. But hey, it must be either this way. No, if you say that, you're going to get in trouble. They say that can't be so bad. There must be that nature isn't quite like that. And every hope that they have is one by one so far demolished. Okay, whether they can find a way of doing it some other way, I don't know, but that's the way it is at the present moment.

I understand some people think about Bell's, who philosophically believe that the universe is somehow connected way. They they try to use this idea that there is this connection between these boxes, which is to say that and there is an instantaneous connection between things and the universe. Yes. Well, they would like to do it that way. I must, uh, say to you that because this is unfamiliar, that there do appear all the time when you're thinking about things, difficulties, uh, you don't that you're not satisfied with. And I'll try to explain some of those further on when we talk. The difficult is if we try to apply this idea somehow to the whole universe or something like that. And you say, well, we're in the universe, and we're pushing the button, isn't something done externally? And, uh, how is it done inside? When if you can't talk about the condition that things are in, how can you talk about the condition that the universe is in? After all, we're in it, and things like that produce a certain amount of trouble which haven't been thought through very well and leave us with a very uncomfortable feeling that the story isn't finished.

Could it be that by suspending, say, one one law of logic, like if A equals B, C, then A? If you just suspend that, that it would work? Well, yes, that's more or less what we do. But we suspend an assumption. We suspend an assumption that we were able to say things like, uh, "There, this is in either this or that condition when you haven't made any observation yet." And then we can continue to think straightforwardly, and it's the most efficient way of doing it as far as we know. There might be another way by suspending some particular rule of reasoning and keep the old assumptions of. But I don't know a particular way, and I'm I'm just used to the normal, the way everybody else does it, which is to change the statement. We have a different statement. I'll just make words which would mean anything to most. But we're going to say things like, "A particle has an amplitude to be in this condition or that condition," and so on, not a chance or a probability or reality of being in this condition, but another quality. And we would work with these so-called amplitudes and tell you how to combine them. So in the end, from this reasoning, you can predict what the probabilities will be. But this system of reasoning works, but we don't understand it any deeper than that. This is a system that can replace the old system, but that works well. I don't know what else to say about it. It's very discomforting because it's so easy. It's so hard to believe that a simple-minded idea like, "There's chicken in the ice box," that you can't say either there's chicken in the ice box or there's not chicken in the ice box until you open the door and look at the chicken, that you can't even say that there are these two alternatives, or you get into trouble. It's a kind of shock, and this the shock keeps coming back. And no doubt, because we're all human, we're always sort of falling every once in a while. And I may well have said something about states or something which is incorrect, because you sometimes fall off the wagon when trying to reason. But I'll show you the kind of reasoning that is done, the type of assumption that is made, and the system for computing the probabilities. But you'll be very dissatisfied by all that because it all looks so crazy and abstract and mathematical and dopey, and you don't know why it works. And you say, "Well, wait, why, why, same question, why is it going to be this?" We can't answer. But I can tell you what the machinery is that we do use to figure out the probabilities. But the machinery wouldn't help to understand this. I mean, there could very well be that there is a complex world you're entering which the common voice just don't work anymore. That's what we think it is, actually. That's what I think it is. Is is part the differentiation between the macro world and micro world? And that, for instance, there are chickens are not chickens in the ice box, which is a different thing than the probabilistic nature is what I'm getting feeling about about atomic phenomenon.

Well, strictly, uh, it's like this. When a thing is as big as a chicken or an ice box, since I could find out what's in the ice box by tapping it, by listening to the vibrations, by weighing the ice box, and so on, this all a situation that's so large. A chicken is so many atoms, it's so big, and it's a light shining off it. And so it's like this bulb which is emitting photons in all directions, already made millions of copies of certain information. Whether it's in or it's not. So that idea that we can't tell for a chicken is really an extreme. It's like saying, after I made thousands of these copies, I can't say that this is either red or green. What kind of a nervous? Why are you so nervous? I could tell by looking at any one box. It's okay. But it's a very delicate situation where I only have two boxes and I haven't amplified it yet. I can't say. So it's before you amplify information that you have to be careful and just say it's the micro world. It's strictly, yes, it's the micro world. But the macro world we understand as being made out of micros. And so it's technically true of the larger world, but it's harder to get the situation because you have to be very delicate. In other words, yeah, it's not because of, um, the probabilistic nature. Let's just say nature plays dice or however you want that actually exists in a sense. If one's allot actually exists in that thing. In other words, I no longer have a need to say that nature has, you know, three in this box, I mean, all of them in this box or that box, but I can see three, four kind of probabilities happening. Um, it just feels okay at that level in a certain sense to, to probability rather than, you know, as a one zero. It's not just probability. It isn't just probability that gives us side difficulty. We've discussed, uh, probability earlier, and there's a probability in classical physics if you don't know the details well enough.