Transcription
Undeclared wars are commonplace. Tragically, our government engages in preemptive war, otherwise known as aggression, with no complaints from the American people.
Sadly, we have become accustomed to living with the illegitimate use of force by government who developed a truly free society. The issue of initiating force must be understood and rejected.
What if sometimes to love your country you had to alter or abolish the government? What if Jefferson was right? What if that government is best which governs least? What if it is dangerous to be right when the government is wrong? What if it is better to perish fighting for freedom than to live as a slave? What if freedom's greatest hour of danger is now?
Hi everyone, Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom. Welcome back, my dear friends. I had a wonderful vacation, but I'm happy to be back, uh, with all of you. I did spend some time with our first guest and his family, and I know he's happy to be back with us as well. Today is Monday, July 20, 2026. Alistair Crook joins us now. Alistair, always a pleasure to see you, whether it's in Italy or from my office, uh, in New York. Before we get to what you have recently written, the Iran War 3.0, zero, I need to ask you about Israel. Is Israel on the cusp of domestic deterioration?
Yes, it is. It is on the cusp of quite serious deterioration and potentially even more serious, um, deterioration. Um, uh, first of all, because Netanyahu is in trouble. All his plans and his promises to the electorate have failed to materialize. They know that. They feel that. And so, as it stands, he's always been a wily fox, a survivor politically, but now he really is in trouble. He's ill, but he's deeply in trouble. And he's trying to get through this, um, period. And the way he's trying to get through it is to lay the basis, to lay the grounds for either canceling elections or, if there are elections, to be able to deny, um, if you like, a change of government, to be able to insist that it should be the change of the government.
So, the Likud could, um, if, uh, what they call the Supreme Court, it's the Supreme Court for the Likud party, not for the government as a whole, uh, have, um, agreed that if there is security concerns, if there is an escalation in the conflict with Iran, um, then elections can be canceled by Netanyahu. And in the interim, it is agreed in the circumstances, instead of holding primaries for candidates for these elections, Netanyahu will appoint them all. He will appoint all the candidates. There won't be elections. He will appoint all of them. This has been a tough battle in the Likud, and he has got it. He will be the one to appoint them. And what he will appoint will be not far-right, because the far-right will damage his electoral prospects. It will be the more moderate, um, candidates that he, he will post.
So, in a sense, what I'm saying to you is, um, we've seen what is happening in the United States, but what we're having is, uh, if you like, a first run at the whole issue of the possibility of contesting an election outcome in Israel sometime in October, just before the midterm elections in America, and Trump talking already about 2028 and the question of citizenship as a qualification for, uh, voting. So, these two things are marching in parallel. Both, um, depend heavily, both are doing badly in the polls, Netanyahu and Trump, and both are looking to the future and considering the possibility, um, that they will contest an outcome that goes against them in the future in Israel.
This could lead directly to violence, and, uh, it's not going to be easy because, um, the, uh, the coalition on the right, which is of, uh, national religious and settlers and, um, the messianic elements, they are not about to give up power. They will not concede power, whatever happens in the, uh, in the elections. So, it's going to be a very difficult period leading up to elections at the end of October, sometime then will be the elections, but largely in these last days, Netanyahu has fixed that so that he will control at least the Likud elections completely.
Is he physically well?
No, no, he's not. And he looks it. I mean, it's obvious from you, he's a shadow of his former self. He, he, he has, um, um, we believe, who he has a pacemaker. He has had, um, I think it is prostate cancer and surgery for that. Um, he is not, not at all well, and everyone knows he's sick. But as you also, um, all your viewers will remember, he has these cases, legal cases hanging over him that if he is removed from the premiership, um, then those cases will come to verdict, and most legal experts suggest that those verdicts will be guilty, and that he would go to prison, um, failing a pardon by the president or, or failing, um, uh, the elimination of these cases against him, which he's been seeking but has not achieved.
What are the chances that his government collapses before October?
Um, they could do, but at the moment, um, the, the Iranians have not been taking any military action into Israel. There was an attack. There was a missile that was fired, not right down in the south by Israel, but it was just outside Israel. The Israelis have complained debris landed in Israel. But this is not the, the justification for further war, against full-out war against Iran. That, that won't, that won't work. Um, so the Israelis are not, if you like, giving the pretext, um, by attacking inside Israel. How long that will last, we have to wait and see. Um, Netanyahu is absolutely determined, and it's very clear from the press today, the Hebrew press about it. He is determined to try and persuade Trump to hit Iran in its strategic infrastructure. This is not said exactly what that means, but you understand the content when they say this will be the strategic infrastructure, that means that the government is no longer able to provide services to the people. In other words, helps bring down the state, and, uh, they say the state is not going to immediately fall, but it will fall in due course if Trump hits this strategic infrastructure. I think strategic is a word that basically hides what would be involved, which would be basically, um, war crimes, crimes against water, against fundamental services, um, that are necessary to sustain a community, sustain a community in the middle of summer. That's what Israel is looking for to, uh, Iran.
How badly has, uh, President Trump misread the significance of Hormuz and the ability of the Iranians to control water that under international law is theirs?
Um, well, I mean, this is going to be considered when the history books are written. Uh, the classics, another classic intelligence error, misreading Iran, um, misreading the nature of Iran, um, and misreading the military capabilities of Iran is going to be a, a key element. Uh, we, you entitled this talk about Iran 3.0, zero. And so I would just underline what is meant by that is that we have now entered an escalatory fray phase. Both sides are escalating. Iran is, uh, the US promises to attack, um, let all hell loose on Iran, and then Iran responds, and we, and it responds plus it goes more than one step up, and then another step up. So, we're entering, I believe, a phase, um, in chess, you call it, um, Zwang, where every move you make is bad for you. For Trump, every move he makes at the moment trying to put further pressure on Iran to negotiate. That's what they say the aim is, is to bring them to the negotiating table so that Hormuz can be open. But actually, every step is actually doing the opposite. It is actually making the possibility of negotiations impossible. I mean, put it bluntly, the, the risk, um, the chances of escalation are now higher than the chances of deescalation. And we're getting to the point, and that's why I call it 3.0. We're getting the point, um, where the escalatory phase for Trump becomes, um, uncontainable. He cannot contain, um, the escalatory, um, impulse in order to try and find a way down from his tree that he has climbed. And I, I mean, the reasons for that, we don't have to go into, but they largely involve Trump's psychological situation, his ego, and other things make it extremely difficult because we're talking about something fundamental here. We're talking about something that, you know, the choice is either to, to back down and see Iran, um, become a, a player, a, a major, uh, player on the world scene, and the Middle East scene, or else, um, he has to escalate further to the point at which he risks bringing down the whole concept of American deterrence. American military deterrence, um, will be seen to have been a, a sham, a hollow sham, because it cannot win a war against Iran. So, on one hand, he has, you know, the prospect of turning Iran, BRICS, Russia, China into a stronger position, or alternatively, continuing, um, with the war to the point at which the whole deterrence capability of the West is undermined by its obvious weaknesses and its failings. And that was very much illustrated yesterday and the day before in what's happened in Iran.
Do you get the feeling that he has no understanding of this? That he's almost, um, like a wind-up toy who's been wound up and, and that someone continues to wind him up so that he continues to say the same thing over and over and over again. We have to make sure Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon. We must make sure they don't have a nuclear weapon. They can't have a nuclear weapon. To the point where what he's saying now, uh, underscores to the Iranians that his signature on the memorandum of understanding is meaningless, and therefore his signature on any agreement that they may come to will be meaningless.
Well, exactly. This, and this is the, um, this is the impasse into which he has shut himself. Um, because exactly that, um, the memorandum of understanding, whether it was ever intended to be taken by the American negotiators, um, seriously beyond the attempt to use it to open the Straits of Hormuz, is, is one thing. Uh, but what it has achieved, and that's why I said, um, deescalation is becoming, um, virtually impossible. The deescalation is becoming impossible because Rouhani, in a speech, um, yesterday said exactly what you said, uh, that there is no partner, America is no partner for negotiations, and that Trump's signature is worthless on any piece of paper, on the MOU, worthless. So, there's no point in negotiating. I think this has become a, a, a feeling in Iran that is, uh, much more embedded in the aftermath of the funeral ceremonies that has given a very strong sense to the leadership and to everyone, um, about the size, you know, the degree of support there is for Iran, for Iran, not for individuals necessarily, but for Iran, Iranian civilization, the Iranian revolutionary model. So, they are confident as a consequence of that. And then there is another change that has taken place is that Iran has moved from deterrence to proactive, um, elements. So, in this period, they have effectively, in these last two days, they've effectively pushed the United States out of its Gulf bases. They've pushed them. First of all, they went into Jordan. They've left Kuwait and, um, Bahrain, and moved into Jordan. And then now, after the attack last night, the attack on Jordan, which was heavy by Iran and caused, uh, all of these attacks on these three sites, caused dozens of American wounded. How many killed? This is, you know, obscured by the Pentagon. They are reluctant to admit the full state of casualties, but there were significant casualties, um, sustained in Jordan and also in Kuwait. That, that is, uh, that is clear. So, they are being pushed further and further away from their own bases. So, now they're relocating all the aircraft from Jordan, um, into a base in Israel, the Ovda base, an Israeli base in the south, and to other, um, uh, Israeli airfields. So, they are pushed out of the, the scene, further away from Iran, into Israel, uh, and, um, it has degraded their capabilities because in their own bases, they had more facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities, all these things are no longer available. Yes, the Israelis have some of these, but they don't have the ones that they are used to in, in America. And this, in a way, also concentrates their vulnerabilities being pushed like that away. And what we've seen is, um, sort of proactive, um, uh, effect that the, uh, the signs that there could be an American attempt at boots on the ground by someone, whether it is, um, Americans or Gulf-led operations or even Kurds coming in through Kuwait or something like that. What we see happening, what we've seen overnight in, in the last day happening has been a very clear attempt to cut off Bandar Abbas, which is the major port beyond, if you like, the straits. It's outside of the straits, a major port there, to cut it off from its hinterland. Cut it, bridge it off. They destroyed the tunnel, cut leading to it. They've destroyed several bridges. They've destroyed, um, various telecommunications. This is the American forces have done all this in, in the last two days. And, um, any, um, military person interprets this as the preparation for a staging area because also, uh, Bandar Abbas is very close to Qeshm Island. But the question is, I mean, do they have the forces? They can take it if they want to take this. I mean, it's no point just taking Qeshm Island because it'll be under fire control of, um, Iran from the mountains on the other side. It will be under missile control and drone control and all of the, uh, available resources to, to Iran. But how are they going to sustain troops, sir? How can they really have a, a staging ground? I mean, it's, it's 50-plus at the moment in this area, and as humid as can be, 99% humidity. People would need about 8 liters of water just to survive out in the open in the, in, in that, those situations. But the point is, and the Iranians have completely repaired those bridges and they've reopened the tunnel to Bandar Abbas. Why are they doing this? Well, I think they've always said, the Iranians have said, if America wants to put boots on the ground, well, you're welcome. Come into our parlor. And there are also suggestions of what is going on because a former, um, Iranian foreign minister, now no longer an active one, but a former foreign minister, has suggested that Iran should take some of the American bases, um, in either, uh, Kuwait or Bahrain, seize the bases and perhaps seize hostages in those two as further leverage. So, Iran has moved from deterrence to increasingly to proactive and punishing, um, American bases heavily. It is not just ordinary attacks on the bases. All I hear, and it's confirmed even in the Wall Street Journal, I mean, the attacks hit substantial vulnerable targets of the United States in those bases, and this is the reason they've had to abandon them and move their aircraft further away from the Gulf area. So, how are they going to support? Yes, they can support things from Israel, but how are they going to support an attempted landing on Qeshm Island if that is the plan? I personally doubt it very much. I think that if that is the plan, the sane heads in, in the Pentagon and others would say, listen, I mean, remember our history. Remember our American history. You know, we had huge casualties trying to take islands that are smaller than Qeshm Island. I think 3,000 American casualties more in attempting. And then they were vulnerable, incredibly vulnerable as sitting ducks if they took the island. So, I'm not sure that they are going to do this. Maybe this is the Iranians trying to, you know, uh, their psychological warfare against America, suggesting they may take Bahrain and Kuwait militarily.
I want to ask you the ultimate question, and that is, is, uh, all-out war coming? Is this the Iran War 3.0, the title of this, uh, segment? However, before I do, uh, I want to post what the Ayatollah Khamenei, the present Ayatollah, said on Saturday evening. "Now that the American enemy is seeking to escalate the conflict, thereby incurring even heavier costs and further humiliation, it should know that the noble nation of Iran and the resistance front have, and now it's in large, almost Trumpian letters, unforgettable lessons in store for it." This is the Ayatollah on, uh, Saturday evening, two, two days ago. Um, are we about to see another full-fledged war?
That depends on Mr. Trump and on Mr. Trump's psyche and on his ego. If he, um, if he is sensible, he will try and find how to deescalate. But as I say, he's more or less put him into a position where deescalation is impossible for him. And so, if he escalates, what they are promising is that they have surprises in store. I wouldn't call them surprises as much as to say, some of them may be surprises, but what they have in store is other cards. Cards like, um, they may, uh, derogate from the NPT, the nuclear proliferation treaty, or other things that, um, are damaging, uh, to the US narrative. But they have cards, and the Iranians have shown that they're very adept at only using cards when it is needed, when they are needed to be used, and when they can achieve tangible results. They don't show their cards willy-nilly. They don't expose them, and they keep the biggest cards, um, for the final battle, if you like.
Wow. Larry Johnson, who, uh, is on in 35 minutes, right after you, is going to tell us that the American military, notwithstanding what the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense says, is dangerously low, uh, in ammunition. I'm going to guess that the Iranians understand this, and it's not a problem from which they suffer.
Absolutely not. They can keep up the missile barrage far, far longer than most estimates. I, I have some idea what it is, um, but I don't know, but I think, you know, they can continue this rate of attack for months, and I don't think Trump has months. And what you've just said is absolutely clear. They do not, I think, have the resources even on the ground or even the aircraft sufficient, um, to mount, um, a major attack. I think Trump may try and propose that or insist on that to his, uh, staffers, um, and to the Secretary for War, um, but I think CENTCOM and others will be warning, um, that this is impossible. And I think if this does happen, it will widen the war. You will see the war widening already. The preemptive attack efforts, as I mentioned earlier, the preemptive elements has been Iran, uh, destroying the Kurdish forces over the border in, in Solomon. Um, special forces, Iranian forces gone in, killed a number of their leaders, destroyed their, um, their munition piles, um, and, uh, inflicted huge losses to prevent any sort of idea that America may have of inserting the Kurds into, into Iran proper, into the Iranian state. I think they've taken a, a heavy blow, and there may be surprises. I mean, it's possible Iran would seize, uh, either Bahrain is in a very vulnerable state, Kuwait. Um, it may not be the Iranians that go in there. It, it could be, in fact, um, uh, the Hashd, the, um, military militia, um, in Iraq, who, who might take, um, uh, Kuwait. I, I, you know, you can't tell. No one knows what the details of their strategy and their thinking is, but what is quite clear is that Iran has a plan for not just matching American escalation, but exceeding their escalation. Each time Trump escalates, they will go a step higher, and he will then retaliate with another step, and they will go higher. And this is why he is in the sort of Zwang, um, chess game. Wherever move you make for Trump actually makes things worse. And that's, uh, why he's in this escalatory, um, trap.
Wow. Alistair Crook, thank you very much, as always. A, a superb, a frightening, but a superb analysis. All the best to you, my dear friends. Safe travels. Best to your family, and we'll look forward to seeing you next week.
Thank you so much, Judge. Thank you.
Sure. And coming up later today, as mentioned, at 9:00 this morning Eastern, Larry Johnson. At 10 this morning, Ray McGovern. At 11 this morning, Professor Jeffrey Sachs. At 1:15 this afternoon, from France, Scott Ritter. At 2:00 today, Max Blumenthal. Judge Napolitano for Judging Freedom.