Transcription
In the West, we have this new narrative that the tide has turned in favor of Ukraine, that the Russians are doing poorly on the battlefield, and this drone campaign against targets deep inside of Russia is having a significant economic and political effect on Russia. The belief is that, given this newfound success, what we have to do is put great pressure on Russia to come to the bargaining table and work out a deal to settle the war.
So, you don't hear Rubio or others in the administration saying that we have to defeat Russia. This is not the same approach that we took early in the war when we were talking about actually knocking the Russians out of the ranks of the great powers. You don't see that rhetoric anymore.
The argument that Rubio is making is that we have to settle this war. It can't be settled on the battlefield; it has to be settled diplomatically. But the only way you can get the Russians to reach some sort of diplomatic bargain, some sort of agreement, is to inflict significant pain on them, both on the battlefield and with this drone and missile campaign that's aimed at targets deep inside of Russia.
So, that's essentially what's going on here. And the question you have to ask yourself is whether you think the tide has really turned, uh, that the Russians are losing this war, and that the Russians are just going to sit there and allow Ukraine and the West, uh, operating together, to inflict significant, uh, punishment on Russia.
>> And so the question is going to be, is that going to succeed? Uh, because if it, if that doesn't succeed, then all that does is leave you with this never-ending war, which we allegedly—President Trump allegedly says—is something he was against, although I guess his words really carry no weight anymore. How do you see that?
>> Well, let's distinguish, Danny, between what's happening on the battlefield and what's happening in terms of this, uh, bombing campaign against Mother Russia. Uh, I think with regard to what's happening on the battlefield, the Russians are actually winning. Uh, everything I read tells me that they're on the move, uh, and they're well on their way to taking control of all of the Donbass, and, uh, this should be accomplished by the end of the summer, if not the early fall. Uh, I see no evidence that the Ukrainians are reversing the situation on the ground. So, I don't know what people are talking about there. And if you read all the articles that are written on this subject carefully, there's no evidence in those articles that the Ukrainians have turned the tide.
Uh, so this brings us to the whole question of the, uh, uh, campaign of, uh, the bombing campaign, uh, deep into Russia with mainly drones but also some missiles. And the question is, can the West and Ukraine, working together, inflict significant punishment on Russia and cause Russia to come to the negotiating table and cut a deal that's actually quite favorable to Ukraine? Is that possible?
And there's no question that the Russians understand the game that the West is playing here, right? They understand, uh, that the West is cooperating big time with Ukraine and that, if anything, the West and Ukraine intend to escalate this air campaign, this drone campaign against Mother Russia, and the situation is only going to get worse with the passage of time.
Now, of course, people like Rubio think that this will bring the Russians to the negotiating table; it will get them to throw up their hands. I don't think that's going to happen.
Uh, first of all, you want to talk about what, uh, Putin's reaction is to all of this. It's quite clear from recent comments that he's made that he believes that the West is at war with Russia. He thinks that the West is out to defeat Russia, and he, of course, is not going to allow that to happen. So, the question that is then raised is, what does, what does Putin do?
And I believe that there is lots of evidence that the Russians are preparing themselves to strike military targets in Europe with conventional weapons, and if that doesn't work, they will use nuclear weapons. Now, Putin, of course, has not said this, but Sergey Caragonov has famously made this argument in the West, and if you read the Russian media carefully, there are all sorts of people inside of Russia who agree with Caragonov that it's time for the Russians to take off the gloves.
Look, the perspective from Moscow goes, uh, it's the West plus Ukraine that is responsible for these attacks on the Russian homeland. It's not just Ukraine. Ukraine could not do this by itself. It's the West. And that includes President Trump.
Indeed, the Kia of Independent, a major newspaper inside of Keev, just had a big story that said that President Trump has basically sanctioned this, uh, bombing campaign that Ukraine is engaged in. And in fact, the Kev Independent was saying it's not just the Europeans plus the Ukrainians against the Russians; it's the Ukrainians, the Europeans, and the Americans against the Russians. President Trump is back on the side of the Ukrainians.
Given this situation, the Russians understand that they have to do something to respond because again, the Ukrainians and the Europeans—not so much the Americans on this issue—have promised further escalation. And by the way, one could interpret Marco Rubio's comments to indicate that the Americans are committed to further escalation.
Regardless, the Russians think the situation's only going to get worse. And then you want to ask yourself, do you think the Russians are going to surrender or not? I don't think that's going to happen. I think that Sergey Caragonov's logic is going to apply, and that at some point in the not-too-distant future, the Russians are likely to attack targets in Europe.
And this makes the situation surrounding the Ukraine war, in my opinion, really dangerous because I don't think that most people in the West—certainly most, uh, people in the foreign policy establishment—take the Russian threat seriously.
And by the way, this is Caragonov's argument. Caragonov's argument is that, uh, Russia has been unable to establish red lines with the West. The West believes, and Ukraine believes, that they can slap the Russians around and the Russians will not respond. They will not do anything like attack targets in Europe.
And Caragonov's argument, which I believe increasing numbers of Russians believe, is that what Russia has to do is it has to make it clear that there are red lines. It, it has to establish a deterrent. It has to put an end, uh, to these attacks on Mother Russia. And there's only one way to do that, and that's to attack targets in Europe. First, with conventional weapons, and if that doesn't work, then turn to nuclear weapons.
>> Yeah. You know, that's, it's, it's, it's hard to believe we're even having this conversation today. And, and I can assure you, I, I can confirm exactly what you said from both the U.S. and Russian side. There are those in, in, there are those—most everybody in America and in Europe, and we're going to see some evidence of this in a second—do not believe that Russia has any red lines and that they would ever cross that line. They believe that the Article 5 piece of paper that says "attack on one is attack on all" is, is like a get-out-of-jail-free card, and that Russia would therefore never attempt to do that. So, they do think that we can do anything.
And I have seen also from some, some Russian sources just in the last 24 hours that confirm also what you said: that they believe that they're mad at President Putin. In fact, they say, "We should have done something much harder, some of these earlier things where the red lines were crossed, and then we wouldn't be in this situation today." But now then they say, "It's better late than never, but we quote, 'have to take this action.'"
Now, obviously, that's not Vladimir Putin. He did not return to my call, so I don't know what he's thinking. I'll just point out. But I know that a lot more on the Russian side are thinking that. So, now then the question is going to be, what are we going to do about it? I've talked to you a little bit about the U.S. side here. Now, let's go to the European side.
Um, and it's going to get a little bit uglier. Here's one that's more embarrassing than it is ugly, but it also is that. This is Mark Rut in the White House, just lathering up on President Trump and playing up to all of his arrogance and all of his love for praise.
"The Trump trillion shows you the increase Europeans and Canadians are paying into defense since you took office in 2017."
>> "Trump 45 plus Trump 47, a total of extra spend by the Europeans and the Canadians of 1.2 trillion. When you look at the effect of Trim 47, so the isolated effect of the extra defense spending in 2025 and in 2026, you see almost 140 billion extra spent nominal on defense by the Europeans and the Canadians. And also this year, you will again see an increase by about 120 billion, which brings a total in two years of over $250 billion. I can assure you this is because of Russia, because of the threat, but I'm also absolutely convinced that you, being president of the United States, being consistently pushing for something which since Eisenhower has not been achieved, which is the Europeans equalizing their defense spending with the United States."
>> You know, I was thinking more in the Eisenhower—the warning about the military-industrial complex—which was on graphic display there. He might want to have added that. Uh, do you think that this is going to move President Trump to go further down the path we saw Rubio talking about, of supporting Ukraine?
>> Uh, I think it might. I think, Danny, these issues are very complicated at this point in time because so many different, uh, so many different conflicts are at play. But I think if you look at what's happening in Iran, President Trump is being forced to make huge concessions to the Iranians. And his critics, who are many inside the foreign policy establishment, are accusing him of being an appeaser, of, uh, giving in to the evil Iranians, for being weak, uh, for being the equivalent of Neville Chamberlain.
Uh, in that situation, I think Trump has a deep-seated interest in being portrayed as a tough guy on Ukraine so that he can compensate for the problems that he's facing because of the concessions he appears willing to make on Iran. So, I think that events in the Middle East are going to be of great importance for influencing how Trump thinks about dealing with Ukraine. And I think it's likely that Trump will play hardball with Russia on the Ukraine issue to compensate for his problems regarding Iran.
Well, we'll, we'll certainly see how that's going to go, but that's—that can't be good because it's just not—I mean, you, you alluded to it there, but when you look at all of the ammunition and weapons we spent with, with Ukraine for four and a half years, with, with Israel for two and a half years (closing in on three now), and then what we've expended here, um, and then what we're selling to other people around the world, we're in a dearth of ammunition and weapons. So, maybe that's part of what they think about: they're going to ramp up defense spending.
But John, look, that, that stuff could take years to, to actually replace that. And we're not anywhere near. Why are we even dithering around the corner of potentially spending more or sending more of our ammunition? Forget about the money. It's the, the actual ammunition is what matters. And if we keep sending it to Ukraine, that's going to dwindle our resources even more. Are you worried about that?
>> No. I, I think you're missing the key issue here, Danny. The key issue is the drone war against Russia. And all we have to do—and this is reasonably easy to do working with the Europeans—is help Ukraine build up an even bigger inventory of drones, an even more deadly inventory of drones, and then help provide them with the intelligence to employ those drones against targets deep inside of Mother Russia. And that we can do.
I think your points are applicable to what's happening on the battlefield. If you're interested in reversing events on the battlefield, then Danny Davis's rhetoric from a minute ago kicks in. But if you're focusing not on the battlefield, but you're focusing on the drone war, it's a very different story.
And this is why the Russians understand that when the West and Ukraine promise that things are bad now, but they're going to get much worse with the passage of time, uh, this is true. The West and Ukraine, working together, can make this drone war much more effective, much more deadly. And that is a huge problem for the Russians, who believe, quite correctly, that there are no red lines here. I don't think Trump, any more than the Europeans, believe that the Russians will kick back if we continue to escalate our assistance to Ukraine in its waging of the drone war.
>> Okay. Well, you know, as it turns out, uh, there's a couple of voices from Europe, and I think it was today, maybe it was yesterday when the video was actually made. Uh, Ursula Vanderland seems to be, uh, completely backing up your contentions on this support for drones.
"Ukraine's defense industry, with Europe's support, is showing that it can out-innovate Russia's. Ukraine now produces drones at a scale that matches and even exceeds Russian production capacity. And the determination of the Ukrainian people has shown to the world that their European choice cannot be broken. And now it is our task to turn that choice into a reality. Earlier this month, indeed, we opened the first cluster of negotiations with Ukraine. And this was a historic moment, a recognition—a recognition of the remarkable progress Ukraine has made already—and a strong signal that Ukraine's future belongs in our European family."
Literally no discussion. And, and, and that was just one sound, but she makes no discussion at all about looking for a negotiated way to end the war. Unless, as she later describes, it's effectively a surrender of the Russian side to just give Ukraine what it wants, maybe along the line of contact. That's about as far as you'll go. But it sounds to me like they don't even want that. They just want this perpetual, open-ended, uh, thing of more military capacity for Ukraine going into Russia.
>> Exactly. I mean, everything that Ursula has said reinforces the point that I was making, and what you want to do is put yourself in Vladimir Putin's shoes and think about how he views those comments. And needless to say, he believes, quite correctly, that Europe has basically declared war on Russia. That's his worldview.
And now what you and I are saying is that Trump is moving in that direction. That Trump, who once promised to shut this war down and looked like he was going to, uh, be a bosom buddy of Vladimir Putin, is, if anything, moving in the opposite direction. And I made the argument that that is definitely likely to happen because of events in Iran.
But regardless, the fact is that from Putin's point of view, uh, the Europeans have effectively declared war against Russia. And furthermore, as we've talked about, uh, the Europeans and the Americans and the Ukrainians don't respect Russian red lines. So, if you're in Putin's shoes, Danny, what do you do? What do you do?
>> We're going to hear from his mouth here in just a second. But one final piece there that to really reinforce this a little bit more. Uh, we know, of course, that, uh, months ago, uh, Germans sent an, an armored brigade into the Baltics as a forward-deployed branch of NATO. They talked about how they're going to have the biggest land army in Europe. So, they're trying to build up to that. And then we have the Chancellor, Merittz, at that same conference, added this.
>> "Dear friends and colleagues, in these days we are seeing a new dynamic. The G7 summit, the European Council last week, and the E5 meeting in Berlin yesterday have sent strong signals of European and transatlantic unity and support for Ukraine. Ukraine and its brave people will prevail as a strong and sovereign nation and as a future member of the European family."
They will prevail. All the stuff that Ursula said, all the stuff that Germany is doing. Uh, I mean, again, I go back to what do you think—what you just asked about—what is Russia going to think? But let me ask you that specific question on Germany. How much of this is rhetoric?
Because we're also looking at how Russia's observing all of this because they claim—many, Mark Rut and some others even in Germany and France—that we could be at war with Russia by 2029 or 2030, and so they're building up. But can they really, does, do you think that Germany actually has the military capacity, let's say by 2030, to actually be a formidable military with ground force, air force, drones, missiles, etc., to actually threaten Russia?
>> No. Uh, but I don't think they're talking about threatening Russia with, uh, a conventional army. They don't have the World War II, uh, model in mind. Again, what they're, what, what they think is providing the magic formula, um, is technology. It's drones that they think that they have discovered a way of getting at Russia that provides the West and Ukraine with a remarkable amount of coercive leverage. That, that's what's going on here.
I think they fully understand that, first of all, they don't have the capability to rebuild the Vermach, if we're talking about Germany. Uh, and furthermore, if they do rebuild the Vermacht, it's kind of hard to imagine World War II all over again because who in their right mind would want to do that? Uh, in addition to the fact that you're in a nuclear world. So, that's not what's going to happen here.
Uh, they see Ukraine as the frontline state, right? And to the extent that the Europeans are, are going to engage the Russians militarily, they don't want to do it on German territory or Polish territory. They want to do it on Ukrainian territory, and they think the key is just to be able to hold on the battlefield. Right? Remember I said the Russians are winning on the battlefield. There's no question in my mind about that. But they're winning slowly.
And people in the West think that they can actually styy the Russians on the battlefield, so that the Russians can't even win slowly. And once you styy the war on the battlefield, then you turn to the air war. You turn to using drones and maybe eventually sophisticated cruise missiles as well, uh, and you hit targets inside of Russia. That's the magic weapon that they're focusing on. This is what's given them, uh, giving, giving Western leaders this false hope, and giving Ukrainian leaders as well this false hope, uh, that they can turn the tide and win the war.
And you know, but I, what is even in the mind of the West? And I'm going to ask this is kind of a two-part question. First of all, why do you think—why do they think—that using technology and drones and stuff is going to cause Russia to capitulate when it hasn't, hasn't worked on Ukraine? Because they have been subject to tremendous amounts of long-range drones and the, the FPV drones and the fiber optic drones, you name it. Uh, and that hasn't caused them to capitulate, which is just a massive, massive, years-long operation. Why do we think that a few more drones from the West is going to cause the much bigger Russia to capitulate?
I make the same argument all the time. I mean, the historical record, even beyond the Russian campaign against Ukraine, supports your point. There's no question about it: the idea that drone attacks are going to bring the Russians to their knees.
Furthermore, as you and I have emphasized from the beginning of this war, uh, from Russia's point of view, what's going on in Ukraine is of an existential nature, right? This is an existential threat. And when the Europeans and the Americans basically, uh, ally themselves fully with Ukraine, uh, and make it look like they're going to integrate Ukraine into the Western security architecture, this, if anything, just increases, uh, Russian fear, and this is what gives Russia, uh, the incentive to think about employing the Sergeate Caragana strategy. That's what's going on here.
I think what people in the West don't understand, Danny, is that if the West and Ukraine, operating together, are successful, that increases the likelihood of nuclear war. The, the situation from Danny Davis's and John Mir Sharmmer's point of view is getting increasingly dangerous. We're scared. We're nervous. We think this is not going to have a happy ending.
But you and I are at odds with most people in the national security community. They think that you can just slap the Russians around. You, you can ignore what they believe are red lines—the Russians believe are red lines, but are really not red lines—and get the Russians, uh, to capitulate at the negotiating table to Ukraine and the West's demands. That, that's the worldview here. And they think that, you know, our concerns are just not justified.
Uh, as you said before, they tend to think that the Article 5 guarantee, uh, that's embedded in NATO, makes it impossible for Russia to retaliate with conventional weapons against a European country. Not going to happen because of the Article 5 guarantee. Uh, and now you have all this transatlantic solidarity. Just listen to that, uh, Merritt's speech. He was talking about transatlantic solidarity. He was not just talking about the Europeans and the Ukrainians. He was talking about the Americans as well, uh, indirectly, of course. But he was saying, in effect, that the Americans, the Europeans, and the Ukrainians are all operating on the same page, and we now have the magic formula, right? We, we found it. It's not so much on the battlefield. This is my point to you about don't focus on tanks and artillery. That's not the key. It's drones.
And by the way, drones matter on the battlefield. Their view is that drones are the great equalizer on the battlefield, but they're really just the equalizer. Where the West and Ukraine win, um, is in the, uh, attacks on Mother Russia. And there we've done a lot of damage already, Danny. But you want to understand that we can really up the ante here. We can give the Ukrainians a lot more drones. Uh, we can give them increasingly sophisticated and deadly drones. We can provide them with all sorts of intelligence, and there's no end to how much damage we can do in Russia, and that will cause them to throw up their hands. This is the narrative, and you, of course, believe that this is delusional.
But >> no, I think it's potentially suicidal because we're saying that we want the Russians to act like we never would. That just because of some line somewhere or something on a document, on a piece of paper, that there might be some respect that we're going to allow a foreign country—nuclear power or an alliance—to, with impunity, just keep hitting American factories and whatever else, and nothing's going to happen. Uh, because to me, that is just almost shoving Vladimir Putin into where, if especially if what Ursuland said and mounts, and that they're actually going to do all this technology stuff to help more. Those factories have been named, by the way, by name by the Russians as targets, and it seems to me that we're just shoving Russia into a position to make them strike on these targets. And here, in fact, is what I said a minute ago: that we would let Vladimir Putin speak for himself. Here's what he recently had to say.
>> "The potential for conflict has risen significantly in a number of regions around the world, including in Eurasia. We see that if earlier NATO countries limited themselves to supporting the Kiev regime, which came to power through illegal armed means and a coup d'etatar, they are now openly saying in the West that they are preparing for war with us and are increasing their defense budgets. To justify this spending and the radical militarization of their states, NATO and European Union leaders continue, as before, to resort to false claims about an alleged military threat from Russia."
So, what I mean—maybe you've already answered this question—but, uh, how much further do you think that Putin is going to allow these kinds of strikes to keep hitting his country at the biggest cities: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vores, which apparently was an actual British Storm Shadow missile? So, they've gone back to that. How much longer will he go before he actually does something like what you've described?
>> Let me make a couple points here. Uh, would you start by saying, uh, Dimmitri Pescov, uh, just said recently—there was a big story in RT today about this—but Pescov said, and Pescov, uh, for viewers who are not familiar with his name, he's, uh, Putin's principal spokesman, but Pescov said that Russia's only ace in the hole at this point in time is its nuclear deterrent. Uh, and I thought it was very interesting that Pescov was talking about the importance of Russia's nuclear deterrent because I think in a very important way he's basically saying that it's—and, and this, of course, gets at the Caragonoff argument—it's the threat of using nuclear weapons or the actual use of nuclear weapons that probably is the only thing that can save the day for the Russians. Uh, so you just don't want to underestimate the extent to which the Russians understand, uh, that they are involved in mortal combat and that nuclear weapons are their ace in the hole. So, we just want to keep that in mind.
Now, with regard to Putin and how far he's willing to go, I think to some extent, Danny, a lot depends on what happens in the ground war. Uh, as I said to you, I think the Russians are clearly winning, and it looks like they're going to conquer all of the Donbass. Uh, they already have Lugansk, all of you Lugansk, and they will, I believe, have all of Donetsk, uh, by, uh, either the end of the summer or the early fall. Uh, so they're doing well, but nevertheless, the progress is slow. There's just no question about that.
And if you have progress that's slow on the battlefield and these, uh, drone campaign—this drone campaign—continues to ramp up, that could put Trump, uh, could put in a position where he feels compelled, uh, to do something that involves attacking into Europe sooner rather than later. However, if all of a sudden the Russians started winning, uh, big time on the battlefield in the next month, that would probably have an effect on how Putin thinks about the drone war. He may be willing, uh, to, uh, not, uh, act in a decisive way quickly on, uh, on that front. So, I, I think what happens on the battlefield is interrelated or is related to what happens, uh, uh, in the, uh, uh, in, in the drone war, the drone war and the in the war on the battlefield. They're related to each other.
Uh, but the bottom line here, and this is my final point, the bottom line is it's just very hard to tell. Uh, you know, you're sort of in the dark here. And that's what, in my opinion, makes it all so scary. Uh, if you knew exactly where the red line was, uh, then you can talk about marching up to the red line but not crossing it. But the point is, we don't know where Putin's red line is. It's quite clear from what Pescov said and from the clip that you played with Putin speaking that they are drawing a red line, that they are making it clear that enough is enough. But where exactly the red line is is hard to say, but it seems to me, just to repeat myself, we don't think there's a red line. We think we just push the Russians around.
>> Gary, I'm sorry, Gary. And I get you to scroll up a little bit on that, on that, so I can see a little bit more what's written under it there. Uh, because the, the, the phrasing you use here, to me, is really important: "Nuclear deterrence only force preventing global war." That, to my interpretation, my ears, seems like it's kind of something that Caragonov has said, that that is a way to prevent war. Not that it—because we've always think of that, that's like the last resort. That's like once, once we've got a big war, then it's going to go into nuclear, and then everybody's, you know, mad and all that. But he seems to be implying here that that is a nuclear deterrence and that they have to reestablish that, which sounds kind of like the Caragonov theory. What do you think?
>> I agree. I agree. I mean, he's not quite as clear as Caragonov is. So, you have to read a bit into it as you're doing and as I'm doing, but I don't think there's a lot of daylight between him and Caragonov. And you want to remember that Caragonov says very clearly that when he first articulated his view early in the war about using conventional weapons first, then nuclear weapons second, to, uh, establish red lines, that he was in a clear minority, that a lot of people thought that he was, uh, deranged in making this argument.
He now says that an overwhelming majority of Russian, uh, individuals who he interacts with—you know, people in the Russian foreign policy establishment—agree with him. And if you look at what Pascov said, if you look at what Putin said, uh, Medvev, uh, uh, I, I think there's just lots of evidence that we are playing with fire here.
And I, I, you know, just to go to the media for a second, what's amazing about what's going on with the American media is that the issue that you and I are talking about, which scares the living bejesus out of us, gets hardly any attention in the mainstream media, >> right?
It's not that it gets a little bit of attention. It gets any attention. Okay.
>> Yeah.
What gets all the attention? The argument that the Ukrainians have turned the tide. The Russians are on their back feet. You know, all we have to do is ramp up the pressure on them. We'll bring them to the negotiating table. You heard Marco Rubio in the clip that you played before. This is what you hear endlessly in the mainstream media. The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal are filled with articles about how the tide has turned, >> and, uh, and how we have this magic weapon now. Everybody is trumpeting, uh, the powerful and devastating effects of these drone attacks on Mother Russia, uh, and emphasizing that this is a good thing and this is working to Ukraine's advantage. It's working to the West's advantage. That's what you hear about.
>> Yeah. And I think this, if anything, just encourages the Ukrainians and Western leaders to go out and ramp up the attacks on Mother Russia. And what you and I are saying is, this is playing with fire. But not a lot of people seem to agree with.